Vera Cruz Commodore David Conner and his Home

Squadron before the Veracruz landing of 1847

Keith Rakes

12/9/2008

History 302

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On March 9, 1847, the United States Navy launched the largest amphibious landing the world had

ever seen. It took place at Collado Beach two miles south of Veracruz, Mexico. The Home Squadron at

the time was short of men and supplies yet somehow, it managed to land General Winfield Scott and

14,000 troops without a life lost. So how could a fleet of warships achieve such a mission with very little

support from Washington? It all comes down to one man: Commodore David Conner. His decisions on

supplying coal, food, and expanding his squadron had a lasting effect on the landing itself with little to no

help from Washington. To this if Conner hadn’t taken serious measures to ready his fleet and support the

landing, would it had been as successful as it was?

Commodore Conner was Commanding Officer of the U.S. Home Squadron in the Gulf of Mexico

and Caribbean. Born in 1792 in Pennsylvania, He joined the Navy at the age of 17 in 1809 as a

midshipman and was commissioned at the age of 20. Conner was considered the most experienced naval

officer of his time. His conflicts include the War of 1812, Caribbean Piracy and the African Slave Trade.

The Mexican War would be an interesting challenge for him and his fleet. This would also be the last

maritime conflict of his career as would soon be relieved of duty because of poor health. His relief would

be another famous American Sailor: Commodore Matthew Perry.

To the Polk administration the Mexican War was supposed to be small. Robert P. Smith, in his

article “Impossible Campaign Attempted”, writes that, “the president did not want a ‘big war’ with the

U.S. Army fighting its way to Mexico City” (Smith, 37). A long, drawn out war would be a political

disaster and would make a general a national hero. This is something Polk didn’t want because all of his

generals were Whigs. He was a Democrat. Thus, Polk wanted to bring the war to an end as fast as

possible. In late 1846, Polk began having talks with his cabinet about how to do just that. After hours of

arguing and coming up with ideas that were routinely scrapped, the best and only option was to make an

amphibious landing at Veracruz utilizing the Army as the landing force and the Navy as a secondary force

and supporting role. It was also agreed that General Winfield Scott be placed in charge of the operation.

Scott gladly accepted the position as a soldier first, politician second. In K. Jack Bauer’s The Veracruz

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Expedition of 1847 he says, “To Polk’s credit it must be said that once appointed he supported Scott

fully” (Bauer, 162). When Comm. Conner got word of this, he soundly disagreed with the idea of landing

a large scale army in a hostile environment. The Home Squadron at the time was not ready to handle such

a mission. Even Veracruz, which was the most heavily fortified city in the Americas, could withstand a

barrage of cannon fire for weeks before surrendering. After hearing Conner’s disagreement, the plan still

went into effect.

The city of Veracruz is an anomaly to say the least. It was the largest port city in Mexico but it

did not have a harbor. The closest anchorage site was at an island chain called Antón Lazardo twelve

miles southeast of the city. This site would be Conner’s base of operations before the landing. Another

problem was the city’s location. Veracruz sits on a coastal plain that is prone to major storms called

“northers” that last from October to April and yellow fever for the rest of the year. J .Y. Mason, Secretary

of the Navy said in his congressional report on December 6, 1847, “Many valuable officers and men have

fallen under the ravages of fever, but it is a source of great satisfaction that the number of deaths has been

very small in proportion to the number of cases of yellow fever, and of fever of malignant type” (Mason,

950). Conner was grateful to have a well trained medical staff on board his ships to deal with the

illnesses. He also used Antón Lazardo as a hospital and to contain the fever.

