veto players and referendums around the world

8/4/2019 Veto Players and Referendums Around the World

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VETO PLAYERS AND REFERENDUMS AROUND

THE WORLD

Simon Hug and George Tsebelis

ABSTRACT

The literature on referendums comes to con icting assessments: for some

authors referendums are equivalent to direct democracy, for others, a poor

and unfounded substitute. In addition, existing classications use very diverse

criteria, and theoretical models lead to different results depending on whether

the underlying assumptions reect a single- or multi-dimensional policy space:

single-dimensional models lead to specic policy predictions, while multi-

dimensional models typically identify paradoxes connected with referendums.

We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums that leads to generaliza-

tions of the single-dimensional models. This multi-dimensional model makes

predictions about how various provisions for referendums affect policy

stability and the relationship between voter preferences and policy outcomes.

To assess the relevance of these predictions we present information about

referendum procedures all around the world on the basis of our model. Linking

this information with existing empirical work on the effects of referendumssuggests that our theoretical predictions are largely borne out.

KEY WORDS . institutional analysis . referendums . veto players

No act of [representatives] can be law, unless it has been ratied by the people in person;

and without that ratication nothing is a law. (Rousseau, 1947: 85)

[W]e are deluding ourselves if we consider the referendum and the popular initiative of

legislation as modern equivalents and substitutes of direct democracy. (Sartori, 1962: 256)

If the people speak in meaningless tongues, they cannot utter the law that makes them

free. (Riker, 1982: 239)

Introduction

Institutional provisions for referendums are increasingly being added to new

constitutions (e.g. in Eastern Europe, see Auer and Bu tzer, 2001). More and

more important questions are decided by referendum (e.g. recent changes of

Journal of Theoretical Politics 14(4): 465515 Copyright & 2002 Sage Publications

09516928[2002/10]14:4; 465515; 027705 London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi

Simon Hug acknowledges the partial nancial support of the Swiss National Science Founda-

tion (Grants 8210046545 and 50040487882/1) and the research assistance of Anke Tresch.

George Tsebelis acknowledges support by the Russell Sage Foundation.
http://www.sagepublications.com/http://www.sagepublications.com/


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constitutions in Venezuela and Australia, ratication of international treaties

in the European Union, etc.). Increasingly scholars advocate greater use of

referendums (e.g. Budge, 1996; Zu rn, 1996; Abromeit, 1998; Ackerman,

1999; Schmitter, 2000; etc.). But in the theoretical literature Riker's (1982)

warning against populism together with recent work on `problems with

referendums' (e.g. Brams et al., 1997, 1998; Lacy and Niou, 2000), or the

`referendum paradox' (Nurmi, 1997a, b, 1998) still cast some doubt on the

usefulness of referendums. We argue that ultimately the difference in assess-

ments can be attributed to inadequate attention paid to the institutions

regulating referendums. More specically, scholars tend to neglect the

important question of who controls the referendum agenda. We argue that

this question is in fact separated into two parts: (1) who asks the question

and (2) who triggers a referendum.But the existing literature has a series of additional shortcomings. Some

authors classify referendums without paying attention to the strategic

choices of the different actors involved. The more theoretical studies come

to conicting conclusions depending on whether they assume that the under-

lying policy space is single-dimensional or has multiple dimensions. Single-

dimensional models lead invariably to sharp predictions of outcomes,

while multi-dimensional models underline possible paradoxes. In this respect

the referendum models mirror the rest of the spatial voting literature which

leads to median voter results in single-dimensional models and in chaos whenmore dimensions are introduced. This discrepancy is particularly damaging

to the study of referendums, because actual referendums sometimes address

a simple question, in which case a single-dimensional model is a reasonable

approximation, while at other times they are used to ratify whole constitu-

tions, in which case single-dimensional models are inadequate.

We present a multi-dimensional model of referendums on the basis of veto

player theory (Tsebelis, 1995a, 1999, 2000, 2002). According to this theory

veto players are actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the

legislative status quo. Every government of a country represents a certainconguration of veto players.1 As the number of these actors and the ideo-

logical distances among them increase, a signicant change in the status

quo becomes more difcult (policy stability increases). The possibility of a

referendum introduces one additional veto player in each country: the popu-

lation. As a result, it moves policy outcomes closer to the preferences of

the median voter (if such a voter exists), but, provided that the remaining

466 JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS 14(4)

1. See Tsebelis (2002) on how to identify and count veto-players as a function of the prevail-

ing institutions (presidential or parliamentary regimes, uni-cameral or multi-cameral legislatures,

required simple or qualied majorities) and the prevailing political game (number of parties in

government, ideological distances among them).


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veto players keep their powers, it also makes signicant policy changes more

difcult.2 These are the similarities of all referendums. The differences among

them stem from institutional differences about who asks the question and

who triggers a referendum. We explain the signicance of these differences

and, on the basis of them, examine the institutional details of referendums

all around the world. In particular, we argue that if the same actor (whether

it is an existing veto player or not) controls both the formulation of the ques-

tion and the triggering of the referendum, other veto players lose their ability

to veto outcomes and hence the number of veto players actually decreases.

With our model we address the shortcomings in the different streams of

the referendum literature: unlike the conictual conclusions of single- and

multi-dimensional models in the theoretical literature, we analyze referen-

dums exactly the same way whether the underlying space has a single ormultiple dimensions; we distinguish referendums on the basis of the strategic

choices of the actors involved; we do so by paying attention to the institu-

tions regulating referendums; nally, we come to conclusions consistent

with the empirical evidence on the effects of referendums.

The paper is organized in ve sections. Section I reviews the different

approaches in the literature. We show that each one of these approaches

has serious shortcomings on the theoretical or the empirical level. Section

II introduces a model of referendums on the basis of veto player theory.

This model compares the institutions of a representative democracy and arepresentative democracy combined with referendums. Section III develops

the model further and points out the differences between referendums

depending on who is empowered to ask the question and who triggers a

referendum. On the basis of this classication, we discuss the consequences

of various types of referendums. Section IV uses the veto players model to

study the institutions of referendums around the world. In Section V we

show how well existing empirical evidence resonates with the theoretical

claims we advance. The conclusion suggests avenues for further research.

I. Different Literatures on Referendums

The literature on referendums can be subdivided in three groups. The rst

is empirical and often presents classications of the institutions allowing

citizens a direct say on policies. Each of these classications emphasizes

particular aspects of the referendum process, but most are disconnected

from any theoretical framework. The other two groups consist of theoretical

HUG & TSEBELIS: VETO-PLAYERS & REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 467

2. We will show later that our argument holds even in multi-dimensional spaces where such a

median rarely exists.


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models that examine referendums as games among different actors. How-

ever, the rst of these two groups assumes that the questions asked can be

represented on a single dimension and as a result the outcomes of different

procedures can be calculated and identied, while in the second group the

multi-dimensionality assumption leads to a series of paradoxical and disturb-

ing results.

Classications

At the most basic level authors often distinguish between referendum and

initiative (e.g. Ranney, 1978: 69; Magleby, 1984; Cronin, 1989). The refer-

endum in this crude distinction is dened as a vote on a measure adopted

by parliament. The initiative, however, allows citizens to propose a ballotmeasure, which may be adopted in a popular vote. Often, authors add a

second criterion distinguishing whether the measure appearing on the

ballot is a constitutional amendment or a statute or law (e.g. Ranney,

1978: 69). These distinctions between two basic forms of referendums are

questioned in part by authors like Smith (1976), who rely on the functional

properties of the referendum device. Smith (1976) argues that referendums

can either be pro- or anti-hegemonic, and either controlled or uncontrolled.3

Combining these two criteria, Smith (1976) arrives at a fourfold classication

to which he adds an additional residual category, namely that of non-functional referendums, dened largely by their non-signicance. This classi-

cation, obviously, does not only rely on institutional properties of the

various referendum devices, but considers mostly contextual elements.

