u.s.-soviet cooperation in space

U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space

July 1985

NTIS order #PB86-114578

Recommended Citation:U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technol-ogy Assessment, OTA-TM-STI-27, July 1985).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600561

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

Foreword

Space holds a fascination for all of us. For many, it represents a final physical fron-tier—a place to explore the very essence of knowledge, to experiment with new tech-nology, and to seek new levels of human adaptation and change. As the major spacefaringnation on our planet, the United States has taken special pride in our achievements inspace.

Discoveries in space science have already added immensely to our fund ofknowledge. U.S. scientists have moved quickly to take advantage of new opportunitiesfor learning, and the future of scientific work in space is virtually unlimited.

Given the promise of space, an additional issue comes to the fore. How can theUnited States proceed in space in relation to the other principal spacefaring nation andsuperpower—the Soviet Union? What is to be gained or lost by working together inspace? With regard to science in particular, can the two countries benefit from jointefforts? Can the two countries cooperate as well as compete?

Since the beginning of the space age, the two countries have been examining thesequestions. This study was requested by Senators Matsunaga, Mathias, and Pen as ameans to shed light on the subject at the time of the I0th anniversary of the major U. S.-Soviet cooperative endeavor, the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.

OTA is pleased to be able to provide this technical memorandum, outlining theprincipal issues of the debate, the history of cooperation, and the experience of France,another country involved in space cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Additional OTA docu-ments that may be of interest include Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future inSpace, Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Human Presence in Space, and International Cooper-ation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities, OTA studies in the areas of tech-nology transfer are cited in the text.

JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

.,.///

Related OTA Reports

Civilian Space

● International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities.OTA-ISC-239, July 1985. GPO stock #052-003-00958-7.

● Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future in Space.OTA-STI-241, November 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0969-2.

● Civilian Space Policy and Applications.OTA-STI-177, June 1982. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0878-5.

Ž Radio frequency Use and Management: Impacts From the World Administrative RadioConference of 1979. OTA-CIT-163, January 1982. GPO stock #052-O03-O0863-7.

● Solar Power Satellite Systems and Issues.OTA-E-144, August 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-108846.

Technical Memoranda

● Remote Sensing and the Private Sector: Issues for Discussion.OTA-TM-ISC-20, March 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0945-5.

Ž Salyut: Soviet Steps Toward Permanent Human Presence in Space.OTA-TM-STI-14, December 1983. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0937-4.

● UNISPA CE ’82: A Context for International Cooperation and Competition.OTA-T’IM-lSC-26, March 1983. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0962-5.

● Space Science Research in the United States.OTA-TM-STI-19, September 1982. NTIS order #PB 83-166512.

Military Space

“Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control” (scheduled for publicationsummer 1985)

“Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies” (scheduled for publication summer 1985).

● Arms Control in Space— Workshop Proceedings.OTA-BP-ISC-28, May 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0952-8.

● Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space —Background Paper.OTA-BP-ISC-26, April 1984. GPO stock #052 -O03-O0948-0.

Technology Transfer

● Technology and East-West Trade: An Update.OTA-I!X-209, May 1983. GPO stock #052-003-00908-l.

● Technology and Soviet Energy Availability.OTA-ISC-153, November 1981. NTIS order #PB 82-133455.

● Technology and East-West Trade.OTA-ISC-1O1, November 1979. NTIS order #PB 80-119381.

NOTE: Reports are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, DC 20402, (202)783-3238; and the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161, (703) 487-4650.

iv

— —

OTA Project Staff for U. S.= Soviet Cooperation in Space

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTAScience, Information, and Natural Resources Division

Nancy C. Naismith, Science, Transportation, and innovation Program Manager

Nancy Lubin, Project Director

Betty Jo Tatum, Research Assistant

Philip P. Chandler, II* Courtland Lewis** Michael McFaul

Michael Strong Kate Tomlinson *

Administrative Staff

Marsha Fenn, Administrative Assistant

Gala Adams, Clerical Assistant

‘*Workshop Director ““C[)ntrartor

Contributors and Reviewers

During the course of this study, a large number of individuals assisted the OTA staff by providinginformation from their own research and experience, reviewing draft documents, arranging interviews,providing photographs, and giving their time and energy in many ways. The project staff deeply ap-preciates this willing and thoughtful help from our colleagues. All responsibility for the document it-self rests with OTA.

Reviewers

Richard Barnes, National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationFrancis Cevasco, Department of DefenseJennifer Clapp, National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationHubert Curien, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, FranceRichard DalBello, Office of Technology AssessmentMerton Davies, Rand Corp.Daniel Deudney, ConsultantSidney Drell, Stanford UniversityEileen Galloway, International Institute of Space Law of the International Astronautical FederationRonnie Goldberg, New York Chamber of Commerce and IndustryLoren Graham, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyAlan Greenberg, Department of StateJerry Grey, ConsultantJohn Hardt, Congressional Research ServiceJames Head, Brown UniversityBenjamin Huberman, ConsultantDouglas Jenkins, American Embassy, FranceFrancis Kapper, Department of DefenseSaunders Kramer, ConsultantLouis Laidet, French Embassy, Washington, DCLouis Lanzerotti, AT&T Bell LaboratoriesGordon Law, Office of Technology AssessmentJohn Logsdon, George Washington UniversityEdward McGaffigan, Office of Senator BingamanGeorge Ojalehto, Department of StateKenneth Pederson, National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationTheodore Postol, Stanford UniversityDiane Rausch, National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationVictor Reis, Science Applications International Corp.Harold Relyea, Congressional Research ServicePeter Sharfman, Office of Technology AssessmentEugene Skolnikoff, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyMarcia Smith, Congressional Research ServicePete Smith, National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationPaul Uhlir, National Oceanic and Atmospheric AdministrationCharles Vick, ConsultantMitchell Wallerstein, National Academy of SciencesRay Williamson, Office of Technology AssessmentJohn Zimmerman, Department of State

Contributors

M. Amigues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FranceJean Arets, European Space AgencyHarry Atkinson, Science and Engineering Research Council, Great Britain

Vt

David Blatherwick, Energy, Space, and Science Division, Foreign andGreat Britain

H. Bourlakoff, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, FranceDina Braverman, French Embassy, Washington, DCSir Arnold Burgen, The Royal Society, Great BritainJames Burke, Jet Propulsion LaboratoryOdile Burton, French Embassy, Washington, DCAnthony Cox, British Embassy, Washington, DCRosemarie Crisostomo, Rand Corp.Robert Cronin, Science Applications International Corp.Harriet Crosby, Institute for Soviet-American RelationsGenevieve Debouzy, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, FranceChris Dodge, Congressional Research ServiceMurray Feshbach, Georgetown UniversityLouis Friedman, The Planetary SocietySue Fruchter, National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationDonna Gold, Congressional Research ServiceAmbassador A. Hartman, U.S. Embassy, MoscowArnold Horelick, Rand Corp.Robert Kelley, Federal Bureau of InvestigationLee Love, ConsultantJack Matlock, National Security CouncilBarbara McKenney, Science Applications International Corp.Cheryl Mendonsa, Office of Congressman Brown

Commonwealth Office,

A. C.- Nicholas, Space Branch, Department of Trade and Industry, Great BritainDavid Peary, Foreign and Commonwealth, Office, Great BritainPaul Poujade, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, FranceIan Pryke, European Space AgencyDavid Roberts, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Great BritainR. Roberts, Department of Trade and Industry, Great BritainPeter Roland, a-rid associates, Soviet Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Great BritainJoseph Rowe, Library of CongressTamara Sherman, LinguatronicsJohn Sopko, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. SenateM. Stuyck-Taillandier, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FranceSir Iain Sutherland, British Embassy, MoscowLady Jeanne Sutherland, British Embassy, MoscowMarvin Tatum, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center LibraryJohn Thomas, Department of StateKip Thorn, California Institute of TechnologyDidier Unman, Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, FranceAsa Wember, ConsultantPeter Warren, The Royal Society, Great BritainSir Frederick Warren, The Royal Society, Great BritainClaude Wachtel, Secretariat General de la Defense Nationale, France

Interviews were also conducted with Soviet scientists and foreign policy experts at the followinginstitutions: Interkosmos; Institute of Medical and Biological Problems, Ministry of Health; Instituteof Space Research, Soviet Academy of Sciences; State Committee for Science and Technology; andInstitute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada.

vii

Contents

C h a p t e r Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2. HISTORY OF U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN SPACE, . . . . . . . . . .Background: From the Cold War “Missile GapH to a Cooperative

Space Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Early U.S. Interest in Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Early 1960s: Unfulfilled Promise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Late 1960s: The United States Lands a Man on the Moon.. ., ..., ...,

The 1970s: Moves Toward Broader Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rendezvous and Docking for Space Rescue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., .Initiation of Cooperative Space Science and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The 1972 Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Post ASTP: Changing U.S. Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .The 1980s: Promise for the Future?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3. COOPERATION IN THE SPACE SCIENCES: THE SCIENTIFIC VIEW . . . . .Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Past U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in the Space Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., .Scientific Basis for Future Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Soviet Cooperative Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Summary and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. THE VIEW FROM FRANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . .Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Astronomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Solar Terrestrial Physics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . .Life Sciences and Materials Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...,Planetary Exploration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Space Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Evaluation of French-Soviet Projects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Key Issues and Policy Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Scientific and Economic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Foreign Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Military Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Implications for U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. U.S. POLICY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Scientific and Practical Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Foreign Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Reduce Tensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Symbolism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .“Linkage” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Maintaining Channels of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Military Technology Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Defining Military Sensitivity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

9

15

1515171923232425253233

393940454848

53535457575959596162636566

71727477778081838486

ix

Contents—continued

Delineating Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90Utilization of Sensitive Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Soviet Approach.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

A p p e n d i x e s Page

A. U.S. Cooperative Projects in ‘Space Science and Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101B. Text of Public Law 98-562, Originally Senate Joint Resolution 236,

and Presidential Statement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106C. COSPAS/SARSAT: A Briefcase Study... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Tables

Table No. Page

3-1.

3-2.

4-1.4-2.4-3,

Potential U.S./U.S.S.R. Collaborative Activities:From OTA Workshop, May 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Participants in May 8 Workshop on Possible Future U.S.-SovietSpace Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Budget of the French Space Agency: Breakdown offending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55Breakdown offending for Bilateral Cooperative Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56French Space Program: Main Scientific Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Figures

Figure No). Page

2-1.2-2.2-3.2-4.2-5.2-6.2-7.

2-8.3-1.4-1.c - 1 .c - 2 .

c - 3 .

Soviet Type G Booster, and U.S. Saturn V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Conceptual Illustration, Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Program, 1967-73. . . . . 21Apollo Command Module and Soviet Soyuz Counterpart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29Docking Mechanism Developed for Use in ASTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30ASTP Mission Profile and Timeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31Trajectories of the Various Halley Spacecraft Relative to a Fixed Sun-Earth Line 3.5Primary Operational Soviet Launch Vehicle Family, and Canceled Type-A,A-1, B-1, and Type G-l-e Boosters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Artist’s Depiction of Direction of the Soviet Space Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39Photographic Coverage of the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Zond Spacecraft . . . . . . 46Soviet Proton Launch Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60Soviet COSPAS Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Basic Operational Configuration of the COSPAS/SARSAT SystemComponents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11OThrough a Network of Satellite-to-Ground and Ground-to-GroundCommunications Linkages, COSPAS/SARSAT Affords Coverage of theEntire Globe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ill

xecutive Summarv

Executive Summary

On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signeda Joint Resolution of Congress, now Public Law98-562, in support of renewing cooperation inspace with the U.S.S.R. Since then, a number ofspecific proposals have been put forward for pro-spective U.S.-Soviet joint projects—including acongressional resolution introduced by SenatorMatsunaga in February 1985 in support of U. S.-Soviet cooperation on Mars exploration missions.

Public Law 98-562 marks the outcome of sever-al years of debate on the merits of cooperationwith the U.S.S.R. in space and other activities.This technical memorandum, written at the re-quest of Senators Matsunaga, Mathias, and Pen,is intended to sort out the issues of implementingPublic Law 98-562 as they apply to debates inCongress today. It is not intended to determinewhether cooperation should be pursued, nor toprescribe optimal methods for doing so. Instead,it is intended to sketch out the broad issues sur-rounding the implementation of U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in space, and to provide a basis for dis-cussing guidelines and specific policy approachesin the future.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space comprises acombination of scientific, foreign policy, and na-tional security issues. It is influenced by a back-ground of strained, unpredictable, and ambiguousrelations between the two countries overall, andby the fact that international scientific and tech-nological cooperation and the civilian and mili-tary uses of space have become more complex andcontentious issues in their own right.

In light of conflicting currents in U.S.-Sovietrelations, therefore, balancing competing objec-tives and different perceptions of the U.S.S.R. willbe a major challenge in determining the shape andmagnitude of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace. Four issues are central:

• the scientific and practical benefits that canbe gained from space cooperation,

● the potential transfer of militarily sensitivetechnology or know-how between the twocountries,

• the effect of space cooperation on foreign pol-icy, and

● perceptions about Soviet motivations and be-havior and the course of U.S.-Soviet relationsoverall.

From a scientific and practical point of view,past experience has shown that cooperation inspace can lead to substantive gains in some areasof space research and applications, and can pro-vide the United States with improved insight intothe Soviet space program and Soviet society asa whole. As discussed in chapter 3, scientists inOTA’S workshop concluded that the scientific re-turn from U.S. space exploration activities couldbe expanded significantly by cooperation with theSoviet Union. The scientists also suggested thatcooperation be initiated with modest exchangesof solid scientific substance in relatively well-bounded areas, and that the possibility of a large-scale mission might be held out as a long-termgoal, provided that it, too, offered rewards of sol-id scientific substance.

Past experience also suggests that technologytransfer from the United States to the U.S.S.R.will remain a major countervailing concern in anyfuture space cooperation. Should cooperation berenewed or expanded, the challenge facing U.S.planners will be to minimize these concerns; butconcerns will continue to arise regardless of thescale or level of cooperation. Most people agreethat precautions must be taken to prevent trans-ferring militarily sensitive technology and know-how to the U.S.S.R. The difficulties will lie in de-termining what should be considered militarilysensitive, who should be authorized to make suchdecisions, and the extent to which potentially sen-sitive technology or know-how can be protectedin any particular exercise.

Past experience, both in low-level cooperationwith the U.S.S.R. and in more extensive cooper-ation with our allies, suggests that this will be adifficult and controversial challenge. The Sovietshave no doubt been pursuing an aggressive cam-paign to acquire Western technology and know-how, particularly in the area of space systems andtechnology; severely limiting cooperation in spaceis one way of protecting Western security againstsuch efforts. But Soviet scientists are also conduct-

3

4

ing innovative and high caliber work in certainareas of space research and applications. Overly

stringent controls could threaten the free inter-change of scientific and technical ideas and infor-mation in areas complementary to, but not alwaysaddressed in, the U.S. space program. In addi-tion, since the Soviets are already cooperatingwith other Western countries in space researchand applications, the United States could find itincreasingly difficult to control the flow of infor-mation to the U.S.S.R. without isolating itselffrom the rest of the world space community. Akey challenge, then, will be to craft cooperativearrangements that diminish the possibility of aid-ing Soviet military capabilities but that keep spacecooperation substantive and viable.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge will be toassess how space cooperation can be effectivelyused to support U.S. foreign policy objectives.Space cooperation, on both low and high levels,is inherently symbolic. The main areas of contro-versy concern whether space cooperation can alterSoviet behavior, and so ease U.S.-Soviet conflicts;and whether starting and/or stopping space coop-eration is an appropriate political symbol to un-derscore other U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The extent to which space cooperation can alterSoviet behavior, and in that way reduce tensionin U.S.-Soviet relations overall, is hard to pre-dict. One viewpoint suggests that this is entirelyplausible, and cooperation should be pursued to-ward this end. An opposing viewpoint suggeststhat there is no reason to believe the Soviets wouldalter their behavior as a result of U.S.-Sovietcooperation in space and that cooperation mighteven be dangerous: from this perspective, any re-duction in tension would be superficial, andwould only lead the United States to lower itsguard against an adversary that uses cooperationsolely for its own purposes. In between are a rangeof views, including the belief that a low level ofinterchange among scientists at a working level,removed from the realm of superpower politics,can be the most effective way for keeping chan-nels of communication open and reducing tensionsbetween the two countries in the long run. An-other belief is that space cooperation has no fun-damental positive or negative effect on U.S.-So-viet relations, and must be weighed simply on its

own merit. Although there is no evidence frompast experience that space cooperation can affectforeign policy in any far-reaching way, many be-lieve the future can be different.

Regardless of whether space cooperation canalter Soviet behavior, another question is whetherit is smart to exploit its symbolic value to achieveother U.S. interests. Symbolic value has alwaysbeen a key component in both the U.S. and So-viet space programs, on low as well as high levelsof cooperation. The question of whether cooper-ation should be initiated or terminated primarily

to pursue symbolic goals has generated a contro-versy of its own. Creating a large-scale coopera-tive effort in space, for example, could bring posi-tive benefit to the United States, by illustratingto other countries the U.S. desire to work withour adversaries to promote peace. But it couldalso bring risks: 1) it may provide the U.S.S.R.with a great deal of symbolic benefit by castingthem as technological equals; and 2) should alarge-scale joint project fail, the symbolic costcould be damaging to U, S. interests. The symbol-ic benefits and risks from U.S.-Soviet cooperationin space would increase with the size, scale, andvisibility of any cooperative effort.

Similarly, severely curbing or terminating coop-eration may be an appropriate symbolic measureto show displeasure with egregious Soviet behav-ior, but it also carries risks. U.S.-Soviet cooper-ation in space inevitably occurs in the context ofU.S.-Soviet relations overall, and the tendency

of U.S. policy in the past has been to utilize spacecooperation for foreign policy ends. The assump-tion has been that an abrupt reduction in spacecooperation can be an effective means of protest-ing Soviet behavior: when the Soviets do some-thing morally reprehensible at home or abroad,some believe the United States has a moral respon-sibility to respond, and space cooperation is aneffective way of doing so. But as this will gener-ally result in scientific and practical losses, manyquestion this approach, preferring other methodsof protest that show displeasure at less cost, Theybelieve that curtailing or terminating space coop-eration with the U.S.S.R. brings little benefit, andin fact may harm scientific inquiry and/or U. S.-Soviet relations overall. There is a notable lackof agreement on how past experience might clar-

5

ify these debates, and the degree to which pastexperience may be useful in assessing potential fu-ture cooperation.

Underlying all of these viewpoints are differ-ent assumptions about Soviet objectives and be-havior. The Soviet approach to cooperation hastended to mirror its overall approach to U. S.-Soviet relations, reflecting both an official com-mitment to cooperation in space, and a basic com-petition between the two superpowers. Sovietleaders have consistently used their space programnot only to enhance cooperation, but also to pur-sue other foreign policy objectives more competi-tive and confrontational in nature (such as weak-ening the prestige and influence of the UnitedStates while enhancing that of the U. S. S. R., anddeveloping a strong militarily related space capa-bility of their own). This has led to vastly differ-ent interpretations of Soviet motivations andactions among U.S. observers, and different inter-pretations of the lessons of past U.S.-Soviet coop-eration. A central U.S. foreign policy challenge,therefore, will be to assess how U.S. objectivesmay be attained independent of Soviet intentions.

Other countries with space programs of theirown are grappling with these same issues. Manyof these countries have developed different ap-proaches to cooperating with the U.S.S.R. thatmay be instructive for U.S. planners, and that willcertainly have an impact on the effectiveness ofU.S. policy choices in the future. OTA reviewedthe issues in French-Soviet space cooperation—themost continuous and extensive East-West coop-eration in space science research—to examinewhether they might offer insights for U.S. policy.

French-Soviet space cooperation was begunwith political aims paramount. As the politicalclimate has become less opportune for promot-ing such cooperative efforts, however, and as thescientific base of the French space program hasgrown, scientific and economic aspects have beenincreasingly emphasized.

In the 1980s, therefore, French policy reflectsthe view that the scientific and economic bene-fits, and the political advantages gained fromkeeping lines of communication open with the

U.S.S.R. through space cooperative efforts, off-set any benefits that may be attained by terminat-ing cooperation in symbolic protest. Accordingly,space cooperation has not been dramatically in-terrupted in response to broader political events.While believing that no area of cooperation withthe U.S.S.R. can be totally depoliticized, Frenchplanners argue that it is important to seek an areafor cooperation where political considerations arereduced as much as possible, but where scientificbenefit can be substantial and continuous. Interms of technology transfer, the French believethey have effective mechanisms in place to con-trol the transfer of militarily sensitive technologyto the U. S. S. R., and they provide briefings toFrench scientists who work with Soviet scientiststo better control the flow of sensitive information.But the French differ markedly from the UnitedStates in defining “militarily sensitive” technol-ogies as only those with direct military applica-tion—as opposed to more extensive U.S. defini-tions—and by tending to be more confident aboutspecial “packaging” and other ways in which sen-sitive technology can be protected.

Because of several factors, then—the conflictsbetween the gains of cooperation and the risks oftechnology transfer; disagreement over the rela-tive importance of scientific and practical bene-fits and foreign policy goals; and possible incon-sistencies among foreign policy objectives —therewill always be a multiplicity of views about East-West cooperation in space. The ways in whichthese viewpoints are reflected in policy will de-termine the size, shape, scope, and effectivenessof any potential space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

It would clearly be useful to further examinethe costs and benefits of past cooperation, as abasis for considering the establishment, cancel-lation or continuation of cooperative arrange-ments in the future. At the same time, however,it is important to remember that views on howmuch cooperation to pursue will necessarily re-flect judgments about broader issues of world ten-sions, Soviet objectives, and the overall courseof U.S.-Soviet relations at least as much as theywill reflect judgments about the costs and bene-fits of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation itself.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 1

Introduction

The issue of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in spacehas been the subject of congressional and otherdebate since the beginning of the space age in the1950s. For the most part the two countries havedeveloped extensive space programs in almostcomplete isolation from each other, with spaceprograms heavily military and strategic in nature.But in light of overall world tensions, U.S.-Sovietcooperation in space has been viewed by bothcountries as a mechanism for enhancing nationalprestige, sending peaceful symbolic messages tothe rest of the world, pooling important scientificand technical information and insights, and per-haps leading to a genuine reduction of tensionson Earth. In U.S. congressional debates U.S.-So-viet space cooperation has characteristically beenpromoted as a means of reducing tensions andpromoting world peace.

The development of U.S.-Soviet cooperationin space has occurred as part of a growth in U. S.-Soviet scientific and technical (S&T) cooperationoverall. Formal cooperation in S&T began be-tween the two countries on a bilateral basis in1959, with the signing of agreements for scientificexchange programs between the National Acad-emy of Sciences of the United States and the Acad-emy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. It continued witha variety of inter-institutional agreements betweenthe Soviet Academy of Sciences and such U.S.Government agencies as the National Aeronau-tics and Space Administration (NASA), the Na-tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration(NOAA), the Federal Aviation Administration(FAA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and theDepartment of Agriculture (USDA). In the early1970s this cooperation culminated in the signing ofa broad U.S.-Soviet intergovernmental agreementto cooperate bilaterally in 11 areas of science andtechnology.

U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has occurred ona number of levels: on a bilateral intergovernmen-tal basis, in multilateral forums, and through moreinformal scientist-to-scientist exchange. For exam-ple, the United States and the Soviet Union havesigned broad agreements to cooperate in space onfour occasions, the first two at the interagency level

(1962 and 1971, between NASA and the SovietAcademy of Sciences), and the latter two at the inter-governmental level, when an intergovernmental“Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Explo-ration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Pur-poses” was signed in 1972 and renewed in 1977. Inthe multilateral context U.S.-Soviet space cooper-ation has expanded through international projectsand organizations such as the World Weather Watchconducted by the WorId Meteorological Organiza-tion (WMO), and the International Maritime Sat-ellite (INMARSAT) system; the United States andthe U.S.S.R. have also signed and ratified four U.N.treaties and agreements concerning the peaceful useof outer space.1 And U, S.-Soviet interaction and dis-cussions without governmentaI-level recognitionhave also taken place in such forums as the Inter-national Astronautical Federation (IAF) and theCommittee on Space Research (COSPAR), orga-nized in 1958 as a coordinating body of the Inter-national Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU).

Despite these various types of cooperative efforts,the history of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation hasbeen an uneven one, marked by intermittent hopes,occasional accomplishments, and many disappoint-ments. The high level of secrecy surrounding So-viet space activities (due to the absence of a sepa-ration between Soviet military and civilian spaceprograms) has impeded the interchange of informa-tion and ideas. And it has proved to be exceedinglydifficult, in the U.S.S.R. as well as in the UnitedStates, to separate the issues of U.S.-Soviet militaryand political competition on Earth from the pursuitof cooperation in space.

‘These are: I ) the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Act]vltlesof States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including theMoon and Other Celestial lk>dies” (1967) (TIAS b3~7; 18 UST 2410:610 UNTS 205): 2 ) an “Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,the Return of Astronauts, and the Return ot Objects Launched InOuter Space” (1968) (TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; bi’2 UNTS 20513) the “Convention on International Liability for IIamage Causedb} Space Objects” ~ 1Q72 ) (TIAS 7762; 24 UST 238Q: 961 UNTS 187):and ~ ) the “(-(~ nvention cln Registration of Objects I.aunched Intc~Outer Spare” ( 1974) (TIAS 8480 28 UST oQ5; 1023 UNTS 151 AIItth treaty, ~n “Agreement G(~vernlng the Actl\ritles CIt Statei ~~nthe hl{~(~n an~i Other (’ele~tial Hoci]e+’ ( 1 Q7Q I, ha~ entereci Into I (w( el>~]t neither the IIn]teci Statt\ nor the [1 S .S R has >i~ned it.

9

10

on are also being voiced

Photo credit National Air and Space Museum

Vanguard I

Thus, notwithstanding a stated desire on thepart of both countries to pursue such cooperation,U.S.-Soviet space cooperation in practice hastended to follow the course of U.S.-Soviet rela-tions overall. After more than a decade of frus-trated attempts to establish space cooperation dur-ing the late 1950s and the 1960s, cooperationreached its high point in the mid-1970s, at theheight of detente, with the Apollo-Soyuz TestProject (ASTP), before declining to a very lowlevel in the late 1970s and to the lapsing of the1972 Agreement in 1982. Now, 10 years afterASTP, the renewal of U.S.-Soviet space coop-eration on an intergovernmental basis is onceagain being actively proposed, but many of thesame concerns and issues which characterized

early efforts at cooperattoday.

** ** ** ** **

The signing of Public Law 98-562 in October1984 in support of renewing space cooperationwith the U. S. S. R., and subsequent proposals forprospective U.S.-Soviet joint projects, have againbrought fundamental questions to the fore. Whatshould specific U.S. objectives be, and how shouldthese objectives be reconciled with each other? IsU.S.-Soviet space cooperation primarily a polit-ical or scientific endeavor? Does it in fact promotepeace or reduce tensions? What should take prec-edence when scientific and foreign policy objec-tives conflict? How much “technology transfer”to the U.S.S.R. should the United States permitso as not to jeopardize real scientific and foreignpolicy benefits? And to what degree should spacecooperation fluctuate depending on broader po-litical events?

These and other questions have triggered a greatdeal of public debate in the United States. Oneviewpoint, for example, argues that renewed U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space should be vigorouslypursued for political, economic, and scientific rea-sons. At a time when the “weaponization” ofspace has become a major concern in the UnitedStates and abroad, some observers argue thatcooperation in space represents a feasible meansfor altering this trend. At a time when U.S.-Sovietrelations are at one of their lowest points of thelast few decades, space cooperation is viewed asa means of reducing tensions. And in more quan-tifiable terms, the potential scientific and eco-nomic benefits of renewed cooperation are con-sidered substantive enough in their own right tomerit renewed cooperation. Proponents of theseviews tend to support a relatively large-scale jointU.S.-Soviet cooperative endeavor in space, insu-lated from the ups and downs of U.S.-Soviet re-lations and world politics.

Others, however, are more wary of renewedU.S.-Soviet space cooperation, placing more em-phasis on the possible negative foreign policy andnational security implications. In terms qf poten-tial political benefits, for example, these observersargue that U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space should

—

not be viewed as the antithesis of militarizationof space: one can compete militarily and cooper-ate at the same time. They argue that space coop-eration cannot be insulated from, nor greatlychange, broader political events, and may resultin Soviet rather than U.S. political advantage.And the scientific and economic benefits, someargue—although real, and at times substantial—are not great enough to offset the technologytransfer and national security concerns whichwould accompany any cooperative venture inspace. Proponents of these views tend to opposerenewing cooperation in space, or support pur-suing space cooperation on a very low level, per-haps using it as a foreign policy tool when appro-priate.

This technical memorandum is designed to sortout these issues as a basis for discussing guide-lines and more specific policy approaches in thefuture. It is not intended to determine whether co-operation should be pursued, nor to prescribe op-timal methods for doing so. Instead, it is designedonly to clarify the pros and cons of each set ofpolicy issues and highlight the potential conflictsamong them.

Following this brief introduction, chapter 2 out-lines the history of U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace, and the policy debates which have takenplace in the United States since the beginning ofthe space age. It focuses on bilateral intergovern-mental U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, as a back-ground to analyzing policy issues facing Congresstoday and the kinds of questions these may sug-gest for the future.

Chapter 3 identifies some potential areas for ex-panded U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space sci-


The world’s first cosmonaut —Laika

ences. Based on a workshop of space scientistsheld at OTA in May 1984, the chapter presentsa scientific evaluation of past U.S.-Soviet coop-erative efforts in the planetary and space lifesciences, and enumerates potential projects for thefuture which could have substantial scientificmerit.

Chapters 4 and 5 combine this historical andscientific background with the complex array offoreign policy and national security issues whichlie at the heart of any U.S.-Soviet cooperative ac-tivity in space. Chapter 4 focuses on French pol-icies since, of all the Western countries, Francehas had the most extensive and long-term spacecooperation with the U. S. S. R., and has tendedto approach space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.in terms quite different from those in the UnitedStates. Chapter 5 examines all of these issues asthey face U.S. policy makers today.

Chapter 2

. . - —

... .—--- - ---—- ---Yt

History of U. S.- SovietCooperation in Space---- - ~--.” .

— - — . - — .

1

, . A .— ‘


Eleventh century tapestry showing the Comet Halley

Chapter 2

History of U.S.-SovietCooperation in Space

BACKGROUND: FROM THE COLD WAR “MISSILE GAP”TO A COOPERATIVE SPACE AGREEMENT

The history of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in spacehas been marked by a number of overarchingthemes. In both countries, space cooperation hasostensibly been viewed as one means to achievea greater degree of understanding and diminishconflict on Earth; a stated objective of both coun-tries has been to encourage space cooperation forthe benefit of mankind. But efforts to establishbilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation have beenmarked by certain inherent tensions difficult toresolve: tensions in cooperating in space whilecompeting on Earth; in simultaneously compet-ing and cooperating in space, where, in both coun-tries, military activities have been a prominent,if not driving force; in reconciling U.S,-Sovietspace cooperation with the broader U.S.-Sovietpolitical relationship; and tensions within bothcountries among various interests and bureaucra-tic perspectives in formulating national policy.United States and U.S.S.R. policies traditionallyhave reflected different viewpoints regarding whatcooperation means and how it fits into the broaderU.S.-Soviet relationship. All of these issues havecolored the history of U.S.-Soviet space cooper-ation, and continue to shape the direction inwhich such cooperation may move in the future.

Early U.S. Interest in Cooperation

work cooperatively, 1 and by a strong concern forsecrecy in virtually all of its space activities. TheUnited States, on the other hand, was more favor-ably disposed towards cooperation with theU. S. S. R., viewing it not only as a means to pro-mote peace, but as a means of pooling technicalknowledge, placing the use of space under somedegree of control, and of increasing U.S. prestigeinternationally. 2 Although Soviet planners grad-ually warmed toward space cooperation in the1970s, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized byU.S. overtures for space cooperation which were,for the most part, rejected or ignored. They weremarked by only sporadic and low-level coopera-tion, against a background of strident compe-tition.

