International Journal of Social EconomicsVeblen's evolutionary economics of religion and the evolutionary psychology of religionCharles G. Leathers J. Patrick Raines

Article information:To cite this document:Charles G. Leathers J. Patrick Raines , (2014),"Veblen's evolutionary economics of religion and theevolutionary psychology of religion", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 41 Iss 2 pp. 146 - 161Permanent link to this document:http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJSE-02-2013-0045

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Veblen’s evolutionary economicsof religion and the evolutionary

psychology of religionCharles G. Leathers

Economics and Finance, University of Alabama,Tuscaloosa, Alabama, USA, and

J. Patrick RainesCollege of Business Administration, Belmont University,

Nashville, Tennessee, USA

Abstract

Purpose – Because belief in a supernatural agent with extraordinary power is rooted in psychology,Veblen’s instinct psychology was the essential basis for his evolutionary economics of religion.The innate behavioral traits that Veblen called instincts in human nature are now recognized inevolutionary psychology as domain-specific mechanism that evolved as adaptations to enable humansurvival and reproduction. The authors aim to explain how the modern evolutionary psychology ofreligion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen’s evolutionary economics of religion.

Design/methodology/approach – First, the authors review how Veblen’s theory of an evolvedhuman nature of instincts was applied to explain the origins of religion in primitive societies andremained a resilient force despite evolutionary erosion of institutional religion as science advanced.Second, the authors note how evolutionary psychology explains the origins of religion in terms of thefunctioning of domain-specific psychological mechanisms that evolved as adaptations for purposesother than religion.

Findings – The similarities between Veblen’s instinct psychology and the explanation of religion asby-products of domain-specific psychological mechanisms are sufficient to allow the conclusion thatthe evolutionary psychology of religion provides a modern psychological basis for Veblen’sevolutionary economics of religion.

Originality/value – An evolutionary economics of religion has a great social value if it providescredible explanations of both the origins of religious belief and innate tendency for religious belief tocontinue even as science refutes elements of religious doctrines. With a modern psychological basis,Veblen’s evolutionary economics of religion accomplishes that purpose.

Keywords Religion, Evolution, Domain-specific psychological mechanisms, Instinct of workmanship,Parental bent, Psychological by-products

Paper type Research paper

1. IntroductionAs evidenced by the flow of articles on various aspects of religion in IJSE over the pastthree decades, the socio-economic influence of religion is a topic of continuing interest insocial economics. A number of those articles have made significant contributions to thenew subfield of “economics of religion”, defined by Iannaccone (1998) as applying allelements of modern microeconomic theory to religion, including the newer techniques ofgame theory, experimental economics, and empirical studies of consumer behavior.In his review of the literature, Iannaccone (1998) cited Hull and Bold (1989) for theireconomic theory of the church, and also the modeling of churches as collective action

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/0306-8293.htm

Received 22 February 2013Revised 21 April 2013Accepted 26 April 2013

International Journal of SocialEconomicsVol. 41 No. 2, 2014pp. 146-161q Emerald Group Publishing Limited0306-8293DOI 10.1108/IJSE-02-2013-0045

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groups by Wallis (1990). As other examples, Ahmed and Salas (2009) and Ahmed andHammarsledt (2011) used experimental techniques to test whether religion influencedsocial cooperation; Papyrakis and Selvaretnam (2011) examined how life expectancy orage impacts religiosity or church attendance; and Dilmaghani (2012) used modernquantitative indexing to assess how religiosity affected human capital and earnings.

1.1 Why an evolutionary economics of religion?At the same time, the broadness of vision and social concern embraced in socialeconomics would be equally well served by an evolutionary economics that focusesattention on the interactions between changes in religious institutions and economicinstitutions under the impact of advances in science and technology. In The MarketPlace of Christianity, Ekelund et al. (2006) presented a microeconomic theory ofevolutionary changes in forms of religion explained within the context of religious“markets” being impacted by religious innovations that change cost-benefit ratios forrational consumers of religious “products”. But microeconomic-based evolutionarymodels start with the premise that a “demand” for religion exists. Social economicswould be best served by an evolutionary economics of religion that explains thepsychological origins of religion and integrates the psychological elements with theexternal socio-economic circumstances in explaining changes in religion.

Such a theory was provided by Thorstein Veblen, who throughout his writings fromthe late 1890s through 1923 examined religious practices and institutions “from thepoint of view of the interest which they have for economic theory”, seeking “to isolatethe economic interests or the economic bearing of these phenomena” (1899/1961,pp. 293-294). In keeping with his approach to economics as an evolutionary science, hisanalyses of the origins of religion and changes in institutions of religion blendedpsychological, anthropological, and theoretical elements to coalesce in an evolutionaryeconomics of religion (Veblen, 1923).

1.2 Purpose and overviewA special feature of Veblen’s theory was in explaining why religious belief persists inthe face of challenges presented by modern science and the materialism of economicprogress. Unfortunately, the core element in Veblen’s evolutionary economics ofreligion is a theory of human nature based on a psychology of instincts that has longbeen criticized by social scientists. In this paper, we explain why a modern psychologyis needed to establish the relevance of Veblen’s evolutionary economics of religion, andhow the modern evolutionary psychology of religion serves that purpose. By replacingVeblen’s problematic psychology of instincts with this modern evolutionarypsychology of religion, his evolutionary economics of religion becomes a viablecomplement to the microeconomic-based “economics of religion” in seeking greaterinsights into the complex relationships between religion and socio-economic activities.

