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Value orientation as a contributing factorin protest potential in Western societies:The postmaterialism thesis reconsidered
Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic)
Authors Spehr, Scott Lawrence, 1948-
Publisher The University of Arizona.
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Download date 30/05/2021 12:38:37
Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/282484
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VALUE ORIENTATION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN PROTEST
POTENTIAL IN WESTERN SOCIETIES: THE POSTMATERIALISM THESIS
RECONSIDERED
by
Scott Lawrence Spehr
A Dicrertation submitted to the Faculty of the
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
In the Graduate College
THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
1997
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DMI Nxunber: 9814360
UMI Microform 9814360 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
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THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE
As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have
read the dissertation prepared by Scott Lawrence Spehr
entitled VALUE ORIENTATION AS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN PROTEST
POTENTIAL IN WESTERN SOCIETIES: THE POSTMATERIALISM
THESIS RECONSIDERED
and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation
requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
rrold Rusk
9/SL6/?̂
Date
Date
Date/ [
Date
Date
Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College.
I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation
Jerrold Rusk Dissertation Directo
Steven E. Finkel D^e /
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STATEMENT BY AUTHOR
This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at THE University of Arizona and is deposited in the University-Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library.
Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable with special permission provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the head of the major department or the Dean of the Graduate College when in his or her judgement the proposed use of the material is in the interests of scholarship. In all other instances, however, permission must be obtained from the author.
SIGNED
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT 7
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION 9 Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action 9 Predicting Behavior Over Time 14 Postmaterialism as an Explanatory Theory of Behavior
17 Primary Hypotheses 19 The Data Set 22 Research Setting 24
CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORY OF POSTMATERIALISM 28 The Relationship between Social Structure and the
Theory of Value Change 28 Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action
The Postmaterialism Model 39
CHAPTER THREE
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ACTION . 53 Socio-Economic Status and Unconventional Political
Action 53 SES, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action 57
The Demographic Control Model 59 Relative Deprivation Theory and Unconventional
Political Action 61 Relative Deprivation, Postmaterialism and
Unconventional Political Action 64 The Relative Deprivation Model 66
Social Forces and Unconventional Political Action . 72 Social Forces, Postmaterialism and
Unconventional Political Action 75 The Social Forces Model 78
Rational Actor Theory and Unconventional Political Action 83
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TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Rational Actors, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action 89 The Rational Actor Model 91
CHAPTER FOUR
DATA AND MEASURES 96 Postmaterialism and Materialism 98
How Valid Are Our Measures of Materialism and Postmaterialism? 104
The Dependent Variable - Protest Potential .... 118 Dependent Variable Construction 121 Independent Variable Construction 123
The Postmaterialism Causal Mechanisms Model . 123 The Demographic Control Model 126 The Relative Deprivation Model 127 The Social Forces Model 129 The Rational Actor Model 131
CHAPTER FIVE
TESTING THE POSTMATERIALISM MODEL 135 Findings 137
Descriptive Statistics 137 Regression Analysis 142
Conclusion 149
CHAPTER SIX
TESTING THE ALTERNATIVE MODELS 152 The Demographic Control Model 153
Causal Mechanisms Associated with Socio-Demographic Characteristics 155
Findings 157 Conclusion 164
The Relative Deprivation Model 165 Findings 168
Descriptive Statistics 168 Regression Analysis 173
Conclusion 178 The Social Forces Model 180
Findings 182 Descriptive Statistics 182
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TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Regression Analysis 194 Conclusion 199
The Rational Actor Model 202 Findings 208
Descriptive Statistics 208 Regression Analysis 211
Conclusion 216
CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION 220 The Effect of Value Orientation on Protest Potential220
APPENDIX A: FIGURES 234
APPENDIX B: TABLES 250
REFERENCES 291
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ABSTRACT
The theory of postmaterialism contains the proposinion
chat basic values are changing in advanced industrial
societies. Furthermore, the theory contains the
propositions that individuals in these societies can be
classified according to clusters of value oriencations and
chat political behavior can be predicted according to these
orientations. Among other things, this theory has been put
forward as a powerful explanatory model for unconventional
policical action in advanced industrial societies. This
study utilises survey material from Germany to construcc a
model chat explores the effect of value orientation on
unconventional political action. The study then goes on co
investigate the links between value orientation and ocher
leading theories of unconventional policical action.
Until now, nothing has been attempted in the way of
invescigacing empirically the specific factors put forward
as causal agents regarding postmaterialists' hypothesized
propensity to participate in unconventional political
action. Likewise, little work has been done in the way of
investigating the relationship, if any, between
postmaterialism and important other theories of such
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behavior. This project then has as its central foci the
testing of the primary hypotheses regarding the basis for
value orientation and unconventional political action, and
whether postmaterialists' hypothesized propensity to
participate in such activities may be the result of an
underlying relationship between value orientation and
factors that make up much of the conceptual landscape of
other leading theories of unconventional political action.
The results indicate that value orientation does have a weak
direct effect on unconventional political acts, but that
integrating value orientation and other theories results in
more powerful explanatory models of such activity, and
serves to more fully explain the manner in which value
orientation affects political behavior.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action
"[Hiistory is a graveyard of scientific theories once
considered useful" (Everson and Paine 1973, p. 142).
"[T]he history of science is a graveyard of defunct,
inadequate, and out-dated theories" (Strickland, Wade, and
Johnston 1968, p.3).
The social upheavals commencing in the 1960's that
characterized much of the political landscape of advanced
industrial societies came as a surprise to many who had
believed that the "end of ideology" was to herald an era of
relative political tranquility in democratic polities (Bell
i960). Belatedly, efforts to explain this phenomena began
to surface in the press, the political arena, and academia.
Social scientists attempted to develop coherent theories
that could account for the sudden increase in unconventional
forms of political behavior. One of the more prominent
theories that emerged from this period was that of
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"postmaterialism" (Inglehart 1971). The particulars of this
thesis will be explored in more depth in the following
chapter, but in brief the central proposal put forward is
that in Western societies macro-environmental changes have
resulted in a fundamental shift in individuals' basic
values. Primary among these profound changes were rapid
economic and technological development, the absence of total
war, and rising levels of education. All have been proposed
as contributing to a gradual turning in individuals'
hierarchy of personal concerns from an overwhelming emphasis
on material and physical security to an increasing emphasis
on the importance of individual rights and freedoms.
Especially affected are post-war generations comparatively
untouched by the material privations and insecurities common
to the experience of their parents and grandparents. This
development has been positied to have had a number of system
level political consequences, from the growing importance of
"life style" issues, the decline of social class conflict as
the axis of political conflict, a gradual decline in
support for national institutions, and, as we shall examine,
for the increase in unconventional political action (see
Inglehart, 1977, p.5). Regarding this latter hypothesis,
the theory received quite a bit of attention initially, yet
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has fallen from grace as a leading explanatory model for
such behavior, as the phenomenon of youth protest in western
societies receded with time.
While it might at first appear that the status quo in
cerms of political behavior has now reasserted itself, this
is a serious misperception. More likely, social norms and
perceptual frameworks have conspired to make unconventional
behaviors both more conventional (at least in terms of being
more accepted, if not performed), and therefore less
psychologically obtrusive. Indeed, political behavior in
post-industrial societies (including Germany, the setting
for this study) has continued to be marked by an expansion
of the individual's potential repertoire of political acts
(Watts et al 1989,. p.11). Concomitantly, explanatory
theories of unconventional political activity have been
developed which pay particular attention to factors which
reflect individual level utility calculation or the
importance of the individual's potential repertoire of
political skills.
