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HISTORICALCOLLECTION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 October 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahonDeputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT Report

1. Enclosed is a report. or conveniceof reference by NFIB agencies, the codewordhas been assigned to the product of certain extremely sensi-tive a _et s_our_ces of CIA's Directorate of 0 erations. Theword is classified and is to beused only among persons authorized to read and handle thismaterial.

2. This report must be handled in accordance withestablished security procedures. It may not be reproducedfor any purpose. Requests for extra copies of this reportor for utilization of any part of this report in any otherform should be addressed to the originating office.

John N.McMahon

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Distribution:

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for IntelligenceDepartment of the Army

The Assistant Chief of Staff, IntelligenceUS Air Force

Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland/ Warsaw Pact

DATE OF DATE 20 October 1978INFO. 1974

SUBJECT

Exercise "LATO-74"--a Nuclear War Scenario

SOURCE Documentary

SUMMARY:

This report is a translation of a Polish documententitled "Qritique of Exercise LATO-74" and classifiedSECRET. The repot includes critiques by General JARUZELSKI,Minister of Defense, and Major General SIWICKI, Chief of theGeneral Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. The purpose ofthe exercise was to test commands and staffs of the army,front, and defense ministry level on mobilization andoperational deployment of front forces under conditions ofconventional and nuclear war, with focus on offensiveoperations in Central Europe. Two situation maps are ofparticular interest; map 1 depicts more than 100 nuclearweapons strikes. Eorcomnarisannwith_ conventional warscenario, refer tol Special note is madeof the release and ignition of liquid fuels in the MainRiver to serve as a barrier for 5-6 hours duration.

END OF SUMMARY

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Ministry of National DefenseThe General Staff

SECRET

Critique of Exercise"Lato-74"

WarsawJuly 1974

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The Political-Military Scenario,Intentions of the Opposing Sides, and

Conduct of Exercise "Lato-74" Critique

By Major General Florian SIWICKI,Deputy Minister of National Defense,

Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces

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Within the framework of the training program of theMinistry of National Defense of the Polish Peoples Republicand the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces, an interallied ,exercise, under the direction of the Minister of NationalDefense, was conducted from 10 to 24 June 1974. The exercise,under the cryptonym "Lato-74", was a one-sided, bilevelfront (front-army) command post exercise using field communi-cations means, and its theme was: "Organization and Conductof Offensive Operations of a Front".

The principal objective of the exercise was to improvepreparedness of the participating command, taffs, andoperational grnupS of the central institutions of the Ministryof National Defense for efficient mobilization and operationaldeployment of front forces, and control over them duringcombat operations conducted under complex conditions ofconventional and nuclear war.

In addition, the exercise included testing and verificationof some of the solutions integrated into practical application,and deeper analysis of a number of objectives or theoriespertaining to:

- operations of peacetime commands and institutions ofthe armed forces in a situation of increasing threat of war;

- new vuidelines for delyinithe field cmmand systemof a front and army;

- method for planning operations on a new axis whilecontrolling forces in the process of their mobilizationexpansion;

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- employment of an air army in air operations in theWestern Theater of Military Operations;

- use of many captured operational documents written in -

foreign languages, and control of forces under conditions ofradioelectronic iamming and breakdowns in wire and radiora1ay communicati ons;

- replacement of human losses and material-technical,medical, and transportation support of combat operations ofa front based on the home front system.

In compliance with the decision of the Minister ofNational Defense a rather wide scope of studies, encompassingselected topics from the Ministry's program devoted toimprovement of the development of the armed forces, was alsocarried out during the exercise. In order to accomplishthis task, groups of officer specialists, including militaryscientists, were assigned to undertake.research work in thisfield. The studies encompassed mostly problems related tostructures of command elements, particularly on the frontlevel, and of some of their support units, from the -point ofview of searching for the best possible solutions ensuringuninterrupted transition of wartime strength, and analysisof factors for increasing their mobility and survivability.

An ex erimental e inte atin reconnaissance andradioelectronic warfare systems was conducte in order toverify theoretical principles pertaining to integration ofreconnaissance units with radioelectronic warfare, improvementof information dissemination and analysis, and most importantly--acceleration of dec' on ma ' sses pertaining to thecon uct of radioelectronic attacks. Studies in the field ofinformation science were also initiated and, of course, thetraditional personnel problems.

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Based on conclusions drawn from previous higher levelexercises and from experiences of the military districts andbranches of the armed forces, modified organizational-methodical guidelines were accepted for exercise "Lato-74".The substance of these guidelines was expressed in broaderdeployment of simu d eroups which represented a kind of afinal control eement of the participating staffs, and even \though they were at the disposal of the exercise directingstaff they simulated enemy operations on orders from theparticipating commanders who were the point of departure forworking out subsequent situations for the opposing sides.This method permitted mnre ralism _in the exercise, and atthe same time compelled the staffs to generate i n forthe subordinate tactical large units. We substantially-reduced-the number of umpires in the participating commands,and we assigned a group of umpires-specialists to observethe work of individual headquarters in subsequent episodesof the exercise. Work of the umpires organized in thismanner allowed comparison of evaluations, improvement oftheir objectivity, and preoccupied the participating teamsto a much lesser degree. Some of the umpires were assignedresearch tasks, and to a certain degree they combined theiractivities with the work of the research teams.

In order to deceive the reconnaissance organs of theNATO armed forces, our exercise was camouflaged by undertakingsdesignated by the cryptonym "OMEGA-74".

Exercise participants included:

- assigned central institutions of the Ministry ofNational Defense playing the role of command and staff ofthe 3d Western Front (command post, forward command post,quartermaster command post--at full strength);

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- operational groups of the Secretariat of the NationalDefense Committee, the Ministry of National Defense andother ministries working at points of contact with the armedforces;

- assigned teams of commands and staffs of militarydistricts playing the role of commands and staffs of combinedarms armies: The Pomeranian Military District--the 11thArmy; the Silesian Military District--the 12th Army; and theWarsaw Military District--the 13th Army (reduced to 60percent strength);

- command and staff of the Air Force playing the roleof command and staff of the 14th Air Army;

- assigned teams from the Northern Group of SovietForces playing the role of the 41st Army and the 46th FighterBomber Aviation Division;

- wartime staff of the Silesian Military District;

- command and staff of the 3d National Air DefenseCorps;

- forces and means of the experimental army regimentand of two divisional reconnaissance and radioelectronicwarfare battalions.

A total of 20,000 persons participated in the exercise.The exercise directing staff apparatus, including umpiresand simulating groups, numbered 456 persons. A total of3 %66 vehicles of various types, 102 aircraft and helicopters,and radi'os, radio relay stations, radars, and communicationsYans were used.

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A field communications system was organized for thee r drectin 'c and arti catin staffs, in which17 operational level and 5 tactical level communicationscenters and 14 official Soviet hi h frequency communications ?centers were deployed. A total o 10 kilometers of radiotrunk lines and 980 kilometers of cable lines were established.

The relevant operations of the front were played out onthe Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis in difficult, wooded-mountainous and urban terrain. However. the participatincommands, staffs and units, actually deployed and conductedoperations in t e central an western part of Poland, in anarea of approximately 130,000 square kilometers.

The- Political-Military Scenario

It was assumed that the process of a deterioratinginternational situation began in the first months of 1974.The contributing factors were disagreements mounting amongthe capitalist countries, creating an atmosphere of prolifer-ation of conflicts in the South American, Asian and Europeancountries. In the Near East, Israel provokes a series ofmilitary incidents. Then, jointly with the United States,o es militar o erations intendin tq yil-p n ut. Balancing on the brinkof war, the United States resumes_armed interve4-o .theIndochiness-Peninsula. The Governments of the principalcapitalist countries are limiting democratic freedoms andare demanding that the socialist countries cease supportingforces fighting for social freedom and independence fromimperialism. This tense situation is intensified by theirresponsible policies of Chinese leadership circles which,on a broader scale than heretofore, provoke armed incidentson the borders with the USSR and Mongolia. In the GermanFederal_ Rpuhlic the right wing of the CDU-CSU parties,which come to power, hardens the policies toward the socialistcountries, and the revisionist and revanchist circles initiatediversionary-sabotage operations on the borders with theGerman Democratic Republic and the Socialist Republic ofCzechoslovakia.

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Faced with the fiasco of political pressure, the NATOcountries resolve to achieve their goal by a military decision.On 4 June 1974 they secretly initiate a changeover of theirarmed forces from a peacetime to wartime footing. urder thepretext of exercise "Big Lift-74," they airlift strategicreserves from the United States and Great Britain to theGerman Federal Republic. Incidents in space and in the.

\I Atlantic Ocean, provoked by the United States against theUSSR, follow. Countries of the Warsaw Pact propose negotiations

in order to settle the growing issues. At the same time,they are strengthening their defenses in proportion to thegrowing threat. Within the framework of these developments,since 10 June, higher states of combat readiness are graduallyimplemented in the armed forces of the PPR, and under the

\,pretext--of exercise "Tarcza-74" ["Shield-74"] the dispositionof the operational forces is improved.

Plans of the Opposing Sides

Forces of the "West" intend to break away the GermanDemocratic Republic from the community of socialist countriesand--under favorable conditions--also other central Europeansocialist countries. With this goal in mind, they plan toinitiate offensive operations at 0500 hours on 19 June,

em ons,making their main attacks

Northern Army Group:

- Lueneburg, north of Berlin, south of Szczecin.

Central Army Group:

- Bamberg, north of Karl Marx Stadt, Spremberg;

- Amberg, north of Pilsen, north of Prague, Zgorzelec.

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Simultaneously, they plan an operational air dron onthe line of Odra-Nysa Rivers, in order to isolate the firststrategic echelon of the "East" forces from the flow offresh forces, and as much as possible, to contain the firstphase of operations within the territory of the GermanDemocratic Republic and partly Czechoslovakia. Within theframework of joint land-air operations of the NATO forces,they intend to defeat the "East" forces on the territory ofthe German Democratic Republic, and reach the western borderof Poland in 6-8 days.

In the event of an unfavorable turn of military operations,they plan to use nuclear weapons.

The "East" forces are determined to repulse everystrike of the "West" forces, then change over to the offensive,making their main effort in the Western Theater of MilitaryOperations on axes as follows:

1st Western Front:

- Goslar, Cologne, Brussels;

2d Western Front:

- Plzen, Straubing, south of Munich;

3d Western Front formed from the Armed Forces of thePolish Peoples Republic:

- Perleberg, Verden, Lingen, The Hague.

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Using forces of these three fronts, they plan to defeatthe forces of the Northern Army Group, the Central ArmyGroup, and the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces [NATO]operating jointly with them, and on the 6th or 7th day ofoperations, occupy the line Kolding-Ebsjerg-Ems River-Dortmund-west of Bonn-Koblenz-Frankfurt.

Then, by committing additional forces to battle, defeatenemy operational-strategic reserves, eliminate Denmark,Netherlands, and Belgium from. the war, and on the 12th to14th day of operations, reach the North Sea coastline andwestern and southern borders of the German Federal Republic.

* *

The exercise was divided into four stages:

In the first (initial) stage which began at 0800 hourson 10 June and continued for 7 days, we assumed that despitedeclarations of peace, the NATO countries were secretlybuilding up their war potential.

