26 Veterinary Times

THE first part of this series (February 4 issue) discussed why ethical debates are neces-sary, presented a theoretical foundation, and argued for guidelines and a legal frame-work to support veterinarians facing ethical dilemmas. This article will cover animal rights ethics (animal consciousness, research and rights), sentiency and animal advocacy.

Animal rights ethicsMost ethical debates surrounding animal issues have started out-side the veterinary profession. This chapter, and the following one, will discuss some of the more recent philosophical ideas as they relate to animal ethics.

l Animal consciousnessIn some people’s minds, the ethi-cal treatment of animals hinges on the question of animal conscious-ness. If animals are aware of fear and pain, ethical consideration requires that any human use of an animal should be designed to minimise its distress.

Assuming that animal con-sciousness exists, animal rights

advocates1 argue that animals should not be used by humans in any way. Instead, as sentient beings (discussed later), they should be given the same rights and respect as humans. Con-versely, this would mean organ-isms that are not aware of their pain and fear2 need not be so carefully treated3 (Griffin, 2001).

The most extreme animal-use proponents would argue that there is no animal consciousness and argue that “unfeeling beasts”

can be used in any way humans see fit. Most cognitive ethologists agree that humans have a right to use animals, since all species use others in natural, ecological interactions, such as predation. Animal use should, however, be carried out with the animal’s potential awareness in mind, and pain or discomfort should be minimised (Griffin, 2001).

Animal thought and aware-ness (Table 1) were assumed, by many scientists and most lay peo-

ple, to exist before the establish-ment of behaviourism. Yet, early in the 20th century, behaviourists claimed that animals were prob-ably not conscious of themselves or their behaviour – and, if they were, the knowledge would not be important to them.

Through the following dec-ades, behavioural scientists assumed that animals were inca-pable of thought, emotions and self-awareness; animals were almost treated as machines in behavioural studies (Griff in, 2001). Later in the century, some ethologists, like Griffin himself, began to question the assumptions of behaviourism. In his 1976 book, The Ques-tion of Animal Awareness, Griffin explored the possibility that reason and consciousness exist in animals. His book initiated a new science: cognitive ethology4.

l Animal researchThrough the 17th century, the scientific community had no moral, legal or religious objec-tions to vivisection, and it was not until the 19th century that vivi-section became the focus of pub-lic controversy (Rupke, 1987). This controversy grew out of the animal welfare movement of the 1820s and eventually led to the introduction, in Great Britain, of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, which was the first law imple-mented to regulate experiments using animals, although many of its clauses were ambiguous5.

The public debate over vivi-section continued into the 20th century. The publication of phi-losopher Peter Singer ’s Ani-mal Liberation, in 1975, fuelled and revived the anti-vivisection movement. Singer’s book con-tained the most powerful argu-ments to date against the use of animals in research. He coined the term “speciesism” to encap-sulate the notion that it is morally

indefensible for one particular species (humans) to dominate and abrogate the rights of another species for its own interests.

With regard to the moral acceptability of using animals in research, our society’s views are still divided. At one end of the spectrum, a minority of scien-tists advocates the unrestricted use of animals for experimental research and teaching purposes, regardless of the value of that research, for improving the wel-fare of the human condition.

At the other end of the spec-trum, a minority of animal advo-cates, such as Tom Regan, pro-motes the total elimination of the use of animals for science. Most scientists and animal advocates seem to hold positions some-where between these stances.

Anti-vivisectionists argue, pri-marily on moral or ideological grounds, that inflicting pain on another species is cruel and immoral. Many animal advo-cates state that humans do not have the authority to usurp the rights of another species for their own purposes – holding that animals possess intrinsic worth and should be able to live freely, without restrictions imposed by an intellectually superior species. Peter Singer suggests that speciesism could

be equated with blatant racism (Singer, 2002), while those who support animal research argue that animals are not morally equal to humans (Fox, 1986)6.

Most animal rights groups do not necessarily want to see all animal research abolished, but they press for more responsible research practices and continue to accuse the scientific com-munity of being reluctant to use humane research methods that are intended to reduce the number of animals being used, and minimise or even eliminate the pain or suffering animals experience. They also argue that much of the research serves no valuable purpose.

l Animal rightsThe prevention of blatant mis-treatment of work and com-panion animals was the primary focus of the original animal pro-tection organisations such as the RSPCA – which was founded in 1824 as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals – and its American counterparts, the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and the Humane Society of the United States. Singer’s Animal Liberation kick-started serious debates by other professional philosophers with regard to eth-

ConTroversy over moraliTy of animal use sTill spliTs soCieTy

franK BusCHPhD, MRCVS

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outlines philosophical viewpoints relating to the ethical treatment of animals, from calls for a total ban on their experimental use to those who believe animals lack cognition and feelings

Animal consciousness

Definition Argument that animals may experience thought processes, self awareness and emotions similar to, though simpler than, those of humans.