A classication based much more heavily on institutional characteristics

appears in Suksi (1993: 28f). This author proposes four dichotomous criteria

to distinguish among different institutional provisions allowing for referen-

dums. First he distinguishes between referendums that are mandatory and

facultative. The second criterion discriminates between decisive and con-

sultative. The third one distinguishes between pre-regulated and non-pre-regulated referendums, while the last one concerns whether citizens play an

active or passive role in launching a referendum. The combination of these

four dichotomies leads to a classication with (theoretically) 16 possible

types, several of which, however, are largely irrelevant since they do not

appear in reality.

In an attempt resembling Smith's (1976) classication, Hamon (1995) pro-

poses several classications emphasizing the control various actors have over

the referendum process. The most interesting aspect of his classication

effort is a simple table (Hamon, 1995: 24) showing possible combinations


3. Smith (1976) uses referendums as a generic term, also comprising initiatives.


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between the author of a measure appearing on the ballot and the actor

triggering the referendum process. Both sets of actors comprise parliament,

government, the head of the state, parliamentary opposition and the citizens.

While some combinations do not exist in reality, the classication neverthe-

less goes a long way in emphasizing the difference between triggering a refer-

endum and formulating the question.

Uleri (1996) proposes a largely inductive classication relying on six

dichotomous criteria, which in part resembles the ones proposed by Suksi

(1993). Uleri (1996) arrives, however, only at a fourfold typology, compris-

ing decision-promoting initiative, decision-controlling initiative, decision-

promoting referendum and decision-controlling referendum. Among the

latter he distinguishes between rejective and abrogative votes. This classica-

tion attempt is picked up by Seta la (1999) and combined with some of Suksi's(1993) criteria. Mueller (1996: 177f ) distinguishes among four types of refer-

endums, namely the constitutionally mandated referendum, the government-

initiated referendum, the citizen initiated veto and the citizen initiative. Hug

(1999) derives an almost identical classication by employing two criteria

proposed by Suksi (1993), namely whether a referendum is required or not

and whether voters are actively involved or not in triggering a referendum.

For the non-required referendums, which are launched actively by the

citizens, however, he introduces as an additional distinction the criterion of

whether the ballot measure is proposed by the government or anotheractor. These latter two classications are almost identical, since both authors

explore the consequences of these four types of referendums in a strategic

context. In such a strategic context it is of prime importance to know who

triggers the referendum and who detains the agenda-setting power.

Theoretical One-dimensional Models

The last two classications also tie in very closely with existing theoreticalmodels of referendums. While early models in the public choice tradition

simply presumed that referendums would correct any type of rent-seeking

behavior of government (see Mueller [1979] for a discussion of this litera-

ture), Romer and Rosenthal (1978, 1979) studying different types of

school-bond referendums and demonstrated how required referendums

may lead to policy outcomes quite far away from the one preferred by voters.

Extending Romer and Rosenthal's (1978, 1979) work, Steunenberg (1992)

proposes a generalization of these insights over a whole set of possible insti-

tutions for policy-making in a single dimension. Gerber (1996) presents amodel more closely reecting the initiative process. However, this earlier

work is limited in two ways, namely by assuming rst complete and perfect

information for all actors involved in the decision-making process and,



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second, that the policy to be decided can be represented in a one-dimensional

policy space.

Relying on more recent work in the agenda-setting literature, several

authors relaxed the rst limitation by assuming some informational asym-

metry among the actors involved. Lupia (1992, 1994) focuses on the limited

information voters may have about ballot proposals and nds that endorse-

ments by interest groups may provide helpful decision cues.4 Matsusaka and

McCarty (2001) propose a model of the initiative process where both the

legislature and an interest group fail to know the voters' exact preferences.

They nd that for most preferences the initiative process allows for policies

more closely aligned with the voters' wishes. A similar model of the initiative

process appears in Besley and Coate (2001). While they consider two policy

issues that have to be decided, in equilibrium only one of them appears on theballot, while the other is resolved in the legislature. Hence, despite the two

issues, voting on the ballot proposal is represented on a single dimension,

and the two authors also nd that the voters' wishes are more closely

reected in policy outcomes if initiatives are possible. Moser's (1996)

incomplete information model of the popular referendum process comes to

a similar conclusion. Hug (1999) explores the effect of incomplete informa-

tion for four types of referendums and nds that the effects of these institu-

tions differ. In general, however, for most preference proles voters (i.e. the

median voter) are better off having referendums at their disposal which theymay trigger themselves or which are required. While these theoretical models

relax the complete information assumption of previous models, they do not

question the assumption of a single-dimensional space.

Theoretical Multi-dimensional Models

The multi-dimensionality of policy decisions in referendums appeared

much more strongly in work relying on social-choice-theoretic approaches.

McKelvey (1976) and Schoeld (1978) demonstrated the importance ofagenda-setting. In their analysis the agenda-setter could produce literally

any outcome by sequencing appropriately the questions and exploiting the

different preferences among the different individual actors. Based on their

ndings Riker (1982) argued strongly against the existence of a Rousseauean

`general will' in multi-dimensional policy spaces.

Related to these theoretical models is recent work on some paradoxes

which may occur in referendum voting, because either policies are multi-

dimensional or voters vote on various non-separable proposals at the same


4. Bowler and Donovan (1998) provide persuasive empirical tests of these implications as well

as others in the context of referendum voting in the United States.


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time. Brams et al. (1997, 1998) and Saari and Sieberg (2001) focus on the

problem of multiple measures appearing on the same ballot. While they

are concerned with the fact that possibly no voter has voted for the winning

`combination', Lacy and Niou (2000) explore this problem from the angle of

non-separable preferences. Provided that various ballot measures are related,

voters may have preferences over a particular ballot measure which are

dependent on the outcome of another ballot measure. But since voting

occurs simultaneously over all ballot measures at the same time, voters

with non-separable preferences cannot condition their vote on the outcome

of another ballot measure. Lacy and Niou (2000) suggest that referendums

are not very good at resolving the problems stemming from non-separable

preferences and suggest that legislatures deal more effectively with these

issues. Hence, they advocate the use of normal legislative procedures forissues where voters may have non-separable preferences. Brams et al.

(1997, 1998), however, suggest using approval voting to overcome the

problems of multiple ballot measures.

Nurmi's (1997a, b, 1998) work relates much more strongly with social

choice theory and suggests a series of paradoxes that may appear in referen-

dums. While this theoretical and empirical work related to social choice

emphasizes important problems of referendums, it is useful to take a step

back. Work in this tradition assumes well-behaved preferences over indi-

vidual proposals while emphasizing that these preferences may be non-separable from those on other proposals. In addition, this work, with the

exception of Nurmi (1997a, b, 1998) does not consider how referendums

interact with representative democracy. In conclusion, the disorderly image

of positive and negative results nding also reection in our quotes at the

beginning of our paper persists when one focuses on the accounts in

the literature. Multiple criteria and different classications characterize the

more empirically oriented literature, while specic outcomes or paradoxes

dominate the more theoretical approaches. Our goal is to provide a unied

framework for the study of referendums and to demonstrate two points.First we show that the actual provisions prevailing around the world can

be understood on the basis of our framework and, second, we demonstrate

that the results generated by empirical analyses are congruent with the expec-

tations generated by our theory.