Another issue was the city itself. Veracruz was viewed as being the most heavily fortified city in

the Americas. The land side was protected by a half- mile long wall ringed by nine small forts with two

larger forts at both ends. The city was also protected from the sea by Fort San Juan de Ulúa a massive fort

1,000 yards off the coast that would defend the city from enemy ships. The fortress had up to 135 cannons

and, at its time, was considered the strongest fortress in Mexico. This is what Conner assumed. What he

did not know was that Veracruz’s defenses were in poor condition. The city walls and fortress were

rapidly deteriorating because of lack of maintenance. Even a majority of the gun mounts were not

operational on the fort. If Conner had known that Veracruz was in such a poor state of disrepair, his

massive build up would have been reduced to a smaller scale. Yet to get his fleet ready for the landing

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and the siege shortly thereafter, he would need to add more manpower, ships, and much needed supplies

to an already exhausted squadron.

For Comm. Conner to succeed in his mission he needed to supply his squadron and make it war

time ready. For this he sent letters to Washington D.C. requesting more manpower, ships, and supplies.

Congress would do just that, but on a smaller scale and a tighter budget. In Stanley Adamiak’s article

“American Naval Logistics during the Mexican War, 1846- 1848”, he states that, “Congress raised

manpower limits from 7,500 to 10,000 men and authorized the employment of any partially constructed

ships of the line, sloops, and frigates, held as reserve, and the purchase of any appropriate craft”

(Adamiak, 6-7). This was welcomed by Conner, but it had its issues. With the annual amount that

Congress gives to the Navy department to keep itself operational (manpower, ship repair, and stores)

Congress only allowed and additional $2.75 million for the war effort. This meant that Conner would

only receive a fraction of anything he requested. His first request to Washington would be big: expanding

the squadron.

The Home squadron was created in 1841 to protect the U.S. Gulf Coast from Caribbean pirates. It

was placed under Conner’s command in 1844. Adamiak states that, “In September 1845 Conner had one

frigate, four sloops, three brigs, plus the steamers Princeton and Mississippi, a force he considered “quite

sufficient” to protect American commerce from the negligible Mexican navy” (Adamiak, 6). By 1846,

Conner issued a request to strengthen his squadron for the intended landing and siege. Robert Smith states

that, “Conner concluded that in order to reduce both city and castle, he would need, in addition to his

blockade vessels, at least five 80- gun ships of the line , four bomb frigates mounting 10- inch Columbiad

cannons, three frigates and 10 sloops-of-war” (smith, 40). Conner believed that this would be sufficient to

bring Veracruz to a quick surrender. But due to politics back in Washington and the Navy department

being stretched financially, Conner did not receive a fraction of his requested ships.

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His fortunes changed when Commodore Matthew Perry, Commanding officer of the Steamship

USS Vixen arrived in the summer of 1846. Perry was Conner’s second in command (Executive Officer) of

the squadron from 1846 to 1847. In October, Perry raided the town of Tabasco, 70 miles up the Tabasco

River. Mason states in his report that, “In the gulf of Mexico, the squadron has captured a number of

steamers and gun boats of light draught, suitable for entering the rivers along the coast, which were

valued and taken into service by the commanding officers with the approval of the department” (Mason,

952). This would help Conner in attacking and capturing coastal towns and cities that were situated on

shallow rivers and coastal plains. Also to help strengthen his landing force, he had to strip his blockading

force. From his flagship USS Raritan, Conner made the decision to pull two frigates, three sloops of wars,

and a large steamer from there station and make them apart of his landing fleet. Even though this would

anger his superiors back in Washington, he had no choice to strengthen his fleet his way. By making his

blockading fleet much smaller, Conner understood that ships could go in and out of Mexico without U.S.

knowledge. Yet, no country was trading with Mexico at the time and the Mexican navy was non-existent

so his decision was worth it.

Conner’s pleas to Washington for more ships to aid in his blockade and the subsequent landing

finally came true. In January 1846, the Navy Department sent a force of ships to help reinforce Conner’s

fleet. J.Y. Mason states in his report that, “Bomb ketchers and steamers were purchased, armed, and sent

forward; the Ship-of-the-line Ohio destined for the Pacific, was ordered to the gulf; the sloops

Germantown, Saratoga, and Decatur, were fitted and sent down, and all the necessary means at the

command of the department, were put in requisition to make the co-operation of the naval force as

efficient as possible” (Mason, 949). Most of these ships, including the Ohio, were used as cruisers due to

their late arrival. For Conner help from Washington came too little, too late for his exhausted squadron.