Significance Representations of animal consciousness are used to argue for the ethical treatment of animals.

Animal research

Definition Use of animals in research for the purpose of education, product testing or acquiring new knowledge that might benefit human mankind.

Significance Research conducted on animals raises questions regarding the moral acceptability of subjecting animals to pain, suffering and sometimes death for the benefit of people.

Animal rights

Definition Extension of rights-based ethical theories to non-human animals.

Significance

Animal rights have been advocated by a political movement with philosophical foundations in both the utilitarian and rights-based tradition in ethical theory. This movement raises the issues of the basis of human rights and the grounds upon which such rights should, or should not, be extended to other living beings.

Animal sentiency

Definition Not only the capacity to respond to stimuli, but to have at least some feelings, whereby feelings include conscious sensations, such as pain, but also emotional states, such as fear.

SignificanceNon-sentient beings (to which enfeebled humans could be counted) – ie, lacking the capacity to feel, think or have other mental states – must, by definition, be incapable of caring how they are treated. In theory, they cannot be harmed or benefited in any morally important way.

Table 1. Animal rights ethics

Due to competing issues attracting public and media attention, the author believes animal advocates and animal rights groups are often forced to use “shocking” advertisements – such as this 2001 campaign by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) – and more creative approaches to draw attention to animal protection concerns.

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ics of the treatment of so-called “non-human animals”7.

Animal rights groups that have been founded more recently, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA, 1980), the Fund for Animals (USA, 1967) and the Farm Ani-mal Reform Movement (FARM, USA, 1976), used ideas that emerged from the philosophical debate to question the very use of animals, especially in agricul-ture and science. In particular, PETA became a potent political force, capitalising on the public-ity of some high-profile cases, particularly in the US.

SentiencyIn the philosophy of animal rights, sentience is commonly seen as the ability to experi-ence suffering. The 18th century philosopher Jeremy Bentham raised the issue of animal suffer-ing and sadism in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “The blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor… What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of dis-course? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not ‘can they reason?’ nor ‘can they talk?’ but ‘can they suffer?’”

Sentience is more than the capacity to respond to stimuli; it is the capacity to have at least some feelings. These feelings include conscious sensations, such as pain – where pain refers to something felt and not merely the nervous system’s detection of noxious stimuli – and emo-tional states such as fear.

Unfortunately, we do not know at which point on the phylogenetic scale, or evolu-tionary tree, sentience disap-pears, being replaced by more primitive, non-conscious neural mechanisms, but there is strong evidence that at least vertebrate animals are sentient, and little or no evidence that the most primi-tive invertebrates are sentient (DeGrazia, 2002).

Sentient animals are aware of their surroundings and what hap-pens to them, and they are capa-ble of feeling pain and pleasure, at the least. We know that some animals can both remember and anticipate events and some can foresee their future needs and

plan ahead. Some animals can maintain complex social rela-tionships in their groups. Some animals can understand what another animal is going to do, and attempt to deceive that ani-mal to gain an advantage. Some animals can enjoy learning a new skill. Some animals react to other animals in ways resembling human empathy.

On the other side, animals can experience the unpleasant emo-tions of pain, fear, frustration and

boredom. They can be reduced to a state resembling human depression by chronic stress or confinement to a cage8.

According to Peter Singer, sen-tiency is often dismissed by appeal to a distinction that condemns human suffering but allows animal suffering (see also the forthcom-ing article on philosophical discus-sions and theories).

However, as many of the suggested distinguishing features of humanity (such as intelligence

and highly complex language) are not present in marginal cases, such as newborns or severely mentally impaired humans, it appears that the only distinction is a prejudice based on species alone (speciesism).

Others take no objection with the conclusion that it is wrong to cause unnecessary suffering, but contend that on this issue the moral concept of right and wrong should not mirror human nature, but should, instead, be

modelled from nature: since animals naturally kill each other and inflict (at times unnecessary) suffering on each other, then as part of Animalia it would not be wrong for us to also do so.

This is a view most of the world’s population seems to follow, whether intentionally acknowledging it or not. There-fore, the reason the rules of nature regarding killing aren’t applicable towards other humans is because we are then dealing

with the human realm. Our own psychology and the collective sociology make it unfavour-able (less safety, added stress, reduced efficiency) to partake in killing other humans.