As-a result of secret mobilization measures, and initiationunder the pretext of exercise "Big Lift-74" of an air bridgeand amphibious lift of forces and equipment, the strength ofthe NATO armed forces in the Western Theater of MilitaryOperations increased by an additional 10 divisions, comparedwith their peacetime strength.

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During the exercise, consistent with developments ofthe political-military situation, permanent, intensifiedalert duty of operational groups was successively implementedat the basic commands of the armed forces, which performedan ongoing analysis and evaluation of the threat, and fulfilledessential tasks increasing national defense capability. At0100 hours on 12 June, the front and army forward commandpost system was deployed.

At 0800 hmirs on Id .Tunn a state of ,increased combatreadiness was declared, and army and front commanders wereordered to open their operational plans for further familiar-ization and updating. Faced with intensified airlifts ofUnited States strategic reserves to the German Federal

-Republ-i-c-, and their concentration in Bavaria and in theNurnberg area, the Supreme Commander of the Combined ArmedForces, in an operational directive, ordered the commanderof the 3d Western Front to prepare an operational plan for anew, Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis, under the cryptonym"Sudety", allowing however for an option of alternate actionbased on plan "Pomorze" or "Sudety". At the same time anoperational order was issued to the air force commander,defining participation of the 14th Air Army in coalition airoperations in the Western Theater of Military Operations.Anticipating the capability of the "West" forces to initiatemilitary operations, the General Staff under the cover of -exercise "Tarcza" began to improve the disposition of partof the front forces, movin them t ern areasPoland, thus ensuring the capability to change over to

'oTterr3ve operations on the northern-coastal or Dresden-Frankfurt axis.

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Simultaneously, the Planning Commission of the Councilof Ministers and the civilian miistries ean to renderservices in support o the armed forces within the frameworkof the estimated annual plan-71.

On 17 June we initiated the second phase of the exercise,assuming that: NATO forces, while employing a full arsenalof strategic deception means designed to weaken the alertnessand to exhaust the defensive system of the Warsaw Pactcountries, in fact began fulfillment of final preparationsfor aggression. The NATO armed forces, while continuing thelift of troops and equipment from the United States andGreat Britain--and conducting mobilization--increased theirbuildup in the Western Theater of Military Operations to 37

-divisions, 362 ground transporters for nuclear weapons, andapproximately 3,000 aircraft. In addition, under the pretextof exercise "Summertex", they initiated operational deploymentof ground forces along the eastern border of the GermanFederal Republic, attaining full readiness for initiatingmilitary actions at dawn on 19 June.

The Warsaw Pact forces, in possession of information onpreparations for an attack by NATO forces, increase combatreadiness of their armed forces and prepare to repulseaggression, consistent with the actual threat.

Within the framework of these undertakings, on l7 June,the front and army command system was deployed. By decidingto deplooy command posts sooner than in the past, we intendfor this system to attain early full combat readiness of theforces for the control of which the system was designated.The exercise fully verified the validity of the above guidelines,initiated during decision-making games of the command cadreof the armed forces.

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On 18 June as a result of an increased threat of war,a state of . comnbat readin w in all thearmed forces. Until that time, within the framework ofsecret mobilization, tactical large units and most of the

por unit e irst ope redeloyedand alert echelons were called up for the remainder,t us augmenting their authorized strength. The armed forcesattained overall 80 percent of their wartime strength. Thisundertaking allowed full deployment of front forces, exceptreserve divisions and replacement elements, prior to theoutbreak of hostilities.

At the same time mobilization was ordered, the GeneralStaff directed further improvement of operational dispositionof forces, while the commands and staffs of the front, the11th, 12th, and 13th armies, and also the 14th Air Army werepreparing operational plan "Sudety", and the 14th Air Armyin addition was preparing a plan for its forces to participatein the first air operation in the Western Theater of MilitaryOperations.

As a result of the dynamic work method at front headquarters,all subordinate commands began parallel work on the newoperational plan already by the end of the same day on whichthey received new missions.

The staff of the 41st Army assigned to the NorthernGroup of Soviet Forces, operating as a component of the 1stWestern Front, while planning on offensive-defensive operation,also organized cover for the border of the German DemocraticRepublic in its zone of operations.

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Radioelectronic warfare units, working within theframework of an experimentally formed system, actuallydeployed a shortwave radio reconnaissance system along thenorthwestern border of Poland and designated jamming meansfor alert duty, assigning them the mission to provideradioelectronic cover for forces of the 11th Army.

When the course of events, precipitated by actions ofNATO forces, created an irreversible situation and it becamenecessary to strengthen the left flank of the Polish forcesin the Western Theater of Military Operations, the GeneralStaff of the Polish Armed Forces, acting in compliance withthe decision of the Supreme Commander of the Combined ArmedForces, sent a message at 0400 hours on 19 June to the front-commander putting into effect plan "Sudety".

On 19 June at 0500 hours we began the 4-day, third stageof the exercise, the theme oi which was conduct of operationsunder conditions of conventional warfare.

We based the first phase of this stage--commitment of

the front to battle--on the assumed situation that: at 0500hours on 19 June, following mass strikes of the air forces,the forces of.the Northern and Central Army Groups, usingconventional weapons, changed over to offensive operationson axes according to plan. At 1100 hours on the same day,following an air preparation lasting approximately 3 hours,the 18th Airborne Corps, composed of an equivalent of threedivisions, landed on the line of the Odra-Nysa Rivers,captured most of the bridges and crossings and split theoperational grouping of the 3d Western.Front. In addition,the 101st Air Cavalry Division captured thieareas: Torgau,Riesa and Meissen, forming a second line which delayed theforces that were regrouping. The course of the borderbattle on the flanks of the theater, initially favorable tothe enemy, allowed him to carry the operations deep into theterritories of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakiaon the axes: Bremen-Perleberg, and Nurnberg-Prague.

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However, on the strategic central axis, the forces ofthe Northern Army Group and the Central Army Group lost theborder battle on their internal flanks and were forced toconduct delaying actions.

From the time of outbreak of hostilities, forces of the1st Western Front and the 2d Western Front were repulsingmass enemy strikes from the air and land. The air force,executing air operations anticipated in plans for the WesternTheater of Military Operations, inflicted heavy losses onthe enemy.....[Part of Text Missing]

The second phase of this stage encompassed deploymentfor ofiensive operations deep in the enemy defense, repulseof enemy-counterattacks, and commitment to battle of thesecond echelon of the front. We assumed that NATO forces(Northern Army Group andCentral Army Group) in the CentralEuropean Theater of Military Operations on the dawn of thefourth day of war, after committing to battle strategic-operational reserves, and still adhering to the use ofconventional weapons, were making efforts to reach theplanned objective of the campaign by coordinating operationswith the air landing on the Oder River which was continuouslyreinforced and strongly supported by air. The strategic-operational reserves committed on the northern coastal axisconsisted of the 2d Army Corps (Great Britain) and the 1stArmy Corps (Netherlands), totaling six divisions, and on theDresden-Frankfurt operational axis--the 3d Army Corps, theso-called supercorps (US), with a strength of five divisions.After about 24 hours of fighting--after the momentum of theNATO forces attack significantly slowed down as a result ofdetermined operations of the forces of the 1st Western Frontand the 3d Western Front, and when commitment to battleof-the closest of the approaching strategic reserves, consistingof four Soviet armies, clearly changed the ratio of forcesto the disadvantage of the "Western" forces--the enemydecided to employ nuclear weapons. In this Manner, at 0400hours on 23 June, we progressed to the fourth stage of theexercise, the substance of which was nuclear war.

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The Warsaw Pact forces, on the basis of unmistakablein i nthei possession that the enemy was re arinto use weapons of mass destruction . were a preemptivenuclear strike, thereby preventing the enemy from fullyachieving desired objectives.

As a result of the use of nuclear weapons by bothsides, the following strikes were delivered:

- byenem forces: 196 strikes of 8.1 MT yield, including116 strikes against orces of the 3d -Western Front, and 80strikes, including 29 surface strikes, against Poland,causing wide zones of contamination on the lines of theOdra-Nysa Rivers and Vistula River.

- by missiles and aviation of the 3d Western Front:113 nuclear strikes of 8.5 MT yield, primarily against themeans transporting nuclear weapons, the command system,antiaircraft defense, and the "supercorps".

The characteristic feature of this stage of operationswere the large losses in life and equipment which, unfortunately,were too optimistically estimated by the exercise participants.Some tactical large units and units lost all combat effectiveness.The 13th Army, which had attained operational readiness at2300 hours on 22 June, suffered heavy losses as a result ofremaining in the assembly area where it was surprised by thefirst nuclear strike which considerably reduced its capabilityto carry out its task, particularly in view of the fact thatthe line of departure required a forced crossing of thedefended Main River immediately upon commitment of the firstechelon divisions.

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The exercise ended at 1800 hours on 23 June upon theannouncement of decisions made.

In the immediate future, the General Staff will performa detailed analysis of the wealth of material prepared bythe umpires, research teams, and respondents, and will usethe conclusions drawn in the course of official activities.

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Critique of Exercise "Lato-74"

By General Wojciech JARUZELSKI,Member of the Political Bureau

- -- of the C-entral Committee of thePolish United Workers Party, andthe Minister of National Defense

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Comrades:

Exercise "Lato-74" was the focal training event of ourarmed forces during the current year. It added to ourtheoretical knowledge and practical competence, enriched ourexperience, and brought out a number of conclusions bearingon the doctrinal-training and structural organizationaldevelopment of staffs and forces. This exercise, encompassingat the same time training objectives of the Combined ArmedForces plan, was yet another proof of allied unity and closecollaboration.

A noteworthy highlight of the exercise was the yisit,on 21 June, of Comrade Edward GIEREK, the first Secretary of

-the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers. Party,and the congratulations and best wishes he extended to allthe participants of the exercise. Thus, once more, keeninterest and sincere concern of the party leaders, alwaysheld for the Armed Forces, was underlined, compelling us andcalling upon us to attain even greater accomplishments.

Thirty years ago, on 23-24 June 1944, one of the greatestbattles of World War II was fought on the 500-kilometer longfront from Vitebsk to Mozyr. The Soviet Army, concentratingits main effort on the central strategic axis, went on theoffensive. By defeating Hitler's army group "Center", itcleared the avenues of approach to Poland and to liberationof our country. The Polish Army, formed on Soviet soil withbrotherly assistance of the Soviets, also marched to itshomeland, side by side with its Soviet ally and comrade-in-arms.

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On the same day, 23 June 1944, the Association ofPolish Patriots, together with the Polish Army, on the basisof a resolution adopted by its Main Directorate, was subordinatedto the National People's Council--the first people's democraticgovernment, still operating, from the underground. At aboutthe same time, in the Janowski Forest and Skolska Wilderness,units of the People's Army together with groups of Sovietpartisans fought hard battles with the invader.

I am recalling these events because of their historicalimportance to our nation. They occurred on the very thresholdof the birth of People's Poland. There is symbolism inthem, and a lesson as well--we must preserve this symbolism,strengthen it and pass it on to future generations. We mustrelate-to this symbolism each day of well performed soldierlyservice.

