BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION CONCERNS

JONATHAN B. TUCKER, PH.D. Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies Monterey California United States

1. Introduction

In a speech to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in November 1996, U.S. arms control official John Holum said: "Overall, the United States believes that twice as many countries now have or are actively pursuing offensive biological weapons capabilities as when the Convention went into force." 1

Since the U.S. government declines to list proliferators by name, relying on open sources to monitor the spread of biological weapons is a difficult task. Nearly all offensive biological-warfare (BW) programs are undeclared, and information about such efforts is usually highly classified to preserve military secrecy and maintain diplomatic deniability. In recent years, only Iraq and Russia have officially admitted having pursued biological weapons.

Given that most BW programs are shrouded in secrecy, open-source analysts must rely on press accounts, government reports, and intelligence leaks that may be biased or incomplete. For example, the unclassified BWC compliance report published annually by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) covers only countries that have signed or ratified the BWC.2 Other published sources may be unreliable for political reasons. For example, information on Arab BW programs released by Israeli government officials must be viewed with some skepticism. Similarly, the 1996 report issued by the U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, excludes a number of suspected BW proliferators such as Egypt, Syria, and Israel, apparently on diplomatic grounds.3

Further complicating the data problem is the fact that various open-source lists of BW proliferators are inconsistent. Detailed information is also unavailable on the level of sophistication of a BW program, which can range from early research and development to the stockpiling of filled munitions. Moreover, the historical record of BW programs is largely unknown, making it difficult to reconstruct the internal government decision-

33 M. Dando et al. ( eds), Verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, 33-76. ©2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

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making processes involved. With these caveats in mind, Annex I provides open-source information about known or suspected BW programs.

2. Empirical Observations

On the basis of this table, one can make some empirical observations about the distribution of known or suspected BW proliferators. First, although approximately 100 countries possess a basic pharmaceutical or fermentation industrial base capable of producing biological weapons, only about a dozen have actively pursued BW programs.4

Second, BW proliferators are concentrated in regions of chronic conflict and insecurity. With the exception of Russia, which has pledged at the presidential level that the BW program inherited from the former Soviet Union wiii be terminated, and South Africa, which reportedly eliminated its BW program shortly before the end of white-minority rule, six of the suspected BW proliferators are located in North Africa and the Middle East (Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and Syria) and the remainder are in East Asia (China, North Korea, South Korea, and Taiwan). Cuba, which has an advanced biotechnology industry, is also included on some lists. This highly clustered geographical distribution of BW proliferators suggests that regional security dynamics are a critical factor contributing to the spread of biological weapons.

Third, some BW proliferators are pursuing the full range of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons (e.g., China, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea), whereas for others, nuclear weapons are technically or financially beyond reach (e.g., Egypt, Libya, and Syria). Moreover, countries that have BW programs are a subset of those that possess chemical-warfare (CW) capabilities. A possible explanation is that proliferant states view these two types of weapons as complementary. Whereas chemical weapons have greater tactical utility on the battlefield, biological weapons are more effective for strategic attacks against population centers. In addition, although production technologies for BW and CW agents are entirely different, some overlap exists in weaponization and delivery-system requirements and protective equipment. Finally, toxin weapons--non-living chemicals synthesized by living organisms--represent a "gray area" between CW agents and microbial pathogens and may constitute a bridge between CW and BW capabilities.

3. Motivations for Acquisition of Biological Weapons: A Typology

Understanding the motivations that drive countries to acquire biological weapons should facilitate the development of "demand-side" nonproliferation strategies that aim to change the incentive structure of governments so that they are no longer motivated to pursue BW capabilities. States appear to pursue weapons of mass destruction as a cost­effective means of addressing a perceived security deficit. In particular, states that face

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a serious threat to their security but lack the financial and technical resources to acquire advanced-conventional or nuclear weapons may choose to pursue BW capabilities. Incentives and disincentives for BW proliferation exist primarily at two levels of analysis: (1) the external security environment; and (2) the bureaucratic and institutional context. These motivations are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1: Typology of Possible Incentives and Disincentives for BW Acquisition

I. Security Environment

A. Incentives 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

To deter chemical, biological, or nuclear attack by regional or extra-regional powers As a force-multiplier against outside power having superior conventional capabilities To achieve regional hegemony by intimidating neighboring states As a tactical weapon for battlefield use For covert warfare or economic sabotage against enemy states For state-supported terrorism For counterinsurgency warfare against internal opposition groups

B. Disincentives I. Absence of a perceived security threat or presence of a credible security guarantee 2. Economic costs and technical difficulties of acquiring and maintaining a BW capability 3. Risk of provoking offsetting weapons programs by other states, an increase in tension, or

military action such as preventive strikes 4. Security problems associated with maintaining a BW capability 5. Existence of international norms against acquisition and use 6. Global and regional arms control regimes 7. Concern over international political or economic sanctions

II. Domestic PoliticaVBureaucratic Environment

A. Incentives I. 2. 3.

Reluctance of military to give up any potent weapon Institutional inertia caused by jobs and money associated with a BW production program Bureaucratic careerism and vested interests

B. Disincentives I. Interagency or inter-service competition for scarce resources 2. Military preference for acquisition of conventional arms over BW capability 3. Resistance to integrating BW into military doctrine, strategy, and tactics 4. Opposition from domestic public opinion

4. External Security Environment: Incentives for Proliferation

The general reluctance of states to admit the possession of biological weapons suggests that they do not have the same prestige value as nuclear weapons. Instead, the decision to acquire a BW capability arises primarily from the security-related motivations listed below.

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1. Quest for regional hegemony. Some BW proliferators, such as Iraq, seek to acquire biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as a means to intimidate their neighbors, project power, and exert regional hegemony.

2. Deterrence of nuclear weapons use. Countries that face a nuclear-armed adversary but lack the resources to acquire their own nuclear weapons may view a BW capability as a "poor man's atomic bomb" that enables them to achieve some measure of strategic parity and mutual deterrence.5 Some countries seeking nuclear weapons, such as Iraq, may seek biological weapons as an interim strategic deterrent or as a means to deter preemptive strikes against their nuclear installations until they can build and deploy secure nuclear forces. For a country such as Syria, which lacks the technical and financial resources to acquire advanced-conventional or nuclear arms, a BW capability may offer a cost-effective means of strategic deterrence vis-a-vis Israel.

BW proliferation is not an inevitable response to existential security threats, however. States may choose alternate means of defense and deterrence, such as joining a military alliance or relying on the nuclear umbrella of a superpower patron. Since all known BW programs in the Middle East predate the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet nuclear umbrella over Iraq and Syria obviously had nothing to do with the original decision to acquire biological weapons. Even so, the motivations of these states to retain biological weapons may have changed in recent years in response to the dramatic shifts in the external security environment.

The acquisition of a BW capability as a strategic deterrent involves a paradox: since proliferant countries rarely admit possessing biological weapons, how can an undeclared capability can provide a credible deterrent? A possible explanation is that a deterrent capability does not have to be formally declared to be effective. As the undeclared nuclear programs of Israel, India, and Pakistan have shown, states can hint at a "bomb in the basement" without officially acknowledging its existence. Suspicions that a state possesses biological weapons are difficult to prove because the BWC lacks a verification regime and because national intelligence agencies are loath to release information collected by clandestine means. For this reason, suspected BW proliferators may obtain the benefits of deterrence or coercion vis-a-vis potential adversaries without exposing themselves to international opprobrium.

For example, while Egypt does not admit to possessing chemical or biological weapons, Egyptian officials have stated that in principle, the acquisition of such weapons by Arab states is warranted by the strategic imperative of offsetting Israel' s undeclared nuclear capability. Similarly, in a November 1996 interview with the Egyptian daily Al Ahram, the Syrian ambassador to Cairo, Issa Darwish, warned that if Israel threatened to attack Syria with nuclear weapons, "there will be a harsh response. Syria will respond with chemical weapons and is now ready for any Israeli threat." In a press statement the next day, Amb. Darwish denied that Syria had chemical weapons and insisted that he had been misquoted. 6 Not long afterwards, however, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad hinted at a Syrian CBW capability when he told a news conference, "He who has nuclear

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weapons has no right to criticize others for whatever weapons they have. If they want disarmament, let's start with nuclear weapons. Arabs in general are ready to get rid of other weapons."7

By making such oblique statements, the Syrian government has apparently sought to maintain the unofficial status of its chemical/biological arsenal while making credible deterrent threats vis-a-vis Israel. According to Israeli defense analyst Dany Shoham, Syria's chemical/biological warfare capabilities may have helped to restrain Israel's military response to the provocative redeployment of Syrian troops near Israeli positions on the Golan Heights in August 1996. "The fact that there is a Syrian [chemical/biological] arsenal and there is awareness of this affects the balance of power with Israel," he said. 8

3. Asymmetric strategies. Some developing countries may choose to acquire biological weapons to deter military intervention by outside powers that enjoy an enormous advantage in advanced conventional warfare capabilities, such as precision-guided munitions and ground and space-based navigation, surveillance, target-acquisition, and communications. Having learned the lessons of Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, regional powers such as Iraq and Iran may pursue an "asymmetric strategy" in which they seek to pit their military strengths against the vulnerabilities of technologically superior states, with the aim of deterring intervention or preventing the stronger side from bringing to bear the full weight of its military power. In July 1996, for example, Libyan dictator Col. Muammar Ghaddaffi seemed to imply the resort to such an asymmetric strategy when he observed, "There is no longer any logic between us [Libya and the United States], no common denominator or rationality. We are looking for ways to frighten America so that it retreats."9

Such countries may view biological weapons as a usable "force-multiplier" that can compensate for the weakness of conventional military capabilities in the face of a numerically or technologically superior adversary. For most battlefield applications, biological weapons have limited tactical utility in that they are hard to deliver in a controlled manner and induce incapacitating effects only after an incubation period of several hours to days. Nevertheless, some military analysts contend that biological weapons could be employed tactically for military operations in which immediate results are not required and the risk of exposing friendly troops is low. Such contingencies include attacks against fixed enemy positions in a drawn-out war of attrition; special­operations missions against targets deep behind enemy lines such as airfields, supply dumps, port facilities, command centers, logistical staging areas, and reserve forces; and attacks against large naval vessels passing through narrow straits. 10

Biological weapons might also be acquired as a means of covert warfare, such as sabotage actions behind enemy lines by special-operations forces, counter-insurgency campaigns against rebel forces, or attacks against civilians by state-sponsored terrorists. 11 Plant and animal disease agents could be employed covertly against enemy crops and livestock to cause starvation and economic hardship, undermining the morale

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of the civilian population. Biological weapons are well suited to covert use because they are effective in small amounts, give rise to acute symptoms only after a delay of hours or days, and can be selected to simulate a natural outbreak of disease, providing "plausible deniability." The insidious nature of biological weapons also gives them a powerful psychological impact, including the ability to induce terror and panic.

In sum, because biological weapons can inflict mass casualties yet are more cost­effective for this purpose than conventional bombs and delivery systems, they offer a potential means for poor countries to offset the enormous military advantage possessed by industrialized states armed with high-technology weapons such as stealth aircraft and precision-guided munitions. Overt or covert use of biological weapons against foreign intervention forces could inflict mass casualties, spread terror, and undermine troop morale and public support. The military utility of biological weapons is considerably greater if it involves an element of surprise, and if the adversary lacks effective detectors or defenses. Even if enemy troops are equipped with gas masks and protective suits, however, operational benefits may be gained by forcing them to don the cumbersome gear, which degrades military performance and slows the tempo of combat operations.

4. In-kind deterrence. Because of the "security dilemma" inherent in an anarchic world order, efforts by one state to acquire potent military capabilities to meet a security deficit may be perceived by other states as posing a new offensive threat. 12 Given this dynamic, it is reasonable to assume that as soon as one country acquires a BW capability, its potential adversaries will seek to offset it by developing an in-kind retaliatory capability, giving rise to a chain-reaction of proliferation decisions. As Egyptian President Anwar Sadat observed in 1972, "The only reply to biological warfare is that we too should use biological warfare. I believe that the density of the Israeli population confined in a small area would provide the opportunity to reply with the same weapon if they should be using it."13

5. External Security Environment: Disincentives for BW Proliferation

The external security environment provides disincentives as well as incentives for the acquisition of biological weapons.

1. Questionable military utility. Biological weapons provide neither the deterrent power of nuclear weapons nor the tactical utility of chemical weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, they are slow-acting, unpredictable in their effects, have never been employed in warfare on a large scale, and are incapable of destroying military hardware or infrastructure. 2. Arms race instability. Acquisition of a BW capability may be counterproductive by raising tensions, causing neighboring states to deploy offsetting capabilities, and increasing the risk of catastrophic war.

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3. Risk of retaliation. Even if an acute threat of outside intervention exists, countries may hesitate to use biological weapons for fear of provoking a devastating retaliatory strike. Shortly before the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III met with Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and "purposely left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq could invite tactical nuclear retaliation."14 This action was a deliberate bluff to deter Baghdad from employing its unconventional arsenal, since President George Bush had already ruled out nuclear or chemical retaliation if the Iraqis launched chemical or biological attacks. In March 1996, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry sought to establish a broader deterrent threat by warning that the United States would answer any chemical or biological attack with "overwhelming force" and refusing to rule out the use of nuclear weapons. 15

4. Lack of legitimacy. Another disincentive to the acquisition of biological weapons is that they are widely viewed as abhorrent and have been formally banned under international law. In recent years, however, the international norm against biological warfare has been weakened by the muted condemnation that followed Iraq 1 s large-scale employment of chemical weapons during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, in blatant violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical and biological warfare. William Webster, then U.S. Director of Central Intelligence, expressed concern that the failure of the international community to punish Iraqi use of chemical weapons meant that "the moral barrier to biological warfare has been breached."16 Since then, the international norm against biological warfare has been further eroded by the BWC's lack of verification and enforcement measures, as well as festering allegations that major powers such as Russia and China have systematically violated the treaty. Ironically, the recent entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which includes a highly intrusive verification regime, may motivate some states to pursue biological weapons instead.

5. Availability of defenses. Another disincentive to the acquisition of BW capabilities relates to the ability of adversaries to defend themselves. In addition to the inherent uncertainties associated with the tactical use of biological weapons, their military utility will be considerably less if the opposing troops are equipped with effective defensive equipment such as stand-off detectors, individual protective masks, and collective shelters. The use of defensive measures to discourage aggression by preventing an attacker from achieving his military objectives is known as "deterrence by denial."

6. Bureaucratic and Institutional Factors: Incentives for BW Proliferation

Although the net balance among proliferation incentives and disincentives in a given country 1 s external security environment should determine whether it decides to pursue a BW capability, an examination of actual cases suggests that reality is more complex. Neighboring states in the Middle East, such as Iraq and Jordan, or Libya and Tunisia,

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respond differently to a similar external security environment because of country­specific factors such as history, form of government, foreign-policy objectives, and the personality of the national leader. The processes by which external proliferation incentives and disincentives are perceived and acted upon also differ from one state to the next. In particular, little is known about the differences among authoritarian, totalitarian, and democratic states as they approach such decisions.

