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Compliance pluralisme and processes

Wu, Y.

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Citation for published version (APA):Wu, Y. (2017). Compliance pluralisme and processes: Understanding compliance behavior in restaurants inChina

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Appendixes

Appendix A: Laws Concerning Restaurants Involved in This Research

Several laws that apply to restaurants were studied in this research. These lawsencompass several regulatory fields, including food safety, environmental concerns,business management, taxation, fire control, city management, and alcohol sales. Inthis appendix, and brief introduction to the relevant laws is provided, and the specificrules in these laws concerning restaurants are highlighted.

1. Food Safety LawsSeveral laws about food safety are relevant. The first and most important is the

Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China (the Food Safety Law), whichwas promulgated on February 28, 2009, and revised on April 24, 2015. It was enactedto ensure food safety and guarantee the safety and health of the public. All foodproduction, processing, circulation, and catering services, as well as food additivesand food-related products, including packing materials, containers, detergents, anddisinfectants for food and utensils and equipment for food production and operation,are governed by this law. The law makes provisions for food-safety risk inspectionand assessment, food safety standards, food production and operation, food testing,food import and export, food-safety incident resolution, and food safety inspectionand management.

Rules related to restaurants address licensing, locations, equipment, disinfection,food safety personnel and internal regulations, layout and processing procedures,dishware, food materials, food additives, food storage, food workers’ health conditionand personal sanitation, washing hands, clothes, water, detergent, and disinfectants.Several of these were studied in this research.

Several complementary implementation regulations and operational norms thatregulate restaurants support the main Food Safety Law, including Implementation Regulation of Food Safety Law of People’s Republic of China

(Implementation Regulation), Catering Service Food Safety Inspection and Management Measures (Inspection

Measures) issued by the Ministry of Sanitation on March 4, 2010, and Operational Norms of Catering Services for Food Safety316 (Operational Norms)

issued by the FDA in 2011These regulations, measures, and operational norms further refine the general rules setout in the Food Safety Law.

For instance, while article 27 of Food Safety Law mentions that “the personsengaging in the production or business operation of food shall…[wash] their handsclean,” the Operational Norms further identify eight conditions under which a foodworker should wash his or her hands. They are before processing food; after using the

316 Refer to http://www.foodmate.net/law/shipin/173257.html

Appendix A Laws Concerning Restaurants Involved in This Research270

toilet; after touching raw food materials; after touching polluted tools or equipment;after coughing, sneezing, or blowing one’s nose; after dealing with animals or garbage;after touching the ears, nose, hair, face, mouth, or other parts of the body; and afterany activities that may pollute the hands. Similarly, while article 27 of the FoodSafety Law mentions that “persons engaging in the production or business operationof food shall keep personal hygiene,” the Operational Norms further detail severalsubstantial aspects of personal hygiene. As article 12 of Operational Norms state,people who work with food “shall keep personal hygiene [and] wear clean workingclothes and hats during the processing of food, [and] hair should not be outside of thehat, [and the person] should not have long nails, paint nails, [or] wear accessories.”

In this research, six specific requirements from Food Safety Law and itscomplementary regulations, measures and operational norms were studied. The firstwas licensing, specifically the catering services license. According to Article 29 of theFood Safety Law, “the state shall adopt a licensing system for the food production andbusiness operation. Those intending to engage in food production, food circulation orcatering services shall obtain a license for food production, food circulation orcatering services.” The second was the regulations related to health certificates.According to article 34 of the Food Safety Law,

Food producers and traders shall establish and implement an employee healthmanagement system. Anyone who suffers from an infectious disease of digestivetract, such as dysentery, typhoid, or virus hepatitis, active tuberculosis, andpurulent or weeping skin diseases that adversely affect food safety must notengage in work in direct contact with food for consumption. The personnelinvolved in food production and trading shall take a medical check-up each year,and can work only after they have obtained a health certificate.The third was regulations related to raw meat, specifically pork and chicken.

According to article 28 of the Food Safety Law,it is forbidden to produce or engage in business operation of the followingfood…meat that has not been quarantined by the animal health inspectioninstitution or has failed the quarantine or meat products that have not beeninspected or have failed the inspection.

The fourth was dishware disinfection. Subarticle 5 of article 27 of the Food SafetyLaw reads, “[E]nsuring that the cutlery, drinking sets and containers for ready-to-eatfood are washed clean and disinfected prior to use.”

The fifth was washing hands, as set out in subarticle 8 of article 27 of the FoodSafety Law, which states, “[E]nsuring that the persons engaging the production orbusiness operation of food shall keep personal hygiene, washing their hands clean…”The Operational Norms further identify eight conditions under which a food workershould wash his or her hands, as mentioned preciously in this section. The sixth wascutting nails. Article 12 of Operational Norms highlights “should not have long nails”as one aspect of maintaining “personal hygiene,” which is required under article 27 ofthe Food Safety Law.

2. Environmental Laws

Appendixes 271

Restaurants are considered polluters of the environment, as they release cookingfumes and oily wastewater, and they contribute to noise pollution, so they shouldabide by environmental laws. Several environmental laws are relevant, including Air Pollution Prevention Law of the People’s Republic of China317 (Air Pollution

Law) Water Pollution Prevention Law of the People’s Republic of China318 (Water

Pollution Law) Regulation for Administration of Pollutant Discharge License,319 issued by the

Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China Provincial Regulation for Environmental Protection in XX Province Provincial Regulation for Administration of Pollutant Discharge License in XX

Province Local Regulation for Administration of Drainage in XX City

This research studied the environmental and drainage licenses required in termsof these laws. According to Article 20 of the Water Pollution Law,

[T]he nation [is to] implement [a] discharge licensing system. Companies andentities that directly or indirectly discharge industrial wastewater and medicalwastewater and other companies and entities that should get discharge licensebefore discharging wastewater and polluted water according to regulation, shallget discharge license… Companies and entities [are prohibited from dischargingthe] above-mentioned wastewater and polluted water without a discharge licenseor to violate the regulation of discharge license.

According to Article 19 of the Air Pollution Law, “companies and entities thatdischarge industrial exhaust gas or other poisonous air pollutants listed in article78…and other implement discharge licensing management units, shall get dischargelicense.” Article 81 of the Air Pollution Law specifically notes that

catering service entities giving out oil smoke shall install oil smoke purifyequipment and use it normally, or take other purification measure to make surethe oil smoke reach the discharge standard, and prevent from pollution toresidents’ living environment in vicinity.

Other provincial and local city environmental protection and licensing regulationsdetail further the license administration. To maintain confidentiality, they are notprovided here.

3. Business Registration and TaxationAs business organizations, restaurants must abide by the Regulation for

Individual Business,320 issued by the executive meeting of the State Council, and

317 http://www.envir.gov.cn/law/air.htm318 http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/2015/20150331/xgbd32636/Document/1397628/1397628_1.htm319 http://www.mep.gov.cn/hdjl/yjzj/zjyj/201411/t20141127_292080.shtml. This regulation is anexposure draft. There is no officially issued national regulation on pollutant discharge. However, manyprovinces, such as Yunnan, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, have created their own provincialregulations.320 This regulation was issued by the 149th executive meeting of the State Council on March 30, 2011,and executed on November 1, 2011.

Appendix A Laws Concerning Restaurants Involved in This Research272

Measures of Administration of Individual Business Registration321 (BusinessRegistration Measures), issued by the State Administration for Industry andCommerce of the People’s Republic of China. Restaurants should obtain businesslicenses according to these regulation and measures. Article 2 of Regulation forIndividual Business points out that “citizens that register in industry and commerceadministration bureaus and operation industry and commerce operation are individualbusiness entities.” Article 2 of Business Registration Measures states, “citizens shallregister in industry and commerce administration bureaus, and get individual businesslicense before operating business.” If a restaurant’s ownership changes, the formerowner should cancel the old business license and the new owner should apply for anew business license, according to article 10 of Regulation for Individual Business:

[I]f items of the individual business registration change, individual shall apply tochange registration. If the individual business changes owner, it shall apply newregistration after cancelling the old registration. If individual business that isoperated by a family changes the owner within the family, it shall apply to changeregistration according to the article.After obtaining a business license, a restaurant should apply for a tax registration

license. Taxation is governed by The Law of The People’s Republic of China Concerning the Administration of Tax

Collection322(Tax Law) Regulation for Implementation of The Law of The People’s Republic of China

Concerning the Administration of Tax Collection323 (Regulation ofImplementation of Tax Law)