The next biggest issue was supplies and Conner would have to make some unique decisions to keep his

ships fueled and his officers and sailors fed.

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With Comm. Conner receiving little help from Washington, he had to make unique decisions to

resupply his vessels. There were three large items that Conner desperately needed for his ships: coal, fresh

water, and food. Between March and September 1846, Congress did send Conner his requested amount of

coal but he didn’t get it directly. The large shipments of coal (a total of seven) were sent to his squadron’s

homeport: Pensacola, Florida. This meant that Conner would have to rotate ships back and forth between

Veracruz and Pensacola a distance of 900 miles.

For food, he found that he could get shipments from an unusual place: Mexico. The Yucatan

province declared its independence before the outbreak of war. The United States recognized there

government and there coast was not blockaded. In return the Yucatan government aloud Conner’s ships to

receive stores from there ports. Food was also seized from raids on small seaside villages and towns along

the Mexican coast that were captured. Conner also received stores from passing European merchant

vessels and U.S. merchant ships coming from or going to New Orleans, Louisiana. The city itself, besides

being a repair depot for naval ships, never sent any food or coal to the squadron during the conflict. This

would put the city’s newspaper, the Daily Picayune and the city government at odds with one another on

why the city would not help the ships at wartime. Conner would subsequently send ships to New Orleans

for repair, but not supplies.

Fresh water was the final issue that Conner had to resolve. As of September 1846, the store ship

Relief was the only supply ship available to the squadron. Conner seeing that Washington failed to deliver

his much needed store ships chartered the ship Abraisa to help in resupplying. The Relief was then sent

back to Pensacola to be refitted as a water-tender. These were Conner’s direct orders with the amount of

fresh water onboard his ships running at dangerous levels. In February 1847, Conner finally got what he

wanted from Washington. Two supply ships: the Fredonia and Supply were delivered to Connors

squadron. Along with Relief and the Abrasia, Conner reported back to his Superiors in Washington that

his squadron was manned and ready for Scott and his army. Gen. Scott arrived at Anton Lizardo on

March 6, 1847.

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Commodore Conner was ready to accept General Scott and his army of 14,000 men onboard his

ships, but there was one thing Conner was missing and luckily Scott was bringing: landing craft. Gen.

Scott knew that Conner’s smaller crafts couldn’t reach Mexico’s shallow depth beaches. To overcome

this he had specialty built flat- bottomed boats built for the landing. These would be the first purposely

built landing craft for this operation. These boats would be a mainstay on all Navy ships after the war.

The landing was originally scheduled for March 8 was pushed back to the following day due to a drop in

the barometer onboard Conner’s flagship USS Raritan, signaling an approaching storm. The landing

would take place on March 9, 1847 at Collado Beach, two miles south of Veracruz.

The landing began at 3:30 AM on March 9, 1847. Conner positioned his ships within ninety yards

of the beach. This would a low his Sailors to land Scott’s army without rowing for a great distance. Some

people (newspaper reporters) were landed in a safer area above the actual landing site to report the news

back to the States. According to a special correspondence of the New Orleans Daily Picayune that was

staying onboard the steamship USS Alabama “We shall land, I understand, at Sacrificios, several miles

above the anchorage. Two or three naval vessels will convey troops to the vicinity of the landing, and

cover them with their guns” (H, Letter, March 7, 1847). The landing was complete at 11:00 PM that

night. Amazingly, Scott did not face any resistance from the Mexican army during the landing.