Predisposing factors are internal factors that enhance a state' s general tendency to acquire weapons of mass destruction. These factors include the following:

I. the personality of the national leader reinforces the drive for weapons of mass destruction (e.g., megalomania combined with paranoia or profound insecurity);

2. the acquisition of biological weapons is supported by prominent government scientists, military planners, and political officials;

3. the state has an autocratic regime structure with a top-down policymaking process that is insensitive to domestic public opinion, and a government-controlled press;

4. military policymaking is rigidly compartmentalized and non-transparent, so that the existence of a BW program may be a closely guarded secret;

5. the state's political culture emphasizes national self-determination over the norm of nonproliferation, which may be perceived as discriminatory;

6. the state has an expansionist, irredentist, or revolutionary ideology rather than a status-quo foreign policy; and

7. the regime is internationally isolated and may already be viewed as a "pariah," making it less responsive to international legal norms, incentives, or the threat or imposition of economic sanctions.

Other predisposing factors at the institutional and bureaucratic levels involve the participation of scientists and military organizations in proliferation decision-making.

Role of scientists. Studies of weapons acquisition in the United States have documented the important role of scientists in driving technological innovation from the bottom-up.17

The extent to which scientists have the freedom to develop and promote innovations in authoritarian regimes is unclear, but without sufficient scientific expertise, successful development and weaponization of BW agents would be impossible. It is therefore likely that a successful BW program requires the close collaboration of government scientists and engineers with political decision-makers and military strategists. Soviet biologists reportedly agreed to participate in BW research because they understood that their field "was doomed without employing the funds and facilities of the military­industrial complex. Private interests were also involved: many biologists became academicians, state prize winners, heroes of socialist labor and were given honored places in the Academy of Sciences."18 Once a BW program has been established, participating scientists may promote the utility of these weapons with the military and political leadership.

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Organizational interests. Numerous case studies of weapons acquisition have shown that large procurement programs engender organizational structures that can entrench weapon systems long after their strategic rationale has disappeared.19 One reason is that the senior scientists and government officials involved in the development and production of a weapon system generally acquire a vested interest in its perpetuation, including career goals, status, and special prerequisites. The U.S. Army Chemical Corps, for example, long served as a powerful institutional defender of offensive CBW capabilities. Military staffs may also oppose disarmament treaties that require them to renounce potent weapons, and, when overruled, may drag their feet in implementing such agreements. Bureaucratic obstacles of this type appear to have delayed the elimination of the Soviet/Russian BW program (see case study below).

7. Bureaucratic and Institutional Factors: Disincentives for BW Proliferation

Bureaucratic disincentives for the acquisition of BW may arise from the competition among government ministries for scarce resources.

Competition for budgetary resources. Within the military sector, officials may prefer to spend money on conventional weapons such as tanks, fighter aircraft, and battleships, which have more obvious military utility and support traditional armed-service roles and miSSIOnS.

Failure of assimilation. The degree of assimilation of a particular type of weaponry into mainstream military doctrine affects the armament process. Frederic Brown' s landmark study of the non-use of chemical weapons during World War II concluded that a major explanatory factor was the reluctance of both the German and allied military hierarchies to integrate offensive chemical warfare into their doctrine, strategy, and tactics. 20

Role of public opinion. In democratic states such as Sweden, Japan, and the United States, public opinion strongly constrains the ability of a government to acquire or use a BW capability. However, this constraint is weak or nonexistent in authoritarian regimes, where military matters are shrouded in secrecy and the population enjoys few if any freedoms of the press or of individual expression.

8.Precipitating Factors

Precipitating factors are short-term events that catalyze BW proliferation. The decision to acquire weapons of mass destruction can be triggered by "situational variables," such as an international crisis that provides the opportunity to forge a bureaucratic consensus, the acquisition of a nuclear capability by a hostile state in the region, or a major change in political leadership.21 Short-term events that might influence a state's decision to acquire biological weapons include the following:

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I. the outbreak of war or the emergence of an acute security threat or imminent military intervention;

2. the sudden disappearance of a superpower patron or the breakdown of a regional security arrangement or alliance;

3. a rapid and unexpected change of regime (e.g., by military coup rather than democratic election); and

4. the suspected acquisition by a regional adversary of a nuclear, chemical, or biological capability.

In summary, two categories of factors--predisposing and precipitating--appear to influence how a given state responds to the proliferation incentives and disincentives in its security environment.

9. Case Studies of BW Acquisition

Although the typology presented above was derived from anecdotal evidence, few detailed case studies of BW proliferators are available. In recent years, however, the political transformations of the Soviet Union and South Africa, and the extensive investigations in Iraq by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), have made available a wealth of detailed information on the BW programs of these three countries, providing a rare opportunity to gain insights into the motivations underlying BW proliferation. These three cases are summarized briefly below.

9.1 SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA

The Soviet Union began preparing for biological warfare in the early 1930s. In 1931, a secret laboratory for research on anthrax was established in the Siberian city of Tabolsk.22 In 1933, the Special-Purpose Bureau of the OGPU (Soviet secret police) established a BW research and development facility at Pokrovskiy Monastery in the town of Suzdal. According to one account, "The monastery gates were tightly wrapped in a half-meter layer of thick felt which had been saturated with formalin and lysol. Standing in the Zachatyevsk Church were cages containing marmosets, guinea pigs, and jars filled with laboratory rats."23 Medical experiments were also reportedly performed on human prisoners, who were deliberately infected with cholera, plague, malaria, and tetanus.

In 1935, when rumors began to spread around the district about sinister activities at the monastery, the OGPU moved the BW program to to Gorodomyla Island on Lake Seliger in Kalinin Oblast, where experimentation continued throughout World War II?4 Also in 1933, the Red Army opened a BW research facility called the Scientific-Research Institute of Microbiology in the village of Perkushkovo near Moscow. In 1942, this institute was moved to Kirov, 900 kilometers northwest of Moscow, to prevent it from being captured by the advancing German army.25

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During the 1950s, the Soviet military conducted research and development on anthrax, tularemia, brucellosis, plague, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, typhus, Q fever, and botulinum toxin. In 1954, a top-secret BW test site was opened on two islands in the Aral Sea, Komsomolsk Island and Vozrozhdeniye Island.26 In 1960, a shift in the wind led to the widespread contamination of Komsomolsk Island with a hazardous agent, forcing an emergency evacuation. From then on, the island remained off-limits to human visitors.Z7

During the 1960s, the Soviets built experimental plants at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk to explore the possibility of industrial production of BW agents if the need arose. Storage facilities with protective berms were constructed alongside the plants. Soviet researchers also tested various BW formulations, which were loaded into prototypes of aerial bombs, missile warheads, and spray tanks.Z8

The Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 10, 1972, ratified it on March 26, 1975, and was a depositary of the treaty along with the United States and the United Kingdom.29 Nevertheless, Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev proceeded secretly to expand the Soviet offensive BW program and open additional facilities.

9.1.1. BW Facilities Under Military Control During the 1970s, U.S. and British intelligence agencies identified possible Soviet BW facilities at several military installations equipped with high incinerator stacks and cold­storage bunkers, including Aksu, Berdsk, Omutninsk, Pokrov, Sverdlovsk, and Zagorsk.30 In April and May 1979, an unusual outbreak of human anthrax in Sverdlovsk claimed at least 68 lives. The United States alleged that the outbreak had been caused by the accidental release of anthrax spores from the military biological facility in the city, but Moscow insisted that the source had been consumption of contaminated meat. (In the mid-1990s, independent analyses of pathological and epidemiological evidence revealed that the epidemic had involved pulmonary rather than intestinal anthrax and that the casualties had all lived or worked within a narrow zone downwind of the suspect facility, providing strong support for the U.S. allegations? 1)

On October 13, 1987, the Soviet Union officially declared five microbiological laboratories under Ministry of Defense control: the Institute of Military Medicine in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), the Scientific Research Institutes of Microbiology in Kirov and Sverdlovsk (Y ekaterinburg), the Scientific Research Institute of Sanitation in Zagorsk (Sergiyev Posad), and an unidentified facility in Aralsk, Kazakstan.32 In 1991, a U.S. Department of Defense publication, Soviet Military Forces in Transition, observed that the activities underway at these facilities were "not consistent with any reasonable standard of what could be justified on the basis of prophylactic, protective, or peaceful purposes."33

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In 1989, Vladimir Pasechnik, director of the Leningrad Institute of Ultrapure Biological Preparations, defected to England.34 He claimed that the Soviet Union had engaged in systematic deception on BW issues throughout the 1980s and possessed not one but two offensive programs, employing a total of some 6,500 dedicated scientific workers. In addition to the research activities of the Soviet Academies of Science and Medicine funded by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Pasechnik revealed a second, previously unknown BW program based in ostensibly civilian facilities under the auspices of a state-owned industrial biotechnology enterprise, the All-Union Scientific Production Association Biopreparat.

9.1.2. The Biopreparat Complex The Communist Party Central Committee established the Biopreparat organization in 1973, a year after the Soviet Union signed the BWC but before it ratified. (Even prior to formal ratification, however, the Vienna Convention on Treaties forbids signatories from undermining the aims of an agreement.) Although Biopreparat was funded by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the USSR Council of Ministers placed it under the civilian "cover" of the Main Administration of the Microbiological Industry (Glavmikrobioprom). The Biopreparat complex included several institutes and plants formerly subordinated to the Ministries of Agriculture and Health?5 In addition to legitimate commercial activities such as vaccine production, the institutes engaged in an offensive BW research and development.

Biopreparat had an annual budget of approximately 100 million rubles, was run by about 150 managers, and functioned autonomously despite its formal subordination to other ministries. Because the first director of Biopreparat was General Vsevolod I. Ogarkov, the complex was known informally as "the Ogarkov system." His successors were Col. Gen. Yefim Ivanovich Smirnov, a former Soviet Minister of Health36 and Yuri T. Kalinin, a former general in the Chemical Troops of the Soviet Army. 37

During the 1980s, Biopreparat employed more than 25,000 people-about 1,000 of them Ph.D. scientists-at 18 research institutes, six mothballed production plants, and a large storage facility in Siberia. Since state funding for civilian biological research was minimal, many Soviet biologists were willing to engage in military research. According to a Russian journalist, "There was but one reason, the most earthly-money. Given the traditionally meager financing provided to biological science in the USSR, only the military program provided a possibility for fully productive work."38 Even so, it is unclear whether these Soviet biologists knew the real purpose of their work or were aware that it violated an international treaty.

9.1.3. Key Biopreparat Facilities The Biopreparat complex was centered around four primary research facilities in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg), Obolensk, Koltsovo, and Chekhov. The State Scientific Institute of Ultrapure Biological Preparations was founded in Leningrad in 1974, ostensibly for vaccine development. According to former director Pasechnik, however,

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the institute's assigned task from 1983 to 1985 was to study militarily useful strains of tularemia and other microbial pathogens and increase their virulence. Researchers also developed the means to deliver respirable aerosols of microbial and toxin agents by artillery shell, bomb, or missile, and to enhance the persistence and dispersal of aerosolized agents in the open air. Beginning in 1985, the Leningrad institute developed efficient production processes for a genetically engineered strain of pneumonic plague resistant to cold, heat, and several antibiotics.39

The State Research Center for Applied Microbiology in Obolensk (100 kilometers south of Moscow) employed about 2,700 people in 1990 and worked on virulent strains of bacteria, including tularemia, anthrax, plague, and Legionnaire's disease. The center had rows of large fermentors capable of mass-producing BW agents. In an "aerosol­dissemination test chamber" roughly 50 feet on each side, test animals were tethered to the floor and exposed to BW agent aerosols released from ceiling vents. Sensors measured the dispersion rate of the aerosol while monitors tracked the vital signs of the doomed animals. Obolensk also had a reinforced "explosive-test chamber" in which prototype BW munitions were detonated.40

The Vektor Scientific Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology in Koltsovo (near Novosibirsk) was established in 1985 and was a totally secret institution until 1990. At the height of the Cold War, several facilities at Koltsovo employed about 6,000 people (including more than -120 Ph.D.s) who did research and development on deadly hemorrhagic fever viruses and Eastern equine encephalitis virus.41

The Institute of Immunological Design at Lyubuchany near the city of Chekhov, in Moscow oblast, was founded in 1980. It had more than 100 scientists on its staff who engaged in basic and applied research and development, and a small pilot fermentation plant. The institute played a major role in developing technology for production of a live tularemia vaccine, as well as diagnostic kits for the detection of tularemia.42

Beginning in 1984, the top priority in the five-year plan for the Biopreparat research institutes was to alter genetic structure of known pathogens to make them resistant to Western antibiotics.43 A more ambitious effort to develop entirely novel BW agents through genetic engineering was reportedly unsuccessful. According to a Russian account, "It turned out that no decision by the party or government could force a microbe to alter its face. To obtain a bacterium or virus with pre-specified properties is an almost hopeless business if you do not know the nature of those properties."44

During the late 1980s, open-air tests of various BW agents on Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea were associated with a series of mysterious ecological disasters in the region. In May 1988, about half a million antelope died on the Turgay Steppe, and in July 1989 a major outbreak of plague in the region killed entire flocks of sheep.45

In addition to research institutes and test sites, the Biopreparat complex included plants capable of producing large quantities of plague bacteria and other BW agents in

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wartime. Production equipment was mothballed in special shops at the Berdsk and Omutninsk Chemical Plants and the Progress Plant in Stepnogorsk, Kazakstan. The Stepnogorsk facility was built in the early 1980s to a dual-purpose specification requiring that production of biological weapons could be brought on-stream with six months' notice. Several buildings at the site were specifically designed and built to produce, process, handle, store, and weaponize offensive BW agents, including one in which bomblets could be filled with agent payload.46 To plan for wartime contingencies, the Biopreparat organization established a "mobilization" program and department.47 By 1987, the Biopreparat network had the capacity to produce 200 kilograms of freeze-dried plague bacteria per week if ordered to do so.48

9.1.4. Strategic Rationale for the Soviet BW Program Little information is available from open sources on the military or strategic doctrine underlying the Soviet BW program. Reportedly, high-ranking Soviet generals were briefed on the availability of a latent BW production capability and integrated it into their military planning. Biological agents, termed "weapons of special designation," could be used not only as weapons of last resort but to support conventional military operations-for example, by incapacitating enemy reinforcements and contaminating

d "1 49 ports an rat centers.

Another possible motivation for the secret BW program was as a strategic weapon in the event that the Soviet nuclear arsenal ceased to represent a credible deterrent. After the Reagan Administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983, Moscow may have wished to hedge against the possibility that the SDI program might eventually yield an effective space-based laser defense, blunting the Soviet nuclear retaliatory capability and exposing Moscow to U.S. nuclear blackmail. Since biological agents could be delivered against cities and other strategic targets by covert means, they might offer a fallback deterrent. Indeed, in a polemic against the SDI program, Politboro member Valentin Falin made a veiled threat to this effect.

9. 1.5. Soviet/Russian Response to Allegations Vladimir Pasechnik's revelations about the Biopreparat complex stunned the U.S. and British governments. According to one official, "A whole ministry exposed, billions of roubles spent, a complete organization shown to be a front; then there was the clear involvement of Gorbachev, this friend of the West. It just went on and on."50 This intelligence windfall prompted U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to raise the allegations privately with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who adamantly denied them.