Administration Measures of Taxation Registration,324 issued by the StateAdministration of Taxation

According to article 15 of the Tax Law,Enterprises, branches in other jurisdictions established by the enterprises, sitesengaged in production or business operations, individual households engaged inindustry and commerce as well as institutions engaged in production or businessoperations (hereinafter collectively referred to as “taxpayers engaged inproduction or business operations”) shall, within 30 days after the receipt of abusiness license, report to and complete tax registration formalities with the taxauthorities on presentation of the relevant supporting documents. Uponexamination and verification of the supporting documents, the tax authoritiesshall issue tax registration certificates.

http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-04/28/content_1854129.htm321 This administrative measure was first issued on September 30, 2011, and revised on February 20,2014. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2011-10/08/content_1963965.htm,http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/22016/wa2014030309194666262060.shtml322 The tax law was first promulgated on September 4, 1992, and revised in 1995, 2013, and 2015.http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/31/content_146791.htm323 This regulation was first issued on September 7, 2002, and revised in 2012 and 2013.http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2014/content_2695454.htmhttp://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-11/16/content_2268184.htmhttp://www.gov.cn/flfg/2013-07/26/content_2477674.htm324 http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2004/content_62924.htm

Appendixes 273

However, on September 1, 2016, four state departments—the StateAdministration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), State Administration of Taxation(SAT), National Development and Reform Commission (NDR), and State CouncilLegislative Affairs Office (SCLAO)—announced together that China will integratebusiness licenses and tax registration certificates into one license. Four trial districts,Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Fujian, and Hubei, implemented the system on October 1,2016, while another 27 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directlygoverned by the Central Government, and five selected cities implemented it onDecember 1, 2016. Consequently, since the end of 2016, restaurants need one licensefor both business registration and tax registration.

In terms of the formal Fapiao receipts used to collect tax, Article 20 of FapiaoReceipt Management Rule of the People’s Republic of China325 states “a company orindividual who sells products, provide services, and other business activities shouldissue invoice to the customers.” Therefore, restaurants pay tax based on the value ofthe Fapiao receipts they buy from the taxation bureau.

4. Fire ControlAs a public gathering place, a restaurant needs a fire license, according to article

15 of the Fire Control Law326 issued in 2008, which states public gathering placesshould apply for fire control safety assessment before use and opening. Provisions onAdministration of Fire Safety in Public Entertainment Location327 (Provision of FireSafety), issued by the Ministry of Public Security, states in article 10, “safetyexits …shall install light escape direction signs that meet the standards”. Furthermore,article 11 of Provision of Fire Safety requires that “public entertainment locations,including restaurants, shall install fire accident emergency lights.”

5. City ManagementRestaurants are also subject to the Urban Management Law Enforcement Bureau

that regulates any attachment outside the building such as awnings and light boxes.Relevant laws include Regulation for City Road328 and Law of the People’s Republicof China on Administrative Penalty.329

6. Liquor LicensesRestaurants that sell alcohol must apply for liquor licenses, according to

Regulation Rule of Alcohol Circulation 330 that was issued by the Ministry ofCommerce in 2005. Article 6 of the regulation requires that “an organization orindividual who sells alcohol, including wholesale and retail, should register incommerce administration departments on the same level as the industry and

325 http://www.chinaacc.com/new/63/67/81/2005/12/dr65075413310321500219845-0.htm326 http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-10/29/content_1134208.htm327 http://119.china.com.cn/qwxx/txt/2010-09/22/content_3737835.htm328 http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2011/content_1860785.htm329 http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-08/21/content_25101.htmhttp://www.gov.cn/flfg/2009-08/27/content_1403326.htm

330 http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/d/200511/20051100748397.html

Appendix A Laws Concerning Restaurants Involved in This Research274

commerce administration bureaus where they registered, within 60 days after gettingbusiness licenses.”

Appendixes 275

Appendix B: Supplemental CasesIn addition to the two restaurants studied in depth, four restaurants were studied

in less depth—Liguan, Weiguan, Haguan, and Shangguan. The four restaurantsdiffered in terms of scale, location, and clientele. Liguan, similar to Naguan, waslocated in a residential area and near a fresh food market. It could serve 50 customers,and each customer spent around 30 RMB. Weiguan was located in avillage-in-the-city and had only four tables, serving a maximum of 30 customers.Most customers were local residents, and the average cost of a meal was 20 to 30RMB. Haguan was located near universities, TV stations, hospitals, and residentialareas, and most of its customers lived or worked nearby. At approximately 400 squaremeters, it could serve 200 customers. The average cost for each customer was about30 RMB. Shangguan restaurant was located in a central business area, and it couldseat 300 customers. Its upmarket clientele spent approximately 100 RMB each. Thedata collected at Shangguan derived mainly from workers, and it was used forvariable analysis at individual level. Because of a lack of information about itscompliance as an entity and interaction with regulators, it is not discussed in thissection. Instead, Liguan, Weiguan, and Haguan are introduced.

Liguan

Liguan had more difficulty than Mingguan and Naguan to obtain itsenvironmental license. The owner, Miao, had successively established two Liguanrestaurants, which shared the same characteristics in terms of location, scale, andcustomers. 331 The first Liguan was the first restaurant Miao had opened, andeverything was new to her. When she applied for the environmental license, theinspectors announced that they could not issue the license because the restaurant was25 meters from a river, and the regulations stated that it could be no closer than 30meters. However, Miao noticed that a nearby restaurant was located only 20 metersfrom the same river. When she asked the inspectors why that restaurant could operateso close to the river, the inspectors answered they (personally) had not approved thatlicense.

Subsequently, Miao obtained an environmental license by asking an acquaintancein the Sanitation Bureau for help. Through an acquaintance of this acquaintance, whoworked in the Environmental Bureau, she obtained a license. In this case, Liguan hadan environmental license, which one could claim showed compliance, but whentracing back the process of obtaining the license, it becomes clear that the restaurantengaged in fraudulent compliance. It did not satisfy the licensing conditions butobtained the license to show it was in compliance.

Furthermore, the environmental license at the new Liguan revealed anothercompliance issue. When Miao opened the new Liguan, she did so in another district,

331 Miao from Liguan had opened two restaurants. The first was successful and profitable, but she hadto close it after the area underwent reconstruction. She chose another site for her new restaurant inanother district. In this study, Liguan refers to both restaurants.

Appendix B Supplemental Cases276

which belonged to a different enforcement bureau. However, it was a restaurantbefore, and the former restaurant had the required opening licenses. With the lease,Miao received the old environmental license. According to the law, she should haveapplied for a new license, as ownership had changed, similar to the case of Ming atNaguan. Nevertheless, in light of her experiences at the first restaurant, she did notapply for a new license but invited some inspectors for dinner via an acquaintance.She said the enforcement in that district was not strict. The outcome was that she wasaccepted as being in compliance and experienced no trouble related to that license.This was fake compliance, as shown when examining the process. The environmentallicense Miao held for the second restaurant was not a genuine license issued toLiguan.

Moreover, Miao engaged in full compliance at the first restaurant and fakecompliance at the second when applying for the fire license. At the first Liguan, shewas asked to buy five fire extinguishers, which she did. Unlike at Naguan, theinspectors in this district came to verify in person that she had carried out theirinstructions. In her view, one fire extinguisher was too many if no fires broke out, butonce a fire broke out, any number of fire extinguishers would not be enough. At thesecond Liguan, she did not apply for a fire license and did not buy any fireextinguishers but invited the inspectors to a meal, as she did when applying for herenvironmental license. Although faced with the same legal requirements, Miaoengaged in completely different compliance behaviors. When she opened her firstrestaurant, she fully complied with fire license requirements and bought the requirednumber of fire extinguishers, but when she opened the second one, she had learned toplay games with legal requirements. If no inspectors questioned Liguan’s license, itdid not need to apply for a new one.

For the dish disinfection log, when inspectors told Miao to keep a log showinghow many bowls and chopsticks had been disinfected each day, she complied for amonth. However, when she realized the inspectors did not check the log, she stopped,and compliance became noncompliance.

