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A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes in Corporate and Public ManagementAuthor(s): F. Neil BradyReviewed work(s):Source: Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 23-30Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25071468 .

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A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes

in Corporate and Public Management F. Neil Brady

ABSTRACT. Thegrowing

awareness that corporate and

public policy forming processes areintensively utilitarian

has provokeda variety of criticism. The procedural dif

ficulties of utilitarianism are well known; less well

known butpotentially

moredevastating

is a set of

chargesthat utilitarian

policy processes intrude upon

important relationshipsand societal processes. This

paper defends utilitarian methodsagainst these

charges.

More specifically, two criticisms aresingled

out for

examination. The first is the claim that utilitarian policy

processes systematicallydiscriminate

againstthe

rights

of non-human life and suppress any feelings of sympathyor

obligationhumans

mighthave for animals or

plants.

The second is the argument that utilitarianism ultimatelycircumvents considerations of process which are essential

for the development of individual and societal identity.Given these criticisms, the goal of this paper is to

defend the role of utilitariantechniques

in corporate and

public policy processes againstsuch

charges.

Classically,the functions of the human

facultyof reason have been divided into two realms,

roughly reflecting the means-ends distinction

(Kant, 1985; Whitehead, 1929). One function of

reason was to chooseappropriate

human ends,

the other to select the means forachieving

what

everpurposes one

may have. Kant's (1785) dis

tinction between thecategorical

and hypotheticaluses of reason is

typicalof the classical position.

Accordingto this view, however, the two

functions of reason were notequally regarded.

F. Neil Brady is Assistant Professor of Managementat

the College of Business Administration, San Diego

State University. He is the author of 'Feeling and

Understanding: A Moral Psychology for Public

Servants', Public Administration Quarterly 7, and

'Ethical Theory for the Public Administrator: The

Management of Competing Interests', American

Review of Public Administration 15, pp. 119?126.

Traditionally,the

objective function of reason

(to choose proper ends) heldpriority

over the

subjective function and reflected the common

assumption that carefulthinking produced

objective truths?

especiallyin ethics. Max

Horkheimer (1947) describes some of its uses

below:

This view asserted the existence of reason as a force

not only in the individual mind but also in the

objective world? in relations among human beings

and between social classes, in social institutions, and

in nature and its manifestations... Thedegree

of

reason-ableness of a man's life could be determined

according to its harmony with this totality... The

theoryof

objectivereason did not focus on the co

ordination of behavior and aim, but onconcepts

?

howevermythological they

sound to ustoday

?on

the idea of the greatest good,on the

problemof

humandestiny,

and on the way of realization of

ultimategoals.

So, the classical view of the human

facultyof

reasonplaced great trust in its promise

to

providea 'center

point'from which the

proprietyof individual

preferences could be assessed.

The twentieth century industrialized world,

however, seems to have lost confidence in

reason's claim toobjectivity, according

to Hork

heimer. Hisdiagnosis for recurring

western crises

of nihilism anddespair

incapitalism points

to

the pervasive mistrust of reason toclarify

human

ends and theresulting preoccupation with the

utilitarian calculation ofpersonal preferences.

Daniel Bell reaffirms this view when he writes,

"There is no center; there areonly peripheries'

(1976, p. 104). Scott and Hart (1973, p. 419)also echo this concern when

theywrite:

"One of the distinctive features of oursociety

is its

goallessness.More than one observer of western

Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985) 23-30. 0167-4544/85/0041-0023*01.20.

? 1985

by

D. Reidel Publishing Company.



24 F. Neil Brady

culture has noted the ceaseless busynessof its

people,

questingfor better and better means to achieve

instrumental ends... It is assumed that ultimate

ends will take care of themselves, and they tend to

be taken forgranted."

Therefore, thelargest question

is whether the

subjectivefunction of reason as found in the

predominantlyutilitarian or instrumental pro

cesses of the administrative worldexcessively

distorts life, as Horkheimer and others suggest.