Can the theory of postm.aterialism contribute to our
understanding of unconventional political activity in
contemporary western society, or has it been overtaken by
theories which appear to offer a more nuanced interpretation
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of individual level political behavior? We believe that the
concept of postmaterialism still has an important
contribution to make in regard to the explanation of
political behavior in post-industrial settings.
Postmaterialism theory is not too broad or unsophisticated
to compete with the contemporary leading theories of such
behavior, but it is true that the argument put forward for
the impact of value change on unconventional political
behavior has not been adequately developed, and certainly
not adequately tested. Ronald Inglehart's original model
posits a basic three factor matrix to explain the causal
relationship between value orientation and protest. Our
proposal is that this was an intriguing preliminary effort
aimed at explaining the causal relationship between value
change and protest, but the model is much too simple. Its
very unfortunate that this theory has never been adequately
explored, in terms of the potential overall impact of value
orientation on unconventional political behavior. Competing
theories do nothing to rectify this situation, as they do
not even address the role value preferences may play in
regard to political behavior. In this thesis, the
relationship between values and protest is more fully
developed, exploring the way that value orientation is
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associated with a variety of important factors central to
the heretofore most impressive models of protest behavior.
This manuscript thus addresses prior oversights, and helps
restore postmaterialism theory to its rightful place as a
leading, powerful explanatory theory of unconventional
political activity.
Postmaterialism theory can contribute to our
understanding of political behavior in a number of very
important ways. One concerns the theory's proposals
concerning the genesis of preferences. Such a fundamental
but important process is ignored in most research designs
formulated to explain unconventional political behavior.
Another concerns the way in which leading theories of
political behavior rely, inappropriately, on unexplored
fundamental assuptions regarding individuals' policy
preferences. Most of the theories of political action which
examine behavior at the individual level begin by simply
assuming two things: individuals have political preferences,
and these preferences are undifferentiated causal factors in
regard to political behavior. Thus, at best, part of some
research programs is testing mechanisms hypothesized to
encourage or discourage certain behaviors directed at
achieving political preferences, whatever they might be.
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Obviously this approach is not wholly satisfactory, from a
theoretical perspective. Why, for example, are some
individuals concerned with particular political or economic
issues when others are not? And what effect may the concern
for certain definable types of political preferences have on
political behavior?
Predicting Behavior Over Time
The variety of theoretical and quasi-theoretical models
of political behavior contain, to varying degrees, the
capacity to predict aggregate changes in behavior over time.
Postmaterialism theory is specifically targeted at this sort
of prediction, and this is at once its strength
theoretically, and its weakness, empirically. For while
postmaterialism theory is touted as a powerful predictor of
political and social developments (see Abramson and
Inglehart 1995, p.38), its continued usefulness has been
questioned, in terms of discerning future events. For
example, the slowdown in economic growth that brought
disturbing levels of unemployment to many advanced western
societies over the past two decades led many social
scientists to surmise that the emergence of a post-
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industrial challenge to the dominance of economic and
security issues in individuals' hierarchy of personal
concerns was an epi-phenomenon, one that was merely an
artifact of a unique, and transient, historical period.
This is erroneous, as it confuses short-term transient
effects with long-term basic developments.
Demographic models, such as the standard socio-economic
model, can predict changes in levels of political activity
corresponding to demographic changes in particular settings.
These types of changes, in turn, can be foreseen. If, for
example, political activity is positively associated with
education and income, then predicted rising aggregate levels
of these characteristics should predict as well a
corresponding rise in political involvement (see, for
example. Verba and Nie 1972, pp.143-45). Similarly,
resource mobilization models of political activity propose
that individual capacity for political activity is a
function of the "tools" (Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995;
Traut and Emmert, 1993) along with the opportunities
(Godwin, 1988; Knoke, 1990) available to individual citizens
and groups. If these mechanisms should increase (or
decrease) in a particular political setting, then political
behavior should follow suit. These resource mobilization
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mechanisms may change absent any particular attempts to
manipulate the social environment, as a result of a long
term aggregate change in demographic criteria such as income
or education. For group mobilization proponents change can
be deliberate, as a function of activity aimed at political
organizing a specific social segmeni;, for example.
Other prominent theories of political behavior are more
temporally static. Rational choice theory is based on the
proposition that individuals calculate the costs and
benefits associated with particular actions, including
political activity. One fundamental assumption central to
this theory is the proposition that individuals "know what:
they want and can order their wants transitively" (Riker
1995, p.24). But while wants in a political context are
difficult to pinpoint and can theoretically change over
time, the cost and benefit calculus remains immutable (a
sort of eternal verity). Thus, aggregate long-term change
can only occur at the environmental or systemic level, and
these factors are external to the model. Grievance or
relative deprivation theories again incorporate no specific
proposals regarding future aggregate levels of change in
political activity, but rather focus on fluctuating
individual perceptions of dissatisfaction and deprivation.
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Ted Gurr even explicitly states that relative deprivation is
dependent on the unpredictability of events (1970, p.57).
Gabriel Almond recently stated emphatically that
"Inglehart's work is one of the few examples of successful
prediction in political science" (Almond 1990, quoted in
Abramson and Inglehart 1995, p. 139). The theoretical
capacity of the postmaterialism concept to make predictions
about gradual, long term political change is in itself
reason for continued interest in this theory.
Postmaterialism as an Explanatory Theory of Behavior
While postmaterialism is attractive as a potential
predictive model of political behavior over time, it also
has the capacity uo contribute to the richness of an
explanatory model of political activity. There may be a
variety of ways in which value orientation may be linked to
unconventional political behavior, some of which have been
discussed at some length, others that have only been, in one
context or another, hinted at. The explicit mechanisms
associated with postmaterialism theory and unconventional
political action have been well articulated. Unfortunately,
they have remained for the most part untested. Various
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implicit mechanisms have been less well articulated, and
have been subject to even less empirical investigation. And
other possible relationships have been ignored. This leads
one to the conclusion that postmaterialist models of
collective political action may be seriously misspecified.
Thus, the relationship of value orientation to
unconventional political action may be significantly
misunderstood, and worse, inappropriately discounted. Many
of the ways in which postmaterialism may affect
unconventional political activity could be a function of
underlying relationships between value orientations and
factors found to be associated with unconventional political
activity in the competing theoretical models mentioned
above. Only Karl-Dieter Opp has investigated the
possibility of such relationships, when he integrated
postmaterialism into a rational actor model of protest
(1990). Given postmaterialism theory's capacity for the
prediction of future political trends, ignoring these
possible connections may be foolish. Thus the central
thesis of this work is that value orientation has direct,
and most importantly, indirect effects on individuals'
potential for unconventional political action, and that
these indirect effects remain latent, albeit significant
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factors underlying unconventional political activity in
western societies.
Primary Hypotheses
1. Postmaterialist values will demonstrate a significant
causal relationship to the propensity to participate in
unconventional political action, as Inglehart has suggested.
Materialism will demonstrate no such relationship.