In late 1990, however, in response to persistent demarches by Washington and London, Gorbachev invited both countries to send a joint team of experts to inspect the major Biopreparat research institutes, provided the site visits took place without publicity. U.S., British, and Russian officials negotiated inspection procedures, and in January 1991 a team of U.S./UK experts visited some of the Biopreparat institutes. After a two-

47

week tour in which the inspectors were allowed to see restricted areas, make sound and video recordings, and take samples, they came away with information that "tended to confirm our suspicions, without providing a smoking gun," according to a U.S. official. The team found evidence of extensive military ties to the ostensibly civilian facilities, learned that secret research was underway, and found "production capabilities clearly in excess of any legitimate work."51 Similar conclusions were reached by a group of seven scientists from Merck, a New Jersey-based pharmaceutical company, who visited civilian and military biological facilities in Russia in early 1992 to look for investment

. . 52 opportumties.

Although Gorbachev never admitted the existence of the BW program, his successor, Russian Federation President Boris Y eltsin, was more forthcoming. In a speech on January 29, 1992, Yeltsin referred to a "lag in implementing" the 1972 BWC by the former Soviet Union and then Russia. 53 On February 1, in a meeting with President Bush at Camp David, Yeltsin revealed that according to a confidential report prepared at his direction by General Anatoly Kuntsevich, the Soviet military had illegally developed prototypes of aerial bombs and rocket warheads capable of carrying anthrax, tularemia, and Q fever agents. Kuntsevich later stated publicly that the Soviet offensive BW program had existed through 1990, after being scaled back during the six years of Gorbachev's presidency.54 Although the Soviet Union had initially pursued offensive BW research and development to match the American BW program, Moscow had not halted these efforts after ratifying the BWC.

On April11, 1992, Yeltsin responded to the Kuntsevich report by issuing Edict No. 390 committing Russia, as the legal successor to the USSR, to comply with the BWC. This action was prompted by conditions imposed by the U.S. Congress on the release of $400 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for the dismantlement of Soviet nuclear and chemical weapons.55 In an interview with a Russian newspaper on May 27, 1992, Yeltsin acknowledged that the Sverdlovsk anthrax epidemic of 1979 had been caused by the accidental release of anthrax spores from a military facility and not by natural causes, as previously claimed by senior Soviet officials.56 (In March 1997, however, the Russian delegation to the Ad Hoc Group in Geneva disavowed Yeltsin's admission and once again insisted that the source of the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak had been contaminated meat. 57)

After Yeltsin's edict, military funding for the Russian BW program was cut, and some of the research facilities associated with the program were assigned new civilian missions. Kuntsevich declared that the Vozrozhdeniye Island test site (now on Kazak territory) had been closed and that "special-purpose structures" at the test site would be dismantled. The island would be decontaminated over two or three years, after which Russia would transfer it to back to Kazakstan.58

In July 1992, the Russian government provided a draft history of its post-1946 offensive BW program to U.S. officials, who responded that the declared list of activities was incomplete.59 In particular, the draft history did not acknowledge that the Soviet Union

48

had filled and stockpiled biological weapons and had engaged in the extensive production of mycotoxins (fungal poisons).60 Soviet officials denied that any stockpiles of biological weapons existed (since all of the agents produced had a short shelf-life) and insisted that the development of BW munitions had been halted at the prototype stage.61

On August 24, 1992, U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd wrote a joint letter to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stating: 62

"We are very concerned that some aspects of the offensive biological warfare program, which President Y eltsin acknowledged as having existed and which he then banned in April, are in fact being continued covertly and without his knowledge. This issue could undermine the confidence in the U.S. and UK's bilateral relationships with Russia."

On August 31, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher confirmed press reports that Washington and London were pursuing high-level discussions with Moscow about its BW program. "To date, we do not have the kind of concrete actions that would indicate that the Russian government has effectively terminated the illegal Soviet offensive biological weapon program," Boucher said.63 In late 1992, the CIA brought out another Russian defector who confirmed Pasechnik's story and claimed that the research and development of new strains of genetically-engineered "supergerms" was

d. 64 procee mg apace.

9.1.6. The Trilateral Process After negotiations in Moscow on September 10-11, 1992, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation signed a Trilateral Agreement specifying a program of measures to build confidence that Russian biological disarmament was being carried out. According to a joint statement, "The three governments confirmed their commitment to full compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention and stated their agreement that biological weapons have no place in their forces."65 The fact that the text of the Trilateral Agreement referred to the "dismantlement of experimental technological lines for the production of biological agents" confirmed that at least pilot production had occurred. At a press conference announcing the agreement, Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov admitted that the Soviet Union and then Russia had violated the BWC until March 1992 and that the offensive BW program had been "one of the best guarded secrets of the old Soviet Union."66 Nevertheless, Berdennikov denied that Russia had engaged in any large-scale production of agents, had filled munitions, or possessed any stockpiled weapons.

Under the Trilateral Agreement, Russia agreed to terminate all offensive BW research, dismantle pilot production lines, close testing facilities, cut personnel involved in military biological programs by 50 percent, and reduce funding for such activities by 30

49

percent. Defensive BW research would henceforth be performed only in specialized military institutes. The agreement also provided for short-notice inspection visits to "any non-military biological site" suspected of being involved in the Russian BW program, to include "unrestricted access, sampling, interviews with personnel, and audio and video taping." Such site visits would, however, be "subject to the need to respect proprietary information on the basis of agreed principles."67 After initial U.S./UK visits to Russian facilities, Russian teams would make reciprocal visits to American and British facilities on the same basis.68

In February 1993, Igor Vlasov, a department head with the Russian President's Committee on Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, insisted that no biological weapons existed on Russian territory. "We have no stocks of biological weapons as such, so there is nothing to get rid of," he said, adding that "work related to the possible production of biological weapons in Russia has been fully stopped and all pilot facilities for producing germs have been dismantled." Any research projects Russia maintained in this area, he said, were devoted exclusively to the development of defenses against the most dangerous agents. 69 Russia's 1993 declaration under the confidence-building measures to the BWC made no mention of offensive BW activities but described a defensive program centered at five primary facilities and supported by seven others, with a staff of at least 6,000.70 Yet this defensive program appeared to incorporate a significant portion of the facilities and personnel of the former offensive program and was extremely large for its stated purpose.

In the fall of 1993, another senior official from the Biopreparat organization defected to the British intelligence service MI-6 and claimed that the Russian military had taken steps to preserve the offensive BW program in defiance of Yeltsin' s orders. According to an account by James Adams in the March 27, 1994 issue of the London Sunday Times: 71

"In every facility that had been opened for inspection to Western intelligence, the Russians had established convincing cover stories that made it appear as if each site had been converted to research or manufacture of vaccines. The secret work continued in parts of the sites that were never visited by the American or British officials. At the same time, a secret new facility was being built at Lakhta near St. Petersburg. Far from the Biopreparat biological warfare program being shut down, it had undergone considerable modernization."

Adams alleged that the Russian military was secretly developing a new strain of plague so powerful that just 200 kilograms of dried agent, sprayed from an aircraft, could kill 500,000 people. He also claimed that evidence for this program had come from three defectors, one to CIA and two to MI-6.72 The Russian Ministry of Defense categorically denied the Sunday Times report the next day.73

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9.1.7. The Risk of "Brain Drain" According to Vladimir Pasechnik, approximately 6,500 dedicated scientific workers were involved in the Soviet BW program, raising concerns that Yeltsin's edict to eliminate the Russian BW program could lead to a "brain drain" of BW experts to other proliferant states?4 From the late 1980s to 1994, for example, the virology institute at Koltsovo lost an estimated 3,500 personnel, whose whereabouts are unknown.75

According to 1992 congressional testimony by then-CIA Director Robert Gates, the most serious problem involves BW experts whose skills have no civilian counterpart, such as bioengineers specializing in the weaponization of BW agents. 76 On August 25, 1995, the London Sunday Times reported that the recruitment of Russian BW experts had enabled Iran to make a "quantum leap forward" in its development of biological weapons, allowing Tehran to proceed directly from basic research to production and to acquire an effective delivery system.77 Although this account is anecdotal, the U.S. intelligence community is paying close attention to scientists formerly involved in the Soviet BW program, as well as potential customers.78

One effort to address the brain-drain problem is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, which became operational in August 1992 and funds civilian research projects by former Soviet weapons scientists. According to 1996 figures, however, only 4 percent of the projects funded by the ISTC involve biologists. 79

Tentative efforts have also been made to convert Biopreparat facilities to legitimate commercial activities, such as the former BW production plant in Stepnagorsk, Kazakstan.80 The government of Kazakstan wants to dismantle the infrastructure associated with the former BW program and find legitimate employment for the large remaining cadre of BW experts. Conversion of the Stepnagorsk plant has been slowed, however, by problems of financing and liability. Western pharmaceutical firms have hesitated to invest in Biopreparat production facilities because they do not meet U.S. good manufacturing practice (GMP) standards, raising concerns about quality-control. Since research-intensive biotechnology companies do not require GMP facilities, however, they might find it attractive to take advantage of the pool of skilled researchers by forming joint ventures with the Biopreparat institutes.81

9.1.8. Current Status of the Russian BW Program Today, the status of the Russian offensive BW program remains uncertain. Despite modest steps toward conversion, the veil of secrecy that surrounds the Soviet/Russian BW program has contributed to suspicions in the West that elements of the offensive program may persist. Although some research and production facilities have been closed or scaled-down, substantial know-how and access to biological research materials remain, and some offensive research may be continuing in defiance of Y eltsin' s edict. Under the Trilateral Agreement, the United States and Britain have sought to arrange visits to the microbiological facilities operated by the Russian Ministry of Defense, but these requests have been turned down. According to the 1996 ACDA arms control

I. 82 comp tance report:

"With regard to former Soviet biological weapons related facilities, some research and production facilities are being deactivated and many have taken severe personnel and funding cuts. However, some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the capability to produce biological warfare agents.... With regard to the trilateral process that began in 1992, while there has been progress toward achieving the openness intended in the Joint Statement, the progress has not resolved all U.S. concerns."

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In sum, bureaucratic inertia and resistance from elements of the Russian military have slowed the BW demilitarization effort. 83 A powerful lobby within the Russian government, including senior members of the Ministry of Defense, appears to have resisted the complete elimination or conversion of Russia' s former BW facilities. 84 In a speech to the Fourth BWC Review Conference, ACDA Director John Holum said:

"In 1992 ... President Yeltsin publicly and bravely acknowledged and then renounced the massive offensive biological weapons program Russian had inherited from the Soviet Union. The challenge to demonstrate full eradication of that program still remains."85

It remains to be seen if the Yeltsin administration has the political will to remove senior officials associated with the offensive BW program and replace them with individuals who are prepared to implement a comprehensive demilitarization effort.

9.2. IRAQ

Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq had the largest and most sophisticated BW program in the developing world. The best source of unclassified information on the Iraqi BW program is the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was established by the UN Security Council after the Gulf War to eliminate or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles. Immediately after the war, Iraq denied any possession of biological weapons. Over the next five years, however, persistent detective work by UNSCOM personnel gradually revealed that Iraq had acquired a remarkably extensive and sophisticated BW arsenal. 86

The first major breakthrough came in late 1994, when Iraq declared that the Technical and Scientific Materials Import Division (TSMID) of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization had imported large quantities of culture media on behalf of the Ministry of Health. Although Iraq claimed that the media had been intended for disease diagnosis in hospital laboratories, the TSMID purchases totaled 39 metric tons in 25-100 kilogram drums, whereas hospitals use only small quantities of media in small packages to reduce waste from spoilage. Moreover, the types of media imported were unsuitable for diagnostic purposes but ideal for the cultivation of BW agents such as

52

anthrax bacteria. By the summer of 1995, 17 tons of the imported culture media remained unaccounted for, and Iraq's cover story was unconvincing.87

A second breakthrough in the UNSCOM investigation occurred with the defection in August 1995 of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, a son-in-law of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the mastermind behind Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. Kamel provided a wealth of additional information on the country's pre-war BW activities. In addition, his revelations forced Baghdad to admit it had mass­produced and weaponized one microbial agent and two potent toxins.

9.2.1. History of the Iraqi BW Program According to statements by Iraqi officials, Iraq adopted a policy to acquire biological weapons in 1974.88 The following year, a BW research and development program began at the AI Hazen Ibn AI Haytham Institute at AI Salman, south of Baghdad, but the work was poorly directed and equipped, and was terminated in 1978. Seven years later, in 1985, a group of biologists in the Taxies Evaluation Group at the Muthanna State Establishment, Iraq's main facility for chemical weapons research and development, proposed reviving the BW program and won the endorsement of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD). In the context of the ongoing Iran-Iraq War, the MOD may have viewed BW as a potential means of neutralizing Iran's numerical superiority on the battlefield.

Muthanna recruited personnel and obtained equipment throughout 1985, and by the end of the year a staff of 10 was working on BW research. Initial research efforts focused on literature studies until April 1986, when bacterial strains were imported from suppliers in France and the United States. At this juncture, research concentrated on the characterization of Bacillus anthracis (the bacterium that causes anthrax) and Clostridium botulinum (the bacterium that produces botulinum toxin) to establish pathogenicity, growth and sporulation conditions, and storage parameters. In May 1987, the BW program was transferred from Muthanna to a laboratory complex at AI Salman, south of Baghdad, where it came administratively under the Forensic Research Department of the Technical Research Center (TRC), which reported to the Iraqi Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). The TRC had a murky organizational surbordination, with more links to the Iraqi security services than to the MOD.

Fermentation tanks were transferred from Muthanna to AI Salman, new equipment was acquired, and additional staff joined the BW group, bringing the workforce to about 18. This team studied the effects of BW agents on larger animals (sheep, donkeys, monkeys, and dogs) in experiments conducted in the laboratory, in an inhalation chamber, and in the field. In mid-1987, the Technical Research Center took over a former single-cell protein plant at Taji that was in a rundown condition and did not become operational until early 1988. With a workforce of eight people and one 450-liter fermenter, the Taji plant began production of botulinum toxin in February or March of 1988 and continued until September/October of that year. Meanwhile, production of botulinum toxin also took place at AI Salman in flasks and laboratory fermenters.

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In spring 1988, the BW research program at Al Salman was expanded to include the development of two more deadly agents: Clostridium peifringens, a bacterium that infects wounds and causes gas gangrene, and a fungal poison called aflatoxin. Aflatoxin was produced by growing the fungal mold Aspergillus in 5-liter glass flasks. Iraqi scientists also conducted research on the toxic effects of aflatoxins, both in isolation and in combination with other chemicals. Iraq has also admitted to experimenting with a variety of other lethal and incapacitating agents, which it claims were never produced in quantity. The following agents were studied:

1. wheat cover smut, an anti-plant agent intended for use against enemy wheat crops as an economic weapon;

2. two lethal fungal toxins known as trichothecene mycotoxins, which were reportedly produced only in milligram amounts;

3. ricin, a deadly toxin extracted from castor beans, of which at least 10 liters of concentrated material were produced, filled into munitions, and tested without promising results;

4. three incapacitating viral agents (hemorrhaging conjunctivitis virus, which causes painful eye inflammation and temporary blindness; rotavirus, which causes acute diarrhea that can lead to dehydration and death; and camelpox, which causes fever and skin rash in camels but may have been developed as a simulant); and

5. two lethal viruses (yellow fever and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic virus.)