Despite its great difficultythe need to resolve

the issue leaves thethoughtful

administrator

withsignificant philosophical

discomfort. Are

utilitarian techniques fundamentally flawed,

biased, or distorted? Does one servesociety

well

whomerely manages resources in the service of

unexamined wants, withoutconsidering

whether

things (especially preferences) should be any dif

ferent from what in factthey

now are? The link

of corporate andpublic policy

with utilitarian

theoryis

virtually axiomatic, with little or no

recognition givento

objective goalsor

philo

sophical purpose. At the same time, itsprocedures

have beenseverely

criticized and are well-known

topolicy analysts (Maclntyre, 1977; Tribe 1972;

Tribe, 1974). Such

problems

will notgo away,

but willcontinually

serve tokeep

makers of

policy firmly if uncomfortably immersed in

the fluidreality

of human wants and needs. Yet,

the focus of this paper goes beyond these well

known procedural difficulties to defend

utilitarian policy-analytic techniques against

chargesof

alleged distortion to human nature

inherent in its use. Ifprocedures

have flaws, that

is one matter; but if a method intrudes upon

essentialrelationships

or modifies important

social processes, that is

quite

another.

Therefore, althoughthis paper cannot

respondto Horkheimer's

largeassertions head

on, it does respondto two

specific charges made

against utilitarian processes in the world of cor

porate andpublic policy making.

The first is the

claim that utilitarianpolicy processes system

aticallydiscriminate against the

rightsof non

human life and suppress any feelingsof sym

pathyor

obligationhumans might feel for

animals orplants.

The second is the argument

thatutilitarianism

circumventsconsiderations

of

process which are essential to the development

of individual and societal identity.This paper hopes

to show that from aphilo

sophical pointof view utilitarian

policy-analytic

techniques'hold their own'

againstcertain

powerful and specific complaints. In that

event, themonkey

is placedon the back of

those who are so critical of thepredominantly

utilitarian nature ofpolicy processes

to show

what theobjective

function of reason and add

topolicy processes beyond

the presentcon

tribution of utilitarian techniques.

Utilitariantheory

and homocentrism

Even if the widely recognized procedural diffi

culties ofapplying

utilitariantheory

to decision

makingin

publicand corporate policy

were

overcome, it does not follow that aperfected

techniquewhich encompasses all manifestations

of human preferencewill prove satisfactory.

Laurence Tribe (1974) hasargued

that utilitarian

techniquesin the law and in

public policy sys

tematical suppress certain kinds of values

which expresssome individuals' concern for

naturalobjects

and non-human life. That is,

utilitarianism as asystem of

publicdecision

makingtends to

suppress the expressionof

sympathyand other felt

obligationstoward

animal life and, instead, distorts thosefeelings

by translating them into mereexpressions of

human interest. Any obligationsor

feelingsof

intrinsic worth, apart from human self-interest,

arecomparatively unimportant

in thepolicy

game.*

Every year, business leaders andpublic

executives, for

example,

face issues where

someargue that the

'rights'of

higheranimal

life or that one's initialsympathies

for the

intrinsic worth of aneco-system take priority

overcountervailing

human interests.Whaling,

forexample,

is animportant Japanese industry

which could beseverely

hurt if the general

obligationtoward the whale were felt to super

sede the first order interests of millions of

Japanese whodirectly

orindirectly

benefit from

the traditional whaleindustry. Unfortunately,

Tribeargues,

thesystem

in which such issues are



ADefense of Utilitarian Policy

Processes 25

debated is a utilitarian one. As a result, any felt

obilgationsor

sympathiesfor whale life are

under great pressureto be translated into the

languagewherein such issues are

currently

processed. Thus, what wasinitially

agenuine

selfless stance is reduced to an argument playing

onlyto the motive of human self-interest: future

generations will not be able toexperience whales,

science will lose theopportunity

tostudy

and

learn from asignificant mammalian species,

etc.

Theinadequacy

of'planting' plastic

shrubs

alongour

highwaysas the aesthetic equivalent

toliving species

or ofreplacing

the Parthenon

piece-by-piecewith material

designedto with

stand the corrosive effects of twentieth century

pollution testifyto the claim that the utilitarian

satisfaction of human aesthetic preferences is

somehow not the whole storyto these

public

policyissues.

Historically,utilitarian

analytic

techniques have had difficulty taking seriously

any interests other thanirreducibly

human ones.