We begin in Section 2 by explaining how Veblen’s psychology of instinctsconstitutes the core element in his evolutionary economics of religion. To illustrate therelevance to social economics in Section 3, we reference a Veblenian interpretation ofthe liberation theology movement among Catholics in Latin America and theemergence of the new religious political right in the USA. But this case example alsoillustrates how the problematic nature of Veblen’s psychology of instincts cloudsthe relevance of his evolutionary economics of religion to social economics. In Section 4,

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we turn to the modern evolutionary psychology of religion, which explains the originsof religious belief and the tendencies to form religious social groups in terms ofdomain-specific psychological mechanisms that evolved in the human brain asadaptations to serve functional purposes other than religion. We find sufficientsimilarities to Veblen’s instincts in the innate proclivities giving rise to religious beliefas an enduring aspect to human nature, thus providing a modern psychological basisfor his evolutionary economics of religion.

2. Veblen’s psychology of instincts as the core element in his evolutionaryeconomics of religionVeblen recognized that religious belief in origin and persistence against the challengespresented by advances in modern science and technology must be deeply rooted in thehuman psychological architecture or human nature. In criticizing the “hedonisticpsychology” underlying neoclassical and Austrian economics, Veblen (1898/1961, p. 74)stated that an evolutionary economics requires a psychology that recognizes humannature is “a coherent structure of propensities and habits which seeks realization andexpression in an unfolding activity”. Veblen’s economic psychology was a combinationof three factors: the instinctive impulses to conscious purposive action, the emotion(s)associated with each particular instinct, and the mental habits shaped by the inheritedsocio-economic institutional environment. The instinctive proclivities and associatedsentiments (emotions) form a human nature that has remained stable after havingevolved by natural selection during the long prehistory of modern humans.In Veblen’s psychological and anthropological analyses of the formation of socialhabits, the impulsive tendencies play out in the changing conditions of economic lifeunder the continuous evolutionary improvements in technologies. As products of thecombination of instincts that form human nature and life experiences underever-changing industrial technology, habits or institutions lag behind technologicaladvances, but become eroded, modified, or ultimately eliminated by theirincompatibility with the current state of technology.

A universal trait of people is an evolved human nature consisting of a “complementof instinctive dispositions”, a term that included the appropriate sentiments(Veblen, 1914, p. 14). In contrast to tropismatic actions that are involuntaryresponses to certain stimuli, instincts are impulses to action that involve consciousnessand adaptation to ends or purposes aimed at under that impulse (Veblen, 1914, p. 4).In Veblen’s (1914, p. 6) words:

Men take thought, but the human spirit, that is to say the racial endowment of instinctiveproclivities, decides what they shall take thought of, and how and to what effect.

The appropriate sentiments give force to the instinctive impulse to action (Veblen, 1914,p. 54) and are virtually inseparable from the instincts in Veblen’s discourses.But the sentiments also essentially determine whether the instinctive impulse isgroup-regarding or self-regarding. The two primary group-regarding instincts wereworkmanship and the parental bent, with idle curiosity playing a tangential role.The sentiment associated with workmanship is:

[. . .] the efficient use of means at hand and adequate management of resources available forpurposes of life is itself an end of endeavor and accomplishment of this kind is a source ofgratification (Veblen, 1914, pp. 31-32).

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The sentiments associated with the parental bent are the “kindly, humane sentiments”,“tender emotions”, and solicitude for the young (Veblen, 1914, pp. 90-93). With theparental bent reinforcing the sentimental approval of economy and efficiency for thecommon good, the instinct of workmanship is a propensity to work out the ends thatare made worthwhile by the parental bent (Veblen, 1914, p. 48).

While the instincts and sentiments of workmanship and parental bent in theirnatural states are group-regarding, Veblen (1914, pp. 43-47) spoke of the self-regardingsentiments of self-complacency, self-abasement, self-aggrandizement, and fear in waysthat suggest both emotions and instinctive impulses. In The Theory of the LeisureClass (1899) and Veblen (1899, pp. 12-21) devoted more critical attention to theself-regarding instincts in terms of their influence on the development of habits ofexploit versus industry in predatory societies. But in both The Theory of the LeisureClass (1899, p. 291) and Instinct of Workmanship (1914, p. 47), the self-regardinginstincts were depicted as being rather latent, coming into play to influence habits“in any culture that partakes appreciably of a predatory or coercive character”(1914, p. 47; see also 1899, p. 291).

How the instincts influence the evolution of habits involves both the nature of theeconomic life and what Veblen termed “contamination” of instincts. Among membersof the human population there are different endowments of self-regarding instincts andsocial-regarding instincts. In social evolution as in biological evolution, the naturalselection process favors those with native endowments that are most conducive tosurvival and reproduction within the given socio-economic environment. Where theprimitive economic culture was one of peaceable agriculture, habits conformed tothe sentiments of the instincts of workmanship and parental bent. But in primitivesocieties in which exploit and domination were endemic through an economic lifedependency on hunting and fighting, the self-regarding instincts that manifest into a“predatory human nature” come into full play (Veblen, 1899, pp. 215-217, 225).