9.2.2. Large-Scale Production and Weaponization Towards the end of 1987, the Technical Research Center submitted a report to MIC on the success of the BW research and development program, which led to a decision to enter full-scale production. In March 1988, a site for BW agent production was selected at a remote desert location known as Al Hakam, 55 kilometers southwest of Baghdad, and given the designator "324." The plan for the new facility envisaged research and development, production, and storage of BW agents but not the filling of munitions, which would take place at Muthanna. AI Hakam was constructed in great secrecy and was equipped with extensive security features such as fencing, guard towers, and decoy bunkers. (After the war, Iraq declared AI Hakam as a civilian facility for the production of single-cell protein and biopesticide, and not until 1995 was it identified as a former BW production facility. The plant was subsequently destroyed by UNSCOM in the summer of 1996.)

During 1988, several production fermentors were transferred from other facilities to Al Hakam. Iraq also ordered 5,000-liter fermentors from Switzerland, but an export license was not granted. Construction of the production halls at the northern end of the Al Hakam site was largely completed by September 1988, after which work began on erection of the laboratory buildings.

Because of the Muthanna State Establishment's extensive experience with weaponizing chemical agents, it assisted with the selection of BW weapons types and the conduct of

54

field trials. The first trials of aerial bombs filled with anthrax simulant (Bacil'IJ.s sabtilis) and botulinum toxin were performed at the Muhammadiyat Test Range at Muthanna in March 1988. The weapons were detonated on test stands and their effects observed on test animals (for botulinum toxin) or on Petri dishes (for Bacillus subtilis). The first tests indicated that the agent aerosols did not spread very far and hence were considered failures. Later in March, however, a second set of field trials was successful.

At the end of 1988, pilot-production studies with anthrax were conducted at AI Salman using 7-liter and 14-liter laboratory-scale fermentors. Beginning in early 1989, a 150-liter fermentor that had been transferred from Muthanna to AI Salman was used to produce the anthrax simulant Bacillus subtilis. After five or six production runs of simulant, cultivation of anthrax bacteria began .at AI Salman in March 1989. About 1 ,500 liters of agent were generated in 15 production runs and concentrated down to 150 liters, forming a slurry. In November 1989, further weaponization trials were conducted at the Muhammadiyat Test Range, this time using 122mm rockets filled with anthrax simulant, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin. Live firings of 122mm rockets were carried out in May 1990, and trials of R400 aerial bombs with all three agents were performed in August.

9.2.3. "Crash" Production Campaign After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi BW program shifted from research and development to a "crash" program of industrial production and weaponization, with the apparent aim of fielding a strategic offensive BW capability. Aflatoxin production was moved from AI Salman to a facility at Fudaliyah, which from May to December 1990 produced a total of 1,850 liters of concentrated toxin in solution. At AI Hakam, production of botulinum toxin began in April 1989, followed by anthrax simulant, with production of real anthrax starting in early 1990. AI Hakam produced a total of about 6,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin and 8,425 liters of anthrax in 1990. Six fermentors at the Food and Mouth Disease Vaccine Plant at Daura, Baghdad, were shifted to production of botulinum toxin, and large-scale production of anthrax and Clostridium perfringens began at AI Hakam. All told, Iraq produced a total of at least 19,000 liters of concentrated botulinum toxin, 8,500 liters of a slurry of anthrax spores, and 2,200 liters of concentrated aflatoxin.

9.2.4. Munitions and Delivery Systems Large-scale filling of BW munitions began at Muthanna in December 1990. For aerial delivery, the Iraqis selected R400 bombs, of which 100 were filled with botulinum toxin, 50 with anthrax, and 16 with aflatoxin. In addition, 25 AI Hussein (extended-range Scud) missile warheads, manufactured since August in a special production run, were filled with BW agents: 13 with botulinum toxin, 10 with anthrax, and 2 with aflatoxin. (Clostridium perfringens and ricin were reportedly produced in significant quantities but not weaponized.) According to Iraqi declarations, biological munitions were deployed in early January 1991 at four locations, where they remained throughout the war. Aerial bombs filled with biological agents were deployed to three remote airfields, where they were placed in open pits, covered with canvas, and buried with dirt to shield them from

55

attack. The 10 anthrax warheads for the Al-Hussein missiles were reportedly hidden in a railroad tunnel north of Mansuriya ( 40 kilometers northeast of Baghdad), while the other 15 warheads were buried in earth-covered pits near the Tigris canal. 89 The biological warheads remained under the administrative control of the 1st Missile Maintenance Battalion. Technicians from AI Hakam would check on the warheads every two or three days.

Iraq also acquired 52 custom-built Mistral aerosol generators from Italy, ostensibly for spraying fruit trees with pesticides. These aerosol generators had adjustable nozzles capable of delivering a range of BW agents, and were small enough to be mounted on a pickup truck, all-terrain vehicle, crop-dusting aircraft, or small boat. Each generator could aerosolize about 800 gallons of material per hour in liquid or dry form. With the appropriate wind direction and speed, a truck-mounted sprayer travelling perpendicular to the wind could generate a line-source aerosol cloud capable of contaminating hundreds of square miles of terrain. 90

Iraq also developed an indigenous spray-tank system for aerial delivery of biological agents based on a modified aircraft drop tank. The concept was that the tank would be fitted to a piloted fighter or a remotely piloted aircraft and spray up to 2,000 liters of anthrax slurry over a target. Field trials for both the spray tank and the remotely piloted vehicle were conducted in January 1991. Although the trial was considered a failure, three additional drop tanks were modified and stored, ready for use.

A declassified U.S. intelligence report, dated October 1991, also describes the modification of an Su-22 Sukhoi Fitter, a ground-attack fighter manufactured by the former Soviet Union, for the possible delivery of BW agents. According to this report: 91

"A photograph taken during the multinational invasion of Kuwait, at [Tallil] airbase approximately 10 kilometers southwest of An Nasiriyah, reveals a possible chemical/biological spray tank on the port side pylon of a probable Su-22 aircraft. The jet aircraft bears an Iraqi flag and appears to have been either hit or blown in-place by Coalition gunfire/bombs. Enlargements of the original picture reveal a possible 'air scoop' on the top-front of the tank, thus the hypothesis of a possible [chemical­biological] spray tank. This tank also has an access panel on its port side."

In addition, a blown-up vehicle next to the aircraft appears to contain "hoses and tubing which could indicate a non-standard [decontamination] vehicle for [chemical/biological] munitions."92

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A second mention of the Su-22 aircraft as a possible BW delivery system occurs in a declassified 1992 CIA document on "Iraqi BW mission planning." The sanitized document reads as follows: 93

"In the fall of 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn ordered that plans be drawn up for the airborne delivery of a biological warfare (BW) agent.... The plan called for a test mission of three MiG-21 s to conduct an air raid [deleted] using conventional high-explosive ordnance. If these aircraft were able to penetrate [deleted] air defenses and successfully bomb [deleted], then a second mission was to take off within a few days of the first, using the same flight path and approaches. The second mission, also composed of three MiG-21s carrying conventional ordnance, was to serve as a decoy for a single Su-22 aircraft following the same route but flying between 50 and 100 meters altitude. Optimal delivery altitude for the BW agent was judged to be 50 meters at a speed of 700 kilometers an hour. ... Shortly after hostilities began ... the three-MiG mission took off from Tallil Airfield, near An Nasiriyah. All three aircraft were shot down early in the mission, and as a result plans to launch the Su-22 armed with a biological agent and flying under cover of a second, decoy mission were cancelled."

9.2.5. Current Status In summary, only five years after its 1985 decision to relaunch a BW program, Iraq was able to deploy a sophisticated biological arsenal. The Iraqi BW program was remarkable in its scale and scope, encompassing a wide range of lethal and incapacitating agents. Delivery systems ranged from tactical weapons (artillery shells and 122 mm rockets) to strategic weapons (aerial bombs and missile warheads).94

According to UNSCOM officials, Iraq has employed deception and denial techniques to foil the inspection regime and retain elements of its prohibited BW program. Although Iraqi officials claim that the entire biological arsenal was destroyed after the Gulf War, they have not provided physical or documentary evidence to back up this statement. Senior UNSCOM officials now suspect that Iraq may have retained a significant stockpile of filled biological munitions. While botulinum toxin is unstable except under refrigeration and has probably degraded, dried anthrax spores have a shelf-life of at least 20 years. Although the Iraqis have declared only liquid agents, if they succeeded in producing dried anthrax spores, a hidden stockpile could represent a serious threat to the region. According to one assessment, the amount of anthrax not accounted for would be sufficient to kill millions of people, assuming optimal distribution in urban areas.95

Moreover, many Iraqi scientists who worked on the BW program are presumably still in-country and their considerable expertise could be reactivated (or exported) at some time in the future. 96

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9.2.6. Iraqi Motivations for Acquiring BW To preserve its residual :BW program, Iraq has been prepared to defy UNSCOM inspectors for more than six years, delaying the lifting of the oil embargo and forfeiting about $120 billion in oil revenues.97 Although the nuclear and chemical weapons programs have been largely destroyed, Iraq has been able to retain a residual BW capability because its is the easiest to conceal.

Why has Iraq been willing to make such financial sacrifices to retain a BW capability? The reason is Saddam Hussein's ambition to make Iraq the hegemonic power in the Persian Gulf by intimidating the smaller Gulf states, while assuming the mantle of defender of the Arab world against Iran and Israel. A watershed event was the successful Israeli air raid on June 7, 1981 against Iraq's Osirak production reactor, which dealt a major setback to the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Following that attack, Baghdad sought to deploy a strategic retaliatory capability that would deter Israel from making·' future preemptive strikes against high-value targets deep inside Iraqi territory. Some analysts also contend that Baghdad's desire to match the unconventional-warfare capabilities of Syria--its traditional rival for primacy in the region--has provided an additional incentive for Iraq 1 s strategic build-up.98

In April 1990, Saddam boasted that Iraq had developed "binary" chemical munitions and the capability to deliver them against Israeli cities.99 In contrast to Saddam's open threats of chemical warfare, however, Iraq's offensive BW arsenal remained a closely guarded secret. Although biological weapons are widely perceived as morally more abhorrent than chemical weapons, it is ·doubtful that Iraq's actions were constrained by international norms. A more likely explanation is that Iraq viewed its biological arsenal as a weapon of last resort--a trump card against total military defeat and occupation--and sought to keep it secret until the appropriate moment.

Some evidence also exists that Iraq may have intended to use chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf War to inflict high casualties on Coalition forces, generating strong pressures from U.S. public opinion to end the war and forcing the Bush Administration to reach a settlement with Baghdad. Possible insights into Iraq Is

offensive BW doctrine can be drawn from Iraqi military manuals, although the extent to which these manuals actually reflect Iraqi strategic thinking is unclear.

A manual titled Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Operations, published by the Iraqi Chemical Corps in 1984 during the Iran-Iraq War, discusses the use of biological weapons as a means of overburdening the enemy 1 s medical infrastructure and weakening morale. In a section on the tactical use ofBW agents, the manual states: "It is possible to select anti-personnel biological agents in order to cause lethal or incapacitating casualties in the battle area or in the enemy's rear areas.... Incapacitating agents are used to inflict casualties which require a large amount of medical supplies and treating facilities, and many people to treat them. Thus it is possible to hinder the opposing military operation."HXJ Another Iraqi manual titled Principles of Using Chemical and Biological Agents in Warfare, published in 1987 by the Iraqi Ministry of

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Defense, includes the following passage on the covert use of biological agents: "It is possible to undertake small attacks and sabotage operations through the use of vehicles or small boats in coastal areas. The use of these quick attacks before beginning the general offensive requires its protection and secrecy."101

Iraq has not provided a clear or consistent explanation of its military doctrine for the use of biological weapons during the Gulf War. Since the end of the war, senior Iraqi officials have claimed that their biological arsenal was intended not for tactical use but was strictly a "weapon of last resort" for retaliation against Israel in the event of a nuclear attack against Baghdad. This contingency plan, called "Operation Thunderstrike" would have involved the massive retaliation against Israeli cities with BW warheads fired from fixed launchers. According to Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, "Shortly before the Gulf War our leadership reached the following decision: as long as the enemy used conventional weapons, we would do the same. But if nuclear weapons were used against us, then our military had the following order: to utilize all weapons at our disposal, including chemical and biological agents."102 Iraqi officials told UNSCOM that Saddam Hussein had predelegated the authority to launch aerial and missile strikes with BW payloads to subordinate commanders. Thus, if Baghdad's communications were cut off or its central military command destroyed by an enemy nuclear attack, a retaliatory strike could still be carried out. 103

Senior Iraqi officials have stated that they were deterred from any first use of chemical or biological weapons by fears that the United States or Israel would retaliate with nuclear weapons. On January 9, 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III met with Tariq Aziz in Geneva and handed over a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein. The letter warned that the United States would not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons and threatened "the strongest possible response."104 In August 1995, Aziz told UNSCOM Executive Director Rolf Ekeus that he had interpreted the Bush letter to mean that the United States intended to retaliate with nuclear weapons and that as a result, Iraq had chosen not to use its chemical or biological weapons during the Gulf War, shifting instead to massive conventional retaliation. 105 In October 1995, Iraqi Oil Minister Amer Rashid insisted that Iraq would have used its BW -armed missiles only in retaliation. "Iraq had no intention of using biological weapons unless the allies or Israel attacked Baghdad with nuclear weapons," he said.106

Nevertheless, the fact that Iraq possessed a BW retaliatory option does not constitute proof that Iraq's biological arsenal was strictly a weapon of last resort. Indeed, an UNSCOM status report released in October 1995 states that the Special Commission had obtained Iraqi documents indicating that during the Gulf War, Iraq had deployed its chemical weapons "in a pattern corresponding to strategic and offensive use through surprise attack against perceived enemies. The known pattern of deployment of long­range missiles (AI Hussein) supports this contention."107 Since Baghdad would have nothing to gain from admitting plans for the first use of chemical or biological weapons, Iraqi denials should not necessarily be taken at face value.

59

9.3. SOUTH AFRICA

During the mid-1980s, the apartheid (white-minority) government in South Africa ran a secret chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program known variously as Project Coast or Project B. The program was directed by Dr. Wouter Basson, a cardiologist who headed the 7th Medical Battalion of the South African Defense Force (SADF). The South African government reportedly decided to acquire a CBW capability after Belgian chemist Aubin Heyndrickx claimed to have detected the use of chemical weapons by the MPLA forces in Angola fighting against South Africa. But Dr. Heyndrickx declined to allow his analytical data to be reviewed by his peers, and he was later convicted of fraud for misusing funds from his employer, the University of Ghent (Belgium), raising doubts about his scientific integrity. 108 U.S. intelligence assessments at the time concluded that Angola had not used chemical weapons, and there are no known allegations of Angolan b. l . l 109 10 ogtca weapons use.