These compliance behaviors described at Liguan show a learning process. In theprocess of responding to legal requirements, Miao learned the practical rules from herexperience of dealing with inspectors. The practical rules she learned guided herresponses in return. For example, despite following inspectors’ directions to completea disinfection log, after she learned that inspectors would not check it, she soonstopped complying with this requirement. As a result, compliance behavior turnedinto noncompliance behavior. When she learned inspectors would check the fireextinguishers before issuing a fire license, she bought the required number of fireextinguishers, but when she found out that inspectors in another district were not stricton this, she did not buy any fire extinguishers and engaged in dishonesty to escape theregulatory encounter. Previous compliance behaviors changed to fake compliancebehaviors. Additionally, she learned the practical rules from another restaurant’sexperience. Although she was told that opening a restaurant within 30 meters of theriverside was prohibited, she saw that another restaurant was located within thisdistance. This showed that the practical rule differed from what she was told. As a

Appendixes 277

result, she found a corrupt way to obtain the license, and compliance becamefraudulent compliance.

This learning process also embodies a process of contesting, where Miao’s beliefscontest with the legal requirements. For most legal requirements, Miao did not paymuch attention to the legal requirements per se, and her belief was not having belief inthose legal requirements. Her ideology did not align with the aims of the legalrequirements, such as food safety and concern for the environment. In other words,her belief is amoral and pragmatically oriented. She claimed, “I am just an ordinaryperson and have not studied in school. I do not know about the law things and do notknow whether it is rational or not. I just do what they asked.” Thus, her belief is, “I donot know what I should or should not do; I just do what the inspectors asked.”However, during the process in which she found out what the genuine regulationswere that she should follow in practice, she learned to circumvent legal requirementsthat were not strictly enforced. In this way, her beliefs competed with the law inclarifying what needed to be done and what did not need to be done.

From the perspective of motivational posture, Liguan showed manly capitulationand game playing. It accepted the regulatory authority as legitimate, and it wouldhave liked to do what it was asked, but in the process of learning practical rules, ittried to falsify those requirements and escape whatever it could manage to escape. Interms of management style, Liguan showed characteristics of laggards and reluctantcompliers. As a laggard, it actively escaped legal requirements whenever it saw theopportunity to do so. As a reluctant complier, it also showed the willingness tocomply with the legal requirements set out by inspectors, but only aimed to meet theminimum standards.

Weiguan

Weiguan was located in a “village in a town” in a suburban area. It did not haveany opening licenses and seemed to engage in noncompliance behaviors. However,when asked about the process of how the noncompliance behaviors took place, theowner explained that the restaurant actually complied with the norms the localenforcement department required. Inspectors from the local enforcement department,ICB, came to check Weiguan when it first opened. They asked Weiguan to pay 2,000RMB and said after that it did not need to apply for all the licenses. According to theowner, the inspectors said that if restaurant owners wanted to apply for openinglicenses, they simply applied. If they did not want to apply for opening licenses, theysimply needed to pay the 2,000 RMB fee. The owner thought,

They are the same person that I need to resort for if I want to apply openinglicenses. They will not give opening licenses to me if I apply. Since they said Ican run the restaurant by paying some fee and without opening licenses, I just paysome money and do not need to apply for those licenses. Restaurants in the wholestreet do not have opening licenses…

Later, the boss bargained with the inspectors and finally handed over 1,500 RMB.Subsequently, the restaurant was considered legitimate.

Appendix B Supplemental Cases278

According to the owner, inspectors said it was acceptable to open restaurantsthere, but it was impossible to obtain opening licenses. When asked why, the ownerstated that the inspectors did not explain why. When one considers the letter and thespirit of the laws that regulate restaurant behaviors, it is clear that Weiguan did notcomply with either. However, when considered from the oral requirements of theregulatory department, it could be argued that Weiguan complied with the law bynegotiating with inspectors. The regulatory department clearly knew it was impossiblefor restaurants to obtain opening licenses in that street for various reasons, yet itwanted to allow restaurants to operate there. Therefore, it created its own practicalrule for these restaurants, that is, to register with a fee. After paying the fee, Weiguanwas considered legitimate and in compliance. Although it did not comply with thegeneral laws that apply to ordinary restaurants, it complied with the specific practicalrule made by this specific regulatory department. This kind of compliance can be seenas a form of creative compliance.

In addition, this creative compliance behavior at Weiguan involved the learningand contesting processes. The owner of Weiguan actually knew about openinglicenses because one of his friends had a restaurant in the city and had those openinglicenses. Nevertheless, he also learned that restaurants in the same street did not haveopening licenses but paid the regulatory department. Consequently, when theinspectors told him he could apply for licenses or pay the fee, he quickly decided topay the fee. He learned to follow the practical rule that applied specifically in that areaand not to attempt to follow the general laws for restaurants. Furthermore, he learnedfrom other people’s experience to bargain with the inspector and finally discountedthe fee by 500 RMB.

The contesting process shares some similarities with that of Liguan, specificallythe belief that “I do not know about the law; I just did what they asked.” Thisargument justifies its response to the specific practical rule but not the general law forrestaurants. What is different is that the owner Weiguan restaurant believed thatrestaurants should have fire extinguishers. As a result, Weiguan bought two fireextinguishers although it was not required to do so. Considering this behavior fallsoutside the requirements of the specific practical rule in that area, it can be viewed asbeyond-compliance behavior.

While Naguan showed that the attitude of the regulated toward the regulatoryauthority and the law could differ, Weiguan showed that the legal requirements mightdiffer when dealing with a specific regulatory authority. From friends, Weiguan knewthe general legal requirements for restaurants, that is, to obtain various openinglicense; however, from the specific regulatory authority, it learned that it needed tofollow another kind of specific practical rule but not the general legal requirements. Interms of motivational posture toward the regulatory authority, it clearly showedcapitulation. It was inclined to follow inspectors’ directions, although they differedfrom what was known from friends. Again, the motivational posture of capitulationdoes not forecast positive compliance behaviors toward general laws for restaurants,but a kind of creative compliance behavior. This can be seen as an extreme case

Appendixes 279

where the practical rule enforced by the regulatory authority differs completely fromthe general laws it should enforce.

In addition to capitulation, Weiguan showed the motivational posture of gameplaying, as can be seen by negotiating the fee. What the regulatory authority requiredwas not respected as defining the limits of acceptable activity but was viewed assomething that could be molded to suit the restaurant’s purposes. Although it wasinclined to cooperate with the regulatory authority and followed its directions, at thesame time, it tried to manipulate the specific practical rule to minimize its cost ofcompliance. The two kinds of motivational postures were taken and changed in thecompliance process of learning the specific practical rule.

In terms of management style, Weiguan restaurant was a laggard regarding mostgeneral laws for restaurants, a reluctant complier regarding the specific practical rulesenforced by the specific regulatory authority, and a strategist regarding thefire-fighting law. The three kinds of management styles were adopted and alteredduring the contesting process. When it showed a motivation of capitulation toward thespecific regulatory authority and did not share the same beliefs as the general laws forrestaurants imply, it became a laggard. When it learned the specific practical rule,showed capitulation toward the authority and game playing toward the specificpractical rule, it became a reluctant complier. When it shared the beliefs implied in thefire-fighting law and bought fire extinguishers without enforcement, it became astrategist.

Haguan

Previously, Haguan used prepacked tableware, as was the case at Naguan.However, it stopped after a nearby TV station filmed a TV program in the restaurant.Customers were interviewed about their opinions of the prepacked tableware, andthey complained that the restaurant, not customers, should bear the costs of washingthe dishes. Subsequently, the owner stopped using prepacked tableware because of theTV program, the complaints, and the questionable cleanliness of the prepackedtableware.

Haguan restaurant tried to make its dishware acceptable for customers, and one ofits internal standards was dryness. It did not use a high-quality disinfection cabinetlike the one at Mingguan but partially dried the dishware with a cloth after washing it.The cloths were not disinfected every time before drying dishes. However, the ownerHaguan believed that wet dishes equated to dished that had not been disinfected. Theowner state, “Sometimes I eat outside [at another restaurant]. I will not use dishwarethat is wet. Why? If the dishware has been disinfected, [where does] the water come[from]?” As a result, she required servers to wipe the dishware after washing, eventhough items were not disinfected every time. According to the dishwasher, thedishware was disinfected with disinfection fluid at random interval. Nevertheless,disinfection was rare, as the researcher did not see this practiced once during thetwo-week observation period. Therefore, Haguan restaurant only partly complied withthe disinfection legal requirements.

Appendix B Supplemental Cases280

Handwashing was not regulated by internal rules at Haguan. According to theresearcher’s observations, servers would not wash their hands unless they were toooily, and every server had her own handwashing habits. When asked abouthandwashing, the manager and chef stated,

It is enough that workers wash their hands before starting doing their work [thismeans once in the morning and once in the afternoon when workers come towork]. It is impossible to wash hands every time you touch or scratch your bodyin the middle of doing kitchen work…Such small detail will not have any biginfluence. …In our village, people cook even without wash the vegetable, notmention about washing hands. The hands of the cook look almost black, but thecook grab some vegetable and throw into the pan to fry. However, people in ourvillage are healthier than people in the city. The most important is the big issuessuch as chemicals.

