valuing, desiring and noramtive priority brady

8/9/2019 Valuing, Desiring and Noramtive Priority BRADY

1/13

Scots Philosophical Association

University of St Andrews

Valuing, Desiring and Normative PriorityAuthor(s): Michael S. Brady

Source:The Philosophical Quarterly,

Vol. 53, No. 211 (Apr., 2003), pp. 231-242Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Scots Philosophical Associationand theUniversity of St. AndrewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542866.

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2/13

The

hilosophicaluarterly,

ol.

53,

No.

21I

ISSN

oo3i-8o94

April

o03

VALUING,

DESIRING AND

NORMATIVE

PRIORITY

BY

MICHAEL.

BRADY

Judgement

nternalism

laimshat ur valuative

udgements

illmotivate

s

to ct

ppropriately,

t

leastn o

ar

s we re ational.examineow his

laim houlde

understood,

ith

articular

focus

n

whether

aluingnjoys

kind

f

normative

riority'

ver

esiring.

considernd

reJect

views

ccording

owhich

aluingomethingrovides

ne

with reasonobe

moved;

his laim

f

normative

priority

nd he

eadings

f

nternalism

t

uggests

re oo

trong.

also

reject

n nter-

pretation

hichschewslaims

f

normative

riority,

hilst

aintaining

hat

aluing

evertheless

rationally

ommits

r

equires

ne o e

motivated;

his

ejection

f

ormative

riority

nd he

eading

of

nternalismt

upports

re ooweak.n

the

inal

ectionssketchhe

nderstanding

fjudgement

internalism

favour,

nd

efendt gainstbjections.

Judgement

nternalismlaims

hat here s a

conceptual

onnection etween

judging

hat

omething

s

valuable nd

being

motivated o attain

hat

hing.'

The

precise

nature f this

onnection

s, however,

ifficulto

pin

down. One

problem

s

that here re

(or

can

be)

occasionswhenwe lack

any

motivation

to

act

in

accordancewith ur

evaluative

udgements;

n

the

ight

f

this,

ny

conceptual

onnection

must e a

defeasible

ne. Another s

that failure o be

moved

by

one's values is a

failure, omehow,

f

rationality;

n

the

ight

f

this,wemustunderstand hedefeasible onnections implyinghatfavour-

able

evaluations f

x will

motivate s to

act in so

far

as we are

rational.2

his

paper

examines how

udgement

nternalismhould

be understood

n

the

light

fthese

onstraints.

n

?1

reject eadings

which

laim that

valuations

enjoy

a

particular

ind of

normative

riority'

ver

motivations

uch that

valuing

omething

rovides

ne with

reasono be

moved

appropriately.

n

?II

I

reject

an

interpretation

hich eschews

claims of

normative

riority,

and

maintains hat

valuing

nevertheless

ationally

ommitsr

requires

ne to

I For detailsof this and other kinds of internalism,ee D. Brink,Moral Realismnd the

Foundations

f

Ethics

Cambridge

UP,

1989),

PP.

37-43;

S.

Darwall,

Reasons, Motives,

nd the

Demands of

Morality:

n

Introduction',

n

S. Darwall et

al.

(eds),

Moral

Discourse

nd

Practice

(Oxford

UP,

1997),

P- 305-12;

and

M.

Smith,

TheMoral

Problem

Oxford

UP,

1994), p. 60-3-

2

Smith,

p.

133-7.

See also C.

Korsgaard,

Skepticism

bout Practical

Reason',

Journal

f

Philosophy,

3 (1986),

pp.

5-25-

?

The

Editors f The

hilosophical

uarterly,003.

Published

y

Blackwell

ublishing,

6o00

arsington

oad,

Oxford

x4

2DQ,

UK,

and

350

Main

Street, Malden,

MA

2148,

USA.

This content downloaded from 84.89.129.46 on Mon, 2 Feb 2015 11:18:01 AMAll use subject toJSTOR Terms and Conditions
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3/13

232

MICHAEL

S.

BRADY

be motivated.

n

the

final

ections

sketch nd

defend he

understanding

f

internalism hich

favour.

I

If

we make

the

plausible

ssumption

hatmotivation

equires

he

presence

of

desire,

we can

understand

udgement

nternalisms

claiming concep-

tual connection etween

aluing

nd

desiring.

n

particular,

e

can

under-

stand

t as

claiming

hat

gents

will

desire

n

accordance

with heir

aluing,

at

least

in

so

far as

they

are rational. But what

is the nature of

this

connection?n this ection shallconsider,nd ultimatelyeject, viewof

internalism

ccording

o

which here s

something

ormatively

pecial

bout

valuing,

r more

correctly,

view as to the

way

n

which

valuing

ounts s

special.