Lt. Gen. Niel Knobel, the surgeon general of the South African National Defense Force (SANDF, the post-apartheid name of the SADF), claims that South Africa synthesized small amounts of chemical weapons for the sole purpose of producing antidotes and other defenses. 110 Former SADF chief Constand Viljoen has also admitted that he instructed Dr. Basson to produce a novel riot-control agent that would not kill but could be used to control rebellious blacks and prevent another Sharpeville massacre. "We were trying to avoid bloodshed," Viljoen explained. "I asked him to develop a tear gas which would neutralize the offensive spirit of the people. There was no intention of

d . d h. I ''111 pro ucmg mustar gas or anyt mg e se.

Compelling evidence suggests, however, that the 7th Medical Battalion developed lethal chemical and biological warfare agents for use in offensive military operations against Angola and Namibia, and also supplied poisons to assassins from army hit squads, although the identity of the agents involved is not yet known. According to an account published in 1995 in the London Sunday Times, "Both biological and chemical weapons were used as part of an extensive campaign of assassination against opponents of apartheid at home and abroad."112 In 1996 testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki said he beli.wed the apartheid regime used CBW agents against black liberation groups in Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique, as well as to assassinate ANC and other anti-apartheid figures living in South Africa and in Zambia and Mozambique. 113 For example, the Reverend Frank Chikane, an anti-apartheid leader and general secretary of the South African Council of Churches, became ill during a trip to Namibia on April23, 1989. He suffered vomiting, severe dizziness, and inability to walk. A few days later, when travelling to the United States for talks with President George Bush, Chikane began to suffer from a variety of symptoms, including sweating, salivating, and vomiting, muscular shakes and twitches, acute respiratory problems, and loss of consciousness. Investigations later revealed that his suitcase and clothes had been doused with a poison or toxin that he had either inhaled or absorbed through the skin. 114

60

The research, development, and production of CBW agents was conducted by a network of interlocking front companies founded by officers who had retired from the 7th Medical Battalion, including Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G Scientific.IJ5 Scientists who worked in the program also made substantial use of the forensic laboratories of the then South African Police. 116 Plans for the covert operations conducted by Basson and his associates were reportedly made at annual winter bush retreats attended by top apartheid politicians and security chiefs. According to South African military sources, many of the operations were funded with money generated by illicit drug factories in Botswana, Zambia, and Mozambique. 117

No solid information is yet available on which outside countries and companies provided materials, equipment, and technical assistance to the CBW program, although the journal Africa Confidential alleged that South Africa worked closely with Israel in the 1980s to develop a CBW capability .118 Basson testified during his bail hearing in February 1997 that he had received death threats from foreign intelligence agencies because of technology he had "obtained" from various countries for the South African CBW program. 119

In 1992, South African President Frederik W. de Klerk appointed General Pierre Steyn, a former SADF chief of staff, to investigate allegations of a covert "third force" operating within the Army responsible for a campaign of "dirty tricks" against opposition members during the apartheid period. 120 The Steyn report, submitted at the end of 1992, concluded that the SADF's 7th Medical Battalion had supplied CBW agents to Army special-forces hit squads and had also been involved in a chemical attack on Frelimo troops in Mozambique in the late 1980s. 121 The Steyn Report was considered so explosive that the de Klerk government denied its existence and sought to suppress it.

President de Klerk terminated the South African CBW program in January 1993, more than a year before the April 1994 democratic elections that brought black majority rule to South Africa. Nevertheless, the research and development records were reportedly preserved on computer optical disks, which were stored under tight security. 122 The front companies involved in the CBW program were also liquidated or privatized, a process in which Project Coast operatives pocketed state assets worth more than 50 million rand for an initial investment of as little as 350,000 rand. 123

After receiving the Steyn report, President de Klerk decided to purge the military of Basson and 22 other senior officers who had been implicated in criminal activities and irregularities, although the Attorney-General found that the evidence against Basson was not strong enough to indict him. In March 1993, Basson took early retirement from the SADF with the rank of brigadier general. After his retirement, however, he travelled to several countries including Libya, raising concerns that he might be selling military secrets. 124 Indeed, U.S. intelligence agencies monitored telephone calls by Libyan agents attempting to obtain materials, scientists, or information on the CBW program from South African arms and military establishments. 125 In October 1995, the new

61

Government of National Unity (including both the National Party and the AN C) ordered the SANDF to rehire Basson as a specialist medical consultant as a means of legally controlling his activities and movements and preventing him from selling sensitive information to other countries. 126

President Nelson Mandela was briefed on the contents of the Steyn report after taking power in 1994, and sought to keep the explosive information secret for two years to avoid disrupting the country's delicate political transition. 127 In August 1996, Mandela also supported the efforts of SADF chief Gen. Georg Meiring to keep details of the South African CBW program classified.128 In January 1997, however, the story came to light when Dr. Basson was arrested in Pretoria on charges of trafficking in the banned designer drug Ecstasy and possessing 1 ,000 tablets of the drug. Basson' s bail application was heard behind closed doors because of concern that he might reveal state secrets. According to the testimony of a national intelligence agent, highly classified documents on chemical warfare were seized from the home of Basson and a colleague. 129

On February 11, 1997, President Mandel a expressed concern about the latest reports on the South African CBW program, observing that it might be ')ust the tip of the iceberg."130 TRC investigative unit head Dumisa Ntsebeza has also stated,"It is now becoming clear to the TRC that activists and opponents of the previous regime were being poisoned systematically and there doesn't seem to be any doubt that people within the apartheid security system were responsible."131 At least some of the poisonings appear to have been joint police/military operations.

lO.Conclusions

The three case studies shed some light on the range of motivations underlying the acquisition of biological weapons by developed and developing countries. In general, countries pursue biological weapons when they are perceived as the most cost-effective means to fill an urgent security deficit. Russia was motivated to obtain a BW capability by the need for a tactical weapon to neutralize deep targets in a major conventional war and as a back-up strategic weapon to buttress nuclear deterrence. Iraq sought a BW capability as a force-multiplier to neutralize Iran's numerical superiority on the battlefield, as an interim strategic deterrent to balance Israel's nuclear capabilities until it could acquire its own nuclear arsenal, and possibly as a means of asymmetric warfare against the technologically superior conventional forces of the United States and its allies. Finally, South Africa pursued a BW capability primarily as a means of covert assassination and counterinsurgency warfare against the ANC and other foes of apartheid.

At the same time, however, the case studies suggest that a state's motivation to pursue biological weapons is not determined by security calculations alone but may also be affected by predisposing and precipitating factors, including a change in government

62

from autocracy to democracy, the creation of new regional security structures, and the strengthening of global norms. States may also be motivated to acquire biological weapons by one set of factors and to retain them by a different set. The multiplicity of factors involved in proliferation decision-making suggests that demand-side strategies such as arms control treaties, democratization programs, regional confidence-building regimes, and international sanctions may be effective in reducing the incentives that drive the proliferation of biological weapons.

AN

NE

X I

: In

form

atio

n fr

om O

pen

Sou

rces

Abo

ut K

now

n o

r S

uspe

cted

BW

Pro

life

rato

rs

U.S

. A

CD

A, "

Adh

eren

ce to

and

I U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f D

efen

se,

I Russi

an F

orei

gn I

ntel

lige

nce

Ser

vice

, C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

Arm

s C

ontr

ol

Pro

life

rati

on:

Thr

eat

and

Res

pons

e,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of

Mas

s A

gree

men

ts,"

199

6 19

96

Des

truc

tion

, 19

93

Chi

na

I "T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s be

liev

es t

hat

I "C

hina

has

a m

atur

e ch

emic

al w

arfa

re

base

d on

ava

ilab

le e

vide

nce,

ca

pabi

lity

and

may

hav

e m

aint

aine

d th

e C

hin

a m

aint

aine

d an

off

ensi

ve

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re p

rogr

am i

t ha

d pr

ior

BW

pro

gram

thr

ough

out

mos

t o

f to

acc

edin

g to

the

Bio

logi

cal

Wea

pons

th

e 19

80s.

T

he o

ffen

sive

BW

C

onve

ntio

n in

198

4 ....

Its

bio

logi

cal

prog

ram

inc

lude

d th

e w

arfa

re p

rogr

am i

nclu

ded

deve

lopm

ent,

pro

duct

ion,

m

anuf

actu

ring

inf

ecti

ous

stoc

kpil

ing

or o

ther

acq

uisi

tion

or

icro

orga

nism

s an

d to

xins

. C

hina

has

a

mai

nten

ance

of

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re

wid

e ra

nge

of

deli

very

mea

ns a

vail

able

, ag

ents

C

hin

a's

CB

M-m

anda

ted

incl

udin

g ba

llis

tic

and

crui

se m

issi

les

decl

arat

ions

hav

e no

t re

solv

ed

and

airc

raft

, an

d is

con

tinu

ing

to

U.S

. co

ncer

ns a

bout

thi

s pr

ogra

m

deve

lop

syst

ems

wit

h up

grad

ed

and

ther

e ar

e st

rong

ind

icat

ions

ca

pabi

liti

es."

th

at C

hin

a pr

obab

ly m

aint

ains

its

of

fens

ive

prog

ram

. T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s. t

here

fore

, be

liev

es t

hat

in

the

year

s af

ter

its

acce

ssio

n to

the

B

WC

, C

hina

was

not

in

com

plia

nce

wit

h it

s B

WC

ob

liga

tion

s an

d th

at i

t is

hig

hly

prob

able

tha

t it

rem

ains

no

ncom

plia

nt w

ith

thes

e ob

liga

tion

s."

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

"The

U.S

. in

tell

igen

ce c

omm

unit

y is

w

orri

ed t

hat

Ch

ina

may

hav

e re

vive

d an

d po

ssib

ly e

xpan

ded

its

offe

nsiv

e ge

rm w

eapo

ns p

rogr

am...

. T

he

pffi

cial

s sa

id U

.S.

inte

llig

ence

con

cern

ab

out

Ch

ina

are

part

ly b

ased

on

evid

ence

tha

t C

hin

a is

pur

suin

g bi

olog

ical

res

earc

h at

tw

o os

tens

ibly

ci

vili

an-r

un r

esea

rch

cent

ers

that

U.S

. of

fici

als

say

are

actu

ally

con

trol

led

by

the

Chi

nese

mil

itar

y.

The

res

earc

h ce

nter

s w

ere

know

n to

hav

e en

gage

d pr

evio

usly

in

prod

ucti

on a

nd s

tora

ge o

f bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

, th

e of

fici

als

said

. T

hey

said

U.S

. su

spic

ions

int

ensi

fied

in

199

1 w

hen

one

of

the

susp

ect

biol

ogic

al c

ente

rs w

as e

nlar

ged.

S

uspi

cion

s he

ight

ened

fun

her

last

sp

ring

, af

ter

Bei

jing

mad

e w

hat

one

U.S

. of

fici

al t

erm

ed a

'pa

tent

ly f

alse

' de

clar

atio

n to

the

Uni

ted

Nat

ions

tha

t it

had

neve

r m

ade

any

germ

wea

pons

or

con

duct

ed a

ny w

ork,

per

mit

ted

unde

r in

tern

atio

nal

trea

ties

, to

bla

ster

de

fens

es a

gain

st a

bio

logi

cal

atta

ck."

R

. Je

ffre

y S

mit

h, "

Ch

ina

May

Hav

e R

eviv

ed G

erm

Wea

pons

Pro

gram

, U

.S.

Off

icia

ls S

ay,"

T

he W

ashi

ngto

n P

ost,

Feb

ruar

y 24

, 19

93,

p. A

4.

0'1

v.>

U.S

. A

CD

A,

"Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

, R

ussi

an F

orei

gn I

ntel

lige

nce

Ser

vice

, V

ario

us A

rtic

les,

as

cite

d ~

Com

plia

nce

wit

h A

rms

Con

trol

Pr

olif

erat

ion:

Thr

eat a

nd R

espo

nse,

P

roli

fera

tion

of W

eapo

ns o

f M

ass

Agr

eem

ents

," 1

996

1996

D

estr

ucti

on,

1993

Egy

pt

"The

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

beli

eves

tha

t "T

he c

ount

ry h

as a

pro

gram

of

Egy

pt h

ad d

evel

oped

bio

logi

cal

mil

itar

y-ap

plie

d re

sear

ch i

n th

e ar

ea o

f w

arfa

re a

gent

s by

197

2.

The

re is

bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

, bu

t no

dat

a ha

ve

no e

vide

nce

to i

ndic

ate

that

Egy

pt

been

obt

aine

d to

ind

icat

e th

e cr

eati

on

had

elim

inat

ed t

his

capa

bili

ty a

nd

of b

iolo

gica

l ag

ents

in

supp

ort

of

it r

emai

ns l

ikel

y th

at t

he E

gypt

ian

mil

itar

y of

fens

ive

prog

ram

s.

The

ca

pabi

lity

to c

ondu

ct b

iolo

gica

l re

sear

ch p

rogr

ams

in t

he a

rea

of

war

fare

con

tinu

es t

o ex

ist.

" bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

dat

e ba

ck t

o th

e 19

60's

."

Indi

a 'W

hile

Ind

ia p

osse

sses

the

infr

astr

uctu

re

"Ind

ia d

oes

not

poss

ess

offe

nsiv

e ne

cess

ary

to s

uppo

rt a

n of

fens

ive

biol

ogic

al w

eapo

ns.

How

ever

, it

does

bi

olog

ical

war

fare

pro

gram

, inc

ludi

ng

have

con

side

rabl

e po

tent

ial

in t

he f

ield

hi

ghly

qua

lifi

ed s

cien

tifi

c pe

rson

nel

and

of

biot

echn

olog

y.

The

nat

ure

of

the

indu

stri

al p

rodu

ctio

n fa

cilit

ies,

it

wor

k o

f ce

rtai

n ci

vili

an r

esea

rch

appa

rent

ly h

as g

iven

pri

orit

y to

res

earc

h ce

nter

s co

oper

atin

g w

ith

the

Def

ense

an

d de

velo

pmen

t ap

plic

able

onl

y to

M

inis

try

sugg

ests

tha

t it

s re

sult

s co

uld

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re d

efen

sive

mea

sure

s."

be u

sed

for

mil

itar

y-ap

plie

d pu

rpos

es,

prim

aril

y in

a d

efen

sive

res

pect

. N

o fe

wer

tha

n fi

ve m

ilit

ary

cent

ers

are

invo

lved

in

deve

lopm

ents

in

the

mil

itar

y-bi

olog

ical

are

a.

The

pro

gram

s be

ing

cond

ucte

d by

the

se r

esea

rch

cent

ers

are

of a

cla

ssif

ied

natu

re."

Iraq

"T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s be

liev

es t

hat

"Ira

q re

veal

ed t

o U

N i

nspe

ctor

s in

"I

raq'

s ov

erse

as o

rder

s fo

r du

al-u

se

"Ant

hrax

, af

ter

bein

g dr

ied,

...

can

last

afte

r si

gnin

g th

e B

WC

in 1

972,

A

ugus

t 19

95 t

hat i

t ha

d a

far

mor

e eq

uipm

ent

and

biol

ogic

al m

ater

ial..

. fo

r de

cade

s.