Consequently, Haguan did not comply with handwashing requirements.Examining compliance behavior at Haguan showed that learning and contesting

processes occurred. Haguan learned that prepacked dishware was unacceptable to itscustomers and consequently stopped using prepacked dishware, despite its benefits ofconvenience and profitability. It disinfected dishware occasionally with disinfectant,which led to partial compliance. From experience, it learned that one standard foridentifying disinfected dishware is dryness. As a result, to meet that standard, itensured that dishes were wiped after washing, as it did not disinfect its dishware witha heated disinfection cabinet. However, these actions did not truly comply withdisinfection legal norm. Moreover, contesting was present in the process, as themanager’s argument about handwashing shows.

Due to a lack of data about the interaction between Haguan and the regulatoryauthority, the restaurant’s motivational posture is unclear. In terms of managementstyle, it shows characteristics of both laggard and strategist. As laggard, it had anegative attitude toward the legal requirement of handwashing and engaged innoncompliance behavior. As a strategist, it voluntarily abandoned the use ofprepacked dishware to retain its customers and realize economic benefit, although theprepacked dishware was acceptable for meeting legal requirements. The restaurantlearned from customers’ responses that while using prepacked dishware wasconvenient, it might lose customers by doing so, which would influence its business.For the sake of the business, it preferred to give up the prepacked dishware despite notbeing required to do so by law. Nevertheless, abandoning the prepacked dishware didnot mean it was concerned about the disinfection promoted by the legal requirement.As its disinfection practices showed, it paid scant attention to disinfection. In addition,the restaurant’s belief about wet dishes indicating its ignorance regarding disinfection.As to handwashing, it strongly believed that this requirement was not necessary. Thisbelief competed with the legal requirement and result in noncompliance with therequirement.

Appendixes 281

Table A.1: Compliance Behaviors, Motivational Postures, and Management Styles inthe Three Restaurants

Restaurant BehaviorsTypes of

ComplianceMotivationalPosture

ManagementStyle

Liguan

Obtained environmentallicense at first restaurantbut did not satisfyrequirements

Fraudulent

Game playingLaggardReluctantcomplier

Invited inspectors fordinner and did not applyfor new license atsecond restaurant

Fake

Did not maintaindisinfection log

Noncompliance

Bought enough fireextinguishers andobtained fire license atfirst restaurant

Full Capitulation

Weiguan

Did not apply foropening license but paidfee to regulatoryauthority; negotiated 500RMB discount

CreativeCapitulation,Game playing

Laggard,Reluctantcomplier

Bought fireextinguishers despite noinstruction fromregulatory authority todo so

Beyond Strategist

Haguan

Give up packeddishware, disinfectdishware withdisinfectant occasionally

Partial Strategist

Did not havehandwashing rules andworkers did not alwayswash their hands

Noncompliance Laggard

Summary 283

Summary

Compliance Pluralism and Processes:

Understanding Compliance Behavior in Restaurants in China

Yunmei Wu

China faces major challenges in ensuring that its citizens and companies complywith its laws, despite its great efforts and achievements establishing an entirely newlegal system in the last 30 years. This calls for high-quality empirical work tounderstand the problems of compliance in China to identify solutions to thesechallenges. In addition, studying compliance in the Chinese context provides atremendous opportunity to add a non-Western case to the predominantly Westerncompliance literature. The present research aimed to address China’s compliancechallenges and seize the opportunity for further theoretical development. Thus, itsfirst aim was to provide an in-depth study of compliance in China by drawing on theexisting body of compliance research. Its second aim was to contribute to compliancetheory by offering a unique empirical study conducted in China’s unique context, witha novel ethnographic study approach that facilitates the understanding of the dynamicprocesses of compliance in a small business organization involving many differentlegal rules and changes throughout the business cycle. This new research approachwas developed to overcome the limitations of existing methods, especially in theChinese context. Nevertheless, it has several implications beyond China.

The research approach allows both an endogenous understanding of whatcompliance means for the key actors involved and an exogenous exploration of thefactors that influence compliance behavior, as well as a processual dynamicunderstanding of how compliance emerges, changes, and varies, and ultimately whatexplains the changes and variations. Instead of looking for steps (or processes)involved in moving from legal norms to final compliance, or the eveninstitutionalization of legal norms, which is the focus of the conventional processapproach, this dynamic approach seeks to understand how compliance changes in thebusiness cycle from the start-up phase to daily operations. It does not evaluatecompliance at one static point and analyze it statically but analyzes the developmentof compliance over time and attempts to understand it dynamically.

Furthermore, most existing compliance research focuses on one particular law,attempts to understand compliance by examining how regulated actors act regardingthat law, and characterizes regulated actors based on their performance on that singlelaw. However, the reality is that regulated actors have to deal with multiple laws intheir daily lives. In this view, compliance involves how regulated actors respond to a

Summary284

combination of different and often diverging legal rules that seek to shape theirbehaviors. Based on such understanding, this research attempted to offer an integratedview of compliance true to how it is experienced by the regulated actors.

With those research aims, compliance was studied in one type of business setting,restaurants. Thus, how restaurants responded to relevant legal rules and regulations(including food safety, occupational health, environmental protection, fire safety,business registration, and taxation) was studied. The research answers three mainresearch questions:1. How do selected restaurants respond to relevant regulatory rules, and what

variation is there in their responses to different types of such rules and at differentpoints in time in their business cycles?

2. What factors influence the variation in compliance behavior identified throughquestion 1?

3. What new insights do the answers to questions 1 and 2 provide for generalcompliance research in China and abroad—practically, methodologically, andtheoretically?

To answer these questions, compliance was viewed as an interaction between legalnorms and organizational and individual behavior, and compliance was seen to existwhen the behavior aligned with the law. The first question focuses on behavior and ondescribing the behavioral response to legal norms that occurred in restaurants. Thesecond question focuses on explaining these behaviors in terms of why there isvariation in responses to legal rules in these restaurants and what factors influence theemergence and evolution of compliance.

An in-depth qualitative methodology, which consists of a combination ofparticipant observation, in-depth semi-structured interviews, and document collection,was employed. Participant observation was the most significant data collectionmethod. The researcher was permitted to work as a server in two core restaurants,where she conducted participant observation for six weeks in each setting. She gaineda vivid understanding of the real-life context of restaurants’ compliance behaviors andestablished relationships based on trust with the interviewees.

To describe compliance behaviors and capture their complexity as much aspossible, the diverse cases sampling technique was used to select cases. This allowedmaximum variances along relevant dimensions to emerge. Two dimensions, size andcost of consumption, were used to identify diverse cases in the pilot study, but afterdeveloping a deeper understanding of restaurants, more nuanced dimensions, such asthe owners’ ideology of operating restaurants, attitudes toward regulators, andapparent compliance behaviors, were found to be more relevant dimensions foridentifying diverse cases. In addition, the researcher considered the most diverserestaurants that would allow the deepest level of study and where she would gain atruly comprehensive understanding of all the research questions. Besides the two corerestaurants, data was included from four other restaurants studied in less depth to addcomplementary information and dimensions.

The main body of thesis is presented in two parts. Part A, which aims to answerthe first research question, deals with compliance behaviors. The approach of

Summary 285

descriptive analysis of compliance behaviors used later is described based on a reviewof the literature on existing compliance approaches in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 and 4detail the two contrasting restaurant cases and illustrate how compliance was studiedin this research through descriptions of compliance behaviors that occurred andchanged from the start-up phase to daily operation.

Chapter 3 tells the story of a health-oriented and idealistic restaurant, Mingguan.This restaurant intended to provide healthy and environmentally friendly food, and themain owner was highly educated, idealistic, and morally concerned about food safety.Mingguan had a strong intention to comply with the law it encountered, but itscompliance behaviors ultimately were complex. These behaviors included full,beyond, creative, partial, attempted, skeptical, formal, fraudulent, conflictive, andfake compliance, as well as noncompliance. Regardless of the complexity,compliance behaviors at Mingguan showed an overall commitment to the law.