The “mutual contamination” of instincts occurs because the working out of oneinstinct is affected by the biases and proclivities of the other instincts (Veblen, 1914,p. 40). In predatory societies, the instinct of workmanship becomes contaminated bythe self-regarding instincts, resulting in high social status being accorded to prowess inthe fight and hunt. But a significant feature of workmanship and parental bent is thatneither “commonly” runs “to passionate excesses” (Veblen, 1914, p. 34). Together, thesesocial-regarding instincts effect a “common-sense” selective control over the scheme oflife. Both give way under immediate pressure of other instinctive impulses, butcontinually reassert themselves in a resilient solicitude for the future of the group thatreinforces the instinct of workmanship’s sustaining interest in efficiency in theeconomic life processes.

2.1 Instincts and the origins of religion in animism and anthropomorphismThe origin of religion is in the animism of primitive people leading to the imputation ofparental solicitude and workmanship to an anthropomorphic divinity, which continuesthrough modern institutional religion (Veblen, 1914, p. 50). Veblen explained theanimistic tendencies of human nature as resulting from “self-contamination” by theinstinct of workmanship (Veblen, 1914, p. 52). All phenomena of the natural world areinterpreted in the light of the observer’s habits of thoughts, which are shaped byhis own life experiences that form his “apperception mass” (Veblen, 1914, p. 60).

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Naı̈ve animism is the tendency to impute to natural objects and events an agency withsome sort of personality. The essential trait of anthropomorphic conceptions is thathuman-like conduct is imputed to external objects, i.e. phenomena interpretedanthropomorphically are imbued with a “human interest”. When the instinct ofworkmanship becomes “mutually contaminated” with the instinct of idle curiosity, thepersonality imputed by the instinct of workmanship takes dramatic form, resulting intendencies to create fantastic myths and legends (Veblen, 1906, p. 26, 1914, pp. 84-85).

Veblen traced the evolution from naı̈ve animism and anthropomorphism to theprimitive religious concepts as beginning in peaceable cultures dependent onagriculture (crops and flocks), where fertility and growth being nurtured by humanswere fundamental. With plants and animals imputed to have human-like personalitiesof their own, it was in the economic self-interest of humans to develop and maintainsome sort of spiritual contact and communion with their world of fertility and growthof these “speechless others” (Veblen, 1914, p. 78). The natural phenomena of weatherand seasons which affected agricultural productivity were also conceived as beingunder the control of agents with human-like personalities (Veblen, 1914, p. 83, 92).Thus, it was incumbent on humans to also cultivate the good will of those agents.

Veblen noted that archeological discoveries revealed the common presence ofobjects suggesting that in small agricultural cultures the early gods were female(motherly) deities and religious observances were rituals of fecundity (Veblen, 1914,p. 125). The scheme of life in agriculture is one of fecundity, growth, and nurture,matters which in primitive societies were considered to be natural to women. Thus, aspiritual or “magical congruence of great force” between women and the propagationof growing things was seen as being so strong as to fear any intrusion of the men in theaffairs of growth and fertility (Veblen, 1914, p. 93). The kindly humane sentiments,affectionate disposition, and tender emotions intrinsic to the parental bent instinct wereadmirably in place in the care of plants and animals (Veblen, 1914, pp. 90-91). In thisway, the instincts of workmanship and parental bent brought women and motherhoodinto an ever-growing scheme of magical observances designed to further the naturalincrease of flocks and crops (Veblen, 1914, pp. 96-97).

The minor instinct of imitation also comes into play. By means of sign-language,lines of communication of a spiritual kind with the “speechless ones” were developed,which in the evolutionary formation and progression of institutions, becamesystematized into ritual and ceremonial procedure (Veblen, 1914, pp. 78-79). In laterphases of cultural development, the more elaborate phases of these magical rites ofhusbandry evolved into formal religious observances and theological tenets, withwomen serving as the priests who could communicate with the female deities on behalfof the entire group (Veblen, 1914, p. 81).

In the peaceable agricultural societies, the deities that emerged were women (1914,p. 97), and the economic interest served would be in agricultural fecundity providinglife-sustaining action for the social group. But things worked out differently whereeconomic life processes based on hunting and fighting (exploit) resulted in predatorycultures. The “self-contamination” of the instinct of workmanship that gave rise toanthropomorphic conceptions of supernatural agents with human personalitiesbecame joined with the “mutual contamination” of instincts as the self-regardingproclivities dominate in predatory cultures. In the evolutionary development ofreligion, male deities took first rank and rituals symbolized the mastery of a powerful

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and ferocious deity and the fearful submission to his will by the worshipers (1914,p. 126, 1899, pp. 294-297). A male priesthood of high status emerged as the worldlyagents of that deity, exhibiting the same predatory proclivities as the hunters andwarriors in ritualistic exercise of authority.