UN

SC

OM

, ho

wev

er,

has

Iraq

dev

elop

ed,

prod

uced

, an

d ex

tens

ive

and

aggr

essi

ve b

iolo

gica

l ar

e be

ing

subj

ecte

d to

in-

dept

h no

t be

en a

ble

to f

ully

acc

ount

for

eit

he

stoc

kpil

ed b

iolo

gica

l w

arfa

re

prog

ram

pri

or to

the

Gul

f War

than

it

anal

ysis

. C

urre

nt c

onje

ctur

e ha

s no

t as

kn

own

stoc

kpil

es o

r th

e pr

oduc

tion

agen

ts a

nd w

eapo

ns.

Tho

ul!;h

the

ha

d pr

evio

usly

adm

itte

d. T

he I

raqi

s ye

t be

en b

orne

out

by

othe

r da

ta.

equi

pmen

t...

desp

ite

five

yea

rs o

f

U.S

. A

CD

A,

"Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

, C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

An

ns

Con

trol

P

roli

fera

tion

: T

hrea

t and

Res

pons

e,

Agr

eem

ents

," 1

996

1996

re

cent

ira

qi d

iscl

osur

es h

ave

been

cl

aim

to h

ave

prod

uced

90,

000

lite

rs o

f su

bsta

ntia

l, w

e be

liev

e th

at i

raq

botu

linu

m t

oxin

and

8,3

00 l

iter

s o

f ha

s no

t ye

t pr

esen

ted

all

deta

ils

of

anth

rax,

as

wel

l as

sig

nifi

cant

qua

ntit

ies

its

offe

nsiv

e bi

olog

ical

war

fare

o

f an

age

nt [

afla

toxi

n] t

hat

caus

es

prog

ram

. It

is p

ossi

ble

that

ira

q ca

ncer

. F

urth

er,

the

iraq

's c

laim

to h

ave

reta

ins

stoc

kpil

es o

f B

W a

gent

s lo

aded

bot

ulin

um t

oxin

and

ant

hrax

on

and

mun

itio

ns.

The

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

SC

UD

mis

sile

war

head

s an

d ae

rial

be

liev

es t

hat

iraq

is

capa

ble

of

bom

bs.

Bag

hdad

als

o ad

mit

ted

prod

ucin

g bi

olog

ical

war

fare

co

nduc

ting

res

earc

h on

myc

otox

ins

and

agen

ts a

nd is

pro

babl

y in

tent

on

infe

ctio

us v

irus

es.

The

ira

qis

clai

med

in

cont

inui

ng i

ts o

ffen

sive

BW

A

ugus

t 19

95 t

hat

they

des

troy

ed t

he

effo

rts

if th

e th

reat

of

UN

SC

OM

ag

ents

aft

er th

e G

ulf W

ar (

Janu

ary-

insp

ecti

ons

and

long

-ter

m

Feb

ruar

y 19

91 ),

but

hav

e ye

t to

pro

duce

m

onit

orin

g ar

e re

mov

ed."

ev

iden

ce to

sup

port

the

ir c

laim

."

iran

"T

he i

rani

an B

W p

rogr

am h

as

"ira

n be

gan

its

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re

been

em

bedd

ed w

ithi

n ir

an's

pr

ogra

m in

the

ear

ly 1

980s

dur

ing

the

exte

nsiv

e bi

otec

hnol

ogy

and

iran

-ira

q w

ar.

It m

ade

agre

emen

ts w

ith

phar

mac

euti

cal

indu

stri

es s

o as

to

num

erou

s co

untr

ies

for

coop

erat

ive

obsc

ure

its

acti

viti

es.

The

ira

nian

re

sear

ch,

scie

ntif

ic e

xcha

nges

, an

d m

ilit

ary

has

used

med

ical

, te

chno

logy

sha

ring

. T

he i

rani

ans

are

educ

atio

n an

d sc

ient

i fie

res

earc

h co

nduc

ting

res

earc

h on

tox

ins

and

orga

niza

tion

s fo

r m

any

aspe

cts

of

orga

nism

s w

ith

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re

BW

age

nt p

rocu

rem

ent,

res

earc

h,

appl

icat

ions

. W

ith

thei

r bi

otec

hnic

al

and

prod

ucti

on.

iran

has

als

o su

ppor

t st

ruct

ure,

the

ira

nian

s ar

e fa

iled

to

subm

it th

e da

ta

capa

ble

of

prod

ucin

g m

any

diff

eren

t de

clar

atio

ns c

alle

d fo

r in

the

bi

olog

ical

war

fare

age

nts.

ir

an h

as

CB

M's

."

evol

ved

from

pie

cem

eal

acqu

isit

ion

of

biop

roce

ssin

g eq

uipm

ent

and

is n

ow

purs

uing

com

plet

e bi

olog

ical

pro

duct

ion

plan

ts t

hat c

ould

be

conv

erte

d to

pr

oduc

ing

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re a

gent

s.

Rus

sian

For

eign

Int

elli

genc

e S

ervi

ce,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of

Mas

s D

estr

ucti

on,

1993

S

peci

fica

lly,

the

re i

s no

inf

orm

atio

n re

gard

ing

a sy

stem

of

stor

age

of

larg

e m

asse

s o

f bi

olog

ical

age

nts

and,

wha

t is

mos

t im

port

ant.

on

perf

ecte

d sy

stem

s fo

r th

e de

live

ry o

f fi

nish

ed b

iolo

gica

l w

eapo

ns."

"ira

n do

es n

ot h

ave

offe

nsiv

e bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

as

of

this

tim

e.

Bu

it is

pos

sibl

e to

say

wit

h co

nfid

ence

th

at t

here

is

a m

ilit

ary-

appl

ied

biol

ogic

al p

rogr

am...

. T

here

is

a po

ssib

ilit

y th

at s

mal

l st

ocks

of

biol

ogic

al a

gent

s ha

ve a

lrea

dy b

een

prod

uced

. W

este

rn c

ount

ries

hav

e re

cord

ed a

ttem

pts

by i

rani

an

repr

esen

tati

ves

to p

urch

ase

unof

fici

ally

eq

uipm

ent

and

biol

ogic

al m

ater

ials

su

itab

le f

or t

he p

rodu

ctio

n o

f bi

olog

ical

w

eapo

ns,

myc

otox

ins

in p

arti

cula

r."

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

insp

ecti

on in

ira

q, R

olf

Eke

us,

U

NS

CO

M's

exe

cuti

ve c

hair

man

, sa

id

Sep

t. 1

7."

Phi

lip

Fin

nega

n, "

Sad

dam

's B

io-C

hem

A

rsen

al C

ould

Sna

rl U

.S.

Gul

f P

lans

,"

Def

ense

New

s, S

epte

mbe

r 30

-O

ctob

e 6,

199

6, p

p. I

, 58

.

"[A

] C

IA r

epor

t se

nt r

ecen

tly

to t

he

Sen

ate

inte

llig

ence

com

mit

tee .

.. ac

know

ledg

es f

or t

he f

irst

tim

e th

at

iran

not

onl

y ha

s bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

, bu

t al

so t

he m

eans

to

deli

ver

them

....

Isra

eli

sour

ces

say

the

iran

ians

kee

p st

ocks

of

anth

rax

and

botu

lism

in

Tab

riz,

nor

thw

est o

f T

ehra

n, a

nd c

an

prod

uce

mor

e st

ocks

qui

ckly

....

A

ltho

ugh

they

will

not

be

able

to

put

biol

ogic

al w

eapo

ns o

n lo

ng-r

ange

ba

llis

tic

mis

sile

s be

fore

the

end

of

the

deca

de,

they

can

del

iver

the

m w

ith

Scu

d m

issi

les .

.. an

d th

ey h

ave

a sy

stem

fo

r dr

oppi

ng t

hem

fro

m S

ovie

t-er

a S

ukho

i at

tack

air

craf

t."

0'1

V1

U.S

. A

CD

A.

"Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

. C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

Ann

s C

ontr

ol

Pro

life

rati

on:

Thr

eat a

nd R

espo

nse,

A

gree

men

ts,"

199

6 19

96

Som

e o

f its

maj

or u

nive

rsit

ies

and

rese

arch

org

aniz

atio

ns m

ay b

e lin

ked

to

its b

iolo

gica

l w

arfa

re p

rogr

am."

Isra

el

Lib

ya

"Evi

denc

e in

dica

tes

that

Lib

ya h

as "

Lib

ya c

onti

nues

its

effo

rts

to e

stab

lish

th

e ex

pert

ise

to p

rodu

ce s

mal

l a

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re c

apab

ilit

y.

quan

titi

es o

f bi

olog

ical

equ

ipm

ent

How

ever

, ha

mpe

red

by i

ts i

nade

quat

e fo

r it

s B

W p

rogr

am a

nd t

hat t

he

biot

echn

ical

fou

ndat

ion,

the

Lib

yan

Lib

yan

Gov

ernm

ent

is s

eeki

ng t

o of

fens

ive

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re p

rogr

am

mov

e its

res

earc

h pr

ogra

m i

nto

a re

mai

ns i

n th

e ea

rly

rese

arch

and

pr

ogra

m o

f w

eapo

nize

d B

W

deve

lopm

ent

stag

e.

Lib

ya m

ay l

ook

to

agen

ts."

sm

all

rese

arch

and

dev

elop

men

t pr

ogra

ms

supp

orte

d by

uni

vers

itie

s to

L

__

__

fil

l in

the

gap

s in

its

tec

hnic

al

Rus

sian

For

eign

Int

elli

genc

e Se

rvic

e,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of M

ass

Des

truc

tion

, 19

93

"The

re is

no

dire

ct e

vide

nce

of

the

pres

ence

of

biol

ogic

al w

eapo

ns i

n Is

rael

. A

t th

e sa

me

tim

e ...

a ra

mif

ied

prog

ram

of

biol

ogic

al r

esea

rch

of a

ge

nera

l na

ture

, in

whi

ch e

lem

ents

of a

m

ilit

ary-

appl

ied

purp

ose

are

pres

ent,

is

bein

g im

plem

ente

d in

Isr

ael..

.. A

s a

who

le,

Isra

el p

osse

sses

a s

tron

g ci

vili

an

biot

echn

olog

y ba

se,

whi

ch,

if

nece

ssar

y, c

ould

be

redi

rect

ed f

airl

y ea

sily

to t

he p

rodu

ctio

n o

f bi

olog

ical

w

eapo

ns."

"The

re is

inf

orm

atio

n in

dica

ting

that

L

ibya

is e

ngag

ed i

n in

itia

l te

stin

g in

the

ar

ea o

f bio

logi

cal

wea

pons

. A

t th

is

stag

e th

e L

ibya

ns a

re d

ispl

ayin

g pa

rtic

ular

inte

rest

in i

nfor

mat

ion

on

wor

k in

volv

ing

biol

ogic

al a

gent

s ov

erse

as.

In c

onta

cts

wit

h re

pres

enta

tive

s o

f oth

er A

rab

coun

trie

s,

Lib

yan

spec

iali

sts

are

expr

essi

ng a

w

illi

ngne

ss t

o fu

nd j

oint

bio

logi

cal

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

·

~zi

Mah

naim

i an

d Ja

mes

Ada

ms,

"Ir

an

Bui

lds

Bio

logi

cal

Ars

enal

," T

he

Sun

day

Tim

es (

Lon

don)

, A

ugus

t II

. 19

96.

"Att

ribu

ting

U.S

. in

tell

igen

ce s

ourc

es,

Mid

dle

Eas

t M

ilit

ary

Bal

ance

, pu

blis

hed

by T

el A

viv

Uni

vers

ity'

s Ja

ffee

Cen

ter

for

Str

ateg

ic S

tudi

es,

mai

ntai

ns t

hat

'alt

houg

h Is

rael

has

the

ca

pabi

lity

to p

rodu

ce b

iolo

gica

l ag

ents

at

will

, it

has

not

stoc

kpil

ed o

pera

tion

al

wea

pons

. T

he c

apac

ity

is a

ttri

bute

d to

th

e B

iolo

gica

l R

esea

rch

Inst

itut

e' [

at

Nes

Zio

na].

" I

P.R

. K

amar

asw

amy,

"M

arcu

s

I K

lingb

erg

and

Isra

el's

'B

iolo

gica

l O

ptio

n,"'

Mid

dle

Eas

t In

tern

atio

nal

1 53

2, A

ugus

t 16

, 19

96, p

p. 2

1-22

.

"Lib

ya's

off

ensi

ve B

W p

rogr

am is

in

the

earl

y re

sear

ch a

nd d

evel

opm

ent

tage

and

has

bee

n la

rgel

y un

succ

essf

u be

caus

e o

f an

inad

equa

te b

iote

chni

cal

foun

dati

on a

nd t

he s

low

rat

e of

ac

quis

itio

n o

f for

eign

tec

hnol

ogy.

A

nu

mbe

r of

Lib

yan

univ

ersi

ties

are

be

ing

used

for

bas

ic r

esea

rch

of

com

mon

BW

age

nts.

"

0\

0\

U.S

. AC

DA

. "A

dher

ence

to a

nd

U.S

. D

epar

tmen

t of D

efen

se,

Rus

sian

For

eign

Int

elli

genc

e Se

rvic

e,

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

Com

plia

nce

wit

h A

nns

Con

trol

Pr

olif

erat

ion:

Thr

eat a

nd R

espo

nse,

P

roli

fera

tion

of W

eapo

ns o

f Mas

s A

gree

men

ts,"

199

6 19

96

Des

truc

tion

, 19

93

know

ledg

e.

The

se t

echn

ical

pr

ogra

ms,

inc

ludi

ng o

nes

of a

mili

tary

-R

ober

t D

. W

alpo

le,

Dep

uty

Dir

ecto

r,

shor

tcom

ings

, com

bine

d w

ith

appl

ied

natu

re,

prov

ided

tha

t th

ey a

re

Non

-Pro

life

rati

on C

ente

r, "

Con

cern

s li

mit

atio

ns in

Lib

ya's

ove

rall

abi

lity

to

not

unde

rtak

en o

n L

ibya

n te

rrit

ory.

" O

ver

Che

mic

al a

nd B

iolo

gica

l D

ual-

put a

gent

s in

to d

eliv

erab

le m

unit

ions

, U

se T

echn

olog

y,"

in U

.S.

Pub

lic

will

pre

clud

e pr

oduc

tion

of m

ilit

aril

y H

ealth

Ser

vice

, O

ffic

e of

Em

erge

ncy

effe

ctiv

e bi

olog

ical

war

fare

sys

tem

s fo

r P

repa

redn

ess,

Pro

ceed

ings

of

the

the

fors

eeab

le f

utur

e."

Sem

inar

on

Res

pond

ing

to t

he

Con

sequ

ence

s o

f Che

mic

al a

nd

Bio

logi

cal T

erro

rism

(W

ashi

ngto

n,

D.C

.: U

.S.

Gov

ernm

ent

Prin

ting

O

ffic

e, 1

995)

I

Nor

th

"At t

he d

irec

tion

of

Pre

side

nt K

im l

l-"N

orth

Kor

ea i

s pe

rfor

min

g ap

plie

d "N

orth

Kor

ea is

rep

orte

d to

hav

e be

en

Kor

ea

Son

g, N

orth

Kor

ea b

egan

to e

mph

asiz

e m

ilit

ary-

biol

ogic

al r

esea

rch

at a

who

le

enga

ged

in b

ioch

emic

al w

eapo

ns

an o

ffen

sive

bio

logi

cal w

arfa

re p

rogr

am s

erie

s o

f un

iver

siti

es,

med

ical

ins

titu

tes

deve

lopm

ent

prog

ram

sin

ce t

he l

ate

!

duri

ng th

e ea

rly

1960

s.