Attempts to characterize Mingguan’s compliance behavior, existingclassifications fell short. On the one hand, classifications related to how regulatedactors comply, such as Braithwaite’s motivational postures and Kagan et al.’smanagement styles, showed the most positive classifications of commitment andcapitulation, as well as true believer and committed complier. Yet these classificationsdo not fit the restaurant’s behavior, which was mixed and included negativecompliance, which conflicted with what characterization in terms of the motivationalpostures and management styles predicted.

Chapter 4 deals with Naguan, which aimed to provide tasty and affordable foodwhile maximizing profits. The owner’s knowledge was based on experience, and hewas pragmatic and rarely concerned with morals. Naguan’s compliance generallyfocused only on profit maximization, which led to instances of symbolic, fake,fraudulent, and forced compliance, as well as noncompliance. However, it alsoengaged in compliance with some legal norms at certain points.

Naguan showed a complex combination of motivational postures, including gameplaying, capitulation, disengagement, and resistance. Different motivational postureswere even expressed regarding the same regulatory requirements and the same typesof compliance behaviors, for example those governed by the FDA. As to managementstyle, Naguan was a combination of laggard and strategist, which have divergentranks in terms of managerial commitment to regulatory requirements. A laggardcomplies only to avoid costly enforcement actions, while a strategist compliesstrategically and proactively. Theoretically, the strategist has greater commitment toand a more positive attitude toward legal requirements than the laggard does. Hence, alaggard combined with a strategist found in this research calls for further examination.

Chapter 5 offers a short conclusion for Part A, moving beyond the two corerestaurants and drawing out some broader implications from the variations incompliance behavior found in restaurants and the proposed novel approach used. Forthis analysis, compliance information from three other restaurants was included.Implications identified in this chapter include compliance pluralism, complianceprocesses, characterizing the compliance subject, and several methodologicalimplications.

Summary286

Compliance pluralism captures the complexity and fluidity of compliance foundin the restaurants studied. The concept refers to the many rules, concrete behaviorstoward each legal norm, and time points during the processes of responding to legalnorms that constitutes compliance. Compliance in one restaurant might have differedbetween different legal norms and concrete behaviors, and for even one legal norm,may have changed over time. Moreover, it was understood differently from theperspectives of different actors.

The compliance processes described in the two core restaurants clearly show twokinds of processes: clarifying processes (or learning processes) and contestingprocesses. The two processes share some similarities with other processes proposedby previous scholars using the processual approach, but some significant differencesalso were identified. During the clarification or learning process, the regulated actorattempts to clarify what compliance is expected and verify with the regulator whatcompliance entails. This process has not been the focus in preexisting complianceprocess studies. During the contesting process, the regulated actor contrasts its ownvalues and interests with the legal norms. This is thus different from the negotiationprocess previously discussed by compliance process scholars, as the negotiationprocess focuses on the negotiations between regulated actors and regulators.

Furthermore, in this chapter, conclusions are drawn about the characterization ofthe regulated actors. The previous classifications of the regulated actors that this studyhas drawn on, motivational postures and management styles, assume that theregulated have the same attitudes and postures toward legal norms and regulatoryauthority, and partly classify the regulated actors based on that assumption. However,this research revealed that restaurants may have different attitudes and posturestoward legal norms and regulatory authorities, and that this should be consideredwhen classifying the regulated.

Part B answers the second research question, that is, what explains thecompliance behaviors? The explanation falls into three levels: regulatory,organizational, and individual levels. Factors in each level are addressed in thesubsequent chapters, with one chapter dedicated to each level.

Chapter 6 focuses on factors at the regulatory level and on how laws arrive at therestaurant through interaction between the regulator and so-called regulatory receptors,that is, the restaurant owner or top manager. More specifically, it focuses onrestaurants’ comprehensive legal knowledge formation. Comprehensive legalknowledge consists of two kinds of knowledge: doctrinal legal knowledge and legalpractice knowledge. The two kinds of knowledge may be different and becomedissonant in terms of showing the regulated actors what “the law” is with which theyneed to comply. Doctrinal legal knowledge and legal practice knowledge influenceeach other and form the comprehensive legal knowledge from which the regulatedactors identify what the law is.

There was limited doctrinal legal knowledge but abundant legal practiceknowledge in restaurants. The comprehensive legal knowledge in restaurants haddeviated from the original written law that attempted to regulate the restaurants.Consequently, their comprehensive legal knowledge pointed to a different direction of

Summary 287

compliance rather than the compliance direction to which the original written lawpoints. Restaurants’ compliance behaviors are situated in their comprehensive legalknowledge. Variation in restaurants’ compliance behaviors reflected the variations oftheir comprehensive legal knowledge. When such comprehensive legal knowledgechanged, compliance behavior changed as well.

Chapter 7 offers a discussion of the organizational influences on compliancebehaviors and specifically focuses on how legal norms are activated by or how theycompete with other norms in an organization. In this analysis, restaurants were treatedas being composed of people at all levels, including employees and employers orowners, instead of as a single entity. To reach the very employees targeted by certainlegal norms, the law must be transmitted within the restaurant internally, and it ismediated, either activated by or competing with, by organizational norms that guideemployees’ behavior at the same time.

In this study, three forms of organizational norms—managerial, injunctive, anddescriptive norms—were analyzed. Several organizational norms relevant to legalnorms and compliance in each restaurant were identified, and the interaction betweenthose organizational norms and legal norms, as well as how organizational normsinfluence compliance, was analyzed. Some organizational norms activate and promotecertain legally required behaviors. Simultaneously, some organizational normscompete with legal norms in reducing the reasonability of legal norms, rationalizingthe low possibility of meeting the legal requirements, reducing the responsibility ofensuring the goal of legal norms, impeding the enforcement of legal norms, andoveremphasizing one side of behaviors the law requires but dismissing the other sideof behaviors that violates the law.

Moreover, organizational and legal norms interact with each other, and theyshape employees’ behaviors and influence compliance during the process ofsocialization, specifically during the management process. Thus, organizationalsocialization and management processes were discussed, and how they shape theformation of different organizational norms and mediate the function of legal normsand influence compliance was examined. Several key aspects are discussed here,including the owners’ preferences and personal beliefs or norms, organizationalstructure, the capacity for internal monitoring, the size of the organization, and thecharacteristics of employees and customers.

Chapter 8 focused on what shapes compliance behavior at the individual level bydiscussing the regulated actors’ subjective explanations for their compliancebehaviors and by analyzing variables suggested in the existing literature as keyindividual compliance variables, including plural subjective deterrence, personalnorms, descriptive norms, perceived obligation to obey the law, practical constraints,and recognition of legal requirements. To allow for analysis at this level, compliancebehaviors in this chapter were coded into a dichotomy of compliance and violation incontrast to the complexity of classifying compliance in previous chapters.

Plural subjective deterrence was the most common reason mentioned in thesubjective explanations for both compliance behaviors and violation behaviors. Thesecond important reason raised by interviewees was personal norms. Operational

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benefit and recognition of legal requirements were the next most common reasonsmentioned to explain compliance behaviors, while practical constraints, descriptivenorms, not being responsible for compliance, and recognition of legal requirementswere the next most common reasons mentioned to explain violation behaviors. Notbeing responsible for compliance is a new factor raised in this research. It refers to theregulated actors not seeing themselves as responsible for compliance behavior.

Variable association analysis identified descriptive norms, personal norms, andplural subjective deterrence as the variables most significantly associated withcompliance behaviors. Perceived obligation to obey the law was overwhelminglynegative and not obviously associated with compliance behaviors. Practicalconstraints were negatively associated with compliance behaviors, as predicted.Individuals’ recognition of the legal requirement in terms of whether they know it islaw was overwhelmingly negative and did not show association with compliancebehaviors.

Some general implications are discussed in the concluding chapter, Chapter 9,which answers the last research question. An integrated model to study compliance isproposed. First, in this model, knowing legal norms is not a necessary preconditionfor compliance. Second, legal knowledge is considered in a broader sense and calledcomprehensive legal knowledge, which is composed of doctrinal legal knowledge andlegal practice knowledge and is the result of interaction between the two kinds ofknowledge. Third, compliance behaviors, instead of legal norms, are taken as thestarting point for compliance research. Researchers should note that compliancebehaviors are responses to “the law” the regulated actors perceive subjectively, ortheir comprehensive legal knowledge, which may differ from doctrinal law ordoctrinal legal knowledge. Consequently, understanding how this “perceived law” isformed and knowing what the “perceived law” is are crucial for understanding andpredicting compliance behaviors. Fourth, if the regulated actors are organizations, onemust understand how organizational norms transmit and compete with legal norms.Organizational members’ compliance behaviors are shaped by the combination oflegal norms and organizational norms through organizational socialization andmanagement processes. Fifth, the processes are interrelated at three levels. Processesat regulatory level and organizational level influence and are influenced by variablesat individual level. All variables functioning in or produced by regulatory andorganizational processes come together at individual level and produce the finalcompliance behaviors. For instance, the plural subjective deterrence and descriptivenorms that function at individual level are directly linked to “what the law is” in theperception of the regulated actors, and they are the vital outcome of regulatory andorganizational processes. Personal norms underline the entire process ofcomprehensive legal knowledge formation at regulatory level and keep conflictingwith final comprehensive legal knowledge if they deviate from what comprehensivelegal knowledge considers proper.