2.2 Instincts and institutional religionThe instinctive impulses give rise to the psychological basis for belief in supernaturalagents with superior powers. In the peaceable agricultural societies, the economicinterests of the group shape reflective thought on the personality of the deity and howher/his goodwill can be attained through ritualistic behavior under the guidance of apriesthood assumed to act as the worldly representative. With economic advancement,institutional religion took increasing form as the achievement of an economic surplusallowed increased time for reflection. In predatory cultures, that development washeavily influenced by the pursuit of economic self-interest on part of the priests, whocharged “what the traffic will bear” as their services increased in value (Veblen, 1914,pp. 155-156).

In Christianity, the predatory culture conception of the deity and the accompanyingtheology and ritual reached a high point in the feudalistic church of the middle ages.Under the influence of the predatory instincts, the sentiments of the instinct ofworkmanship were not imputed to the feudalistic deity. On the contrary, the vulgaraffairs of industry were beneath his dignity, and work was proclaimed by thepriesthood “as the most calamitous curse laid on mankind by a vindictive God”(Veblen, 1914, p. 174). Any workmanlike preoccupation with industrial efficiency in thematerial side of life was presumably sinful (Veblen, 1914, pp. 170-178).

From the middle ages onward, two themes run through Veblen’s evolutionaryeconomics of religion. Both related to the influence of advances in science andindustrial technology in the progression of economic life through the era of handicraftindustry and into the modern machine age. One is the diminishing but everresilient influence of the anthropomorphism arising from the “self-contamination” ofthe instinct of workmanship. The other theme is the evolutionary changes in theinstitutional religion: “notoriously, the fashion of the religious faith changes tardily”(Veblen, 1914, p. 255). As feudalism gave way to life under the handicraft system, theinstinct of workmanship again came into a dominant position in the habits of thoughtshaped by the discipline of daily life (Veblen, 1914, p. 234). In time, religious conceptsunderwent a change, becoming infused again with sentiments of the instinct ofworkmanship (Veblen, 1914, p. 256). Conceptually, the deity became the mastercraftsman to be reverenced for his beneficial workmanlike qualities in creating anorder of nature designed to serve the good of man in securing the highest practicalstate of material well-being (Veblen, 1906/1961, p. 14, 1914, pp. 254-255). But theimputed persona and presence of the deity also underwent change. As earlieranthropomorphic preconceptions and elements of institutional theology becameincreasingly discredited by the matter-of-fact logic of tool-use by skilled craftsmen,and even more by modern scientific and technical knowledge, the deity became aremote and abstract “Great Artisan” who had retired from active play after creatingthe world ruled by natural law.

Institutional religion changed “tardily” because religious beliefs had little directimpact on economic activities, and vice-versa. But the indirect economic impacts were

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of prime importance because all animistic and anthropomorphic influences areobstructive to the matter-of-fact knowledge of science and technology:

Any instinctive bias to colour, distort and derange the facts by imputing human nature willunavoidably act to hinder and deflect the agent from an effectual pursuit of mechanicaldesign (Veblen, 1914, p. 74).

In The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) and The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904),Veblen argued that the matter-of-fact logic of modern industrial technologies waseroding the mental habits conducive to the acceptance of institutional religion, what isnow termed the “secularization thesis” (Iannaccone, 1998, p. 1468). Two exceptions,however, explained the resilience of the religious influence of anthropomorphictendencies of human nature rooted in instinct psychology even in the modern age(Veblen, 1904).

First, human nature formed in and suited for the economic life of the primitivesavagery was at odds with the materialistic mentality of modern industry:

Neither the manner of life imposed by the machine process, nor the manner of thoughtinculcated by habituation of its logic, will fall in with the free movement of the human spirit,born, as it is, to fit the conditions of a [peaceable] savage life (Veblen, 1914, p. 334).

Laymen, especially among the moderately well-to-do “seek respite in the fog of occultand esoteric faiths and cults, and so fall back on the will to believe things of which thesenses transmit no evidence” (Veblen, 1914, p. 333). Even scientists could not fullyescape from the instinctive element of anthropomorphism in their work:

In the most advanced communities, and even among the adepts of modern science, therecomes up persistently the revulsion of the inhumanly dispassionate sweep of the scientificquest, as well as against the inhumanly ruthless fabric of technological processes that havecome out of this search for matter-of-fact knowledge. Very often the savage need of a spiritualinterpretation (dramatization) of phenomena breaks through the crust of acquiredmaterialistic habits of thought, to find such refuge as may be had in articles of faith seizedon and held by the sheer force of instinctive conviction (Veblen, 1906/1961, p. 26; emphasisadded).

Second, and more directly related to religion, Veblen asserted in an essay published in1910 that a natural form of Christianity, “Christian Morals”, was an enduring socialforce. The two unique elemental principles of the “Christian animus” were “brotherlylove” or “the impulse to mutual service” and “non-resistance (humility)”. While bothhad been formed by people under the oppression of Roman rule, there was a difference.Non-resistance was a conditioned behavioral tendency that was easily eroded when theoppression lifted, and was never acquired by people who were not subjected to Romanoppression. In contrast, natural Christianity was the principle of “brotherly love” or“mutual succor”. While this became an institutional feature of Christianity underRoman oppression, Veblen traced it to the instinct of workmanship in human nature, ahereditary trait that “springs eternal” when the pressure of conventionality is removedor relieved (Veblen, 1910, p. 177):

[B]rotherly love or mutual service, appears, in its elements at least, to be a very deeprooted and ancient cultural trait, due to an extremely protracted experience of the race in theearly stages of human culture, reinforced and defined by the social conditions prevalent inthe early days of Christianity [. . .].