II. Veto players, Direct and Mediated Democracy

Our analysis of the institutional frameworks of referendums is based on theconcept of `veto players' and expands on the work of Tsebelis (1995a, b,

1999, 2000, 2002). According to Tsebelis (1995a) a veto player is an indi-

vidual or collective player whose agreement is required for a change of the



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status quo. This denition can be applied to all countries and allows for iden-

tifying the actors involved in policy-making whether they are individual (like

Presidents with the power to veto legislation) or collective (governments, one

or both chambers of parliament, parties) actors. Tsebelis (1995b) demon-

strates that in countries under a parliamentary regime the actual veto players

are most of the time the parties in government.5 Tsebelis demonstrates both

theoretically (Tsebelis, 1995a, 2002) and empirically (1999, 2002) that the

number of veto players and the ideological distances among them make

changes to the status quo more difcult. In addition, he points out (2000)

how the interactions in referendums can be understood on the basis of the

veto player framework.

What difference does it make if outcomes are selected directly by the

people or indirectly by the people's representatives in parliament? By deni-tion outcomes selected by parliament will be preferred over the status quo by

a majority in parliament, while outcomes selected by a referendum will be

preferred by a majority of the voters. In a single dimension the outcome

will be determined by the corresponding median voter, but in multiple

dimensions such a median voter very rarely exists. The number of policy

dimensions involved in a referendum is an open question. Sometimes multi-

ple issues are lumped together; at other times efforts are made to separate

issues and decide them one at a time. For example, on the one hand, refer-

endums are sometimes used to approve (or disapprove) whole constitutions;on the other hand, the Italian Constitutional Court decided to exclude a

popular proposal on the basis that it contained `such a plurality of hetero-

geneous demands that there was a lack of a rational, unitary matrix that

would bring it under the logic of Article 75 of the Constitution' (quoted in

Bogdanor, 1994: 634).

This section will rst make the argument that in our model (in sharp con-

trast with the literature that we reviewed) the number of underlying dimen-

sions makes very little difference. The second issue that we will address is

that the preferences of such an `as if' median voter may be signicantlydifferent from the policy selected by existing veto players.

Median and `As If' Median Voter Preferences in Referendums

If we consider a group of people voting by majority rule whether to accept

a proposal or reject it (and keep the existing status quo (SQ)), the set of


5. However, there are exceptions, for example if the President of the Republic has veto power

over legislation (Portugal) or ordinances (France), or in bicameral systems, if the upper cham-

ber's approval is required and a different majority controls this chamber (Germany some of

the time).


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outcomes that can defeat the SQ form the win-set of the status quo: W(SQ).

Social choice literature (Ferejohn et al., 1984) has identied an area within

which W(SQ) is located. This area is a circle centrally located within the

group of voters. More precisely, Ferejohn et al. make the assumption that

voters' preferences are represented by points in space and each voter is

indifferent between two alternatives equal distance from their ideal point

(Euclidean preferences); they draw all the `median' lines within the voter

population.6 They then consider the smallest circle intersecting all these

lines and call it the `yolk'. If the yolk has center Y and radius r, and the

segment SQY has length d, they show that W(SQ) is included in a circle

(Y, d 2r), and includes a circle (Y, d 2r).7

We will take this nding as the departing point in our analysis.8 As a result,

the boundaries of the win-set of the status quo are located between twocircles; both of them with center Y, one with radius (d 2r) and the other

with radius (d 2r). It has also been shown (with computer simulations)

that on average the size of the radius of the yolk (r) decreases as the

number of voters increases (Koehler, 1990).9 Consequently, for the millions

of people who are the potential participants in a referendum, in most

countries or states r is (most of the time) exceptionally small. As a result,

the win-set of the status quo is contained between two circles that differ

little from each other: 4r, when r becomes smaller and smaller.

What the previous two paragraphs indicate is that for a large population,the median voter may not exist but all median lines pass through a very small

area (of radius r), so an `as if' median can be very well approximated by the

center Yof the yolk of the population. In addition, the win-set of the status

quo for such a large population is also very well approximated by a circle

with radius d. In other words, the multiplicity of voters simplies rather

than complicates the problem of identication of the median voter and the

win-set of the status quo.

Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the argument. The yolk of

the population is very small and has center Y. The win-set of a point thathas distance dfrom Yis the shaded area in the gure, and is located between

the two circles with radii (d 2r) and (d 2r), so it can be approximated by

the circle (Y, d).


6. Median lines have on both sides of them majorities of voters (including the points on

them).

7. Ifd>

2r

; otherwise such a circle does not exist.8. The interested reader can nd a simple proof of these statements in Miller et al. (1989).

9. We underline `on the average' because one can nd counterexamples. For example, if the

voting population has only three distinct preferences, then there is no difference between such a

population and a three-member voting body.


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Representative Democracy

Consider a country with ve parliamentary parties, A, B, C, D and E, three of

which are required to form a parliamentary majority (a simple example of

that would be if each one of them had 20 percent of the seats). Where

would a parliamentary decision be located? If we know nothing about the

parliament's decision-making except that it requires a simple majority

(think of a decision taken in a presidential system where coalitions depend

on the issue under consideration), then we have to locate the intersections

of any three of the circles with centers A, B, C, D and E. We have shadedthese areas in Figure 2. If we know some additional information about

parliament's decision-making we can incorporate it in the calculations, and

identify the win-set of the status quo more accurately. For example, if we

know the parties that form the government of a parliamentary system, we

will identify the win-set of the status quo by considering each one of them

as a veto player and nding the intersection of their win-sets. Figure 2 indi-

cates with dark shade the area where the outcome will be located if the parties

forming the government are A, B and C in a parliamentary system govern-

ment (where coalitions are, by denition, stable). In the remainder of thepaper, when we use the term `parliamentary' we will imply a system with

stable majorities, while when we use the term `presidential' we will imply


Figure 1. Win-set of a Large Group of Voters


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the possibility of different coalitions depending on the issue. What happens if

representative democracy and referendums are combined?

Representative Democracy and Referendums

Denmark provides some interesting examples of the differences between

the outcomes from representative democracy and referendums. As Vernon

Bogdanor (1994: 72) puts it:

It may seem a paradox that the Single European Act, which could not have gained a

majority in the Folketing, received a majority in the country, while Maastricht, which

enjoyed the support of parties with 80 percent of the seats in the Folketing, was rejectedby the voters in 1992.

Figure 3 helps us think the potential paradox through.


Figure 2. Win-set of Status Quo in Representative Democracy


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There is no reason to believe that the two processes (representative democ-

racy and referendum) will lead to the same outcome. In fact, we do not even

know that the preferences of the public will be centrally located within the

preferences of the parties. Even the most pure proportional representation

systems like Israel or The Netherlands cannot guarantee representation for

minorities of 0.5 percent, for example. Systems with higher thresholds like

Sweden's 4 percent or Germany's 5 percent exclude many more. In addition,

the existence of electoral districts may create serious differences between the

preferences of the voters and their representatives.10 Finally, parliamentary

institutions (like committees, qualied majorities) may also create discrepan-

cies between popular preferences and parliamentary outcomes (see Tsebelis,

2002).


Figure 3. Difference of Results Between Direct and Representative Democracy

10. The literature on referendum paradox (Nurmi, 1998: 3367) shows one mechanism

generating such a discrepancy.


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In Figure 3 we present how a referendum interacts with the parliamentary

arena. In order to capture the differences in preferences between the people

and their representatives we represent the center of the yolk Y H generated

by the preferences of the people not in the center of the parties' preferences.

On the basis of the analysis for median voter preferences, the outcome of a

referendum will be located inside the hatched area called W H (SQ). On the

basis of the analysis for representative democracies, the outcome of a presi-

dential system would be anywhere in the area W(SQ), while the outcome of a

parliamentary system with parties A, B and C in government would be

located in the very dark area. One can see that the possible solutions under

representative democracy and referendums have several points in common,

but the preferences of the population and the political parties do not neces-

sarily coincide. This is only part of the story because there is no guaranteethat the coalition prevailing among the voters would be politically the

same as the coalition prevailing in parliament. For example, the parlia-

mentary government A, B, C would produce an outcome located inside the

very dark area, while the outcome of a referendum could be anywhere

inside the hatched area in Figure 3.