In addition to the integrated model for studying compliance, implications arediscussed for other aspects of compliance study, such as implications aboutcompliance at different times in the business life cycle (start-up versus regular

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operation), about compliance pluralism, for the process approach in complianceresearch, of comprehensive legal knowledge formation, and of differentiation betweenenforcement agency and legal norms. Furthermore, methodological implications arereviewed. Some new insights about how to address China’s compliance challenge arealso addressed at the end of the thesis.

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Samenvatting

Nalevingspluralisme en -processen:

Inzichten in nalevingsgedrag in restaurants in China

Yunmei Wu

Ondanks het feit dat China er dankzij grote inspanning in geslaagd is om in delaatste 30 jaar een geheel nieuw rechtssysteem op te bouwen, wordt Chinageconfronteerd met grote uitdagingen bij het waarborgen van rechtsnaleving van haarburgers en bedrijven. Empirisch werk van hoge kwaliteit is nodig om denalevingsproblematiek in China te begrijpen en zo ideeën te ontwikkelen om dezeuitdagingen het hoofd te bieden. Bestudering van naleving in Chinese context biedtbovendien een zeer goede mogelijkheid om een niet-Westerse casus toe te voegen aande overheersend Westerse literatuur over naleving. In dit onderzoek wordt China'suitdaging op het gebied van naleving bestudeerd en tegelijkertijd van de mogelijkheidgebruik gemaakt om tot verdere theoretische ontwikkeling over naleving te komen.Het eerste doel van dit onderzoek is zodoende om een gedegen bestudering te biedenvan naleving in China op basis van bestaande literatuur op het gebied vannalevingsonderzoek. Het tweede doel is om een bijdrage te leveren aannalevingstheorie door een unieke empirische studie te bieden vanuit China's uniekecontext. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van een nieuwe etnografische methodologiedie het mogelijk maakt een inzicht te krijgen in de dynamische nalevingsprocessenbinnen kleine bedrijfsorganisaties waar veel verschillende juridische regels enveranderingen tijdens de bedrijfsvoeringscyclus zijn. Deze nieuwe benadering vanonderzoek is ontwikkeld om de beperkingen van bestaande onderzoeksmethoden teoverstijgen, in het bijzonder in de Chinese context. Desalniettemin heeft het ookmeerdere bredere contextuele implicaties.

De gebruikte benadering zorgt voor een endogeen begrip van wat naleving voorde betrokken actoren betekent, een exogene onderzoeking van de factoren dienalevingsgedrag beïnvloeden, alsook voor een procesmatig dynamisch begrip van hoenaleving tot stand komt, verandert en varieert, en uiteindelijk wat deze veranderingenen variaties kan verklaren. In plaats van te zoeken naar stappen (of processen) die vanjuridische normen leiden tot uiteindelijke naleving of zelfs institutionalisering vanjuridische normen, zoals gedaan wordt in de conventionele procesbenadering, wordtmet deze dynamische benadering gepoogd te begrijpen hoe naleving verandert

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gedurende de bedrijfsvoeringscyclus, van het opstarten van een bedrijf tot en met dedagelijkse bedrijfsvoering. Naleving wordt niet op één enkel moment of statischgeanalyseerd, maar in plaats daarvan wordt de ontwikkeling van nalevinggeanalyseerd en gepoogd naleving in dynamische zin te begrijpen.

Bovendien wordt bij de meeste bestaande nalevingsonderzoeken wordt op éénspecifieke wet gefocust en wordt geprobeerd naleving te begrijpen door te kijken hoeeen gereguleerde actor zich gedraagt naar aanleiding van die specifieke wet.Gereguleerde actoren worden vervolgens gekarakteriseerd op basis van hun handelenmet betrekking tot die enkele wet. Echter, in de realiteit van het dagelijks levenmoeten gereguleerde actoren rekening houden met meerdere wetten. Vanuit ditperspectief gaat het erom hoe gereguleerde actoren reageren op een combinatie vanverschillende en veelal uiteenlopende juridische regels die bedoeld zijn om hungedrag te beïnvloeden. Op basis van dergelijk begrip wordt met dit onderzoekgeprobeerd een holistisch perspectief op naleving te bieden dat nauwer aansluit bij debeleving van de gereguleerde actoren.

Bij dit onderzoek zijn de eerdergenoemde onderzoeksdoelen in één soortbedrijfsmatige omgeving onderzocht: het restaurant. Er is bestudeerd hoe er bijrestaurants gereageerd wordt op relevante juridische regels en regelgeving (inclusiefvoedselveiligheid, arbeidsomstandigheden, milieubescherming, brandveiligheid,bedrijfsregistratie en belasting). Op basis hiervan zijn hier de volgende driehoofdonderzoeksvragen beantwoord:

1. Hoe reageren de geselecteerde restaurants op verschillende relevanteregelgeving en wat voor variatie is er in hun reactie op verschillenderegelgeving op verschillende momenten in hun bedrijfsvoeringscyclus?

2. Welke factoren beïnvloeden de variatie in nalevingsgedrag die gevonden is invraag 1?

3. Welke nieuwe inzichten bieden die antwoorden op de voorgaande twee vragenvoor algemeen nalevingsonderzoek in China en elders in de wereld, inpraktisch, methodologisch en theoretisch opzicht?

Om deze vragen te beantwoorden, is in dit onderzoek naleving beschouwd als eeninteractie tussen juridische normen, organisatorisch en individueel gedrag. Er wordtgesproken van naleving als het gedrag overeenstemt met de wetgeving. De eerstevraag is gericht op gedrag en op de beschrijving van het gedrag in de restaurants inreactie op juridische normen. De tweede vraag is gericht op het verklaren van dezegedragingen: Waarom is er variatie in de reacties op juridische normen in dezerestaurants en welke factoren beïnvloeden totstandkoming en verandering vannaleving?

Voor dit onderzoek is gebruik gemaakt van een diepgaande kwalitatievemethodologie bestaande uit een combinatie van participant-observatie, diepgaandesemigestructureerde interviews en documentatie verzameling. Participant-observatiewas hierbij de belangrijkste methode van dataverzameling. De onderzoekster kreegtoestemming om als serveerster in twee “kernrestaurants” te werken en verrichtte zoparticipant-observatie gedurende een periode van zes weken per restaurant. Op dezemanier ontwikkelde ze een levendig begrip van de wezenlijke context van

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nalevingsgedrag in deze restaurants en bouwde ze een vertrouwensrelatie op met degeïnterviewden.

Om nalevingsgedrag te beschrijven en de complexiteit ervan zoveel mogelijkweer te geven werd de steekproeftechniek van diverse casussen gebruikt om diegevallen te selecteren die de grootste verscheidenheid op de belangrijkste dimensieszouden weergeven. Bij de pilot studie werden twee dimensies – de mate en kosten vanconsumptie – gebruikt om zeer diverse casussen te identificeren. Echter, toen deonderzoekster eenmaal meer kennis over restaurants ontwikkeld had, bleken meergenuanceerde dimensies, zoals de heersende ideologie binnen de restaurants, dehouding ten opzichte van de wetgever en duidelijk nalevingsgedrag, relevanter om deverscheidenheid weer te geven. Verder koos de onderzoekster voor de meestverscheiden restaurants waar de meest diepgaande studie uitgevoerd kon worden,zodat een allesomvattend antwoord op de onderzoeksvragen gevonden kon worden.Naast de twee kernrestaurants werden ook onderzoeksgegevens van vier andererestaurants ingewonnen, die minder diepgaand onderzocht werden, maar diedesondanks aanvullende informatie en dimensies toevoegden aan dit onderzoek.

De kern van dit proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd in twee delen, m.u.v. deintroductie en de conclusie, resp. hoofdstuk één en negen: Deel A gaat overnalevingsgedrag. Hierin wordt het antwoord op de eerste onderzoeksvraag behandeld.