One of the earliest forums for encouragingspace cooperation in the 1950s was the Interna-tional Geophysical Year (IGY). The IGY—actu-ally a period of 18 months from July 1957 toDecember 1958—was established by the Interna-tional Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to poolinternational efforts in studying our physical envi-ronment: the Earth, the oceans, the atmosphere,and outer space. Although the IGY’s program ini-tially did not include the launching of artificialsatellites, American scientists proposed such an

Since the beginning of the “space age, ” in theearly 1950s, both the United States and theU.S.S.R. have been committed in principle to theidea of international cooperation in space. Butagainst a background of the Cold War and sub-stantial military competition, initial efforts toestablish U.S.-Soviet space cooperation met withlittle success. The Soviet approach to space wascharacterized by efforts to “score propagandapoints against the capitalist West” rather than

‘Joseph G, Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward Cooperation InSpace’, ” in Congressiona] Research Service .%)~’iet Spdc(J 17rogrc]n7.5197&&?0, prepare~~ [Or the senate C[}rnmil t~~ [m c(~mmerc(>, Scienc(’and Transport atlon ( Wash i n~ti(}n, 1 X : L]. S. G(}vernment I’rintingoffice, 1982), p. 207,

‘See Marcia Smith, ‘International C(><~p~’r~t i<~n in Space, ” Urr~tec/Stdtes CiLri/jdn Sp<3ce I’rograms JQ.581~78 d report p r e p a r e d t(~rthe House Subcommittee on Space Science and Appl lc.]ti<lnt, C-c~m-mlttee on Science and Technology, Q7th C[~ng, ( ~~’dshingt(~n, ~>C’.

L]. S. G[]vernrnent Printing Ott ice, ]981 ), pp. 834$37 and r>(~dd1,. Harvey and Linda C. Cicconttl, [‘ S,-Sotjet Cm)peratjon jn Spacr( Nl]dmi: Center for Ach’anced International Studies, Uni\’er\ity othliami, IQ741, pp. 1-22.

15

16

effort at the planning conference in Rome in 1954of the committee established to coordinate theIGY effort, the Comite' Special de L’Annee Geo-physique International (CSAGI).3 With tens ofthousands of scientists from 69 countries partici-pating, the IGY involved investigations in manyareas, both in space and on Earth, including thosedirected at the physics of the upper atmosphere,the Earth’s heat and water regimen, and theEarth’s structure and shape. Both the United Statesand the Soviet Union participated in the IGY, andboth planned to launch a satellite in conjunctionwith it.

Largely because of Soviet reluctance to engagein extensive information exchange, however, co-operation in space activities both in planning forthe IGY and during the IGY itself remained ona token level. Although the Soviet Union did par-ticipate in the IGY, it applied restrictions to IGYagreements for exchange of information in space,and Soviet compliance with IGY requirements inspace science was poor.4 This was due at least inpart to the high level of secrecy and the lack ofa clear distinction—unchanged to this day—be-tween the Soviet military and civilian space ef-forts, which inhibited the Soviets in sharing in-

—‘For a more in-depth look at this early part of space history see:●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Walter Sullivan, Assault on the Uriknown: The InternationalGeophysical Year (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (En-glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).Constance McLaughlin Green and Milton Lomask, Vanguard:A History (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration, 1970).Michael Collins, Carrying the Fire, An Astronaut’s Journeys(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1974).Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space, op.cit.Congressional Research Service, Science Policy Research Di-vision, WorL+Wide Space Activities, a report prepared for theSubcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the Com-mittee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representa-tives (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,1977).Homer E. Newell, Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years in SpaceScience (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration, 1980).Walter A. McDouXall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Poiitica)History of the S&-ce Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985).

4See Frutk in, International Cooperation in Space, op. cit., pp.19-20:

The %vlet Union provided virtually no advance information of asubstantive character regard]ng either its satellite or sounding rocketprograms, restricted agreements prescribing types of information tobe exchanged, and released only Ilmited quantities of digested sclen-t]fic findings such as normally appear in conventional publications (p.20)

Photo credit” Nat/onal Air and Space Museum

Sputnik 1

formation and data. The Soviet approach wasdifferent from that in the United States, whichstressed a separation between civilian and mili-tary space efforts.

Both the promise and problems of this spacecooperation were highlighted with the Soviets’launching of Sputnik 1 in October 1957. The U.S.public and the Congress were caught by surprise,and the launch was viewed both as a humiliatingdefeat for U.S. prestige and as a deep nationalsecurity concern. In the words of one specialist:

The Soviet Union had demonstrated by its sat-ellite program its capacity for launching intercon-tinental ballistic missiles, and its intention of ex-ploring the space environment whose controlcould affect methods of maintaining peace andwaging wars

The immediate effect of Sputnik, therefore, wasto inspire competition. The United States in-creased funding for its space program, viewingexpanded capabilities in space as critical to U.S.prestige and strategic defense. b At the same time,however, it also underlined the importance of en-

‘Eilene Galloway, “Congress and International Space Coopera-tion, ” International Cooperation in Outer Space: A Symposium,prepared for the U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Aeronauti-cal and Space Sciences (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-ing Office, 1971 ), p. 4.

bJohn Logsdon, The Decision to go to the Moon: Project Apolloand the National Interest (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1970).

77

couraging international cooperation as a meansof promoting peaceful rather than military usesof outer space. As stated by the Preparedness In-vestigating Subcommittee of the Senate ArmedServices Committee in 1958:

. . . the same forces, the same knowledge, and the

s a m e t e c h n o l o g y w h i c h a r e p r o d u c i n g b a l l i s t i c

missi les can also produce instruments of peace and

u n i v e r s a l c o o p e r a t i o n . . . t h e t r u l y w o r t h w h i l e

goal is a world of peace—the only world in whichthere will also be security.7

A total of eight successful satellite launches wereaccomplished during the IGY: The U.S.S.R.launched Sputnik I, 11 and 111; the United Stateslaunched Explorer I, II, and IV, Vanguard I, andPioneer III. But despite some exchange of infor-mation, space cooperation was the most disap-pointing part of the IGY, and efforts outside ofthe IGY to engage Moscow in space cooperationremained unanswered or were refused.

Thus, the late 1950s highlighted the twin themesof competition and cooperation which wouldcharacterize all subsequent U.S.-Soviet effortstowards cooperation in space. The IGY markedthe beginning of efforts of space scientists through-out the world to work together despite politicaldifferences. But especially with the launching ofSputnik 1, it also showed the difficulties of coop-erating, and revealed the Soviets as strong com-petitors with the United States in space technol-ogy and possessors of a military capability withstartling implications.

‘Inquiry into Satel/ite and Lfissile I’rograms, hearings before thePreparedness\ Investi&ating Subcommittee of the Senate Commit-tee on Armed Services, 85th Cong,, 1st and 2d sess., Part 3 (Wash-ington, DC-: U.S. Government Printing office, 1958), pp. 2429-2430.

Photo credit Nat/onal Air and Space Museurr

Explorer 1

One result for the United States was the estab-lishment of the National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration (NASA) to address both the com-petitive and cooperative sides of space. NASAwas created by the National Aeronautics andSpace Act of 1958, whose declaration of policy—that space activities be conducted for peaceful pur-poses and for the benefit of mankind—includedspecific goals for encouraging both peaceful com-petition and cooperation with foreign countries,East and West. For example, the Act calls for “thepreservation of the role of the United States asa leader in aeronautical and space science andtechnology” 8 and for “cooperation by the UnitedStates with other nations and groups of nations. . .“9

in the conduct and peaceful application of space-related activities.

The Early 1960s: Unfulfilled Promise

Although the goal of international cooperationhad been included in NASA’s charter—and al-though the 1960s saw expanded U.S. cooperationwith countries other than the U. S. S. R., and So-viet cooperation with countries other than theUnited States—U.S.-Soviet relations regardingspace during the decade of the 1960s were charac-terized primarily by competition. The KennedyAdministration accelerated the pace of U.S. spaceefforts soon after entering office, and on May 25,1961, during an address to a joint session of the88th Congress, President Kennedy called on thecountry to commit itself to landing a man on theMoon by the end of the decade. ’O Although theidea had been discussed among scientists and inCongress in the late 1950s, this official statementof policy became part of another round of the“space race, “ not “won” until 1969. The first halfof the 1960s was marked by major achievementsin the Soviet Vostok and Voskhod programs, inthe U.S. Mercury and Gemini programs, and thefirst “space walk, ” conducted by the Soviet cos-

‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1Q58, Public Law. 85-5d8,Section 102(c)(5).

*Ibid , Section 102(c)(7) Section 205 of the act provides forma]authorization for international cooperation in space.

“’John F. Kennedy, Special Nlessage to the C{~ngres\ on [Jr~entNational Needs, ” May 25, IQ61, Public- [>apers of the presidents ofthe United States: /ohn F. R’ennedjr, J%l ( Washington, DC: L] .S.Cotrernrnent [>r]nting office, 1 Qb2 ), pp. 3Q7-407.

18

But despite the commitment to devote more re-sources towards the “space race, ” the idea of co-operation with the U.S.S.R. was not abandoned.President Kennedy explicitly underlined this in hisState of the Union message in 1961:

Finally, this Administration intends to explorepromptly all possible areas of cooperation withthe Soviet Union and other nations “to invoke thewonders of science instead of its terrors. ”Specif-ically, I now invite all nations—including the So-viet Union—to join with us in developing aweather prediction program, in a new communi-cations satellite program, and in preparation forprobing the distant planets of Mars and Venus,probes which may someday unlock the deepestsecrets of the universe.

Today, this country is ahead in the science andtechnology of space, while the Soviet Union isahead in the capacity to lift large vehicles into or-bit. Both nations would help themselves as wellas other nations by removing these endeavorsfrom the bitter and wasteful competition of theCold War. The United States would be willing tojoin with the Soviet Union and the scientists ofall nations in a greater effort to make the fruitsof this new knowledge available to all .. .11

Soon after taking office President Kennedy formeda special panel—a Joint NASA-President’s ScienceAdvisory Committee-Department of State Panel,directed by Jerome Wiesner—to study the possi-bilities for international cooperation in space ac-tivities and related fields. Focusing its attentionprimarily on collaboration between the UnitedStates and the U. S. S. R., the Panel made a seriesof concrete proposals for cooperative activities.Again Soviet interest, however, was not forth-coming on any of these proposals.

Part of the reason for the lack of agreement wasthe relation of cooperation in space to broaderissues of U.S.-Soviet relations. While the UnitedStates hoped to isolate cooperation in space as aseparate area of negotiation, the U.S.S.R. tendedto view it as inextricably intertwined with broaderforeign policy issues. Whereas U.S. statements re-flected the hope that cooperation in space mightlead to more understanding and cooperation inother areas, Soviet statements declared that issues

in those other areas—especially disarmament—had to be settled first.

Soviet planners, therefore, declined to discussissues of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space untilthe political situation changed in 1961, when is-sues such as the Berlin crisis and the break withthe Chinese Communist Party led to a fundamen-tal shift in the Soviet stance toward the UnitedStates overall. This shift in attitude was reflectedin October 1961 at the 22nd Congress of the Com-munist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), whenSoviet party and government officials began dis-cussing a policy of cooperation with other nationsin the fields of trade, cultural relations, science,and technology. In December 1961, after yearsof relative intransigence over other U.N. resolu-tions, the Soviet Union for the first time gave itssupport to the passage of a U.N. Resolution stress-ing “the urgent need to strengthen internationalcooperation . . . for the betterment of mankind. . . . “12 And Soviet leaders gradually moderatedtheir position toward cooperation in space withthe United States. The following February, Khrush-chev sent a letter to President Kennedy congrat-ulating the American people on John Glenn’sthree-orbit flight and suggesting that there becloser cooperation in space activities between thetwo powers .13

“John F, Kennedy, “Annual Message to the Congrvss on the Stateof the Union, ” Jan. 30, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of theUnited States: Iohn F. Kennedy, 1%1, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

79

This response led to a series of talks betweenHugh Dryden of NASA and Anatoliy Blagonra-vov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Thesetalks, which were suspended temporarily duringthe Cuban missile crisis, led in turn to the sign-ing of an interagency agreement in December1962. Generally referred to as the Dryden-Blagon-ravov agreement of 1962, the agreement stipulatedcoordinated national efforts in the fields of me-teorology, geomagnetism, and satellite commu-nications experimentation. In addition, a 24-hourcommunications link—the so-called “cold line”*—was established for the real time exchange ofsatellite meteorological data between Washingtonand Moscow. An additional formal agreementconcerned the joint publication of a study onspace biology and medicine. Dryden believed thatthe Soviet concern for secrecy prevented furthercooperation. 14

While some useful data were exchanged, how-ever, the results of the agreements were disap-pointing. Part of this was undoubtedly due toinadequate Soviet technical capabilities for proc-essing data as well as to Soviet intransigence. Themeteorological data received by U.S. scientistswere late and of poorer quality than had been an-ticipated; no satellite data were exchanged con-cerning the magnetosphere; the Soviets receivedexperimental satellite communications but de-clined to transmit; and the space biology and med-icine study was not published until 1975, largelybecause of delays of up to 2 years in Soviet re-sponses. Despite “frequent and repeated effortsto persuade the Soviets to enter new space proj-ects, “lb U.S.-Soviet relations generally remained

(continued)For a description of the Soviet change In attitude at this time see

Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Coop-eration in Space, ” Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 427-430.

For a discussion of the events in the U.N. concerning East-West

cooperation in space at this time see Eilene Galloway, “Part 111: TheUnited Nations, ” International Cooperation and Organization forOuter .s~ace (Washington, DC U.S. Government Printing Office,19651, pp. 163-227.

● Terminated in 1984.l~Eze]] and Eze]], The Partnership, op. cit., P P. 58-59.*’U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space

Sciences, NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1970 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), especially pp. 635-636.

“Ibid., p. 636.

cold, and the level of cooperation in space seemedto follow suit.

The Late 1960s: The United StatesLands a Man on the Moon

During the mid to late 1960s, efforts to expandU.S.-Soviet space cooperation became more mod-est. Despite previous disappointments, the John-son Administration continued to pursue such co-operation. But now studies on potential areas forU.S. cooperation in space—such as the Webb Re-port1 7 —stressed caution, urging that sights forcooperation be lowered, the serious limitationsof cooperating with the U.S.S.R. be recognized,and a “measured approach” with respect to high-level initiatives vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. be adopted.While the Kennedy Administration had hoped forbig projects—extending even to a proposed jointlunar landing–the Johnson Administration shiftedback to an emphasis on small “first steps” whichmight be a basis for broadening cooperation inthe future. ’g Cooperation was left primarily forthe established NASA-Soviet Academy channels,with few overtures for cooperation coming direct-ly from the President himself. Soviet planners, fortheir part, seemed less inclined to cooperate, giventhe greater belligerence in foreign and domesticaffairs of the new Brezhnev /Kosygin leadership,the escalation of the war in South Vietnam and,as before, the fact that relationships with respectto space activities were very much determined bythe nature of the broader political relationship.

Thus, cooperation in space continued on a verylow level. The Soviets began furnishing meteoro-logical data via the long inactive “cold line”; per-haps most importantly, final agreement wasreached on a U.N. Outer Space Treaty in 1967,which was implemented by four subsequent inter-national treaties on space law. 19 But proposals formore substantive bilateral cooperation in spacewere consistently rejected, ignored, or sidestepped

—17 James E. Webb, “Report on Possible Projects [or Substantive

Cooperation With the Soviet Union in the Field of Outer Space, ’Lnown as the Webb Report (letter of transmittal dated Jan. 31, 19~41cited in Harvey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space,op. cit., pp. 138-139.

I ~ Harvey and C iccorit t i, U. .$-soviet Cooperation in Space. ~P.cit., pp. 135-139.

‘“See ch. 1,

2 0

Figure2-l .—Soviet Type G Booster, and U.S. Saturn V

I

2-16M

FIGURE- N

110.64M—A —

LET

LM.

S-IVB I I II I

5-II

.

D-1 G-i-ePROTON TYPE-G

HEAVYSOYUZ CONCEPTCONCEPT

APOLLO/SATURN-VSKYLAB-1

The Type-G booster has never been placed on display, and the U.S.S.R. has never released anydata on its characteristics. The design shown here was developed from deductions about theprobable Soviet manned lunar mission profile and from a line drawing of its possible servicegantry.

SOURCE: Charles P Vlck, 198244

Figure 2-2.–Conceptual Illustration, Soviet Manned Lunar Landing Program, 1967-73

● L U N A R O R B I T I N S E R T I O N

Soviet manned Lunar landing program from 1967 to 1973 when the p(ogram was abandoned. Commentary from Soviet sources, plus the requirements fora manned lunar mission, indicate that the U.S.S.R. had planned to conduct an Earth Orbit Rendezvous (EOR)/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) flight profile.A manned craft would meet the huge unmanned payload in Earth orbit before being propelled off to the Moon. At the completion of the lunar phase of themission, the crew would return to Earth in a variant of their Soyuz spacecraft. All necessary hardware had been developed. The repeated failure of the G-1-ebooster blocked the mission.

SOURCE Charles P Vlck, 1983

22

by Soviet officials. Simultaneously, efforts wereintensified to gain the advantage in the new legof the space race: placing a man on the Moon.

One of the key elements of the Moon race wasthe ability to launch heavy payloads. The Sovietswere testing their Type-G series launchers, but en-countered a series of failures. The developmentof the Saturn V was largely responsible for theUnited States’ success in landing a man on theMoon .20

of U.S. launch vehicles at

this time see Charles S. Sheldon 11, “Launch Vehicles and Propul-sion, ” United States Civilian Space Programs 1958-1978, preparedfor the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications ofthe Committee on Science and Technology (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, January 1981 ), pp. 210-217.

For a discussion of the development of U.S.S.R. launch vehiclesat this time see Charles P. “The Soviet G-1-e Manned LunarLanding Programme Booster, ” Journal of British

Society, No. 1 (January 1985), 11-18.

With the end of the 1960s, many congressionaland other U.S. observers believed that the begin-ning of the Nixon Administration and the land-ing of an American on the Moon in 1969 wouldtrigger more U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space.With the United States having “won the spacerace, ” many believed that American “superiority”would provide incentive for the U.S.S.R. to co-operate rather than fall farther behind in a costlycompetition. The new Administration had stateda desire to move from an “era of confrontationto an era of negotiation” in relations with the So-viet Union; the new NASA administrator, Thom-as Paine, had renewed efforts to interest the So-viet Academy of Sciences in cooperative projects.The successful landing of the U.S. Apollo 11manned spacecraft on the Moon encouragedmany observers to believe that the Soviets wouldnow accept these offers. A number of congres-sional addresses and resolutions introduced in the

Photo credit: National Alr and Space Museum

U.S. Apollo Astronauts: The First Moon Walk

23

House and Senate urged that the lunar landingbe viewed as a catalyst for changing the directionof the U.S. program to place more emphasis onU.S.-Soviet cooperation rather than competi-tion.2’———

“SW tor exam~le:●

●

●

●

●

●

●

U.S. Congre;s, Houser Representative Hechler Speaking onApollo and World Peace, 91st Cong., 1st sess., July 21 ~ 196Q,L’ong,ewonal Rec[)rcf, H~l ltJ.L’. S. Congress House, Representative Keith Commenting onIntroducing H. Con. Res 305 Regarding Future Space Explcwration Jointly by U.S. and Other Nations, Q 1 \t Cong., 1st wss.,JUII 24, 1969, Congress~ond/ Record, H~2W.U.S. Congres\, Senate, Senator Gravel Commenting on andIntroducing Senate Resolution 221 to Internationalize the U.S.Space I’rograrn, Q 1 ~[ ~on~,, 1st sess., Ju]y 22, 196Q, Con&~re\-wonai Rec>orcl, S8385.U ,S. Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire Introducing SenateResolution 285–Resolution Authorizing the Senate Foreign Re-lations Committee to Undertake a Comprehensive Study of AllI’oss]bi]]ties tt~r Internatlona] Cooperation in Space, Qlst Cong.,1st w~s,, No\, 18, 1Q69, Corr,gressiona) Record, S14593.U.S Congress, Ht~use, Representative Nliller Commenting onthe Possibllit> of U.S.-U, S. S. R. Future Exploration of Space,91 St ~ong., 1st ws,, Aug. 11, 1 Q6Q, Congressional” Record,S47251,U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Fulbright Commenting on U. S.-Soviet Competition ]n Space and Possibility ot Future Coop-eration, Q 1st Cong., 1st sess,, Aug. 11, 1~69, CongressionalRecord, S~b31.U.S Congress, Senate, Senator Percy Commenting on U.S.-SOJfiet Cot]peratlon in Space, cv st con~,, 1st sess., Aug. 12, IQ@.~’ongressi(~na] Record SQ828.

But instead of acknowledging “defeat,” Amer-ican technological superiority, and a new willing-ness to cooperate, Soviet officials asserted thatthere never had been a “space race” to the Moon,and simply congratulated the United States onmatching the significant technological achieve-ments already attained by the U. S. S. R.:

Man’s walk on the Moon will go down in thechronicles of the twentieth century as an impor-tant event, along with such related significantachievements as the launching of the first artifi-cial satellite, the first space flight by Iurii Gaga-rin, Aleksey Leonov’s first walk in space, and thefirst launchings of automatic spacecraft towardsthe Moon, Venus, and Mars.22

After Apollo 11 the Soviets continued until 1976to launch unmanned probes for exploration of theMoon. Their manned space program was directedmore towards Earth-orbit operations, leading tothe successful Salyut program of the 1970s. Butat the time of the Moon landing extensive U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space appeared to remainelusive.

“I., Sedov, “CheloveL na lune” [A hlan on the Lloon ], T2-a\’&,]U]y 23, 1969.

THE 1970s: MOVES TOWARD BROADER COOPERATION

Rendezvous and Dockingfor Space Rescue

A major shift towards broader cooperationcame with the 1970s. The end of the 1960s sawa relaxation of tensions on a number of fronts,including the signing of the Non-ProliferationTreaty in 1968 and the beginning of the StrategicArms Limitation Talks (SALT I) in 1969. In theperiod following the lunar landing, one relativelylarge-scale U.S. proposal for a U.S.-Soviet coop-erative space project received a positive response:the idea of astronaut safety and reciprocal rescuecapability as a basis for cooperation. In May 1970,a U.S. proposal to develop a common dockingmechanism for manned spacecraft and space sta-tions was accepted by the U.S.S.R.

It is unclear why the Soviets became interestedin space cooperation with the United States at thistime. Some observers argue that Soviet accept-ance was based primarily on Soviet technologi-cal requirements. Despite some docking successes,the repetition of docking difficulties in the Sovietspace program was considered by some to pro-vide a technical incentive for their acceptance ofcooperation with the United States. For example,in 1968 the manned Soyuz 3 approached the un-manned Soyuz 2 in orbit with the apparent in-tention of docking, but no docking occurred. InOctober of 1969a tandem flight of three mannedspacecraft took place; two of these were expectedto dock, but did not do so—presumably a failedmission.

2 4

Other observers, however, argue that the So-viet shift was motivated more by political con-siderations. Following the beginning of a generalrelaxation of tensions, these observers suggest, theU.S.S.R. viewed a joint U.S.-Soviet venture inspace as a means to enhance its image around theworld and at home.

The Soviets, for their part, have described theshift almost entirely as an outgrowth of changesin their broader political relation with the UnitedStates:

The atmosphere of the “Cold War” of the 1950sto 1960s precluded giving U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion in space the character of a constantly expand-ing process. It is not accidental that cooperativeactivity in the 1960s was limited to an exchangeof information, contact between scientists, and in-dividual experiments. Efforts on the part of theU.S. military industrial complex to direct Amer-ican aeronautics towards military channels, andconsiderations of prestige and competition . . .created the impression for a wide American pub-lic that any Soviet success in space was to thedetriment of the “national interests” of the UnitedStates.

Changes in the character of Soviet-Americanrelations, and positive results of discussions onthe highest level in Moscow and Washington, al-lowed for a significant expansion of U.S.-Sovietcooperation in the research on and use of space .23

Discussions were begun in 1970 for joint devel-opment of a common docking mechanism. TheUnited States, however, had not intended to es-tablish cooperation on one isolated topic; sincebefore the days of the Dryden-Blagonravov talks,the U.S. thrust had always been toward a broadrange of cooperative space activities .24 After themeeting on docking was successful, therefore, dis-cussions of other forms of cooperation were heldin Moscow in January 1971, and an agreementwas signed between NASA and the Soviet Acad-emy of Sciences involving coordination of spaceactivities, data exchanges, and a lunar sample ex-change. This agency-to-agency agreement estab-lished the framework for what would evolve intothe 1972 intergovernmental agreement.

“G. S. Khozin, S. S. S. R.-S. Sh.A.: Orbity kosmicheskogo sotrud-nichestva [U. S. S. R.-U. S. A.: Orbits of Space Cooperation] (Moscow:Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, 1976), p. 6.

‘iHaWey and Ciccoritti, U.S.-soviet Cooperation in Space, op.cit., pp. 220-221, 229.

Initiation of Cooperative SpaceScience and Applications

The text of the agreement of 1971 betweenNASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences setsforth a fairly specific plan for cooperation in anumber of applications and science areas:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In the field of meteorological satellites, towork jointly to make improvements in thecurrent exchange of data and to consider al-ternative possibilities for coordinating sat-ellite systems of both countries so as toachieve the economic and other advantagesof complementary systems.In the field of meteorological rocket sound-ings, to formulate provisions for a programof soundings along selected meridional linesin cooperation with other countries.In the field of the natural environment, tostudy the possibility of conducting coordi-nated surface, air, and space research overspecified international waters and to ex-change results of measurements made byeach country over similar land sites in theirrespective territories so as to achieve the po-tential applications of space and convention-al survey techniques for investigating the na-tural environment in the common interests.In the field of exploration of near-Earthspace, the Moon, and the planets, to workjointly to define the most important scien-tific objectives in each area, to exchange in-formation on the scientific objectives and re-sults of their national programs in thesefields, to consider the possibilities for coordi-nation of certain lunar explorations, and, inparticular, to initiate an exchange of lunarsurface samples by performing an agreed ex-change of samples already obtained in theApollo and Luna programs.In the field of space biology and medicine,to develop appropriate procedures and rec-ommendations to assure a more detailed andregular exchange of information includingbiomedical data obtained in manned spaceflights .25

“NASA News Release, HQ, 71-57, “U.S.-Soviet Agreement, ”Mar. 31, 1971; NASA News Release, HQ, 71-9, “U.S./U.S.S.R.Space Meeting,” Jan. 21, 1971.

.

2 5

Soviet officials favored signing a more general setof agreements, but NASA negotiators, recallingthe disappointing experience of the Dryden-Bla-gonravov agreements, argued for a set of goalsas specific as possible. Under the framework ofthis agreement, five Joint Working Groups wereestablished to determine means by which theseprojects would be implemented: the Joint Work-ing Group on Meteorological Satellites; JointWorking Group on Meteorological Rocket Sound-ings; Joint Working Group on the Natural Envi-ronment; Joint Working Group on the Explora-tion of near-Earth, the Moon, and the Planets;and the Joint Working Group on Space Biologyand Medicine.

Informal discussions of a joint docking proposaltook place at the time the 1971 agreement wassigned; it remained for a 1972 intergovernmentalagreement to incorporate the joint docking proj-ect into a formal cooperative project between thetwo countries.

The 1972 Agreement

The intergovernmental Agreement ConcerningCooperation in the Exploration and Use of OuterSpace for Peaceful Purposes (see below) wasdrafted and signed with the dawning of “detente”in U.S.-Soviet relations overall. The Summitmeeting between President Nixon and Soviet Pre-mier Brezhnev in Moscow in May 1972—the firsttime a U.S. President had officially visited the So-

Photo credlf National Aeronautics and Space Administration

President Richard Nixon and Premier Alexei N. Kosyginsigning the 1972 Agreement in Moscow

viet capital—triggered hopes that better relationsand increased interaction in scientific, economic,and cultural affairs would usher in a new era ofpeace and cooperation. This summit meeting setthe stage for the signing of a total of 11 bilateralagreements for scientific and technical coopera-tion between 1972-74. In addition to the agree-ment for cooperation in space, three other bilat-eral agreements were signed in 1972, for coop-eration in science and technology, environmentalprotection, and medical science and public health.In 1973 four additional agreements were signed,in agriculture, studies of the world’s oceans, trans-portation, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.Three final agreements were signed in 1974 onhousing and other construction, energy, and arti-ficial heart research. The Apollo-Soyuz Test Proj-ect (ASTP) was to be among the most ambitiousand most spectacular joint efforts between the twocountries.

ASTP was specifically described in the pointsof agreement shown in box 2A, relating to Arti-cle 3 of the 1972 Agreement.

The Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)

Details of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP)are already well known. As a contribution notonly towards detente, but towards the develop-ment of a universal, androgynous docking sys-tem, the United States and the Soviet Union joint-ly developed and conducted a flight where theU.S. Apollo spacecraft, carrying a special dock-ing module, rendezvoused and docked with amodified Soviet Soyuz. Soyuz 19 was sent upfrom Tiuratam (Tyuratam), in the Kazakh Repub-lic of the U. S. S. R., with two cosmonauts onboard: Colonel Alexei Arkhipovich Leonov andValerii Nikolaievich Kubasov. The Apollo waslaunched from the Kennedy Space Center, withthree astronauts: Brigadier-General Thomas P.Stafford, Major Donald K. Slayton, and MajorVance D. Brand.

On July 17, 1975, Apollo and Soyuz dockedin orbit 225 kilometers above the Earth, and for2 days the two crews paid exchange visits and con-ducted five joint experiments. Figure 2-5 depictsthe ASTP mission profile and timeline. Live tele-vision coverage of the event was broadcast to rnil-

27

ARTICLE 5.—The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in theexploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6.—This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force forfive years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

Done at Moscow this 24th day of May 1972 in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages bothequally authentic.

For the United States of America For the Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsRichard Nixon A. N. KosyginPresident of the United States of America Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.

Z7TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; 610 ~TS 205.z6TIAS 6599; 19 UST 7570; 672 UNT’S 119.Z9T1AS 7343; 23 UST 7~.

lions around the world with enthusiastic commen-tary and dramatic pictures. The astronauts andcosmonauts on board emphasized ASTP’S impor-tance as a symbol of the peaceful intentions ofboth countries. And on an official level, the hopewas expressed that ASTP would lead to wider andmore extensive U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts inthe future. Upon the landing of Apollo and Soyuzspacecraft, L. 1. Brezhnev stated:

A relaxation of tensions and improvements inSoviet-American relations have created the con-ditions for carrying out the first internationalspace flight. They are opening new possibilitiesfor wide, fruitful development of scientific linksbetween countries and peoples in the interests ofpeace and progress of all mankind .30

Amid the generally enthusiastic response over thesuccess of ASTP, however, many observers be-gan to express criticism of the project as a primar-ily symbolic, empty, and wasteful use of U.S.space dollars.3

I

‘“G, S. Khc)zln, S. S. S. R-S,Sh,A : Orbit} Losmiche.+ogf) sotrudnlchest!d, op. c i t . , p. 7

‘]lt is difficult to determine the precise cost of ASTI’ tor the UnitedState’ .~rrd US S.1<. According to ,’Y’ASA Pocket Statistics-)anuaryIGI&~ /washingtc)n, DC: office Of Nlanagernentr NASA, 1985), p.C-5, ASTP cost a total of S214.2 millmn. The existing Apollo Com-mand Space hlodule and Saturn 1 B launch vehicle, valued at $100m I IIic)n, were transferred to the project at no cost from the com-pleted Apollo program. ( Similar Iett<)ver Apollo hardware was dwnated t[~ the N’ational Air and Space hluseum. ) Substantial add-tic)rral +upp(~rt co~t~ may ha~’e been incurred b}’ NASA for ASTPwhl~h did not show up as a direct charge to the project. Soviet plan-ners dId not pu blic[m the ir ASTP bud~et, which precl ucies J do] la r-

Despite the dramatic hopes it represented, theASTP gradually became the most visible and con-troversial product of U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace. It became symbolic of cooperation in theminds of most, and for many it was the onlymemorable product of U.S.-Soviet space coop-eration. It has also received the sharpest criticism.Critics argued that it was a “costly space circus, ”a “250 million dollar handshake, “32 and that fundsallocated to ASTP should have been used formore fruitful projects. They also argued that theUnited States financed a chance for the Soviet Un-ion to present itself as technologically equal to theUnited States, and asserted that such a joint tech-nological undertaking inevitably involved a trans-fer of American space technology to the Sovietspace program. Finally, they argued that the de-velopment of an androgynous docking system it-self was unjustified, since the ASTP was to be thelast time that the U.S. Apollo spacecraft wouldbe used. Supporters of ASTF’ countered that nosignificant technology transfer occurred, and thatthe joint mission was valuable as a symbol ofworld peace—”a dramatic demonstration to bothnations” and to the world of the potential “prac-

[page omitted]This page was originally printed on a dark gray background.

The scanned version of the page was almost entirely black and not usable.