The idea that

valuing enjoys

a

privileged

tatus

when

compared

with

desiring,

hat

t

has a measure f whatwe

might

all

normative

riority,

tems

from ur conviction hatrational

gents

eem to tailor heir esires o their

values,

but not viceversa. his

suggests

hat when

valuing

and

desiring

diverge,

he

rrationality

eems o attach o

agents'desiring

ather

han

their

valuing

cf.

mith,

p.

142-7,

177-8o,

n the

spirit'

f

nternalism).

fwe are

sympathetic

o the

dea

of

normative

riority,

e need

to

give

an

accountof

what t

consists

n.

The

strongest

osition

here

will

hold that

valuing

ome-

thing

n

and of itself

rounds

rational

bligation

o desirethat

thing:

n

this

iew,

f

n

agent

valuesx then

rationally

ught

o

desire

.

The

notion

rationally

ught'

s meant to

capture

what

the balance of

considerations

avours,

nd

hence what

it

is

all-things-considered

ational

for n

agent

to

do.3

A

slightly

eaker

reading

f the claim

that

valuing

has

normativeriorityverdesiring oldsthat aluing omethingnand of tself

grounds

n

objective

easono desirethat

hing.

A

reason s here

viewedas a

consideration

which

favours

ome course of

action,

but

which can

in

principle

e

outweighed y

other

onsiderations. n this

view,then,

f

an

agent

values

x

then has an

objective

eason

o desire .

I think

we have

good

reason o

reject

hese

ways

of

understanding

orma-

tive

priority,

nd

hence

good

reasonto

reject

hese

ways

of

nterpreting

he

claims that

udgement

nternalism

akes.

For

suppose

that S's

values are

themselveso highlyrrationalrunjustifiedhat oughtnottovaluex; it s

highly

ounter-intuitive

n

this

ase to

maintain hat

nevertheless

aluing

x

grounds

rational

obligation,

r

provides

S with an

objective

reason,

to

3

ee

J.

Broome,

'Normative

Requirements',

n

J.

Dancy

(ed.),

Normativioy

Oxford:

Blackwell,

000),

pp.

78-99,

at

p.

79.

?

The Editors

f

The

hilosophicaluarterly,003



4/13

VALUE,

DESIRING AND NORMATIVE

PRIORITY

233

desirex. What S

ought

o do

in

this

ase is

surely

o

get

rid

of the

positive

evaluation f

x,

rather handesire

n

accordancewith

t.4

We do not

have

to

relyonly

on

what seems

plausible,

however.For we have

reason to

reject

equally strong

eadings

fother rational

requirements,

n which case the

conclusion an be

supported y

analogy

with

hese.

The

epistemic equirement

o

believe

n

accordance

with modus

onens

provides

n

illustration.

strong

way

of

understanding

his s

as the claim

that fS

believes

hat and also

that

supports

,

S

has

a

rational

bligation

to

believe

q.

However,

s

John

Broome

has

argued,

his

eading

s

mistaken,

and not

ust

because S's

belief

n

the

former

ropositionsmay

be

epistem-

ically

uspect.5

or

suppose

thatthe

strong

eading

were

true.

f

we

grant

that believes hetautologyfpthen, theprinciple mplies hat fS believes

p,

thenS

rationally

ught

o believe

-

which s

obviously

alse.As a

result,

we should

reject

he

trongway

of

understanding

his

pistemic

rinciple.

The same

form f

argument

ells

quallyagainst

strong

eading

f the

principle

of

instrumental r

means-end

rationality.6

t is

traditional o

understand his

s the claim

that

f

an

agent

S intends

o

4

and

Iing

s a

necessary

means to

4ing,

then S

rationally

ught

to

W.

This

reading

too

should

be

rejected,

nd

not

simply

because

agents'

intentions,

ike

their

evaluations,an be irrational.n addition,fS is to fulfilhe ntention o

4

then

t s

necessary

or

to

4.

If

the

trong

eading

were

true,

t

wouldfollow

thatS

therefore

ationally

ught

o

4,

n

which ase

the truth f

the

strong

reading

entails hat

merely

ntending

o do

something rounds

rational

obligation

o do that

thing.

ince this

s

false,

we

should

reject

he

strong

reading.

It is

tempting,

n

the

light

f

this,

o

reject

trong eadings

f the

claim

that

valuing

has

normative

riority

ver

desiring.

his

does

not,

however,

forceus

to

abandon the

dea that

valuing njoys weakerkindofpriority,

which

we

might

apture

n

terms

f ts

provision

f a

different

weaker)

ort

of

normative

eason.

ndeed,

rejecting

he dea

that

valuing rovides

s with

obligations

r

reasons

of an

objective

ort

uggests

he

obvious

replacement

candidate,

namely, ubjective

bligations

r

reasons.