The years, which passed since that time, constitute intheir essence a period of revolutionary transformations--andtherefore--foundations of the present. As soldiers, .werecall that those were also difficult years of continuous,unyielding confrontation with imperialism, demanding constant,intensive defensive effort. There were times when pressureand tension grew to an extremely dangerous level. However,in each instance imperialism had to back down, retreat,restrain itself, which was always the result of the defensivestrength of socialism. To the sum total of this strength,the Polish People's Army has always made, and continues tomake an active and earnest, loyal and proportional contribution.

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If currently a new leaf is being turned--the period ofdetente--then it is a dialectic consequence of all thoseconfrontations, it is a historical result of effectiveopposition to imperialism carried out on various levels:ideological and political-diplomatic, economic and scientific-technical--and in the final analysis the military defense.level. As a result of these processes, particularly duringrecent years, conditions favorable to improving internationalrelations and factors limiting the adventurism of imperialismcontinued to develop. However, comrades, I ask you to note,that not only imperialism's actual intent at a given momentis important, but also what imperialism is potentiallycapable of undertaking, what originates from its nature, andwhat is its main objective.

These considerations once more confirm the need tocontinue strengthening the combined defensive potential ofsocialism--the Warsaw Pact. It is this strength, and primarily,the might of the Soviet Army and Navy, which lays realfoundations for mounting a peace offensive. It is theSoviet Union that plays the leading role in this peaceoffensive. Therefore, from here stems the feeling of relianceand confidence which this tested ally inspires in us, who atYalta and Potsdam also insisted on recognition of our rights,later cleared a way for us on the question of border recognition,and finally now, at conferences at Geneva and Vienna, takesa common stand on the interests of Poland and all countriesof the socialist community.

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Exercise "Lato-74" was but another practical example ofactive participation of our armed forces in the militaryorganization of the Warsaw Pact, in particular, of brotherhood-in-arms and collaboration with the Soviet Army. In thisspirit, I cordially welcome General Afanasyev F. SHCHEGLOV,reresentative o the Supreme Commander o e om inedArmed Forces and his colleagues, and express sincere appreciationof their presence and friendly, helpful attitude toward ourexercise. I also sincerely welcome Lt. General Ivan A.GERASIMOV. Commander of the Northern Group of Soviet Forces,and Brig. General Vasiliy A. DANILOV, member of the MilitaryCQlincil, and the entire team ot boviet comrades who camesuperbly prepared, and I thank them for the assistance inconducting the exercise and for their active participationin it.

The scenario for exercise "Lato-74" related to therealities of the actual international situation, particularlyin the strategic-military aspect. In this situation, weassumed the possibility of aggression as a result of a shiftin the policy of imperialism. Features of this shift werepresented today in detail by the Chief of Staff of thePolish Armed Forces. I would like to refer briefly to someof the ideas and aspects of this broad problem.

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Let us view the international situation as a relationbetween detente and chances for peace on one hand, andtension and threat of war on the other hand. This, ofcourse, is a reflection of the relation between.socialismand imperialism. However, the fact of the matter is thatthis relation develops in many different aspects and areasof confrontation, and at this time, has developed successfulland to an advanced stage. Therefore, even if the globalrelation of forces were shifting in favor of socialism, itscomponents in individual aspects and areas could, during thesame time, be forming somewhat differently, some favorably,and some even unfavorably. Briefly speaking, socialistpositions are not equally strong everywhere. And hereinlies one of many reasons why simultaneously with the processof detente, various explosive situations can develop.

Therefore, clearing the road to permanent peace requirescreating such realities in which positions once attained bysocialism are permanently secured and, which at the sametime, would constitute for the opposing side a final, establishedcondition difficult to reverse. In this sense, it is extremelyimportant to shape actively man's psychic domain, his viewsand awareness oriented toward condemnation of militarism,demanding peace, and the public call for detente. This kindof attitude is spreading in the West. Such an attitude isholding back reactionary-military circles from winningpublic opinion and stimulating various anti-communist neuroses.

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Despite all this, it is necessary to keep in mind thatdetente is being maintained against enormous opposition andconstantly renewed counteraction efforts of cold war andmilitaristic circles. They are searching for and are readyto take advantage of each of our possible weak spots, everysensitive point, and less favorable situation. There are anumber of fluid, unstable, indecisive situations. Hotbedsof unrest, clashes and unextinguished war still exist. Itis not feasible to rule out once and for all the recurrenceof dangerous confrontations. Our exercise also focused onthese factors.

Let us consider the Near East. General normalizationof relations between the Arab countries and Israel are stillin the distant future. The United States, taking advantageof Egypt's departure from Nasserism and general stimulationof Arab conservative elements, strives to weaken and eliminateprogressive and liberation movements and, at the. same time,to restore its influence and to alter the alignment offorces. This is not indifferent to the matter of peace, andnot in the best interests of the socialist community in thisstrategically important area.

Also, the situation on the Indochinese Peninsula, whichwas taken into consideration during the exercise, continuesto give rise to anxiety. The victory of the Vietnamesenation, won with the assistance of socialist countries,forcing the United States to renounce direct military interventionin that country, has not ended the war. The USA continuesto support the regimes of THIEU and LON MOL, and to blackmailby yet another intervention. However, of importance here isthe fact that the huge sums spent on this war in the past,which at the peak reached 21.5 billion dollars on an annualscale, later were left in the Pentagon's budget. Every yearthese sums are invested in armaments.

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The problem in Asia and in the Far East is primarilyChina. Maoist leadership of China is attempting to torpedothe peace policy of the socialist community. China istraveling on a provocative anti-Soviet course, hand in handwith the most reactionary imperialistic forces, includingthe West German revanchists and militarists and Chileanfascists. ,It appears, that one has to assume that this fact/influences strategic calculations of NATO.

Finally, Europe. For us, her affairs are most important.The last 3 years of this continent's postwar history werethe most successful in the sense of relieving internationaltensions, many constructive achievements, and stabilizationof peaceful coexistence. I will just mention the universalrecognition by the Western countries of the statehood of theGerman Democratic Republic--an unthinkable matter not toolong ago. Consequently, the basic international-legalproblems which at one time were referred to the so-calledGerman Peace Treaty--or--as believed, into infinity, alreadyhave been defacto settled and normalized.

Therefore, without negating the importance of the manypositive events and facts (included among them is the pendingvisit of President NIXON to Moscow), it is necessary to seealso the other, les's favorable side of the matter. Eventhough it is true that detente has already progressedsufficiently in the political-diplomatic realm, and itcontinues to develop in spite of opposition, nevertheless,in such a basic field as the military, it has not created--for all practical purposes--any reverberations, on Europeansoil in particular.

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For example, let us consider the problem of negotiationspertaining to the armed forces and arms' limitations inCentral Europe. For us, the basic issue is full observanceof the so-called equal security. This is the only basis fora possibility of agreement. The result of this is thepossibility of an agreement only for such reductions whichwould not disturb existing relations of military potentials,and which would include foreign and national troops (ofcourse, including the Bundeswehr), ground forces as well asair forces, together with nuclear weapons.

However, the NATO circles desire an entirely differentformula for reductions. While adhering to the asymmetricalformula, they strive to change in their own favor the complementary

-and balanced relation of forces established in CentralEurope, a relation which has proved itself historically as areliable peace factor in this major area of contact betweenthe socialist world and capitalism. This same relation offorces in Central Europe simultaneously constitutes a certaincompensating factor on a global scale: it freezes theprofits, so to say, from maintaining a system of forwardbases which the United States would reap unilaterally as aresult of their geostrategic locations.

Similarly, the scale of proposals submitted in Viennaand Geneva pertaining to the so-called concurrent moves isunacceptable. In reality, it is a delaying game and at the sametime an attempt to obtain a full view of the disposition andtraining of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries.

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At the time when the above tactic characterizes therelation of the NATO countries toward disarmament talks inEurope, when they bemoan their alleged military weakness,when they demonize the forces and intentions of the WarsawPact--at the same time, a real intensification of armamentsis taking place in those countries.

As a side note to this problem, I would like to expressmy view on the universally used phase "armaments race". Itsprecise meaning does not correspond with the essence of thematter; it camouflages it, distorts, and is misleading.Bourgeois propaganda takes great advantage of this opportunity.We must therefore remember that the concept of the so-calledarmaments race can be dealt with only by mutual agreement.

-After-all, imperialism is the initiator, it is imperialismwhich challenges us. On the part of socialist countries, itis simply a necessary reaction to this state of affairs, avital defense.

It was with this in mind that comrade L. BREZHNEV, theSecretary General of the Central Committee of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union recently stated, that "with regardto limiting armaments...we were successful in concludingseveral international agreements without which the currentsituation would have been, without doubt, much more serious.Unfortunately, we were unable to slow down the armaments race."

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Let us examine a concrete example of armament of NATOcountries during the last 3 years only, and those were yearsof detente. During that time, as a result of rapid increasesin military budgets--by 20 percent in the overall alliance,and as much as 33 percent in the group of its Europeanmembers--quantitative and primarily qualitative armamentfactors were developed.

In American strategic weaponry--as a result of intro-duction of multiple warhead reentry vehicles, and despiteslower growth in the number of launchers, in accordance withSALT-I agreements--the number of nuclear charges in A ciiilesalvo increased by about 80 percent, and with regard tonuclear submarines--by as much as 125 percent.

In the Western European Theater similar phenomena aretaking place. Increases in fire power or volume of asalo, as a rule, have greatly exceeded the quantitativeincrease of corresponding armament. For example, in the airforces, the number of aircraft increased by 6-7 perrnt butbecause of modernization of one-fifth of the total park, thenuclear salvo increased overall by 23 percent, and econvAntional salvo--hy 3 prrrnt. A similar situationdeveloped in ground operational-tactical nuclear weapons,the quantitative potential of which increased by 13 percent,whereas the volume of the nuclear salvo increased by 70percent. An improved generation of antitank gnidAe miseis9has been introduced, and allocation of these weapons increasedby 5.percent; lastly--the modern means of antiaircraftdefense of troops increased by 27 percent.

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Even from this sketchy review a conclusion can bedrawn, that we are dealing with a complex, long-range

expansion process frequently difficult to discern fromexternal appearance. The number of divisions or numerical

stregthof personnel situp y oes not de'-ine --is e nn;h~peer, the Quantitative, combat-technical and terhnical-structural transformation does.

For these reasons, it is essential to constantly opposethis process. The Soviet Union and all the countries of thesocialist community have been doing this successfully foryears. Lasting peace is and always will be the function ofpolitical resistance, economic vigor, and above all, socialism'smilitary unity and power. Exercise "Lato-74" also served-this purpose.

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Exercise "Lato-74" was a successive, higher phase ofinterallied cooperation and intensification of brotherhood-in-arms between the armies of the Warsaw Pact countries andspecifically between our forces and the Armed Force.s of theUSSR. This cooperation has its rich and beautiful history.It was indeed the Soviet Army, its people, experience,combat equipment which served as the basis for creation ofthe Polish People's Army, and they served us with unfailingassistance along the road.to development. The permanentbasis of interallied ties is above all ideological unity,but there is also--based on Marxist-Leninist foundations--the foremost Soviet socialist art of war, and there are ouridentical views on doctrine for the conduct of modern warfare.Therefore, the exercise offered another oportunity to enrichthe substance and methods of combined operations, exchangeexperiences in this regard, and to penetrate deeper theproblem area of conducting operations within the-coalitionalpact against a background of specific operational guidelines.