Ironically, however, even those who feel most

stronglythe kinds of values suppressed by

utilitarianpolicy procedures may be further

legitimatingthe distortion inherent in the game

by consentingto

play:

[The environmentalist] may be helping to legitimatea

system of discourse which so structures human

thoughtand

feelingas to erode, over the

long run,

the very sense of obligation which provided the initial

impetus for his ownprotective efforts. (Tribe, 1974,

p. 1221)

So, there issomething

about currentpolicy

analytic techniques,if Tribe is

right,which dis

courages theadoption

of positions thatappeal

tofeelings

andobligations which transcend mere

human self-interest.

This conclusion, however, is both useful and

flawed inimportant ways. It is useful in

illuminatingthe kinds of distortions that occur

inpublic policy analytic processes, but it is

flawed inattributing

themwholly

to utilitarian

causes and insupposing

the distortions to

consistonly

inneglecting

non-human interests.

Rather, the following discussion will show how

such distortions arise not from theapplication

of utilitariantheory per

se but from the

strategies

of social choice.

For the defender of the utilitarian faith, the

crucial issue iswhether utilitarianpolicy-forming

processes systematicallydiscriminate against

'higherorder' human sentiments, merely

because

they sympathetically represent inferred interests

of non-human life.The

historyof the

developmentof utilitarian

theory appears to allow room for the 'higher

order'sympathies.

Eventhough

the originating

expression of utilitariantheory

in Bentham's

(1789) work waspurely hedonistic, Mill's

(1859) arguments seemedsuccessfully

to allow

for even the most idealistic form of human

preferencein the utilitarian scheme.

Nevertheless, the distortion Tribe calls our

attention to does exist, but it has been induced

not so much by utilitarian theory. Rather, social

choice strategies have been anticipated by

persons who understand thecompetitively

democratic nature ofpolicy-making,

whether

corporateor

public.In

theory, utilitarianpolicy-forming

institu

tionshope

to elicit first order preferences from

those involved. However, humanbeings

are also

reflective beingswhich assess

prospects, anti

cipate outcomes, and make tactical (andnot

necessarily personal) preferences.In other

words, as Tribe and others havecorrectly shown,

the traditionalpolicy-making system, corporate

andpublic,

cannot control the translation of

personal preferenceinto tactical

preference.If

this distortion isalways

to be regardedas a

degradation of human sentiment, then Tribe's

concerns would be ontarget. What Tribe fails to

see is that the kinds of distortion which occur

work both ways?

both to thepossible degrada

tion of sentiment as well as to theenhancing

of

motive.

As for the latter alternative, consider the case

of a 'malicious whaler' whose primary motive

is to cause whales pain, but whoopenly defends

thehunting

of whalesby appealing

to more

widely acceptedreasons: the industry

creates

jobs,it

supplies products needed in the market

place,etc. Here, it is not the utilitarian nature of

apolicy process that distorts one's true motives,

it is the awareness of what kinds of argumentsseem to have wider

appealto those who solicit

one's

preferences. Further,consider the



26 F. Neil Brady

arguments commonlyused to

justifya collection

of industries of doubtful social utility. The

production and distribution ofpornographic

material, forexample,

isjustified by appeal

to

itsalleged

status as an art form, byits influence

in liberalizing outmoded attitudes toward sex, or

byits social function to

challengestate censor

ship and control.

The list could be made muchlonger, but the

insight that emerges is therecognition

that both

corporate andpublic policy

can transform even

the lowest of humanpreference

intoexpressed

preferencesmore

acceptableto

policy-makingcontexts. Whereas Tribe

insightfully argues that

policy-analytic techniquescan suppress

expressions of'higher' sentiments, as the above

examples show, it may also be true that expres

sions of the 'lower' forms of humanpreference

are alsosuppressed. Sympathy

fordisappearing

whales may reduce topotential experiential

losses for future generations, but base appetitescan likewise be

publicallytransformed into

literaryor artistic freedoms. Whether

ultimatelyeither initial feeling ('high'

or 'low') isdissipated

byits transformed

public expressionis an

open

question, but it is notmerely

aquestion any

more of the utilitariandegradation

ofhigher

human sentiments.