2 9

Figure 2-3.—Apollo Command Module and Soviet Soyuz Counterpart

/

SOURCE NASA ASTP press release

Photo credit National Aeronauttcs and Space Administration

< D O C K IN G M O D U L E

ticality and benefits of detente. ” In more practi-cal terms, they believed that the result was “amore open [Soviet] space program, “33 and thatthe establishment of U.S.-Soviet working proce-dures for joint manned missions was potentiallyuseful for the future. Disagreements over the ben-efits and liabilities of ASTP continue today (seechapter 5).

33Preceding quotes from a lettter to Senator Matsunaga from Dr.

Thomas O. Paine, dated Sept. 6, 1984, in East-West Cooperationin Outer Space, hearings before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, Sept. 13, 1984 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Print-ing Office( 1984), p. 65.

Astronaut Donald K. Slayton and Cosmonaut Aleksei A.Leonov in the Orbital Module during the ASTP

3 0

Figure 2-4.— Docking Mechanism Developed for Use in ASTP

1. In i t ia l contac t 2. Guide ring mate and capture

I

3. Mutual a l ignment and re t ract ion 4. Hard and pressure-tight coupling

5. Cosmonauts ’ t ransfer

SOURCE Soviet ASTP press klt

31

c

o

32

POST ASTP: CHANGING U.S. POSITION

Whatever the ultimate assessment of the proj-ect, the aftermath of ASTP was marked by highhopes for future cooperation which graduallyeroded towards the end of the 1970s. Discussionson forms of future cooperation were begun almostimmediately after the ASTP was completed. InMay 1977, the 1972 agreement was renewed for5 more years, largely emphasizing the same direc-tions as established in the 1972 agreement: deliv-ery of Soviet lunar samples; mutual briefings onVenera 9 and 10 and Viking landers on Mars; U.S.participation in Soviet experiments aboard theirbiological satellites; continuation of the jointproject for remote sensing of crops and vegeta-tion; and tests to cross-calibrate NASA and So-viet meteorological rockets. 34

In addition, the agreement called for lookinginto another large-scale joint project, a joint Shut-tle/Salyut mission, and the possibility of devel-oping an international space platform—activitiesdesigned to use complementary areas of theUnited States and Soviet space programs to pro-vide solid scientific and technical benefits. Thelong orbital staytime of the Salyut, for example,coupled with the greater flexibility of the Shut-tle—its ability to ferry people and large quanti-ties of supplies in a reusable craft—were regardedas especially complementary for joint scientificand applied experiments and for further develop-ing the two countries’ rendezvous and docking ca-pabilities.

35 An agreement was signed betweenNASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences estab-lishing two joint working groups to study “the ob-jectives, feasibility and means of carrying out ajoint experimental program using the Soyuz/Sal-yut and Shuttle spacecraft"36—one working groupfor basic and applied scientific experiments, andone for operations. A third working group wasestablished “for preliminary consideration of thefeasibility of developing an International Space

34NASA Authorjzatjon for Fiscal Year 1978, hearings before theSubcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space for the Committeeon Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 95thCong., 1st sess., on S36.5, Feb. 25, Mar. 1 and 3, 1977, Part 2 (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19’77), p. 815.

“Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Cooperation inSpace, ” op. cit., pp. 214-221.

JbAgreement Between the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and theNational Aeronautics and Space Administration of the USA on Co-operation in the Area of Manned Space Flight, May 11, 1977, p. 2.

Platform on a bilateral or multilateral basis in thefuture. ”37

The working groups began to meet soon afterthe agreement was signed to discuss planning forthe mission—its feasibility, potential, and possi-ble operating modes for conducting experiments.The working groups were to proceed on the as-sumption that the first Shuttle/ Salyut flight wouldtake place in 1981, but no further commitmentswere made.

Cooperation in space, however, again becameprey to a broader U.S.-Soviet political relation-ship. By 1978 the human rights issue had alreadycreated severe strains in U.S.-Soviet relations.These strains were further aggravated by the es-tablishment of formal diplomatic relations be-tween the United States and China on January 1,1979, and the granting of most favored nation sta-tus to China, but not the U. S. S. R., in the sameyear; by delays in concluding the SALT II agree-ment, and then its failure to gain ratification inWashington; by the publication of official evi-dence alleging the presence of a Soviet brigade inCuba; by the NATO decision in December 1979to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruisemissiles in Europe; and, ultimately, by the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan in the same month. Thesestrains were severely exacerbated by the exile ofAndrei Sakharov to Gorkii in January 1979; byU.S. charges in April 1980 of a Soviet violationof the Biological Weapons Convention in an in-cident in Sverdlovsk 1 year before; and by thecutback in Jewish emigration starting in January1979 and continuing at least through the first halfof the 1980s.

Along with other measures intended to showdispleasure with Soviet actions, the United Statesseverely curtailed cooperation in space with theU.S.S.R. By 1978, the White House was question-ing whether it was in the interest of the UnitedStates to be seen as a cooperative partner inanother spectacular and costly manned missionwith the U. S. S. R., and the Shuttle/Salyut projectwas gradually set aside. By the end of the dec-ade, the United States had greatly curtailed coop-eration in other areas of space cooperation as well.

371 bid., p. 4,

3 3

The 1980s: Promise for the Future?

The early years of the 1980s were not promis-ing for further U.S.-Soviet space cooperation.With U.S.-Soviet cooperation already at an ex-ceedingly low level, declaration of martial law inPoland exacerbated the rift in U.S.-Soviet rela-tions and further reduced initiative for coopera-tion in space. As part of U.S. sanctions againstthe U. S. S. R., the 1972/77 Agreement for coop-eration in space was allowed to expire when itcame up for renewal in 1982.

The level of U.S.-Soviet cooperative space ac-tivity since the agreement lapsed has decreasedsubstantially. The joint working groups are nolonger constituted, and no new projects have beenstarted.

Despite the lapse of formal cooperation, how-ever, several projects begun under the 1972/77agreement have continued, and there has been adegree of continuing low-level scientist-to-scientistcooperative activity in certain areas. These on-going projects include the following areas:

Space biology and medicine: In 1983, for ex-ample, Cosmos 1514, a primate mission, car-ried four U.S. medical research devices; otherCosmos biosatellite flights carrying Ameri-can experiments included Cosmos 782 (1975),Cosmos 936 (1977), and Cosmos 1129 (1979).This collaboration had been planned beforethe expiration of the 1977 Agreement, andwas allowed to be carried out under agree-ments between NASA and the Soviet Acad-emy of Sciences. CAT-scan bone data fromSalyut missions are still being supplied toNASA, also under continuation from the pre-vious agreement. Some exchanges continuebetween individual working group memberson an informal basis, especially through at-tendance at professional conferences andmeetings. 38

Near-Earth Space, Moon, and Planets: Lead-ing Soviet scientists recently presented radardata from Venera 15 and 16, both currentlyin orbit about Venus, at a number of U.S.

-.‘“See IYorrnan L’, Llartello, Biomedical Rmearch Di\’ision Signif-

icant Accomplishments tor FY 1 Q84, 1VAS,4 Technical fklernoran -(Ium 86692 ( Moffett Field, CA: Biomedical R=earch Division, AmesResearch Center, NASA, February 1Q851, p. 119.

conferences and academic institutions. U.S.and Soviet scientists also continue to ex-change Pioneer-Venus radar altimetry dataand Venera gas chromatographic and massspectrometric data. Recent collaborations instudies of solar wind interactions with Ve-nus, landing sites for a forthcoming Veneramission, and Venus lightning have involvedexchange and subsequent interpretation ofdata. Such exchanges are of considerable in-terest to U.S. scientists in the absence of pub-lished data on these topics.Venus Halley (VEGA) Mission: The presentmissions to the planet Venus and to Halley’sComet do not involve official U.S.-Soviet co-operation, but coordination among the va-rious countries calls for U. S .-Soviet interac-tion on different levels. The Soviet Union,the European Space Agency (ESA), and Ja-pan are sending spacecraft to the vicinity ofthe comet, with the United States playing asupporting role both in preparing for the mis-sion and in subsequent data analysis. To fa-cilitate this cooperation and coordination, aninformal multilateral body known as the In-teragency Consultative Group (IACG)—aninternational working group comprised ofrepresentatives from NASA, the EuropeanSpace Agency (ESA), Japan’s National SpaceDevelopment Agency, and the Soviet Inter-kosmos—was created in 1981. In addition,three experiments designed and built in theUnited States are flying aboard the two Rus-sian space probes: a comet dust counter, de-veloped by John Simpson, University of Chi-cago; a Venus nephelometer, by Boris Ragentof NASA Ames Research Center; and a Com-et Neutral Mass Spectrometer, by JohnHsieh, University of Arizona .39 Other U.S.scientists will be involved in analysis andprocessing as data are received on Earth.

“See Colin Norman, “U.S. Instruments Fly on Soviet Spacecraft, ”Science, CCXXVII, No. 4684 (Jan. 18, 1985), pp. 274-275; and LouisD, Friedman and Carl Sagan, L~. S. U.S.S.R. Coo~ration in ~~-ploring the Solar Svstem, an internal report of The Planetary Soci-ety (Pasadena, CA: The Planetary Society, 1985 ), At least four otherscientists from the United States are part icipating as theoreticianco-investigators: Bradford Smith, Andrew Nagy, Thomas Cravens,and Asoka hlendis.

●


View of Comet Halley, taken in May 1910

The present VEGA mission, however, can-not be viewed as an example of official U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space. The interagencyagreements governing Halley are bilateral, sothat, for example, the United States and ESAhave an agreement, but there is no NASA-In-terkosmos agreement. Indeed, at present theSoviet Union does not officially recognize theU.S. role in the IACG, and has not recog-nized U.S. participation in the Venus/Hal-ley’s Comet mission; the U.S. experiments arebeing carried on Soviet spacecraft via third-party agreements. 40 But in light of the Amer-ican experiment on board the Soviet space-craft, and the role of the United States in dataanalysis and tracking, some observers believethat U.S.-Soviet cooperation will expand asdata from the mission are received.Pathfinder and International Halley Watch:The IACG has identified a number of coop-erative activities that will enhance the over-all science return from these missions. Themost significant of these is “Pathfinder,” an

i~The Comet Duster designed by John Simpson, to measure the

density and mass distribution of dust particles in the comet’s tail,was incorporated in a German package, through the Max PlanckInstitute in West Germany. The other two experiments were includedvia Hungarian participation.

effort which utilizes the U.S.S.R.'s VEGAspacecraft to improve the targetting accuracyof ESA’s Giotto spacecraft during the latter’sencounter with Halley’s Comet. One weeklater NASA will assist in the Pathfinder activ-ity by providing tracking support from itsDeep Space Network antennas in California,Spain, and Australia. Also, several years agoU.S. scientists established the InternationalHalley Watch (IHW), an activity to coordi-nate ground-based astronomical observationsof Halley’s Comet. The IHW has becometruly international in character, with partici-pation by astronomers all over the world, in-cluding the Soviet Union. And some coop-eration continues in related areas as well. Forexample, United States, ESA, Japanese, andSoviet scientists are scheduled to be atNASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center whenthe U.S. International Cometary Explorer(ICE) spacecraft flies by the comet Giacobini-Zinner in September 1985.4’

● Space Applications: In the area of space ap-plications, there are at present no ongoingprojects begun under the 1972 agreement, al-

41’’ First Space Probe to Comet Now Halfway to Target, ” God-dard News, XXXI, No. 3 (March 1985), pp. 1 - 2 .

35

Figure 2-6.—Trajectories of the Various Halley Spacecraft Relative to a Fixed Sun. Earth Line

SUN

SOURCE European Space Agency

36

●

�✎

though some level of discussion has contin-ued in forums outside of the now lapsedspace agreement. In one of the workinggroups under the 1972 Agreement for Coop-eration in the Field of Environmental Protec-tion, for example, which is still in forcetoday—in Working Group VIII, on the In-fluence of the Environment on Climate andEnvironmental Protection—some U.S.-Sovi-et discussion has taken place since 1982 onpossibilities for expanding cooperative workin climatic applications of space. The tenthmeeting of the working group, for example,in January and February 1985, discussed thepossibility of using satellite data for jointcloud, hurricane, and/or surface radiation re-search, in either this or some other forum .42

The key joint applications projects current-ly in operation, however, are multilateral innature, such as the COSPAS/SARSAT searchand rescue agreement, As discussed in appen-dix C, the COSPAS/SARSAT system is theresult of two multilateral agreements signedseparately: the SARSAT agreement amongCanada, France, and the United States; andthe COSPAS/SARSAT agreement amongthe United States, Canada, France, and theU.S.S.R. But the project continues, and inOctober 1984 the parties signed a new agree-ment covering extension of the program fromits experimental phase to initial operationsover the next 5 to 7 years.Nongovernmental U.S.-Soviet Telecommu-nications: As a sidelight to U.S.-Soviet in-tergovernmental or interagency cooperationin space, recent years have also seen instancesof more indirect “space cooperation” outsideof the auspices of official agreement. Thesehave taken the form of satellite telecommu-nications link-ups, both video and audio, be-tween U.S. and Soviet scientists (and in onecase a U.S. Congressman) for discussion ofa variety of current scientific and othertopics.

The first of these recent “space applica-tions” projects, organized by the Esalen So-

42see u.s,.u.s,s,R, Agreement on Cooperation in the Field ofEnvironmental Protection: Protocol, Tenth Joint Meeting of WorkingGroup VIII, on the Influence of Environmental Changes on Climate,Jan. 24-Feb. 7, 1985 (unpublished typescript),

viet-American Exchange Program, took placein September 1982 and May 1983. In the sec-ond session, U.S. Congressman GeorgeBrown and Soviet Academician E. P. Velik-hov discussed the value of satellite telecom-munications as a vehicle for scientific and cul-tural exchange, and proposed that a per-manent satellite communication project beestablished between the United States and theU.S.S.R. Two more exchanges occurred laterin 1983, with the second one involving a col-loquy between Soviet and American scien-tists. And in September 1984 a similar satel-lite teleconference hosted four American andthree Soviet scientists (including Dr. RoaldSagdeyev, Director of the Institute of SpaceResearch) in discussions of cooperation invarious fields of science: 1) fusion research,2) astrophysics, 3) seismology, and 4) bio-physics.

Whether politically or scientifically motivated,however, cooperation in all of these areas has re-mained on a very low level. By 1984, Soviet offi-cials were stating that space cooperation, even onthe level of scientist-to-scientist exchange, couldnot be sustained without the framework of a bi-lateral agreement between the U.S. and Sovietgovernments.

The mid-1980s, therefore, have brought in-creased debate concerning the merits and demeritsof official, bilateral U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace. These debates have yet to be resolved, andare discussed in chapter 5. In contrast to 1982,however, the mid-1980s have seen a sharp rise incongressional and Administration interest in ex-panding U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, on ascale perhaps larger than ever before. In a speechat the White House in June 1984, President Rea-gan explicitly called for renewing U.S.-Soviet co-operation in space as well as other areas. Hear-ings on this topic were held by the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations in September1984. This was followed by the enactment of Pub-lic Law 98-562, which calls for “energetically” pur-suing a renewal of the 1972/77 agreement on spacecooperation and “exploring further opportunitiesfor cooperative East-West ventures in space. ”

Specific projects have also been proposed. Themost prominent of these is the revival of the no-

3 7

tion of a Shuttle /Salyut mission, or a joint simu-lated space rescue mission as specified in the Pub-lic Law. In this project, “marooned” astronautsand cosmonauts would simulate a rescue betweenthe U.S. Shuttle and the Soviet Salyut space sta-tion. As currently envisioned, the shuttle wouldpull up near the Soviet Salyut, and an astronautwearing a jetpack would fly from the shuttle tothe Soviet station, perhaps ferrying a cosmonautback and forth between the two craft.

On February 6, 1985, Senator Matsunaga in-troduced S, J. Res. 46 in support of U, S.-Sovietcooperation on Mars exploration missions .43 Ini-tially cosponsored by Senators Proxmire and Si-mon, the resolution calls for exploring opportu-nities for cooperation with the Soviet Union onspecified Mars exploration missions and examin-ing opportunities for joint East-West Mars-relatedactivities. According to Matsunaga, these missionscould be pursued on a manned or unmanned ba-sis. Since both countries are presently planningunmanned missions to Mars, for exampIe—theUnited States with its scheduled launch of a Marsorbiting mapper in 1990, and the Soviets with aplanned launch of a mission to the Mars moonknown as Phobos in 1988—he suggests that waysbe sought to coordinate missions to best sharedata and information. A manned mission to Mars,he suggests, could well become “history’s moststirring undertaking. ”44 Other proposals includea joint unmanned mission to Venus; joint un-manned exploration of the moon; a joint mannedlunar base; and joint study of asteroids and de-fense against a possible asteroid collision withEarth .45

‘3S. J. Res. 46; A joint resolution relating to NASA and coopera-tive Mars exploration, referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee, introduced by Senator Matsunaga with cosponsors Sena-tor-s Gorton, Proxmire, Kassebaum, Pen, Stafford, Simon, Mathias,Kerry, and Cranston. Initially introduced in Jan. 21, 1985, as S.J. Res 18 by Senator Matsunaga( with cosponsors Senators Prox-mire and Simon. As of June 6, 1985, there were 11 cosponsors,

“See Spark M. Matsunagat “Needed: Cooperation, Not War, inSpace, ” Newsda,v, Apr. 9, 1984.

‘5 For a discussion of these and other suggestions see:● Craig Covault, “U.S. Plans Soviet Talks on Joint Manned Mis-

These proposals, however, remain controver-sial, and as of this writing, Soviet officials havenot responded to any of these overtures for re-newing cooperation on a bilateral basis. Severalprominent Soviet scientists have emphasized theirown desire to expand cooperative projects inspace, and have underlined the difficulties in do-ing so without an overarching bilateral intergov-ernmental agreement. News stories from a meet-ing in Houston refer to possible “hints” that theSoviets may be interested in expanding space co-operation overall .46 But Soviet officials have alsostated that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiativewould be a serious obstacle to any major coop-eration in space, and that more important mili-tary and strategic issues will have to be resolvedbefore serious discussions on renewing any large-scale bilateral cooperation in space can be initi-ated. Soviet officials so far have not respondedto any U.S. overtures on an official basis.

Thus, the same twin issues which surroundedU.S.-Soviet space cooperation more than 30 yearsago—competition and cooperation in space, andthe relation of space cooperation to broader po-litical relations—are facing proponents and op-ponents of space cooperation today. Cooperation,however limited, has illustrated the scientific ben-efits which can be gained from pooling efforts ofthe two superpowers, particularly in certain areasof space research and applications. But the past30 years have also highlighted the difficulties inreconciling space cooperation with broader po-litical realities, and shaping and implementingmutually beneficial projects fairly and effectively.

Chapter 3

Cooperation in the SpaceSciences: The Scientific View

Photo credit: National Air and Space Museum

Halley’s Comet, 1910

Chapter 3

Cooperation in the Space Sciences:The Scientific View

INTRODUCTION

As the preceding chapter illustrates, U.S.-Sovietcooperation in space involves a complex, oftenconflicting mixture of political, scientific, and mil-itary issues. These all have a bearing on whetherone believes that U.S.-Soviet space cooperationshould be pursued and, if so, on the types of proj-ects most appropriate for such activity. These is-sues and the trade-offs among them are discussedin chapter 5.

In order to clarify some of the specifically scien-tific and technical issues surrounding cooperation,OTA held a workshop in May 1984 on potentialareas for U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the spacesciences. Since planetary research and the lifesciences are considered the most successful areasof past space cooperation, 13 scientists previouslyand/or presently involved in cooperative pro-grams with the U.S.S.R. discussed the costs andbenefits of past U.S.-Soviet cooperation in theplanetary and life sciences and potential areas ofsuch cooperation for the future.

This chapter presents the findings of this work-shop in evaluating past and potential U.S.-Sovietspace cooperation from a scientific point of view.As illustrated in chapter 2, congressional testi-mony and other forums have provided evalua-tions of individual U.S.-Soviet cooperative proj-ects in the past, 1 and several areas outside of the

‘See, for example, Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude TowardInternational Cooperation in Space, ” in Congressional ResearchService, Sot’iet Space Programs: 1976 -IQ80, prepared for the Sen-ate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation (Wash-

space sciences have been suggested as potentiallypromising for U, S.-Soviet cooperation for the fu-ture, These range from the joint simulated spacerescue mission called for in Public Law 98-562 tojoint efforts in near-Earth scientific stations, lu-nar bases, and trips to asteroids, Mars, or themoons of Jupiter. In the area of space applications,COSPAS/SARSAT has been viewed as a success-ful paradigm which could be used for other typesof activities, such as improvements in meteoro-logical coverage, disaster warning systems, andeducational satellite telecommunications. OTAdiscussions with representatives from Third Worldcountries to the United Nations in May 1984 sug-gested that U, S.-Soviet cooperative efforts, espe-cially in such areas as developing a worldwide dis-aster warning system, would have some modicumof international support.

The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluatethese or other potential cooperative projects, noris it to make specific recommendations. Instead,the workshop was intended to focus on one area—space science—which has been regarded as a via-ble area for cooperation in the past, and may wellbe among the most valuable for the future. Byfocusing on one broad area, the workshop wasdesigned to highlight the scientific advantages anddisadvantages of cooperation with the U.S.S.R.which may be applicable to other areas as well.

ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 221 -260:East-West Cooperation in Outer Space, hearings before the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations, Sept. 13, 1~84 (l~rashington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Otfice, 1Q84).

3 9

4 0

PAST U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN THE SPACE SCIENCES

Two primary areas of scientific cooperation un-der the 1972/77 agreement2 examined in OTA’Sworkshop were in: 1) space biology and medicine,and 2) near-Earth space, the Moon, and the plan-ets. Both of these areas of cooperation were re-garded as having contributed to scientific knowl-edge in a way U.S. scientists could not have donealone, although the interchange was not withoutproblems.

Participants viewed the life sciences area as themore substantive and successful, especially inthree areas. First was the exchange of flight ex-perimental data regarding human response tospaceflight conditions. Because of the emphasison extended manned spaceflight in the Sovietspace program, of greatest value here were So-viet data on the effects of long-duration flight onbone loss and cardiovascular deconditioning—problems that continue to be of significant con-cern for manned spaceflight. Data exchanges inthis area were particularly valued by U.S. scien-tists because the Soviets had, in Salyut, the op-portunity to conduct an extensive program of re-peatable experiments on the response of humanbeings to long-term stays in space. The U.S. space

‘The Agreement Between the United States of America and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in theExploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, signedin May 1972 and renewed in May 1977.

program had no manned spaceflight from theApollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) in 1975 to thefirst Shuttle launch in 1981.

The second area of especially fruitful coopera-tion was considered to be joint ground-based sim-ulations of spaceflight conditions. For example,participants cited the long-term bed rest studiesas a useful example of such joint simulations, andnoted that useful joint symposia were held on ves-tibular problems (1980) and on cardiovascularchanges resulting from spaceflight (1981).

Finally, U.S.-Soviet space cooperation has alsoinvolved a good deal of animal (biological) re-search. The joint U.S.-Soviet three-volume workon space biology and medicine,3 in progress formore than a decade, was published in 1975, andscientific experiments conducted aboard ASTPprovided interesting biological data. Perhaps mostimportantly, the Soviet Cosmos series biosatel-lites have provided U.S. investigators with a num-ber of opportunities to fly experiments designedto investigate basic biological processes in space,and to exchange information on a range of prob-lems in space biology. The first of several suchflight opportunities came in 1975 when the So-viet Union launched Cosmos 782, a “biosatellite”mission carrying 11 U.S. space biology experi-ments. Subsequently, in 1977, Cosmos 936 waslaunched carrying 7 U.S. biological experiments;in 1978, Cosmos 1129 carried 14 U.S. biologicalexperiments; and in 1983, Cosmos 1514 waslaunched carrying 4 additional U.S. biological ex-periments. According to workshop participants,American experiments have generally been self-contained and delivered to Moscow by U.S. spe-cialists who provide information on how to carefor the package until the time of launch. U.S. ex-perimenters have not been allowed at launch orrecovery sites, but according to workshop par-ticipants, the Soviets have sometimes been quitehelpful in other ways, such as in one case allow-ing an American experiment to fly overweight.

3Foundations of Space Biology and Medicine, edited by MelvinCalvin (U. S. A.) and Oleg G. Gazenko (U.S.S.R.), a joint U. S.-U.S.S.R. publication in three volumes (Washington, DC: Scientificand Technical Information Office, National Aeronautics and SpaceAdministration, 197s).

The workshop scientists involved in these and ●

other exchanges believe that the overall successof the collaboration in life sciences can be attrib-uted to several factors: ●

●

●

●

a focus on well-defined and specific scientificobjectives;

an institutional organization that granted of-ficials on both sides the autonomy to decideon the implementation of plans; andthe development of mutual confidence, knowl-edge, and goals among working groups overa long period of cooperation.

the selection of areas of complementary ca- In the planetary category, workshop partici-pability, providing strong motivation to co- pants identified the strongest areas of cooperationoperate; as lunar studies, the exploration of Venus, andthe fact that required instrumentation was solar-terrestrial physics. The exchange of lunarnot generally of a type raising concerns of samples and cartographic data provided bothtechnology transfer; sides with a range of information unobtainable

by either program on its own. Although the So-viets shared few significant data from their Marsmissions in the early 1970s (possibly due to fail-ures of spacecraft, resulting in little data to be ex-changed), the cooperation in the late 1970s andearly 1980s between Soviet scientists in the Veneraprogram and U.S. investigators in the Pioneer Ve-nus program was substantial; it extended to theuse of Pioneer Venus data to select Venera land-ing sites and to attempts to intercalibrate instru-ments. Soviet data from the 1975 Venera land-ings on Venus were transmitted promptly, pro-viding several surprises regarding the nature ofthe Venusian surface. The U.S. Pioneer missionto Venus in 1978 profited from details about theSoviet program that would not have been avail-able without the agreement.4

Transfer and Scientific Cooperation Between the and A Review, prepared for U.S.

Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcom-mittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs (Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 117-118.

In other areas, data were exchanged on solar-wind phenomena and magnetospheric plasmaphysics. In the solar-terrestrial area, for example,exchanges of solar wind data obtained by SovietPrognoz and the International Sun-Earth Explorer(ISEE) spacecraft, developed jointly by the UnitedStates and ESA, have been valuable because ofdiffering spacecraft design characteristics. U.S.magnetospheric plasma physics research in spacehas benefited from cooperation between the twocountries in controlled thermonuclear research.Overall, workshop participants noted an evolu-tion toward greater openness in the Soviet plane-tary program over the past decade.

Finally, workshop participants noted a signifi-cant amount of cooperation in astrophysics ex-periments utilizing detectors mounted on a vari-ety of spacecraft, including Venera and PioneerVenus, Prognoz, and ISEE. The objective of theseexperiments was the precise location of gamma-ray bursts by means of simultaneous observationsfrom widely separated spacecraft, with coopera-tive analysis of resulting data.

43

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Adrninistration

Panoramic views of surface of Mars, from the American Viking spacecraft, and of surface of Venus, from theSoviet Venera spacecraft

44

The workshop scientists involved in these ex-changes believe that cooperation started out slow-ly but eventually became quite fruitful. Particu-larly with regard to Venus, the United Statesgained at least as much information as it provided.However, the interaction in the planetary and so-lar-terrestrial areas was not as consistently smoothas in the life sciences. There were significant dif-ficulties in acquiring information on missionplans, and in obtaining accurate and complete sci-entific data. These problems varied in severitythrough time and across different fields. But work-shop scientists believed that the situation was im-proving noticeably, with regard to both opennessand data quality, when the intergovernmentalagreement expired in 1982. At that time, U.S. sci-entists were for the first time being taken into So-viet laboratories and shown instruments, perform-ance data, etc.

4 5

SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION

Workshop discussions resulted in a number ofgeneral observations and specific recommenda-tions regarding the content and possible mecha-nisms for future U. S .-Soviet cooperation in space,

One point of consensus was that such cooper-ation must be scientifically substantive, with clearscientific objectives, in order to be successful. TheSoviet Union has enough to offer scientifically,participants argued, that cooperation for purelypolitical reasons is not, in their view, an adequaterationale for U.S. participation. Areas of comple-mentarily, they stressed—such as that representedby American orbital capability and Soviet landercapability—must be found so that cooperationwill be mutually beneficial on a scientific and tech-nical level.

Participants agreed that the simplest levels ofexchange—joint discussions, cooperative dataanalyses, and joint planning of separate mis-sions—would be the most workable. Hosted U.S.experiments on Soviet spacecraft (as well as thereverse) were also viewed as practicable, althoughit was emphasized that official U, S. concernsabout technology transfer have introduced con-siderable complexity into some of these interac-tions. Participants agreed that the introduction~of hardware into the exchange would invariablybe a complicating factor. The difficulty of work-ing together would reach its highest point, theysaid, in the case of full-scale joint missions, whereboth hardware and many layers of official par-ticipation would be involved.

Based on past successes in planetary, solar-ter-restrial, and astrophysics areas of cooperation,it was suggested that should future cooperationbe pursued, the concept of coordination andtracking of separate spacecraft be added to jointmission planning. The advantage of this wouldbe to maximize scientific return while minimiz-ing problems of hardware exchange and technol-ogy transfer. A second recommendation was toinclude U.S.-Soviet co-investigators within theframework of cooperation.

Finally, participants also addressed the ques-tion of which new areas of scientific exchange cur-rently hold promise for U. S .-Soviet cooperation.

The workshop itself represented a somewhat dif-ferent breakdown of disciplines than the catego-ries included under the previous agreement. Mostnotably, astrophysics and heliospheric studieswere broken out as separate disciplinary groups.One promising new area was regarded as the fieldof “global habitability, ” which includes a widerange of integrated Earth environmental obser-vations. The vast size of the Soviet Union makesthat country’s participation in this field especiallyimportant.

In the life sciences area, the field of exobiology(i.e., nonterrestrial biology and biochemistry) wasviewed as one promising area for future cooper-ation. Workshop participants believed that studiesin this area might include search for extraterres-trial intelligence (SETI), or joint collection andanalysis of Antarctic meteorites. Global biologywould be an important aspect of the global habita-bility studies just described. Another suggestionwas the joint demonstration and testing of ad-vanced life support systems, including those ofthe “closed,” or bioregenerative, type.

In solar-terrestrial physics, workshop partici-pants noted a complementarily in American andSoviet research plans, suggesting that mission co-ordination and data exchange would yield sub-stantial scientific benefits for both countries. In-tegration of Soviet data into the online dataprocessing and exchange program now being de-veloped for the International Solar-TerrestrialPhysics Program, they believed, would be espe-cially valuable.

Astrophysics, the participants also noted, offersseveral promising opportunities for complemen-tary and mutually advantageous cooperation. Inthe radio area, they believed that joint missionsin very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) couldbe undertaken using independent U.S. and Sovietspacecraft, with collaborative planning for the or-bits and frequencies to be used. They suggestedthat U,S, Spacelab experiments involving large-scale equipment such as X-ray detectors of largecollecting area could be reflown on the Salyut forlong-term exposure. In the first example, two es-sentially free-standing missions enhance one an-

4 6

Figure 3-1 .—Photographic Coverage of the U.S. Apollo and Soviet Zond Spacecraft(example of informal information exchange between U.S. and Soviet scientists)

Coverage of Apoflo and Zond Mapping Pictures

Note Base map courtesy of National Geographic Society

SOURCE Merton Dawes

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Adrninistration

The Moon

other by proper coordination and planning; in thesecond, the scientific potential of expensive ex-periments is realized more fully by a longer timefor making observations in orbit.

Possibilities for cooperative ventures in theplanetary field, participants underlined, are nu-merous, including: lunar geochemical orbiters,continued lunar sample exchange, joint Venusmissions (studies of the atmosphere as well aslong-lived surface missions); coordination of sep-arate Mars missions or even a joint Mars samplereturn mission; comet rendezvous and sample re-turn; and outer planet exploration.

A final concern was the relative merit of con-tinuing low-level exchange, as against initiatinga high-visibility “spectacular,” such as a joint Marssample return or a joint “Starprobe” mission tothe Sun. Workshop participants stressed thatlarge-scale missions would have little lasting sig-

4 7

Box 3B.—Nongovernmental Initiatives for U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation

Quite apart from other issues affecting U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, the scientific benefits ofsuch cooperation have been viewed as positive in many disciplines. Despite the lapsing of the bilateralU.S.-Soviet agreement in 1982, a number of initiatives have been taken by U.S. scientists and nongovern-mental institutions to sustain or expand certain U.S.-Soviet cooperative efforts.