This

view

might

be

supported

s

follows:

o value x

is to

think

hat

x

is

good,

and to think

hat

x

is

good

is

to think

hat

one

has an

objective

ustificatory

eason to

obtain

it. But

subjective

easons

ust

are

considerations

ne

takes to

be

objective

See G. Sayre-McCord,The Metaethical roblem', thics,1081997), P- 55-83,atp. 64,

fn.

5.

5

See

J.

Broome,

Reasons and

Motivation',

roceedingsf

he

ristotelian

ociety,

upp.

Vol.

71

(1997),

.

126.

See also

his

Normative

Requirements',

.

85.

6

The

following

rgument

s

due to

Alan

Millar.

See his

'Normative

Reasons

and

Instrumental

ationality',

nJ.L.

Bermldez

and

A. Millar

eds),

Reasons

nd

Nature:

ssays

n the

Theory

fRationalityOxford

UP,

2002).

?

The

Editors

f

The




5/13

234

MICHAEL S.

BRADY

justificatory

easons,

n

whichcase

one's

valuing

x

necessarily

rovides

ne

with

subjectiveustificatory

eason

to obtainx.

Since,

n standard ases

at

least,

reason o do

something

s also reason

o desire o do

it,

we can

derive

the claim thatvaluing

Oing

providesone with a subjective ustificatory

reason

to

desire o

4.

Moreover,

incethe

fact hat ne desires

omething

n

itself

rovides

neither

bjective

nor

subjective

easons,

hese laims eem

to

warrant heviewthat

aluing

has

normative

riority

ver

desiring.7

We

should

reject

this weaker

reading.

The

first

hing

o note is that

weaker

readings

f

our otherrational

principles

r

requirements

eem no

more

plausible

hantheir

tronger

ousins.

f,

for

nstance,

t s

claimedthat

S's

believing

hat

p

and that

f

p

then

grounds

subjective

eason

for

to

believeq, or entails hatS subjectivelyughtto believeq, we can simply

repeat

the

previous

form f

argument:

ince

S

believes

the

tautology

f

p

then

,

the

weakened

principle mplies

hat

believing

grounds subjective

reason

or

obligation

or

to

believe

p;

and

this

gain

seems

false.

Believing

that

,

in

and

of

tself,

ails

o

provide

ny

kind

of

self-justification.

imilar

remarks

pply

o

ntending

nd,

by

analogy,

o

valuing.

A

second

argument gainst

the

weaker

nterpretation

s

perhaps

more

straightforward:

t

is

not clear thatthe

concept

of a

subjective

eason s a

conceptof a genuinereasonat all, inwhichcase a reading f internalism

which nvokes his

oncept

will not be a

reading

which

ndicates

genuine

relation f normative

riority.

easons,

by

definition,

ecommend r favour

that for

which

they

are reasons.

Subjective

reasons,

by

definition,

re

considerationshat

n

agent

hinksavour r

recommend

hatfor

which

hey

are reasons.But this s not a

weakerkindof

favouring

r

recommending;

t

is

no kind

of

favouring

r

recommending

t all.

Whenever think have a

reason,

t

is

always

the

case that

regard

ome

considerations

favouring

acting

r

believing,

nd

never he case that

regard

he

act

hat thinkome

consideration

avours

ctions

in

and

of tself

avouring

ction.

ndeed,

would

be inclined o

deny

this,

without measureof

confidence hat

am

a

good

judge

of

these

things,

nd

hence that the considerations a

reason. As a

result,

he

concept

of a

subjective

eason

s

the

concept

of

something

hich

rational

eople

would not

recognize

r

taketo be a

reason

which

uggests

it

represents

o kind

of reason at all.

So

even f

t s claimed

that

valuing

x

provides subjective

eason

to desire

x,

we can

deny

that

this ntails hat

there s

any

kind

f

genuinely

ormative elation f

priority

etween

aluing

anddesiring. he weaker eading urns uttobe false.

Given

this,

we

might

oubtthat here

s

any

genuinely

ormative elation

of

priority

etween

aluing

nd

desiring.

his does

not,

however,

orce

s

to

7

See

W.

Quinn,

Putting

Rationality

n

its

Place',

in R.

Frey

nd

C. Morris

eds),

Value,

Welfare,

nd

Morality

Cambridge

UP,

1993), p. 26-50.