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The direct, practical expression of this was participationin the exercise by operations groups from the Northern Groupof Soviet Forces, playing the role of commands and staffs ofthe 41st Army and the 46th Fighter Bomber Aviation Division.This was the first time that so many actual, far-reachingcom inations characterizing coalitionist operations wereintroduced and played out-in all their phases. This wasdemonstrated in the manner in which: air operations in thetheater of war operations were conducted and supported; the41st Soviet Army was included in the composition of the 3dWestern Front; and some Polish divisions were subordinatedto this Army, and some Soviet divisions to the Polish Armies.

The staffs participating in the exercise were fullyaware of the substance and importance of interallied coordination.These were the basis for numerous contacts between our andSoviet large units.

These contacts produced considerable experience-trainingbe iwu work, genera conclusions should bedrawn from them. they shou be thoroughLy studied anddisseminated. Particularly, i is necessaryn-6 dee

prec'exchanging operations gro s eewit means of communications, e use o on orm documents,the pr in maps, repair oand similar nractic oblems.

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In accordance with the objectives of the exercise,we concentrated our attention on o eration of the staffsections of the ont. Of particular importance was gainindee the location and role of our front asa component part of the coalitional defense system o- theWarsaw Pact countries. Also, it was important to test andimprove the- miization process, and operational deploymentof the front and conduct o offensive operations undercomplicated conditions of a conventional war followed by anuclear war.

In this process, the progress in organization-trainingconsolidation of the front staff, already during peacetime,became'an important factor. This was achieved, among otherthing-s by improving the structure of the Inspectorate ofTraining which now has in its composition both of the basicstaff sections--the operational directorate and reconnaissancedirectorate. Subordinated to the Chief Inspector of Trainingare the chiefs of rocket troops and artillery, and of airdefense troops, and since this year, also chiefs of engineerand chemical troops. In addition, included in the compositionof the collegium of the Chief Inspector of Training werechiefs of the basic organs of the staff of the front who intime of peace are not subordinate to him. The above mentionedmoves will have a positive influence on stabilization ofcadre assignments, and will create a favorable basis forplaying the role of higher forms of a front staff section.

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The exercise fulfilled not only the main objectivediscussed by the Chief of the General Staff of the PolishArmed Forces, but also a number of detailed objectives. Inaddition, many new, original solutions to structural arrangementand methods of operation of the exercise command and umpireapparatus were verified or analyzed.

Justification of these solutions was, in general,confirmed. We have the capability to organize an exerciseof great organizational-operational momentum, and of educationaland up-to-date substance. The authors and the staff of theexercisojmand did a good in that ct. However,we also observed wea nesses. On the basis of conclusionsdrawn from this exercise, we will continue to improve controlof this -type of training undertakings.

The exercise was at the same time a kind of a workshopby itself, where specific concepts and guidelines for thedevelopment of the forces surfaced. Therefore, the exercisewas a sort of lead-in to the currently being preparedorganizational-technical plan for the development of thearmed forces during years 1976-80, and a base for enrichingand precisely defining its initial guidelines. An importantrole in this regard was played by the special research teamswhich were appropriately integrated into the structure of theexercise and operated according to individual programs, andeither verified or undertook selected problems from theviewpoint of the guidelines of this plan.

Of the entire complex of broad and comprehensiveproblems, I sll fo obviou reasons. d uss only en z

prablems of most current interest to us

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During the multiyear cycle of operational training, weendeavored to play out various, even radically different,variants of entering into war. For example, during exercises"Lato-70" and "Kraj-73," the outbreak of war was preceded bymounting tensions in the international situation and agradual operational-mobilization buildup of the armed forces.During exercise "Lato-71" hostilities broke out under conditionsof rapid deterioration of the situation, and the armedforces switched to a war structure when nuclear operationswere already in progress. But in each situation we stroveto attach great importance to the period directly precedingthe outbreak of hostilities.

_ For this reason, in May of this year, we conducted forkey officials of our Ministry a decision game dealing withthe subject of operation of the central institutions duringthe es at readmessby the armed forces. From this game we derived many valuableideas. The conclusions drawn dictated the need for furtherim rovement of s stem of the Ministry's centralo ans articula o the Polish ArmedForces, institutions subordinate to the Chief Inspector ofTerritorial Defense, Chie -Quartermaster of the Polish ArmedForces, and Chief Technical Inspector of the Polish ArmedForces during the crucial period initiating transition ofthe national economy and administration and the armedforces to conditions and requirements of wartime. Theseinstitutions, and in particular the General Staff of thePolish Armed Forces, having direct or indirect influence onthe degree of readiness of the national defense potential,should, during that period, effectively weigh the increaseand decrease of tensions, pay attention to possible political,economic and operational-strategic consequences of proposedor undertaken decisions. This is why the problems underconsideration are complex; the need for synchronization oftasks with plans for the buildup of the national economy andthe armed forces must be continuous, along with the need,even in the future, for their systematic verification duringsubsequent decision games and high level exercises.

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During this year's exercise "Lato-74", national problemswere played out by operations groups of selected centralinstitutions of the Ministry of National Defense, interestedcivilian ministries, the wartime command and staff of theSilesian Military District, and the 8th National Air DefenseCorps. Therefore, from that point of view, this exercisewas sort of a continuation of exercise "Kraj-73," except itwas treated primarily from the standpoint of services renderedby the national economy and obligations of the nationaladministration and of the territorial system on behalf ofthe external front. I believe that this was necessary,useful, and helpful for subsequent planning and organization-defense studies.

- -In this exercise we decided to integrate routinetraining and mechanics of.procedure with the operationalplan. For this purpose, a training operations plan wasprepared in advance (within the framework of preparationsfor the exercise) with reference to which subsequent activiteswere played out. For example, among many tasks during theperiod preceding the outbreak of hostilities, the necessityto make essential corrections in the plan for operationaluse of forces becomes greater. It is only then, that theoutline of many problems becomes more realistic--tasks aredetermined, development of events progresses, and currentdispositions of forces becomes evident. Of course, thescope of corrections can vary, including the change ofoperational axis, which was the case in our exercise.Constant updating of plans makes their implementation easierand does not cause loss of time when time becomes a critical,factor. In our exercise, the staff of the front prepared a'complete alternate operational plan, and what is important-in minimum prescribed tim , and operationally transmittedthe essence of changes to be implemented by the chain ofcommands of the armies.

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This plan correctly directed the front forces to operationson a new operational axis and properlydefined the basicoperational and supply-technical support units of the operation.The substantive value of the plan would have been evengreater were the e'oat 'in and ralr1latinv of rapahilitie5rof our own and enemy forces more specific.

The critical mnment for operations of the commands ofthe front and the armies was activation of the field commandsystem for the operational forces. As a starting point forplaying out this part of the exercise, a mo ofpertinent standing rules was used. It was based on s nngout Cmaand elementg prinr tn the deploeynt deadlines forthe troops, and on occupation by them individually--particularlyby the forward command post--of disposition areas ahead ofthe troops. In this manner, the staffs of the front andthe armies could properly prepare themselves in advance forwork under field conditions, initially to participate in thecontrol of troop movement, then, gradually, to assumefull command "in person". Of course, these undertakingsshould be accomplished in a highly organized and disciplinedmanner, so that neither the intention, nor the very factthat individual commands and staffs are being assigned, orthat command posts are being occupied by them, are compromised.

The prnc f d ng th system inour exercise was generally efficient in the first phace.However, during displacement of posts in combat operations,breaks in continuity of control occurred, primarily causedby failure to use technical means of communication whichwere available during the move.

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The exercise offered another opportunity to verify theapplicable provisions of the mobilization plan. Experiencesgained in this respect confirmed again the validity of theprinciple of flexibility in conducting mobilization, simpli-fication of controlling its progress, and greater involvementof territorial authorities in this process.

Speaking on the subject of these problems, we should atthe same time firmly keep in mind that NATO countries haveat their disposal modern armed forces which are kept in arelatively high state of combat readiness and are capable ofinitiating operations without a prolonged period of preparation.A specific example indicating that the potential enemy iscapable of taking advantage of such an eventuality servesthe fact that all the armed forces of the United States wereplaced in a state of increased combat readiness during thecritical October days last year. All of this confirms againthe necessity to comply strictly with the standing procedurespertaining to combat readiness and to continue perfectingproceedings in this extremely important area.

In the exercise, a possible variant was outlined forparticipation of our operational large units in strategicoperations conducted within the framework of coalitionaloperations in the Western Theater of Military Operations.Comiitment t battle of the 3d Western Front was intended tobe an unusually important moment of this operation becauseits mission was destruction of northern flank forces of theCentral Army Group operating on the Leipzig-Karlsruhe axis.The only condition for accomplighing this mission was commitmentto battle of a strike grouping sufficiently strong andappropriately supported.

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In this respect, a certain confusion developed. The.fact was confirmed that re nvment of a large mass oftroops, especially after a a o hostilities is anextremely enmplex uncertaking. demanding excellent preparationand unfailing command.

Fighting an enemy airborne landing, strong air bombardment,losses en route, especially at water crossings, caused majorchanges in our exercise in time and spatial fulfilment ofthe plan for redeployment of troops, particularly congestedon 20 June. A solution to this situation presented realdifficulties to the participants.

The degree of complexity of the situation was notalways very realistically evaluated. There occurred insuffi-ciently justified overcommitments of certain divisions, andthe actual times of their commitment to-battle-4id-notens re operational Cynrhrnioatinn of the attack. Also, atendency prevailed to use frontal attacks exclusively andto form insufficiently deep groupings in mountainous,channelized terrain. Nevertheless, by more thorough analysisof certain aspects of the critique and by making corrections,the participating staff formed a strike group, in principlesuited to the plan, capabilities, and requirements of theoperation. Of great, even crucial, importance to fulfilmentof this plan was the posture of the 41st Army which containedthe enemy pressure and ensured that the main forces of thefirst echelon of the front were committed to battle from anadvantageous line. A correct decision and good organizationof positions by the commander and the staff of this armyallowed the exercise directing staff to declare that appropriateterrain lines were held, and that enemy operational freedomat this stage of operations was decidedly limited.

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During this exercise we have undertaken, for the firsttime on such a broad scale, the problem of committing an airarmy to air operations in the theater of military operations.Experiences of past wars, beginning with Hitler's attack onPoland in 1939 through Israel's aggression in the ear East,provide evidence that an air operation was the initia ,extremely important act of a conventional armed conflict.The role of air operations is maintained also today. Itsmain objective, in the final analysis, is destruction ofmain enemy air groups on the ground and in the air, and, bydisorganizing his air command system and air defense systems,to create for the ground forces and other branches of thearmed forces more favorable conditions for strategic operationsin the theater of military operations.

In our exercise, the air army was to participate in airoperations by flying three army missions on the axis of theadjacent front, then, immediately upon redeplnyment tonother operational axis--to support the commitment tobattle and conduct of operations of its parent front.

This variant of employing an air army required from theparticipants, among other things, the organization of acommand system working with precision, capable of accomplishingtwo successive difficult missions.