Wit

h th

e an

d sp

ecia

lize

d re

sear

ch i

nsti

tute

s.

1960

s, p

rodu

cing

var

ious

kin

ds o

f I

scie

ntis

ts a

nd f

acil

itie

s fo

r pr

oduc

ing

Wor

k is

bein

g pe

rfor

med

at

thes

e ba

cter

ia,

such

as

Yers

inia

pes

tis,

biol

ogic

al p

rodu

cts

and

mic

roor

gani

sms,

re

sear

ch c

ente

rs w

ith p

atho

gens

for

B

acil

lus

anrh

raci

s, V

ibri

o ch

oler

a.

Nor

th K

orea

pro

babl

y ha

s th

e ab

ilit

y to

m

alig

nant

ant

hrax

, ch

oler

a, b

ubon

ic

Salm

onel

la t

yphi

, Ye

llow

Fev

er a

nd

prod

uce

limite

d qu

anti

ties

of

trad

itio

nal

plag

ue a

nd s

mal

lpox

. B

iolo

gica

l C

lost

ridi

um b

otul

inum

, am

ong

othe

rs.

infe

ctio

us b

iolo

gica

l w

arfa

re a

gent

s or

w

eapo

ns a

re b

eing

tes

ted

on t

he i

slan

d H

owev

er,

the

Nor

th's

tec

hnol

ogy

in

toxi

ns ...

. "

terr

itor

ies

belo

ngin

g to

the

DPR

K.

No

life

sci

ence

is s

till

far

fro

m s

uch

an

info

rmat

ion

indi

cati

ng t

hat

thes

e ad

vanc

ed s

tand

ard

as t

o en

able

it t

o pr

ogra

ms

are

offe

nsiv

e in

nat

ure

has

empl

oy t

hem

pro

perl

y in

the

tac

tical

be

en r

ecei

ved.

" th

eate

r. If

the

Nor

th e

ver

uses

the

m,

it w

ill r

isk

the

dang

er o

f exp

osin

g its

ow

n so

ldie

rs t

o th

e to

xic

effe

cts

as w

ell.

Thi

s re

alit

y m

ay c

ompe

l th

e N

orth

to

refr

ain

from

usi

ng th

ese

wea

pons

in

a co

mba

t si

tuat

ion.

B

ut th

e th

reat

of

thes

e w

eapo

ns s

houl

d no

t be

~

U.S

. AC

DA

. ''A

dher

ence

to a

nd

U.S

. D

epar

tmen

t of D

efen

se.

Com

plia

nce

wit

h A

rms

Con

trol

Pr

olif

erat

ion:

Thr

eat

and

Res

pons

e.

Agr

eem

ents

," 1

996

1996

Pak

ista

n "P

akis

tan

has

the

reso

urce

s an

d ca

pabi

liti

es a

ppro

pria

te to

con

duct

ing

rese

arch

and

dev

elop

men

t re

latin

g to

bi

olog

ical

war

fare

."

Rus

sia

"Wit

h re

gard

to

form

er S

ovie

t "T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s co

ntin

ues

to h

ave

biol

ogic

al w

eapo

ns r

elat

ed

conc

erns

abo

ut R

ussi

an c

ompl

ianc

e fa

cili

ties

, so

me

rese

arch

and

w

ith t

he B

iolo

gica

l W

eapo

ns

prod

ucti

on f

acil

itie

s ar

e be

ing

Con

vent

ion,

des

pite

Pre

side

nt Y

elts

in's

de

acti

vate

d an

d m

any

have

tak

en

decr

ee i

n A

pril

1992

ban

ning

all

seve

re p

erso

nnel

and

fun

ding

cut

s. a

ctiv

ities

con

trav

enin

g th

e C

onve

ntio

n.

How

ever

. so

me

faci

liti

es,

in

Rus

sia

may

be

reta

inin

g ca

pabi

lity

for

Rus

sian

For

eign

Int

elli

genc

e S

ervi

ce,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of

Mas

s D

estr

ucti

on,

1993

"It

has

been

est

abli

shed

tha

t in

Pa

kist

an r

esea

rch

is b

eing

con

duct

ed i

n th

e ar

ea o

f th

e ch

emis

try

of

toxi

c an

d es

peci

ally

dan

gero

us s

ubst

ance

s an

d m

icro

biol

ogy.

T

he m

ain

scie

ntif

ic

cent

ers

cond

ucti

ng th

is w

ork

are

mic

robi

olog

y la

bora

tori

es o

f th

e sc

ient

ific

and

tec

hnic

al s

ubdi

visi

on o

f th

e D

efen

se M

inis

try

... a

nd t

he

mic

robi

olog

y fa

cult

y o

f th

e un

iver

sity

in

Kar

achi

. A

ll o

f th

e su

bjec

t m

atte

r re

late

d to

che

mic

al a

nd b

iolo

gica

l w

eapo

ns i

s cl

assi

fied

."

------

-

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted·

over

look

ed.

beca

use

the

Nor

th m

ay

inte

nd t

o us

e th

em t

o co

ntam

inat

e th

e re

ar a

reas

of

Sou

th K

orea

."

You

ng-T

ai J

eung

and

Sun

g-H

ee Y

oo,

"Nor

th K

orea

's S

uspi

ciou

s A

rms

Bui

ldup

and

Mil

itar

y T

hrea

ts f

or

Reg

ime

Sec

urit

y,"

Kor

ea a

nd W

orld

A

ffai

rs.

Win

ter

1996

, pp

. 64

8-64

9.

"In

ever

y fa

cili

ty t

hat h

ad b

een

open

ed

for

insp

ecti

on t

o W

este

rn i

ntel

lige

nce,

th

e R

ussi

ans

had

esta

blis

hed

conv

inci

ng c

over

sto

ries

tha

t m

ade

it ap

pear

as

if e

ach

site

had

bee

n co

nver

ted

to r

esea

rch

or m

anuf

actu

re

of

vacc

ines

. T

he s

ecre

t w

ork

0'1

00

U.S

. A

CD

A.

''Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

, R

ussi

an F

orei

gn I

ntel

lige

nce

Ser

vice

, C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

Ann

s C

ontr

ol

Pro

life

rati

on:

Thr

eat a

nd R

espo

nse,

P

roli

fera

tion

of W

eapo

ns o

f Mas

s A

gree

men

ts,"

199

6 19

96

Des

truc

tion

, 19

93

addi

tion

to

bein

g en

gage

d in

th

e pr

oduc

tion

of

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re

legi

tim

ate

acti

vity

, m

ay b

e ag

ents

....

In a

ddit

ion

... R

ussi

a's

mai

ntai

ning

the

cap

abil

ity

to

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re t

echn

olog

y m

ay b

e pr

oduc

e bi

olog

ical

war

fare

vu

lner

able

to l

eaka

ge t

o th

ird

part

ies.

" ag

ents

."

Sou

th

Afr

ica

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

cont

inue

d in

par

ts o

f th

e si

tes

that

wer

e ne

ver

visi

ted

by t

he A

mer

ican

or

Bri

tish

off

icia

ls.

At

the

sam

e tim

e. a

se

cret

new

fac

ilit

y w

as b

eing

bui

lt a

t L

akht

a ne

ar S

t. P

eter

sbur

g.

Far

from

th

e B

iopr

epar

at b

iolo

gica

l w

arfa

re

prog

ram

me

bein

g sh

ut d

own,

it

had

unde

rgon

e co

nsid

erab

le m

oder

nisa

tion.

W

ork

is c

onti

nuin

g as

bef

ore,

in

defi

ance

of

Yel

tsin

's o

rder

s."

Jam

es A

dam

s. "

The

Red

Dea

th,"

The

S

unda

y T

imes

(L

ondo

n),

Mar

ch 2

7,

1994

, Se

ct.

4, p

p. I

, 2.

"The

bio

logi

cal

wea

pons

pro

gram

me

bega

n in

the

mid

-198

0s a

s pa

rt o

f a

secr

et p

roje

ct f

unde

d by

the

Sou

th

Afr

ican

min

istr

y of

def

ense

. N

ot

onte

nt w

ith

the

chem

ical

wea

pons

tha

t ha

d be

en u

sed

in N

amib

ia a

nd A

ngol

a,

the

gove

rnm

ent

wan

ted

a ne

w f

orm

of

erro

r to

use

on

the

oppo

siti

on,

or in

the

ev

ent

of

civi

l w

ar ...

. B

oth

biol

ogic

al

and

chem

ical

wea

pons

wer

e us

ed a

s pa

rt o

f an

ext

ensi

ve c

ampa

ign

of

assa

ssin

atio

n ag

ains

t op

pone

nts

of

apar

thei

d at

hom

e an

d ab

road

."

Jam

es A

dam

s, "

Sou

th A

fric

a: L

ibya

S

aid

See

king

Bio

logi

cal

Wea

pons

,"

0\

\0

U.S

. A

CD

A.

"Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

, C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

Arm

s C

ontr

ol

Prol

ifer

atio

n: T

hrea

t and

Res

pons

e,

Agr

eem

ents

," 1

996

1996

Sou

th

Kor

ea

Syr

ia

"The

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

reaf

firm

s its

pr

evio

us ju

dgem

ent

that

, ba

sed

up

on t

he e

vide

nce

avai

labl

e to

dat

e.

it is

hig

hly

prob

able

tha

t S

yria

is

deve

lopi

ng a

n of

fens

ive

biol

ogic

al

war

fare

cap

abil

ity.

"

Tai

wan

"T

he U

nite

d S

tate

s be

liev

es t

hat

Tai

wan

has

bee

n up

grad

ing

its

biot

echn

olog

y ca

pabi

liti

es b

y pu

rcha

sing

sop

hist

icat

ed

biot

echn

olog

y eq

uipm

ent

from

the

U

nite

d S

tate

s. S

wit

zerl

and

and

Rus

sian

For

eign

Int

elli

genc

e S

ervi

ce,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of M

ass

Des

truc

tion

, 19

93

"The

FIS

has

no

reli

able

inf

orm

atio

n to

in

dica

te t

hat

offe

nsiv

e bi

olog

ical

!w

eapo

ns h

ave

been

dev

elop

ed b

y So

uth

Kor

ea.

The

re a

re s

igna

ls i

ndic

atin

g th

at S

outh

Kor

ea is

con

duct

ing

rese

arch

in t

he a

rea

of

biol

ogic

al

wea

pons

and

has

the

nec

essa

ry

tech

nolo

gies

for

the

cre

atio

n of

bi

olog

ical

age

nts.

"

"In

spit

e o

f th

e co

ncer

n ex

pres

sed

by

Isra

el a

bout

the

bio

logi

cal

agen

ts f

or

cont

amin

atin

g dr

inki

ng w

ater

that

Sy

ria

is s

uppo

sed

to h

ave,

the

re i

s no

el

iabl

e in

form

atio

n ab

out

the

exis

tenc

e o

f bi

olog

ical

wea

pons

in

Syr

ia o

r a

dire

cted

pro

gram

for

the

cre

atio

n of

an

offe

nsiv

e po

tent

ial

in t

he b

iolo

gica

l re

alm

."

"Tai

wan

doe

s no

t ha

ve b

iolo

gica

l w

eapo

ns.

Still

, it

has

show

n si

gns

of

cond

ucti

ng b

iolo

gica

l re

sear

ch o

f an

appl

ied

mil

itar

y na

ture

....

The

~e

velo

ped

mic

robi

olog

ical

ind

ustr

y an

d th

e hi

gh l

evel

of s

cien

tifi

c re

sear

ch i

n

Var

ious

Art

icle

s, a

s ci

ted

The

Sun

day

Tim

es (

Lon

don)

. Fe

brua

ry

26.

1995

.

"Syr

ia a

lso

has

an o

ffen

sive

bio

logi

cal

war

fare

cap

abil

ity

and

is r

epor

tedl

y se

ekin

g as

sist

ance

fro

m C

hine

se a

nd

Wes

tern

fir

ms

in t

he d

evel

opm

ent o

f bi

olog

ical

mis

sile

war

head

s as

wel

l. Fe

w a

ddit

iona

l de

tail

s ab

out i

ts

biol

ogic

al w

arfa

re p

rogr

ams

are

avai

labl

e."

Mic

hael

Eis

enst

adt,

"Syr

ia's

Str

ateg

ic

Wea

pons

," J

ane'

s In

telli

genc

e R

evie

w,

Ap

rill

99

3,

pp.

168-

173.

"U.S

. of

fici

als

also

are

con

cern

ed th

at

neig

hbor

ing

Tai

wan

may

hav

e m

aint

aine

d a

germ

wea

pons

pro

gram

o

f its

ow

n, w

hich

als

o da

tes

from

the

19

70s-

-a c

ircu

mst

ance

tha

t th

ey s

aid

may

hav

e en

cour

<lgl

!d t

heC

hif1

f:Se

to

-J

0

U.S

. A

CD

A,

"Adh

eren

ce to

and

U

.S.

Dep

artm

ent o

f Def

ense

, R

ussi

an F

orei

gn I

ntel

lige

nce

Ser

vice

, V

ario

us A

rtic

les,

as

cite

d C

ompl

ianc

e w

ith

Arm

s C

ontr

ol

Prol

ifer

atio

n: T

hrea

t and

Res

pons

e,

Pro

life

rati

on o

f Wea

pons

of

Mas

s A~ments," 1

996

1996

D

estr

ucti

on,

1993

'

othe

r co

untr

ies.

...

The

evi

denc

e bi

olog

ical

are

as e

nabl

e T

aiw

an t

o se

t co

ntin

ue t

heir

pro

gram

."

indi

cati

ng a

BW

pro

gram

is n

ot

up p

rodu

ctio

n an

d ac

quir

e bi

olog

ical

su

ffic

ient

to d

eter

min

e if

Tai

wan

w

eapo

ns i

n re

lati

vely

sho

rt p

erio

ds o

f R

. Je

ffre

y S

mit

h, "

Chi

na M

ay H

ave

is e

ngag

ed in

act

ivit

ies

proh

ibit

ed

tim

e."

Rev

ived

Ger

m W

eapo

ns P

rogr

am,

U.S

. b

yth

eBW

C."

O

ffic

ials

Say

,"

The

Was

hing

ton

Post

, Fe

brua

ry 2

4,

1993

, p.

A4.