2. Postmaterialism will be positively correlated with the
causal agents previously hypothesized to account for
increased rates of unconventional participation as Inglehart
has suggested. Materialism will demonstrate no such
relationships.
3. A causal model including the particular mechanisms
explicitly put forward as responsible for postmanerialist
participation will be superior to the simple postmaterialism
model in terms of explaining participation in unconventional
political action. This follows logically from Inglehart's
proposition that postmaterialism works indirectly through
these mechanisms.
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In addition to the above hypotheses derived from a
careful reading of the Inglehart thesis of postmaterialism
and protest, the following hypotheses are developed in the
theory section of this study:
4. Demographic factors will be important predictors of
postmaterialism, but the findings from the postmaterialism
models should remain stable after taking such factors into
account.
5. Postmaterialism will be positively associated with
important factors central to leading alternative theories of
such behavior, factors which demonstrate positive effects on
unconventional political action. Materialism will be
associated only with certain factors which demonstrate no
significant causal effect on such behavior. The results
will serve to extend the existing alternative theories of
unconventional political behavior, by accounting for the
indirect effects of value orientation on such activity, as
well as providing important insight into why
postmaterialists demonstrate a heightened potential for
unconventional political action.
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Finally, the logic associated with the elaboration and
testing of our various models of value orientation and
protest leads us to our last hypothesis:
6 . A composite model, that incorporates disparate causal
mechanisms borrowed from alternative theories of
unconventional political action and found to be associated
with value orientation, will prove to be a superior model of
unconventional political action.
Accordingly, the outline of the project is as follows:
Chapter one - Introduction.
Chapter two - Postmaterialism theory as an explanation of
unconventional political action. Investigation of the logic
associated with the hypotheses linking value orientation and
unconventional political action.
Chapter three - Investigating the relationship between value
orientation and alternative theories of unconventional
political action. How closely does postmaterialism theory
correspond with SES theory, resource mobilization theory,
relative deprivation theory, and rational choice theory?
What may be the relationship between value orientation and
causal mechanisms central to these alternative theories,
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mechanisms not previously articulated in the context of
postmaterialism theory?
Chapter four - Data and measurement.
Chapter five - Testing the postmaterialism models.
Chapter six - Testing the relationship between value
orientation and important independent variables in
alternative models of unconventional political action.
Testing the power of these models when value orientation has
been included as an integral component of such models.
Chapter seven - Review of the findings and a summation of
the conclusions to be drawn regarding the inclusion of value
orientation in models of unconventional political action.
Construction of a grand model of value orientation and
protest.
Appendices - Figures and Tables.
The Data Set
This project will employ survey data to test the
hypotheses put forward for postmaterialism theory in regard
to certain unconventional political behaviors, and attempt
to integrate, where possible, theoretical propositions
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associated with other central theories of unconventional
political action.
The data are from a representative national survey of
714 adult citizens carried out in the (then) entire area of
the Federal Republic of Germany, including West Berlin,
between November 1987 and January 1988 and two further
representative samples carried out between December 1987 and
January 1988. One of these surveys was conducted in the
Bavarian county of Schwandorf and consisted of 501 adult
citizens. The other survey was conducted in Bockenheim, a
district in the city of Frankfurt A. M., and consisted of
494 adult citizens. The expectation is that one should
encounter significant differences in levels of certain
political behaviors between the national sample and the two
subsamples and (perhaps) between the subsamples them.selves.
All of the surveys were carried out by the Getas Institut.
In Bockenheim, the expectation is that one should
encounter a significantly politicized population - one that
should respond to the societal network and personal
normative incentives to participate in unconventional
political activity. Additionally, one would expect a higher
percentage of postmaterialists in this population - a
further postulated stimulus to political activity in
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general, and unconventional political activity in
particular. Thus, Bockenheim should prove fertile ground
for a more robust test of the relative strength of the key
components of the theory of postmaterialism and
unconventional activities.
In Schwandorf, the expectation is that one should
encounter a significant number of individuals opposed to a
particular government policy that effects them directly.
Research Setting
The Federal Republic of Germany at the time this survey
was taken (winter 1987/88) demonstrated a gross domestic
product of 625 billion dollars, a per capita rate of
$14,652.
Both figures placed the F.R.G. in the top income bracket
among advanced industrial countries (OECD economic survey -
Germany, 1987).
Moreover, in the "Wirtschaftswunder" years of the
1950'3, the Federal Republic's growth rates exceeded those
of comparable European countries and the United States.
Since that time, levels of affluence have risen steadily if
not quite as spectacularly as in that formative period for
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The F.R.G.. The Federal Republic also has exhibited one of
the worlds lowest inflation rates over the past thirty years
(Hancock 1989, pp.131-132). Furthermore, the F.R.G. has
become the world's third largest industrial economy behind
Japan and the United States and by 1986, had become the
world's largest exporter (Marsh 1989, pp.87, 335). As a
result. The Federal Republic has been described as having
"maintained a pattern of economic performance characterized
by largely continuous growth and unprecedented prosperity"
(Hancock 1989, p.131). Concomitantly, The Federal Republic
has enjoyed a remarkable period of labor peace. Strikes
have been rare in comparison to other large Western
industrial states (Hancock 1989, p.133).
One would expect then, according to conventional
theories of class conflict or deprivation models, to
encounter in the F.R.G. a society markedly free of political
protest activities. And in a relative sense, compared to
strife torn areas of the Third World and political turmoil
that has periodically erupted in the old East Bloc since the
end of the Cold War, this holds true. Yet, the F.R.G. has
not been completely without civil strife. Indeed the
Federal Republic, compared to other democratic nations, has
demonstrated "relatively high levels of political protest"
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for the past quarter century (Muller and Opp 1986, p.475).
Significant political protest against public policies began
with the Easter march movement for nuclear disarmament in
1960 and continued through the period of extra-parliamentary
opposition to the "Grand Coalition" of the two major
political parties from 1966 to 1969. After a brief lull,
mass protest resumed with the "citizen initiative"
movements of the 1970's and 1980's against nuclear power
plants and other government projects environmentalists
deemed harmful or otherwise undesirable, and with violent
confrontations between squatters and their supporters and
police in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, and other large cities
suffering from real estate speculation and accompanying
shortages of affordable housing. Additionally, a resumption
of massive peace marches and demonstrations accompanied the
NATO decision in 1983 to "modernize" their nuclear weapons
stationed in West Germany. Not only have rates of political
protest been relatively high, but the severity of civil
strife also has been notable, with considerable property
damage and injuries not infrequently accompanying these
events. Few followers of the German political scene would
take issue with the observation that "ferocious mass
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demonstrations... have become a German specialty" (Marsh
1989, p.123).
The Federal Republic of Germany then, has provided and
concinues to provide researchers with a relatively ample
supply of material necessary for the investigation of
unconventional political behavior. Likewise, for
investigators of postmaterialism, the F.R.G. has been a key
area of research, as its post-war economic development has
afforded the widespread levels of affluence and economic
security postmaterialist theorizers posit necessary for che
emergence of significant numbers of holders of the new value
hierarchy. Thus the Federal Republic furnishes an
appropriate setting and adequate variation for testing
postmaterialist hypotheses concerning political protest.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORY OP POSTMATERIALISM
The postmaterialism thesis in its most basic form can
be stated quite simply; "the values of Western publics have
been shifting from an overwhelming emphasis on material
well-being and physical security toward greater emphasis on
zhe quality of life" (Inglehart, 1977, p.3). The reasoning
behind this proposition is more complex. This section of
Chapter two is devoted to an overview of the postmaterialism
thesis and the proposed relationship between postmaterialism
and unconventional political action.