Because of the complementarily of lunar data from the Soviet Zond and U.S. Apollo missions, forexample, one scientist has received lunar data and photographs from Moscow, and is pursuing the pos-sibility of joint U.S.-Soviet analysis to determine the geodetic control network of the Moon—creatinga selenographic coordinates system encircling the Moon, and building a unified photogrammetric gridbased on pictures from Apollo 15, 16, and 17, and Zond 6 and 8 (see figure 3-l). Photographs fromthe Soviet Venera 15 and 16—mapping high latitude regions of Venus not well covered by the U.S. Ve-nus Radar Mapper mission—have been shared with American scientists, and U.S. scientists have contin-ued to participate in data analysis and some aspects of planning for Soviet planetary missions; workinglargely through third-party agreements, several American scientists are now collaborating on the SovietVEGA mission, in data analysis, image processing, and other areas.

On the institutional side, an agreement between California Institute of Technology and MoscowState University, signed in the late 1970s, has allowed for continued joint theoretical work in gravita-tional physics, 30 to 40 percent of which is directly space-related (such as the recent design of a gravita-tional wave detector). The Planetary Society—an independent organization, with Roald Sagdeyev, Di-rector of the Soviet Institute for Space Research, on its Board of Advisors—has been sponsoringconferences and other forums among Soviet, American, and European space scientists, and is encourag-ing formal cooperation in areas such as Venus radar data exchange, a joint mission to Mars, and scien-tist exchanges on forthcoming missions.

The experiences of all of these individuals and groups have varied markedly. Many have noted adecisive shift in Soviet openness since approximately 1983. Despite the lapsing of the bilateral agree-ment, they note that the Soviets have been sharing data and photographs with Westerners, and havetended to be more open in discussing plans for future missions, whether to Venus, the Moon, or Mars.While recognizing more openness on the Soviet side, other scientists stress the still essentially closednature of Soviet scientific and technical programs, and the difficulties Soviet scientists may have work-ing through their own political bureaucracies. For tracking the data of the upcoming VEGA missions,for example, both Soviet and American scientists organized a world wide network of tracking stations;but according to scientists involved, Soviet security has precluded Soviet scientists from sharing the ex-act location of their tracking stations, limiting the utility of the Soviet data for mathematical calcula-tions. Both American and Soviet scientists, however, have stated that they are limited in the extent towhich they can cooperate without a U.S.-Soviet bilateral agreement.

Few Americans truly understand the role of different Soviet people or organizations in establishingand maintaining cooperation in space with the United States, or the Soviet decisionmaking process andmechanisms to deal with space-related issues. Few American scientists have been immune to the difficul-ties of working with Moscow, in terms of difficulties in making arrangements, obtaining visas, correspond-ing with Soviet counterparts, and dealing with a high level of government secrecy.

But continuing efforts on the part of both American and Soviet scientists to share research and knowl-edge are testimony to the scientific value which both communities place on such interchange. Both scientificcommunities believe that such interchange would be greatly eased with the signing of another bilateralagreement. But both communities must deal with broader government apparatuses where other calcula-tions have become the subject of debate, and where science is but one concern.

48

nificance if they did not include substantial scien-tific content. The consensus was that, given the .difficulties inherent in large-scale joint missions,it would be wise to begin with simpler exchanges

SOVIET COOPERATIVE PRIORITIES

Shortly after the space science workshop, OTAdiscussed the workshop results with leading scien-tists in the U.S.S.R. These interviews, conductedin the Soviet Union, indicated a high degree ofcommonality with U.S. scientists concerning themost promising areas for future cooperation inspace science. The Soviet scientists interviewedby OTA not only listed areas of study, but enu-merated projects within fields in order of coop-erative appeal. Levels of cooperation, however,were not specified.5

Briefly, their suggestions were as follows. (As-terisks indicate projects not mentioned by U.S.scientists at the OTA workshop. )

‘N. Lubin, OTA, interviews in Moscow, June 1984.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Participants in OTA’S workshop underlinedthat past interactions with the Soviet Union inspace science have benefited U.S. scientific pro-grams, and believed that such interactions wouldagain be fruitful, given an appropriate officialframework.

According to workshop participants, Soviet ca-pabilities now present an opportunity for a sub-stantive, broad-based exchange that is equally bal-anced on both sides. In addition to renewingprevious areas of scientific exchange, future co-operation could include new areas of joint work(e.g., astrophysics and global studies) that takeadvantage of our respective strengths and meetmutual needs. A dramatic joint mission to Marsor the Sun could be considered as a long-termgoal, to be reached through successive coopera-tive steps. Types of cooperation, they noted,should be flexible. For example, joint coordina-tion of separate missions could be an effective wayto maximize scientific return while minimizing

of the type now underway, perhaps holding thepossibility of such a large-scale mission as a long-term goal.

● Planetary:—Study of asteroids, * comets, and interplan-

etary dust—Study of Mars, including sample return—Continuation of Venus study—Study of planetary moons and Saturn’s

rings,• Life sciences:

—Human and animal responses to space-flight factors

—Standardization of research methods anddata collection techniques*

—Further ground-based simulation studies.. Solar-terrestrial physics/astrophysics:

—General interest in cooperating in thesefields.

problems of technology transfer and mission man-agement.

This is not to suggest, participants stressed, thatcooperation should offset the development of ourindependent space capabilities. A key point of theworkshop was that the United States must con-tinue to have a strong, active space program ofits own in order to be viable as a cooperative part-ner—whether with the Soviet Union or others. Butsuch cooperation, they argued, can in turn greatlyenhance U.S. knowledge and capabilities, andshould therefore be carefully designed to assuremaximum scientific benefit.

The early scientific rationale for cooperationin space activities, following the spirit of the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year (IGY), was thatspace exploration was too vast and expensive anarea of exploration for any one country to under-

49

Table 3-1 .—Potential U.S./U.S.S.R. Collaborative Activities: From OTA Workshop, May 1984

Sun-Earth (Heliospheric):●

●

●

●

●

Joint meetings to develop space plasma theoryJoint coordination and data exchange in solar terrestrialphysics—specifically for International Solar-TerrestrialProgram (U.S./ESAlJapan)Exchange of co-investigatorsHosted instruments (detectors)Joint Starprobe mission to the Sun (very long range)

Astrophysics:● Joint planning for:

— Gamma-ray burst studies using Gamma Ray Observa-tory and other spacecraft

— Very long baseline interferometry (complementary or-bits of spacecraft)

● Data exchange regarding contamination of cooled surfaces(infrared telescopes) and plasma glow problems (ultraviolettelescopes)

● Co-investigators on Space Telescope, Gamma Ray Observ-atory, and Advanced Astronomical X-ray Facility

● Mounting of Spacelab experiments on Salyut for long-termexposure

Planetary:Venus:● Joint planning or joint missions as part of a sequence to

investigate the properties of the atmosphere of VenusŽ Joint planning/missions for “long-lived” Venus surface

studiesMars:● Coordinated planning for Mars missions ca. 1990 (Phobos

lander and Mars Geochemical Climatological Orbiter(MGCO))

• Joint planning/missions for Mars sample analysis or return

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment—

Table 3-2.—Participants in May 8 Workshopon Possible Future U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation

Bernard Burke, WorkshopChairman

Department of PhysicsMassachusetts Institute of

Technology

Donald De VincenziNASA Headquarters

Thomas M. DonahueDepartment of

Atmospheric andOceanic Sciences

University of Michigan

Paul GorensteinCenter for AstrophysicsHarvard University

James W. HeadDepartment of Geological

SciencesBrown University

Martin IsraelDepartment of Physics and

McDonnell Center forthe Space Sciences

Washington University atSt. Louis

Charles KennelDepartment of PhysicsUniversity of California at

Los Angeles

Eugene LevyLunar Planetary LabUniversity of Arizona

Harold MasurskyU.S. Geological Survey

David MorrisonUniversity of Hawaii

Tobias OwenEarth and Space Sciences

DepartmentState University of New

York at Stony Brook

Fred ScarfSpace and Technology

GroupTRW

Gerald WasserburgCalifornia Institute of

Technology

Moon:• Lunar geochemical orbiters• Continued lunar sample exchangeComets:● Soviet contribution to instrument design for U.S. mission

to Comet Kopf (1990) [possibly a hosted experiment]● Coordinated or joint cometary sample return missionsOuter Planets:• Joint orbiter/probe missions to Saturn, Uranus, or Neptune

[after the NASA/ESA Cassini mission to Saturn and Titan,Uranus is the next cooperative opportunity here]

Life Sciences:Effects of long-duration spaceflight:Ž Data exchange and joint or hosted flight experiments, es-

pecially on problems of (human) bone loss, radiation ef-fects, life support, and countermeasures

● Joint ground-based simulations (e. g., long-duration bedrest)

● Joint (or hosted) biological experiments aboard Cosmosbiosatellites and/or Spacelab, using various animal andplant species

Exobiology:Ž Joint unmanned missions or data exchange to further in-

vestigate the question of life on Mars. Joint meetings and/or data exchange regarding search for

extraterrestrial intelligence (SETI)• Joint collection and analysis of Antarctic meteoritesGlobal biology:. Earth observations data exchangeLife support systems:. Joint ground-based demonstration and flight testing of Iife

support systems (including bioregenerative type)

take alone. According to the scientists at OTA’Sworkshop, 25 years of independent space effortshave not discredited that rationale.

OTA’S workshop highlighted the belief that co-operation with the U.S.S.R. has been, and cancontinue to be, mutually beneficial in many areasof scientific research. The following two chaptersdiscuss how the scientific and technical concernsmust be integrated with other issues in makingdecisions today—first, as illustrated in anotherWestern country, and then in the context of is-sues facing policy makers in the United States.

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Chapter 4

The View From France:An Alternative Perspective

Display module of Venera type landing craft of VEGA I and II, carrying experiments from France,the United States, and other countries.

Chapter 4

The View From France:An Alternative Perspective

U.S,-Soviet cooperation in space does not oc-cur in a vacuum. Other Western countries haveentered into cooperative arrangements with theU.S.S.R. and have faced serious issues and de-bates of their own. Although these countries aregrappling with the same basic issues as U.S. plan-ners, their approaches to cooperation with theU.S.S.R. have been quite different.

Before discussing issues facing U.S. planners,therefore, this chapter examines the approach ofanother country towards cooperation in spacewith the U. S. S. R., with an eye towards assessing:

● possible alternative approaches to the pol-icy issues associated with U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in space; and

● the potential impact of renewed U. S .-Sovietcooperation on our allies.

France was selected as a focus of study, since ofall Western countries, it has had the most con-tinuous and most extensive cooperation with theU.S.S.R. in space science research. Although our

BACKGROUND

French-Soviet cooperation in space dates backto 1966, with the visit of Charles de Gaulle toMoscow and the signing on June 30 of an open-ended ended Inter-governmental Accord on Scientific/Technical and Economic Cooperation. The inclu-sion in this agreement of a large segment onFrench-Soviet cooperation in “the exploration andpeaceful uses of outer space” provided the frame-work for formal cooperation in space activitiesgenerally. An umbrella agreement with no spe-cific time frame of its own, the accord providedan institutional framework within which furtheragreements could be negotiated. The agreementcreated a Grande Commission, comprised of the

focus is on France, it should be kept in mind thatcooperation with the U.S.S.R. is a relatively con-troversial issue in other Western countries in-volved in space programs of their own.

The following discussion is based largely on in-terviews conducted by OTA in France in July1984, and subsequently in the United States, withrepresentatives from a number of scientific, for-eign policy, and defense agencies, including theCentre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES), theFrench Ministry of External Relations, the Secre-tariat General de la Defense Nationale (SGDN),and the European Space Agency (ESA). * After abrief discussion of the background of French-So-viet cooperation in space, this chapter examinesthe policy issues associated with potential futurecooperative projects, how the French approachthese issues, and the implications this may holdfor U.S. policy.

‘Unfootnoted quotations have been taken from these interviews.

President of CNES, I the President of the Advi-sory Board to the U.S.S.R.'s Interkosmos, andworking groups in four key areas of space re-

I Created in 1962, CNES is charged with five pri mar}’ missions.As described by CNES officials, these are: 1 ) to assist French gowernmental services in the establishment of French space pollcy; 2)to take the requisite actions to implement this policy and managethe associated programs: 3) to create the appropriate facilities anddevelop the necessary know-how: 4) to orient the French space in-dustry in order to make use, especially on foreign markets, of theexperience and competence acquired and the resources set up overa period of 20 years; and .s) to develop international cooperationon both bilateral and multilateral bases, and to promote scientificand commercial utilization of space technology. CNES is comprisedof four main centers: the Paris head office: the Evry Center con-cerned with launch vehicles: the Toulouse Space Center: and theGuiana Space Center in Kourou, French Guiana. Today, CNESboasts a staff of over 2,OOO people, located in four centers, morethan half of whom are engineers.

5 3

54

search: scientific studies of space; spatial and aero-nomic meteorology; space medicine and biology;and space telecommunications. Annual meetingsof the commission were to provide a forum forassessing ongoing programs and initiating newones. z By the early 1980s, one-third of the morethan 2,000 space researchers and technicians inFrance was working in some way with French-So-viet cooperation in space.

Today space research has grown to a consid-erable level in France, and cooperation with theU.S.S.R. has grown commensurately, As the mainagency in France responsible for national spacepolicy and programs, CNES is in charge of de-veloping international cooperation on both bila-teral and multilateral bases. As table 4-1 illus-trates, in 1984 CNES’S budget was almost $600million (4, 763 million francs), of which almosthalf was designated for bilateral and multilateralcooperation. While most of the funds budgetedfor such cooperation are directed towards ESA,approximately 51 million francs each year, orabout 10 percent of the bilateral budget, is budg-eted for cooperation with the U.S.S.R. By com-parison, about 83 million francs per year arebudgeted for cooperation with the United States.

If cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is significant,however, it is concentrated in a relatively smallnumber of areas. Table 4-2 shows the breakdownof funding for French bilateral cooperative proj-ects by country and category in 1984. The levelof French-Soviet cooperation in space is not farbelow that of French-U. S. cooperation. But whileFrench cooperation with the United States is morediffuse—spread out in Earth observation data col-lection, scientific experiments, and manned flights–French-Soviet cooperation is largely concentratedin the area of scientific experiments. Indeed, coop-erative efforts with the U.S.S.R. account for over60 percent of the total budget allocated for Frenchcooperative space science experiments generally.

‘The presidents of CNES and Interkosmos meet annually, alter-nately in France and the U. S. S. R., to examine the progress of French-Soviet cooperation in space and to decide on new projects for thefollowing year. The results of such work are presented by the twopresidents to the Grande Commission which oversees French-Sovietscientific ~technical and economic cooperation.

Forms of cooperation between France and theU.S.S.R. have ranged from exchange of data andinformation to a joint manned flight in 1982. Thelion’s share of cooperation has fallen in data ex-change and Soviet hosting of French experiments.But the first manned space flight is also viewed asa valuable landmark in French-Soviet cooperation.While the next flight of a French spationaute on aforeign spacecraft was on the U.S. Shuttle, when

Patrick Baudry joined U.S. astronauts in June 1985,French planners envision another French-Sovietmanned space flight if feasible.

Table 4-3 outlines the main scientific programsbeing undertaken by CNES as of late 1984. Accord-ing to CNES, projects with the U.S.S.R. are nowemphasizing four areas:

● astronomy;. solar system exploration, including:

—plasma physics, mainly in the ionosphereand the magnetosphere; and

—planetary exploration, primarily of Venusand the Comets;

. materials processing in space; and● life sciences.

While most of these projects are listed in appendixA, some of the major research areas and projectsare as follows.

Astronomy

Space observatories provide French scientistswith the means to pursue research in modern as-tronomy and astrophysics from a point beyondthe interference of the Earth’s atmosphere. Alongwith ESA, the U.S.S.R. is one of France’s chiefpartners in these endeavors.

One of the key projects in cooperation with theU.S.S.R. is the gamma-ray astronomy project Sig-ma. The Sigma program (Systeme d’imageriegamma a masque aleatoire), representing a newFrench-Soviet Gamma Ray and X-ray Space Ob-servatory, calls for the joint French-Soviet man-ufacturing and placing into orbit of an astronomysatellite which will study the universe with X-rayand gamma-ray telescopes. The French Sigma tele-scope will utilize a Soviet platform, Astron II,which will be a modified version of the Venera

Table 4-1 .— Budget of(State subsidies

By program category

Amount Percent Percent1984 1984 1983

—

the French Space Agency: Breakdown of Fundingand Centre’s own resources)a (in million francs)

European prograrr 1, 901. 200 39.91 36.12 Launch vehiclesBl later, i l programs 540.450 11.35 1 2 2 6 SatellitesNational programs 984 .130 20.66 24.32 SPACE LABProqram support 641 .050 13.46 11.12 BalloonsG e n e r a l o p e r a t i n g c o s t s 6 9 6 4 7 5 14.62 16.18 Scienti f ic experiments

Appl lcat ions systems

and experlmentsR&DProgram support

Total 4 ,763 ,305 1 0 0 0 0 100 .00—

dSums taxes e x c l u d e d

B Y type of system

Amount Percent Percent

I 1984 1984 1983

847 .9001 ,654 .930

90.30018.200

1,32 500

66 .100132 .500

1 ,820 .875

4 ,763 .305

1.39 1 1.77

2 7 8 3 5 03 8 2 3 37 00

100 .00 100 .00

Sciences

ApplicationsTelecommunicationsEarth observat ion and

data col lect ionLaunch facilities

R&DProgram support

56

Table 4-’2.— Breakdown of Funding for Bilateral Cooperative Projects

Table 4-3.— French Space Program: MainScientific Programs

Astronomy:Hipparcos (Astrometrical Satellite)– ESAISO (IR Astronomical Observatory )-ESASpace Telescope–U.S.A. /ESAFrench Astronomy Program on SPACELAB 1 with:

• Telescope UV Fause — Program in cooperation withUs.

. Very Wide Field Camera— ESASigma (Gamma Ray Astronomy Project) in cooperation

with Soviet UnionA program of balloon-borne equipment in IR and UV

astronomyPlanetary exploration:VEGA—Mission to Venus which will also fly by Halley’s

Comet in cooperation with the Soviet UnionGiotto– European mission to Halley’s Comet– ESA

Plasma physics:Arcad launched in September 1981 in cooperation with

the Soviet UnionInterball —a new project in cooperation with the Soviet

Union

Oceanography—meteorology:Poseidon (Oceanographic satellite using an altimeter for

the study of the general circulation of the ocean) eitheron SPOT 3 or in cooperation on TOPEX (U. S. A.)

Design and development of a passive microwaveradiometer to be placed on board the European ERS-1Earth Resources Satellite.

SOURCE OTA briefing at CNES, July 1984

type adapted for astronomy.3 Scheduled to belaunched at the end of 1987, the satellite will beequipped with a French-made gamma telescope,a Soviet-developed X-ray telescope package to bemounted on the side of the gamma-ray telescope

3The satellite will be placed in a very elliptical orbit of 2,000 kmperigee and 200,000 km apogee, inclined between 51” and 60”, de-pending on whether the satellite is launched from Baikonur or Ka-pustin-Yar. See Pierre Langereux, “Pro jet franco-sovietique de sat-ellite d’astronomic SIGMA, ” Espace, Oct. 12, 1983; and “French,Soviets Define Observation Platform, ” Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, Feb. 20, 1984, p. 55.

MajorScientlflcprograms

(in million francs)

Exportac t i ons

———

3 2 0 0

3200

M a n n e df l i gh t s

10.0002.7006.4003.100

———

22.200

Total

83.20050.55015.300

361.5001.1003.200

25600

540.450

tube, and X-ray and gamma-ray burst detectors.The Sigma mission will permit gamma-ray emit-ting objects to be located with a far greater de-gree of precision (in the range of about a 2 min-ute arc) than is presently attainable. Sigma wasoriginally conceived as a French project; theFrench then proposed joint conduct with theU.S.S.R.

The Sigma program is an outgrowth of severalcooperative efforts in astronomy in the past. Forexample Signe 3, a French Earth satellite launchedby a Soviet rocket on June 17, 1977, was accordeda great deal of acclaim for its mission to detectand locate the sources of “gamma flashes, ” a typeof cosmic radiation seldom studied.4 A jointFrench-Soviet launch of the astronomy satelliteGamma 1 is scheduled for 1986 to carry threescientific experiments: a large Gamma telescope,Gamma 1; an X-ray telescope, Spectre II; and asmaller Gamma telescope. Gamma 1 is a high-energy gamma radiation study designed to deter-mine the structure of the galaxy and the originand distribution of gamma sources. Mounted onthe same satellite as Gamma 1, Spectre II will ex-amine galactic and extra galactic X-ray and gam-ma sources, as well as “burster” sources in thesewavelengths. The study of gamma ray bursts isa key area of cooperation between France and theU. S. S. R., and the collaborative program in thisarea is recognized worldwide as one of the lead-ing ongoing initiatives in high-energy astro-physics.

4Joseph G. Whelan, “Soviet Attitude Toward International Coop-eration in Space, “ in Congressional Research Service, Soviet SpacePrograms; 1976-80, prepared for the Senate Committee onCommerce, Science and Transportation, CXX, No. 8 Washington,

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 286.

57

Photo credit Charles P Vick

Oreol 3 as displayed at French Pavillion, Paris AirShow, 1985, with Salyut Solar Panel and gravity

gradient boom

In the area of optical astronomy, the U.F.T.project in ultraviolet astronomy is another keyFrench-Soviet joint effort. The project consists ofa French ultraviolet spectrometer placed in the fo-cal plane of a Soviet telescope to study the ultra-violet spectrum of the stars. The U.F.T. waslaunched on a Soviet craft on March 24, 1983,to examine the stellar atmospheres in ultraviolet(wavelengths ranging from 1200 to 2500-A). Itwas designed for coordinated ground-based meas-urements of the interstellar medium to be madethrough an 80 cm, telescope located at an observa-tory in the Soviet Crimea, and from a high-resolu-tion spectrometer in the Laboratoire d’AstronomicSpatiale (L. A. S., or space astronomy laboratory)in Marseille, France.

Solar Terrestrial Physics

Solar terrestrial physics is an important area ofcooperation between France and the U.S.S.R. Par-ticular areas of emphasis are the terrestrial mag-netosphere and ionosphere and the interplanetaryenvironment. A key joint effort in this area wasthe launching on September 21, 1981, of theFrench Arcad 3 satellite by a Soviet launch vehi-cle. The purpose of this project was to study thephysical parameters (especially wave character-istics) of the lower magnetosphere at high lati-tudes. The project was an outgrowth of thelaunchings of Oreol 1 and Oreol 2 in 1971 and1973, which carried scientific equipment to ex-plore physical phenomena in the Earth’s upper at-mosphere. At present, the operational phase ofArcad 3 is continuing, using the French Tromsoeground station for receipt of data. Results of Ar-cad 3 are scheduled to be discussed at an interna-tional symposium to be held in Toulouse, France,in May 1986.

Araks and lnterball are two other significantjoint French-Soviet efforts in the area of solar ter-restrial physics. In the Araks project a Frenchrocket placed a Soviet electron accelerator intoorbit to study the nature of the aurora borealis,or Polar lights, by injecting electrons into the Po-lar region of the ionosphere. ]nterball is a newproject in French-Soviet cooperation to study thesolar wind, and the terrestrial magnetosphere-ion-osphere relationship.

Life Sciences and MaterialsProcessing

The first French-Soviet manned fright of aFrench spationaute, Jean-Loup Chretien, on a So-viet spacecraft from June 24-July 2, 1982, washailed as a great step forward in French researchin the fields of the life sciences, and especially inthe area of human physiology. Four key experi-ments were conducted: Echographic, Posture,Cytos 2, and Biobloc 3. Echographic experimentsprovided information on blood circulation andblood volume distribution, as well as a visual rep-resentation of heart pumping characteristics. In-formation of this type is necessary for understand-

58

ing the way liquid is pumped through the bodyin a weightless environment. The Posture exper-iment involved the use of French-designed neu-rophysiological measurement equipment to col-lect data relating to the influence of gravity onmovements and equilibrium. Spationaute Jean-Loup Chretien participated actively in all of theseexperiments.

In addition to furthering research in the lifesciences, the joint flight also provided valuableinformation for materials processing in space. Ma-terials processing is viewed as an important areafor future development in France, a key part ofwhat the French see as the future economic valueof space applications for a broad-based, high-technology economy. One of the key tasks of theChretien mission was to produce certain metal al-loys unobtainable on Earth. This was a follow-up to other experiments, such as the Kristall ex-periment, which had been conducted with Frenchhardware by Soviet cosmonauts aboard the Salyut6 space station.

Analysis of the results of experiments conductedin both areas during the joint manned flight havecontinued well into 1985. In addition, coopera-tive experiments in the material and life sciencescontinue within the framework of later flightsaboard Soviet spacecraft. In addition to the ex-periments conducted during Chretien’s flight, forexample, CNES has also been cooperating in bio-logical research with the U.S.S.R. both on Cos-

PhoIo credlt Centre Nationale d'Etudes Spatiales

Salyut 7: Echography experiment

rnos satellites and Salyut 7, examining such ques-tions as the influence of cosmic rays on biologicalorganisms, and the effect of microgravity on cellgrowth. One program, Biocosmos, has beenstudying the behavior of a primate under weight-less conditions aboard a Soviet biosatellite. UsingFrench-supplied equipment, Soviet cosmonauts onSalyut 7 have continued to conduct experimentsbegun by French principal investigators in con-junction with Chretien’s flight.

Overtures have been made to conduct anotherjoint manned flight in the near future. One yearafter Chretien’s flight, French officials are quotedas having stated: “We still are in favour of thisidea, especially for long duration flight which willpermit us to carry out further biomedical research. ”5

Following the meeting of the Grande Commissionin Samarkand, U.S.S.R,, in October 1984,Frederic d’Allest, Director General of CNES, wasquoted as stating “the French delegation reaf-firmed its great interest in conducting a long du-ration flight of a French spationaute , . . on boarda Soviet orbital station.”~ He stated that the flightwas envisioned to last about 4 weeks, to take placearound 1987-88. And OTA interviews with French

‘Jean-Paul Cr(~i.ze, “Un satcllit( d astronomic” et k pro]ets ~m-bitieux ver> I’enus et la Lune: L’e>paw tr.]nco-so~ietique,”” J!.e }:i+iro,

Ckt 5 , 1Q83,“See P]erre I.dngcreuk, Id Franc{’ Intercw’>e par un vO1 dc’ longue

dur~,e a~,ec 1’LJ 1-/ S. S , .4ir et ~-()~rn()s N,) 1018 (0< t. 13, 1 4 8 4 ) ,

p 5 5 .

French “spationaute, ” Jean Loup Chretien on boardSalyut 7

59

officials in July and December 1984 suggest thatthis desire has not changed.

As of late 1984, however, while a number ofprojects have been adopted for joint French-Sovietcooperation in the near future, there has not beena commitment from the U.S.S.R. to the prospectof hosting another spationaute on a Soviet flight.This suggests that an agreement for another jointmanned flight may be less a French decision thanone determined in Moscow.

Planetary Exploration

Undoubtedly one of the largest cooperativeventures in planetary exploration between Franceand the U.S.S.R. is the VEGA, or Venus-HalleyMission. This project represents a multilateralventure with extensive French-Soviet cooperation.The mission involves two Venus landers and at-mospheric balloons, as well as a probe towardHalley’s Comet. Launched from the U.S.S.R. inDecember 1984, the mission rendezvoused withVenus in June 1985, and is scheduled to flyby Hal-ley’s comet in 1986. The study of Venus involvesbilateral cooperation between the U.S.S.R. andFrance, while the mission to Halley’s Comet is aninternational program in which Hungary, Aus-tria, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Ger-many, and West Germany are also officially par-ticipating. Experiments being flown on theballoons, landers, and the Halley probe fallmainly in the following areas:

●

●

●

●

●

●

study of the Venus atmosphere (pressure,speed, temperature, chemical and isotopiccomposition, study of the constituents);study of the chemical and isotopic composi-tion of Venus soil;study of the nucleus and environment of Hal-ley’s Comet (physical characteristics, temper-ature of the molecules, and gas composition);observation of solar wind plasma waves;study of the interplanetary environment andthe intensity of the Lyman emission of hydro-gen and deuterium from comets, with thehelp of an absorption cell multiphotometer;andexamination /determination of the composi-tion of the gas which comprises the coma andthe tail of the comet.

Several French experiments will also be carriedout by the Giotto probe, to be launched by theEuropean Space Agency to rendezvous with Hal-ley’s Comet in 1986.

In addition to VEGA, the meeting of the GrandeCommission in October 1984 highlighted somepotential future areas of French-Soviet coopera-tion in planetary research. According to one re-port, the Commission discussed a potential newmission of an interplanetary probe, Venera 91,envisioned to be launched in 1991 to study theplanet Venus and asteroids. ’ According to anoth-er, the Soviet Union has proposed to France toparticipate in its “Planet F“ project to launch aSoviet probe to Mars and the Mars moon Phobosin 1988.8

Space Applications

In the area of space applications, a key coop-erative effort is illustrated by Sargos, the Frenchcontribution to the France-American-CanadianSARSAT system which works in conjunction withthe Soviet COSPAS system for the search and res-cue of ships and aircraft in distress. France is pres-ently supplying three Sargos detector units toSARSAT for the reception of 406 MHz signals,to be placed onboard NOAA satellites. As oneof the SARSAT member parties, France partici-pated in the joint demonstration phase, just con-cluded, which involved an extended checkout ofthe interoperability of SARSAT with the SovietCOSPAS system. France is also party to the newagreements which continue the system through1990.

Evaluation of French= Soviet Projects

The French tend to stress the relative strongpoints of previous space cooperation with theU.S.S.R, and generally support continued coop-erative efforts. French scientists appear to haverun up against less in the way of harassment, visaproblems, time delays, or other logistical prob-lems which have frequently confronted their Amer-

‘Ibid,‘See Pierre Langereux and Serge Berg, “Planet F, pro jet trancm

sovietique de survol de Mars et Phobos, ” Air et Cosmos, NO. 1019(Oct. 20, 1984), p. 80.

60

Figure 4-1 .—Soviet Proton

● VENERA

—

Launch Vehicle

● Z O N D

D - l - e

4, 15 M

● BASE VIEW OFFIRST STAGk(CONCEPT ONLY)

ENGINE

SOURCE Charles P Vick, 1982-85

ican counterparts. Access to data and informa-tion also appears to have been better than forother Western countries. And French planners be-lieve that the informal contact established betweenthe two scientific communities is also beneficialfor the longer term.

Nonetheless, French cooperation with theU.S.S.R. has not escaped other problems whichchallenge other Western countries cooperatingwith the U. S. S. R., and substantial difficulties re-main in implementing cooperative agreements.Chief among these are the many barriers in gain-ing access to people and information. The Frenchstress, however, that these barriers are not only

an outgrowth of Soviet politics and the closed na-ture of Soviet society, but are also a function ofbureaucratic problems endemic to the Soviet sys-tem. For example, whereas scientists in the Westtend to see all aspects of a scientific problem, theyunderscore that Soviet scientists, by virtue of amore compartmentalized scientific establishment,are often confined to a more limited view. TheFrench therefore do not see access problems as pri-marily political issues, and feel it is worth the ef-fort to keep cooperation alive with hopes that theU.S.S.R. will become increasingly easier to workwith.

KEY ISSUES AND POLICY APPROACHES

Because of a somewhat different approach to-wards cooperation with the U. S. S. R., the issuesconcerning France-Soviet space cooperation todayare quite different from those facing U.S. plan-ners. Whereas in response to the Soviet invasionof Afghanistan and the declaration of martial lawin Poland U.S. planners allowed space coopera-tion with the U.S.S.R. to lapse, French plannersdecided that such cooperation should be sus-tained. Whereas the key issue in the United Statestoday, therefore, is whether space cooperationshould be reestablished, the key issue in Francehas concerned the degree to which space cooper-ation with the U.S. S. R. should be maintained.Perhaps because of this, the issue of France-Sovietspace cooperation has not been as much a focusof public debate in France as it has been in theUnited States.

This is not to suggest that France-Soviet coop-eration in space has been without controversy.Some joint projects have been the target of op-position in the past, and others are the focus ofFrench internal debate today. Probably the great-est controversy, for example, surrounded theflight of Jean-Loup Chretien in 1982, when a largesegment of the French scientific community op-posed the flight of a French spationaute on a So-viet spacecraft at the same time that the Sovietswere flagrantly violating human rights at homeand abroad. As illustrated above, French scien-tists or other communities may well oppose

another potential joint flight in the future. Andat present, there is also evidence that some scien-tists may be declining to travel to the U. S. S. R.,and may be withholding from Soviet scientists in-vitations to their own laboratories.