If a parliamentary decision has to be ratied by the population (as is

frequently the case in constitutional matters) then the outcome has to be

located in the intersection of the parliamentary and the popular win-sets.

In other words, referendums create one additional veto player in thedecision-making process: the people. There are two results from this introduc-

tion of a new veto player: rst, it becomes more difcult to change the status

quo (Tsebelis, 1995a). Second, the nal outcomes will approximate the prefer-

ences of the `as if' median voter better when the possibility of a referendum

exists (whether the actual decision is made by a referendum or not).11 But

the institutions that regulate referendums affect both of these results.

III. Institutions Regulating Referendums

From the perspective of the veto player theory two main criteria are funda-

mental. First, we have to know who may trigger the process of a referendum.

Second, we need to know who is able to frame the question of the popular

vote. These two crucial questions underlie, in part, some of the classications

discussed earlier, but they are seldom pursued to their ultimate conclusions.

Stating these questions clearly and using them as the main criteria for a

classication of different institutional provisions for referendums has the


11. Gerber and Hug (2001) discuss in detail these direct and indirect policy effects of institu-

tional provisions allowing for referendums.


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additional advantage of allowing theoretical claims on referendums to be

easily tied into insights gained about representative democracy from veto

player theory.

Figure 4 employs these two basic questions to derive a fourfold classica-

tion which comes very close to the ones proposed by Mueller (1996) and Hug

(1999). There are some slight differences. Mueller and Hug dene distinctions

among referendums on the basis of what government and opposition do

though these concepts may not be well dened in presidential systems.

Here we make distinctions on the basis of the behavior of actors identiable

in every political system: veto players and non-veto players.12 This allows us

to make a much clearer distinction with respect to the two main criteria. How

these criteria are used is best presented in a treelike fashion in Figure 4. First,


Figure 4. Questions Dening Different Categories of Referendums

12. There is an additional minor distinction, namely that even in parliamentary systems

`government' and `veto-players' are not always identical (see footnote 6).


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we have to distinguish between referendums that are required and those that

are not. Obviously, in the former case the question of who triggers the refer-

endum process is irrelevant. Non-required referendums come in different

forms and shapes and distinguish themselves by the two criteria. With respect

to the question of who decides to trigger a referendum, two possibilities have

to be taken into consideration. First, a veto player in the normal legislative

arena might trigger a referendum. Second, an actor who is not a veto

player in the representative system might trigger a referendum: popular

vetoes and initiatives are prime examples. When a non-veto player triggers

a referendum the crucial question becomes who asks the question. In the

Italian case the question is asked by parliament, since referendums may

only strike existing laws (or parts thereof) from the books. In other cases,

an actor who does not have veto player status in the legislative arena mayask the question. Popular initiatives, for instance in the States of the USA

or in Switzerland, are the main examples. This much more ne-grained

classication into four major types allows a very detailed analysis of the

policy consequences of the various types of referendums. We discuss these

policy effects for each referendum separately.

Required Referendums

At the most basic level required referendums introduce an additional vetoplayer. Apart from the veto players whose support is normally necessary

to change policies, required referendums add the hurdle of the support of

the voters. For policies that are the object of required referendums, e.g. con-

stitutional amendments in many countries or changes in the voting age in

Denmark (see Table 1), the status quo can only be changed if the change is

preferred by the new veto player, namely the voters. Thus, any new policy

has to belong to the win-set of the status quo as dened by the voters' prefer-

ences. In most cases this win-set corresponds to the set of policies that is pre-

ferred by a simple majority of the voters to the status quo. Often, however,provisions for required referendums specify qualied majorities.13 The


13. For instance in the federal system of Switzerland constitutional changes require a major-

ity not only among the voters, but also among the cantons which make up the federation. In

Italy, however, a referendum outcome is only valid if turnout exceeds 50 percent. In Denmark,

a rejection of a bill transferring some aspects of national sovereignty to an international organi-

zation is only valid if at least 30 percent of the voters having participated at the last election reject

the bill. If less than this minimal percentage of votes against a proposal it is deemed to beaccepted by the voters. This almost resembles the rules under which Napoleon held the rst

national referendum in Switzerland on adopting a new constitution for the Helvetic Republic.

Although roughly 56 percent of the voters rejected the new constitution Napoleon declared it

adopted, since the citizens having failed to vote were obviously in favor (Mo ckli, 1994: 60).


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model can easily accommodate such differences in majority requirements

(e.g. Tsebelis, 2002). They simply affect the nature of the veto player intro-

duced by referendums. In countries with no turnout criterion the veto

player is simply formed by the collectivity of participating voters. In

countries with a turnout requirement, some form of qualied majority of

voters makes the decision. Despite these considerable variations we limit our-

selves in this paper to explore the consequences of referendums of various

types under the assumption of simple majority requirements. Under this

assumption our model predicts that policies in issue areas subject to required

referendums will belong to the intersection of the parliamentary win-set

(W(SQ) in Figure 3) and the voters' win-set (W H(SQ) in Figure 3). Figure 3

illustrates that a majority of voters will not be worse off due to required

referendums, because required referendums rule out elements of the parlia-mentary win-set that are worse than the status quo for a majority of

voters.

Veto player Referendums

From the previous discussion it becomes clear that only under extremely rare

conditions would the possible outcomes of the two processes (the win-sets of

representative democracy and referendums) be identical. In terms of actualoutcomes, they can be identical even when the win-sets differ, or different

even when the win-sets are the same. This obviously gives considerable

leeway to the veto player who may trigger a referendum, and even more so

if this veto player may also formulate the referendum question. We rst

consider veto player referendums in which a veto player may trigger a refer-

endum, but the normal legislative procedures leads to the formulation of the

ballot question. Then we move on to the case where the same veto player

formulates the question and triggers the referendum.

Let us focus on Figure 3 and see under what conditions different vetoplayers actually would call for a referendum. In a purely representative

system the policy outcome would belong to the win-set of the status quo

W(SQ). But any policy not belonging to W H (SQ), the voters' win-set of the

status quo is open for a referendum challenge. In order to simplify our

calculations, let us assume that a referendum has no political costs for the

agenda-setter. Obviously, this is an incorrect assumption, but one can

address it easily by adding these costs in the calculations. For instance, if

the legislative process led to an outcome in the small petal of the win-set to

the lower right, most likely B, but certainly C would trigger a referendumwhich would result in the rejection of the new policy by the voters. Thus if

B and C are veto players and can trigger a referendum, the referendum

threat will lead to the adoption of a policy in the intersection of the two



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win-sets W(SQ) and W H (SQ).14 For the case in which the veto player triggers

a referendum and asks the question we will consider the two different cases of

`parliamentary' and `presidential' systems (stable coalition of parties A, B

and C in the rst case and any coalition of three of A, B, C, D and E in

the second). In each of these cases we consider two possible agenda-setters:

party A and party E (the rst is part of the parliamentary system govern-

ment, the second is not).15

Under complete information the referendum agenda-setter is guaranteed

to get his/her most preferred point from the popular win-set of the status

quo (W H (SQ) in the picture).16 Given that both A and E are located outside

W H (SQ) they can achieve the points AH and EH respectively when they control

the referendum agenda. The question is: Can indirect democracy offer to the

referendum agenda-setters a more attractive alternative? In order to answerthis question we have to calculate the win-set of these two points W(A H) (see

Figure 5) and W(E H) (see Figure 6).