The Relationship between Social Structure and the
Theory of Value Change
The world witnessed the widespread and relatively
rapid breakdown of colonialism following World War II. The
newly independent societies that emerged from this process
undertook a number of daunting projects, and were subject to
a number of serious developments, all of which were subsumed
under the general rubric of modernization. As a consequence
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of this singular moment in history, one prime area of
interest to social scientists was the manner and the
consequences of rapid change in these largely non-industrial
countries.
Among other things, development studies attempted to
explain how modernization might affect the political
behavior of the inhabitants of this part of the world. One
basic thesis proposed that modernization disrupted
longstanding social arrangements and orientations. A result
of such disruption and disorientation was political behavior
that could range from the anomic to the pathological (see
for example, Lerner, 1958).
Profound structural and behavioral change was generally
regarded as confined to the underdeveloped world. Yet, this
was not the case. While economic, political, and social
change may have appeared more dramatic in the underdeveloped
world, structural change of a rather profound nature was
taking place in the West as well. This change was most
effectively described in Daniel Bell's "The Coming of Post-
industrial Society" (1973). According to Bell's thesis, the
growth of the tertiary sector in Western societies had
reached a point where they could no longer be referred to as
industrial, but rather were increasingly becoming service
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economies. The structural changes associated with the
growing dominance of a knowledge- based service sector were
widespread and profound. Educational levels grew rapidly,
the communications and transportation industries exploded,
and, above all, the white collar work force associated with
the service sector meant the growing domination of a new
middle class of managers, administrators, technicians, and
the like.
Germany, the setting for this study, offers an
illuminating example regarding these general developments.
The Federal Republic experienced many of the changes alluded
to above in the first two decades following the war. Rapid
economic growth, a manifold increase in the number of
educated young, the growth of a nev/ middle class and
subsequent calls for increasing democratization and social
leveling were distinct features of the social and political
landscape ((Kolinsky in Smith et al 1989, pp.257-258; Baker
et al, 1981) .
In developing postmaterialism theory, Inglehart drew
heavily on Bell's post-industrial thesis as the basis for
his work. What he proposed was that the profound structural
changes taking place in highly industrialized societies were
producing fundamental changes not just in ephemeral
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attitudes or transient behaviors, but also in the more deep-
rooted, less mutable basic values of individuals in these
societies. Inglehart employed the previously developed
psychological notion of needs hierarchies to suggest that
Western publics were becoming less preoccupied with basic
safety and sustenance needs and more concerned with
aesthetic, intellectual, "belonging", and esteem needs.
Moreover, a previously developed sociological theory
concerning the long lasting effects of formative years on
adult orientations implied that this change in needs would
be predictable and permanent. Inglehart referred to this
development as a "silent revolution" taking place in the
Western world (Inglehart 1971; 1977). And Inglehart implied
that although none of these interests were specifically
political, they had obvious, and im.portant, political
implications.
In essence, while Bell proposed that the fundamental
structural changes that had been taking place in the West
would have widespread ramifications for the very way that
such societies would function in the future, Inglehart took
this thesis to a more basic level v/ith his value change
proposal.
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3 2
Inglehart's proposals rested heavily on the structural
and historic factors cited above as an explanation of
fundamental value change. But at least initially,
Inglehart's explanation for this value change gave special
significance to the scarcity and socialization hypotheses.
These hypotheses are based on the work of the psychologist
Abraham Maslow, and the sociologist Karl Mannheim,
respectively.
Maslow's scarcity hypothesis proposes that one places
the greatest subjective value on those things that are in
relatively short supply, and discounts those things which
are relatively abundant. Hence in a situation where basic
material things - food, shelter, physical security, etc. -
are scarce, material needs take on overwhelming importance,
under circumstances where such basic needs are regarded as
secure, individuals turn their attention to less fundamental
things. These Maslow referred to as "higher order needs" -
belonging, esteem, esthetic considerations, etc., (Maslow,
1954). Inglehart devised an interesting economic uwist on
this thesis by proposing that, in postindustrial societies,
the "decreasing marginal utility" of continuous material
accumulation in affluent circumstances contributed to the
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3 3
comparative attractiveness of higher order needs (Inglehart,
1987) .
Mannheim's socialization hypothesis proposes that one's
basic values reflect conditions that prevailed in one's
preadult years (1928, in Kecskemeti et al 1952). In this
regard, one's immediate circumstances do not dictate, at
least not completely or fundamentally, the importance one
attaches to different needs. Thus, if one were subject to
continuous material deprivation as a child, one would
continue through life attaching substantial importance to
material security, even to the point of accumulating
material goods far beyond what might be necessary to meet
one's present or future needs. Many individuals socialized
during the Great Depression, or who experienced the
privations associated with protracted war during their
childhood might display such behavior.
Alternatively, individuals raised in circumstances of
peace and material security might tend to regard such
conditions as natural, scarcely considering that material
and security needs could ever go unmet for any significant
amount of time, even in circumstances of immediate relative
impoverishment.
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3 4
Inglehart indicates that individuals born into Western
societies since the end of World War II are more likely to
reflect the relative influence of these
psychological/economic and social forces. He hypothesizes
that this segment of society focuses less on material and
security needs, which they take as given, having been raised
under materially secure conditions, and more on the non-
material quality of life issues alluded to above that come
to the fore once basic material needs are satisfied (see
Inglehart 1970 pp.991-992, 1981 pp.76-77, 1990 p.66).
Inglehart refers to these people as postmaterialists. Those
who remain concerned with security needs he refers zo as
materialists. Others may be mixed in their orientations.
One of Inglehart's major contributions to the study of
both political culture and political behavior is the attempt:
to ground a political culture proposal - the value change
thesis - in quantifiable terms that allow it to be tested
empirically. To this end, to identify postmaterialists,
materialists and mixed types in societies and cohorts,
Inglehart devised a twelve item battery of survey questions
designed to indicate materialist or postmaterialist
orientations. This series of questions was designed to tap
Maslow's needs hierarchy thesis. Responses were gathered by
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3 5
presenting respondents with a series of three cards, each
proposing four goals. The respondents were asked to
indicate which goal they considered most important and which
they considered second most important on each individual
card. The procedure used is reproduced below.
There is a lot of talk these days about what
the aims of this country should be for the
next ten years. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD A.)
On this card are listed some of the goals
which different people would give top
priority. Would you please say which one of
these you, yourself, consider most important?
CARD A
A. Maintaining a high rate of economic growth.
B. Making sure the country has strong defense
forces.
C. Seeing that the people have more say in how
things get decided at work and in the community.
D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more
beautiful.
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3 6
(HAND RESPONDENT CARD B.) If you had to
chose, which one of the things on this card
would you say is most desirable?
CABO B
E. Maintaining order in the nation.
F. Giving the people more say in important government
decisions.
G. Fight rising prices.
H. Protecting freedom of speech.
Here is another list. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD C.)
In your opinion, which one is the most important?