Opposition to cooperation has generally stemmedfrom humanitarian concerns, i.e., expressing sup-port for Sakharov, opposition to the Soviet in-vasion of Afghanistan, etc. Opponents of jointmanned missions, for example, have argued thatthe implicit acquiescence of French scientists toSoviet violations of scientific integrity and humanrights at home, and the political profits which theU.S.S.R. inevitably accrues on the internationalstage more than offset any possible benefits ofsuch projects. Others contend, however, that thescientific and economic benefits of such missionsfar outweigh the political costs, and that Franceshould pursue as many joint manned missions aspossible, regardless of whom the partner may be,Europeans in general, these proponents argue, arelooking forward to several joint manned missionsbefore the end of the century, not only with theU. S. S. R., but with the United States and poten-tially with the European space station Columbus.The French are also looking forward to their ownmanned vehicle called Hermes, a small space planewhich could be used in association with satellitedeployment or space station maintenance andoperation. The more exposure French scientistscan get to manned space flights and training, these

62

proponents argue, the more they can apply thatto the development of their own programs.

Despite these working level debates, however,a fairly consistent policy approach has been pur-sued in France regarding interaction with theU.S.S.R. in space activities in particular, and inscientific and technical cooperation generally. Co-operation with the U.S.S.R. was begun essentiallywith political aims paramount. French plannersviewed scientific and technical cooperation gen-erally, and space cooperation in particular, as ameans of broadening relations with the U.S.S.R.and offsetting political tensions in other areas.

As the political climate has become less oppor-tune for promoting such cooperative efforts, how-ever, and as the scientific requirements of theFrench space program have grown, scientific andeconomic aspects have been increasingly empha-sized. Today, the scientific and economic bene-fits of cooperation in space are stressed as the cen-tral reason for continued cooperation, althoughFrench planners agree that it is impossible to ig-nore the political background against which coop-eration occurs.

Current French policy decisions, therefore, rep-resent a mixture of political, scientific, and eco-nomic aims, which have varied in relative impor-tance, but together have created a mainly stableand consistent policy approach. Today, Frenchplanners are attempting to maintain the politicalwill for cooperation in spite of political differ-ences, but are trying to keep cooperation itself ona scientific level.

Scientific and Economic Issues

In light of the existing structure and present lev-el of funding of the French space program, Frenchplanners assert that their space research requirescooperation with other countries, and that theU.S.S.R. is a good partner for answering thoseneeds. The force of this argument was intensifiedwith the cutbacks in NASA’s budget in the early1980s and the consequent curtailing of NASA’sparticipation in some international projects. TheFrench—interpreting the cutback in U.S. partici-pation in the International Solar Polar Mission

(ISPM)’ in political rather than budgetar y

terms—reasserted their view of the U.S.S.R. asa viable partner for many areas of space coop-eration. Regarding a possible joint France-Sovietmission to }’enus, for example, one French scien-tist stated:

This has been the only possibility for Frenchscientists to go into the planetary programs. Thereare some individuals like me who have had in-struments on U.S. spacecraft but we’d like to havea larger constituency and the only way for ourscientists to go to the planets is through this co-operation with the Soviets. 10

Although Chretien’s flight was politically contro-versial, it was viewed as an important step forthe French space science program: France did nothave its own craft for sending a man into space,so required a joint mission with another country

which did. The mission was considered beneficialfor developing the life sciences in France, and pro-vided new data for further space research unavail-able elsewhere.

From cooperation with the U.S.S.R. today,France continues to obtain payload opportunitiesthat it might not otherwise be able to acquire. Andeven though, as mentioned above, French scien-tists have sometimes opposed cooperation withthe U.S.S.R. on humanitarian grounds, they havegenerally favored cooperative efforts such as thepresent mission to Halley’s comet, where Frenchparticipation has been on a low level and the po-tential scientific benefits are large.

The economic benefits of cooperation with theU.S.S.R. have also been substantial. Being ableto place experiments on another country’s space-craft, and sharing costs in joint ventures have re-duced French expenditures considerably. Accord-ing to Le Figaro (Oct. 5, 1983), for example, theSigma project, if conducted by France alone,would have cost the French at least 400 millionFrench francs, or about $5o million. In coopera-tion with the Soviets, who will be mainly respon-

9See Robert Reinhold, “U.S. Dismays Allies by Slashing Fundsfor Joint Science Projects, ” The New York Times, May 10, 1981, p. 1.

IOThomas O’Toole, “France and Soviets Will Aim Wind Balloons

at Venus, ” Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1978, p. A 31,

63

Photo credit Charles P Vick. Paris Air Show. 1985

French Atmospheric Balloon carried on Soviet Venus-Halley Mission

sible for the launching operations, it is now ex-pected to cost France only about 80 million Frenchfrancs, or about $10 million for the first 5 yearsuntil 1987 or 1988 when the satellite is projectedto be placed into orbit.

Foreign Policy Issues

Although France today emphasizes scientificand economic benefits as the basis for coopera-tion with the U. S. S. R., French-Soviet coopera-tion in space has consistently been buttressed bythe foreign policy community. Decisions haveconsistently been made at the higher politicallevels for cooperation to continue, emphasizingthe conviction that such cooperation can be use-ful in attaining certain foreign policy goals as wellas scientific ones, and that little would be gainedfrom curbing or terminating it.

A key goal of French-Soviet cooperation in space,for example, concerns the position of France onthe international stage., i.e., maintaining and rein-forcing French independence. 11

’ As the Frenchspace program grows and becomes more sophis-ticated, cooperation with both superpowers al-lows France to avoid the dependency which Frenchplanners fear could result from relying on just oneor the other for payload capabilities and exper-tise, By maintaining a balance between the U.S.S.R.and the United States, or by playing one super-power off against the other, the French believethat they occupy a better bargaining position indetermining the shape of future cooperativeventures.

French planners also view France-Soviet coop-eration in space as important in working towardsa number of more elusive objectives, such as re-ducing tensions worldwide, and keeping commu-nication open with the U.S. S. R. As in other areasof France-Soviet relations, they have found it dif-ficult to evaluate just how effective space coop-eration may be in achieving these ends. But evenif cooperation does not minimize tensions, theyargue, the alternative—curtailing or terminatingdialog–would isolate the U.S.S.R. from the worldcommunity, force it to expand its own indigenouscapabilities, and ultimately increase tensionsworldwide. In the French view, therefore, coop-eration is a means of keeping channels of com-munication open, perhaps of most importancewhen the overall political climate is so dismal.

Another French objective of cooperation inspace is the opportunity to learn more about theU.S.S.R. A key example is the intimate view thetwo French spationautes, Jean-Loup Chretien andPatrick Baudry, believe they acquired of both theSoviet space program and of Soviet society whiletraining with Soviet cosmonauts in preparationfor the joint manned mission in 1982.

If cooperation in space is indeed beneficial inthese ways, then in a certain sense cooperation

I I see for ~xamp]e testimony ot H u b e r t Curieu, I>rmident. CNTES,

[n hearings betore the House Science and Technology Comm]ttee,international Space Activities, May lb, 17, 18, 1978 [No. 74] (Wash-

ington, DC L], S, Government Printing Office, 1Q79), pp. 2-3:It I. a pol]cy which strltes to en~ure our ]ndqcncience to tht, full

exttmt nec e+sar~ and (() estahl l~h t lt’~ ()! ctfec t IV(’ c (l(~perat Ion wlt h~he space power~ tu,peLIJll Y tht, Llnltd States

64

with the U.S.S.R. is also viewed as a means ofsimply sustaining the mechanisms for cooperationitself. Bureaucratic and political constraints haveimpeded all areas of France-Soviet cooperation—selecting areas for cooperation, negotiating agree-ments, and implementing them efficiently and ef-fectively. Because it was so difficult for France andthe U.S.S.R. to reach the present level of coop-eration, French planners assert that it would becounterproductive to destroy the fruits of theseefforts—especially if the French were to want torebuild to this level sometime in the future whenthe climate may be more opportune. Some degreeof consistency is regarded as important, if onlyto ensure that the window for cooperative activ-ities remains open.

“Every country, ” one French planner stated,“must find areas for cooperation. ” The French,he added, “through prudent and determined ef-fort” have decided on space as an area of coop-eration which can be kept insulated from the dan-gers of technology transfer (see below), but whichcan offer mutual benefit to the countries involved.

Despite this overarching commitment to con-tinuing cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in spacescience research, concern over two issues was ex-pressed by some in the French foreign policy com-munity. One of these issues concerns the degreeto which such cooperation may affect French re-lations with other Western countries. Althoughthe French believe that France-Soviet cooperationso far has not affected relations with other coun-

tries in any lasting way, there was some concernexpressed that it could affect relations in the fu-ture, especially with the United States. This viewwas buttressed by the belief expressed by severalFrench planners that NASA’s curtailed participa-tion in the International Solar Polar Mission(ISPM) was motivated more by political thanbudgetary concerns. But French planners hopethat continued cooperation with the U.S.S.R. willnot affect their relations with the United States—and argue that it should not.

A second issue concerns the degree to whichFrance-Soviet cooperation in space should be“linked” to other foreign policy considerations,either to affect or to protest Soviet behavior whichthey may consider politically or morally egregi-ous. French planners discussed the moral attrac-tiveness of using cooperation as a lever to effectchange in Soviet society, or to send a moral mes-sage to protest Soviet actions which might havesome bearing on Soviet behavior in the future.But scientific and technical cooperation, they be-lieve, can only have an impact if the cooperativeproject is something which the U.S.S.R. perceivesas important to its own interests, and the majorityof French programs in space cooperation do notfall into this category. According to one Frenchofficial, some scientific and technical cooperativeprograms with the U. S. S. R., such as in nuclearphysics, were curtailed or stopped in response tothe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the exileof Andrei Sakharov, and other potential futureareas of cooperation have been “put on the backburner. ” But whether the intent is to affect So-viet behavior or to protest, they argue that cur-tailment or termination of cooperative projectsin space would have little impact on Soviet poli-cy at large while having a large negative impacton the French space program. They therefore be-lieve that space cooperation should not be heldhostage to Soviet actions in other areas, and thatany displeasure with Soviet actions should beshown in other ways.

Indeed, some planners asserted that coopera-tion may even make it easier for France to pro-test Soviet actions, by providing a mechanismthrough which displeasure can be conveyed. Justas French President Mitterrand, when visitingMoscow in the spring of 1984, was provided more

6 5

of an opportunity than many other Western lead-ers for voicing his concern over the persecutionof Andrei Sakharov, some French scientists ar-gue that by being involved in cooperative projects,they may find it easier to discuss questions of po-litical and humanitarian concern than if there wereno interchange at all. There is no evidence, how-ever, to indicate whether this approach may havebeen any more successful in affecting Soviet be-havior than that of others in the West who ter-minated cooperative ventures.

In short, although the link between scientificcooperation and political relations with theU.S.S.R. cannot be ignored, French planners areattempting to “de-link” the two by downplayingthe use of science for political ends, While no areaof cooperation with the U.S.S.R. can be totallyde-politicized, French planners argue that it is im-portant to seek an area for cooperation where po-litical considerations are reduced as much as pos-sible, but where mutual scientific benefit can besubstantial.

Military Technology Issues

In light of the overall policy to pursue substan-tive cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in space re-search, questions of the potential transfer of mil-itarily sensitive technology loom large. WhileFrance enjoys many scientific, economic, and po-litical benefits from cooperation, the French agreethat the Soviets are vigorously pursuing an ag-gressive campaign to gain access to Western tech-nology and know-how, and that they are un-doubtedly acquiring technical capabilities fromspace cooperation with France beyond thosewhich they already possess. This was highlightedby the expulsion of 47 Soviet technological spiesin 1983, and by the 1985 “leak” by French intelli-gence services of secret Soviet documents whichillustrate the breadth and scope of Soviet indus-trial espionage activities in the West, especiallyin the aeronautic sector. 12 In interviews withOTA, French planners stated that the Soviets maygain some technical know-how via space coop-

I ZThese \\, ere pub] ished in part in two editions of the French news-

paper Le Monde, See Edwy Plenel and Christian Batifoulier, “Undocument secret sovietique, ” Le Mond~, Mar. 30, 1985, p, 8; andEdwy Plenel, “L’ Espionage sovi~tique a l’ouest: Les mysteres de laVPK, ” Le ,tlonde, Apr. 2, 1985, p. 7.

eration —e. g., from French data processing—andare also able to use French instrumentation thatthey otherwise might not have had.

The key question for French poIicymakers, how-ever, is the actual value of these new capabilitiesto the U. S. S. R., and it is here where they differmarkedly from present U.S. policy. Defining “mil-itarily sensitive” technologies as only those withdirect military application—as opposed to moreextensive U.S. definitions* —they argue that strin-gent controls are in place to avoid their transferinto Soviet hands, As in the United States, a listof sensitive technologies—the Missile TechnologyControl List—governs technology exports fromFrance, and an inter-ministerial group of specialistsis assigned to examine every new project propo-sal—in the space field as well as in others—to en-sure that no violations of the list occur. With in-put from the Secretariat General de la DefenseNationale (SGDN) and various ministries, this in-terministerial committee, the Commission 1nter-ministeriel d’Examen des Exportations du Mate'riels de Guerre (CIEEMG), reviews technologytransfer possibilities in space-related areas and ischarged with the final approval of proposed proj-ects. Thus, each project proposal in France is eval-uated for its technology transfer potential, anddepending on the ultimate assessment, access topeople, techniques, and/or equipment may becurtailed.

Once a project has been accepted, moreover,French planners argue that still other systems ofverification remain in place. According to offi-cials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “certainprocedures guarantee that any potentially sensi-tive equipment is protected, and information flowis carefully monitored. ” For example, protectivepackaging may be used to prevent the Sovietsfrom gaining access to particular items that maybe sensitive. And French scientists and partici-

● The United States is the only OECD country that defines strate-gic goods as including products and technologies with only indirectmilitary implications, that views the weakening of the Soviet econ-omy as an appropriate factor in determining policy, and that in-cludes “foreign policy criteria” in export licensing or the impositionof embargoes and sanctions. See John P, Hardt and Donna L. Gold,“Trade Sanctions and Controls, ” in East-West Technolo&T~’ Trans-fer: A Congressional Dialog Ij’ith the Reagan Administration, a dia-log prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Go\’ernment Printing Oftice, 1984), p. Q9.

6 6

pants in cooperative projects are generally briefedbefore a project begins on the “myth” of the sep-aration of the Soviet civilian and military spaceprograms, and on precautions to be taken in coop-erative projects to counteract Soviet efforts to ac-quire Western technology and know-how. “If in-ternational cooperation, ” one such briefingconcludes, “presents numerous advantages (ratherinexpensive access to sophisticated space equip-ment, knowledge of Soviet technology), it alsopresents risks. It is necessary to recognize theserisks of transferring sensitive know-how, so as totake the precautions that are necessary in ex-changes with the U. S. S. R.”

Key criticisms from supporters of a more strin-gent U.S. policy are that the French definition ofwhat may be “militarily sensitive” is not exten-sive enough —i. e., it does not include dual-use

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

French planners emphasize that their approachto cooperation with the U.S.S.R. cannot andshould not be perceived as a model for U, S. plan-ners. They believe that French policies would notbe appropriate for another country with more fi-nancial and human resources invested in an al-ready sophisticated space program of its own, andwith superpower status. U.S. space requirementsand political relationships are too different from

technologies but is limited to technologies withdirect military applications—and that Frenchmechanisms for limiting Soviet access to West-ern technologies, such as protective packaging,are not always effective. But French plannersstated strongly, if not defensively, that “whilethere will always be some transfer, we do not be-lieve the Soviets are acquiring any militarily sig-nificant technology as a result of this coopera-tion. ” Especially in the realm of space, Frenchplanners assert that France has not aided Sovietmilitary capabilities “because of their [Soviet] ad-vanced state of development” in certain of theseareas, and because of French “vigilance” in others.

Disagreements with the United States over tech-nology transfer, the French believe, do not stemfrom a fundamental difference of opinion, butonly of degree. In the grey area of technologywhere the degree of military sensitivity is in ques-tion, these disagreements stem from the fact thatthe French yardstick tends to be more liberal, of-ten guiding French planners to draw the “technol-ogy transfer line” in a different place from theirAmerican counterparts. These “yardsticks” havebeen the subject of considerable discussion, bothwithin COCOM and in other forums. But theFrench feel certain that their yardstick is an appro-priate one and, as in the area of commercial trade,question the wisdom of American planners inevaluating the technology transfer potential of in-dividual French-Soviet projects more harshly.13

“For a discussion of these issues in the commercial realm, anddebates within COCOM, see OTA’S Technology and East WestTrade: An Update (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, OTA-ISC-209, May 1983), esp. pp. 63-72.

France’s for French policies to work for the UnitedStates. Scientifically, the American space programdoes not have the same needs as the French spaceprogram, which is newer, less extensive, and oper-ates on a smaller scale. The U.S. space programdoes not face the same financial limits as theFrench program. The United States at present doesnot have the same governmental communicationsmechanisms in place for sharing information with

6 7

the U.S.S.R. on a steady basis, as illustrated bythe direct lines for transmitting data between theToulouse Space Center and Moscow. And froma political vantage point, the French believe thatwhatever the project, it is by nature easier forFrance to cooperate with the U.S.S.R. than theUnited States: U.S.-Soviet cooperation, they be-lieve, automatically has a much higher politicalsignificance attached to it simply by virtue of thetwo countries’ competitive status as world super-powers.

But even though individual French plannerswere reluctant to draw lessons from their own ex-perience for U.S. planners, a few common viewsemerged during discussions there. These includethe view that, while U.S.-Soviet space coopera-tion is potentially beneficial, it should be ap-proached soberly and with lower expectationsthan in the past; the United States should not fo-cus on large-scale joint projects, which both coun-tries would want to use for political ends, butshould focus on small-scale projects where scien-tific and/or economic concerns are paramount;and that space cooperation should be de-linkedfrom politics as much as possible, so that regard-less of what happens in the political arena, coop-eration and channels of communication can besustained. Some suggestions included more jointprojects in the area of planetary research and com-patibility between space stations and transporta-tion systems—areas in which there have alreadybeen some preliminary discussions. “The more sci-entific you are, the more successful you’ll be, ” oneplanner noted. They also stressed the importance

of being involved in the planning stages at thevery beginning of any particular cooperative mis-sion; the importance of keeping joint efforts sta-ble, without disruptions due to unrelated events;and the importance of diminishing the dramawhich has sometimes accompanied U. S.-Sovietexchanges,

French planners would look with favor on re-newed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, for thebroad reasons of promoting world peace. In ad-dition, some suggested that increased U.S.-Sovietspace cooperation might also be in France’s owninterest, in that it would allow France to cooper-ate with the Soviet bloc in a freer atmosphere,and reap the benefits of both the U.S. and Sovietspace programs more easily. Some concern wasexpressed on the part of some French officials thatthere could be drawbacks to U.S.-Soviet cooper-ation: Some feared that U.S.-Soviet cooperationmight carve out space as a superpower domain;others, that further French-Soviet cooperation inspace could hurt French-U. S. relations. But nei-ther of these ideas appears to be widespread.

The official French point of view expressed mostoften is that there is always some uncertainty inrelations with the U.S.S.R. The lesson for anycountry to learn from this, however, is not to ter-minate cooperation. Instead, it should be to ap-proach cooperation soberly, with caution, with-out grandiose expectations, but still with the hopethat it will contribute to the pursuit of space re-search in a positive manner, and perhaps toachieving broader objectives as well.

Chapter 5

U.S. Policy Issues

On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signeda Joint Resolution of Congress (S. J. Res. 236) insupport of renewing cooperation in space with theU.S.S.R. Introduced by Senator Matsunaga andinitially cosponsored by Senators Mathias andpen,’ the resolution, now Public Law No. 98-562,

states that “the President should: 1) endeavor, atthe earliest practicable date, to renew the 1972/77agreement between the United States and the So-viet Union on space cooperation for peaceful pur-poses; 2) continue energetically to gain Sovietagreement to the recent U.S. proposal for a jointsimulated space rescue mission; and 3) seek to ini-tiate talks with the Government of the Soviet Un-ion, and with other governments interested inspace activities, to explore further opportunitiesfor cooperative East-West ventures in space. ”2

This Public Law is one of a number of over-tures made by both this Administration and Con-gress towards cooperation with the U.S.S.R. Aspeech delivered by President Reagan in June 1984announced a renewed U.S. effort to revive orstrengthen economic, cultural, and consular aswell as scientific contact with the U. S. S. R., andcalled for efforts to renew U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion in areas other than space—for example, inthe areas of environmental protection, fishing,housing, health, agriculture, and in discussionsof maritime problems and joint oceanographic re-searche s An amendment sponsored by SenatorNunn to the Department of Defense Authoriza-tion Act of 1985 (signed into law on October 19,1984, as Public Law 98-525), calls for expandingconfidence-building measures between the United

‘After the resolution was introduced in February 1984, an addi-tional 13 senators became cosponsors: Senators Cranston, Hart, In-ouye, Tsongas, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Stafford, Leahy, Bump-ers, and Hatfield. The House version of the resolution was introducedi n March 1984 by Representative Mel Levine with 75 cosponsors.

‘For a copy ot the tull text, see app. B.‘See President Reaganrs speech, “Conference on U.S.-Soviet Ex-

changes, ” White House, June 27, 1984, and proceedings of the Con-ference on U.S,-Soviet Exchange, Kennan Institute of Advanced Rus-sian Studies, The Wilson Center, June 1984. See also PresidentReagan’s “Address Before the 39th Session of the General Assem-bly, ” United Nations, Sept. 24, 1984, in i+’eekl~’ Compi~ation of Pres-icientia] Documents, Sept. 24, 1984, especially pp. 1357-1359.

States and the U. S. S. R., including the establish-ment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Wash-ington and Moscow linked with modern commu-nications. And as of May 1985, the 99th Congresshas before it several bills directed towards increas-ing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space as well asin other areas. In February 1985, for example,Senator Matsunaga introduced S. Res. 46 callingfor coordinating already scheduled Soviet andU.S. missions to Mars (for 1988 and 1990, respec-tively), and for examining ways to coordinate fu-ture Mars-related activities, Bills are presentlypending in both the House and the Senate (spon-sored by Congressman Huckaby in the House andSenator Proxmire in the Senate) calling for a jointU.S.-Soviet study of the long-term climatic effectsof nuclear war. A House resolution sponsored byCongresswoman Schneider calls for an exchangeof travel between leaders of the United States andthe U.S.S.R. And a joint resolution of bothhouses, sponsored by Senator Warner and co-sponsored by Senator Nunn, authorizes the Sec-retary of Defense to provide equipment and serv-ices necessary for an improved U. S .-Soviet “HotLine. ”

Public Law 98-562 marks the outcome of sev-eral years of debate on the merits and demeritsof cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in other areasas well as in space. As it is primarily a statementof intent rather than a plan for resuming cooper-ation, however, the law has not resolved the pol-icy issues surrounding its implementation. In-stead, it has raised more questions, which mustnow become the subject of intense scrutiny.

The purpose of this chapter is neither to deter-mine whether cooperation should be pursued, norto prescribe optimal methods for crafting anagreement to achieve any particular set of goals.Instead, it is intended only to sketch out the broadissues surrounding the implementation of U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space, and to clarify thedifferent viewpoints as a basis for discussingguidelines and specific policy approaches in thefuture.

71

72

Photo credit’ National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The issue of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space has beena subject of congressional hearings since the beginningof the Space Age in the 1950s. Here Astronaut ThomasP. Stafford, Commander for ASTP, addresses the Membersof the Senate Space Committee during the 1973 hearingson the NASA budget. Seated at the table are; left toright; Astronaut Charles Conrad, Jr., James C. Fletcher,

George M. Low, and Astronaut Stafford

BACKGROUND

The signing of Public Law 98-562 and the de-bate concerning renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperationin space is occurring against a background ofstrained, unpredictable, and ambiguous relationsbetween the two superpowers. Increased tensionsince the detente of the 1970s reflects such fac-tors as: the imposition of martial law in Poland;the shooting-down of KAL 007; the continued So-viet presence in Afghanistan; the slaying of anAmerican officer in East Germany in March 1985;the internal exile and uncertain condition of So-viet Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov; the SovietUnion’s continued persecution of dissidents athome; expressed Soviet concern over “aggressive”“imperialist” policies of the Reagan Administra-tion in Nicaragua and elsewhere; and a continuedmilitary buildup in both countries. The beginningof 1985 produced accusations by the Reagan Ad-ministration of Soviet violations of almost everyarms control treaty signed in the past quarter cen-

Chapter 3 lists several potential areas and levelsfor cooperation, primarily from a scientific pointof view. But as in France, the issue of U.S.-Sovietspace cooperation is not only—or even primari-ly—a scientific one. These scientific considerationsmust be considered along with political messagesthe United States may or may not want to send,and the potential technological benefits and lossessuch cooperation might entail. After a brief back-ground discussion of the policy questions as awhole, this chapter examines the scientific, for-eign policy, and national security issues surround-ing U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, Soviet per-ceptions and behavior, and key challenges whichwill face U.S. planners in shaping any future U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space.

tury,4 and hostile invective on the part of Sovietofficials towards the United States, especially con-cerning the U.S. “Strategic Defense Initiative. ” Onthe other hand, this hostile atmosphere has beenimbued with cautious optimism by the resump-tion of the stalled U.S.-Soviet negotiations onarms reductions, the first high-level Soviet-American trade and economic talks in 5 years,and explicit U.S. overtures for renewing overallU.S.-Soviet cooperation.

The debate is also occurring at a time whenU.S.-Soviet scientific and technical cooperationand the various uses of space are raising morecomplex and contentious issues in their own right.

‘For a detailed listing of these accusations of Soviet treaty viola-tions see A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices UnderArms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 (Washington, DC: Gen-eral Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, Oc-tober 1984). These accusations remain controversial.

73

The U.S. scientific community has shown renewedinterest in international scientific and technical co-operation in the 1980s, in areas outside of spaceresearch per se. “The constraints on domestic re-sources and growing scientific excellence abroadsuggest strongly the need for the United States toenter into cooperative arrangements with othertechnicall y advanced nations. ”5 This increased in-terest in international cooperation, however, hasbeen countered by opposing, and sometimes ir-reconcilable factors, including two key concerns:1) science and technology have become increas-ingly important instruments of foreign policy, sothat foreign policy interests have led to the reshap-ing, termination, and/or curtailing of scientificand technical cooperation; and 2) growing sensi-tivity of technology transfer questions has led togreater concern over the potential disseminationof “militarily sensitive” hardware or informationthrough cooperative projects in the 1980s. ’

Controversy in international and bilateral fo-rums over both civilian and military space activ-ities have also made space a particularly sensitivearena in which to encourage cooperative activ-ity. In both the United States and the U. S. S. R.,the high budgets directed towards uses of spaceessential to military programs—for satellite recon-naissance, communications, predicting weather,verification of arms control, and even for protec-tion of these satellites—underline that space is,and will remain, an area of sensitive militarily re-lated activities. Each country has consistently ac-cused the other of pursuing policies which will“militarize” or “weaponize” space to an unaccept-ably dangerous level. U.S. press and governmentreports are filled with information regarding apossible “massive” Soviet buildup of militarilyoriented space systems, including space weaponsand an already operational ASAT capability,7

‘Mitchell B. Wallerstein, “U.S. Participation in International S&TCooperation: A Framework for Analysis, ” Scientific and Techno-logical Cooperation Among Industrialized Countries, Mitchell B.Wallerstein (cd, ) (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1984),p. 6.

‘For detailed discussions of the growing debate on S&T coopera-tion generally, see two recent reports by the National Academy ofSciences and National Research Council: Scientific Communicationand Nationa] Security (Washington, DC: National Academy Press,1982 ), commonly known as the “Corson Report” after its panel chair-man, Dale Corson; and Wallerstein, op. cit.

‘See, for example, “Soviets Develop Heavy Boosters Amid Mas-sive Military Space Buildup, ” Aviation Week and Space Technol-

Only tacitly admitting that they have a militaryspace program of their own, s Soviet officials havedecried the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)and have consistently stated that the U.S. SDI willbe a serious, if not insurmountable, obstacle toany major U, S.-Soviet cooperation in space.9 Incivilian areas of space as well, international dis-putes over such issues as controlling radio fre-quency and orbital slot allocations have high-lighted how difficult it can be to reach agreementeven with our allies. Space by nature is an envi-ronment which extends beyond any one country’sborders, making disputes likely.

Given all of these conflicts, the question of whattype of bilateral U.S.-Soviet space cooperationshould be pursued has created a good deal ofcontroversy. Some believe that the United Statesshould pursue a large-scale joint mission largelyinsulated from the ups and downs of U.S.-Sovietrelations and world politics. Others support pur-suing space cooperation only on a very low andstrictly scientific level, if at all. And others holddifferent views, including pursuing scientificallyvaluable cooperation (such as joint data exchangeand analysis, or hosted experiments on one an-other’s spacecraft) that is insulated from the upsand downs of world politics; pursuing coopera-tion on any level, but linking it to politics, so thatsuch cooperation would be turned on and off inprotest to any egregious Soviet behavior; or pur-

ogy, CCXXII, No. 11 (Mar. 18, 1985), pp. 120-121; Soviet MilitarySpace Doctrine (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency,1984), p. 31; and annual issues of the U.S. Department of Defense,Soviet Military Power, 4th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Governmentprinting Office, 1985).

8For a discussion of Soviet positions on the “roil i tarization ” ofspace, see “Appendix A: The ‘Militarization’ Issue at Unispace ’82,in Unispace ’82: A Context for ]rtternationa] Cooperation and com-

petition—A Technical Memorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, OTA-TM-ISC-26, March 1983), For a dis-cussion of evidence that the Soviets have a “Star Wars” programof their own, see “Soviet Directed Energy Weapons— Perspectiveson Strategic Defense” (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency,March 1985).

9See, for example, “U.S.-Soviet Mission in Space is Sough t,” New’York Times, Jan. 8, 1985; Walter Pincus, “Soviet Scholar WarnsAgainst Space Arms, ” Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1984; and inter-views ccmducted by OTA in Moscow, June-July 1984. See also V.S,Avduievskii, “Space Should Be Peaceful, ” in Russian in Zeml~a IVselennaia, No. 5 (September-October 1984), pp. 6-11, translatedin Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), U.S.S.R. Daily Re-port, May 6, 1985, pp. 94-100; and “Academician on Cooperation, ”TASS in English, Moscow, May 20, 1985, reprinted in FBIS, U.S.S.R.National Affairs, May 22, 1985, p. U3.

74

suing a series of relatively low-level cooperativeefforts of gradually increasing complexity, to leadto larger joint projects and commitment in thefuture.

A related issue concerns the renewal of an in-tergovernmental bilateral agreement for cooper-ation in space, regardless of the level of coopera-tion. Soviet leaders have made it clear thatcooperation in space on any level is exceedinglydifficult without an overarching agreement whichwould provide a formal framework for coopera-tion. But the signing of an agreement itself wouldbe a major event in U.S.-Soviet relations over-all, even if it were to call for only low levels ofexchange.

Each of the viewpoints on how to cooperate in-volves a combination of scientific, foreign policy,and national security concerns. Each also involvessubjective judgments about broader issues ofworld tensions, Soviet objectives and the courseof U.S.-Soviet relations. U.S. planners and thepublic have demonstrated a multiplicity of viewsconcerning the goals of U.S.-Soviet space coop-eration, and it is unlikely that U.S. policy as awhole will pursue a consistent, unified set of ob-jectives. But the objectives the policy reflects, andthe way inconsistencies among them are recon-ciled, will shape any U.S.-Soviet space coopera-tion in the future—or determine whether such co-operation will be possible.

SCIENTIFIC AND PRACTICAL ISSUES

One key issue in U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace is whether it is valuable to the UnitedStates—either from the standpoint of gaining ac-cess to data and information, or from a cost-savings perspective—and whether these benefitsoffset the costs. Does cooperation with theU.S.S.R, in space research and applications openmore research opportunities than we would beable to gain from our programs alone? Can it pro-vide opportunities for cost-savings through re-duced duplications of missions and/or sharedcosts of cooperative missions? And do the Sovietsgain far in excess of what the United States does?

The scientific issues in U.S.-Soviet space coop-eration are discussed extensively in chapter 3,based on the proceedings of a workshop held atOTA in May 1984 on U.S.-Soviet cooperation inthe space sciences. The workshop and the recordof past experience suggest that scientific gains canindeed be substantial from cooperation with theU.S.S.R. in many areas of space research.l0 I nbrief, OTA’S workshop suggested that:

● Past U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the space lifesciences area has been substantive and valu-able, especially in: 1) the exchange of flight

‘“’’U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation, ” proceedings of workshop heldat OTA on May 8, 1984, staff paper compiled by the staff of theScience, Transportation, and Innovation Program, OTA.

experimental data regarding human responseto spaceflight conditions; 2) joint ground-based simulations of spaceflight conditions;and 3) animal (biological) research.