C The

Editors

f

The




6/13

VALUE,

DESIRING AND

NORMATIVE

PRIORITY

235

reject

hetruth

f nternalism.or

there re other

normative elations hich

eschew

the

dea of such

priority,

nd

yet

re no less

genuine.

The

following

section onsiders

whether he relation etween

valuing

nd

desiring

an

be

understoodlongsimilarines.

II

In

the

previous

ection

argued

that

valuing

x does not

ground

reason of

either n

objective

r a

subjective

ind,

et alone

a

rational

bligation,

o

desire

x.

Nevertheless

e

might

till

hink

at

east

f

we are inclined owards

judgementnternalism)hat here s something rong, rom henormative

standpoint,

n

someone who values

x

but lacks

any

desireforx. What

this

might

e

emerges

rom

omething

imilar

hat an be

said

once

again

about

our other elations.

ven ifwe

doubt

hat

believing

hat

and

that

fp

then

grounds

reasonfor

subject

o believe hat

q,

we

might

evertheless

hink

there

s

something rong

with

subject

who does

not,

from he

standpoint

of

rationality;

nd even

if

we doubt that

ntending

o

do

something ives

agents

reason

o

take he

necessary

teps

o fulfilhat

ntention,

e shallbe

inclined o think hatthere s somethingmiss ftheydo not.How might

our views bout

these ther elations

e

captured?

The

solution

s

to

deny

thatthere s

anything

ormativelypecial

about

the

elements

n the

left-hand ide

of

these relations

deny,

that

s,

that

these lements

round

easons o believe

or

ntend

what s

on the

right-hand

side;

and to

maintain nsteadthat there

s

something ormatively

pecial

about each relation

onsidered s

a

whole

this

s

the

ine

taken

by

Broome

and

Millar).

To

illustrate,

e should

reject

the view that

if

S

believes that

p

and

believesthat

fp

then

,

then

S

has

a

reason

to believe that

q;

we

should

maintain

nstead hat has

a

reason o

believe ,

f

S

believes hat

and

that

Ifp

then

).

Similarly,

e

should

reject

heviewthat

fS

intends

o

0

then his

gives

S a

reasonto takethe

necessary

means

to

#ing,

nd

should

ccept

that

S

has

a

reason to

(take

the

necessary

means

to

oing,

f S

intends

o

0).8

In

each

instance,

what S

has

a

reason to do is to avoid ts

being

he ase hat he

left-hand

ide

of

the relation

ccurswithout he

right-hand

ide:

n

the

epi-

stemic

ase,

thismeans S

has a reason

to avoid

believing

hat

p

and that

If

p

then without lso

believing

hat

q;

in the

practical,

has a reason

to avoid

intending

o

4

without lso

doing

what

s

necessary

or

Oing.

But

thereare two

ways

in

which

these

requirements

r

commitmentsan

be

8

Broome talks f

requirements',

nd Millar of

normative

ommitments',

ather

han of

'reasons'.

C The

Editors

f

The

hilosophical

uarterly,

003



7/13

236

MICHAEL

.

BRADY

discharged:

n

the former nstance can either

elieve

that

q

when S

has

theseother

beliefs,

r

get

id

f

hesether

eliefs;

n

the

atter,

can either

o

what s

necessary

o

fulfil

he

ntention,

r

get

id

f

he

ntention.

What

does

not

follow s that,givenS's beliefthatp and that f

p

then , S eitherhas a

justificatory

eason

to

believe

hat

q

or

a

justificatory

eason

to

get

rid

of

the

beliefs hat

and that

p

entails

,

and a

similar

oint

pplies

to

intending:

f.

Millar.)

We

might,

n

the

ight

f

this,

nderstand he

normative elation

etween

valuing

nd

desiring

n similarines.That

is,

on

the

assumption

hat here

s

something rong

with

valuing

x and

yet

failing

o desire

x,

we

might

ash

this s

the claim

that

valuing

x

commits

ne

to

desiring

,

or

requires

hat

onemustdesirex,where his nturns understood s theclaimthat ne has

a

reason to

(desire

x,

if

one values

x).

As

with

the

other

relations,

we

can

suppose

that he

commitment

ncurred

y

one's

valuing

can

be

discharged

in

one of two

ways: by

acquiring

he

desireof

x,

or

by

getting

id of one's

positive

valuation f x.

As a

result,

we can

deny

that

valuingenjoys

ny

normative

riority

ver

desiring.

or as far

s the

above

principle

oes,

we

have no

more

eason to

discharge

ur

obligation y

acquiring

he

relevant

desire

han

by

relinquishing

ur evaluation.