In hoofdstuk twee wordt de beschrijvende analyse van nalevingsgedrag, zoalsdeze verderop gebruikt wordt, beschreven aan de hand van een literatuuroverzicht vanbestaande benaderingen om naleving te bestuderen. Hoofdstuk drie en vier gaan in opde twee contrasterende restaurant casussen en illustreren hoe naleving in ditonderzoek bestudeerd werd door nalevingsgedrag en de veranderingen erin tebeschrijven vanaf de opstartfase tot en met later, in de dagelijkse praktijk.

Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft restaurant Mingguan, een gezondheidsgericht,idealistisch ingestoken restaurant: In dit restaurant werd geprobeerd gezond enmilieuvriendelijk voedsel aan te bieden. De baas was hoog opgeleid, idealistisch enmoreel bezorgd over voedselveiligheid. Bij Mingguan probeerde men om de wettenwaar ze mee in aanraking kwamen, na te leven, maar desondanks bleek hetnalevingsgedrag er complex. Soms was er sprake van volledig nalevingsgedrag, somsging men zelfs verder dan pure naleving, en soms was er sprake van creatievenaleving of van gedeeltelijke of gepoogde, sceptische, frauduleuze, conflicterende,nep- of van geen naleving. Ongeacht de complexiteit, was er qua nalevingsgedrag bijMingguan gemiddeld sprake van een algemene inzet tot naleving.

Bij pogingen om het nalevingsgedrag bij Mingguan te classificeren, bleekgeen van de bestaande classificaties toereikend. Aan de ene kant worden binnenclassificaties zoals Valerie Braithwaite's motiveringshoudingen en Kagen et al.'smanagementstijlen de meeste positieve classificaties van inzet en overgave getoond,de ware gelover en de gecommitteerde “nalever”. Toch sloten deze classificaties nietaan bij het waargenomen nalevingsgedrag bij dit restaurant, waarbij het veel meer omeen mix bleek te gaan, inclusief negatieve naleving. En deze negatieve naleving wasstrijdig met de voorspellingen die volgden uit classificaties zoals demotiveringshoudingen en managementstijlen.

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Hoofdstuk vier beschrijft restaurant Naguan, een restaurant dat erop gerichtwas smaakvol en betaalbaar te zijn, maar welke tegelijkertijd ook opwinstoptimalisatie gericht was. De baas was ervaringsgeschoold, pragmatisch enbekommerde zich zelden om moraliteit. Bij Naguan was naleving gemiddeld gerichtop winstoptimalisatie en dat leidde in sommige gevallen tot symbolische, nep- en/offrauduleuze naleving, in andere gevallen tot gedwongen naleving en soms totniet-naleving. Toch werden sommige juridische regels op sommige momenten welnageleefd.

Bij dit restaurant bleek sprake van een complexe combinatie vanmotiveringshoudingen, zoals het spelen van spelletjes, overgave, onverschilligheid enzelfs weerstand. De verschillende motiveringshoudingen deden zich zelfs ten opzichtevan één enkele wettelijke vereiste en hetzelfde soort nalevingsgedrag voor, zoalsbijvoorbeeld met betrekking tot de Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit. Qua managementstijlwas er sprake van een combinatie van de stijlen van treuzelaar en strateeg, welkegedacht worden zich op verschillende niveaus te bevinden quamanagementtoewijding aan regelgeving. Een treuzelaar leeft de regels alleen maar naom de kostbare consequenties van handhavingsacties te vermijden, terwijl eenstrateeg de regels strategisch en proactief naleeft. In theorie zou de strateeg meertoewijding moeten hebben en een positievere houding ten opzichte van de juridischeeisen moeten hebben dan de treuzelaar. Daarom vraagt de combinatie tussentreuzelaar en strateeg, zoals bij dit onderzoek naar voren kwam, om verderebestudering.

Hoofdstuk vijf is een korte conclusie van deel A, waarbij naast de bredereimplicaties van de variaties in nalevingsgedrag zoals gevonden bij deze restaurants,ook de implicaties van de nieuwe, gebruikte onderzoeksbenadering geschetst worden.In deze analyse wordt naast de informatie van de twee kernrestaurants ook informatiegeïncludeerd over naleving bij drie andere restaurants. De in dit hoofdstuk geschetsteimplicaties betreffen die van pluralisme in naleving, nalevingsprocessen,karakterisering van het nalevingsonderwerp en verschillende onderzoeksimplicaties.“Pluralisme in naleving” betreft de complexiteit, veelvormigheid en veranderlijkheidvan naleving in de bestudeerde restaurants. Dit concept betreft naleving bestaande uitde vele regels en de vele concrete gedragingen ten opzichte van elke juridisch normen de verschillende momenten gedurende het proces waarmee op juridische normenwordt gereageerd. Nalevingsgedrag bij één en hetzelfde restaurant bleek te kunnenwisselen bij verschillende juridische normen en concrete gedragingen konden zelfs bijdezelfde juridische norm nog na verloop van tijd veranderen. Bovendien werd eenjuridische norm vanuit het perspectief van verschillende actoren verschillendbegrepen.

De nalevingsprocessen zoals beschreven naar aanleiding van de bestuderingvan de twee kernrestaurants, tonen duidelijk twee soorten processen: verhelderendeprocessen (oftewel leerprocessen) en tegenstrijdigheidsprocessen. Deze tweeprocessen tonen enkele gelijkenissen met de andere processen zoals beschreven dooreerdere schrijvers die de processuele benadering gebruiken. Er zijn echter ook groteverschillen. Gedurende het verhelderings- of leerproces probeert de gereguleerde

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helder te krijgen wat voor naleving er wordt verwacht en probeert hij/zij met deregelgever te verifiëren wat de naleving exact inhoudt. Dit proces is niet aandachtigbestudeerd in voorgaande studies naar het nalevingsproces. Gedurende hettegenstrijdigheidsproces contrasteert de gereguleerde actor de eigen waarden enbelangen met de juridische normen. Dit is dus iets anders dan hetonderhandelingsproces wat voorheen besproken is door andere auteurs die denalevingsprocesbenadering beschreven, omdat die benadering focust op deonderhandeling tussen de gereguleerde actor en de handhavende partij.

Verder worden in dit hoofdstuk conclusies getrokken over de karakteriseringvan de gereguleerde actoren. Bij de eerdere classificaties van gereguleerde actorenwaar deze studie op voortbouwt, zoals de motiveringshoudingen enmanagementstijlen, wordt aangenomen dat de gereguleerde actoren dezelfde houdinghebben ten aanzien van verschillende juridische normen en gezaghebbende instantiesen zo worden zij deels op basis hiervan geclassificeerd. Uit dit onderzoek blijkt echterdat er binnen een restaurants verschillende houdingen kunnen bestaan ten aanzien vanverschillende juridische normen en handhavingsinstanties en dat die verschillenmeegewogen dienen te worden bij de classificatie van gereguleerde actoren.

In Deel B wordt antwoord gegeven op de tweede onderzoeksvraag naar hoe denalevingsgedragingen verklaard kunnen worden. De verklaring wordt opgesplitst indrie niveaus: regelgevings-, organisationeel en individueel niveau. Per hoofdstukwordt één niveau beschreven en in elk hoofdstuk worden factoren op elk niveaubeschreven.

In hoofdstuk zes worden factoren op regelgevingsniveau besproken en wordtbekeken hoe een wet ontvangen wordt in een restaurant na een interactie tussen deregelgever en de zogenaamde “regelgevingsontvangers”, in dit geval de restauranteigenaar of de hoogste manager. Om precies te zijn, wordt de nadruk gelegd op demanier waarop binnen een restaurant uitgebreide juridische kennisvorming plaatsvindt.Uitgebreide juridische kennis bestaat uit twee soorten kennis: kennis van de juridischeleer en juridisch praktische kennis. Deze twee soorten kennis kunnen verschillen enkunnen tegenstrijdig worden wanneer het gaat om duidelijkheid voor de gereguleerdeactor over wat “de wet” is. Kennis van de juridische leer en praktisch juridischekennis beïnvloeden elkaar en vormen zo samen de uitgebreide juridische kennis opbasis waarvan gereguleerde actoren “de wet kennen”.

