us navy's pacific war session ii

The U.S. Navy in World War II Part II- The Pacific War

session ii-The Period of Japanese Expansion

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Period Covered in Each Session

What made 20th century Japan such a formidable enemy?

Bushidō (武士道),! literally "military scholar road”,! is a Japanese word for! the way of the samurai life

“In his text Feudal and Modern Japan (1896), historian Arthur May Knapp wrote: ‘The samurai of thirty years ago had behind him a thousand years of training in the law of honor, obedience, duty, and self-sacrifice.... It was not needed to create or establish them. As a child he had but to be instructed, as indeed he was from his earliest years, in the etiquette of self-immolation.’ “!

Wikipedia

“Bushido…originates from the samurai moral values, most commonly stressing some combination of frugality, loyalty, martial arts mastery, and honor unto death. Born from Neo-Confucianism during times of peace in Tokugawa Japan and following Confucian texts, Bushido was also influenced by Shinto and Zen Buddhism, allowing the violent existence of the samurai to be tempered by wisdom and serenity. Bushidō developed between the 16th and 20th centuries….

Saburo Sakai; 1916-2000

born into a family of samurai ancestry

1937-age 21—graduated first in pilot training school, earning a silver watch presented to him by Emperor Hirohito himself

8 Dec 41-part of the attack on Clark AFB, Manila

10 Dec 41-downed the 1st B-17 (flown by Colin Kelly) lost in World War II

early ’42—fought in Dutch East Indies, 13 air kills

summer ’42—fought over Guadalcanal, &c., &c.

IJN’s fourth-ranking ace

post-war-became a Buddhist, vowed never to kill another living thing

Out of this tradition of Bushido came two lethal practices:

The Kamikaze !(神風, literally: "Spirit wind"; !common translation: !"Divine wind")

Out of this tradition of two lethal practices:

The Kamikaze !(神風, literally: "Spirit wind"; !common translation: !"Divine wind")

!fight to the death!Never surrender!

Lieutenant Hiroo Onoda, who held out from December 1944 until March 1974 on Lubang Island in the Philippines with Akatsu, Shimada and Kozuka, was relieved of duty by his former commanding officer in March 1974.

Emperor Showa (Hirohito) and Imperial stallion Shirayuki

major topics in this session

I. Japan and America Face Off

II. Pearl Harbor

III. Guam and Wake

IV. Allied Retreat

V. Battle of the Java Sea

VI. Battle of the Coral Sea

I. Japan and America Face OffNotice the use of the “J” word. It was widely used before the war and ubiquitously during the war

“Japan started down the road to World War II with her conquest of Manchuria in the last four months of 1931.…”

Sea Power, p. 646.

“Japan started down the road to World War II with her conquest of Manchuria in the last four months of 1931. Although the U. S. refused to recognize changes brought about by force and sternly reminded Japan of her treaty obligations, the failure of the European powers to support .…”

“…failure of the European powers to support the American position made it evident that Japan might pursue her course of aggression with impunity. The only danger was that of interference by Russia, which also had ambitions in Asia, and against that the Japanese provided by signing an anti-Comintern pact with Germany in November 1936. …”

Sea Power, p. 646.

“…with Germany in November 1936. By this time military extremists were gaining control of Japan, removing by assassination those moderate statesmen who opposed their policy.…”

“… who opposed their policy. When in the summer of 1937 the Army was ready, Japan embarked on the conquest of China proper.”

Sea Power, p. 646.

The rape of Nanking, Dec 37-Jan 38

Oil and Appeasement

“… conquest of China proper.” “In order not to deprive China of war supplies, FDR refused to invoke the 1937 Neutrality Act in this undeclared war. But the Japanese also benefitted, for they were dependent on American steel scrap and Western Hemisphere oil. “In July 1939 Secretary of State Cordell Hull• gave the Japanese the required six months notice for the abrogation of the commercial treaty of 1911, thereby clearing the way for an embargo on munitions.…”

Ibid.

Oil and Appeasement

“…thereby clearing the way for an embargo on munitions. This move and the announcement the next month of the Russo-German non-aggression pact had a temporarily sobering effect upon the Japanese. Moreover, Japan was rapidly ‘bogging down’ in the Chinese hinterland, and her resources were under severe strain. “But the outbreak of the European war eased Japan’s difficulties and presented new opportunities. The fall of France and of the Netherlands in the spring of 1940 left Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies ‘orphaned’ colonies and s weakened Britain’s position that she acceded to Japanese demands that she close the Burma Road, China’s last connection with the sea. The Imperial Japanese Navy (hereafter, IJN), which had never favored the army’s mainland adventure, now saw an opportunity for expansion into the East Indies to obtain oil, tin, rubber and quinine. Japan had already worked her way south along the China coast and early in 1939 had occupied Hainan.…”

Ibid.

Hainan

Oil and Appeasement

“…thereby clearing the way for an embargo on munitions. This move and the announcement the next month of the Russo-German non-aggression pact had a temporarily sobering effect upon the Japanese. Moreover, Japan was rapidly ‘bogging down’ in the Chinese hinterland, and her resources were under severe strain. “But the outbreak of the European war eased Japan’s difficulties and presented new opportunities. The fall of France and of the Netherlands in the spring of 1940 left Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies ‘orphaned’ colonies and s weakened Britain’s position that she acceded to Japanese demands that she close the Burma Road, China’s last connection with the sea. The Imperial Japanese Navy (hereafter, IJN), which had never favored the army’s mainland adventure, now saw an opportunity for expansion into the East Indies to obtain oil, tin, rubber and quinine. Japan had already worked her way south along the China coast and early in 1939 had occupied Hainan.• Shortly after the fall of France the Vichy-controlled government of Indo-China permitted Japanese occupation of the northern part of the country. In September 1940 Japan concluded with the Axis powers an alliance that was an obvious warning to the U.S. not to interfere in either Europe or Asia.”