One obviousreasonagainstunderstandingnternalismnthisway s that

this s

hardly

ow

things

trike

s

from

ur

perspective

s

valuers.When

we

value

something,

t does

not

appear

to

us thatwe

have no

more reason

to

acquire

the

desire hanto

giveup

our

evaluation.

Rather

t

seems

to us

that

we

have

good

reason to

acquire

the

desire,

ince

we have

good

reason

to

attain

what

we value.

This

much

followsfrom

the nature

of

valuing.

Furthermore,

elinquishing

ur

evaluative

ommitmentn

the

ground

hat

we

lack the

relevant

esire eems he

height

f

rrationality,

ince

failure

o

have

therelevant

esire

does not

seem

any

reason t all

to

change

he

evalu-

ation.Here we return o the idea that

valuingenjoys

normative

riority:

rational

gents

ct

in

the

ight

f their

alues,

nd

are

inclined o tailor heir

desires o their

alues,

but not vice

ersa;

nd when

their

alues and

desires

diverge,

ational

agents

think

hat

the

irrationality

ttaches

to the

latter

rather

han

the former.

oes

not

this

therefore

uggest

hat

valuing

does

indeed have

priority

ver

desiring,

nd to

this

extent

grounds

stronger

normative

ommitments

han

hose

provided

y

ntending

nd

believing?

While think

hat

here s

something

ormatively

pecial

about

valuing,

and I argueas much nthefollowingection, heaboveresponse trikesme

as

inadequate,

or

wo

reasons.

The firsts

something

have

already

hown:

the fact

hat

must,

ua

valuer,

egard

myself

s

having

reasonto

act

(and

desire)

does

not entail

that

have

reason;

and the

fact

hat,

ua

valuer,

regard

valuing

s

normatively

pecial

does

not

entail

that t is.

The claim

?

The

Editors of

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O0arterly,

003



8/13

VALUE,


PRIORITY

237

that

valuing

has

normative

riority

ver

desiring

s not the claim

that

we

think

hat t

does;

it is the claim thatwe are

right

o think

his,

nd

nothing

about the

phenomenology

f

valuing

eems

o

guarantee

hatwe are

right.

The second reason s that theputative isanalogy etweenvaluing nd

intending

reaks

down,

incefrom ur

perspective

ur ntentionslso

enjoy

a measureof

priority.

hat

is,

we

are

disposed

to tailorour desires

o

our

intentions,

ather han vice

ersa;

nd

our

ntentionsresist econsideration'n

a

way

our desiresdo not.9

Nevertheless,

f

the above

argument

s

cogent,

then this factwill be insufficiento show

that

ntending

o

0

really

does

provide

us with reasonfor

doing

what

s

necessary

o

bring

t about. As

a

result,

n

analogouspoint

bout

valuing

houldnot

be

thought

o showthat

there s a genuine elation fpriorityetween aluing nddesiring.

I

doubt, herefore,

hat laims

of

normative

riority

an be

grounded y

appeal

to how

things

trike

s

as valuers.Nevertheless think hat here s a

sense

n

which

valuing

has normative nd not

merely sychological riority

over

desiring,

nd

in

the

following

ection

explain

nd defend his iew.

III

My

claim s that

valuingprovides

neither

bjective

nor

subjectiveustifica-

tory

easons o have an

appropriate

esire,

ut

despite

his

njoys

measure

of

normative

riority

ver

desiring.

s

a

result,

deny

hatwe

shouldunder-

stand

nternalism

n

a

way

whichmakes t

analogous

o the nstrumental

nd

epistemic

rinciples

iscussed

n

the

previous

ections.

n

order

to

explain

how

this can be

so,

I

need to consider he relation

between

valuing

and

desiring,

ot

n

isolation,

ut

n

the

ight

f other

spects

f our

psychology.

On

my picture,

he claim that

valuing

has normative

riority

s not

equi-

valent othe claim thatvaluing s somehow pecial,orprovides reasonof

some kind

to desireor

get

x.

What it comes

down to is the claim that an

agent's

bringing

bout one kind of

coherent

elationship

etween

valuing

and

desiring,

y

desiring

n

accordance

with the

valuing,

offers better

solutiono a

normative

roblem

han

bringing

bout a

different

ut

qually

coherentelation

by

relinquishing

he

valuing

n

the

light

of the lack of an

appropriate

esire.

This,

admit,

ounds little

aradoxical:

f

he relations

are

equally

coherent,

o

they

not count

as

equally

good

solutions

o

a

normative roblem, speciallyas I shall how)given hat heproblems one

of

incoherence?think

ot,

since

the former

elation ontributeso a

further

kind of

coherence nd

consistency

n

the

agent's

psychological

et,

and

to

this xtent

ounts s

rationally

referable.

9

See M.