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In this phase of the exercise, the army command experiencedserious difficulties as a result of dispersion of the airarmy command potential. This had a negative effect inpreparation of essential tactical-operational calculationsand made organization of coordination within the army andcombat support of operations difficult. However, in time,particularly during the third mission, this state of affairsgradually and perceptibly improved.

Therefore, participation of the air army in air operations ~in the theater of military operations should become for thestaff of the air forces a subject for penetrating and thoroughstudies. During the process of operational-tactical preparationof officers, it is necessary to devote more time and attentionto this lightly treated subject than thus far.

Defeat of the modern multilayered enemy antiaircraftdefense is, so to say, a derivative problem. This problemis ecoming progressively more difficult. At this time, theenemy has at his disposal powerful antiaircraft weapons. Inthe immediate future he will introduce into the armamentsystems more modern missiles (Rapier, Roland I and II,Crotale, Blowpipe) and antiaircraft guns (Gepard, Falcon)designed to combat aircraft flying at low altitudes. Afterall, this is the general trend in development of theseweapons. Experiences of the last Near East war confirmthis, where, of the 105 Israelis airft shot down, 99 weredestroyed by ground antiaircraft weapons, most of them by"Kub" and "Strela" missiles, and ? - aft ginc 4,at+ ai..uda less than 100 meters.

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The staff of the air army (except in the first phase ofthe exercise) made deliberate efforts to work out variousmethods for combatting a strong enemy antiaircraft defense.However, these efforts should be made constantly and be moreaggressive than thus far. For the pilots, mastering thisproblem is literally a matter of life and death. We expectthe scientific seminar, prepared by the command of the airforces and the General Staff Academy, to furnish us manygood and specific conclusions in this regard.

We should also be concerned about ensuring safety forour own pilots. Flight corridors were established and timeintervals and flight altitudes were designated with thechief of the antiaircraft troops of the front. However, itis essential to initiate more organized, scientificallysupported efforts to maintain high physical and mental pilotendurance in the subsequent stages of operations, as well ascollection, analysis and effective dissemination of experiencesgained during every day of aerial combat.

For the first time in many years we enacted a theoretically 2possible and in practice conceivable variant of a massiveenemy air drop along the Oder and Nysa line at the momentwhen redeploying forces were most vulnerable, that is, whenthis line, to a certain degree, cut the operational groupingof the first echelon armies into two parts isolated fromeach other.

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There are ample historical precedents for this type ofoperation. The not-so-successful allied airborne operationunder the cryptonym "Market-Garden" can serve as an example.Analysis of this operation indicates that Western forcesaccept a high percentage of risk in the calculations oftheir plans, and that at times, they initiate this type ofan operation without sufficiently rationalizing it. Likewise,modern doctrinal principles do not allow ruling out thepossibility that NATO countries will resort to this means ofwarfare in the initial period of hostilities, particularlycalculated to eliminate the German Democratic Republic fromthe war first. Also, we know that an equivalent of twodivisions of airborne troops. in high degree of readiness,is stationed in Europe. In an emergency, they can be rapidlyreinforced with at least one airborne division from theUnited States. It is this concept on which the Pentagon isconcentrating its efforts, envisioning adaptation of certainaircraft (C-141, B-747, DC-10) of the so-called -ciilian airfleet reserve for transatlantic air lift of heavy armamentand equipment.

By introducing into the exercise a powerful airbornelanding, we deliberately assumed that the landing could notsecure far-reaching strategic-political objectives. However,the landing could and did have severe consequences, affectingaccomplishment of missions by the redeploying main forces.This type of a situation, in summary, is realistic, highlyeducational, and should not be treated lightly. Such asituation can be created not only by a massive air landing,but also by concurrent and, to a certain degree, coordinatedoperations of numerous diversionary groups, air strikesagainst bridges, panic of the population, and the like.Therefore, for our front, it remains a major problem whichshould be constantly kept in sight, studied, and in apractical manner played out in various aspects and forms andwith different results.

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However, let us return to the problem of the airbornelanding. The substance of the situation, developed as aresult of the landing, was an attempt to stop the movementof the regrouping front forces, entangle them in stubbornbattles, disrupt the structure of the operational groupingbeing formed from the march, force rerouting of traffic, andgain time--in effect--to disorganize the entire operationalplan of the front. According to enemy reckoning, this wouldpermit breaking the resistance of the 41st Army (Soviet),over extended on a wide front, and moving up fresh forces inorder to attack in depth and seize the initiative from thevery beginning of the campaign.

Although the problems of command presented specific- difficulties, in general the reactions of the participantscan be evaluated as proper. The main force of the redeployingtroops was assigned the mission to break through in thedirection of the lines of commitment to battle, and operationalgroups were designated for commanding units assigned tocombat the airborne landing. Simultaneously--as the territorialforces, units of internal defense troops, motorized units ofthe Citizens' Militia, reserve Border Guard Troops and.otherforces were moved to the airborne landing area--the commandprocess was assumed by the commands of military districtscoordinated by the General Staff which for this purposeassigned an operations group from the composition of thecommand post of the Ministry of National Defense. Likewise,the problem of coordination with the German DemocraticRepublic was not overlooked, which under these conditionswas absolutely necessary and beneficial.....

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Striving to be ahead of the enemy should express itself notonly in categories of time, therefore surprise, or in modernordnance and equipment. There is a third, extremely importantfactor of being ahead, without which the first two factorscannot achieve the intended effect. Specifically, thisfactor is the ability to anticipate, to react in advance, tomonitor the development of phenomena, tendencies, futureorganizations, and arms which certainly will appear in afuture war.

Consequently, we accepted as training objectives--deliberately and purposely in advance--certain planned, orcurrently in the experimental stage, structural-organizationaland technical changes, to name only a few, organization ofthe '-'-supercorps", the TRICAP [triple capability] type division,the so-called laser and TV bombs, new generations of antitankand antiaircraft weapons, the "BARE BASE"* system and theAWACS** system, and the like.

* Assembly of equipment in support of combat operations oftactical aviation from airfields with a minimum ofessential facilities, having only a runway and access towater.

** Detection and guidance system of USA tactical aviation,mounted on E-3A aircraft (Boeing 707); operates ataltitude of 9 to 11 kilometers; range up to 700 kilometers.)

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I believe that this is sound practice and consistentwith scientific and dialectical methodology. We shouldapply it appropriately--of course, primarily on operationallevels. This is exactly the form by which to overtake theenemy already in peacetime, decode his trump cards, andactively confront possible surprise. It is a method thatmobilizes, giving the feeling of holding a hand on thepulse. Such an approach should constitute one of the strengthfactors of the socialist army because it stems from itsnature, it stems from the assumption that the absolutenecessity to be ahead of the enemy is up to the conscious,enlightened man looking into the future.

In summary, Exercise "Lato-74" revealed that the-reconnaissance or ' d a higher degree of pteparedness.Despite stil existing sho rtenmings--which have to be eliminatedsuch as drawing conclusions with accuracy, disseminatinginformation, being alert to the air threat, and reactingeffectively to developing situations--theyennstitute abetE-r funtinning. increasingly more creative organ~ Inmodern armed forces, the importance of radioelectronics isever increasing.

Among the many practical applications of this field isradioelectronic reconnaissance one of the important sourcesof information in time of peace and war. The other practical-application is radioelectronic countermeasures.

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In our exercise, this problem was played out in apractical and relevant manner, more extensively than thusfar. Particularly praiseworthy was the search for betterorganizational structures and closer collaboration by theradioelectronic reconnaissanAA Ana-Gcuntop asre units-which the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish ArmedForces discussed today.

We continue to consider improvement of the radioelectronicwarfare system an omrequiring further theoreticalstudies and experimental research and verification of resultsobtained during the exercises. Therefore, radioelectronicwarfare ues to be mostly a s ogan. Primariiy, specialistsa're working on it, 'de of the mainstreamo-f staff activity. Radioelectronic countermeasures ave noyet gained a place among the leading types of tactical andoperational support. Its main trends are not outlined,comprehensive analyses are not conducted, and there is noaccountability for tasks performed. Undertaking this problemon a broad front, determining its nature, and personalinvolvement of commanders and chiefs of staffs should be thenext stage of our activity.

Over the span of recent years, the antiaircraft defenseof forces was improved comprehensively and is expandingdynamically. Treating this sector on a priority basis, wehave now entered the stage onversion of antiaircraftarily o units ile units. It suffices to say,that rearming of only one antiaircraft artillery regimentwith missiles, increases: the ceiling, from 4 to 10 kilometers,and range from 5 to 24 kilometers; the 'number of targetsengaged simultaneously from 2 to 5; the probability ofeffective fire from 30 percent to 96 percent; and extendsthe covered zone from 81 square kilometers to 2,500 squarekilometers.

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Completion of all organizational-technical changesplanned will produce an entirely new quality in the field ofengaging enemy air attack means.

This prospect was taken into consideration in ourexercise. But at the same time we must say with pleasure,that the participatin.gchief.s.of the .antiaircraftartillrytros. fi1ed their as** r.We tested a number o keen and interesting problems, e.g.,the subject of establishing and maneuvering missile reserves,realistically constructing a radar field for given fieldconditions, forming unique antiaircraft barrage units--so-called antiaircraft ambushes, and organizing air corridorswith exit and entry gates for friendly aviation, etc. As aresult-,-the exercise directing staff rewarded instructiveand reasonable solutions for antiaircraft defense withcorrespondingly reduced losses.

Recently, considerably more attention is being directedto the problem of camouflage, and we note with satisfactiondefinite progress in this area. It applies mainly to practicalundertagings carried out primarily by engineer troops. Inparticular, last year certain changes were made in camouflagesubunits, and various tests pertaining to setting up dummycommand posts of the front and of missile launching positionswere conducted jointly with the air forces.

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Likewise, certain practical elements of operationalcamouflage were integrated into this exercise. Serralduy nstallations of the front iommand post and of missilelaunching positions were constructed. Although simple meansand methods were used, good effects were obtained nevertheless,as verified by the results of air reconnaissance conductedspecifically for this purpose. However, operational camouflageis not an undertaking exclusive of a technical nature.Primarily, it is an integrated and comprehensive systemdeceiving the enemy and concealing from him our intentionsand activities. Fulfilment of specific undertakings relatedto camouflage is the. responsibility of all command levels,according to their missions and competence, but the leadingrole and primary responsibility for operational camouflage

- rests with the staff of the front. The point is to have theobjectives and purposes of operational camouflage conform tothe central idea of the operations planned. It is in thiscontext, therefore, that I would like to sensitize you,comrades, to a distinct necessity to increase the skill andto form a habit of employing camouflage concepts in theprocess of making operational decisions.

Examining the br a viewed camouflage problem it isnecessary to sanal a renaissance and, specifically speaking,new requirements in the field of using camouflage smokes.Unfortunately, in the exercise, this problem was treatedsomewhat indifferently despite the fact that besides theknown forms of chemical smoke--even though not actively andthoughtfully employed, for example, for covering rivercrossings, camouflaging certain installations, etc.--withthe development of modern equipment, new capabilities andnew requirements appeared. This applies in particular tothe use of chemical smokes for hindering various types ofdevices which are based on the use of laser, television, andnight vision technology.