Figure 5 presents exactly the same conguration of players as Figure 3 and

identies the point AH, which is the best outcome the referendum agenda-

setter can achieve (AH is the intersection of the line AY H) with the circle

(center Y H, radius jYH SQj). Figure 5 also identies the win-set of AH instead

of W(SQ), since player A can introduce a referendum and obtain AH as the

outcome. Out of this win-set A will consider only the points included in

the circle (A, AAH

), and trigger a referendum for any point further awaythan AH. There is only one possible coalition that can approve points inside

the (A, AA') circle: A, D and E. Consequently A has to select this coalition

in order to get an outcome which is preferred over A H (preferably A?). In our

idealized `presidential' system this is what will happen. In the case of a

`parliamentary' system with A, B and C in government the situation is

more complicated. Note that there is no point that all three parties A, B

and C prefer to AH because AH is in the unanimity core of A, B and C.


14. If B and C are not veto-players who can trigger a referendum, for instance if A, D, E form

a coalition, then the outcome in the small petal of the win-set to the lower right will not be chal-

lenged in a referendum. Since this scenario is only possible in a popular veto, we will cover it

later.

15. We consider that agenda-setting belongs to single parties, because then it is easy to iden-

tify the proposal that they will make. If several parties (say `the government') control the refer-

endum agenda they will have to negotiate among them what proposal they will make. We have

nothing to say about these negotiations, except that feasible outcomes have to be within W H(SQ).

Note also that E is not a veto-player. We include this counterfactual case (see Figure 6) in order

to show the underlying strategic calculations under all possible congurations, whether they existin actual political systems or not.

16. In the absence of complete information such precise calculations are impossible. Actors

will select points that they think are inside WH(SQ) but they may be wrong in which case the

voters will reject the proposal.


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A has to choose between keeping the government in place or leading a

government to resign. Similarly, parties B and C may offer to approve out-

come AH and avoid a referendum, or they might prefer to delegate their dis-

agreement to a referendum. These calculations lead to three possible

outcomes: (1) government ABC remains in power and adopts AH without a

referendum; (2) government ABC remains in power and AH

is adopted byreferendum; (3) the government resigns, and is replaced by another coalition

which selects a feasible point from W(AH).


Figure 5. Possible Outcomes When A Controls the Referendum Agenda


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Figure 6 presents exactly the same conguration of players as before, but

assumes that player E can introduce a referendum, so identies the win-set of

point E H instead of SQ. Out of this win-set only the points included in the

circle (E, EE H) can be considered, because E would prefer to trigger a refer-

endum than to accept a point further away than E H. There are three possible

coalitions that can approve points inside the (E, EE H) circle: (ABE), (ADE),

and (CDE). Consequently E has to select one of the available coalitions. In

the case that any coalition is possible (the `presidential' system), E will select

his own ideal point supported by (ADE). In the counterfactual case of a

`parliamentary' system with (ABC) in government the situation would be

more complicated. E could use his/her advantage of referendum agenda-

setting to try to negotiate a different government: indeed, players A, D and E

may prefer a new coalition government. If the parties in government want tostick together, E will trigger a referendum and the government will lose.

In all these calculations some previous existing veto players lose their

ability to participate in political decision-making. Instead of calculating

W(SQ) we were basing our calculations on what the referendum agenda-

setter could obtain (points AH or E H). In addition, we saw that a presidential

system, where parties can shift coalitions on the basis of the subject matter

under consideration, was a more exible system than a parliamentary one,

where the existing government coalition was unable to adapt to the new

policy environment generated by the referendum not only when a non-vetoplayer controlled the agenda (case of E being the agenda-setter), but also

when agenda-setting belonged to an existing veto player (the case of A). A

parliamentary system can produce similar outcomes by delegating a political

issue to a referendum and leaving it outside the political conict of the main

parties. For example, in the UK the referendum on participation in the EU

had this special treatment because both parties were divided and could not

handle the issue without serious damage to their unity (Bogdanor, 1994).

Given these calculations, strategically thinking parties in the legislature

(particularly if, for some reason, they want to avoid a referendum) canassure the referendum agenda-setter that they will do anything in their

power to make the legislative process end up in an area that is at least as

good for him/her as the result of a referendum. These mental experiments

lead to the following conclusions. First, the position of referendum

agenda-setter translates into signicant policy advantages: if a veto player

controls the referendum agenda, s/he cancels other veto players as such.

This is a very different analysis than the one presented by referendum advo-

cates who consider referendums the expression of the will of the people (see

earlier quote by Rousseau). Second (and this is a consequence of the rst),the legislative outcomes of representative democracy are altered if referen-

dums are possible (Gerber and Hug, 2001).



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Figure 6. Possible Outcomes When E Controls the Referendum Agenda


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Popular Veto

If popular vetoes are possible, the outcome of the legislative process has to

lead to policies contained in the win-set of the status quo dened by the

voters. If this is not the case, an actor may trigger a referendum, providedthat s/he prefers the status quo to the policy adopted. In Figure 3 this

would suggest that in the parliamentary arena a policy is adopted which

lies outside W H(SQ), the set of policies the voters prefer to the status quo.

If an actor prefers the status quo to the proposed policy and has the capacity

to trigger a referendum, it can ensure that the outcome will remain the status

quo.

An illustrative example in this respect is the rst Danish Maastricht refer-

endum. While a large majority accepted the Maastricht Treaty in the ratica-

tion debates, a minority exceeding one-sixth of the members of parliamentvoted against the Maastricht Treaty and forced a referendum.17 This minor-

ity in parliament evidently preferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty.

As the rst referendum showed, a majority of the Danish voters also pre-

ferred the status quo to the Maastricht Treaty, suggesting that this treaty

was not in the win-set of the status quo.

Hence, popular vetoes allow non-veto players to force a return to the

status quo ante. How this status quo ante is dened may differ quite con-

siderably. For instance, in the rst Danish referendum on the Maastricht

Treaty referred to earlier the status quo corresponded simply to the arrange-ments under the Single European Act (SEA). In other cases the status quo

ante is more complex. For instance, the Italian referendum that struck any

reference to proportional representation from the electoral law for the

Senate (Newell and Bull, 1993), led to a situation where the senators had

to be elected by majority rule. In this case the status quo ante is quite differ-

ent from the one enforced by the Danish voters.

Popular InitiativeSo far, we have dealt with referendums where the question was asked by

existing veto players. Now we focus on referendums delegating agenda-

setting powers to the winner of a competitive process. If different groups can

become agenda-setters (both asking the question and triggering) of a referen-

dum by winning the right to present their question to the electorate (signature

collection) the legislative outcome will depend on how competitive the


17. This example also illustrates that members of parliaments may launch a popular veto

simply by voting against a bill. Provided that a rejection by a qualied minority automatically

triggers a referendum, the mechanisms of such votes correspond perfectly to popular vetoes

(Table 2).


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selection process is. If all potential players are included in the selection pro-

cess the only way that one can select proposals that will not only defeat the

status quo but other proposals as well is to make proposals that are sup-

ported by a majority, which means that the process will converge towards

the preferences of the `median voter'.

If some of the potential agenda-setters (particularly the ones with prefer-

ences similar to the `as if' median voter) are excluded from the process,

then the remaining ones may be more extreme and the legislative outcome

may be further away from the preferences of this voter. As a consequence

of this analysis, we have to focus on the process of selecting the agenda-

setter and assess how competitive it is. This selection obviously depends on

the criteria for the qualication of a ballot measure. These criteria comprise

the number of signatures of citizens required to qualify the ballot, how muchtime the qualication process can take, etc. All these elements thus create

hurdles a group has to cross. Gerber (1999) links this with the notion that

popular initiatives are launched either by broadly based citizen groups or

special interest groups. She argues that given the hurdles a group has to

cross to qualify a proposal, broadly based citizen groups, which will collect

signatures in part or mostly through volunteers, will mostly submit moderate

proposals. This simply because only moderate proposals, i.e. proposals close

to the center of the yolk, will nd sufcient support in the population to allow

volunteers to collect enough signatures. Special interest groups, which oftenrely on paid signature collectors, may make either moderate or more extreme

proposals, depending on how strongly they feel about a particular policy.