● While somewhat more problematic, cooper-ation in planetary science has also been val-uable, especially in the exchange of data inlunar studies, the exploration of Venus, andsolar terrestrial physics.

● The success or failure of U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in the space sciences may depend onsuch factors as: 1) a focus on well-defined andspecific scientific objectives; 2) selection ofareas of complementary capability; 3) the se-lection of projects where the required instru-mentation is generally not of a type raisingtechnology transfer concerns.

● The future offers numerous possibilities forU.S.-Soviet cooperation in space which shouldbe scientifically valuable in areas including:“global habitability;” exobiology; the jointdemonstration and testing of advanced lifesupport systems; integration of Soviet datainto the International Solar-Terrestrial Phys-ics Program (now being developed); jointmissions in very long baseline interferome-try (VLBI); and cooperative ventures in theplanetary field relating to the Moon, Venus,Mars, the comets and outer planet exploration.

75

ments against renewing space cooperation withthe U.S.S.R. based on its scientific and technicalaspects alone are threefold. One is the belief thatthe United States is so far ahead of Soviet effortsthat the U.S. space program as a whole has littleto gain from renewed cooperation. * A second be-lief is that—while cooperation may provide ben-efits in specific areas of space research—whateverthe U.S. might gain from such cooperative effortsis hardly worth the enormous amount of time,money, energy, and frustration involved in ac-quiring it, and that cooperation might draw fundsaway from other, more scientifically importantprojects.

A third argument against cooperation is thatwhat we learn may be out of balance with whatSoviet scientists gain, and, therefore, it may bein our best interests to severely restrict space co-operation. Scientifically and technically, some be-lieve, cooperation provides a greater boost to theSoviet space program overall than to our own;thus, Soviet scientists may learn more about theU.S. space program from interaction with U.S.scientists than the reverse, and may gain accessto potentially sensitive technology or technicalknow-how in the process. They also argue thatin light of the U.S. technological edge, the Sovietsshould not be “subsidized” to improve their spaceprogram and related military capabilities at theUnited States’ expense.

Despite the Iapslng of the intergovernmental agreement, some exchange of data and information continues today.This Soviet photo of Venus, taken from Venera 16, was shared with OTA during a recent visit with members of the

Soviet Academy of Sciences

76

Supporters of cooperation for scientific reasons,however, believe that U.S.-Soviet space cooper-ation is important not only in specific areas ofspace research and applications, but in enhanc-ing our insight into the Soviet space program andscientific knowledge generally. Because of the highlevel of secrecy in the U. S. S. R., cooperation pro-vides the United States greater access to informa-tion not only in one specific area of space research,but in the Soviet space program as a whole. Be-cause of the poor mechanisms for communicationamong people and institutes within the U. S. S. R.,cooperation provides the United States a fuller pic-ture of what Soviet scientists and researchers areworking on—often a fuller picture than Sovietscientists themselves have. And since certainaspects of the Soviet space program have beendifferent from those in the United States, coop-eration also provides U.S. scientists with the op-portunity to learn from different technologicalroots. Soviet scientists have different experiencesto share and a range of scientific experience thatthe United States does not have, and from whichthe United States can draw valuable information.In economic terms, U.S.-Soviet space cooperationis viewed as an opportunity for significant costsavings (although there is no assurance that a jointproject would be less costly to the United Statesthan a separately funded project) and perhaps asa catalyst for the United States to initiate certainprojects or programs which would not otherwisebe undertaken. Indeed, several scientists havecommented that such cooperation is also benefi-cial because it works to garner more funding andpublic support and interest for particularprograms.

In terms of the balance of what American andSoviet scientists may gain from such cooperation,proponents of space cooperation assert that thequestion should not be phrased in terms of “whogets more, ” but rather “who gets more of what-ever they wouldn’t have gotten otherwise. ” Sinceso much more information about U.S. space pro-grams than about Soviet space programs is avail-able in the open literature, Soviet planners are as-

sumed to have ready access to enormous amountsof information whether or not cooperation takesplace. Yet scientific and technical cooperation isone of the few mechanisms available for theUnited States to assess what the U.S.S.R. is do-ing in certain areas.12 In this sense, many ob-servers argue, the United States may actually“gain more” than the U.S.S.R. A State Depart-ment study submitted to the Senate Foreign Re-lations Committee in 1982 described space coop-eration as one of four agreements where theUnited States was seen as benefiting more thanthe U. S. S.R.13

What emerges from these arguments is twofold:It is clear that scientific and practical benefit canbe gained from U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space.But the degree to which the “gains” may be off-set by scientific or technical “losses” is still a matterof debate. The possibility of scientific and tech-nical “losses” is not necessarily a factor of the typeor level of the project. Depending on the natureof the project, a low-level effort (on joint dataanalysis, for example) could present greater risksthan a larger effort carefully crafted to minimizethem. A key challenge, therefore, will be to se-lect areas for cooperation that prove beneficialfrom a scientific and/or practical point of view,but minimize the risks of transferring sensitive in-formation or technology to the U.S.S.R. Specificscientific issues are discussed in chapter 3. Tech-nology transfer issues are discussed below.

121t has been estimated that about 90 percent of the science and

technology information the United States receives from the Sovietsoccurs via official exchange agreements. See Genevieve Knezo,“American-Soviet Science and Technology Agreements, ” East- hVestTechnology Transfer: A Congressional Dialog With the ReaganAdministration, prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Com-mittee, Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, 1984), pp. 117-120.

“See U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress: ScientificExchange Activities With the Soviet Union, Fiscal Year 1981 andFiscal Year 1982, ” Department of State Authorization Act, Sec. 126(a) and (b).

77

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

The issue of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation isfundamentally one of foreign policy. Administra-tion statements and annual reports of the Presi-dent to Congress illustrate how extensively scien-tific and technical cooperation as a whole hascome to be viewed as a component of U.S. for-eign policy. 14 High visibility and drama make thisespecially true in the space arena. 15 Congress hasconsistently viewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace as a means for improving relations in gen-eral and for enhancing U.S. prestige. The primaryobjective of present U.S. overtures for a jointU.S.-Soviet space rescue mission is explicitly oneof foreign policy: to act as a focal point for re-newed dialog and cooperation between the twosuperpowers. Issues of foreign policy have beenthe motivation sustaining space cooperation withthe U.S.S.R. —and also the chief impediment toits successful implementation. It was for foreignpolicy reasons that cooperation in space with theU.S.S.R. was begun, and for foreign policy rea-sons—to express U.S. abhorrence of the declara-tion of martial law in Poland—that the spacecooperative agreement was allowed to lapse in1982.

Controversy arises, however, in determiningprecisely what our foreign policy objectives are,and on the appropriateness of using cooperationin space to meet political goals at the expense ofscientific or technical objectives. Foreign policyconcerns related to U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace embrace many different elements. Some ofthese objectives are mutually contradictory;others are contentious in themselves. These ob-jectives include using cooperation in space as amechanism to: reduce tensions between the twocountries; reverse a perceived trend towards the“weaponization” of outer space; send positive

“See, for example, the annual “Title V“ reports entitled Science,Techno~ogy, and American Diplomacy, submitted to Congress bythe President Pursuant to Sec. 503(b) of Title V of Public Law 95-426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979,which requires the President to provide annual reports to Congresson the U, S. Government’s international activities in the fields ofscience and technology.

I Ssee, for example, Harry R, Marshall, Jr., U. .S. Space Programs:Cooperation and Competition From Europe, Current Policy No.695 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, May 1985), esp.pp. 2 and 5.

symbolic messages to the rest of the world; alterSoviet behavior in a way which would be favora-ble for U.S. or Western interests; manifest dis-pleasure with any reprehensible Soviet behavior;and keep lines of communication open with theU.S.S.R. even—or perhaps especially—when re-lations are strained.

Reduce Tensions

The driving force behind efforts to renew U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space—and the area of mostcontroversy—is the belief that space cooperationcan reduce tensions between the two superpowersand contribute to world peace. With a fundamen-tally adversarial relationship, few expect thatU.S.-Soviet conflicts can somehow be “solved.”But the spirit of Public Law 98-562 is the beliefthat space cooperation can reduce the danger ofsuperpower confrontation, perhaps eventually al-lowing each country to divert some of its re-sources from military to civilian purposes. Thisbelief was expressed in the resolution’s originaltitle: “A Joint Resolution Relating to CooperativeEast-West Ventures in Space as an Alternative toa Space Arms Race. ” The belief that cooperation

78

can reduce tensions has been buttressed by the re-ports of several visitors to the U. S. S. R,, includ-ing that of a delegation of eight senators, led bySenator Pen, to the Soviet Union in September1983. These senators recommended that:

scientific and technical agreements whichhave been allowed to languish or expire shouldeventually be returned to a full level of coopera-tive activity. It is not only self-defeating, but afailure of world responsibility to forego the hu-manitarian and ecological achievements that canemanate from such superpower cooperation. 16

Proponents of this view see significant benefits inencouraging greater dialog and understanding be-tween the two superpowers, perhaps creating a“web” of interactions—as stressed during theperiod of detente—which could make U.S.-Sovietrelations more stable and interdependent.

Others have taken this issue further. In the pressand in congressional testimony, some have as-serted that such cooperation can offset the mo-mentum of “Star Wars, ” whose attraction, theybelieve, lies largely in the exciting, futuristic, andtechnologically challenging image it presents ofman’s future in space, as well as in the high levelof funding and number of people employed. Someview a large-scale, equally spectacular and chal-lenging cooperative U.S.-Soviet effort in space asproviding an alternative means for utilizing thehigh levels of funding and manpower which theSDI requires. 17

From a directly opposing vantage point are ar-guments that such beliefs may not only be mis-leading, but counterproductive. Some observersare deeply skeptical of efforts to reduce tensionswith the U. S. S. R., as they believe that any appar-ent reduction in tension will be illusory. They be-lieve it is unlikely that cooperation in space—onany level—will lead to any genuine concessions

1 bs~~ D~~gerOus stalemate: Superpower Relations in Autumn

1983, A Report of a Delegation of Eight Senators to the Soviet Un-ion, to the United States Senate, September 1983 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 3, The eight Senatorswere Senators Pen (Delegation Chairman), Long, Bumpersr Leahy,Metzenbaum, Riegle, Sarbanes, and Sasser.

“See, for example, Daniel Deudney, “Forging Missiles Into Space-ships, ” World Policy Journal, spring 1985, pp. 271-303, and pre-pared Statement of Dr. Carol S, Rosin, “East-West Cooperation inOuter Space, ” Hearings Before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations of the 98th Congress on S.J, Res. 236 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1984), pp. 43-50.

79

reduction in tension and in the military buildupof both sides was one of the hopes behind the ini-tiation of space cooperation in the 1960s and 1970sand the Apollo-Soyuz mission in 1976. 20 Yet thedecade of the 1970s was characterized not onlyby U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, but by Sovietbelligerence abroad and severe U.S.-Soviet strainsin other areas. And during the same decade, bothcountries were still placing a great deal of strate-gic and tactical importance on military space sys-tems, and exhibited significant growth in militarilyrelated space capabilities. The mid-1970s saw notonly the launching of the joint U.S.-Soviet Apol-lo-Soyuz mission, but also the beginning of theSoviets’ second phase of testing of their anti-satellite weapons and the development of Sovietnuclear-reactor powered radar ocean reconnais-sance satellites (RORSATS); and the number ofSoviet space launches which were exclusively mil-itar y or joint military~’civilian missions remained

“’See, for example, lack hlanno, Arming the’ Fied\ens (New York:Dc~dd, ?dedd, 1Q84 ). At the time of ASTP, he notes, it wds hopedthat “Soviet-Amerl( an cooperation in space might just be the firststep t[lward internat iona] cooperation on earth” ( h!anno, p. 1 Sb ),A ~’Ve\t Y(Jr-L T)rne> editorial also expressed the hope that “So\ietAmerican detente i~ (~nly the beginning toward more broadly basedcooperation in space etforts involving the personnel and talents ofevery nd t ion for the benefit of al 1 human ity. ‘‘Meeting i n Space, ‘,’Vew Yt)rh Times, June 15, 1Q75, p. 32.

While the United States and U.S.S.R, both share statedpolicies that space should be a peaceful domain, militaryuses of space also absorb high budgets in bothcountries. The above artist’s conception depicts a

Soviet Operational Antisatellite Interceptor

high.21 In the United States as well, there was lit-tle linkage between a large-scale cooperative ef-fort with the U.S.S.R. in space and U.S. militaryspace programs. Military space programs in bothcountries have gained their own technologicalmomentum. But there is little agreement onwhether U.S.-Soviet relations might have beenworse without such cooperation, or, alternatively,whether the United States may have become tooconciliatory during past cooperative efforts. Thereis also little agreement on whether the future mightprovide a more or less promising context for coop-eration than the past.

Two questions lie at the heart of these debates.The first concerns how foreign policy and spacecooperation affect each other. Deep conflicts ofinterest form the foundation of U.S.-Soviet rela-tions; it is a subjective judgment as to whetherspace cooperation can significantly change thatlevel of conflict, and lead each superpower toredefine its relation to the other. Foreign policyhas generally affected the direction of U.S.-Sovietcooperation, in space as elsewhere. Cooperationin space has usually been an outgrowth of goodrelations. There is little evidence, however, thatspace cooperation can lead to detente, or can im-prove overall U.S.-Soviet relations in any substan-tial way,

A second question is whether space coopera-tion may be viewed in either/or terms. At the timeof the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, for example,it was assumed that space would become eithermore internationalized, or an arena of greatercompetition and eventual conflict .22 History hasproved otherwise: countries can and do cooper-ate and compete simultaneously. Thus, while

‘*See Marcia Smith, “O\rer\riew’ (lt Unmanned Space I’rograrns:1957 -83,” Soviet Space programs: 1Q7b-80, Part 3, L~nmanned SpaceActit’ities, prepared for the use of U, S. Cc~ngress, Senate, Commit-tee on Commerce, Science r and Transportation (Washington, DC:U S. Government Printing Office, May 19851, pp. 7bl-7b6; and S(I-viet hfilitarJ~ Space Doctrine, op cit. RORSATS are the only So\ri -et military space system for which there is no U. S, equivalent.

For a discussion of the heavy military orientation of the presentSoviet space program, see, for example, Craig Covault, “SpaceplaneCalled a Weapons Platform, ” A\ridtion 11’eeh and Space Trchnol-Og}r, CXX1, No. 4 ( J u l y 2 3 , 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 70, 75; C r a i g Covault,“U.S.S.R’S Reusable Orbiter Nears Approach, Landing Tests, ” Atria-tion l~~eek and Space Technolog}r, CXXI, No. 23 (Dee, 3, 1984),pp . 18-19: and %viet .~fi~itary S p a c e D o c t r i n e , O p, Cit,

“See for example, Jack Manno, Arrnin~ the Heavens, op. cit.,p. 136 .

80

cooperation may provide an alternative vision ofthe future or a more positive backdrop for ne-gotiations—in arms control, space weapons, orother areas—it may represent only a complementto efforts to improve relations generally.

Symbolism

Symbolic value has always been a principalcharacteristic of the U.S. and Soviet space pro-grams. Both countries have used their space pro-grams to increase national prestige, project na-tional influence, display technological leadership,and enhance the image of each country’s respec-tive governmental system—the United States,through emphasizing the openness of democraticsystems; the U. S. S. R., by linking its spaceachievements with the superiority of the socialistsystem over capitalism. The U.S.S.R. has dis-patched cosmonauts to other countries to linktheir celebrity with particular political ideas andpolicy lines, or with historic Communist tradi-tions; and both countries have invited foreign“visitors” to fly on their spacecraft to strengtheninternational ties.23 The idea of U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in space has also played a symbolic roleto offset any aggressive image of either superpow-er, and to demonstrate each country’s goals ofusing space for peaceful scientific purposes.

The symbolic value of any prospective U.S.-So-viet cooperative mission today would be equallycentral. Renewed U.S.-Soviet space cooperationon any level would send to the world a symbolicmessage of the willingness of the two countriesto attempt to work together to reduce tensionsor achieve common goals. Even on lower levelsof cooperation, joint efforts can carry with thempositive symbolic benefits and significant psycho-logical value. The concept of “peace” in space isespecially appealing to those who view peacefuluse as an alternative to, rather than a spin-offfrom, the military use of space.

While the symbolic value of renewed U.S.-So-viet space cooperation could be positive, however,

“James E. bberg, “Window for Space Detente, ” Aerospace Amer-ica, XXII, No. 11 (November 1984), pp. 86-87; exerpted from TheNew Race for Space (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1984), andHarry R. Marshall, Jr., U.S. Space Programs, Cooperation and Com-petition From Europe.

some U.S. observers point to more negative mes-sages. They believe that if cooperation were tobreak down, the positive symbolic benefits wouldbe negated, and the United States might appearmore belligerent than before. They also believethat U.S.-Soviet space cooperation on any levelappears to cast the two superpowers as equals,a status which they feel the Soviets would abuse;the more visible the level of cooperation, the morenegative the symbolic message. The launch of theApollo-Soyuz Test Project is cited as a case inpoint. Despite the fact that U.S. reports described

81

the Soyuz spacecraft as technically primitive, So-viet media nonetheless reported that U.S. special-ists spoke of “the high technical qualities of theSoyuz. ” The Soviet press consistently implied thatthe U.S.S.R. led the United States in space flight,attributing its lead to Marxist ideology .24 Alongwith strong, positive, symbolic messages, then,renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation could give So-viet planners another opportunity to assert tech-nical parity with the United States.

The potential positive and negative symbolicmessages from U.S.-Soviet cooperation in spacewould increase with the size, scale, and visibilityof the cooperative effort. On a low-level of ex-change, both the risks and benefits are small, Asthe level of exchange, and thus the potential risksand benefits increase, however, the cooperationbecomes more controversial. While some empha-size that a joint “spectacular” would provide sub-stantial symbolic benefit for the United States,others emphasize that the risks are also great:should the project “fail,” or should the UnitedStates find it in its interest to withdraw, the lossesto U.S. prestige could be damaging.

“Linkage”

Another foreign policy issue associated withU.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is the questionof “linking” such cooperation to other aspects ofSoviet behavior. For example, some observersquestion the wisdom of having allowed U. S.-Soviet space cooperation to lapse in 1982 in re-sponse to an unrelated event, the declaration ofmartial law in Poland. Others argue that that wasan appropriate action and, further, that suchcooperation should not be reinstituted before theSoviets demonstrate a willingness to make con-cessions on other fronts—in policies regardingemigration abroad, human rights at home, or con-cessions in arms control negotiations.

The use of scientific and technical (S&T) coop-eration as a lever for altering Soviet behavior hasbecome the subject of debate similar to that ofU,S,-Soviet trade. The theory and practice oftrade leverage are discussed in detail in previous

‘“See issues [)1 ]’ra~’cfa before and during the ASTP, especlall}r tromIuly 13, 17, and 21, 1975,

OTA reports .25 The conclusions of these reportsis that trade leverage can work only under verylimited conditions, and that past experiences havedemonstrated its weakness when used against theSoviet Union. Assessments of the potential im-pact of S&T cooperation in altering Soviet behav-ior have been no more positive, A recent studyby the National Academy of Sciences states:

While there is little doubt that S&T agreementshave helped on some occasions to move relationsonto a more positive basis, and on others to sig-nal United States displeasure regarding certain be-havior, there would appear to be little conclusiveevidence that the signing or termination of anagreement has been very influential in persuad-ing another nation to pursue or desist from a par-ticular policy position .2”

The effect may be further diluted as, based on pastbehavior, the Soviets generally expect the UnitedStates to seek renewed cooperation after a rela-tively short amount of time.

The real question is whether S&T cooperation,including space cooperation, is an appropriatemechanism for showing displeasure with Sovietactions, regardless of whether it alters Soviet be-havior. One set of opinions argues that in the ab-sence of other foreign policy levers, S&T coop-eration is one of the most effective means forprotesting egregious Soviet actions and demon-strating U.S. resolve. According to this view,when a superpower does something which theother views as fundamentally “’abhorrent or inim-ical to our interests, “27 there is pressure to re-spond. In these cases, “Soviet activity sometimesdemands responses stronger than rhetoric butmore prudent than military action, “28 In the ab-sence of other measures, canceling an ongoing co-operative program has been viewed as an appro-priate response; the financial costs are hard toidentify and in any case are deferred, the effect

25Techno~og} and East- 14’est Trade (\\’a\hlngton, DC: LT. S, Gc~\’-ernment Printing Office, OTA-ISC-I 01, No\’ember I Q7Q ); Technol-ogy and SO viet Energy A vailabiiit}r ( Wash i ngt c)n, IIc. LT,s Co\r -

ernment P r i n t i n g O f f i c e , OTA-ISC-153, NTo\rember ] Q8 I ), andTechnology’ and East- b$rest Trade: An Upd~te (\ JTashinXt{)n, DCU S. Covernrnent printin~ Off ice , OTA-ISC-209, hla} IQ83 ).

‘OWallerstein, op. clt , p, 19,‘“See George P. Shultz, “New Realities and New lkra}r~ t>t Thlnk-

in~, ” Fc)re~gn Affairs, LXIII, No. 4 (spring 1985), p, 707“\trilliam Root, Trade Controls That Work, ” Fc~re~gn ~’olic~,

N’o. 59 (fall 1 9 8 4 ) , pp.61-80.

82

is immediate, and the intended moral message issent. Moreover, proponents of this view arguethat “business as usual” in S&T exchange wouldbe immoral under these circumstances anyway.As stated in the President’s Title V report to Con-gress, 1984:

Science and technology exchanges between theUnited States and the Soviet Union . . . are ofcritical concern to this Administration. We mustrespond adequately to Soviet actions adverse toour own interests and contrary to the basic prin-ciples of civilized behavior within the communityof nations. For example, during 1983 the UnitedStates, among other actions, stopped discussionson extension of a Transportation S&T Agreementwith the Soviets as a result of their deliberate de-struction of Korean Airlines flight 007.29

Few people argue that the threat to cancel, or ac-tual cancellation of a cooperative program inspace, would really affect Soviet behavior on amatter of substance. The idea is to protest, notto deter.

Opponents of this view assert that little is ac-complished by terminating S&T cooperation asa mechanism of protest, while the benefits fromcooperation are diluted or lost. Canceling coop-erative efforts already underway entails some hu-man and dollar costs, and may give the UnitedStates a reputation as an unreliable partner. Andsome observers argue that more can be achievedthrough cooperation than without it. In the wordsof one historian of science involved in coopera-tive projects with the U. S. S. R.:

Personal links to Soviet scientists lead Ameri-cans to learn more about who is being arrestedor persecuted and to more readily react againstit than in the past . . . Almost all Soviet scien-tists have favored the improvement of commu-nication, and the dissidents in particular havestressed that their security is greater because oftheir links to the West , . . It seems clear that theworst fate for unorthodox Soviet scientists wouldbe to lose their contacts with the West. 30

—‘*LJ .S, C{lngress, Hc)use Committee on F[~reign Affairs and C(~m-

%jence( Techn<]log>’l ~n~i Amer-mittw on Science and Techno]og}’, LJ( ,;n [lpl(~mac}’ z 484, 5th Ann ua 1 Report Submitted to t hc’ Cc>mgres~ b} the I’rtjsicfent Pursuant to %cti(~n S03 (tI ) of Title V of PublicLaw 45-420. (\$’ashington, DC. U.S. (jovernrnent 1’rinting Office,1Q84), p. 3.

‘{’ Lc~ren R. Graham, “How Valuable Are Scientific Exchanges Withth(’ S(,\’let IIn[on?” .%it>nce, CCII, N(J, 4366 (Oct 27, 1Q78), p. 3 8 7

Proponents of this view argue that S&T cooper-ation comprises a relatively minor tool in foreignpolicy, and that terminating scientific and tech-nical cooperation is no more an effective meansof showing displeasure than other symbolic ges-tures (such as speeches of condemnation at inter-national forums, or termination of cultural visits)which carry fewer negative and long-lasting con-sequences.

The difficulty in reconciling these viewpointshas consistently been expressed by the Reagan Ad-ministration in annual reports to Congress:

We must respond adequately to Soviet actionsadverse to our own interests and contrary to thebasic principles of civilized behavior within thecommunity of nations . . . At the same time, wedo not want to jeopardize joint S&T efforts whichmay be of substantial benefit. We will continueto observe Soviet behavior carefully and to ad-just our S&T cooperative agreements accordingly.

The effect of not reconciling these issues, how-ever, was perhaps best expressed in the congres-sional testimony of James Morrison, Deputy Di-rector of International Affairs, NASA, whosuggested guidelines for future U.S.-Soviet coop-erative efforts in space. Noting that any suchguidelines must be applied in a political context,but also stressing the costs of terminating coop-erative efforts once they are underway, Morrisonstated:

Obviously, guidelines such as these will be ap-plied in a political context, because of the highvisibility of this type of cooperation. Neverthe-less, there should be an appreciation that if a ma-jor project should be interrupted while in pro-gress, it is likely that the human and dollarresources would have been utilized better in otherspace endeavors, i.e., once undertaken, there aregood reasons why a project should be allowed toproceed to completion, barring some major dis-ruption in relations between the two countries.

—“science, Techn(j][)g}, ancf Amvr]can [>ip](~m~c~ IQ84, ~~p. clt

pp 3-4. See a]w Shultz, {~p. c it., for a dtscusslon of the Is\ Lie’\ c ~)m-

plexitles in a broader contc’xt: “Whether important negotl~t ions oughtto be interrupted after s(~mc So\’iet outrage w]]] alwa>’> be a com-plex calculation “

“Statement ()( James R. kl~~rriwln, IIeputy Director, Intt’rnati(~nalAtfair> Divisi<~n, National Aeronautics and Space Admlnistratlonbefore the U.S. Senate C(~mrnittee on F(~reign l<elation~, Sept. ] ~,1Q84, p. 8,

83

Maintaining Channels ofCommunication

Perhaps the simplest foreign policy objectiveof renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space is tokeep channels of communication open, even—or especially—during times of increased tensions.At a time when overall U.S.-Soviet relations arepoor, some believe that cooperation on any levelcan provide an important conduit for communi-cation. Aside from its value as a way of learningabout the U. S. S. R., cooperation provides a mech-anism for making U.S. views more widely knownin the U.S.S.R. While acting as a kind of barom-eter for U.S.-Soviet relations generally, it main-tains a continuing dialog on a governmental levelwhen other avenues may not be as active. Andsome level of cooperation also keeps alive the pos-sibility of expanded cooperation in the future.

These objectives, however, run counter to thepolicy of linkage described above. The tension be-tween the two objectives is illustrated by the Rea-gan Administration’s stated emphasis on “main-taining the framework” of the agreements “so thatbeneficial exchanges can be expanded if the po-litical situation improves” while at the same time

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Administration

East-West Cooperative Effort—Soviet CosmonautFilipchenko and U.S. Astronaut Slayton on the banksof the Little Blanco River in central Texas as a break

from training for ASTP

choosing to severely reduce S&T exchange withthe U.S.S.R. and allow the space, science andtechnology, and energy agreements to lapse.ss The1984 Presidential report to Congress also under-lined the importance of keeping lines of commu-nication open, but stressed the need to respondto “Soviet actions adverse to our own interests. ”

A key question, then, is whether the option forrenewing cooperative activities can in fact be ex-ercised once an agreement has been abrogated orallowed to lapse. Past experience suggests anotherbasic asymmetry: it is easier to kill cooperationthan to restart it. Several observers-from NASAand elsewhere—have commented that it is diffi-cult, once ties are broken, to keep them in a statewhere they can be repaired.

It is difficult to assess the degree to which theframework of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation hasbeen maintained since 1982. The institutionalapparatus remains in place and has not been dis-mantled, and one could argue that the low levelof cooperation which continues to occur has lefta door open. But events themselves have changedand complicated the context in which coopera-tion occurs. Administration statements in 1984suggest some questions as to whether the frame-work for renewed space cooperation is still viable. 34

Foreign policy objectives form the foundationfor decisions on U.S.-Soviet space cooperation.One main challenge is to define more preciselyand soberly what U.S. foreign policy objectivesfrom space cooperation actually are, address in-ternal inconsistencies among them, and establishcriteria to evaluate the ways in which coopera-

3 3 See U .S . Congress , House C o m m i t t e e o n F o r e i g n A f f a i r s a n d

Committee on Science and Technology, Science, Technology, andAmerican Diplomacy 1981, 2nd Annual Report Submitted to theCongress by the President Pursuant to Section 503(b) of Title V ofPublic Law 94-426 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, 1981), p. 180. “Despite the sharp curtailment in exchangeactivity, the framework of the agreements is being maintained sothat beneficial exchanges can be expanded it the political situationimproves. ”

34See Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1984, op.cit., pp. 33-34; and “Committee Questions and Administration Re-sponses, ” East- West Technology Transfer: A Congressional DialogWith the Reagan Administration, op. cit., p. 29.

84

tion in space maybe helpful in achieving broaderforeign policy goals.35

A second major foreign policy challenge con-cerns the relationship of foreign policy to scien-tific and technical objectives in cases where pur-

~sThe difficulties of Spe]]ing out specific foreign policy objectives,

and of then establishing criteria to evaluate the effects of S&T coop-eration on foreign policy, are highlighted in the Title V Report for1984 and the subsequent critique by the Congressional Research Serv-ice. See G. J. Knezo, “Congressional Research Service Critique ofthe 1984 Title V Report, ” Science, Technology, and American Di-plomacy 1984, op. cit., pp. 165-167.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY ISSUES

A final set of issues concerns the extent to whichthe U.S.S.R. may gain access to militarily sensi-tive technology and technical know-how throughU.S.-Soviet space cooperation, and thus the ex-tent to which cooperation should be controlledor limited. These “technology transfer” concernsare part of a much larger debate concerning allcommercial and cooperative relations with theU.S.S.R. At the heart of the debate is the trade-off between two important national interests: theimportance of minimizing the use of Americanscientific and technological expertise in the build-up of Soviet military strength; and the importanceof maintaining and promoting open communica-tion in science and technology, both within theborders of the United States and across interna-tional boundaries. The highly technical and sen-sitive nature of space research and technologymakes the question of renewed or expanded U. S.-Soviet cooperation in space especially controver-sial .37

Few would argue against caution in U.S.-Sovietcooperation in space. Rather, the main areas ofcontention are the limits and mechanisms of con-trol, i.e., determining what should be controlled,when, by whom, under what circumstances, howit should be controlled, and finally, how the ef-fects of controls can be evaluated .38

~pFor a brief discussion of the problems associated with transfer-ring potentially sensitive space technology even to U.S. allies, seeStuart Auerbach, “Great Britain Joins U.S. in Space Station Effort, ”Washington Post, Jan. 18, 1985, and William Drozdiak, “Bonn Joinsin U.S. Led Space Base, ” Washington Post, Jan. 17, 1985.

JaFor a discussion of these Issues especially as related to Cc3rnrner-cial exports, see OTA’S Technology and East-West Trade: An Up-

suing the former may be detrimental to the latter.The issue of “how to effectively integrate scienceand technology concerns into the overall devel-opment of American foreign policy’”36 has becomea fundamental issue in all aspects of internationalscientific and technical cooperation. The historyof U.S.-Soviet cooperation suggests this will re-main a central issue in any future cooperative en-deavors in space.

Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1984, op. cit.,p. 6.

Some observers argue in favor of severe restric-tions on all levels of cooperative space activitywith the U.S.S.R. The underlying assumptions ofthis view are that the U. S. S. R., while extremelystrong militarily, is making important militarygains through the acquisition of Western technol-ogy; that cooperation is an important mechanismthrough which these gains occur;39 that space isa particularly sensitive area of S&T cooperation;and hence, that renewed cooperation will doubt-lessly enhance Soviet capabilities to gain evenmore militarily sensitive technology and know-how from the West. Reports on Soviet acquisi-tion of Western technology have singled out spaceas a key “target” of Soviet acquisition efforts in

8 5

the West, especially in this country. 40 These ob-servers fear that cooperation may only facilitatean extensive Soviet effort to obtain space-relatedtechnology and technical know-how, and willcontribute to sophisticated Soviet military capa-bilities. They believe the dangers are greatest inlarge-scale cooperative projects, but that evenlower levels of cooperation—data exchange, jointdata analysis, coordination of missions, etc.—may result in transfer of sensitive technical infor-mation.