Seen in this light, it would not be speciesism to kill animals but spare humans, but instead an outgrowth of humans’ (as a species) naturalistic adaptation while observing all natural ethics regarding suffering.

continued overleaf

POINT-OF-VIEW

“Animals can experience pain,

fear, frustration and boredom, and they can be reduced to a state resembling

human depression.”

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28 Veterinary Times

Animal advocacyAs veterinary professionals, we should already be acting as advo-cates for our patients, but it seems we are not really making the most of these opportunities. It is worth highlighting some particular problems that are related to societal issues, and this, in turn, ties in with the social ethics topic that we have already discussed within the ethics theo-retical framework.

As professional and animal advocates, should we not engage more in raising awareness of ani-mal matters and should we not engage more in public debates? And, if so, what challenges are we facing? There is a clear dichotomy between the lack of public engagement in animal protection versus the generally strong support that most people express for animal issues.

At first, people think animal protection is important, maybe even a priority. But, in reality, animal protection gets lost amid the myriad responsibilities of everyday life and the issues du jour that dominate the media. As a result, animal advocates and animal rights groups are often forced to be creative, or plain shocking9 – such as PETA’s “Did your food have a face?” campaign – to attract attention. Apart from getting animal issues on the

agenda of public consciousness and concern in the first place, advocates must do so in ways that boost their credibility and avoid playing into negative stere-otypes of animal advocates.

The Humane Research Coun-cil (HRC), which has conducted research for more than 20 ani-mal protection groups over the past seven years, identified the “freedom of choice imperative” as a major challenge to animal protection issues and animal advocacy in general. This recog-nises that most people resist big, sweeping changes or far-reach-ing restrictions on their behav-iour. Banning certain practices can work for niche issues like foie gras or intense confinement, but generally “bans” are met with stiff resistance – witness the ban on fox hunting. This stems from the innate sense of indi-viduality and personal “freedom” that many feel is an inherent human right; this “freedom of choice” is often perceived to trump the rights of animals.

Closely related to the free-dom of choice imperative is the notion that humans should always come before animals, but this preference view is even broader. A 1994 General Social Survey found that only 26 per cent of US adults agreed that “animals should have the same

moral rights that human beings do;” twice as many (51 per cent) disagreed (HRC, 2007).

For animal advocates, this poses a clear challenge. Human oppression is a serious and ongo-ing problem, and the widespread belief that humans are more important than animals gives some people license to give less attention to (or even ignore) ani-mal issues as long as humans are suffering. If the issues are consid-ered mutually exclusive, human issues tend to be prioritised.

Another popular misconcep-tion is the belief that policies in place to help animals are adequate. Many people seem to think this is the case for laws, and many also believe that animal “caretakers” – such as farmers and lab technicians – see animal welfare as their top priority.

Episodic types of animal cru-elty (for example, teens lighting a dog on fire) are obvious and abhorrent to most people – and usually well covered by the media – but “institutionalised” animal abuse, such as factory farming, is not. A recent example of single-minded media coverage was the avian influenza outbreak at the Bernard Matthews plant, where 160,000 birds had to be destroyed to combat the H5N1 danger. The media stressed that there was no inherent danger to human health, but little cover-age was given to the suffering endured by the birds that died.

Equally, there was no public outcry as to the status quo of confinement agriculture. On its website, animal rights group Animal Aid reported on this tres-pass under the heading “Britain looks the other way while birds are brutally destroyed”10.

The challenge for animal advocates is to demonstrate that these institutional abuses are as bad as, or worse, than the epi-sodic cruelty situations that are familiar to most people.

Finally, a key factor that animal advocates face is the perception that the beliefs and tactics of animal advocates are “extreme.” A 1990 study by the National Shooting Sports Foundation found that 43 per cent of adults agreed that “animal rights activ-ists are well meaning, but their positions are too extreme”. This is a large segment of the population that believes animal advocates’ beliefs and ideologies are “extreme”, which is likely to be due to perceived limits on “freedom of choice” and/or the notion of placing animals before humans. The same is true of many advocacy tactics, and animal advocates face the challenge of at least not reinforc-ing the stereotype that they are extreme (HRC, 2007).

Despite the obstacles, it may be time that we, as veterinarians, reassess the very foundations of our profession and debate and push our role as animal advocates. Most of us already take a serious look at the conflict between business and veterinary medicine – the situation we commonly see whereby a life is only worth as much as the owner is willing to pay.

The veterinary profession is willing to speak out during times of human crisis. Surely it is our responsibility to speak out on behalf of those that we have a duty to protect?