CARD C
I. Maintain a stable economy.
J. Progress toward a less impersonal, more htimane
society.
K. The fight against crime.
L. Progress toward a society were ideas are more
important than money.
What comes next?
Now would you look again at all of the goals
listed on these three cards together and tell me
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3
which one you consider the most desirable of all?
Just read off the one you choose.
And which is the next most desirable?
And which of all the aims on these cards is least
important from your point of view?
(Inglehart 1990, pp.132-133)
Survey respondents who consistently give top priority
to order, price stability, high economic growth, strong
national defense, a stable economy, and fighting crime are
classified as pure materialists. Those who consistently
give top priority to expanded political participation,
freedom of speech, more democracy on the job and in the
community, a friendlier, less impersonal society, a society
less concerned with wealth and more with ideas, and
beautiful cities and countryside are classified as pure
postmaterialists. Respondents who indicate preferences for
some items from each group are classified as various mixed
types (Inglehart 1990 pp.74-75). Factor analyses of survey
results have shown a distinct tendency for these items to
load or be ranked together by respondents, with the
exception of the beautiful cities item which was apparently
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3 8
subject to alternative interpretations by respondents
(Inglehart 1990 pp.134-139).
Pooled survey results from Western Europe indicate that
in postwar generations postmaterialists comprise a
significant percentage of the general population, even
outnumbering materialists (see table 2.1). If these
attitudes are the result of generational characteristics
rather than the result of life-cycle patterns, a conclusion
which data from surveys repeated at regular intervals seem
to support (Abramson and Inglehart 1995, pp.12-15), and if
Inglehart's fundamental propositions are valid, then
generational replacement will result in a long-term trend
toward postmaterialism taking place in the West. Thus, the
structural changes that have taken place in Western
societies since the end of World War II have allowed,
perhaps for the first time in history, a significant segment
of society to turn from a preoccupation with securing basic
material needs and to focus instead on higher order needs.
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3 9
Postmaterialism and Unconventional Political Action
The Postmaterialism Model
The proposition that an important connection exists
between postmaterialism and unconventional political action
is vitally important to the postmaterialism thesis, because
Ronald Inglehart introduced this thesis into social science
specifically in reaction to such behavioral changes.
In the realm of development studies it became almost
axiomatic that rapid modernization is frequently accompanied
by violence and disruption (see e.g. Huntington, 1968). On
the other hand, it was believed that Western industrial
countries had reached a point in terms of development that
rendered them impervious to such political upheavals. The
West was already industrialized, and over time had developed
economic arrangements that had broken down the overt
barriers to participation in the social and political
institutions of Western society. By the 1950's. Western
societies had been assumed to have reached a modernized
state (Apter, 1965 p.2). This end-state, in turn, was
assumed to have eliminated or at least blurred basic
political antagonism between the classes (see e.g. Dahl
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4 0
1961; Bell, 1960). Further fundamental dislocations
associated with modernization were not anticipated.
As noted in the introduction, the outbreak of large
scale demonstrations directed at governmental and other
authorities and their political decisions signified a
remarkable change in political behavior in the West. This
development was wholly unexpected. Previously it had been
most consistently proposed that large scale street
demonstrations and the like were most often the result of
the frustration and discontent of the least privileged
members of society, concerned with their own material
deprivation. Bread riots, for example, have been a
recurring theme throughout history, in widely disparate
societies. Similarly, in industrial societies, street
demonstrations and other direct challenges to economic and
political arrangements were associated with the working
classes, union organizations, and the like. As Inglehart
has pointed out, 'Muring the 1950's and early 60's writers
with viewpoints as diverse as those of Aron, Bell, Keniston
and Marcuse called attention to the decline of ideological
conflict [in the West] with various degrees of approval or
dismay. Implicit in the discussion was the assumption that
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4 1
radical protest movements could be based only on the working
classes" (italics in the original) (Inglehart 1977, p.208).
Yet the increase in unconventional political activity
in Western societies beginning in the mid 1960's has been
fueled in large part by the participation of individuals
with, in many cases, a quite different demographic profile
than before. For now the protestor is oftentimes young,
well educated, and from a distinctly middle class
background. In short, it has become the relatively
privileged who have displayed a marked "adversarial stance"
regarding key public policies and even basic social and
political arrangements in their own systems (Inglehart, 1990
p. 67), and who are not disinclined to use unorthodox or
disruptive tactics in opposition to such.
In Germany, unconventional political behavior took on
just such a new cast. While "petitions and street
demonstrations" in the 1950's were the work of established
organizations like unions, by the late 1960's the "critical
intelligentsia" (Pallak in Nelles and Oppermann 1980, p.253)
were more likely to lead such activities (Pultzer in Smith
et al, 1989 pp. 82-85). How to explain these developments
taking place in the West was a central problem facing
political theorists and social scientists.
-
A ̂ c,
Inglehart proposed that value change was affecting
political participation in post-industrial societies. He
suggested that postmaterialists would be relatively more
likely than materialists to participate in politics in
general. Inglehart states that "there is evidence that the
value priorities of Western publics have gradually been
shifting from materialist toward postmaterialist values. If
this trend has indeed been occurring, it...should tend to
raise the political participation rates of mass publics"
(Inglehart 1979, p.378; 1990, p.335).
As noted, economic prosperity and educational levels
have risen dramatically in the West since the end of World
War II. Both education and income are associated with
rising levels of political involvement, as the civic culture
thesis of democratic politics makes clear (Almond and Verba,
1963). However, this behavior was generally considered to
not only support the status quo, but to do so in a
conventional manner, such as particularized contacting and
taking part in local politics through established
organizations. Widespread elite challenging activity such
as participation in demonstrations, boycotts, petition
drives, and the like has not been traditionally part of this
repertoire. In fact, such behavior had been considered the
-
antithesis of responsible citizenship associated with the
more highly educated, affluent segments of society. Yet,
just such activities have now been demonstrated to be
positively associated with education and economic well-being
in highly industrialized Western societies (Baker et al,
1981).
Since the end of the Second Industrial Revolution, the
political arena in the West has been dominated by two
opposing groups, the bourgeoisie, or owners of production,
and the working classes, or wage laborers. All Western
political systems have reflected this fundamental division
of economic/political interests. The major political
parties in Western societies have tended to reflect the
economic interests of these two classes, to a greater or
lesser extent, dependent on an individual society's history
of industrialization and other idiosyncratic factors. Thus
all Western political systems have revolved around the power
struggle between a middle class party that desires to
preserve or extend the interests of the property owning
classes, and a labor party, socialist party or communist
party that professes to represent the economic interests of
the workers, or propertyless classes. In essence, "the
battle lines of industrial society led naturally to class
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4 4
based parties" (Baker et al, 1981 p.293). In recent decades
however, the growth of a new middle class of professionals
who may frequently emphasize non-economic political goals
has contributed to a growing lack of fit between a society's
traditional party system and political issues being raised
by this segment of society (Dalton in Smith et al, 1989).
For example, a fundamental premise upon which both
parties of the Right and parties of the Left agree is the
desirability of economic growth. Such growth benefits both
producers and their employees, in terms of profits,
employment, wage levels, welfare schemes, and patterns of
consumption. Put another way, some system critics propose
that there exists "a secret connection between capitalism
and the labor movement" based on their shared desire for
continued progress in material accumulation (Pallak in
Melles and Oppermann, 1980 p.254) (my translation).