In short, utilitarianpolicy processes do not

have a selective impacton

'higher order'

preferences only. Theimpact does occur, but it

issymmetrical;

both'higher'

and 'lower'

preferences get washed out in favor of

preferencesmore

openlyand

widelyheld.

Thistendency

of utilitarian processesto wash

out the extremepositions and

clingto middle

ground is also illustratedby

the reduced atten

tion

given

to issues which are

temporally

removed

from the present. Whenpolicy

isbeing made for

present problems, preferencesare

stronger; but

when the issue is situated in the pastor the

future, it seems to attract less attention.Thinking

of the past, consider theplight of those citizens

of the desert southwest who areseeking

com

pensation for deaths and injuries resultingfrom

radiation fallout from theabove-ground nuclear

tests of the 1950s. Or consider the attempts to

securecompensation

for the Japanese victims of

internmentduring

World War II. If such incidents

occurredtoday, presumably public sympathy

would be far stronger, but it is at leastplausible

tosuppose that

simplytoo much water has

passed under thebridge

to make easy such

attemptsto reform

public policy. Similarly,with

respect to corporate policy, businesses seem to

show little interest in historical relations. Tradi

tion means less than innovation, andprecedent

less thanperformance.

Sympathies representing future developmentsare

similarly impotentin utilitarian discussions.

A present oil crisis seems far moreimportant

than one facedby

future generations. Likewise,

the domination of the presentover future

interests in corporate policyis also easy

to see.

The emphasison short-term over

long-term goals

is a well-known weakness of American corporate

strategy.

In short, there is a kind ofmyopia

that occurs

in both corporate andpublic processes, but it is

a narrowness of vision whichdiscourages

the

expression of extreme orunpopular preferences

and solicits, instead, moderate, current, or

commonpreferences. That is, expressions of

preferenceat the

periphery get washed out, not

just selected preferences such assympathies for

whales. Furthermore, even if this were true,

nothingthat Tribe has said can

convincinglyconnect this flaw to utilitarian

procedures perse. Utilitarian

theoryin principle allows for

theweighing

of allpreferences

?'high'

or

'low', retrospectiveor

prospective. Andalthough

policy processes do seem to undervalueperiph

eral interests, such aphenomenon may be due as

much to human socialization, forexample,

as to

agiven decision-making procedure.

Utilitariantheory and the circumvention of

process

A second criticism of utilitariantheory applied

inpolicy making objects

to its circumvention of

aprocess valuable to

society,viz. the constitutive

orvalue-forming process. Marx, for

example,

objectsto utilitarianism from the perspective of

a social reformer. For him, utilitarian methods

promotea static

society:



A Defense of Utilitarian PolicyProcesses 27

... the theoryof utility [changes]

... into a mere

apologyof what exists; into a demonstration that

under theexisting

conditions the present relations

amongmen are the most

advantageousand in the

generalinterest. It has this character in all the recent

economists. (Bottomore, 1956, p. 166)

That is, utilitarian ethicsonly inquires after the

strengthof current values; it does not

promote

their review orchange.

Of course, Marx's interest inpromoting

societal dynamismis motivated

bya sense of

direction: adynamic society

is arevolutionary

societywhich will, in the long run, promote the

classical Marxist ideals. On the other hand, one's

interest in societaldynamism

need not be

instrumental; awareness and self-criticism can be

prizedfor their own sake, regardless

of the out

come. Morespecifically,

the process in which a

society chooses what it will value is one in which

the society continuouslyconstitutes itself; and

contrasted with asystem of runaway technology,

forexample,

where societal values are in part

determinedby

the forward momentum of

technological development,a

society which con

tinuallyor

periodicallystudies the

implications

oftechnological development

for its well-being

'chooses itself'. It may doso

incrementally andwithout

lofty vision, but all that isimportant

is that society takes itsdevelopment

into its own

hands.

Laurence Tribe (1972) has argued that the

utilitarian system oftechnology

assessment

institutionalized in the United States often

results in the circumvention of the kind of

process essential for thedevelopment

of the

higher forms of humanrationality

and for the

promotion ofdemocracy.