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[T]his principle is forever reasserting itself in economic matters, in the impulsive approval ofwhatever conduct is serviceable to the common good and in the disapproval of disserviceableconduct even within the limits of legality and natural right. It seems, indeed, to be nothingmore than a somewhat specialized manifestation of the instinct of workmanship, and as suchit has the indefeasible vitality that belongs to the hereditary traits of human nature (Veblen,1910, p. 183).

This directs attention back to two particular characteristics of the group-regardinginstincts of workmanship and parental bent. First, by not supporting an excess ofpassion, they provide some resistance to religious fanaticism. Veblen (unlike AdamSmith) never considered religious fanaticism in his evolutionary economics of religion,focusing instead on the conservative nature of institutional religion. This leads to thesecond characteristic, the tendency for the two social-regarding instincts to give way(within limits) to the self-regarding or predatory instincts when the culture is heavilyoriented toward predation. In that regard, religion as a conservative institutionreturned in absentee ownership. The mental influence of national mobilization duringthe First World War had revived the predatory culture to the extent that thecombination of religion under the self-regarding instincts and the emotion of patriotismhad led the “common man” to elect governments that served the vested interests of thelarge businessmen and financiers at his expense.

3. Why Veblen’s problematic psychology clouds the relevance of hisevolutionary economics of religion: a case exampleA case example illustrates the relevance of Veblen’s evolutionary economics of religionto social economics. In the latter decades of the twentieth century, two developments inreligion had significant socio-economic impacts on social policies in the Americas –Liberation Theology among Catholics in Latin America and the new religiouspolitical right in the USA. In terms of sociological characteristics, Leathers (1884) notedthat liberation theology was suggestive of Veblen’s natural Christianity, while thenew religious political right was suggestive of another round of the revival of theconservative religion. The fundamental impulse driving the liberation theorymovement appeared to be the same basic impulse toward brotherhood, mutualservice, and Christian charity that Veblen described. In the sociological aspects of thatimpulse, compatibility existed between liberation theology’s emphasis on solidaritywith the oppressed masses and Veblen’s comment that the Christian trait of brotherlylove historically was most at home among the oppressed classes. There was also acommonality in the primacy of concern for the community welfare and the socialvalues of Veblen’s Christian morals (Leathers, 1884, pp. 1162-1163).

Similarly, in terms of sociological characteristics, the new religious political rightresembled the type of conservative religion that influence the “common man” topolitically support governments that pursued policies that benefited the materialinterests of the large businessmen. The most devout supporters of the new religiouspolitical right came largely from working classes who readily responded to a fusion ofmaterialism with religion, with the theme that material wealth is deemed to be a justreward from God to those who embrace the conservative religion (Leathers, 1884,pp. 1167-1168).

But interpreting these movements as Veblenian-type developments called Veblen’spsychology of instincts into question. As Leathers (1884, pp. 1162) noted, if the liberation

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theology was a manifestation of Veblen’s natural Christianity, its psychological basiswould be in the instinct of workmanship. Similarly, Leathers (1884, pp. 1172-1173) notedthat the new religious political right appeared to have at least some roots in the type ofmental ambivalence to life under modern science and technology arising from theincompatibility between human nature (instincts) that evolved as adaptations toprimitive life and mental influences of life under modern science and technology.In producing material comforts while destroying traditional social relationships andbeliefs, modern science and technology have created tensions that make certain groupsparticularly susceptible to the new religious political right’s political sermons in muchthe same way that Veblen’s people sought escape in spiritualism.

3.1 Criticisms of Veblen’s theory of instinctsAn acceptance of instinct theory was widely prevalent among social scientists ofVeblen’s generation. As Clarence Ayres (1958) stated “the woods were full of instincts”.James (1890, p. 393) devoted a chapter in Principles of Psychology to “instinct”, in whichhe argued that the premise that humans lacked instincts was false: “on the contrary,man possesses all the impulses that they [animals] have, and a great many morebesides”. In Varieties of Religious Experiences, James (1902, p. 517) argued that a“science of religion” rested firmly on “the instinctive belief of mankind: God is realsince he produces real effects”. But from the 1920s onward, psychology embracedbehaviorism, rejecting any notion of an evolved human nature formed by instinctiveproclivities. Evolutionary economics became heavily influenced by Ayres (1958, p. 29)who asserted that it had been “conclusively established” that all complex behaviorpatterns are “wholly cultural”. Rutherford (1984, p. 333), a foremost authority onVeblen and evolutionary economics, argued that Veblen should have rejected allaspects of “psychologism” and relied entirely on behaviorism to explain allevolutionary changes in institutions.

Criticisms of Veblen’s instinct psychology are of vital importance in the case ofreligion because it constituted the essential core in his evolutionary economics ofreligion. Thus, Rutherford’s dismissal of all psychology from Veblen’s evolutionaryeconomics would be inapplicable in the case of religion. The requisite belief insupernatural beings with superior powers over humans necessarily has apsychological basis, and while the theological doctrine and rituals of institutionalreligion are manners of acquired cultural habits, their sustainability requires theelement of belief. Thus, it is highly significant that modern evolutionary psychologistshave explained that innate impulses to action that were called instinctive humannature are now understood as the functioning of psychological mechanisms in thehuman brain that evolved over the long pre-human history as adaptations to survivaland reproduction. Evolutionary psychologists have explained the origins andpersistence of religious beliefs in terms of how particular psychological mechanismsthat were adaptations for purposes other than religion function to give rise to religiousbeliefs as an enduring tendency of human nature.