Consequently, if, for example, what is required is signature selection by

volunteers, then, demands that are supported by a majority of the population

are likely to get the volunteers necessary for their placement on the ballot,

and initiatives that do not have enough volunteers are unlikely to be sup-

ported by a majority. Consequently, such a process is a competitive one

and one can expect that the outcome will be located close to the preferences

of the median voter.If, however, what is requested for an issue to be placed on the ballot is

signature selection by remunerated professionals, it is possible that organized

groups with ideal points far away from the median voter are also able to

participate, in which case the selection process for agenda-setting may trans-

late into outcomes away from the preferences of the median voter. In all

cases, the selected outcome has to be closer to the preferences of the

median voter than the status quo.18 So, again, despite the fact that the `as


18. We have to repeat here that the radius of the yolk is assumed 0, otherwise the selection of

a point that is further from the center of the yolk than the status quo by up to 2r could not be

excluded.


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if' median voter makes the nal decision, the result depends crucially on the

preferences of the agenda-setter.

Institutions for Referendums and Their Policy Consequences

Our model makes predictions in two related domains. First, it shows how

referendums, by introducing a new veto player and possibly eliminating

existing ones, affect the potential for policy change. Second, it also shows

that referendums affect considerably policy outcomes, namely in such a

fashion that voters (i.e. the median voter) are never worse off having provi-

sions for referendums. Both predictions relate closely to the concerns in the

general literature on referendums. But our predictions are of a much sharpernature, provided we have information on the institutional rules regulating

referendums and, even more importantly, can determine clearly the identity

of the actors able to trigger a referendum and to ask the question. Thus,

before discussing in more detail our predictions and how they relate to

empirical studies on referendums, we provide information on provisions

for referendums in constitutions of countries around the world.

While various studies provide partial information about the institutions

allowing for referendums, none relate this information with the notion of

veto player which in our analysis is crucial for understanding the relationshipbetween referendums and representative democracy. For instance, Suksi

(1993) presents information for most countries on whether their constitu-

tions have provisions for referendums and classies them according to his

dichotomous criteria. Similarly, the Research and Documentation Centre

on Direct Democracy (http://c2d.unige.ch) provides information on the insti-

tutions present in the countries around the world. But both these sources do

not directly provide information on whether or not veto players trigger a

referendum and formulate the question, so they do not provide the crucial

information identied in Figure 4. We provide this information in Tables 1and 2 in the Appendix. In collecting this information we relied heavily on

Suksi's (1993) work, but updated it considerably, adapting it to the needs

of our classication presented in Figure 4. A major criterion in this classi-

cation distinguishes between required and non-required referendums. In

Table 1 we list all countries that have provisions for required referendums

and explain the issues subject to such referendums as well as the date of

the constitution consulted.19


19. Suksi (1993: 138, 142) nds that in 56 out of his 160 analyzed constitutions there appear

references to referendums on constitutional amendments. Among them 32 explicitly refer to

required referendums for constitutional changes. Six other constitutions introduce a required

referendum for international treaties, namely Congo, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Singapore, and


24/52

Overall we identify 54 constitutions containing provisions for required

referendums. The number of constitutions allowing for non-required referen-

dums (Table 2) is slightly smaller (47). For all of these 47 countries we pro-

vide detailed information on who may trigger a referendum and the identity

of the actors who ask the question.20 We use this information to determine

whether a veto player or a non-veto player may trigger a referendum and for-

mulate the question to be submitted to the voters. As our theoretical model

clearly indicates, it is this information which is crucial to assess the effect of

institutions allowing for referendums.21 Table 2 illustrates the wide variety

that exists in the institutional provisions allowing for non-required referen-

dums. Predominantly, we nd that existing veto players may trigger a refer-

endum and retain absolute control over the agenda. Only a few constitutions

contain provisions for popular vetoes or popular initiatives.The information contained in Tables 1 and 2, combined with the insights

from our model allow us to qualify claims prevalent in the literature on refer-

endums which discuss the policy and stability-inducing effects of referen-

dums. With respect to the stability-inducing effects of referendums, the

literature is replete with examples and discussions. Neidhart (1970), for

instance, discusses in detail the case of Switzerland, for which he argues

that the popular veto has made policy changes very difcult. Cronin (1989:

222), however, suggests that `direct democracy devices . . . have been an occa-

sional remedy, and generally a moderate remedy, for legislative lethargy . . .'.Reviewing the evidence of whether referendums have a conservative bias,

Gallagher (1996: 237) comes to the conclusion that there is no clear evidence

in support of this view nor its counterpart.

These differences in assessment relate directly to the ndings based on our

model. Generally speaking, referendums introduce an additional veto player

into the political game and thus diminish the potential for policy change.

While this stability enhancing effect is present in all types of referendums


Zaire (Suksi, 1993: 143). For each of these countries we consulted the most recent constitution

and report the detailed procedures that lead to a required referendum in Table 1. Given that

countries in Eastern and Central Europe (e.g. Lesage, 1995; Auer and Bu tzer, 2001) adopted

new constitutions in the 1990s, often with provisions for referendums, we also systematically

consulted these constitutions and list provisions for required referendums in these countries in

Table 1.

20. Again, we used Suksi's (1993) work to identify all countries that had non-required refer-

endums according to the constitutions he consulted. In addition, we checked all constitutions of

countries from Eastern and Central Europe to determine whether they had provisions for non-

required referendums. For all these countries we determined the relevant articles in the constitu-tion to determine the exact procedures for holding such referendums.

21. While several other sources also provide lists of provisions allowing for referendums,

none of them identies the actor triggering a referendum and formulating the question for the

voters in terms of veto-players.


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of our classication (Figure 4), our model also identies the cases that lead to

the elimination of veto players: if the same player (whether an existing veto

player (veto player referendums) or not (popular initiatives)) controls both

triggering and asking the question. First, in a veto player referendum, if a

subset of the normal legislative veto players can both trigger a referendum

and ask the question, then this cancels out the remaining veto players in

the legislative arena (other parties in government). An example for this

type of referendum is the provision of Belarus' constitution allowing the

President to trigger a referendum and to ask any question. The effect of

such powers clearly transpired in the referendums in 1996 in which President

Lukashenka broke a stalemate with parliament (Stone, 1997).22 Proposals

for increasing the president's powers would never have been passed in parlia-

ment. But Lukashenka appealed over the heads of the parliament to theBelarusian voters and changed policy in an area where representative democ-

racy would not have produced any change.

The other type of referendum eliminating existing veto players, and thus

not necessarily decreasing the potential for policy change, is the popular

initiative. Again, this comes about because the power to set the agenda in

these referendums is vested in an actor who is not a veto player in the

normal legislative game. If citizens can submit their own policy proposals

and trigger a referendum, they cancel out the powers of existing veto players.

Thus, countries having provisions allowing for the popular initiative may seethe potential for policy change actually increase. Given that this increase

comes about through reducing the power of the legislative veto players,

namely political parties, it is hardly surprising that few constitutions contain

provisions for such referendums. Overall, 11 constitutions23 allow for such

referendums, but many of these provisions, mostly in East European coun-

tries, have hardly been used. At the national level Switzerland uses such

popular initiatives most frequently. In several policy domains, for instance

environmental protection, this institution is credited with having triggered

signicant policy changes. A case in point is a constitutional amendmentin favor of protecting the Alpine region against automotive trafc through

the Alps, which Swiss voters adopted 20 February 1994, to the chagrin of

most elected ofcials. This constitutional amendment basically ruled out

the construction of any additional roads crossing the Alpine regions,

which might lead to increased trafc through or across the Alps. This new


22. Strictly speaking, the constitution in force required the parliament to agree to a referen-

dum, but the supreme court allowed the referendums to go forward which resulted in a consider-able overhaul of the constitution, giving the president increased powers, including the power to

launch a referendum on any question he chooses.