That is, standard

utilitarian assessment techniques are outcomeoriented:

they collapsewhat

mightotherwise

be ahealthy

review ofpublic values into a

speedy judgment regardingthe comparative

merit ofpossible

outcomes.

'In most areas of human endeavor?

fromperforming

asymphony

toorchestrating

asociety

?the processes

and rules that constitute theenterprise

and define the

rolesplayed by

itsparticipants

matterquite apart

from any identifiable 'end state' that is ultimately

produced. Indeed, in manycases it is the processes

itself that matters most to those who take part in it.

By focusing all but exclusivelyon how to optimize

someexternally

defined end state, policy-analytic

methods distortthought,

and sometimes action, to

whatever extentprocess makes

? orought

to make?

anindependent difference. (Tribe, 1973, p. 631)

Thus, thefundamentally

utilitarian nature of

technologyassessment may distort or abbreviate

animportant societal process simply

in order to

obtain closure on an issue.

Another way to describe the phenomenon

involves seeing technologyassessment

procedures

as a scientific method. In terms of scientific

ideals, nomeasuring technique should have an

effect upon the item it seeks to measure. Yet, if

Tribe is correct, utilitarian assessment tech

niquesdo distort the nature of the

phenomenon

they inquire after, principally byvirtue of the

fact thatthey ignore

thetruly

societal nature of

policy processes in the course ofsampling

personal preferences.Daniel Bell is getting

at

the sameproblem

when he writes that

"utilitarianism neglectsthe

realityof structures

thatnecessarily

stand outside individuals".

(1976, p. 257)

Nevertheless, despairover the

proprietyof

utilitarian techniques for societal processes may

be premature. There are at least two reasons for

supposingthe criticism of utilitarianism outlined

above to be overstated.

The first is related to the corporate experience

with utilitarianpolicy-making.

Itsimply

is not

clear that thetraditionally

utilitarian character

of corporate decision-making stifles the more

constitutive orvalue-choosing functions of

reason. Indeed, the decision-making phaseof

weighing preferencesat least causes executives

to consider the comparative strengths of cor

porate values, if not absolutestrengths.

A

company, forexample,

which iswrestling

with

the issue of expansionof facilities must review

the comparative strengthsof several

goals:the

short-term interests of stockholders, thelong

term survival andgrowth

interests of the cor

poration, public image, the sacrificingof alter

native uses of thecapital,

etc. Such discussions

can be vigorous. Just because utilitarian methods

press for outcomes does notrequire that the



A Defense of Utilitarian Policy Processes 29

tariantechniques

to defend the status quo,one

might conclude that the alternative to utilitarian

rationality,viz. constitutive

thinking,could have

posedan even

greater obstacle to societal

dynamism!The contribution of the constitutive

function of rationality is discovery ? the iden

tification of values orprinciples

which sustain

themselves over time and lend permanenceto

individual identity. The danger lies in attributingmore

permanenceor absoluteness to the products

of constitutivethought

than is consistent with

changingtimes

?the result being institutionalized

dogmaand a form of 'constitutive

rationality'

which nolonger

constitutes but merelyre

affirms.

It seems fair to conclude, then, that Marx

would have beenunhappy

with too much

societalstability,

whether it were due topolicies

derived from the utilitarian inertia of present

preferential relations amongmen or to the

privileged status of historical ideology. Both

instrumental and constitutive forms ofrationality

can be carried to extremes; but there isnothing

about theapplication

of utilitarian techniquesto

the process ofpolicy-formation

that theoretical

ly requires societal stagnationor abdication of

self-formativeresponsibilities.

The successful

management of societies as well ascorporations

mustrely upon an uncomfortable

balancingof

instrumental and constitutiverationality

?of

operatingin an

ambiguous realm of notknowing

fully what should be achieved nor how it should

be achieved?

of the counterposition of incre

mentalpolicy

formulation with 'fell swoop'

analysis.Even

though thetraditionally 'closed' nature

of much ofpublic and corporate policy-making

in the United States is not so 'closed' as some

would have us believe, there is reason to suppose

that'opening' the

policy processes would lead to

its own set of difficulties. One suchproblem

is

the escalation ofpreference.