Bratman, ntention,lans,

nd

Practical

eason

Harvard

UP,

1987),

p.

io8-9.

?

The Editors

f

The

hilosophical

Quarterly,

003



9/13

238

MICHAEL .

BRADY

To

begin

with,

uppose

hat n

agent

S

is

in

the

following osition,

which

I

shall call

(A):

S

values

x,

but does

not desirex. Let us assume

that

this

psychological rofile

s

somehow

ncoherent r

inconsistent,

nd thus

one

thatS hasreasonnot to be in.Let us also assumethat hefollowing sycho-

logical profiles

re coherent r consistent:

i)

S

values x and

desires

;

(ii)

S

does not value x

and

does not desire

x.

Now

(i),

in and of

itself,

s

not

rationally

referable

o

(ii);

nor is

it,

in

and

of

itself,

ny

more

coherent.

Whetherwe should

rationally

refer

's

being

n

state

i)

to S's

being

n

state

(ii)

depends,

urely, pon

whether is indeedvaluable. But

given

hatS

has

the

inconsistent

rofile

A),

is

there sense

in

which S's situation s

better

resolved,

rom he

rational

tandpoint,

y

S's

coming

o be in

(i)

rather

han

(ii)? Is (i) rationally referable o (ii) as a solutiono the inconsistencyr

incoherence

n

A),

at leastwhen ll

other

hings

re

equal?

The

analogy

with

requirements

urrounding elieving

nd

intending

suggests

hat he

answer s 'No'. On this

view,

when we find

urselves

n

a

situation imilar

o

(A),

we are

ust

psychologicallyisposed

o

adopt profile

(i)

rather han

profile

ii),

since we are

disposed

to resist

econsidering

ur

values and

instead esire

n

accordancewith

hem.

But this

isposition

s

not

itself

ationally

arranted. here s

nothing ationally

ntoward

bout

people

who, in situationA), are disposedto get rid of theirvalues and achieve

coherence

n

that

way.

I

think

hatwe

should nswer Yes' to

the

question

bove,

for he follow-

ing

reason. We have

agreed

that

A)

is

incoherent r

inconsistent;

et

us

make the

further

lausible

ssumption

hat here s

something

fvalue about

coherence

nd

consistency.

iven

this,

we

might xplain

S's

moving

rom

A)

to

i)

or

(ii)

not

merely

n

terms f S's

beingdisposed

owards

oherence

nd

consistency,

ut

in

terms f S's

valuing

hesefeatures.

We

cannot,

however,

simply

nvoke 's

valuing oherence,

ince thiswould not

explainwhy

S

is

moved to

adopt profile

i)

rather han

ii),

or vice ersa. ecause of

this,

ur

explanation

f the case

whereS is

motivated o

adopt

profile

i)

will

nvoke

something

ike

S's

valuing

coherence

of

this

ort,

oherence achieved

by

changing

esires

o

that

hey

match

values.

n

other

words,

he

explanatory

or

motivational

tory

we

tell in

this nstancewill

invoke

S's

valuing

the

priority

f

valuing

ver

desiring.

ur

explanation

f the

case

where

S

ends

up

in

(ii)

will

also

invoke 's

valuing

oherence,

ut n

this nstance

what

s

valued is

coherence

ttained

y

changing

alues so as

to match

desires. n

otherwords, heexplanatory torywe tellhere will nvokeS's valuing he

priority

f

desiring

ver

valuing.

What

this

uggests

s

that here s

indeed

something ationally referable

about S's

acquiring

he

desire

f

x,

nstead f

relinquishing

he

evaluation,

s

a

solution

o

being

n

situation

A).

I

need

to

explore

he

explanations

f

the

?

The

Editors f The

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003



10/13

VALUE,

DESIRING

AND NORMATIVE PRIORITY

239

previousparagraph

n more

detail. When

S is moved to

adopt

profile i)

because values

the

priority

f

valuing

over

desiring,

he motivational

tory

we tell

will

nvolve wo nstances f

S's

desires

ollowing

's values: S's

desir-

ingxfollows rom 's valuingx as a result fS's desiringhat heevaluation

should remain steadfast

nd

the

desires hould

change,

where this

desire

itself esults rom

aluing

hiskindofcoherence.As

a

result,

e can

say

that

the motivational

xplanation

f S's

achieving

oherence

y

coming

o

be

in

state

i)

rather

han

tate

ii)

s

one

that

would

endorse,

ince

t

s

consistent

with

hinking

hat

valuing

has

priority

ver

desiring.

o

this

xtent

is,

we

might ay,

as S

values

being;

S's motivationsxhibit r

express

's

prefer-

ences

about

S's

motivations.