However, for increasing numbers of the new class,
postmaterial goals of ,say, pollution control, or a less
hierarchically arranged work environment, may clash with a
continued emphasis on ever more economic growch, as
environmental safeguards and a less efficient workplace may
negatively impact economic growth rates. Thus it can be
that old adversaries find themselves on the same side of the
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4 5
fence on some fundamental issues, opposed to dissident
voices which reflect a political position unrepresented
within the framework of the conventional party/interest
arrangement.
Traditional democratic politics in Western societies
demonstrate a pattern of elite directed activity, dominated
by hierarchically organized political parties and
institutionalized interest groups. These organizations
frame political issues and propose political and social
policies in such a manner that input from the vast majority
of the public is restricted to passing judgment on the
activities of elected representatives at regular intervals.
Henig points out for example, that Western democracies have
been essentially governed by political parties in
conjunction with economic interest groups and other
organized factors, whereas the "vague ideas and interests of
the wider public" find expression only within the context of
the "electoral system" (1979, p.308). The increasing
competence of publics in Western societies to understand the
intricacies of the political policy making process has led
to a partial breakdown of this arrangement. Elite
challenging political behavior that attempts to directly
-
effect the formulation of political policy has increased in
the post-war era (Inglehart 1990, pp.5, 336).
From an institutional perspective, even more vexing
than nev/ issues that challenge the existing economic
paradigm of political divisions, are a range of political
issues associated with lifestyle questions which fall
generally outside the parameters of economics. With the
growch of a "self-directed" social segment that champions
the erosion of moral strictures associated with women's
roles in society, sexuality, religion, and conventional
behavior in general, .political debate has centered
increasingly on the movement to promote or inhibit
"progress" in these areas. Again, the party system as it
has evolved until recently has not been equipped to offer a
coherent choice to opponents on questions such as these,
when coupled with the differences on economic questions
associated with class politics.
Recent decades have witnessed the partial
transformation of the left by these new interests (Burklin
in Wallach and Romosser 1985, p.196). In the United States
for exa.mple, the Democratic Party is regarded as
substantially more sympathetic to the interests of the
wom.en's movement, to "gays", to environm.entaliscs, and the
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4 7
like. On the other hand, the Republican Party touts itself
as the defender of "family values" defined as opposition to
abortion and pornography and support for prayer in schools,
etc. Socially conservative members of the working classes
and lower middle class may have, in many cases, defected to
the Republicans, based on these issues. As a result, the
Republican Party finds itself with a severe internal schism
between the middle class, business oriented laissez-faire
wing of the Party and the new socially conservative wing.
The Democrats suffer from a similar identity crisis.
Partially in response, a growing number of individuals
identify with neither party (see, for example, Welch et al,
1995, pp.142-144 for a synopsis of the current pattern of
dealignment and realignment in American party politics). In
Germ.any, due to systemic differences, this development has
been somewhat muted, but has resulted in the appearance of a
Green Party to the left of the Social Democrats, founded by
a dissident youth wing of that party (Dalton in Smith et al,
1989). This "anti-party party" has been marked by a
decidedly favorable stance regarding unconventional
political activity. The Greens have also been referred to
as the quintessential postmaterialist party by Ronald
Inglehart (1990). Similar weakness, dealignment, internal
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4 8
divisions and party fragmentation have marked party politics
in Britain, the Netherlands, France, etc., (Henig, 1979) .
Writing of the transformation of conservatism in France for
example, one commentator has pointed out how the issues that
are stressed by the forces of the "far right" - "law and
order", immigration, and unemployment - have become a major
part of the agenda of the traditional right in many
respects. Additionally, these issues have become
interrelated in the minds of some in that "immigrants... are
equivaleni; to crime and disruption", and "race and
crime...race and unemployment" have been brought together as
a coherent political program for a political grouping in
postindustrial society that no longer conforms to a
"sociological profile" associated with the "natural
constituency" of the far right. In essence, the far right
has moved "from fringe to mainstream" (Christie, 1995,
p.95). Thus while the new middle class and New Left may
both be phenomena associated with postmaterialism {sometimes
referred to as the new politics), the former as precursor,
the latter as political artifact, the new right may be a
manifestation of the material and security fears of a
seemingly disparate group of individuals that transcends
"the boundaries of class, ideology and narrow vested
-
interests" {Christie, 1995, p.98; see also Chapin, 1997, fo
an investigation of this development in Germany). In any
event, value change has had a profound effect on political
party systems in advanced industrial societies (Baker et al
1981, p. 159) .
This, in turn, has had a profound effect on political
behavior. Political parties function to channel
participation into conventional modes - voting and other
manifestations of electoral politics. On the other hand,
Inglehart finds evidence that postmaterialist values
especially increase the occurrence of unconventional
political action. Inglehart stares that postmaterialists
are "relatively apt" vis-a'-vis materialists to engage in
unconventional political action (Inglehart 1979 in Barnes
and Kaase p.378;1990 pp.310,312). To account for this
influence Inglehart proposes the following explicit reasons
1) secure in their physiological needs, postmaterialists
have more "psychic energy" to invest in other areas.
Politics is one possible area of activity. 2) As a minority
in society in general their priorities tend to be given les;
attention then they believe is appropriate. Thus they are
dissatisfied with current political policies. 3) Property
damage as a possible result of unconventional political
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5 0
action is regarded less negatively by postmaterialists
because property is given a "lower priority" by
postmaterialists than it is by materialists (Inglehart 1990
p. 310) .
The hypotheses put forward for postmaterialism and
unconventional political action then are rather straight
forward. We expect to find a positive, significant causal
relationship between postmaterialism and unconventional
political action. Furthermore, we expect to find a
positive, significant causal relationship between the
explicit causal mechanisms and such behavior. Finally, in
the context of a model that controls for such mechanisms, we
expect that the direct causal relationship between
postmaterialism and unconventional political action will
become insignificant, in keeping with Inglehart's proposals.
In regard to materialism, we have stated that we
expect to find no relationship between materialism and
protest potential. Consequently, we also expect no
relationship between materialism and the causal mechanisms
alluded to above. What we mean when we state that we do not
expect the above is simply that there is nothing in our
theoretical argument which should lead us to expect an
effect of materialism on protest, or the causal agents
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5 1
proposed to generate protest, not that we have developed a
specific notion of how this concept should or should not
affect political behavior or attitudes. Therefore it is
perhaps more accurate to say that we remain agnostic on this
point.
In order to test the above propositions, our first task
is to determine whether we can establish an empirical link
between postmaterialism and unconventional political action,
before proceeding to investigate the relationship between
postmaterialism and other theories of unconventional
political activity. Initially then, the first step is to
construct indexes that measure postmaterialism and
materialism. Once this has been successfully accomplished,
the following step is to test Inglehart's related
proposition - that postmaterial preferences have a positive
causal connection to political protest.
TTE E&Etnas3aLi3nM!E&;
Bdst
Dtejalisn
-
The next step is to test the effects of the explicit
proposals as to why postmaterialists are more inclined to
engage in unconventional political action. These proposed
causal mechanisms have never before been subject to
empirical investigation. Thus we extend the model by
testing Inglehart's key theoretical assumptions regarding
political protest.