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Constantly increasing mass employment of these devicesincreases the importance of chemical smokes, giving themoperational application. Special attention should be paidto laser equipment because of its long-range potential andits capability for versatile application. Chemical smokesespecially can become one of the leading means counteringlasers. They can find laser's weak spot--they can block itspath. Of course, the complexity and unusually rapid growthof the scale of this problem demands not only further technicalresearch but also comprehensive operational-tactical consideration,especially determination of planning trends, coordination,and--in relation to other tasks--unimpeded execution ofthese measures on a complex battlefield and in a battlesaturated with a variety of equipment (I visualize in thissubject--broad and, to a certain extent, collective effortsof the General Staff Academy, the Military Technical Academy,and the Military Chemical and Radiometry Institute).

The enemy has not given up the concept of using thestill extremely dangerous weapon--combat chemical agents.This is attested to by American activities in Vietnam,stockpiling, and research currently being conducted. TheUnited States does not respect the universally acceptedGeneva Protocol. Using a peculiar interpretation, theAmericans argue that incapacitating agents, those not causingfatal poisoning, and defoliating agents are not included inthe prohibition. This interpretation supposedly justifiesconduct of large-scale research on chemical weapons as aresult of which a binary' chemical ammunition program isbeing carried out.

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Even though in our exercise the enemy used chemicalweapons already on 20 June, this fact unfortunately was notreflected in the basic.estimates or in specific decisionsmade by the commanders. Therefore conclusions can be drawnas to the necessity for treating this aspect of combat withmore discrimination, assigning it appropriate priority intraining of commands, staffs and troops and constantlyobserving all new phenomena occurring in it.

The current exercise was conducted on the centraloperational axis, having terrain features different thanthose to which we have been accustomed for years. From theviewpoint of conducting military operations, the terrain wasdifficult, confronting the participants with special demands.

- The mountain range and- high ground ranging from 500 to 1400meters altitude above sea level, facilitated organizationfor defense on the one hand, but on the other hand--slowedthe momentum, canalized movement of forces, and made their Ideployment difficult.

Experiences gained from operations conducted by theSoviet Army in mountainous terrain during the last warindicate, that under similar conditions, the momentum ofoffensive operations is reduced on average by 30 to 40percent and more, and of a march, by 20 to 30 percent incomparison with operations conducted on ordinary lowlandterrain. To what extent mountains can influence the tempoof an offensive was demonstrated during operations of the1st Guards Army.and the 18th Army of the 4th Ukrainian Frontin the east Carpathian Mountains in September 1944, describedby Marshal GRECHKO in his book titled "Over the CarpathianMountains." Also, we know that natural features of, mountainousterrain can_.restrict-"employment-.of large armored unithamper command rontinratio and.supply-support . They maycause efrius interference in operating radio transmittersand radiotechnical means of detection and guidance of aircraft,and to a considerable degree limit also-conduct of radioelectronicreconnaissance.

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It should be stressed, that in the event of nuclearstrikes the shock waves enclogs__by hi h slopes will travelat a higher velocity along the axis of the passes causing,in addition to extensive losses, considerable devastationand deformation of the terrain and frequently total paralysisof movement and transportation. We got the impression thatthis situation was not considered carefully enough by theparticipants.

Water barriers present additional difficulties inoperations in mountainous-forested terrain. Althoughcontemporary river crossing equipment to a great extentfacilitates negotiation of water barriers, the peculiarityof mountain streams can greatly complicate the situation.Particularly dangerous is the sudden release of large watermasses from storage reservoirs existing on that axis situatedon higher mountain ranges, as could well have been the casein our exercise on the Saale and Mulde Rivers.

It is always necessary to reckon with utilization ofthe specific juncture of terrain features with the infra-structure. For example, in our exercise it was the factthat large quantities of liquid fuels were stored upstreamon the Main River, and after being released into the riverand ignited, they became a barrier of fire impassable forabout 5 to 6 hours. Regrettably, the report of this eventhad not reached the staff of the front.

While on the subject of terrain features, we shouldalso constantly keep in mind the elements of the infrastructureexisting in the zone of front operations.

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This problem should be studied in three aspects:

- first, how and which elements of the infrastructurein enemy territory should be completely destroyed in orderto make conduct of his operations more difficult;

- second, how to weigh the effect of these destructionson our own operations conducted subsequently in depth;

- third, how to spare and then seize, secure, and useappropriate elements and structures, especially those servingsupply, transportation, and other purposes.

We have not yet attained in training this kind of--comprehensive and, at the same time, penetrating and selectiveapproach to the above discussed problem. However, it shouldbe emphasized that, for example, the staffs of the antiaircraftdefense and of the engineer troops of the front and the 41stArmy, and the reconnaissance units of the 12 Land 13thArmies demonstrated considerable familiarity with the terrainand capability to-make...a-detaile.dAvaluation of its ~Tetures.Subsequently, the staff of the 11th Army prepared a useful,innovative operational document worthy of dissemination--aplan for seizing major installations.

The NATO armies, aware of the armored power of ourcommunity, treat antitank defense on a priority basis. Asa result, there is large-scale coverage with various antitankweapons.

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The systematic qualitative improvement of antitankweapons increases the significance of the problem. A newgeneration of semiautomatic guided missiles (MILAN, TOW)with greater range and effectiveness has been introduced.Mobile antitank reserves--on land, in armored combat vehicles,in helicopters in the air--are becoming a real factor.Mobility of the antitank defense is additionally increasedby incorporating into it a system of rocket missiles withwarheads having cassette mines which can carry into forwardareas or deep into the opponent's grouping in order to layminefields there and antitank barriers.

The role which even traditional antitank mines continueto play was demonstrated by, among other things, their massuse in-the Arab-Israeli armed conflict. On the Sinai Peninsulaalone, during several years of static war (1967-1973) andduring military operations in 1973, Egyptian troops laidapproximately one million mines, and the Israeli more than750 thousand mines (by the way, information on the latter,gained by our combat engineers serving in the Near East,should facilitate for us appropriate technical-trainingpreparations).

Finally, if we add to all this the enemy capability toutilize the terrain features mentioned above, which undercertain conditions could become a natural factor multiplyingthe effectiveness of the entire antitank defense system,then we can visualize the difficulties in overcoming thissystem.

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All these considerations demand that our commanders andstaffs apply effective, innovative methods of operationbased on thorough knowledge of the enemy in order to come upwith the most favorable anti-antitank.solutions.

It should b stated that our _avr ne yet doe notreprent the highest leve o knowledge in this area,although we note some progress which, with regard to theoperational commands, was confirmed in our exercise. There-fore, we will continue to work on this problem intensively.

We are seeking, for example, ways to increase thenumber of motorized infantry in tank regiments, whichincidentally, was achieved in practice in the 11th and 12thArmies. Also attempts were made to increase the capabilityof tanks to combat antitank helicopters. We are expectingmuch from the test exercise on this subject which will takeplace soon. Appropriate higher military schools and institutesare also charged with this problem. However, regardless ofall these undertakings, the key to overcoming effectivelystrong antitank defense rests in the hands of our commandersand staffs, in the hands of our cadre, in its attitudetoward this problem, in the effectiveness of training, andin its aggressiveness on the modern battlefield.

Continuing offensive operations, the front forcesencountered strong enemy reserves, seasoned-during cyclicexercises (mostly the "Reforger" and "Wintex" type), launchingcounterattacks supported by aviation and artillery, andcovered on the flanks by nuclear and antitank mine barriers.

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However, this time, this reserve appeared in the formof the already above mentioned so-called "IsUpercorps", that -4(is to say a truly powerful operational large unit of the"West". We concluded, that since the enemy had at hisdisposal so large a reserve, he may want to commit it as alast resort to reach his objectives, to establish certainaccomplished facts, still without employing nuclear weapons.After all, he is aware of the consequences of employingweapons of mass destruction. The strategic capability ofthe Soviet Union to retaliate, makes in effect, a nuclearstrike of the "West" an act of desperation.

Repulsing the "supercorps" counterattack and planningthe commitment to battle of the second echelon army of thefront was therefore the- last event of this exceptionallylo ng nonnuclear phase of hostilities. The obvioiudproblem,resulting from the ratiboof forces on the axis of thecounterattack, was the necessity to shift part of the frontforces to defense, while simultaneously striving to accomplishthe offensive mission assigned to them.

The decision of the front commander to repulse thecounterattack of the "supercorps" using 12th Army forces, toattack the enemy flank using part of the 11th Army forces,and to commit the 13th Army to battle on the axis of themain effort is considered proper. Nevertheless, it causedconstant concern for the flank threatened by possible successof the enemy counterattack. For this reason, the commanderof the 13th Army correctly planned for the possibility ofcommitting part of the forces, including the antitank artilleryreserve, to add depth to the defense of the 12th Army.However, the calz11ation-organizational framework of thisdecision was not sufficiently comprehensive. Under actualcpndthions. s ne aac ave developed--and howdangerous that could have been for a redeploying army. Andwhat a flanking attack can do, we also know well from ourhistory-=from the bitter experiences of the 2d Army of thePolish Armed Forces in the final phase of the last war.

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The problem of delivery of the first nuclear strike wasof profound importance to the front command and to the armycommands.

Theoreticians in the West conjecture many variousconcepts on the subject of nuclear war in general, anddelivery of the first strike in particular. These deliber-ations, conducted under the-pretext of unofficial theoreticalopinion., probably contain also camouflaged elements ofconfusion and deception. At the same time, NATO force xexercises in Europe almost automatically include variousoptions and ways to carry out actions in all conceivablecircumstances of the initial phase of the armed conflict andstages of its progression, up to nuclear world war included.

These endeavors take on different expressions. Inaddition to training objectives, they can also be read as an Vattempt to implant in us false notions on the nature offuture operations, and to put Warsaw Pact strategic estimateson the wrong track. Or they can be evaluated, to a certainextent, as soundings for our possible course of action inthe event nuclear weapons were used. However, without adoubt, the enemy is attempting to work out, even now, certainconditions which would enable him to seize the initiative atthe moment of the first nuclear strike.

We examined these problems in sufficient detail duringprevious "Lato"-type exercises, which successively enrichedand improved our orientation in the realm of probable variantsof enemy operations. Likewise, in this exercise we gainednew qualitatively better, cognitive elements on this subject.

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Effectiveness of the first strike is conditioned onproper selection of targ ts against which the strike issuppose to be directed. .t is important to carry out the vfirst, most powerful strike against targets, which in givensituation, are the most threatening, therefore, the means ofe nuclear attack. For this reason, the matter whichwill contnm .3. e of crucial importance is a particularlydetailed evaluation of targetsaciodii- liei ~iio-ance,nature and sequence of destrucjion,.keepingin-min their -lcation. andlmability.

The results of the exercise allow us to state, that--inthis respect- -we have taken a big step forward. The plan ofthe first strike, substantively correct, was systematicallyupdated, and rocket and-aviation units were kept in constantreadiness to execute it. During periods evaluated by thefront commander as critical, additional reconnaissancemeans, including appropriate offensive means, were committedto the operations. The front commander and staff were fullyprepared to accomplish their mission when they received thetime signal for delivery of the first strike. The additionalreconnaissance ordered ensured effectiveness of the firststrike. This time, organizational staff work was fullycoordinated. I would like also to stress the objectivecooperation with the rocket troops of the 41st Army (Soviet).Attention should be called to the precision of performanceand good equipment of the headquarters of the rocket troopsand artillery of the front, ensuring full and modern controlof nuclear weapons delivery means.