Bij de restaurants bleek er sprake van zeer beperkte kennis van de juridischeleer en overvloedige praktisch juridische kennis. De uitgebreide juridische kennisbleek af te wijken van de oorspronkelijke geschreven wet waarmee de restaurantsgereguleerd dienden te worden. Als gevolg daarvan leidde de uitgebreide juridischekennis tot een andere richting van naleving dan de richting waar de oorspronkelijkegeschreven wet op aanstuurde. De nalevingsgedragingen binnen restaurants volgdende daar aanwezige uitgebreide juridische kennis. Variaties in nalevingsgedragingenbij de restaurants weerspiegelden de variaties van hun uitgebreide juridische kennis.Wanneer de uitgebreide juridische kennis veranderde, veranderde ook hetnalevingsgedrag.

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In hoofdstuk zeven worden de organisationele invloeden op nalevingsgedragbesproken en wordt specifiek de nadruk gelegd op de manier waarop juridischenormen worden versterkt of verzwakt door andere normen binnen de organisatie. Inde analyse werden de restaurants niet als een enkele eenheid gezien, maar juist alsbestaand uit mensen op verschillende niveaus, inclusief de werknemers en dewerkgever of eigenaar. Om precies de werknemers te bereiken waar sommigejuridische normen op gericht zijn, moet de wet binnen het restaurant gecommuniceerdworden. Die communicatie wordt tegelijkertijd beïnvloed (hetzij met een versterkende,hetzij met een verzwakkende werking) door de organisationele normen die hetwerknemersgedrag sturen.

Drie vormen van organisationele normen werden geanalyseerd:managementnormen, injunctieve normen en descriptieve normen. Verschillendeorganisationele normen werden geïdentificeerd die relevant waren voor juridischenormen en naleving bij elk restaurant. Verder werd de interactie tussen dieorganisationele normen en juridische normen geanalyseerd, alsook de manier waaroporganisationele normen nalevingsgedrag beïnvloeden. Sommige organisationelenormen activeren en bevorderen bepaald wettelijk vereist gedrag. Tegelijkertijd zijnsommige organisationele normen tegenstrijdig met juridische normen doordat zebijvoorbeeld de redelijkheid van juridische normen verminderen of de lage kans datwettelijke vereisten bereikt worden rationaliseren, of doordat ze het gevoel vanverantwoordelijkheid verminderen om het doel van juridische norm te bereiken, ofdoordat ze de handhaving van juridische normen tegenwerken, of een door de wetvereiste gedraging overmatig benadrukken terwijl andere gedragingen die dezelfdewet breken genegeerd worden.

Organisationele en juridische normen interacteren en ze vormen het gedragvan werknemers en beïnvloeden naleving tijdens het proces van socialisatie enspecifiek tijdens het managementproces. Kortom, organisationele socialisatie enmanagementprocessen worden besproken en er wordt gekeken hoe deze twee devorming van verschillende organisationele normen beïnvloeden. Bovendien wordtgekeken hoe organisationele socialisatie en managementprocessen het functionerenvan juridische normen en uiteindelijk naleving beïnvloeden. Verschillende belangrijkeaspecten worden besproken, waaronder de voorkeuren van de eigenaren, hunpersoonlijke overtuigingen en normen, de organisatiestructuur, de capaciteit totcontrole van interne naleving, de grootte van de organisatie, en de eigenschappen vanwerknemers en klanten.

In hoofdstuk acht wordt aandacht geschonken aan wat nalevingsgedrag opindividueel niveau vormt. Dit wordt gedaan aan de hand van subjectieve verklaringenvan de gereguleerde actoren voor hun nalevingsgedrag. Ook wordt dit gedaan aan dehand van de volgende belangrijke individuele nalevingsvariabelen uit de bestaandeliteratuur, waaronder meervoudige subjectieve afschrikking, persoonlijke normen,descriptieve normen, de ervaren verplichting om de wet na te leven, praktischebeperkingen en herkenning van juridische eisen. In tegenstelling tot de complexeclassificatie van naleving zoals besproken in de voorgaande hoofdstukken, is om

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analyse te op dit niveau mogelijk te maken, hier gekozen voor een dichotomecodering van nalevingsgedragingen in naleving en schending.

Meervoudige subjectieve afschrikking bleek de meest genoemde reden in desubjectieve verklaring voor zowel nalevings- en schendingsgedragingen. Persoonlijkenormen bleek de tweede belangrijke reden genoemd door de ondervraagden.Operationeel voordeel en herkenning van juridische eisen waren de daaropvolgendemeest gangbare redenen als verklaring voor nalevingsgedrag, terwijl praktischebeperkingen, descriptieve normen, gebrek aan aansprakelijkheid en herkenning vanjuridische eisen vervolgens de meest gangbare redenen waren voor regelschending.“Gebrek aan aansprakelijkheid” was een nieuwe factor die naar voren kwam in ditonderzoek en deze houdt in dat actoren zichzelf niet verantwoordelijk achten voornalevingsgedrag.

Een variable association analysis liet zien dat descriptieve normen,persoonlijke normen en meervoudige subjectieve afschrikking het sterkst geassocieerdwaren met nalevingsgedrag. De ervaren verplichting om de wet te volgen bleekoverweldigend negatief en bleek verder niet vanzelfsprekend geassocieerd metnalevingsgedrag. Praktische beperkingen waren zoals voorspeld negatief geassocieerdmet nalevingsgedrag. De herkenning van juridische eisen van individuen (qua of menwist dat iets de wet was) was overweldigend negatief en toonde geen associatie metnalevingsgedragingen.

Tot slot worden in hoofdstuk 9 een aantal algemene implicaties besproken. Indit hoofdstuk wordt de laatste onderzoeksvraag beantwoord. Een geïntegreerd modelter bestudering van naleving wordt voorgesteld. Ten eerste is in dit model het kennenvan de juridische normen geen noodzakelijke vereiste voor naleving. Ten tweedewordt juridische kennis in een bredere zin beschouwd. Dit wordt volledige juridischekennis genoemd welke bestaat uit kennis van de juridische leer en praktischejuridische kennis en welke het resultaat is van de interactie tussen deze twee soortenkennis. Ten derde worden nalevingsgedragingen in plaats van juridische normen alsbeginpunt genomen voor onderzoek naar nalevingsgedrag. Onderzoekers zoudenmoeten opmerken dat nalevingsgedragingen reacties zijn op “de wet” die degereguleerde actoren subjectief waarnemen of op hun uitgebreide juridische kennis(welke kan afwijken van de wettelijke grondbeginselen of kennis van de juridischeleer). Als gevolg hiervan zijn het weten van wat de “waargenomen wetten” zijn enhoe deze tot stand komen, cruciaal om nalevingsgedrag te begrijpen en voorspellen.Ten vierde, is het belangrijk om te weten hoe organisationele normen overgedragenworden en juridische normen tegenwerken, indien de gereguleerde actorenorganisaties betreffen. Nalevingsgedragingen van mensen binnen een organisatieworden gevormd door een combinatie van juridische normen en organisationelenormen aan de hand van organisationele socialisatie en managementprocessen. Tenvijfde zijn de processen op deze drie niveaus onderling samenhangend. Processen ophet regelgevingsniveau en het organisationele niveau beïnvloeden en wordenbeïnvloed door variabelen op het individuele niveau. Alle variabelen die functionerenop, of worden geproduceerd door, regelgevings- en organisatieprocessen, vallensamen op het individuele niveau om het uiteindelijke nalevingsgedrag te produceren.

Samenvatting298

Bijvoorbeeld de meervoudige subjectieve afschrikking en descriptieve normen die ophet individuele niveau spelen, zijn direct verbonden met “wat de wet is” in debeleving van de gereguleerde actoren en zijn cruciaal voor het resultaat van deregelgevings- en organisatieprocessen. Persoonlijke normen onderstrepen het totaleproces van uitgebreide kennisvorming op het regelgevingsniveau en deze blijvenconflicteren met de uiteindelijke uitgebreide juridische kennis als ze afwijken van watop basis van eerdere uitgebreide juridische kennis betamelijk gezien wordt.

Naast het geïntegreerde model om naleving te bestuderen, worden ook deimplicaties besproken voor andere aspecten van de bestudering van naleving, zoalsimplicaties voor naleving tijdens de verschillende momenten in debedrijfsvoeringcyclus (opstartfase versus reguliere bedrijfsvoering), voornalevingspluralisme, voor de procesbenadering in het nalevingsonderzoek, vooruitgebreide juridische kennisvorming, en voor differentiatie tussen de werkzaamheidvan handhaving en juridische normen. Verder worden methodologische implicatiesbesproken. Tot slot worden ook enkele nieuwe inzichten besproken met betrekking tothoe China’s uitdaging op het gebied van naleving aangepakt kan worden.