Ife Ek±!ct tfermsiB
lyfetBdalisn
If Rst cSasads&tin
•^RlitkaL iltMKM. A Hqatyctoe
d^dsfeticn
BrlESt
The manner in which the variables tapping
DOStmaterialism, materialism, protest potential, psychic
energy, policy dissatisfaction and property damage have bee
constructed can be found in Chapter Four.
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5 3
CHAPTER THREE
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OP UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL ACTION
Socio-Economic Status and Unconventional Political Action
It is widely accepted that the standard socio-economic
model of political participation is a powerful predictor of
political behavior in advanced Western societies (Leighley,
1995). Especially for conventional political activity,
factors reflecting individuals' economic and social status -
primarily income and education - have been recognized as
having a significant positive effect on individual political
activity (Almond and Verba, 1953; Nie, Powell and Prewitit,
1969; Verba, Nie and Kim, 1971; Berleson, Lazerfeld and
McPhee 1954). Explanations of t-my such extraneous factors
are associated with specific political behavior revolve
around the proposition that elevated skill levels associated
with high levels of education and income (and increasing
age)(see, e.g., Brady, Verba and Scholzman, 1995; Traut and
Emmert, 1993), along with the inculcation of democratic
norms associated with education (Dahl, 1971), generate an
increase in participation.
-
The manner in which the primary demographic criteria
influence political behavior are often interrelated and
reinforcing. Education, for instance, is proposed to
increase political participation by stimulating an interest
in politics and the awareness of the relationship between
one's political interests and public policy (Almond and
Verba, 1963). Education is also correlated with relatively
recent birth cohorts. That is, educational opportunities
have grown significantly in recent decades. Thus education
may act as an intervening factor in regard to the observed
relationship between youth and unconventional political
participation. There may continue to exist, however, a
residual effect of youth on such behavior even in the face
of educational controls. There are plausible possible
explanations for such residual effects. For example, che
young may suffer less, in certain cases, from the effects o
time costs or social approbation associated with
unconventional political activity (Milbrath and Goel, 1977
p.166). Or, social networks may be more supportive of such
activity than they are for older individuals, for whatever
reason.
Similarly, education is associated with income. It ma
be that an observed relationship between income and
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5 5
political participation may be mitigated by the effects of
education, or vice-versa. Another possible explanation of
the association between income and participation may have to
do with efforts to recruit individuals for political
activity - such efforts have been found to be
disproportionately directed at those with higher incomes.
Additionally, both education and income may be positively
associated with subjective feelings of political efficacy.
These feelings may in turn be the result of elevated
potential political skill levels resulting from education or
affluence that indeed render individuals objectively more
politically efficacious.
Gender too, may have an indirect effect on political
activity. For instance, women have been found to be less
inclined to approve of potentially violent political acts.
Why this is so is not entirely clear, but a plausible
hypothesis is that gender roles and conditioning are
responsible for women's reluctance to engage in such
actions. If this is so, girls subject to less traditional
role expectations may as adults display a lessened
reluctance to take part in such activities. Less
restrictive role expectations may in turn be associated with
class - again income and education are implicated, although
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5 6
this time perhaps more closely with an individual's parental
levels.
In sum, the standard SES model of political activity
suggests that the better educated, more affluent, and
younger members of society are more likely to develop an
interest in politics, be aware of the relationship between
their political interests and public policy, suffer less
from the effect of time costs associated with political
activity, be recruited for political activity, be
objectively more politically efficacious, and exist in a
relatively politically tolerant social milieu that would be
less likely to attach negative sanctions to politically
unconventional acts. Furthermore, women have been found to
be less inclined to participate in potentially violent
political acts. These mechanisms are put forward as
responsible for the causal relationship between education,
income or class, youth, gender, and unconventional political
activity.
It is important in terms of this study, to recognize
that the standard socio-economic model rests on the
fundamental assumption that there is nothing inherently
associated with education, income, or age that spurs
political activity. Rather, these conditions are regarded
-
as associated with mechanisms which, in turn, have a direct
effect on political behavior. These include, for example,
participatory norms, organizational memberships, reduced
relative costs in terms of time and effort needed to gather
political information, etc. In effect, the standard SES
model treats socio-demographic characteristics as proxy
variables that become irrelevant when these mechanisms are
taken into account. Once this is recognized, it becomes
possible to formulate and to test such proposals for their
relative explanatory strength for protest potential by
including the appropriate demographic criteria in an
expanded multi-variate model.
SES, Postmaterialism, and Unconventional Political Action
As the above discussion indicates, demographic criteria
should be highly correlated with value orientation in
Western societies. Postwar generations, having been
socialized in an environment marked by a growing economy,
widespread affluence, the absence of war, and increasing
educational opportunities and information, as well as
growing cognitive sophistication, should be significantly
more postmaterialist than cider cohorts. Hence age,
-
income, education, and postmaterialism should all
demonstrate positive correlations (Abramson and Inglehart,
1995) .
Thus, proponents of the postmaterialism thesis would
certainly expect a positive relationship between
postmaterialism and youth, high levels of education, and
income. What proponents of the standard socio-economic
model should not expect is a robust residual independent
effect of postmaterialism on political behavior once such
criteria are taken into consideration, because models of
political behavior based on socio-economic criteria do not
include an independent effect of value orientation in their
explanatory schema. Such models would by implication,
assume that any causal relationship between postmaterialism
and protest would be dependent on the relationship between
postmaterialism and demographic criteria. Thus the central
question is this: Is the relationship between
postmaterialism and protest primarily a reflection of
postmaterialists' social and demographic characteristics?
We reject this proposition. Rather, we propose that
SES factors are crucial for postmaterialism theory as
antecedent variables. But while age, education, and income
are positively related to postmaterialism, postmaterialist
-
propensity for protest is not wholly a function of the
postmaterialist demographic profile. Postmaterialism leads
to heightened interest in politics, policy dissatisfaction,
and lessened objection to property damage. These factors
are in turn causally related to unconventional political
participation.
The Demographic Control Model
As noted earlier, proponents of the standard SES model
of political activity point to specific causal agents as
responsible for the effect of specific social and
demographic conditions on variations in political activity.
Postmaterialism theory contains the proposition that
postmaterialists are, by definition, disproportionately
middle class, highly educated, and relatively young
(Abramson and Inglehart, 1995). Postmaterialism theory also
contains the proposition that postmaterialists engage
disproportionately in unconventional political action. As
the specific individual socio-demographic characteristics
put forward as associated with postmaterialism have also
been found to be associated with political participation (in
the case of youth, with unconventional participation but not
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6 0
with conventional participation), then it is possible that
the observed relationship between postmaterialism and
unconventional political action may be spurious.
The initial hypotheses to be tested then, concern the
relationship between postmaterialism and age, education,
income, and gender. We expect to find a strong positive
relationship between education, income, and postmaterialism
and a strong negative relationship between age and
postmaterialism. We expect to find no significant
relationship between postmaterialism and gender.
Furthermore, we expect to find significant independent
effects on the dependent variable for all of these factors,
including postmaterialism. Path analysis can map the
relationship between postmaterialism and socio-demographic
factors, and a simple regression model of postmaterialism
and unconventional political action that controls for age,
education, income and gender can test the hypotheses.