Supposeinstead hatS ismovedtobe inprofileii)becauseS values the

kind

of

coherence

gained

by

changing

's values so as to match

S's

desires.

Once

more the

explanation

f

S's

being

moved

to

adopt

some coherent

profile

will

nvolve 's desires

ollowing

's values: S is moved to

adopt pro-

file

ii)

because

S

valuesthis

kind

f

coherence,

nd as a result

esires hat

's

values are

changed

o as to

be

in line

with

S's

desires.

But

this s

a

motiva-

tional

explanation

hat

S

would ot

ndorse,

n the

ground

hat t is

incon-

sistentwith

thinking

hat

desiring

as

priority

ver

valuing.

That

is,

S is

movedto be in (ii),rather han i),because valuesachieving oherenceby

keeping

's desires he same

and

changing

's

values;

but

S's

being

moved

to

be

in

ii),

rather han

i),

displays

he

opposite

elation,

ince t

s

an instance

of S's

valuing

emaining

teadfastnd S's desires

ollowing

uit.

n this

ase,

S is not

s

S values

being,

t

leastto this

xtent;

's

motivations

ail o

exhibit

or

express

's

preferences

bout

S's

motivations.

My point

s

this:

ust

as

there s

something

nconsistent

r

incoherent

n

valuing

x and

failing

o desire

x,

so too is there

omething

nconsistentr

incoherent

n

being

moved to

remedy

his

ncoherence

n

a

way

which

exemplifies

relation etween

aluing

nd

desiring

hich

you

do not

value.

This is indeed he

case

when

S is moved

to

adopt profile

ii)

because

S

values

this

kind

of

coherence.As

a

result,

eing

moved

to

adopt profile

ii)

is not

really palatable

olution

o

the ncoherence r

inconsistency

n

(A),

since t

appears

to substitute

ne kind of

inconsistency

etween

values

and

desires

for

another.

The

same

cannot be said about

S's

being

moved to

adopt

profile

i),

however,

ince

here S's motivation

xemplifies

he

very

relation

between

valuing

nd

desiring

which

S

values

-

in

which

case

we

have an

explanation fwhy i) srationally referableo (ii)as a solution o S's being

in

state

(A).

Rational

agents

will

indeed

avoid

the

inconsistency

r in-

coherence

nvolved n

valuing

x

but

failing

o

desire

x;

but

rational

gents

will

achievecoherence nd

consistencyy

desiring

,

rather

han

by

getting

ridof

their

valuative

udgements.

?

The Editors

f The

hilosophical

uarterly,

00oo3



11/13

240

MICHAEL

S.

BRADY

In

the

following

ection shall consider number

of

objections

o

this

explanation

f

normative

riority,

nd

give

ome brief

esponses.

IV

Objection

a):

the above account

begs

the

question,

ince

it

assumes

that

rational motivation nvolves

valuing

the kind of coherence attained

by

changing

ne's desires o

that

they

match one's

values,

and

being

moved

because of this.But

if

you

assume that thisrelation s indeed

valuable,

of

course

you

will

have

an answer

as to

why

the relation

s

normative

..

because

you

have

ust

assumed t

This

objection

misrepresents

he

account. What is assumed is that

coherence

r

consistency

s

valuable,

and thatrational

motivationnvolves

valuing

coherence

of

somekind.

What

is not

ssumed

-

indeed,

what is

explicitly

enied

-

is that

profile

i)

is

any

more

valuable,

n

and of

itself,

than

profile

ii).

So whilstwhat s

assumed ntails

hat

profile

i)

is

valuable,

as it

s a

coherent

r

consistent

rofile,

t

does

not entail

hat

ailoring

ne's

desires o

one's values s a better

olution

han

changing

ne's values

so that

they

matchone's desires.That

conclusion ollows rom

he

argument,

ather

thanthe ssumption.

Objection (b):

the

account still

begs

the

question,

ince it

assumes that

rational

motivation nvolves

valuing

coherence

of

either

ype)

nd

being

moved because

of this.But

why

assume this?We

can,

after

ll,

grant

he

plausible

ssumption

hat oherence s

valuable,

whilst

enying

hat

ational

agents

mustvalue

coherence.We

might

hink

nstead

that motivation

n-

volves

purely

sychological isposition

o desire

x

whenone

values

x,

but s

no

less rational

or hat.'0

f

so,

the

account

mustbe understood s

claimingthat

valuing

has a measureof

priority

ver

desiring nly

forthose

agents

who value

coherence nd are

thereby

moved,

but otherwise

oes not.