Footnotes1. Because this notion sits uncomfort-ably with opponents of this argument, “animal rights advocates” are often termed “animal rights extremists” or “animal rights activists”. The author prefers to use the more value-neutral term “animal rights advocate”.

2. Society still seems undecided whether to include fish and birds as sentient beings and, therefore, afford them rights that are at odds with scientific evidence. Breathwaite (2006) comments that fish brains are not that different to human brains. She remarks: “Although less anatomi-cally complex than our own brain, the function of two of their forebrain areas is very similar to the mammalian amygdala and hippocampus – areas associated with emotion, learning and memory. If these regions are dam-aged in fish, their learning and emo-tional capabilities are impaired; they can no longer find their way through mazes, and they lose their sense of fear. None of this tells us that fish are conscious, but it does demonstrate them to be cognitively competent.”

3. This deduction, however, is not without its pitfalls and will be further discussed. Common sense dictates that any creature that feels pain should not be subjected to pain, regardless of its emotional existence. This is also true for humans in a permanent vegetative state and some people with severe learning disabilities, who frequently do not demonstrate any degree of cognitive or emotional function. In human medicine, nurs-ing guidelines dictate that if a patient cannot state that he or she is in pain, such as the unconscious or dying patient, then staff must assume that he or she is, and administer analge-sia as a precaution, with the aim of preventing suffering (Liverpool Care Pathway; www.mcpcil.org.uk/liver-pool_care_pathway/overview).

4. The fusion of cognitive science and classical ethology into cognitive ethology “emphasises observing animals under more-or-less natural conditions, with the objective of understanding the evolution, adap-tation (function), causation, and development of the species-specific behavioural repertoire” (Tinbergen, 1963). Donald Griffin coined the term in the 1980s in connection with his agenda of getting scientists to face up to questions about mental states,

including consciousness, in non-human animals.

5. Because so many of its clauses were ambiguous, in 1963, a com-mittee of inquiry, the Littlewood Committee, was set up. It published 83 recommendations (none of these were designed to bring an end to ani-mal experiments), but no legislation was passed to put any of the recom-mendations into effect. By the 1970s, almost six million animals were used per year in experiments.6. Moral rights and moral status will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter of this series, on philosophical discussions and theories.7. Perhaps the most fundamental example of speciesist language is a false distinction between human animals and non-human animals as humans and animals, as if humans were not animals. Another common example is the differential use of the relative pronoun “who” versus “which” and “that”. Similarly, the use of “it” rather than “he” or “she” achieved the same goal. Using the words “that”, “which” and “it” – rather than “who”, “he” and “she” – subtly reduces all non-human animals to things, rather than sentient beings and conceals their individuality; it encour-ages us to see them as mere tools for our use. Dunayer (2001) argues that deceptive language is a primary means of maintaining speciesism. 8. Special issue: sentience in animals, Applied Animal Behaviour Science (2006) 100: 1-2, October. Selection of scientific papers from Compas-sion in World Farming’s conference, From Darwin to Dawkins: The science and implications of animal sentience, (March 2005). 9. “Holocaust on your plate”, the controversial and very graphic cam-paign and exhibit devised by PETA in 2003, juxtaposed 60-square-foot panels displaying scenes from Nazi death camps side by side with disturb-ing images from the confinement agri-culture sector and slaughterhouses. According to Lisa Lange, PETA’s vice-president of communications, the idea for the public relations effort came from the late Nobel Prize- winning author Isaac Bashevis Singer, who, she said, wrote: “In relation to them [animals], all people are Nazis; for them it is an eternal Tre-blinka.” Lange said of the exhibit: “It’s shocking, it’s startling, it’s very hard to look at; we’re attacking the mindset that condones the slaughter of animals. The very same mindset that made the Holocaust possible, that we can do anything we want to those we decide are ‘different or inferior’, is what allows us to commit atrocities against animals every single day.” See www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/02/28/peta.holocaust (last accessed 12.10.2007).10. See www.animalaid.org.uk/h/n/NEWS/pr_factory/ALL/1506 (last accessed 10.10.2007).l A full reference list will be provided in the final article of this series. n

n controversy over morality of animal use – from page 27

POINT-OF-VIEW

While some argue for unrestricted use of animals for scientific experiments, and others push for a total ban, Frank Busch believes most scientists and animal advocates hold positions somewhere between these viewpoints.

FRANK BUSCH has a predominantly small animal background and his main interests are physiotherapy, acupuncture and animal welfare. He works in mixed practice and primarily writes on veterinary ethics and animal-assisted therapy.

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