23. The following countries have such provisions: Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Liechtenstein,

Lithuania, Moldova, Philippines, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland and the Ukraine.


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constitutional amendment originated in a signature petition proposing this

change to the constitution. Most observers were surprised by the outcome

since it endangered in part the delicate negotiations with the European

Union on bilateral agreements and transport.24

The remaining types of referendums, namely the required referendum and

the popular veto, leave the powers of the veto players in the representative

arena untouched, and thus these provisions decrease the potential for

policy change. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that this decrease in the potential for

policy change might reect the wishes of the framers of the constitution.

Often required referendums apply to constitutional amendments, changes

in borders, transfer of powers to international organizations etc. For such

policies, obviously, it is desirable to have a limited potential for change.

Similarly, popular vetoes often also apply to policy areas that are of centralimportance. Thus, for instance, the Danish constitution in article 20 requires

a majority of 83.3 percent of all members of parliament for bills involving

transfers of powers to supranational organizations. Thus, parliamentary

minorities of at least one-sixth can force a referendum vote, such as the

one leading to the negative outcome in the rst referendum on the Maastricht

Treaty (e.g. Ko nig and Hug, 2000). Again, provisions for such popular

vetoes decrease the potential for policy change, as the opt-outs negotiated

by the Danish Government after the Maastricht referendum clearly illus-

trate. A partial exception to this stability enhancing effect of popular vetoesappears with the practice in Italy labeled referendum abrogativo. Article 75

allows for referendums on enacted laws, but also allows for the elimination

of parts of laws. Since laws are often artful packages, allowing referendums

on elements of these packages also reduces, to some degree, the power of the

parliamentary veto players. A clear case in point is the Italian referendum of

19 April 1993 with which the Italian voters canceled a disposition in the

electoral rules employed for the election of the senate. More precisely, the

referendum largely eliminated proportional representation from the election

of the senate. As a consequence of this referendum, the government ofGiuliano Amato resigned and the resigning prime minister proclaimed the

end of the rst Republic (Newell and Bull, 1993: 607). In some sense it was

the culmination of the radical changes that the Italian political system had

undergone since the thorough judicial investigations of the partitocrazia

carried out under the label of mani pulite.


24. Bilateral agreements between the EU and Switzerland were negotiated in the aftermath ofSwiss citizens' rejection of the European Economic Area, a treaty concluded between countries

of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EU. Swiss voters accepted the bilateral

agreements on 5 May 2000, and at the time of writing EU member countries were in the process

of ratifying these agreements.


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The investigations started by prosecutors from Milan divulged the massive

corruption of the Italian party system. Reformist forces attempted through

numerous referendums to force changes in the Italian system. Referendums

in Italy allow citizens to collect signatures to force a vote on most legislation

and parts of it, long after it has been adopted (Table 2). However, referen-

dum challenges face two important hurdles. First, they have to be accepted

by the constitutional court. Of the 13 referendums submitted to the court

in 1993, only 10 were allowed to proceed. Second, for a referendum outcome

to be decisive, the turnout has to exceed 50 percent. On 19 April 1993 this

threshold was easily passed with a turnout of 77 percent, and a yes vote of

82.73 percent. While the adopted referendum only struck a paragraph

from the electoral law for the senate, its consequences were considerable.

Parliament, which already had attempted unsuccessfully to fend off thereferendum by adopting its own changes, went into action and overhauled

the election laws in their entirety (D'Alimonte and Chiaramonte, 1993).

Elections became much less proportional and the plurality element came to

predominate. Only after these changes did alternation between two major

ideological blocks became possible.

Thus, only if the institutional rules allow parts of a bill to be struck down

in a referendum may the popular veto increase the potential for policy

change. If only entire laws can be struck down, policy stability never

decreases. Given that the potential for policy change differs under the varioustypes of institutions allowing for referendums, Gallagher's (1996: 237) mixed

assessment of the conservative bias of referendums is perfectly understand-

able. Depending on the precise institutional provisions referendums may

increase or decrease policy stability. Our model suggests clear links between

institutions and potential for policy change. Table 1, by listing all countries

with required referendums, indicates where we would expect referendums to

lead to increased policy stability (only in the policy areas where such referen-

dums are possible). The countries listed in Table 2, by allowing non-required

referendums to occur, often reduce the number of relevant veto players andthus mostly have reduced policy stability. But this reduced policy stability is

only to be expected if the agenda-setting in the referendum process is either in

the hands of non-veto players or a subset of the veto players.

Apart from predicting various degrees of stability as a function of the pre-

cise institutions allowing for referendums, our model also links these institu-

tions to policy consequences. Our analysis suggests that provisions for

referendums generally lead to policies more closely related to the preferences

of the voters. The effects of referendums differ, however, according to the

exact institutional provisions and which actors (veto players or non-veto players) the latter empower to set the referendum agenda. While the

information provided in Table 2 would allow for much more stringent



28/52

empirical tests of our theoretical predictions, existing empirical analyses of

the policy consequences of referendums largely omit the effects that different

congurations of veto players may have. Thus we can only relate our predic-

tions with respect to policy consequences on the basis of the classication of

referendums presented in Figure 4.

Despite this limitation the predictions based on our model strongly reso-

nate with most of the empirical evidence from systematic studies on the

policy effects of referendums. Given that provisions for popular initiatives

were present only in a handful of countries at the national level, few, if

any, studies have attempted or succeeded in demonstrating empirically the

effect of such referendums on policy outcomes in cross-national analyses.

In studies focusing on the effect of institutional provisions at the subnational

level, both in the United States and Switzerland, the results suggest that pro-visions for popular initiatives and, to a lesser extent, provisions for popular

referendums lead to policies closer to the voters' ideal-point. Gerber (1996,

1999) shows for two policies, namely laws on parental consent for teenage

abortion and the death penalty, that in states with the popular initiative

the policies adopted correspond more closely to the voters' preferences

than in states without the initiative. Similar effects appear in Gerber and

Hug (2001) for a series of policies aiming at protecting minorities. Most

closely related to the theoretical insights discussed in this paper are Hug's

(1999) empirical results. Replicating and extending Gerber's (1999) work,he demonstrates that the voters' preferences are the most closely reected

in the presence or absence of the death penalty in states that allow for

popular initiatives. The relationship between voter preferences and policy

outcome in states with the popular veto is weaker, and still weaker is the

relationship in states with no non-required referendums. Only in the work

by Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998) do authors report evidence

counter to our theoretical results. Matsusaka (2001), however, convincingly

challenges the empirical strategies that these authors employ.

Only partly related to this work attempting to demonstrate the effect ofvoter preferences on policy outcomes is the literature dealing with the

effect of provisions for referendums on economic outcomes. Several studies

show that initiative states (and cantons) have lower tax burdens, lower

decits, etc.25 Since voter preferences do not enter directly into these empiri-

cal models, they only indirectly test propositions related to the theoretical

conclusions of this paper.


25. Kirchga ssner et al. (1999) review in detail these studies, and Matsusaka (1995, 2000) pro-

vides discussion of the literature on the American states.