This

objection

lso fails. he

assumption

hat

oherence

nd

consistency

are

valuable s

indeed

warranted,

ince

otherwise

t s

difficulto

ground

he

claim

that

here re

genuine

equirements

urroundingaluing

nd

desiring

in the

first

lace."

Once

this s

admitted,

t

supports

heview

that

genuinely

rational

motivation

equires

ecognition

f this

alue. For we

might

uppose

that here

s

something

ncoherent

r

inconsistent

n

being

disposed

owards

(and hence desiring)what is genuinely aluable,without egardingt as

valuable.

Since what is

desired n

this

case is

genuinely

aluable,

rational

agents

will

resolve

this

incoherence

by

coming

to

value

coherence

and

10

See

Broome,

Reasons

and

Motivation',

p.

141-2.

I

I

Cf.

p.

x of

Dancy's

introduction

n

his

Nonnativity.

O

The Editors

f

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Philosophical

uarterly,

003



12/13

VALUE,


PRIORITY

241

consistency.

enuinely

ationalmotivation hus

proceeds

from

ecognition

of

the value of coherence nd

consistency,

nd not

merely

rom

disposi-

tion owards uch

things.

It might e thought hatthis eaves unanswered heoriginal bjection,

and that

have

only

offered

n

explanation

f the

priority

f

valuing

ver

desiring

n those

gents

who

happen

to value coherence. or

givenmy rgu-

ment,

hosewho do not value coherence nd

consistency

ack the attitudes

which

make it

true

hat S

ought

to

restore oherence nd

consistency y

acquiring

he desire o

0;

we are thus

unable

to

say

of

them

hat

hey

o the

wrong

hing

f

hey

esolve he

nconsistencyy

getting

id

of

their valuative

beliefs.12

Givenmyprevious omments, owever,we can doubt that nyfurther

explanation

s

required.

My

aim has

been to

explain

he

dea

that

gents

will

desire

n

accordancewith

heir alues n so

ar

as

they

re

rational;

nd

I

have

claimed that

gents

willvalue coherence nd

consistency

n

so

ar

as

they

re

rational.he demand

that must

n

addition

xplain

the

priority

f

valuing

over

desiring

n

thosewho lack he

relevant

ttitudes

hereforetrikesme as

illegitimate,

or

cannot

explain

how thosewho are

incapable

of

rational

motivation an be

rationally

moved to

acquire

the desireforx when

they

valuex. So it s true hat, ivenmy rgument, e cannot ayof suchpeople

that

hey

ught

o

restore oherence nd

consistencyy

acquiring

hedesire

for

when

they

alue

x;

but that s

because

they

ack the

attitudes

hich

re

needed

to

make

ny

such

ought'

laim

appropriate.

Objection

c):

there re

(obviously)

ases where he

right

r

rational

hing

o

do would be

to

get

rid of our

values,

rather handesire

n

accordancewith

them.

ndeed,

mentioned uch

cases

above,

where

n

agent's

values

might

themselves e

highly

rrational.

However,

the

account of the

previous

section uggestshatwhen ourvalues and desires onflict,eason s on the

side of

our

values,

n

which

ase the

account

truggles

o accommodate

uch

(obvious)

ases.

This

response

lso fails.The

account of

normative

riority

have

given

focuses

n

the relation

etween

valuing

nd

desiring

s

such,

regardless

f

additionalor

independent

easons

agents might

have for

changing

heir

values or

desires

or both).

Because of

this,

nothing

n

my

accountrules ut

taking

uch

reasons

ntoconsideration hen

we

attempt

o determine hat

it is all-things-consideredight r rationalfor gentsto do. It is therefore

difficulto see how

the account

struggles

o

accommodate

the fact that

agents

might

have

reason to

get

rid

of

their

alues rather han

acquire

the

relevant

esires.

12

This

point

was

raised

by

an

anonymous

eferee.

?

The

Editors

of

The

hilosophicaluarterly,

003



13/13

242

MICHAEL

.

BRADY

I

do notdoubt

hat

here

re

other

bjections

hat

might

e raised

gainst

this

way

of

understanding

ormative

riority

nd

(hence)

udgement

internalism.

or do

I

doubt

hat he

dequacy

f

this ccount

epends,

t

least npart, ponhow twould ffectthermeta-ethicalssues. efend-

ing

the

reading

gainst

urther

bjections,

nd

cashing

ts

meta-ethical

implications,

re,however,

asks or notherime.13

University

f tirling

13

A

version f

this

paper

was

presented

o the

Philosophy

epartment

t the

University

f

Aberdeen n

May

2ooi.

I

am

grateful

o

the

participants

or

heir iscussion.

would

also like

to

thank

AntonyDuff,

Fiona

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