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Related to the problem of the first strike, even thoughpeculiar for the political-strategic and technical context,is the question of conceivable use of nuclear mines by theenemy.

The Dresden-Frankfurt operational axis, constitutingthe hub of operations of the front exercise, is one of theaxes saturated with nuclear weapons. On this axis, mainlyin its border zone, there are 32 [possibly one or moredigits missing at end] clusters with 1145 mine chambers.This constitutes a density of 8 clusters per 100 squarekilometers, or 4 clusters per 1 kilometer of the front inthe border zone. By comparison, the density of clusters ofmine chambers on the northern-coastal axis is 8 times smaller,and consists of 1 cluster per 100 square kilometers, or halfof a cluster per 1 kilometer of the front.

Overcoming nuclear barriers is, from a technologicaland tactical viewpoint, a rather complicated problem. Thisundertaking, analogous to defense against weapons of massdestruction, is of a specialistic as well as combined armsnature. All arms of troops should participate in it on aproper scale. However, the commander of the operationallarge unit is responsible for accomplishing this task.

In this exercise, we had examples of constructiveapproaches to this problem. Interesting tactical-technologicalproposals in this area were prepared by the chiefs of engineertroops of the front and the 12th and 14th Armies. Work inthis sector should continue, other solutions sought, andinterest of appropriate academies, institutes, and officerhigher schools should be stimulated.

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Enemy nuclear strikes against the forces of the frontand national territory create a complex of problems relatedto eliminating the effects of these strikes. Integration ofoperational-combat and disaster-rescue functions should beviewed as of special importance to understanding theseproblems. Therefore, on one hand, consistent striving toaccomplish the main objective of the operation, to reconstitutethe disrupted command system, the organizational structure,and survivability of troops, and to ensure continuous flowof replacements and material support, and on the otherhand--to rescue the population effectively,.render massmedical aid, and organize special measures and evacuation.On the contrary, specifically at this critical moment whichcould_prejudge the fate not only of the operation butL.Jhut

-entire-war, the most essential qualities required are preparationof the commands, staffs and troops, their moral-politicaLcondition, training, psychological strength and determinedwill to fighgt It is necessary also to keep in mind, thatfollowing the first massed strike, the enemy will deliversubsequent nuclear and air strikes, and on critical axes hewill strive to commit available reserves to battle and in"followup of the strike" he will strive to use all possiblemeans and methods for combat and psychological effect.,

In the event weapons of mass destr'uction are employedby both sides, success will belong to the one who will firstcapitalize on the effects of the strike, thus, the one whowill recover from the nuclear strike sooner, seize theinitiative, and continue the battle.

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Subsequent to the nuclear strikes, the first echelonoperational large units of the front occupied an area ofoperations under specific geographic-physical conditions andeconomic structure, and the fighting forces had to cross thedeformed terrain, negotiate terrain without roads, thedevastated infrastructure of large urban-industrial agglomer-ations, and overcome a fire barrier in wooded terrain. Thisrequired organization of a variety of efforts and utilizationof all possible organic as well as local miscellaneous meansfor rescue work, combatting the elements, and negotiatingthe terrain.

The problem of eliminating the effects of nuclearstrikes should be viewed in the entire complexity andassociated mnultilayered physical, biological, moral, andpsychic phenomena.

Therefore it is necessary to continue to enrich anddiversify training-indoctrination substance and methods; todevelop a high moral-political consciousness in troops, andto be convineA that the power and unity of the Warsaw Pactmember countxies-ar ghyatng at e comtequipmentof our armies- is nf high qnn l i ty At the same time, eyerytacticaLexPrcise-should create surprise situations, developthe habit of performing under emotional stress, of sensingthe threat while expecting various surprises, requiring fromthe participants instant reaction combined with a prudentlyassumed and controlled element of risk.

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Against the background of evaluating the possibledevelopment of the war situation, we considered the essentialproblems of organization and function of rear services andsupply-technical support oi the armed forces.

In this respect, the experiences and conclusions drawnfrom past exercises and studies were very helpful (primarilyfrom exercise "Bariera-73", conducted under the direction ofMarshal Ivan YAKUBOVSKY, the Supreme Commander of the CombinedArmed Forces of the Warsaw Pact).

Enemy action on our national territory and in the rearzone of the front, played out in the exercise, complicatedthe supply system of the forces. Disruption of the lines oftransportation on the Oder and Neisse Rivers by the airbornelanding made organization of the intended field supplysystem much more difficult. In this situation, first echelontactical large units were committed to battle even withincomplete mobile reserves of ammunition. In view of theanticipated losses and expected disruption in continuity ofsupply deliveries, it became necessary for the commanders ofoperational large units to initiate strict measures reducingexpenditure of supplies on hand, especially of rockets andammunition.

Also, it should be remembered, that economical managementof means in short supply, particularly of rockets, antiaircraftand antitank ammunition, is mandatory not only in criticalsituations, but it should be the rule for planning combatoperations, selection of targets, and allocation of thesemeans, primarily to those forces which at a given time carryout the primary mission.

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The exercise)gave evidence of distinct progress inplanning material-technical support for the troops. Ofcourse, there is still more improvement to be made in planning,especially in the area of coordination with the quartermasterdepartment. Also, the system of essential interrelations ofthe two main supply components at the quartermaster commandpost should be improved (for example, during the exercisethere were incidents of the same information reaching bothcomponents at intervals several hours apart.

The quartermaster services participating in the exerciseresolved correctly the problem of organizing supply, medical,and technical support rendered to the 41st Army, as well asthe tactical large units of this Army and those subordinatedto the- 11th and 12th Armies. In this respect, the participatingorgans of the rear services of all echelon demnnctratpd .good knowledge of the pr. nci les for rear services supportoq'oinrtopPratans of tactica and operational iarge units 7initiated by the Supreme Commander of the Combined ArmedForces on 1 .anmary _ -7-4.

The headquarters of the front quartermaster resolvedthe problems of security and defense of the rear areas withdiscretion. However, this is a broad and unusually difficultproblem. Security and defense of the rear services, constitutingan integral part of operational support, is not an exclusiveproblem of the rear services. It should be more thoroughlystudied and resolved more realistically.

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It should be stated, that in general, the quartermaster.services of the front and the army demonstrated a considerableamount of initiative and realistic approach to situations asthey developed.

The performance of participating technical services canbe evaluated simularly.

At the present time, the efforts of the technicalcomponents should be increasingly directed--without sacrificingthe scope of maintenance--toward the problem area of renderingsupport for combat readiness and reliable operation oftechnical equipment, especially of the very sensitive andcontinuously-being-improved technical means of reconnaissance,radioelectronic warfare, automation of command and other.

The exercise offered another opportunity for a relevantplay of integrating the same type of maintenance units ofindividual arms of troops and services into a system ofmaintenance bases. This system should make possible comprehensivemaintenance of complicated construction equipment whichincreasingly is being introduced into the armament of thearmed forces.

Operation of the field maintenance system, in view ofthe anticipated mass losses of equipment, is of particularimportance. The scope of the problem is best illustrated bythe fact that already in the first phase of combat operations,when conventional weapons were used, losses were very serious,and after nuclear strikes were delivered, they increaseddramatically.

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The exercise demonstrated that progress was made inequipping, organization, and operating technique of theo erational staffs. Our greatest achievement, above allelse, was the hfunctionalstaff hu..es. Also, the practically universal use of properlyformalized command documents, employment of many usefultraining aids and equipment, and, finally, the preparationof instructions or diagrams establishing a most efficientorganization for staff work (as was the case at the quartermastercommand post and the command post of the 13th Army), indicatethat years of searching and researching, experimenting andtraining produced highly beneficial results.

Progress was noted also in field application of informatics.-Its expression--among others--is the considerably greatersco f "'-- toan exercise. In reality, this was a very new ality. Thiswas evidenced not only by the genuine aggressiveness of thecommand organs in using the technical programming baseplaced at their disposal, but also by the comprehensivenessof the programs and the computer-information problems resolvedaccording to these programs. In this respect, particularlyfavorable impressions were made by the headquarters of theantiaircraft defense and chemical troops of the front, thestaffs of the 11th and 13th Armies, and the technical servicesof the front and the 14th Air Army.

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These efforts should be continued, and useful experienceseffectively disseminated, while not forgetting the necessityto improve--let us call it--the classic experiences. Aboveall, the very fact, tha w have staff buses should not putour concern to rest. Without a doubt, they represent anessential step forward, but they fa not resolve the prohlema ba s survivabili components. Thisproblem still con ronts us. For example, we should thinkabout portable equipment, increased self-entrenching capability,and--for longer range planning--partial introduction also ofarmored command means at the operational level.

In addition, the exercise demonstrated that there is.still much to be accomplished, among other things, in the-field-of useful utilization of the massive flow of information,improvement of efficiency of internaliinformation, includingcontact between the command post and the forward commandpost, preparation of maps and charts, making calculations,proper and proportional distribution of work, etc.

It is worthwhile to emphasize, that there were noinstances of major security violations. There was improvementin the use of communications equipment.. Yet, observationsmade of radiorelay communications indicate that more attentionshould be paid to security conscious and responsible use of*it.

As in previous years, also in this exercise a series ofstudies were completed which encompassed organizationalstructures of selected command-staff elements an theirsupport units.

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Conclusions drawn from the studies confirm the usefulnessof the newly adopted wartime organizational structure of thefront staff reduced by about 30 percent. It should be notedthat introduction of this structure was preceded by instructionsissued by the front headquarters which prescribed the. proceduresand work policies at the field command posts. Against thebackground of the exercise, the possibility of reducing thenumber of transport vehicles in front support units was alsostudied.

The studies also disclosed that the direction of thechanges made in the command and staff of the air army werecorrect. Relocation of its peacetime home base from Warsawto Poznan, some 300 kilometers westward, elimination of a

- fragmented organization, and reduction of its size (byapproximately 17 percent), are positive signs. Relationsbetween this command and the aviation forces remaining onthe national territory were reexamined, which will allowimprovement of its structure and delineation of authority.

During the exercise, policies for revising duties ofthe wartime military district command were defined, includingcoordination with civilian organs, and conclusions drawnfrom exerise "Kraj-73" pertaining to improvement of efficiency.f the command system structure of the district militaryunits were studied more thoroughly.

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In all the undertakings within the scope of strengtheningthe defensive potential, we regard as most important theideological-moral values of our troops, their military andgeneral knowledge, and their proficiency to function efficiently.These are the fundamental forces of our superiority over theenemy, resulting from the peasant class nature of our troops.

These qualities we hold particularly important for theofficer cadre. We are consistently implementing policies ofthe comprehensive political program for the cadre adopted inrecent years. According to its provisions, during theperiod between exercises "Lato-71" and "Lato-74," manychanges were made, including some in higher positions.' As aresult,_participants in this exercise included 136 officerswho graduated from the Soviet Armed Forces Academy, or whocompleted operational-strategic courses at this academy orat our own General Staff Academy which, when compared withexercise "Lato-71," constitutes an increase of 90 officers,or 200 percent, who have received this training. It shouldbe pointed out that at this time over 61 percent of theparticipating officers ae graduates of military academiesand 15 percent have higher education appropriate for thepositions they hold.