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6 1
-i5ra::hi ; Ccntr " ! Model
A
^ y
The manner in which the variables measuring age,
income, education, and gender have been constructed can be
found in Chapter Four.
Relative Deprivation Theory and Unconventional Political
Action
Relative deprivation as a "formal object of study"
emerged from research conducted during the Second World War
on American soldiers. At this time it referred to a
psychological state resulting from evaluating one's own
well-being "by comparison with levels of benefit obtained by
-
others." Individuals were postulated to feel resentment and
anger if they believe that they are being deprived relative
CO comparable others. In this sense, the condition is
specifically put forward as the result of inter-personal
comparison. However, later work implies that relative
deprivation is more simply the desire for some "unattained
ouucome" coupled with the feeling that one "deserves" the
outcome. In t.his sense, "referent cognitions" can refer to
intra-personal (perceived state versus desired state), as
well as inter-personal comparison (Folger, in Masters and
Smith 1987, pp.184-185, 187; see also Crosby, 1976; 1982).
Both of these variations of relative deprivation can be
regarded as "egotistical" relative deprivation.
One further formulation of the relative deprivation
thesis is referred to as collective relative deprivation.
In this construct, relative deprivation is manifest through
an individual's feelings of closeness to a particular group,
coupled with the perception that the group is relatively
deprived. This type of relative deprivation has been found
to be associated with collective protest action (Grant and
Brown, 1995) .
The relative deprivation thesis of unconventional
political action proposes that there exists a monotonia
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causal relationship between relative deprivation and
political discontent. This in turn is proposed as resulting
in civil disturbances. When individuals feel that they are
relatively deprived they become discontented and react.
This reaction can take the form of unconventional political
action, including rebellion and other acts of a violent
nature. In this sense, relative deprivation theory rests on
a more fundamental proposition, the frustration-aggression
thesis.
Although the relative deprivation theory of
unconventional political action has been embellished in
various ways (see for example, Gurr's list of hypotheses
associated with his development of this theory, 1970), the
basic proposition stands. As Gurr has stated: "[d]isconcent
arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the
basic, instigating condition for participants in collective
violence" {Gurr, 1970, p.13; see also Runciman, 1966; Walker
and Pettigrew, 1984).
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Relative Oeprivatxon, Postmateriallsm and Unconventional
Political Action
Relative deprivation theory is closely linked to
modernization studies, which tend to conform to the "gap"
theory of civil unrest in modernizing societies (Huntington,
1968). According to this thesis, modernizing societies'
fledgling institutions cannot keep pace with the aspirations
of their citizens, and unrest is often the result. A
central feature of the modernization thesis is that rapid
social change can cause political upheaval, and the basic
thesis of relative deprivation theory follows suit - general
societal change that results in a critical mass of
discontented citizenry, frustrated by the perception of
public policy that does not meet their needs can result in
civil unrest. Here one discovers the nexus which can serve
to link relative deprivation theory to postmateriallsm
theory. The postmateriallsm thesis also contains the
proposition that continuing modernization processes have
resulted in social changes in Western societies that in turn
have caused the growth of postmateriallsm (Inglehart, 1977).
The political institutions in these societies responsible
for framing public policy have not responded as rapidly as
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necessary to accommodate postmaterialists, resulting in a
growing body of discontented individuals. This has been
posited as one of the primary reasons that postmaterialists
are more discontented than are materialists. This factor is
a central feature of the explicit postmaterialism
explanation of unconventional political action. But
relative deprivation as it is formulated in at least the
first two of the variations described above refers more or
less explicitly to relative material deprivation.
Furthermore, Gurr states emphatically that "the intensity of
relative deprivation is greatest with respect to discrepancy
affecting economic values, less with respect to security and
communality values, least with respect to participation,
self-realization, status, or ideational coherence values"
(1970, p.71). Thus one would expect to find a stronger
relationship between materialism and egotistical relative
deprivation. It would be highly significant then, within
the framework of relative deprivation theory, if
postmaterialism is found to be causally related to
discontent and this type of relative deprivation. If this
is the case, one would have cause to question the real
nature of the concept of relative deprivation, at least in
the context of postindustrial societies.
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The Relative Deprivation Model
The major hypotheses are straight forward. First, we
dc expect: to find a significant, positive relationship
between intra-personal relative deprivation, specifically
targeted group relative deprivation and postmaterialism
despite the fact that pos^materialists are hypothesized to
have a higher educational and income level than the average
citizen. Second, we expect to observe a continued direct
effect of postmaterialism on unconventional political
action, when included in a model of relative deprivation, as
discontent is only one factor put forward as responsible for
postmaterialists' unconventional political participation.
Third, we expect to find a significant, positive
relationship between materialism and inter-personal relative
deprivation and specifically targeted group relative
deprivation. However, we expect these types of deprivation
to have no effect on unconventional political activity, in
part at least, due specifically to the association between
these types of deprivation and protest adverse materialists.
That is, we propose that relative deprivation will have a
significant relationship to protest when it is associated
with postmaterialism. iMaterialists may feel relatively
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deprived but they will not protest. Not so for
postmaterialists.
Our first proposition points out one of the problems
associated with proposing that relative deprivation causes
social unrest without recourse to micro-level data.
Relative deprivation is routinely defined as the gap between
individual aspirations and achievements. This is one of the
forms of relative deprivation to which postmaterialists
should show a relationship. However, an alternative
formulation is that deprivation derives its relative nature
from individuals' tendencies to compare their personal
circumstances to those of others. This type of relative
deprivation should show no relationship to postmaterialism.
Without the ability to directly measure relative deprivation
at the individual level, and to differentiate between the
cwo leading conceptual constructs of relative deprivation,
it is virtually impossible to falsify the fundamental causal
proposition. Whether one finds that the wealthier, better
educated or the poorer, less well educated are engaging in
unconventional political activity, one always has the
opportunity to propose that it is a relatively deprived
condition that is generating the activity in question. In
the case of the former, it is the discrepancy between
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aspirations and reality that is the causal factor. In the
case of the latter, it is che discrepancy between an
individual's condition and that of others in society that
can be posited as the causal factor. By utilizing the
survey material available for this study, one can determine
the relative strength of each measure and furthermore one
can control for the extraneous (in regard to t.his model)
factors that can compound tautological tendencies associated
with aggregate models of relative deprivation (see e.g.
Greene, 1974 pp. 150-152).
The survey instrument utilized in this study allows for
the construction of four alternative relative deprivation
variables. The first directly taps respondents' perceptions
of their personal financial situations, and how these
perceptions compare to their individual aspirations given
their individual level of education. The second allows
respondents to compare their situation in general to others
in the Federal Republic, and to judge whether any
discrepancy is justifiable or not. Moreover, respondents
were queried concerning the responsibility of the government
for their situation. Thus the survey instrument allows for
the construction of two alternative versions of egotistical
relative deprivation, one comparing respondents feelings
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concerning intra-personal deprivation which we will
hereafter refer to as income deprivation, the other
comparing respondents' feelings of general deprivation
relative to others in society, v/hich we will hereafter refer
to as welfare deprivation.
Finally, the survey instrument allows the construction
of collective relative deprivation variables for both
postmaterialism and materialism, by asking respondents to
identify a particular group which represents their primary
source of identification, the degree to which they feel
identity to this group, and the perception of whether this
group is receiving all that it deserves. The choices
include