4. A modern evolutionary psychology for Veblen’s evolutionary economicsof religionResearch has provided evidence of the existence of neural circuits in the human brainthat are highly specialized for reasoning about physical objects (naı̈ve physics),

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the biological world (naı̈ve biology), the beliefs and motivations of other individuals(naı̈ve or intuitive psychology), and social intercourse. Evolutionary psychologyrecognizes that these circuits or modules were designed by natural selection to solveproblems of survival and reproduction in the long evolutionary history preceding theemergence of modern humans. Each of the many domain-specific modules in theevolved brain is a simple psychological mechanism designed to produce an inference orintuitive response to a specific input. At a critical juncture in evolutionary process, aphysiological change occurred that allowed the domain-specific nodules orpsychological mechanisms to communicate, thus creating the ability for immensecomplexity in computational abilities of the mind without any increase in the size of thebrain (Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 278).

In “evolutionary psychology: a primer”, Tooby and Cosmides (1997) argued thatmodern evolutionary psychology provides a scientific validation of William James’thesis that the human mind functions with a host of instincts in such an automaticmanner that we are largely unaware of their activities. They noted that properties ofthe domain-specific psychological mechanisms are also hallmarks of what werepreviously thought of as instincts, e.g. they develop and are applied without anyconscious thought and are structured to solve specific types of adaptive problems.The similarity of these psychological mechanisms with Veblen’s instincts as impulsesto purposive action is also suggested in Kirkpatrick’s statement:

The fundamental premise of the [evolutionary psychology] approach to our speciespsychological architecture – our “human nature”, if you will – evolved to do something,namely, to solve the many specific adaptive problems of survival and reproduction faced byour distant ancestors (2005, p. 21; emphasis added).

The evolutionary development that enabled communication among domain-specificmechanisms to allow complex inferences suggests Veblen’s “mutual contamination”,or “how and with what effect the several instinctive proclivities cross, blend, overlap,neutralize or reinforce one another” (Veblen, 1914, p. 9). That similarity takes on specialsignificance in the explanation of religion as by-products of psychological systems thatevolved as adaptations for other purposes.

4.1 Evolutionary psychology of religion: by-products of psychological adaptationsIt might appear that the concept of instincts continues to be rejected by evolutionarypsychologists of religion. Between the hard cover and soft cover editions of ReligionExplained, Boyer (2001) changed the subtitle from “the human instincts that fashionGods, spirits, and ancestors” to “the evolutionary origins of religious thought”.In addition, the text contained only several explicit mentions of instincts, in particularthe statement that:

There is no religious instinct, no specific inclination in the mind, no particular disposition forthese [religious] concepts, no special religion centre in the brain, and religious people are notdifferent from non-religious ones in essential cognitive functions (Boyer, 2001, p. 378).

Similarly, Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 215-216) dismissed the notion of a “religious instinct”or “some kind of innate predisposition toward religion”. In the language ofevolutionary psychology, that means a rejection of the “religion-as-adaptationhypothesis” or an “evolved religion-specific mechanism” for religion.

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But Veblen never suggested the existence of a “religious instinct”. Rather, heexplained how several instinctive proclivities that form human nature lead to religiouspreconceptions through several forms of “contamination”. In a similar fashion,evolutionary psychologists explain religion as a behavioral tendency universal inhumans that is a by-product of a number of psychological systems that evolved asadaptations through natural selection to serve other purposes. Psychologicalby-products occur because the natural selection process is far from being perfectlyefficient in either its evolved structure or its operation. Rather than a domain-specificsystem only activated by a very specific stimulus and producing exactly the sameintuitive inference, it may be activated by a variety of other stimuli and produceintuitive representations that have nothing to do with the evolved adaptive purpose(Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 234-237).

In the evolutionary by-product explanation of religion, a number of thedomain-specific psychological systems come into play. But as was the case withVeblen’s prime instincts of workmanship and parental bent, several of those are themost important to the cognitive origins of religious belief. Other systems influence theform that religion takes with respect to both preconceptions of deities and the socialnature of religion, as was the case of Veblen’s self-regarding or predatory instinctsleading to male deities versus his social-regarding instincts leading to female deities.The relative division of labor among the psychological systems is exemplified byKirkpatrick’s (2005, p. 269) statement that:

Attachment theory explains nicely why beliefs about personalized deities tend to take certainforms [. . .] but [it] cannot explain why people find the idea of God or other supernaturalphenomena plausible to begin with.