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Evaluating the results of the concluded exercise it canbe stated with satisfaction that our p.ersonnel._achieved new,higher qualities which were reflected in smooth execution ofe..replacement of entire directin teams, particularly at the

operational level headquarters. A total of 248 officerswere actually replaced at the participating commands andstaffs, of which 30 were in key positions. Officers whowere assigned new duties, generally speaking ifuifilled themin a satisfactory manner, and, having best intentions andproper preparation, were able to adapt to new conditions.Therefore, it is a good practice which we will follow graduallyand systematically, particularly in regard to the officersfrom th. accelerated development pool.

An important problem became evident during the exercise,namely, the manner and the scope of replacing officer losses.

According to indicators of personnel losses that combatforces can sustain, as acce mies,during 4 days of conventional offensive operations theWestern Front lost 8,500 officers and warrant officers,and--after 1 additional day of nuclear warfare--lost approximately16,000 officers and warrant officers, 2,000 of which possessedhigher military qualifications, replacement of which in ashort time would have been very difficult.

Therefore, the exercise proved that the problem ofreplacing losses with officer personnel is Ery-cmplex.requiring further study, followed by appropriate practicalorganizational measures.

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Exercise "Lato-74" was also a broad platform for activitiesof the party-political apparatus. This apparatus fulfilledits tasks satisfactorily. The exercise allowed the party-political organs to analyze and evaluate the political-social situation of the area under its jurisdiction. Theproblems of this work were differentiated according to thedevelopment of the situation played out in the exercise.The work took into consideration the peculiarities of frontforces operations on the territory of our own country, inthe country of our German ally, and on enemy territory. Itwas concentrated on tightening brotherly ties with thesoldiers of the Soviet Army.

The subject of particular attention of the party-polit-i-cal apparatus was the comprehensive characterizationof the enemy. This was especially justified, since theoperations were played in particularly reactionary areas ofthe German Federal Republic. There are located the principleanti-Polish centers, the dense network of displaced personsand militaristic organizations, and-a large concentration ofhostile emigration. By the way, at present, as the 30thanniversary of the Polish Peoples Republic draws nearer,these organizations are actually intensifying the ideologicalstruggle and psychological diversion. They are directingtheir activities primarily against our party and the people'sgovernment, against the alliance with the Soviet Union. Forthis reason our daily experiences or propaganda countermeasureswere productively utilized in exercise activities.

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In conformance with the guidelines of -the exercise, thepolitical apparatus paid much attention to the substance andmethods for improving political work under conditions ofnuclear war.

Our experiences proved that substantiation of activitiesrelated to psychological strengthening of troops for thetime of employment of mass destruction weapons is a problemof primary importance.

During the exercise, we took into consideration thestrong enemy influence on our troops and our civilian populationand the role played in this regard by USA and FRG psychologicalwarfare battalions and companies. The party-politicalapparatus of the participating commands displayed a goodgrasp of the policies and substance of enemy psychologicalactions. The conclusions drawn from conducted analysesconstituted supplementary and broadening intelligence materialon enemy combined arms.

Finally, it should be emphasized, that we highly appreciatethe current party-political activity. This activity contributedeffectively to the high morale-political state and disciplineof the participating staffs and their support troops.

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Comrades!.

Operational competence requires constant refresherpractice. Exercises of this nature alone, because of theirintrequency do not guarantee accomplishment of this task.Pressures of daily requirements performed by the centralinstitutions and operational staffs, in some measure, pushour primary responsibility of war preparation tasks into thebackground. A-a reidltwe b6bserve some ~omiades Tivecertain weaknesses in the field of present-day operational-tactical knowledge, insufficient adherence to specifics,indifference to realities, and insufficient inquisitiveness.Also, we must develop operational reactions and a sense offighting against time; we should improve efficiency, precision,excel-lence of staff work in its broad meaning, and be concernedwith clarity of terminology, and the like. To a greatdegree this is a matter of training.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish ArmedForces jointly with the Chief Inspector of Training willsubmit to me appropriate proposals on this subject matter.

Comrades!

With exercise "Lato-74" we concluded an important phaseof improving operational-strategic -training of the key cadreof the Polish Armed Forces. The conduct and results of theexercise demonstrated that we gained experience whichenriched our know-how in the art of preparing and conductingfront operations on the main strategic axis within theunified allied pact.

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The exercise, conducted at a fast pace, was full ofsuspense and complex operational'situations changing rapidly--demanding from the participants good preparation, physicalstamina, and understanding of the work rhythm of a largecommand-staff body. Despite the weaknesses mentioned above,the overall evaluation is very positive. We have wellqualified experienced staffs which have at their disposalsolid theoretical knowledge, rich experience, and operationalinsight.

It is with this understanding that we treat the achieve-ments gained during the exercise as a real contribution ofthe peoples Polish Armed Forces in strengthening the nationaldefense; as a test of soldierly duties inscribed in theanniversary book of our socialist state.

Dear Comrades--the experiences gained in the exerciseshould be appropriately and fully endorsed for the subsequentphase of training, research work, and the planning process.

Today's critique does not exhaust the total wealth ofexamples, experiences, and conclusions drawn from it. Thebroad observations made by the exercise directing staff, thestaff, and the umpires--and no doubt, by the participatingcommanders themselves--should be given appropriate futureconsideration. This should be done in the course of routinetraining, by conducting local evaluations and discussionswithin individual elements, components, and specialties.

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In general, exercise "Lato-74" should--for a long timeto come--constitute a source of many organizational, methodologicaland training inspirations, should increasingly aid achievementof combat readiness of our forces and improvement of operationalefficiency of our staffs.

Concluding the critique, I wish to thank the members ofthe exercise directing staff and the staff, the scenariowriters, and the comrades from the umpire and enemy simulatingapparatus for their effective and creative participation inpreparing and conducting the exercise.

I wish to thank the participating commanders and staffofficers for their dedicated work and accomplishment oftasks-assigned them.

I also wish to point out the specific, fruitful contributionof the supporting services. Particularly effective was theoperational and security performance of the Military InternalService apparatus which effectively resolved problems confrontingit. Communications, transportation and the entire auxiliaryapparatus worke well and selflessly, and I commend themorit. I wish to thank every participant in the exercise. Tsincerely thank and wish well our Soviet comrades in arms.I wish all of you dear comrades much success.

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Legend to Map 1

1. Outline of Intentions of the Opposing Sides for Exercise"Lato-74"

2. Initial task of the front

Depth of the task: 250-330 kmWidth of the operations zone: 320-400 kmDuration: 6-7 daysAverage rate of advance: 45-50 km/24 hrs

3. Subsequent task of the front

Depth of the task: -200-300 kmWidth of the operations zone: 300-350 kmDuration: 4-6 daysAverage rate of advance: 50-60 km/24 hrs

4. Coastal Ernt

Two armies; one air army

5. 3d Western Front -

6. 1st Western Fine

Six armies; two air armies

7. Northern Army Group

1st Army Corps (W.Ger.), 12th Army Corps (G.B.), 1stArmy Corps (B), 1st Army Corps (Neth.)

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8. 1st Western Front

Four armies; one air army

9. 40th Army

94th, 95th, 96th-Motorized Divs; 97th Tank Div

10. 3d Western Front

11th, 12th, 13th Armies; 14th Air Army; 11th AirborneDiv; 31st and 33d Reserve Mechanized Divs; front 8thOperational-Tactical Missile Brigade

11. 41st Army -

101st, 102d, 103d Motorized Divs; 104th Tank Div; army36th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade

12. 3d Western Front

Four armies; one air army

13. 2d Western -Fron1---' -

Three armies; one air army

14. 60th Army

47th, 48th Motorized Divs; 49th Tank Div

1S. Central Army Group

23d Army Corps (W. Ger.); 3d, 5th, 7th Army Corps (US);18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)

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16. Tactical Air Forces

17. Subsequent Task of the front

Depth of the task: 250 kmWidth of the operations zone: 220 kmDuration: 4-6 daysAverage rate of advance: 45-50 km/24 hrs

18. Initial Task of the front

Depth of the task: 200 kmWidth of the operations zone: 170-200 kmDuration: 5-6 daysAverage rate of advance: 35-40 km/24 hrs

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Legend to Map 2

1. Outline of Intentions of the Opposing Sides for Exercise"Lato-74" (in the zone of the 3d Western Front)

2. 3d Western Front

11th, 12th, 13th Armies; 41st Army (allied); 14th AirArmy; 11th Airborne Div; 31st, 33d Reserve MechanizedDivs; front 8th Operational-Tactical Missile Brigade

3. 2d Western Front

Three armies; one air army

4. 3d Army Corps (US) D+3

4th Mechanized Div; 2d Armored Div; 1st Air ArmoredCavalry Div

5. Central Army Group

2d, 3d Army Corps (W. Ger.); 3d, 5th, 7th Army Corps(US); 18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)

6. 18th Airborne Corps (US-W. Ger.)

82d Airborne Div (US); 101st Air Cavalry Div; 1st AirborneDiv (W. Ger.)

7. 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces

1830 aircraft (1056 nuclear weapons carriers)

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8. 7th Army Corps (US)

1st, 3d Mechanized Divs; 1st Armored Div

9. Initial task of the front

10. Subsequent task of the front

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Glossary to Map 1 and 2

A - army

(A) - US forces

ABROT - army operational-tactical missile brigade

AL - air army

AP(F) - field army (French forces)

(B) - Belgian forces

--BAR - missile artillery brigade

BPD - airborne brigade

CGA- Central Army Group

cztery dyw = four divisions

(D) - Danish forces

D - D-day

D3 - D-day + 3

D 5/6 - D-day + 5/6

DAR - missile artillery division

DD - assault landing division

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Des - assault landing

DKP - air cavalry division

DKP Panc '- air armored cavalry division

DP - infantry division

d"P" - "Pershing" battalion

D Panc - armored division

DPD - airborne division

DPG -_mountain infantry division

DPZmot - motorized infantry division

DZ - mechanized division

DZmot - motorized division

FBROT - front operational-tactical missile brigade

GODes - assault landing operations group

(H) - Dutch forces (Neth)

JKA - Jutland Army Corps

KA - army corps

KON - convoy

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KOPK - National Air Defense Corps

KPD - airborne corps

NBJ - nuclear weapons carrier

(NZ) - West German forces (W. Ger.)

par - missile artillery regiment

piec dyw = five divisions

ppd - airborne regiment

PTSP - allied tactical air forces (NATO)

RDZ - reserve mechanized division

rp panc - antitank reconnaissance

samodz - independent

SOW - Silesian Military District

spr"P" - "Pershing" separate missile regiment

S-tow - number of aircraft

(W Br) - British Forces-(GB)

WSD - forward command post

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z - from

Zach - Western

3D - three divisions

5D- five divisions by D-day + 3

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-- Situation as of 1100 hrs on D-day

Situation and outline of decisions of the opposingsides on. D4/5

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I- ntentions of the opposing sides on D-1

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