Other observers—while recognizing the enor-mous Soviet military strength and significant ad-vances the U.S.S.R. has made in the military usesof space—believe that space cooperation, likeother areas of scientific and technical cooperation,is a relatively ineffective way for the Soviets togain access to Western technology and know-how; 41 that little militarily sensitive technologyhas been transferred through past cooperativeprojects; that other Western countries with sophis-ticated space programs of their own are cooper-ating with the U.S. S. R., providing the Sovietswith much of the same technology and know-how; and that controls are difficult to enforcewithout sacrificing the free interchange of ideaswhich is at the heart of scientific and technologi-cal progress in this country. Consequently, theybelieve the imposition of increasingly stringentcontrols will unnecessarily offset the real scien-tific, economic, humanitarian, and potential for-eign policy gains which can follow from cooper-ation with the U.S.S.R. “A national strategy of‘security by secrecy, ’ “ the Corson panel con-

40See, for example, Assessing the Effect of Technology Transferon U.S.-Western Security (Washington, DC: Office of the Under-secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense, February1985 ), which cites the expansion of the Soviet space program as oneof six major ~oals in present and future Soviet weapons programs(pp. 1-4),

41 The report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences un-der the chairmanship of Dale Corson, and OTA’S Update on EastWest trade reach two conclusions regarding scientific and technicalcooperation generally. First, it has not been demonstrated that thepotential security danger to the United States of exchange programsoutweighs the benefits of maintaining open channels of communi-cations with the U.S.S.R. Second, it is generally believed that suchpassive mechanisms of technology transfer are less likely to resultin Soviet ability to absorb, diffuse, and improve on technologicalacquisitions than are more active commercial channels. No study,however, has been prepared specifically on U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion in space. See Scientific Communication and National SecuritJ,op. cit.; and Technology and East- West Trade; An Update, op. cit,

Photo credit National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Visiting Soviet aerospace engineers discuss a dockingmechanism with a member of the ASTP space team

in Houston, Texas

eluded regarding international scientific and tech-nical cooperation generally, “would weakenAmerican technological capabilities, because thereis no practical way to restrict international scien-tific communication without disrupting domes-tic scientific communication. ”42 These observersbelieve that technology transfer concerns may beespecially exaggerated with regard to lower levelsof cooperation, where Soviet access to data,equipment, and information can be carefully mon-itored. But they believe that even large-scale proj-ects could be crafted to make technology trans-fer a minor concern as well.

8 6

The debate concerning the potential transfer ofmilitarily sensitive technology and technologicalknow-how so far has not been a highly visible is-sue in U.S.-Soviet space cooperation, because solittle interchange has been occurring, because co-operation has been on a very low level, and be-cause technology transfer concerns have led to sig-nificant internal review and self-censorship on thepart of individual scientists and government agen-cies prior to formal review. Since the expirationof the cooperative agreement in 1982, there havebeen few cooperative space proposals submittedfor review, as official State Department policy isto complete ongoing projects but not initiate newones. As illustrated in chapter 3, most instancesof U.S.-Soviet space cooperation to date haveconsisted of exchanges of scientific data gatheredthrough experiments by one country or throughseparate but related missions. Any expansion ofU.S.-Soviet cooperation in space will inevitablylead to greater controversy, and technology trans-fer issues may be the most difficult issues toresolve.

In space, as in many other areas of U.S.-Sovietinterchange, three issues are central to the tech-nology transfer debates: determining how “mili-tary sensitivity” should be defined in the firstplace; assigning jurisdiction among people andagencies for making and implementing decisions;and determining the ways sensitive technologymay or may not be used in any given coopera-tive exercise.

Defining Military Sensitivity

The nature of scientific or technical coopera-tion means that some technology transfer will al-ways be involved in bilateral S&T exchange. Butdefining what precisely may be “militarily sensi-tive” has proved to be an exceedingly ambiguousexercise. As shown in the box, a number of regu-latory mechanisms have been established to con-trol the transfer of militarily sensitive technologyor information abroad. These mechanisms andlists which specify what is “militarily critical, ”especially in the category of “dual use” technol-ogy, have themselves become the subject of enor-mous controversy.

8 7

Technology Transfer Controls

Three main pieces of legislation have marked the Federal Government’s efforts to slow, if not pre-vent the loss of militarily sensitive technology and information since the 1940s. First, the Atomic EnergyAct of 1954, as amended by the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, establishes procedures for the ex-port of nuclear facilities, equipment, materials and technology, and deals with criteria for controllingU.S. nuclear exports domestically and abroad. Second, the Export Administration Act (EAA) of 1979is intended to limit the release of a much wider range of products, processes, and technical data to po-tentially adversary nations. Implemented through the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), andthrough a comprehensive list of products and processes known as the Commodity Control List (CCL),the EAA remains the principal legislative instrument for controlling the flow of sensitive technology andtechnical data across borders. The EAA also mandates that a “Militarily Critical Technologies List” (MCTL)be drawn up by DOD, to assist in identifying items which maybe of significant value to potential adver-saries and should be controlled. Since its expiration in 1983, however, the EAA has continued to beadministered through a Presidential Executive Order, and the MCTL remains controversial.

Finally, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is implemented by the Department of State throughthe International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). These regulations control the export of militarysystems and information on the basis of the Munitions Control List (MCL) maintained by the Depart-ment of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense (DOD). A revised ITAR was formallyreleased in January 1985. All of these regulations govern not only the export of goods or technical datafrom the United States abroad, but also the access of foreign nationals to such materials and informationwithin the United States. A multinational committee to control the movement of militarily sensitive goodsat the international level, the Coordinating Committee for multinational export controls (CoCom), wasalso established by informal agreement in 1949, and meets periodically in Paris.

In the 1980s, a number of regulations and directives have also been instituted specifically to controlthe flow of data and other scientific and technical information beyond U.S. borders. Executive Order12356, signed by President Reagan in April 1982, introduced greater stringency into the governmentclassification procedure, including the introduction of policies which expand the number of categoriesof potentially classifiable information, allow for imposing restrictions where reasonable doubt exists,and allow for reclassifying information previously made public. National Security Decision Directive84 (NSDD 84), a Presidential order announced in 1983, requires, among other things, that governmentemployees and contractors sign lifetime nondisclosure agreements with prepublication review clausesas a condition for access to certain categories of information. Although exceedingly controversial andnot yet issued as official policy, as of June 1985 the directive appeared to constitute unofficial policyfor the control of classified information in many areas. The 1984 Defense Authorization Act assignsthe Secretary of Defense greater authority to withhold certain kinds of unclassified technical data inthe possession or under the control of DOD. And additional proposals have been circulated within DODto seek broader authority to protect sensitive technical data produced by other Federal agencies (includ-ing NASA) by facilitating their transfer to DOD control. Further actions have also been taken on theissuance of visas, other kinds of prepublication reviews, etc.

The increasing number of controls placed on scientific and technical interchange has triggered agreat deal of controversy among those who believe that increased communication in science and tech-nology can and should be promoted without compromising U.S. national security interests. The essen-tially sensitive and strategic nature of both countries’ space programs suggest this will be a serious con-cern in determining potential areas for joint U.S.-Soviet projects in space.

88

In addition, a number of other regulations anddirectives govern the transfer of space-related in-formation to foreign nationals. On December 24,1984, NASA issued such a “NASA ManagementInstruction” to control the availability of NASAdeveloped or supported scientific and technicalinformation. The Instruction, The NASA Scien-tific and Technical Document Availability Au-thorization, provides discretionary authority forthe Administrator of NASA to protect certain un-classified data and information, parallel to author-ities granted the Secretary of Defense in the 1984Defense Authorization Act. The Instruction “es-tablishes policies, procedures, and responsibilitiesfor the authorization process to assure the appro-priate distribution, bibliographic processing andannouncement of availability of NASA sponsoredor authorized information, “45 to be implementedin accordance with existing Management Instruc-tions concerning the production and distributionof information. It is intended to be “responsiveto administration directives to develop plans andprocedures to help stem the flow of advancedWestern space technology to the Soviet Union andother countries. ”46

The exceedingly broad and comprehensiverange of definitions of what may be proprietaryand/or militarily sensitive technology or infor-mation has become quite controversial, oftenleaving wide room for interpretation in any givenassessment. Efforts to make more precise defini-tions have been reflected in such exercises as thedesign of a Militarily Critical Technologies List(MCTL) by the Department of Defense to assistin identifying items which may be of significantvalue to potential adversaries and which shouldbe controlled. But the MCTL has been criticizedon several counts—many believe it is too long,overly broad and comprehensive, and that it lackssufficient clarity and specificity to be usefully

applied 47—and remains controversial today. More

“’’NASA Management Instruction, ” op. cit., p. 1.4bIbid.tpFor example, a 1982 report by the National Academy of Sciences

and the National Research Council recommended “a drastic stream-lining of the MCTL by reducing its overall size to concentrate ontechnologies that are truly critical to national security, ” In, Scien-

tific Communication and National Security, op. cit., p. 67. T h eMCTL was mandated by the Export Administration Act of 1979.For a description of the MCTL and the controversy surrounding

it, see Technolog y and East- West Trade: An Update, op. cit. TheMCTL was declassified in 1984.

89

than 2 years of efforts to renew the Export Admin-istration Act—with no agreement thus far in Con-gress and no coordinated Administration posi-tion—highlight the lack of consensus on howtechnology exports should be controlled. Thissame lack of consensus is reflected in internationalcooperative programs.

Evaluating technology transfer from past coop-erative efforts in space is also controversial. Ex-perts differ over the significance of technology ortechnical know-how that may have been trans-ferred during past cooperative projects, perhapsespecially during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project.Some observers believe that despite the low levelof interchange, the Soviets gained access to val-uable command and control information and U.S.management techniques, such as experimentaldata relay systems (employed for the safety of theastronauts), and insight into U.S. management ofhighly complex systems. Others believe that theSoviets gained little from Apollo-Soyuz that couldhave been detrimental to U.S. interests. A 1980report by the Congressional Research Service, forexample, states that there was “no evidence to dateof any harmful effects from any technologicalgiveaway to either side from these joint spaceefforts. “48

The central role of the technology transfer is-sue in U.S. cooperation today with Western Euro-pean allies on the space station shows how diffi-cult an issue it could become if space cooperationwith the U.S.S.R. were to be expanded. The sec-retary of the backbench parliamentary space tech-nology committee of the British House of Com-mons, Spencer Batiste, stated in February 1985that the European Space Agency (ESA) views thePentagon’s fear of technology “leaks” to the So-viet bloc as one of the biggest problems in jointU.S.-ESA work on the space station project.” Ac-cording to Batiste, strict U.S. export controlsgreatly restrict the transfer of American know-how to its partners in the project, and couldgreatly hamper European and Japanese collabo-ration in the project. According to press reports,

4UCRS Report to the United States Senate Committee on ForeignRelations, GPO Report 87-389 (Washington, DC: Government Print-ing Office, 1980).

“See Christian Tyler, “U.S. Warned on Hi-Tech Controls, ” Fi-nancial Times, Feb. 15, 1985, p. 5.

Photo credit U S Department of Defense

The extent to which space cooperation may enhanceSoviet military programs in space is the subject ofdebate and presently, stringent control. The aboverepresents an artist’s concept of a possible Sovietspace complex with significant military applications

a recent internal West German government reportsuggests that U.S. restrictions on space-related aswell as other high technology areas comprise “oneof the prickliest thorns in transatlantic relationsat the moment. ”50 The paper reportedly docu-ments two instances of a German company be-ing denied access to important U.S. space find-ings, and suggests that the whole idea of coop-eration can work only if the United States easesits restrictions. And recent disputes in the U.K.over the possibility of using the Soviet Protonrocket as a satellite launch vehicle for INMARSAT–an international organization that operates com-munications links between ships—have high-lighted the sensitivity in the West towards allow-ing Soviet engineers to work closely with Westernengineers involved in other militarily-sensitiveprojects sharpening the definition of what maybe militarily sensitive in space without stiflingscientific inquiry will be a major challenge if U. S.-Soviet bilateral space cooperation is expanded.

90

Delineating Responsibilities

Because of the murkiness of the definition ofsensitive space hardware and information, decid-ing the level of control for a particular item orbody of information is a question of judgment.

A second key issue, therefore, concerns notonly the criteria for determining what may be mil-itarily critical, but who should make these judg-ment calls for instituting and implementing tech-nology transfer controls. This question has provedto be a very difficult one throughout the area ofexport control, one which Congress has yet tofully resolve. At a May 1985 Roundtable on Na-tional Security and Scientific Inquiry at the Na-tional Press Club, Assistant Secretary of DefenseRichard Perle suggested that much of the criticismconcerning technology transfer has little to dowith the principle of export controls, or with thesubstance of those controls, but with the “scan-dalously inept administration of those controlsthat has been characteristic of a succession of ad-ministrations.” Hearings conducted between 1982and 1984 by Senator Nunn, Ranking MinorityMember of the Permanent Subcommittee on In-vestigations, Senate Committee on GovernmentalAffairs, and general debates over renewing the Ex-port Administration Act of 1979, highlighted theintra- and inter-agency jurisdictional disputes overresponsibility for making technology transfer de-terminations in various areas of commercial ex-ports, and the particular difficulties involved ininstituting and implementing a set of controls inthe area of commercial exports to the U. S. S.R.52

Similar disagreements have occurred betweengovernment agencies and the scientific and tech-nical communities.

It is likely that expanded U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion in space would create similar conflicts, Asspace activities are usually multidisciplinary, U. S.-Soviet space cooperation inevitably creates co-ordination problems for various offices within theDepartment of State, within and among otheragencies, and individual experts. The process forevaluating projects is often an informal one.

52 See U.S. Congress, Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-tigations, Transfer of Technology (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-ment Printing Office, 1984).

Project proposals are evaluated to assess the de-gree to which they may involve the transfer ofequipment, production/operational know-how,and/or sensitive technical data or information,first within the sponsoring agency, * and then informal or informal interagency meetings. Know-ing the unease surrounding the subject, both scien-tists and individual agencies engage in a consid-erable degree of self-censorship before theinteragency review process begins .53 Objectionsto the transfer of particular pieces of equipmentor areas of technology are sometimes resolved bydowngrading the equipment’s technical specifica-tions or by substituting different equipment. Thisinformal process largely reflects the personalitiesinvolved.

Recent experience in exceedingly low-level spacecooperation with the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. spaceprogram itself highlights the importance of clarify-ing procedures and responsibilities should U. S.-Soviet space cooperation be expanded. For exam-ple, all of the participants in the VEGA missionwith whom OTA spoke underlined the enormousproblems they had working through the “maze”of people and conflicting agencies responsible forevaluating their proposed activities—despite thefact that all of their proposals carried few possi-bilities for technology transfer and all were ulti-mately accepted, The overlap between militaryand civilian space activities, and between NASAand DOD responsibilities, has begun to fuelgreater tension among the defense and scientificcommunities. 54 And serious concern has been ex-pressed on the part of the scientific community

over the extent to which DOD has exercised seem-

*The overwhelming proportion of U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace occurs through NASA. Other cooperative efforts occur, how-ever, with the participation of other U.S. Government agencies andindividuals, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin-istration, the Department of Agriculture, the National Science Foun-dation, the National Academy of Sciences (through their interacad-emy exchange program), and other agencies, universities, and onan individual basis depending upon the nature of the cooperation.NASA is the implementing agency for the intergovernmental bila-teral agreement for cooperation in space.

“See, for example, Robert L. Park, “Intimidation Leads to Self-Censorship in Science, “ Bulfetin of Atomic Scientists, XLI, No. 3,March 1985, and OTA interviews.

5dFor example, see Craig COVaUlt, “Shuttle Earth Imagery SpursCensorship Debate,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, CXXII,No. 17 (Oct. 22, 1984), pp. 18-21. The literature on space coopera-tion has been weak in addressing the extent to which U.S. military

capabilities and responsibilities have been associated with NASA.

—

9?

ingly unilateral control on the communication ofcertain types of scientific information. Many U.S.participants in past space cooperation with theU.S.S.R. have noted that proposals for larger ef-forts would have met with possibly “insurmount-able” resistance from some parties in charge ofevaluating technology transfer concerns. This sug-gests that if space cooperation were to occur ona larger or more substantive scale, these disputesmight only be magnified.

Utilization of Sensitive Technology

A third issue involves determining how sensi-tive technology or information can actually beused in cooperative projects with the U.S.S.R.Some have argued, for example, that at certaintimes it may be in the U.S. interest to allow somepotentially sensitive technical know-how to be uti-lized. They believe that the U.S.S.R. has limitedcapability for absorbing Western technology andgaining production know-how, and they believethat the United States may acquire valuable in-formation in return .55 Others argue that howeverlimited they may be, we cannot afford to under-estimate Soviet capabilities in absorbing techni-cal information, copying U.S. technology, and in-corporating particular items of technology intotheir military effort even without the ability toreproduce them. 56

Similarly, there are major differences of opin-ion on the issue of how well sensitive technologynecessary for particular missions can be “pro-tected. ” As discussed in chapter 4, United Statesand French planners differ regarding how effec-tively “black boxes” or other types of packagingmay protect potentially sensitive instrumentationor devices. On a more individual basis, there isalso disagreement over whether briefing the West-ern participants prior to international symposiaor other cooperative efforts is an effective mech-

—‘ The degree to which the U.S.S.R, can successfully assimilate

Western techn[>lt)gy has been the subject of widespread debate See1. Hardt and 11. Gold, “The Eastern Economies, ” East- \Vest Tech-n(dog~’ Trander: ,4 Congrewonal Dialog Jt’ith the Reagan Adm]n-isfraf](ln op cit , p. 8 3 .

“See, I(lr example, Oftice O( the Undersecretary of Defense forPolicy, Asse~sjng the Effect of Technology’ Transfer on 14~estcrn .ScJ-cur]t}’ -.4 Defense I’erspectj\’e, (\4’ashlngton, DC: U .S. Departmentof Defense, Februam, 1985); and So\,iet Acquisitjort of 14’estern Tech-nc~iog~” (\\’ash]ngtonr X: Central Intelligence Agency, April 1982),

anism for reducing the transfer of sensitive know-how to the Soviet bloc. These, too, will be im-portant considerations should U.S.-Soviet spacecooperation be significantly expanded,

In the area of national security concerns, threeissues will remain central should U. S .-Soviet co-operation in space be greatly expanded. First, itwill not be possible to gloss over concerns aboutthe potential transfer of militarily sensitive tech-nology or technical know-how. Such concernswill remain central and controversial on any levelof cooperative activity, so that U.S. policymakerswill have to address the trade-off between the po-tential scientific and/or foreign policy gains thatmay be attained from U. S .-Soviet space cooper-ation, and the questions that such an interchangemight pose for national security. Any project pro-posal will require intense scrutiny and review, andwill undoubtedly generate controversy.

Second, any large-scale U.S.-Soviet coopera-tive space project could provoke reevaluation ofthe ideological thrust behind the present U.S.trend towards increased controls over exports andthe flow of information, technical data, and ideas,The Reagan Administration has imposed morecontrols over international interchange in scienceand technology than its predecessors. The spiritof openness and cooperation in which a joint proj-

Photo credlt OTA .Naff

OTA staff member meets with leading Soviet officialsand Academicians in Moscow during research

for this study

92

ect with the U.S.S.R. might be undertaken couldlead to calls for a re-evaluation of the line betweenwhat is considered militarily sensitive and whatis made widely available. It could also make itmore difficult to pressure U.S. allies to be morestringent in the area of export controls if U. S.-Soviet cooperation is so prominent.

Finally, the mechanics of dealing with technol-ogy transfer decisions will have to be addressed.This might require a more effective delineation

THE SOVIET APPROACH

Cooperation with the U.S.S.R. in any endeavoris a two-sided affair, and U.S. planners cannotunilaterally make decisions concerning theamount, type, and scope of cooperation whichshould take place. Although Soviet designs andobjectives are themselves a matter of widespreadcontroversy in the West, OTA’S interviews in theUnited States and in Moscow suggest that Sovietperspectives on prospects for U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in space are generally quite different fromour own.57

Soviet official policy has always expressed, andcontinues to express, a commitment to coopera-tion in space:

The potential value of I Soviet-American coop-eration in space] seems very significant on the eco-nomic, scientific and technical plane, since theU.S. and U.S.S.R. space programs are mutuallycomplementary in many of their parameters. Thesignificance of this cooperation would also begreat on the political psychological plane—fromthe point of improving the entire atmosphere ofSoviet-American relations and ensuring trust be-tween the people and leaders of the two greatpowers .58

While there are certainly differences among So-viet scientists and planners, Soviet scientists haveshown great interest in expanding cooperative ef-forts with the United States, pooling knowledgeand sharing in outer space discovery. Like their

570TA interviews in Moscow, June-July 1984.58A KokoShin, “Space-BaSed Anti-lvfissile Defense: Illusions and

Dangers, ” Moscow News, No. 23 (1984), P . 5.

of responsibilities among individuals and agen-cies for determining and implementing controls,utilizing personnel with sound knowledge in bothtechnical and foreign policy areas to conduct suchdeliberations. It might also involve a more in-depth assessment of possible technology transferthrough past cooperative projects in space, the cri-teria used to assess such technology transfer, anda clearer evaluation of the ways in which tech-nology can be protected or used to U.S. advantage,

political counterparts, they emphasize that thegoals of such cooperative efforts are not only, oreven mainly, scientific, but rather are to enhanceprospects for “peaceful coexistence” on Earth andto keep outer space as a peaceful domain.

The issue of space cooperation, however, is anintegral part of Soviet foreign policy, and its ob-jectives extend beyond a desire for peace to com-petition as well.

International cooperation in the study of spaceis inextricably linked with the foreign policy ofgovernments, and it depends on the general stateof political relations between them , . .59

The Soviet view of U.S.-Soviet relations is over-shadowed by a basic competitiveness not only be-tween two space or military programs, but be-tween two polit ical and social systems.Marxist-Leninist doctrine—the ideological foun-dation of the U.S.S.R.—expresses an irreconcil-able conflict of interest between the Socialist andnon-Socialist worlds; today, the Soviet conceptof “peaceful coexistence” represents more of a con-tinuing struggle than a state of equilibrium, as itis generally defined in the West. bo

Thus, Soviet political leaders have consistentlyused their space program not only to enhance co-operation, but to pursue other foreign policy ob-jectives more competitive or confrontational innature: using space as a propaganda tool to en-

59s v Petrunin Sovetsko-frantsuzskoe sotrudnichestvo v k o s -. .mose ( MO S C O W : “Znanie,” 1980), p. 7.

‘“See Paul H. Nitze, “Living With the Soviets, ” Foreign Affairs,LXIII, No. 2 (winter 1984), pp. 368-369.

93

\

(n

zc(un

94.

hance national prestige and influence; weakeningthe prestige and influence of the United States byportraying it as a threat to international peace andsecurity; belittling the impact of U.S. space ac-complishments; and deflecting attention from themilitary character of the Soviet space programonto that of the United States.

Today, therefore, tensions in U.S.-Soviet re-lations are reflected in an official Soviet hard-line,albeit somewhat ambiguous, approach towardsspace cooperation with the United States. Sovietofficials consistently stress the viewpoint that pastU.S.-Soviet cooperation was beneficial, and laythe blame for its termination squarely on theshoulders of the United States; and yet they havenot responded officially to any recent overturesto renew such cooperation. Despite publicity inthe United States surrounding American experi-ments on VEGA, the Soviet press has eitheravoided mentioning or denied that there is anyU.S. participation in this mission. ” The Sovietshave consistently decried the U.S. policy of “link-ing” the issue of cooperation to other politicalevents; but they have also politicized the issue byemphasizing the severe, if not insurmountableconstraints the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiativeplaces on initiating or renewing U.S.-Soviet coop-eration in space. Official Soviet policy on spacecooperation tends to follow the overall state ofU.S.-Soviet relations.

The political dimensions of Soviet participationin space cooperation extend to implementing theagreements as well. Access to people and infor-mation in the U.S.S.R. is closely monitored andcontrolled by the government. This has resultedin a high level of secrecy surrounding many areasof research and other activities, a highly compart-mentalized bureaucracy, and a high degree of con-trol placed over its citizens and scientists in allof their interactions with foreigners.

All of these factors inevitably constrain the im-plementation of a U.S.-Soviet cooperative agree-ment in space. The high level of secrecy in the

*] See, for example, the report of a Moscow television broadcast,“Obvious But Incredible, ” by Professor S. P. Kapitsa on the VEGAprobes, Jan. 12, 1985, translated in Foreign Broadcast InformationService, U.S.S.R. Daily Report, Jan. 16, 1985, pp. U1-3; “SovietDenies U.S. Participation in Soviet Halley Mission, ” Soviet Aero-space, Jan. 7, 1985, p. 8; and Defense Daily, Jan. 8, 1985, p. 39.

U.S.S.R. is compounded in space matters by mil-,itary domination of Soviet space activities. TheSoviet space program is run primarily by the mil-itary-the Air Force is responsible for cosmonauttraining and vehicle recovery, the Strategic RocketForce for conducting all space launches—and mostof the known high officials in Soviet space orga-nizations have strong military or defense indus-try backgrounds and exercise dual responsibili-ties in civilian and military space activities. Thethoroughgoing compartmentalization of the So-viet bureaucracy, and the difficulties Soviet scien-tists face in meeting with foreigners—from beingallowed to travel and mix at international scien-tific meetings, to gaining permission to mail tech-nical letters and papers—also greatly constrainsubstantive interchange. At the same time, spacecooperation is viewed (at least as much as it isin the United States) as an effective means for in-telligence gathering and gaining insight into theU.S. space program and Western technology.

The experience of U.S. scientists involved incooperation in space research has varied enor-mously. Some have registered surprise at thefrankness and openness with which particular So-viet institutes and individuals have shared dataand information. Others have complained that theSoviets bring little data or information to meet-ings and conferences, do not send their best scien-tists, do not provide their papers in advance, andoften treat results as state secrets, making themavailable only to a select few. Sometimes the dis-parity in the success or failure of individual ex-periences has been affected by knowledge or lackof knowledge of the Russian language among U.S.scientists, sometimes by personal style. Moreoften it has been affected by Soviet decisions orbehavior patterns which extend beyond the coop-erative arrangement itself to broader aspects ofSoviet domestic or foreign policies.

In the U. S. S. R., then, the issue of U.S.-Sovietcooperation in space is tied up with both domes-tic and foreign policy concerns in ways often un-familiar to the Western observer. In a societywhere ideas and contacts are tightly controlled,foreign cooperation always implies some loss ofcontrol, however limited, for the Soviet regime.For this reason the Soviets tend to set the criteriafor judging the merits of cooperation very high.

95

Soviet planners seriously calculate the potentialforeign policy and technological benefits and costsof any particular endeavor, and act accordingly.

Should U.S.-Soviet space cooperation be ex-panded or renewed, then, this will place uponU.S. planners a special burden of having to bealert to factors and attitudes affecting coopera-tion that are quite different from those of otherforeign partners.

. . . Soviet-American relations over the yearshave been plagued by the tendency, especially onthe American side, of public and even officialopinion and expectations to fluctuate betweennaive euphoria and angered disillusionment . . .We must understand realistically, what was done,what was not done . . .62

In pursuing renewed U.S.-Soviet cooperation inspace, the United States will be dealing not onlywith an adversarial partner, but with one whoseframework for judging the gains and costs of co-operation is quite different from our own. In thewords of two participants in U.S.-Soviet coop-erative efforts in space:

“See Foy D. Kohler, “An Overview of U.S.-Soviet Space Rela-tions, ” in Dodd L. Harvey and Linda C. Ciccoritti, U.S.-SovietCooperation in Space (Miami: Center for Advanced InternationalStudies, University of Miami, 1974), p. xv.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In light of conflicting currents in U.S.-Sovietrelations, balancing competing objectives and dif-ferent perceptions of the U.S.S.R. will be a ma-jor challenge in determining the shape and mag-nitude of future U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space,Four issues are central:

the scientific and practical benefits that canbe gained from space cooperation,the potential transfer of militarily sensitivetechnology or know-how between the twocountries,the effect of space cooperation on foreign pol-icy, andperceptions about Soviet motivations and be-havior and the course of U.S.overall.

From a scientific and practicalpast experience has shown that

Soviet relations

point of view,cooperation in

When all is said and done, however, Soviet at-titudes and performance, and, indeed, personalrelationships with their representatives, all havecome a long way since the early days of the In-ternational Geophysical Year . . . The prescrip-tion for the future can only be patience and per-sistence on both sides. b3

At the same time, we should not overlook thevast difficulties of space cooperation in the past,difficulties which must arise from the contrastingroles and duties of citizens in the U.S.S.R. com-pared to in the United States. b4

More than in other cooperative ventures with for-eign partners, U.S. policy makers will have to re-concile Soviet decisions and behavior with theUnited States’ own objectives. And this will makeit all the more important for U.S. planners to sortout precisely what U.S. objectives are. In thewords of yet another observer, “Policy, like char-ity, begins at home. ”65

63 Arnold W. Frutkin, International Cooperation in Space (Engle-wood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 120.

~~From a letter to OTA f rom L.J. L a n z e r o t t i , NOV. .5, 1984.~SJameS Cracraft, “U, S .-Sov iet Relations, ” ~u]]etin Of the Atomic

Scientists, XLI, No. 1 (January 1984), p. 8.

space can lead to substantive gains in some areasof space research and applications, and can pro-vide insight into the Soviet space program andSoviet society as a whole. As discussed in chap-ter 3, scientists in OTA’S workshop concluded thatthe scientific return from U.S. space explorationactivities could be expanded significantly by coop-eration with the Soviet Union. The scientists alsosuggested that cooperation be initiated with mod-est exchanges of solid scientific substance and thatthe possibility of a large-scale mission might beheld out as a long-term goal, provided that it, too,offered solid scientific rewards.

Past experience also suggests that technologytransfer will remain a major countervailing con-cern in any future space cooperation with theU.S.S.R. Should cooperation be renewed or ex-panded, the challenge facing U.S. planners will

9 6

be to minimize these concerns; but concerns willcontinue to arise regardless of the scale or levelof cooperation. Most people agree that cautionshould be exercised against transferring militar-ily sensitive technology and know-how to theU.S.S.R. The difficulties will lie in determiningwhat should be considered militarily sensitive,who should be authorized to make such decisions,and the extent to which potentially sensitive tech-nology or know-how can be protected in any par-ticular exercise.

Past experience, both in low level cooperationwith the U.S.S.R. and more extensive coopera-tion with our allies, suggests that this will be adifficult and controversial challenge. The Sovietshave no doubt been pursuing an aggressive cam-paign to acquire Western technology and know-how, particularly in the area of space systems andtechnology; severely limiting cooperation in spaceis one way of protecting Western security againstsuch efforts. But Soviet scientists are also conduct-ing innovative and high caliber work in certainareas of space research and applications. Overlystringent controls could threaten the free inter-change of scientific and technical ideas and infor-mation in areas complemental to, but not alwaysaddressed in, the U.S. space program; and sincethe Soviets are already cooperating with otherWestern countries in space research and applica-tions, the United States could find it increasinglydifficult to control the flow of information to theU.S.S.R. without isolating itself from the rest ofthe world space community. A key challenge,then, will be to craft cooperative arrangementsthat diminish the possibility of aiding Soviet mil-itary capabilities but that keep space cooperationsubstantive and viable.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge will be toassess how space cooperation can be effectivelyused to support or further U.S. foreign policy ob-jectives. Space cooperation, on both low and highlevels, is inherently symbolic. The main areas ofcontroversy concern whether space cooperationcan alter Soviet behavior, and so ease U.S.-Sovietconflicts; and whether starting and/or stoppingspace cooperation is an appropriate political sym-bol to underscore other U.S. foreign policy ob-jectives.

The extent to which space cooperation can alterSoviet behavior, and in that way reduce tensionin U.S.-Soviet relations overall, is hard to pre-dict. One viewpoint suggests that this is entirelyplausible, and cooperation should be pursued to-ward this end. An opposing viewpoint suggeststhat there is no reason to believe the Soviets wouldalter their behavior as a result of U.S.-Soviet co-operation in space and that cooperation mighteven be dangerous: from this perspective, any re-duction in tension would be superficial, andwould only lead the United States to lower itsguard against an adversary that uses cooperationsolely for its own purposes. In between are a rangeof views, including the belief that a low level ofinterchange among scientists at a working level,removed from the realm of superpower politics,can be the most effective way for keeping chan-nels of communication open and reducing tensionsbetween the two countries in the long run. An-other belief is that space cooperation has no fun-damental positive or negative effect on U. S.-Soviet relations, and must be weighed simply onits own merit. Although there is no evidence frompast experience that space cooperation can affectforeign policy in any far reaching way, many be-lieve the future can be different.