4.2 Animism and anthropomorphism: the origins of religious inferencesThe origin of religion, of course, is deeply rooted in the psychological phenomena ofanimism and anthropomorphism. Just as Veblen explained those phenomena in termsof the “self-contamination” of the instinct of workmanship and the “mutualcontamination” of a group of instincts (including the instinct of workmanship and idlecuriosity), evolutionary psychologists of religion explain them as by-products of anumber of innate systems that evolved as adaptations to serve purposes other thanreligion. Because the evolutionary natural selection process did not chose perfectadaptations but only the best of existing imperfect alternatives, the evolvedpsychological mechanisms are prone to biases (Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 285). Animism andanthropomorphism result from a hair-triggering agency-detection mechanism readilylending itself to supernatural intuitive interpretations of uncertain oranxiety-provoking events. As Boyer (2001, p. 184) stated: “people do not inventGods and spirits, they receive information that leads them to build such concepts”.

More specifically, agency-detecting systems involving the animacy system, thenaı̈ve physics system, and the naı̈ve biology system were designed by natural selectionto recognize predators. But these naı̈ve psychological systems are prone to errors. Theanimacy system is activated by the sight of any object that appears to move in apurposeful manner, producing expectations and inferences about animals and persons,e.g. bushes moving due to wind being identified inferentially as lurking animals. Innateintuition is programmed to errors on the side of “safe bets” as an adaption

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(Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 279-281). Thus, an animistic bias is built into our innateperceptual system by an evolved human agency-detector mechanism that operates on ahair-trigger, leading to frequent errors in attributing agency to inanimate objects orunseen forces.

Given the animistic hair-trigger reflex, the single most important domain forunderstanding religious belief is intuitive psychology by which theories of humanminds are misapplied to nonhuman objects or creatures (Kirkpatrick, 2005,pp. 282-285). The human mind is readily accepting of religious conceptions ofsupernatural spirits and deities because they satisfy two conditions (Boyer, 2001,pp. 71-74). They violate certain intuitive expectations about what humans are capableof doing, i.e. possess certain supernatural powers that humans do not possess, whilepreserving other intuitive expectations of the “biological essentialism” of humans as aspecies. The mental concept of a human figure with the counter-intuitive power tobring good or ill fortune allows rich mental inferences by exciting a multiple ofdomain-specific modules. The counter-intuitive feature gives substance to the tendencyfor Veblen’s instinct of idle curiosity to give dramatic features to magic and mythsinvolved in the origin of religion.

As did Veblen, evolutionary psychology recognizes the difference between thepsychological mechanisms that produce non-verbalized inferences and expectations onan implicit process basis, and the explicit thinking involving the use of reasoning andreflective conscious thought (Boyer, 2001, pp. 350-351). In the evolutionary psychologyof religion, concepts of supernatural agents are the consequence of an important linkbetween the implicit inferences generated automatically and the reflective reasoningprocess at the conscious level. This is due to what Boyer (2001, pp. 146-147) calls thecognitive ability to “decouple”, which simply means that psychological systems can beused to generate “what if” inferences. Thus, we have a modern explanation of Veblen’sinstinct of idle curiosity giving rise to “dramatic” representations in myths, some ofwhich become absorbed in religion.

4.3 Social exchange psychological systems and forms of religionReligion involves groups of individuals joining in the belief in a supernatural deity anda prescribed manner (ritual) for relating to that deity. In advanced cultures, religioninvolves institutional structures and doctrines that are products of deliberate actionbased on conscious reflective thought and accumulation of acquired habits passedfrom one generation to another. But evolutionary psychologists recognize that auniversal human tendency to form religious groups is innately rooted in socialexchange psychological mechanisms. Cooperative interaction with others is needed toexist, and hence, receiving information about others is essential for survival andreproduction. The term “social mind” refers to the fact that the human psychologicalarchitecture has been disproportionately designed for processing social information ofall types and keeping track of social-exchange relationships (Boyer, 2001, pp. 30-31,137-139; Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 338). Perceived relationships with supernatural deitiesare explained as by-products of these social exchange systems. In essence, religioninvolves interaction with supernatural agents who are presumed to have full access tostrategic information which humans do not have, i.e. the counter-intuitive feature.How these social-exchange systems come into play suggests a mix of Veblen’ssocial-regarding instincts and self-regarding or predatory instincts.

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4.4 Social exchange systems and Veblen’s social-regarding instinctsThe social exchange relationship between the individual believer and a supernaturaldeity involves by-products of the attachment system and the parental investmentsystem Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 28-31). The attachment system is an evolved adaptationdesigned by natural selection to maintain proximity between infants and theirattachment figures, primarily caregivers, for the purpose of protection and survival.It is activated by such stimuli related to proximity, and triggers a suite of behavioraloptions in response. But this system is neither infantile nor regressive (Kirkpatrick,2005, p. 19). Rather it was designed by evolutionary natural selection to operate acrossthe entire lifespan, hence, its role in religion. It works with a number of related systems,e.g. several sociable systems (Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 30-31). For the individual believer,the deity becomes conceived as an attachment figure, the supernatural caregiver withextraordinary powers.

But that presumed relationship also rests on an inference as to the nature of theparental investment system imputed to the deity, i.e. the impulsive self-sacrifice for thecare of children (Kirkpatrick, 2005, p. 167). A strong system would result in the deitiesbeing the maternal type produced in the primitive agrarian cultures, which suggests byVeblen’s parental bent and more particularly, the female deities of the primitiveagricultural groups. A weak system would result in deities whose perversepersonalities could wreak great discomfort or harm to those seeking care, a parentalinvestment system similar to the deities under Veblen’s self-regarding or predatoryinstincts, e.g. the deity of the Old Testament.