From March 9 to the end of the siege on March 14 Gen. Winfield Scott was in charge of the

entire operation. This placed Conner (as stated earlier) in a secondary role. Conner’s mission was to make

sure all of Scott’s officers and soldiers were placed onshore, hopefully without a life lost. Once landing of

the army was complete by late evening of the ninth, the ships began to play a supporting role by landing

additional weapons, small cannons, and food rations. Sailors were also landed to perform reconnaissance

missions for Scott. This would help in locating Mexican soldiers who would partake in gorilla warfare on

Scott’s army. Additionally Scott got permission from Conner to use Marines in his landing force to

strengthen his army.

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Unfortunately for Conner, his post as Commanding Officer of the Home Squadron was coming to

an end. In March 1847, Comm. Perry relieved Conner of Command under orders from the Navy

Department. Perry gave his support to Scott and to the siege of Veracruz. After the landing, Perry

positioned his squadron near the fortress and the city walls. Soon after reaching position, the ships opened

fire on the fort. After realizing that the fort was not returning fire, Perry ordered his ships to open fire on

the fort and the city itself. The Mexican army did leave a force of 5,000 men for protection of the city.

They did manage to repair some cannons and return fire, but were overwhelmed by the naval force off the

coast.

After Scott’s army was completely on shore, he began his push towards Veracruz. In a letter

written by a Sailor of the Sloop of War USS Albany “As yet nothing like a battle has been fought; but two

days of most laborious duty and hardships have been gone through with by our troops” (F.A.L. letter,

March 11, 1847). During the two days of marching and small skirmishes with the enemy, Scott’s

engineers did manage to cut Veracruz’s water supply and took over roads leading to the city. With all this

and the continuance bombarding of Perry’s ships, the Mexican officials couldn’t take anymore and

surrender their city after a five day siege. The American forces lost twelve men, six sailors and six

soldiers. Overall it was a huge success for both the Army and the Navy. This would also be a key part in

President Polk’s plan to bring the war to a quicker end.

After the city was secured, General Scott used Veracruz as a base of operations. He ordered his

engineers to rebuild the water supply and the roads. He asked Commodore Perry to help in supplying the

city and his army with food, munitions, and medical supplies. Some of his soldier’s caught yellow fever

during the siege and also for civilian injuries. Most soldiers were taken back to Anton Lizardo, but the

city hospital was quickly reestablished. With Veracruz being closer to Mexico City than Gen. Taylor in

Monterrey, Scott had the advantage to take Mexico City and end the war. Polk gave him his orders in

1847.

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After the siege was over, Perry ordered his ships to resume there stations in the blockade. Many

ships were sent to the yards in New Orleans, Louisiana; Pensacola, Florida; and Norfolk, Virginia for

extensive repair and overhaul. Most of the supply ships stayed in the Gulf to resupply the vessels. The

Ship of the Line Ohio resumed her voyage to the Pacific to help in capturing California. Commodore

Conner was given command of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, but due t his poor health while being in the

Gulf, never saw any day to day operations. He also never appeared before any congressional hearings

related to the Veracruz landing. This was due to his health. Commodore David Conner died in 1856 in

Philadelphia. His rank was Captain (Commodore was his title).

The Landing and siege of Veracruz on March 9, 1847 could not have been possible if it weren’t

for Commodore David Conner’s decisions he had to make. Before the war, the Home Squadron was kept

at minimum readiness due to its location and the lack of naval offense from Mexico. Once the war broke,

the Navy department did reinforce his command, but once the landing plan went into effect, and seeing

that the Navy was financially strained, it would take the leadership and the sometimes unique decisions of

Conner to bring his fleet to wartime standards. Conner realized that he couldn’t rely on just Washington

for supplies and ships. He had to rely on merchant vessels, his commands homeport of Pensacola, Florida,

even the breakaway province of the Yucatan to get much needed supplies. After the war, the Navy would

change and add its own regulations on amphibious warfare for any future missions. This would result in

the creation of the U.S. Navy Amphibious Command Headquartered in Norfolk, VA and located around

the world. Even with his sailors fighting yellow fever, and his ships running on a shortage of coal, the

mission to get his fleet ready for Scott’s landing is an amazing achievement and is looked at today as one

of the greatest events in U.S. military history.