Regardless of whether space cooperation canalter Soviet behavior, another question is whetherit is smart to exploit its symbolic value to achieveother U.S. interests. Symbolic value has alwaysbeen a key component in both the U.S. and So-viet space programs, on low as well as high levelsof cooperation. The question of whether cooper-ation should be initiated or terminated primarilyto pursue symbolic goals has generated a contro-versy of its own.

Creating a large-scale cooperative effort inspace, for example, could bring positive benefitto the United States, by illustrating to other coun-tries the U.S. desire to work with our adversariesto promote peace. But it could also bring risks:1) it may provide the U.S.S.R. with a great dealof symbolic benefit by casting them as technologi-cal equals; and 2) should a large-scale joint projectfail, the symbolic cost could be damaging to U.S.interests. The symbolic benefits and risks fromU.S.-Soviet cooperation in space would increasewith the size, scale, and visibility of any cooper-ative effort.

9 7

Similarly, severely curbing or terminating coop-eration may be an appropriate symbolic measureto show displeasure with egregious Soviet behav-ior, but also carries risks. U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion in space inevitably occurs in the context ofU.S.-Soviet relations overall, and the tendencyof U.S. policy in the past has been to utilize spacecooperation for foreign policy ends. The assump-tion has been that an abrupt reduction in spacecooperation can be an effective means of protest-ing Soviet behavior: when the Soviets do some-thing morally reprehensible at home or abroad,some believe the United States has a moral respon-sibility to respond and space cooperation is an ef-fective way of doing so. But as this will gener-ally result in scientific and practical losses, manyhave questioned this approach, preferring othermethods of protest that show displeasure at lesscost. They believe that curtailing or terminatingspace cooperation with the U.S.S.R, brings littlebenefit, and in fact may harm scientific inquiryand/or U.S.-Soviet relations overall. There is anotable lack of agreement on how past experiencemight clarify these debates, and the degree towhich past experience may be useful in assessingpotential future cooperation.

Underlying all of these viewpoints are differ-ent assumptions about Soviet objectives and be-havior. The Soviet approach to cooperation hastended to mirror its overall approach to U. S.-Soviet relations, reflecting both an official com-mitment to cooperation in space, and a basic com-petition between the two superpowers. Sovietleaders have consistently used their space programnot only to enhance cooperation, but also to pur-

sue other foreign policy objectives more competi-tive and confrontational in nature (such as weak-ening the prestige and influence of the UnitedStates while enhancing that of the U. S. S. R., anddeveloping a strong militarily related space capa-bility of their own). This has led to vastly differ-ent interpretations of Soviet motivations and actionsamong U.S. observers, and different interpreta-tions of the lessons of past U.S.-Soviet coopera-tion. A central U.S. foreign policy challenge,therefore, will be to assess how U.S. objectivesmay be attained independent of Soviet intentions.

Because of several factors then—the conflictsbetween the gains of cooperation and the risks oftechnology transfer; disagreement over the rela-tive importance of scientific and practical bene-fits and foreign policy goals; and possible incon-sistencies among foreign policy objectives—therewill always be a multiplicity of views about East-West cooperation in space. The ways in whichthese viewpoints are reflected in policy will de-termine the size, shape, scope, and effectivenessof any potential space cooperation with the U.S.S.R.

It would clearly be useful to further examinethe costs and benefits of past cooperation, as abasis for considering the establishment, cancel-lation or continuation of cooperative arrange-ments in the future. At the same time, however,it is important to recognize that views on howmuch cooperation to pursue will necessarily re-flect judgments about broader issues of world ten-sions, Soviet objectives, and the overall courseof U.S.-Soviet relations at least as much as theywill reflect judgments about the costs and bene-fits of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation itself.

Appendixes

Appendix A

U.S. Cooperative Projects inSpace Science and Applications

Launch Mission Cooperating Science/year name countries applications Objectives

Part 1: Joint Development1 9 6 2 A i r e l - I

1962 Ariel-11

1978 Int’l Ultraviolet Explorer(IUE)

1982 C O S P A S / S A R S A T

1983 Infrared AstronomicalSatell ite (IRAS)

1 9 8 4 A c t i v e M a g n e t o s p h e r i cParticle Tracer Explorer

( A M P T E )1985 Space Telescope

1986 G a l i l e o

Part 2: Hosted Experiments1964

1965

19651965

19671967

1968

1969

1969

1969

1969

196919691971

1971

1971197119711971

Explorer-20

Explorer-31

Alouette-IIOrbiting Geophysical

Observatory-2 11(OGO-2)OGO-4Orbiting Solar Observatory-4

(0S0-4)Orbiting Geophysical

Observatory-5 (OGO-5)

OGO-6

International Satellite forIonospheric Studies (ISIS-I)

0 S 0 - 5

0 S 0 - 6

Apollo-IIApollo-12Ariel-IV

Barium Ion Cloud Probe

Apollo-14Apollo-15Ariel-IVISIS-II

US/UK

US/UK

USESA/UK

US/Can/Fr/USSR

Neth/US/UK

US/FRG

US/ESA

US /FRG

UK a

UK a

Canh

Fra

Fra

UK a

U K ,aF r ,aN e t ha

Fra

Can b

UK, a F ra

UK, a Ita

Switz a

Switz a

U Kb

FRG b

Switza

Switza

U Kh

Can h

s

s

s

A

s

s

s

s

A

A

AA

As

s

A

A

s

s

sss

s

ssAA

Measure energy spectrum of cosmic rays,solar x-rays

Measure galactic radio noise,micrometeoroid flux

UV spectroscopy

Satellite-aided global search and rescuesystem

Conduct IR sky survey

Study solar wind, identify particle entrywindows, energization and transportprocesses into magnetosphere

High-resolution coverage of optical and UVwavelengths

Broad investigation of Jupiter environment

Measure ion mass composition andtemperature

Measure ion mass composition andtemperature

Measure electron densities and VLF noiseMeasure airglow

Measure airglowMeasure solar x-ray distribution, He

emissionDetermine direction of incidence of primary

cosmic rays, density, and temp. of H ingeocorona, and CR, flux/energy spectrum

Spectrometry in airglow and aurora;atmospheric temperature and excitation

Ionospheric sounders

Measure solar x-ray flux and self-reversal ofLyman-Alpha line

Study solar He resonance, x-ray and gammaradiation

Measure composition of solar windMeasure composition of solar windMeasure low energy proton and electron

intensitiesBarium release to stimulate action of solar

wind on comet tailMeasure composition of solar windMeasure composition of solar windProton and electron densitiesIonospheric sounders

101

102

Cooperating Science/countries applications Objectives

Launch Missionyear name

Itb

FRG a

Switza

U Ka

FRG b

FRG, a F ra

FRG, a F ra

U Ka

Bela

Fr, a Switz, a J a pa

A

A

ss

s

s

s

A

As

s

ss

A

As

s

s

sA

A

As

s

s

ss

ssA

A

Density of elements in equatorial upperatmosphere

Stratospheric height and temperaturemeasurements using UV

Measure composition of solar windStudy stellar ultraviolet and x-ray emissions

(project also known as Copernicus)Measure solar extreme UV and correlate

with upper atmosphere componentsBIOSTACK I (effects of CR on selected

biosystems)BIOSTACK II (effects of CR on selected

biosystems)Water vapor, cloud, and atmospheric

temperature soundingsSmelting silver in spaceSky survey, distribution of galaxies and

ionized hydrogen; solar wind analysis;and manufacturing of composite metals inspace

UV photometry and x-ray emissions

Conduct x-ray sky survey and locate sourcesMeasure micrometeoroid flux, study solar

x-rays and mass, and planetary orbitsMeasure composition and temperature of

equatorial thermosphereNeutral atmosphere temperature experimentRendezvous and docking test included joint

biological studiesBIOSTACK-111 (CR effects on biosystems),

blood electrophoresisEleven U.S. experiments aboard (including

centrifugation)Spectrographic study of solar chromosphereApplications technology satellite experiment

to measure electron content andscintillation phenomena

Upper atmosphere temperature sounding

Broadcast experimentsMeasure micrometeroid flux, study solar x-

rays and mass, and planetary orbits

1971 San Marcos-III

Nimbus-41971

19721972

Apollo-16Orbiting Astronomical

Observatory-3 (OAO-3)AEROS1972

Apollo-161972

Apollo-171972

1972 Nimbus-5

19731973

SkylabSkylab

Neth b

U Kb

FRG b

Itb

FRG b

US/USSR

FRG a

USSR b

Fra

India a

1974 Astronomical NetherlandsSatellite (ANS)

Ariel-VHelios-1

19741974

San Marcos-III-21974

AEROS-BApollo-Soyuz Test Project

(ASTP)Apollo-18 (U.S. ASTP Craft)

19741975

1975

1975 Cosmos 782

0 S 0 - 8Radio Beacon

19751975

1975 N i m b u s - 61976 Communications Technology

Satellite (CTS)1976 Helios-2

UK a

Canb

FRG b

E S A ,a Fr ,a FRG, a

Switz, a U Ka

ESA b

1977 Int’1 Sun-Earth Explorer-1(ISEE-1)

Coordinated spacecraft studied-

magnetosphere, interplanetarytheir interaction

Coordinated spacecraft studiedmagnetosphere, interplanetarytheir interaction

Seven US biological experiments

space, and

space, and1977 ISEE-2

1977 Cosmos 9361978 ISEE-3 (NASA Heliocentric

Mission)1978 Pioneer Venus-21978 Cosmos 11291978 T I R O S - N

USSR b

F R G ,a Fr ,a Neth ,a U KC1

FRG, a F ra

USSR b

Fra

UK a

Solar wind composition, behavior andmapping; comet flyby

Atmospheric and cloud studies of VenusFourteen U.S. biological experimentsDemonstrate Satellite Data Collection

System (ARGOS)Stratospheric and mesospheric sounding1978 Nimbus-7

703

Launch Mission Cooperating Science/applications Objectivescountries

Fr ,a D kd

Japan h

US-Neth-UK a

Japa,Itb

USSR b

year

1979

name

s

ss

ss

s

AAs

s

s

s

ss

s

ss

ss

A

A

A

A

s

A

A

A

A

A

Study galactic CR compositionHigh Energy AstronomicalObservatory-3 (HEAO-3)

HakuchoSolar Maximum Mission

(SMM)Spacelab-lSan Marco-D/L

Optical and radio observations of x-ray starsSolar hard x-ray imaging spectrometry

19791980

19831983 Effects of solar activity on meteorological

processesU.S. providing medical research devices for

primate mission; U.S. biologicalexperiments

Atmosphere/ ionosphere electrodynamicsDemonstrate emergency signal receiverShuttle mid-deck study of hemoagglutination

under microgravityGalactic x-ray imaging and determination of

He abundance in solar coronaInvestigations of space environment and

effectsMulti-parameter characterization of

cometary environmentStudy solar/galactic CR ionization states“Space Sled” to conduct neurophysiology

researchObservations of sun and interplanetary

medium out of the ecliptic planeX-ray sky survey and sources studyWide-range gamma ray detection

1983 Cosmos-1514

Itb

C a n ,a F ra

Aus a

UK a

FRG,a US-Ire-ESA; a

Switz, a UK; Fra

ESA a

India’US/Can b

ESA b

FRG-US-UK~FRG a

198319831984

San Marcus-D/ LSARSATBlood Rheology Experiment

1984 Spacelab-2

1984 Long-Duration-ExposureFacility (LDEF)

Giotto1985

Spacelab-3Spacelab-D-l

19851985

1986 Int’1 Solar Polar Mission(ISPM)

Roentgen-Satellite (ROSAT)Gamma Ray Observatory

(GRO)

19871988

Venus gravity and atmospheric tidesI-m optical /UV telescope for deployment on

Shuttle or free flying platform

Venus Radar Mapper (VRM) Fr a

Starlab US-Aus-Cana

19881989

Part 3: Collaborative data collection analysis1961 Compare weather photographs and ground

observationsExperiments using US passive

communications satellite, antennas atSoviet facility

Laser and optical observation of US andFrench satellites

Analyze data obtained by laser tracking ofUS and French satellites

Analyze lunar materials returned by Apollomissions

Coordinate sea, air, and space collection ofmicrowave measurement data

Determine feasibility of aircraft and satelliteoperation in L-band

TIROS

Echo-2

US/(42 others)

US / USSR1962

Int’1. Satellite GeodesyExperiment (ISAGEX)

GEOS/PAGEOS

US/COSPAR

US/Fr

US (21 others)

US/USSR

US /Can/ ESA

1964

1966

1969

1972

1974

Lunar sample studies

Bering Sea Experiment

Position Location andCommunication Experiment(PLACE)

Large Area Crop InventoryExperiment (LACIE)

ARGOS

US Can USSR

US Fr

Collect ‘compare agricultural remote sensingand ground truth data

Collect environmental data from surfaceplatforms via satellites equipped withFrench detectors

Stage search and rescue incident using ATS-6 satellite

1974

1974

Search and Rescue US/Can/FRG/ESA1975

104

Launch Mission—

year name

1975

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1979

1980

1980

1980

1980

1981

1981

1982

1982

1982

1982

1983

1983

1985

1985

Satellite InstructionalTelevision Experiment(SITE)

Advanced Satellite forInterdisciplinaryCommunications (SACI)

Int’1 ApplicationsDemonstration (AIDSAT)

ISEE

Applications ExplorerMission-A

Ocean Dynamics StudyProject

Cloud Height Study Project

Winds and Waves StudyProject

Snow Properties StudyProject

Evaporation Study Project

SMM/Astro-A CollaborativeObservations Program

Agronomic RadiometryResearch Project

Shuttle multispectral infraredradiometer (SMIRR)

Agronomic Remote SensingActivities

Satellite laser tracking dataproject

Crustal Dynamics Study

COSPAS/SARSAT

Int’1. Satellite CloudClimatology Project(ISCCP)

Spacelab-1

Halley Missions

VEGA

Cooperating Science/countries applications Objectives

US/India

US/Bra

US/(27 others)

US/ESA

US/ESA

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Jap

US/Mex

US/ Mex/Sp/Egy

US/Aus

US/Jap

US/ Fr/It/FRG/Neth/Isr

US/ Can/Fr/USSR/UK/Nor/ Swe/Bul/Fin

US/Jap/ India

ESA/US

ESA/USSR/Japan/US

US/Fr

A

A

A

s

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

A

s

s

s

Broadcast of programs to remote Indianvillages via ATS-6 satellite

Broadcast of educational programs toBrazilian students via ATS-6

Broadcast programs to 27 developingcountries

Coordinated spacecraft studiedmagnetosphere, interplanetary space, andtheir interaction

Study earth surface/subsurface phenomena

Relate Seasat data regarding ocean surfacefeatures to measured subsurface features

Stereographic measurements of cloud heightby US and Japanese satellites

Correlation of Seasat data with sea surfacetruth data

Using satellite and surface truth data,explore use of satellites in determiningsnow characteristics

Using satellite and surface truth data,explore use of satellites in estimatingevaporation

Coordinated observation/data analysis ofsolar flares from 2 spacecraft

Study electromagnetic radiationcharacteristics of grains via satellite andground truth data

Verify SMIRR data with ground truth data

Estimate crop production via satellite andground truth data

Joint laser tracking

Satellite laser ranging (US and Frenchsatellites) to determine plate tectonics,polar motion, and earth rotation

Demonstrate global search and rescuesystem

Collect cloud climatology data via globalsatellite coverage

Multinational experiments include biology,medicine, botany, astronomy, and solarphysics

Spacecraft and mission design are beingcoordinated for ESA’s Giotto, USSR’sVega (2), and Japan’s Planet-A. USproviding tracking and coordinatingground-based and near-Earth observations

Track French balloons in Venus’ atmosphereand determine position/velocity usingvery long baseline interferometry

105

Launch Mission Cooperating Science /year name countries applications Objectives

1985 Int’1 Halley Watch US/ (8 others) s Coordinate ground-based observations ofHalley’s Comet

1988 Mobile Satell ite (MSAT) US/Can A Two-way voice data communication withmobile users

1 9 8 9 I n t ’ 1 . S o l a r - T e r r e s t r i a l P h y s i c s U S A / E S A / J a p s Coordinated solar-terrestrial physics(ISTP) Program measurement using 9 spacecraft

‘F(>relgn experiment [ t(~retgn [) 1 ) on L] S m lssl(~nbu s ~xperlment c~n }tJre18n s p a c e c r a f t

NOTES ~ 1 ) Table Includes ~lnly pr<jjec ti lnvolv]ng spacecraft I t d(les not Include cot~peratlve v~uncilng r(~ckct, ballm~n, and gr(~uncibc]w,cl prt))ect5, al~~~ ex[ Iucieciare Inc ]cien ts [)1 data exchange ot launch services t~nly

f z I Tab]e ,nc lucie~ , n the ‘a~e ~J} fu [ure m]s\l(~n5 (~nl} th(~w (~lf lcla]]>, a p p r o v e d .t 3 I klul t]lateral ](~lnt ~entures amt~ng F,SA member countries are cons] ciered as ESA missions Hc~we\er, nat lona] pr~>lec t ac t]\,]t IL+ In i( ~1~.lng ESA members

w!th n{~n ESA c (~un trle+ drc c onslciereci a5 national cm~perat lie ventures(LI ) l-r = France, L ’ K = Llnlted Klngdt~m, I t = Italy Swltz = S w i t z e r l a n d , I-R(; = Federal R e p u b l i c (~t G e r m a n ) , Neth = ~etherlanti~

Aus = Au\tral]a [IL = D e n m a r k lre = I r e l a n d , Bet = Belglum Nlcx = Nlex]ct), S p a = SpaIn. Eg> = Egvpt B r a = Bra711 N(>r = X(>rm dlSme = $v~ecltn Bul = [3ul~arla, F]n = F]nlancl Iw = I s r a e l , C“OS1’iAR = C(~mmlttee on S p a c e Rc+earc h

Appendix B

Text of Public Law 98-562,Originally Senate Joint Resolution 236,

and Presidential Statement

Ninety-eighth Congrcss of the United States of AmericaAT THE SECOND SESSION

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday, the twenty-third day of January,one thousand nine hundred and eighty-four

Joint ResolutionRelating to cooperative East-West ventures in space.

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union could soon findthemselves in an arms race in space, which is in the interest of noone;

Whereas the prospect of an arms race in space between the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union has aroused worldwide concernexpressed publicly by the governments of many countries;

Whereas the 1972-1975 Apoll0-Soyuz project involving the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union and culminatin g with a joint dockingin space was successful, thus proving the practicability of a jointspace effort;

Whereas, shortly after the completion of the Apollo-Soyuz project,and intended as a followup to it the United States and the SovietUnion signed an agreement to examine the feasibility of a Shut-tle-Salyut program and an international space platform program,but that initiative was allowed to lapse;

Whereas the United States signed a five-year space cooperationagreement with the Soviet Union in 1972, renewed it in 1977, thenchose not to renew it in 1982;

Whereas the United States recently proposed to the Soviet Unionthat the two Nations conduct a joint simulated space rescuemission;

Whereas the Soviet Union has not yet responded to the subs-cc ofthis proposal; and

Whereas the opportunities offered by space for prodigious achieve-ments in virtually every field of human endeavor, leading ulti-mately to the colonization of space in the cause of advancinghuman civilization, would probably be lost irretrievably werespace to be made into yet another East-West battleground: Now,therefore, be itResolved by the Senate and House of Representutives of the

United States of America in Congress assembled That the Presi-dent should—

(1) endeavor, at the earliest practicable date, to renew the1972-1977 agreement between the United States and the SovietUnion on space cooperation for peaceful purposes;

(2) continue energetically to gain Soviet agreement to therecent United States proposal for a joint simulated space rescuemission; and

106

107

(3) seek to initiate talks with the Government of the SovietUnion, and with other governments interested in space activi-ties, to explore further opportunities for cooperative East-Westventures in space including cooperative ventures in such areasas space medicine and space biology, planetary science, mannedand unmanned space exploration.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States andPresident of the Senate

108

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate ReleaseOctober 30, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

I am today signing Senate Joint Resolution 236, relating to cooperative East-Westventures in space.

Space represents a challenging opportunity for the United States and for ail ofmankind; a challenge that, I am determined, we will meet. We stand today on thethreshold of a great adventure. Beyond are vast opportunities — for the production ofnew materials, new medicines, and the expansion of our knowledge of the universe and ofourselves.

This must be a cooperative effort. We have worked with many other nations in ourown space program and this cooperation will strengthen and grow. Many countries havetaken part in the successful spacelab program, and I have invited other nations to takepart in the development of a space station.

I find portions of the language contained in the preamble to the Joint Resolutionvery speculative. However, I have stated several times our desire to increase contactswith the Soviet Union, and we are prepared to work with the Soviets on cooperation inspace in programs which are mutually beneficial and productive. As part of this effort,the United States has offered to carry out with the Soviet Union a joint simulated spacerescue mission. We believe this and similar cooperative programs offer practicalbenefits for all mankind. It is in that spirit that I today sign this Joint Resolution.

Appendix C

COSPAS/SARSAT: A Brief Case Study

Description of theCOSPAS/SARSAT System

COSPAS/SARSAT is an international cooperativeprogram to demonstrate the use of satellite technol-ogy to detect and locate aircraft or vessels in distress.The United States, Canada, France, and the U.S.S.R.developed the system, based on a “Memorandum ofUnderstanding” which was signed in 1979 and enteredinto effect in 1980. * Since that time five more coun-tries—Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Fin-land, and Bulgaria—have become participants. Bra-zil and Denmark are expected to join in the near future.There are four participating U.S. agencies: the Nation-al Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)administers the system; the Coast Guard and Air Forceare referred to as “user agencies;” and the NationalAeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) con-ducts technical evaluation and support. COSPAS isadministered by the Soviet Merchant Marine(MORFLOT).

The acronym COSPAS refers to the Soviet compo-nent of the system (from the Russian for “Space Sys-tem for the Search of Vessels in Distress”), SARSATis the joint U. S .-Canadian-French component (fromSearch and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking). Theproject involves the use of multiple satellites to detectdistress signals emitted on the ground by emergencytransmitters aboard ships and aircraft in distress. Thesignals received by a satellite are relayed to a networkof dedicated ground stations where the location of theemergency is determined by measuring the Dopplershift of the signal as received by the satellite. This in-formation is then relayed to the appropriate search andrescue forces in the country nearest the emergencylocation.

The system thus consists of a number of separatebut

●

●

●

linked components:Transmitters: Emergency Locator Transmitters(ELTs) aboard aircraft in distress, and EmergencyPosition Indicating Radio Beacons (EPIRBs)aboard marine craft.Satellites: Detectors are mounted on U.S. NOAAand Soviet Cosmos satellites occupying medium-altitude, near-polar orbits to maximize coverageand detection sensitivity of the system.Local User Terminal (LUT): Dedicated groundstations within each participating country that re-

‘ T h e agencle< that ~lxned the ‘hlemt~rancium t>f Llnderstandlng w e r e(Jnlted S t a t e \ N A S A , C a n a d a I)epartment ot Communlcatl(,n. (DOC ~;France Centre N a t i o n a l d Etucies Spat]ale\ (CNES 1, and the Sov]et LJnl(~nMln]stry ot Nlerchant Llarlne ( FvIORFI.OT ) A COSI’AS SARSAT Coordl-natlng Group ( CSCC ) was established to manage the ] [)mt eftort+

●

●

r..

ceive satellite signals and perform initial proc-essing.Mission Control Center (MCC): Data are relayedby the LUTS to the MCC, which is responsiblefor system control within that country as well asfor coordination with MCCS of other nations.Rescue Coordination Center (RCC): The RCC isalerted by the MCC, and is responsible for coor-dinating the actions of local search and rescueforces.

Figure C-1 illustrates a COSPAS satellite. Figure C-2depicts the various components of the COSPAS/SARSAT system and their interrelationships.

Within this general system, two experiments are be-ing performed. The first is directed at aircraft and ves-sels equipped with commercially available emergencytransmitters operating at 121.5 and 243 MHz. Signalsemitted by these transmitters are relatively weak, andtheir frequency and modulation characteristics are notideal for detection by spacecraft. The transmitters,however, are widely used and therefore offer the op-portunity to test the concept in actual emergency sit-uations.

The second experiment uses transmitters designedespecially for satellite detection and operating at 406MHz. These systems have been used successfully inmeteorological data collection for many years, and ina number of SAR-type experiments. The 406 M H ztransmitters have higher power and better frequencystability than current off-the-shelf emergency transmit-ters, and the frequency itself was designated at the

Figure C-1 .—Soviet COSPAS Satellite

Soviet COSPAS satellite, as displayed at 1985 Paris Air Show

SOURCE Charles P Vick, 1985

109

110

Figure C-2.— Basic Operational Configuration of the COSPAS/SARSAT System Components

EP

D i s t r e s s e d U n i t sSOURCE NOAA

Emergency Locator TransmitterEmergency Position IndicatingRadio BeaconLocal User TerminalMission Control Center\

World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC) of1979 for use in satellite-aided emergency communica-tion worldwide.

Unlike the 121.5/243 units, these 406 MHz transmit-ters can include in their data message information onthe type of aircraft or vessel, its identification andcountry of origin, the nature of the emergency orelapsed time since an accident, and even the locationof the emergency. In addition, some of the signal proc-essing can be performed by an onboard processor andeither relayed to the LUT in real-time or stored for latertransmission. This feature not only simplifies theground operations but also eliminates the requirementfor simultaneous visibility to the satellite of both theemergency signal source and the LUT while a signalis being relayed. As a result, full global coverage canbe achieved with a smaller number of lower cost LUTS.

To accommodate both experiments simultaneously,two data systems and two coverage models are em-ployed in COSPAS/SARSAT. A “repeater data sys-tem” relays received signals directly to the LUT forprocessing, while a “processed data system” is utilizedto process and relay, as well as store and later trans-mit, the 406 MHz data. The first type of system per-mits regional (line-of-sight) coverage. The latter sys-tem provides a global coverage capability, since signalsreceived when no LUT is in view can be stored untilthe satellite can transmit directly to an LUT.

The key to the effectiveness of the repeater sys-tem—especially in remote regions—is the number ofLUTS. There are currently three of these stations inthe United States, three in the U. S. S. R., and one eachin Canada, France, Norway, and the United Kingdom.Each participating country has one MCC, with the

111

m

iA

I

112

U.S. MCC acting as the single point of contact for allSARSAT parties in coordinating system operationswith the COSPAS MCC. Figure C-3 depicts the geo-graphical layout of COSPAS/SARSAT ground com-ponents.

Demonstration and Evaluation

The first COSPAS satellite (Cosmos 1383) wasplaced in orbit in June 1982, followed in March 1983by the first SARSAT satellite (NOAA-8) and a sec-ond Soviet satellite (Cosmos 1447). In June 1984NOAA-8 prematurely failed; in the same month theSoviets added a third satellite, Cosmos 1574, to thesystem, NOAA-9, the newest U.S. addition, wasplaced in orbit in December 1984. Thus, the SARSATsystem has relied heavily (and often exclusively) onSoviet satellites. The next four NOAA satellites willbe equipped with SARSAT instruments, and two ad-ditional COSPAS satellites have already been built.The goal is to provide four-satellite coverage through-out the 1980s.

When system effectiveness had been adequatelydemonstrated, COSPAS/SARSAT began initial oper-ational status; a new Memorandum of Understandingto that effect was signed by the participating nationsin October 1984. This agreement establishes a com-mitment to provide operational services on the basisof the actual operating capability of the systemthrough 1990. Authority for U.S. leadership in the pro-gram was transferred from NASA to NOAA at thattime.

As a new initiative, the United States is now plan-ning to put SARSAT equipment on future U.S. geosta-tionary meteorological satellites. These satellites willprovide instant alert capability for 406 MHz beaconsin the Western hemisphere. The polar-orbiting NOAAsatellites will continue to provide location of incidentsand alert for 121.5 and 243 MHz beacons, as well as406 MHz beacons not in the line of sight of the geo-stationary satellites.

Performance and Prospects

Thus far, the performance of the combined satellite/ground system has been effective. NASA officials re-port that “target” levels of locating accuracy have beenachieved at both experimental wavelengths (i.e., 20 kmat 121 MHz, and 2.5 km at 406 MHz), and sensitivityof reception is good. For example, even though theELTs and EPIRBs transmit a signal no stronger thanthat of a garage-door opener, about 85 percent of thetransmissions are detected on the first pass of the sat-ellite.

Technical problems remain, but these generally havenot stemmed from the COSPAS/SARSAT system it-self. For example, illegal interference on the 406 MHzfrequency (mostly in Europe) has been a continualproblem, but strict enforcement is now reducing thisinterference. A 98 percent false alarm rate on the121.5/243 MHz frequency—the result of faulty ordamaged transmitters that operate intermittently with-out being turned on—has also been a major problem.Improved unit designs, however, are beginning to re-duce false alarms. In the meantime, the strategy hasbeen to wait until a signal is received on two succes-sive passes and, if possible, to verify the informationwith Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, or other reports.As of April 1985, approximately 374 people have beensaved from both aircraft and ships by rescue opera-tions facilitated by the COSPAS/SARSAT system. Ta-ble C-1 shows a breakdown of rescues by country andcategory through October 17, 1984.

The COSPAS/SARSAT system has been success-ful because it consists of two separate projects joinedbecause of their common objectives. SARSAT wasoriginally a cooperative project involving the UnitedStates, Canada, and France. COSPAS reflects a Sovi-et interest to develop a system compatible withSARSAT, especially for use in the maritime fleet. Thesystems are not dependent on one another, yet theyare mutually supportive in providing wider and morefrequent coverage, and permitting a faster responsetime for emergencies. The coordination of spacecraftcharacteristics permits interoperability among the va-rious satellites and ground stations, while coordinat-ing launch dates and orbital parameters provides op-timal coverage across time. The recent failure ofNOAA-8 demonstrated the importance of the backupprovided by satellites of other countries.

At the same time, security concerns seem to be min-imized by the nature of the COSPAS/SARSAT oper-ation. However sensitive the technology involved may

Table C-1 .—Total Rescues to Oct. 17, 1984

Incidents Persons

United States:Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 61Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Canada:Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 22Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Europe:Aeronautical incidents . . . . . . . . . . . 10Maritime incidents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

8571

477

2277

312a

aTotal includes three hikers, not reflected In “incidents” column

SOURCE NOAA data.

113

be, z the fact that COSPAS and SARSAT are two sep-arate systems has led to little, if any, direct interac-tion with the U.S.S.R. other than the communicationbetween MCCs and the periodic planning meetings.Agreements have been made concerning broadcast fre-quencies, but no U.S. assistance has been provided,for example, in the development of non-U. S. groundstations, and no technology has been exchanged be-tween the two systems.

While the COSPAS/SARSAT system boasts a signifi-cant number of rescues, it should be pointed out thatnone of those rescued have been Soviet or East bloccitizens. This is due to the fact that the Soviet Uniondoes not routinely carry operational ELTs/EPIRBs onits own aircraft/ships at this time. By contrast, theUnited States alone has emergency locator transmit-ters on more than 200,000 civilian aircraft and 6,000ships.

Regarding the cooperative interaction itself, how-ever, participants report that there has been a “spe-

2Technlcal areas of potential mllltary sens]tlv]ty include such areas as in-

formation on signal frequencies and formats; satellite-mounted receivers, proc-

essors, and transmitters, ground-based data processing and communicationscapabilltles, and spaceaaft orblta] ephemeris and general performance data

cial spirit” in the project. Due largely to its humanitar-ian and multilateral nature, interaction between theSARSAT and COSPAS elements of the system hasgone smoothly despite some ups and downs in launch-ings and funding, and despite negative events in U. S.-Soviet relations which have resulted in the termina-tion of other space activities. For example, althoughthe number of U.S. SARSAT satellites has fallen be-low the number planned–the U.S.S.R. has launchedthree satellites to the United States’ two, and for a con-siderable period of time the system relied entirely onthe Soviet satellites-cooperative activity has not ap-peared to suffer, even in light of the recent highly pub-licized debate in the United States over whether oneor two (SARSAT-equipped) polar satellites should befunded. 3 Many observers have construed the COSPAS/SARSAT experience as an indication that U.S.-Sovietcooperation can be useful and viable in space activi-ties with a practical purpose, equitable sharing of costs,and for the benefit of many people and countries.

‘See, for example, “US WIII Negotiate With %lvlets on Search and Res-cue Satellite, ” Awatlon L$’eek and Space Technologjr, VOI CXXI, No 13 (Sept24, 1984), p. 22

0