Social religion involves by-products of other social exchange mechanisms. Thosethat are somewhat suggestive of Veblen’s social-regarding instincts are kinshipsystems, reciprocal altruism systems, and coalitional psychology. Kinship has thespecial feature of being explained as an adaptation serving the “selfish gene”, whichsimply means a gene that through the natural selection survives and is reproduced inprogeny (Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 246-251). In theory, pure altruism means that anyindividual carrying that gene is willing to sacrifice to assure survival of the genethrough assuring the survival of others who carry the same gene. In the psychologicalmechanism, kinship involves identifying others who are kin, extended to the concept ofin-groups who merit special benefits from the individual and out-groups who may beenemies or predators. Through primitive ancestor worship, God becomes viewed as apsychological kin, with the kinship relationship closely supporting theattachment-parental investment relationship. By extension, other members of areligious group become members of the kin in-group, with the priests treated as partialsubstitutes for the deity as an attachment figure.

Reciprocal altruism involves systems that generate expectations that providingbenefits to the attachment figure will result in some form of reciprocity of benefits(Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 247-248). In the natural social world, evolved sub-systems weredesigned to detect and respond to cheaters in actual relationships. But in religion thereis only the presumption on part of the believer that the deity has engaged in thepartnership and will reciprocate by providing benefits through use of its extraordinarypowers under the counter-intuitive feature.

Although regarded as a domain-specific mechanism, coalitional psychology involveselements of several psychological systems – parental investment, kinship, andreciprocal altruism. Coalitional psychology is a central feature of evolved psychology in

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the form of a suite of mechanisms for distinguishing “good” from “bad” people andgiving preferential treatment to good guys (members of in-group). Supernatural agentsare seen as coalitional partners, a relationship that extends to other believers in thatdeity. Veblen explained the “golden rule” of natural Christianity in terms of amanifestation of the instinct of workmanship. In evolutionary psychology of religion,the “Golden Rule” represents a codification of social-exchange principles alreadyembedded deeply within our psychological architecture – by-products of reciprocalaltruism and the pure altruism of kinship (Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 257-258, 300).

4.5 Social exchange psychological systems and Veblen’s self-regarding instinctsSocial exchange relationships in religion also involve by-products of severalpsychological systems that are more suggestive of Veblen’s self-regarding instincts.Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 242-244) argues that power, prestige, status, dominance, andcompetition are functionally distinct domain-specific systems. As adaptations thatevolved through natural selection, they are designed specifically to processinformation about relative dominance and status within a social hierarchy. Thesepsychological mechanisms are reminiscent of the Veblen’s self-regarding instincts,with similar concepts on deities and relationships of believers to the deities. Deities areseen as power figures of highest status, with the believer being subject to submissivebehavior. The image of God as being powerful and controlling is a direct reflection of apsychological mechanism designed specifically to process information about relativedominance and status, and keep tract of the current hierarchy and the respective placeof each individual.

4.6 Psychological origins of religion and the challenges from scienceBecause the psychological mechanisms whose by-products generate the mentalinferences that take form in religious beliefs evolved over the long history precedingthe emergence of modern humans, and insufficient time has elapsed to allow furtherevolutionary changes in the psychological architecture to occur, evolutionarypsychology reaches the same conclusion as Veblen with respect to religion versusscience. Institutional changes will occur as elements of institutional religious doctrineare refuted, and life experience leads to dismissal of belief in various religious rituals.But the impulses leading to religious belief generated as by-products of the evolvedhuman psychological architecture will persist in the face of advances in science andtechnology that challenge the rationality of the existence of supernatural agents of ahuman form with extraordinary powers over humans (Kirkpatrick, 2005, pp. 296-298).Indeed, Boyer’s (2001, pp. 368-370) discussion of the inability of scientists to resolve theconflict between religion and science is reminiscent of the inability of Veblen’sscientists to escape the innate tendency toward anthropomorphism.

5. Concluding statementThe strength of Veblen’s evolutionary economics of religion was in explaining thepsychological origins of religion and persistence of religious belief in the face ofchallenges from modern science and the materialistic influences that come witheconomic progress. The innate proclivities of human nature could give rise to religiousmovements that reflect social concerns (e.g. liberation theology) as well as movementsthat reflect self-interest (e.g. the new religious political right), both which could

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influence socio-economic policies. But the relevance of his evolutionary economics ofreligion is clouded by his psychology of instincts which few (if any) social scientistswould accept. In modern evolutionary psychology of religion, we find a viablesubstitution. The by-products of psychological mechanisms that evolved in the humanbrain as adaptations for purposes other than religion not only explain religious beliefas an innate proclivity of human nature, but also how particular social exchangepsychological mechanisms have religious influences similar to Veblen’ssocial-regarding and self-regarding instincts. Thus, with a modern evolutionarypsychology of religion giving greater clarity to the psychological basis of Veblen’sevolutionary economics of religion, his evolutionary economics approach becomes acomplement to the micro-economic based “economics of religion” in the efforts to betterunderstand the complex interplay between religion and socio-economic activities.

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Corresponding authorCharles G. Leathers can be contacted at: cleather@cba.ua.edu

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