Anexample might

show how 'open' processesrun the risk of

provoking momentary expressionsof

preference

which do not reflectlong-term

interests. Con

sider the phenomenonof the public

auction and

open biddingon some stained glass

windows

from an old church which is being demolished

for future development of the site. The essential

difference between open and closed bidding is

the fear of distortedjudgment.

That is, the

intensely competitivenature of an

open process

mightcause a bidder to inflate one's sense of

value of theglass windows beyond

one's initial

judgments in quieter moments. In this sort of

circumstance, it isprecisely

the inflation of

perceived value which ispromoted by

the 'open

ness' of the process, which candelight

holders of

propertyto be auctioned but which can result in

regret for successful bidders when cool reflec

tionagain replaces

thefrenzy

of the moment.

So, whereas 'closed'policy processes may be

accused of certainshortcomings, 'opening'

policy processes falls short in its ownways by

'fanningthe fires' and causing preferences

to

betemporarily

inflated.

The question 'What is the trueintensity

of

preference?'is not an

easy questionto answer.

It isplausible

to suppose that at least in some

cases one would find rueful bidders to comment,

'Ijust

wasn'tmyself;

I lost control for amoment;

Ireally

didn't want it that much', etc. The result

is a distorted assessment of individualpreference

and thevolatility

of the notion ofpersonality,

so far aspersonal identity depends upon the

stabilityof one's

preferences.Similar

problemsoccur in the area of

public

policy formation, as well. Perceiving the power

ofpublic

servants to be anobject

ofcompetition,

thousands ofpolitical

action groups each year

vigorously plead their cases beforecity adminis

trators, county commisioners, legislators, and a

widevariety of

public officials. To suppose

under these conditions that somesimple

measure of theintensity of expressed preferences

would provide reliable informationregarding

real wants and needs is naive.Instead,

in an

effort to resist the atmosphere of an auction,

administratorsregularly

makejudgments regard

ing reasonable wants and tryto avoid

being

unduly influenced eitherby

the extravagant

claims of those who are overrepresented

or the

muffled cries of theunder-represented.

The important pointto notice is that in

public, corporate, and individualpolicy issues,

opening the utilitarian assessmentprocedures

to

promote constitutive processes couldbuy

an

increase in involvement and public participation



30 F. Neil Brady

and commitment with a decrease incertainty.

Indeed, perhaps the epitome of openness in

competitive utilitarian contexts isadvertising,

where combative marketing strategies result in

confused orduped customers, self-deceived

salespersons, and a general degradation of the

notion ofpersonal preference.

Conclusion

For acentury, philosophers, policy-makers,

and

administrators have been aware of theprocedural

shortcomingsof utilitarian theory,

whether

appliedin ethics, cost-benefit analysis, policy

science, or in neo-traditional economics. Human

preferencesare often 'soft', incommensurable,

and indistinct, while the pursuit of alternatives

for choice isambiguous, complex,

and inex

haustible. Even so, humanbeings

do act on

preference,do make judgments

ofpreference

among alternatives, and often do sofreely, being

unrestrainedby principle, precept,

or even

public opinion? as when

choosing toppings for

an ice-cream sundae.

The concerns of this paper generallyrun

much

deeper

than the well-known

proceduralshortcomings

of utilitarianism. Some writers

haveargued

that even if themerely procedural

difficulties could be overcome and the basic

techniques perfected,a set of distortions to

human nature are incurred with the institution

of utilitarian policy-analytic techniques.This

paper has focused on two suchalleged

distortions

and has tried to defend the traditionalpolicy

making techniques againstthose

charges.In the

end, there may benothing

morewrong with

utilitarianapproaches

topolicy-making

than

what isalready

reflected in human nature.

Surely,instrumental reasoning

can be overused

to the neglect of the constitutive orobjective

functions of reason. Horkheimerultimately may

be correct in his assessment of the character of

twentieth century rationality.At the same time,

in cases where reason has yetto rule on law and

principle, preferencerules the

day;and short of

theunlikely

scenario in which every preference

comes under the rule ofprinciple (What

a dull

world that would be!), utilitarian processes

remain democratic, fair, reasonably non-intrusive,

and free.

References

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