29/52

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to organize our understanding of referendums

and the institutions that regulate them in a theoretically consistent andempirically accurate way. We saw that the overall assessments of referen-

dums have been controversial: for some authors referendums are the expres-

sion of popular will, for others the connection between popular will and

referendum outcome cannot be established. We also saw that classications

of referendums do not use the same criteria, and that some of these criteria

are based on strategic considerations (like who takes the initiative) while

others are based on obscure principles (pro- or anti-hegemonic, controlled

or uncontrolled). Finally, even the theoretical approaches come to different

conclusions depending on the dimensionality of the underlying space: single-dimensional approaches can calculate the results of a referendum as a func-

tion of the preferences of different actors; multi-dimensional approaches

stress cycles, paradoxes and inadequacies in outcomes.

In order to deal with all these variations in assessments and approaches, we

introduced a multi-dimensional model which enabled us to understand and

explain all these discrepancies. Our model was based on the theory of veto

players, which identies the individual or collective actors that are required

to agree for a change of the status quo. On the basis of veto player theory,

we concluded that referendums introduce one additional veto player, themedian voter of the population (or a very close approximation of it, the

center of the yolk of the population). In addition, a circle very well approx-

imates the outer bound on outcomes that are preferred over the status quo by

this new veto player, as if the millions of voters participating in a referendum

were a simple individual.

On the basis of our model, the introduction of the mere possibility of a

referendum shifts the outcomes of legislative politics closer to the population

median. The reason is that legislative outcomes that would replace the status

quo by a point that the median voter dislikes more than the status quo canimmediately be defeated by a referendum, so successful policy choices have

to be located inside the set of preferences of the median voter. Empirical

studies corroborate this expectation. Viewing referendums as the introduc-

tion of one additional veto player in a political system leads to the prediction

that the stability of outcomes increases.

The other major consequence of our model is the identication of the insti-

tutions that shape not only referendum outcomes, but also the outcomes of

the legislative game when referendums are possible. On the basis of our

analysis the institutions regulating agenda-setting in referendums signi-cantly affect the possible outcomes. Agenda-setting in referendums is divided

in two parts. The rst is who triggers the referendum (required referendum,



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existing veto player or non-veto player). The second is who asks the question

(veto player, non-veto player). On the basis of the answers in these two ques-

tions referendums are divided into four different categories: required referen-

dums (where the question is asked by veto players), veto player referendums

(veto players both trigger and ask the question of the referendum), popular

vetoes (non-veto players trigger, but veto players ask the question), and

popular initiatives (non-veto players both trigger and ask the question).

The more agenda-setting is divided, the more likely that competition

among the different actors involved may lead the referendum results to

approximate the preferences of the median voter. For this reason, popular

initiative institutions should be studied on the basis of by whom and under

what conditions issues can be placed on the ballot. We believe that the differ-

ences in assessments of referendums existing in the literature (as discussed inthe introduction of this article) can be attributed to the differences in agenda-

setting processes. People who dislike referendums pay attention to the ques-

tion of who controls the agenda of a referendum and why this actor triggered

it; people who like referendums assume a competitive popular initiative pro-

cess.

At the empirical level, existing systematic studies largely support the

theoretical implications we derive. Institutions allowing for referendums to

be triggered by veto players or non-veto players lead to policies that reect

more closely the voters' preferences. The strongest additional effect of voterpreferences on policy outcomes appears under institutional provisions allow-

ing for popular initiatives. However, as Hug (1999) shows, this stronger

effect diminishes quite considerably as the signature requirement increases.

But decreasing signature requirements also corresponds with an increasing

number of referendums. Thus, constitutional framers should balance well

between different institutional provisions for referendums and the costs

they wish to impose on possible users of these institutions.

While existing empirical research lends some credence to our theoretical

model, future research should carry out more stringent tests. More precisely,the information provided in Table 2 on the veto players in control of the

referendum agenda in non-required referendums allows for much more

precise predictions of the policy consequences, even on multi-dimensional

issues. In particular, if provisions for referendums cancel out other veto

players our model would predict policy outcomes much more heavily inu-

enced by the veto player in control of the referendum agenda. Such stringent

tests would give constitutional framers much more material on which to

base their decision whether to introduce provisions for referendums in new

constitutions.



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APPENDIX


Table 1. Required Referendums Around the World

Country Constitutional Provision for Required Referendum Constitution

Used

(revised)

Antigua-Barbuda Art. 47, constitutional amendments, two-thirds of all the

members of the House must approve amendment

1981

Australia Art. 128, constitutional amendments, law must be passed

by an absolute majority of each House of the Parliament

or by one House of Parliament and submitted by the

governor-general

1901

Austria Art. 44, total revision of constitution after adoption inLower House and absence of objection in Upper House

1929

Bahamas Art. 54, constitutional amendments, after two-thirds

(three-quarters for some Articles) majorities in both

Houses adopted amendment

1973

Bangladesh Art. 142, constitutional amendments, a bill, passed by

two-thirds majorities, which provides for the amendment

of the Preamble or any provisions of Art. 8, 48, 94[0r],

56, 95 or 142

1996

Botswana Art. 89, constitutional amendments, after passage by

two-thirds majority in the Assembly

1966

Colombia Art. 377, constitutional amendments to Ch. 1 of Title II,

after passage in Parliament

1991 (2001)

Congo Art. 172, international treaties for cession, exchange or

addition of territory proposed by the president must be

adopted by referendum

1979 (1992)

Croatia Art. 135, for the association of the Republic of Croatia

in alliances with other states, after passage in Parliament

by a two-thirds majority vote

1990

Cuba Art. 137, constitutional amendments, after vote by

two-thirds in National Assembly, provided theconstitution is completely revised, or the amendment

refers to the powers of the National Assembly or to the

rights and duties established in the constitution

1976

Denmark Art. 88, constitutional amendments, after passage by

two separately elected Parliaments

Art. 28, changes in the voting age, after passage by

Parliament

1953

Dominica Art. 42, constitutional amendments, after approval by a

three-quarters majority in Parliament

1978

Egypt Art. 189, constitutional amendments, after approval bytwo-thirds of the members of the Assembly

1980

continued on next page


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El Salvador Art. 89, constitutional amendments on the creation of a

Central American republic after passage by Parliament

1983

Gabon Art. 113, international treaties, if they involve territorial

changes

1975 (1991)

Gambia Art. 226, constitutional amendments, after passage by

three-quarters majority in Assembly

1970 (1996)

Grenada Art. 39, constitutional amendments, after passage by

two-thirds of the members of the House, amendments to

some sections of the constitution have to be adopted in

a referendum

1974

Guatemala Art. 280, 173, constitutional amendments, after a

two-thirds vote to amend constitution in the National

Assembly

1985

Guyana Art. 164, constitutional amendments, after majority of

Parliament has approved amendment to certain parts of

the constitution

1980

Iceland Art. 79, constitutional amendments, after passage by

Parliament of an amendment to the status of the

Church under Art. 62

1944

Ireland Art. 46, constitutional amendments, initiated in the

Lower House and after passage in both Houses

1937

Jamaica Art. 49, constitutional amendments, after passage by

two-thirds majorities in both Houses

1962

Japan Art. 96, constitutional amendments, initiated in the

Diet and after passage by two-thirds majorities in both

Houses

1964

Kiribati Art. 69, constitutional amendments, after passage by a

two-thirds majority in Parliament

1979

Korea, South Art. 130, constitutional amendments, after passage by a

two-thirds majority in the National Assembly

1987

Latvia Art. 76, 77, amendments to Art. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, or 77 of the

Constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in

Parliament

1922 (1998)

Liberia Art. 91, constitutional amendments, after passage by

two-thirds majorities in both Houses

1984

Lithuania Art. 148, amendments to Art. 1, Chs 1 and 14 of the

constitution, after passage by two-thirds majority in

Parliament

1992

Macedonia Art. 74, 120 changes of borders or association with or

dissociation from a union, after passage by Parliamen

veto players and referendums around the world

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