-.J

72

Notes

1 John D. Holum, "Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention," Geneva, Switzerland, November 26, 1996, p. I. 2 "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Threat Control Through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1995 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, July 1995), pp. 66-68. 3 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Prol(teration: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1996. 4 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), p. 85. 5 W. Seth Carns, "The Poor Man's Atomic Bomb?": Biological Weapons in the Middle East, Washington Institute Policy Papers No. 23 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1991), p. 13. 6 S. Rodan, "Chemical, Biological Threats Loom Large in U.S.-Israeli Talks," Defense News, December 2-8, 1996, p. 6. 7 "Chronology, 29 April 1997," The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 36 (June 1997), p. 31. 8 Rodan, "Chemical, Biological Threats Loom Large." 9 Robert Waller, "Libyan CW Raises the Issue of Preemption," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1996, p. 523. 10 Raymond A. Zilinskas, "Biological Warfare and the Third World," Politics and the L(te Sciences 9 (August 1990), pp. 59-76. 11 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat," Politics and the Lite Sciences 15 (September 1996), pp. 167-183. 12 Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30(2), January 1978; reprinted in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics, 4th ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 35-65. 13 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Vol. /1: CB Weapons Today (New York: Humanities Press), p. 241. Some analysts contend that Egypt did not have a weaponized BW capability and that President Sadat's statement was a bluff. 14 James A. Baker III with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics r~t Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), p. 359. 15 Martin Seiff, '"Devastating' Reply to Gas Attack Vowed," The Washington Times, March 29, 1996, p. A6. 16 Testimony of William Webster, in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing, Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat: The Urgent Needfor Remedies, January 24, 1989, p. 30. 17 Matthew Evangelista, innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). 18 Vladimir Umnov, "The Bomb for the Poor," Moscow News, No.5 (February 4-10, 1994), p. 14. 19 Herbert York, "The Elusive Nuclear Airplane," reprinted in Morton H. Halperin and Arnold Kanter, eds., Readings in American Foreign Policy: A Bureaucratic Perspective (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), pp. 353-363. 2° Frederic J. Brown, Chemical Warfare: A Study in Restraints (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968). 21 William C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonprol(teration: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982), pp. 143-144; Potter, "The Politics of Nuclear Renunciation: The Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine," Occasional Papers No. 22 (April 1995), Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center. 22 Masha Katsva, 'Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism in Russia," The Monitor 3(2), Spring 1997, p. 14. 23 Arkadiy Pasternak and Oleg Rubnikovich, "The Secret of Pokrovskiy Monastery: Who Began Developing Bacteriological Weapons in the USSR, and When Did They Do So?" Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 17, 1992, p. 6; JPRS-TAC-92-035 (5 December 1992), pp. 28-29. 24 M. Schitz, "An Off-Limits Island," New Times International, No. 32 (1993), pp. 16-17. 25 Anthony Rimmington, "From Military to Industrial Complex? The Conversion of Biological Weapons' Facilities in the Russian Federation," Contemporary Security Policy 17( I), April 1996, pp. 80-112. 26 "Secret Vozrozhdeniye Island," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 22, 1992, p. 6; JPRS-TAC-92-010 (24 March 1992), p. 48.

73

27 Ibid. 28 Graham S. Pearson, "Biological Weapons: A Priority Concern," in Kathleen C. Bailey, ed., Director's Series on Proliferation No. 3 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, January 1994), pp. 46-47. 29 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories (!f the Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1990), p. 141. 30 James Smith, "Biological Warfare Developments," Jane's Intelligence Review 3(11), November 1991, p.484. 31 Milton Leitenberg, "Anthrax in Sverdlovsk: New Pieces to the Puzzle," Arms Control Today, April 1992, pp. 10-13; Peter Gumbel, "U.S.-Russian Study of Anthrax Outbreak Finds Proof of a Cover-Up by Soviets," The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1993, p. A9; Matthew Meselson, Jeanne Guillemin, Martin Hugh-Jones, Alexander Langmuir, Ilona Popova, Alexis Shelokov, and Olga Yampolskaya, "The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979," Science 266(5188), November 18, 1994, pp. 1202-1208. 32 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Forces in Transition (Washington, D.C., September 1991). 33 Ibid. 34 Bill Gertz, "Defecting Russian scientist revealed biological arms efforts," The Washington Times, July 4, 1992, p. 4. 35 Sergey Leskov, "Plague and the Bomb: Russia and U.S. Military Bacteriological Programs Are Being Developed in Deep Secrecy, and Present a Terrible Danger to the World," lzvestiya, June 26, 1993, p. 15; JRPS-TND-93-023 (19 July 1993), p. 22-23. 36 V. Umnov, "The Danger of a Biological War Remains," Komsomolskaya Pravda, September 19, 1992, p. 3; JPRS-TAC-92-030 (8 October 1992), pp. 32-35. 37 "Interview With Biopreparat Official," Pravda, October 15, 1992, p. 4; JPRS-TAC-92-035 (5 December 1992), pp. 23-25. 38 Leskov, "Plague and the Bomb," pp. 20-25. 39 Mark Urban, "The Cold War's Deadliest Secret," The Spectator, January 23, 1993, pp. 9-10. 40 John Barry, "Planning a Plague?" Newsweek, February I, 1993, pp. 40-41. 41 Rimmington, "From Military to Industrial Complex?," Appendix I, p. 108. 42 Ibid. 43 Barry, "Planning a Plague?", pp. 40-41. 44 V. Umnov, "After 20 Years of Silence the Soviet Microbes Are Talking," Komsomolskaya Pravda, April 30, 1992, p. 1; FBIS-SOV -92-087 (5 May 1992), pp. 4-6. 45 Leskov, "Plague and the Bomb," p. 23. 46 Briefing by Maj.-Gen (ret.) Roland Lajoie, U.S. Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Cooperative Threat Reduction, before the U.S. National Academy of Sciences' Committee on International Security and Arms Control, February 6, 1997; cited in The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 36 (June 1997), p. 13. 47 Milton Leitenberg, "The Biological Weapons Program of the Former Soviet Union," Biologicals 21(3), September 1993, pp. 187-191. 48 James Adams, "The Red Death: The Untold Story of Russia's Secret Biological Weapons," The Sunday Times [London], March 27, 1994, Section 4, pp. 1-2. 49 Ibid, p. I. 50 Ibid, p. 2. 51 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms," The Washington Post, August 31, 1992, pp. AI, AI5. 52 Ibid, p. Al5. 53 Boris Y eltsin, "Statement on Disarmament by the Russian Federation President," Moscow Teleradiakompaniya Ostankino Television, First Program Network, January 29, 1992. 54 Smith, "Russia Fails to Detail Germ Arms," p. A15. 55 "Yeltsin Commits to Germ Warfare Ban," The Washington Post, April 17, 1992. 56 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Yeltsin Blames '79 Anthrax On Germ Warfare Efforts," The Washington Post, June 16, 1992, p. I. 57 Ken Ward, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, personal communication, May 30, 1997. 58 "Secret Vozrozhdeniye Island," Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 22, 1992, p. 6; JPRS-TAC-92-010 (24 March 1992), p. 48.

74

59 Smith, "Russia Fails To Detail Germ Arms," p. Al5. 60 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Yeltsin in the Dark," The Washington Post, June 24, 1992, p. AI9. 61 Boris Belitskiy, "Commentary on Yeltsin's Biological Arms Decree," Moscow Radio World Service, May 15, 1992; JPRS-TND-92-016 (27 May 1992), pp. 21-22. 62 Urban, "The Cold War's Deadliest Secret," p. 10. 63 Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, The Arms Control Reporter, September 1992, p. 701.B.97. 64 Adams, "The Red Death," p. 2. 05 U.S. Department of State, "Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman: Joint US/UK/Russian Statement on Biological Weapons," Press release, September 14, 1992. 06 Urban, "The Cold War's Deadliest Secret," p. 9. 07 Ibid. " 8 "Russia: West assured on biological weapons," Jane's Defence Weekly 18(13), September 26, 1992, p. 6. 09 "Official Denies Existence of Biological Weapons," Moscow RIA in English, February 15, 1993; FBIS­SOV-93-041-A (4 March 1993), p. 1. 70 Milton Leitenberg, Prepared statement before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearing on "Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," November I, 1995, Federal News Service transcript. 71 Adams, 'The Red Death," p. 2. 72 Ibid. 73 Anatoliy Yurkin, "Defense Ministry Denies Report," !TAR-TASS in English, March 28, 1994; JPRS-TAC-94-003-L(31 March 1994),pp.l4-15. 74 R. Adam Moody, "Armageddon for Hire," Jane's International Defense Review 2 (February 1997), pp. 21-23. 75 Ibid, p. 23. 76 Robert Gates, Testimony [as CIA Director] before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Hearing, Weapons Prol(f'eration in the New World Order, January 15, 1992, p. 77 The Sunday Times [London], article on August 27, 1995, cited in Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 30, December 1995, p. 17. 78 Laurie H. Boulden, "CIA, DIA Provide New Details on CW, BW Programs in Iran and Russia," Arms Control Today 26(6), August 1996, pp. 32-33. 79 Richard J. Seltzer, "Moscow Science Center Lauded," Chemical and Engineering News, December 23, 1996, pp. 28-31. 80 Bill Gertz, "Germ Warfare Gives Way to War on Germs," The Washington Times, April6, 1995, p. A13. 81 National Research Council, An Assessment r!l the International Science and Technology Center: Redirecting Expertise in Weapons r!l Mass Destruction in the Former Soviet Union (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996), pp. 17-18. 82 U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements," Threat Control Through Arms Control: Annual Report to Congress 1995 (Washington, D.C., July 26, 1996), pp. 66-67/ 83 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Russia's Germ Warfare Program is Alive, U.S. Says," International Herald Tribune, September 4, 1994. 84 Rimmington, "From Military to Industrial Complex?", p. 81. 85 Holum, "Remarks to the Fourth Review Conference." 86 Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control/International Security Policy, vol. 14, no. 3 (December 1993), pp. 229-271. 87 Stephen Black, "UNSCOM Activities in Iraq in 1995," in J.B. Poole and R. Guthrie, eds., Verification 1996: Arms Control, Peacekeeping and the Environment (Boulder, Co.:Westview Press/Verification Technology Information Centre, 1996), p. 200. 88 The following chronology of Iraq's BW program is drawn from a report to the United Nations Security Council by the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM): "Report of the Secretary-General on the status of the implementation of the Special Commission's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)," UN Security Council document no. S/1995/864 (October II, 1995), pp. 23-31. 89 "CIA Report on Intelligence Related to Gulf War Illnesses," August 2, 1996, posted on GulfLINK, a Department of Defense website devoted to Gulf War illnesses.

75

90 Ed Offley, "Vulnerable in the Gulf War: Despite fear of germ warfare, U.S. unable to develop sensors," The Seattle Post-lntelligencer, March 6, 1997, p. 1. 91 Defense Intelligence Agency, "IIR 2 201 0067 92/Possible ChemicaVBiological Warfare Spray Tank on Su-22 Aircraft," October 11, 1991, GulfLINK file no. 22010067.92.a. 921bid. 93 Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraqi BW Mission Planning," 1992, GulfLINK file no. 062596_cia_74624_01.txt. 94 1bid, p. 30. 95 Philip Finnegan, "Saddam's Bio-Chem Arsenal Could Snarl U.S. Gulf Plans," Defense News, September 30-0ctober 6, 1996, pp. I, 58. 96 B undesnachrichtendienst [German Federal Intelligence Service], Prol!le ration von Massenvemichtungsmitteln und Traegerraketen, April1997, pp. 25-27. 97 Speech by UNSCOM Executive Director Rolf Ekeus to the Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1997. 98 Michael Eisenstadt, "The Sword of the Arabs": Iraq's Strategic Weapons, Policy Papers No. 21 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1990), p. 3. 99 Jean Pascal Zanders, "The Chemical Threat in Iraq's Motives for the Kuwait Invasion," POLE-PAPERS 2, no. 1 (Brussels: Centrum voor Polemologie, Vrije Universiteit Brussel), p. 22. Hxl Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Translation of Manual: Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Operations, by Col. Sameem Jalal Abdul Latif, Training Department, Iraqi Chemical Corps, 1984 (Fort Detrick, Maryland: Foreign Armies Studies Series, No. 21, Report No. AFMIC-HT-101-92, January 12, 1992), p. 6. 101 Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Translation of Manual No. 469: Mobilization Use (~/"Arms of" Mass Destruction, Vol. II, Part 1: Principles cJf" Using Chemical and Biological Agents in Warfare, by the Iraqi Army General Staff, 1987 (Fort Detrick, Maryland: Report No. AFMIC-HT-099-92, 1992), p. 14. 102 "Zum Narren gehalten," Der Spiegel, no. 43, October 10, 1995, p. 164. 103 Reuters, "Iraq targeted 'enemy capitals' if Baghdad nuked," September 21, 1995. 104 Quoted in Peter Herby, The Chemical Weapons Convention and Arms Control in the Middle East (Oslo, Norway: International Peace Research Institute, 1992), p. 29. 105 "Iraq Provides IAEA with Significant New Information," Arms Control Today 25(7), September 1995, p. 27. 106 Farouk Choukri, "Interview with Iraqi Oil Minster Amer Rashid," Agence France Presse, October 18, 1995. 107 United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, Status report, October II, 1995, p. 10. 108 Peta Thornycroft, "Poison gas secrets were sold to Libya," Weekly Mail & Guardian, February 7, 1997. 109 Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons Arms Control, Project on Rethinking Arms Control (PRAC) Paper No. 16, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, University of Maryland at College Park, May I 996, p. 42. 110 Paul Taylor, "Toxic S. African Arms Raise Concern," The Washington Post, February 28, 1995. 111 "Viljoen asked Hasson to develop tear gas," The Star, February 12, 1997. 112 James Adams, "South Africa: Libya Said Seeking Secret Biological Weapons," London Sunday Times, February 26, 1995. 113 Lynne Duke, "Drug Bust Exposes S. African Arms Probes," The Washington Post, February I, 1997. 114 Adams, "South Africa: Libya Said Seeking Secret Biological Weapons." 115 Eddie Koch, "Chemical plant tested nerve gas for SADF," Mail and Guardian, December 6, 1995; Eddie Koch and Derek Fleming, "Bizarre experiments at SADF research firms," Mail and Guardian, December 15, 1995. 116 Thornycroft, "Poison gas secrets were sold to Libya." 117 Chris Steyn, Investigative Unit, "Hasson linked to tests on humans," Pretoria News, February 7, 1997, p. AI. 118 Koch and Fleming, "Bizarre experiments at SADF research firms." 119 SAPA, "Hasson granted bail: Intelligence," Cape Times, February 5, 1997 120 South African Press Association, "South Africa: Report reveals apartheid army 'dirty tricks'," January 31, 1996. 121 "Shocks from the Steyn Report," Weekly Mail & Guardian, January 31, 1997.

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122 Taylor, "Toxic S. African Arms Raise Concern." 123 Stefaans Brummer, "Secret chemical war remains secret," Mail and Guardian, August 23, 1996. 124 Reuters, "S. Africans may have chemical arms," The Washington Times, February 12, 1997, p. 9. 125 Taylor, "Toxic S. African Arms Raise Concern." 126 "Why Hasson is kept under lock and key," The Star, March 20, 1997. 127 South African Press Association, "Report Reveals Apartheid Army 'Dirty Tricks'," January 31, 1996. 128 Brummer, "Secret chemical war remains secret." 129 Cheremaine Pretorius, "Hasson is allowed access to papers," The Citizen, February 4, 1997. 130 "Chemical deal may be 'tip of the iceberg,"' Cape Argus, February 27, 1997. 131 Joseph Aranes and Michael Morris, "007-style operation nets Biko poison file," Cape Argus, undated.