Ibid.

Oil and Appeasement

“… was an obvious warning to the U.S. not to interfere in either Europe or Asia.” “With the termination in January 1940 of the treaty of commerce, the U.S. was free to embargo shipment of strategic materials to Japan. But the Roosevelt administration, warned by Ambassador Grew• in Japan that an abrupt cessation of trade with the U.S. might cause Japan to invade the East Indies, delayed action in the vain hope that supplying the materials for aggression might somehow prevent aggression. In July 1940 Congress passed an act which provided for the licensing of exports. this stopped the sale of a/c and aviation gasoline to Japan, but the export of iron and steel was not cut off till autumn, and the State Department continued to license the export of oil until July 1941. Ibid.

Planning for War

“As it became apparent that Japan was preparing to move south, the U.S. attempted to concert plans with potential allies. The ABC-1 Conference held in Washington early in 1941, besides establishing the European Theater (ETO) as primary, designated the PTO as the responsibility of the U.S. in event of war with Japan. A conference in Singapore in April proved ineffectual, producing only a recommendation for mutual support against aggression. “The Japanese advance in Indo-China was, in American eyes, the crucial issue. When in July 1941 the Japanese announced that the Vichy government had agreed to a ‘joint protectorate’ of Indo-China, the U.S. countered by freezing all Japanese assets in the U.S., thus at long last shutting off the supply of oil.…” op. cit., p. 647.

“… off till autumn, and the State Department continued to license the export of oil until July 1941.”

Planning for War

“…shutting off the supply of oil. This move precipitated the final crisis. Japan had to have oil or see her military machine grind to a halt. In October the Konoye government fell, and a military government headed by Gen Tojo took over.…” op. cit., p. 647.

Planning for War

In November a special Japanese envoy arrived in the U.S. to assist Ambassador Nomura in negotiations looking toward a resumption of the flow of oil. The failure of these negotiations led directly to Pearl Harbor. op. cit., p. 647.

United States Preparations

“The approach of war in the Pacific found the U.S. preparing but still unprepared. In 1938, in accordance with a directive of Congress, the Hepburn Board had recommended an extensive program for development of Pacific bases. Except for the fortification of Guam, most of the board’s recommendations were adopted, and the work was under way when war broke out. “The greater portion of the US Fleet had for long been based on the West Coast, but in the spring of 1940 FDR, in the hope of deterring Japan from further aggression, directed that it be based at Pearl Harbor. Here it lay somewhat exposed while, after the outbreak of war in Europe, much of the new construction went to the Atlantic. In the spring of 1941, because of the necessity for convoying Lend-Lease goods, Adm Harold R. Stark, CNO,…” Ibid.

“The failure of these negotiations led directly to Pearl Harbor.”


“…construction went to the Atlantic. In the spring of 1941, because of the necessity for convoying Lend-Lease goods, Adm Harold R. Stark, CNO, transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic three BBs, the CV Yorktown, four CLs and two squadrons of DDs [“…during World War II, a full-strength DesRon (as it was abbreviated at the time) comprised two Destroyer Divisions or DesDivs of four ships each, plus a squadron flagship; these were operational as well as administrative units—Wikipedia]. American plane production went chiefly to the Atlantic theater. Ibid.


“At the beginning of Feb 1941 the Atlantic Squadron, as we have seen, was made the Atlantic Fleet, while the fleet at Pearl Harbor became the Pacific Fleet (PacFlt). The small American force in the Far East, commanded by Adm Thomas C. Hart, was for prestige purposes designated the US Asiatic Fleet. Ibid.

“…chiefly to the Atlantic theater.”


“…designated the US Asiatic Fleet. It was provided that one of these three fleet commanders should also act as CinC US Fleet. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Adm Husband E. Kimmel was CinC both of the Pac Flt and of the US Flt.


“…and of the US Flt. “In the Atlantic the Axis powers had not a single operational CV, and the greater part of the British fleet was concentrated against the comparatively small German navy. In the Pacific the US faced the formidable Japanese navy practically alone. Yet at the time of the earl Harbor attack the US Fleet was fairly evenly divided between the two oceans, with nine BBs in the Pacific and eight in the Atlantic, three CVs in the Pacific and four in the Atlantic. True, the Atlantic Fleet lacked sufficient patrol craft and convoy escorts,but in the Pacific, even before the losses of Pearl Harbor, the fleet was inferior to the Japanese in every category. Most ominous, the three American CVs faced ten Japanese.1

Ibid.

______ 1 At the outbreak of the war the Japanese had six heavy CVs, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku, two light CVs, Hosho and Riujo; and two conversions, the light CV Zuiho and the CVE Taiyo. The converted light CV Shoho was commissioned in late January, 1942.

United States Preparations “The British had undertaken to reinforce Singapore, but the crisis in the Far East coincided with a desperate situation in the Mediterranean, where they had suffered severe losses. After considerable hesitation the Admiralty consented to send the new BB Prince of Wales to join the battle cruiser (BC) Repulse at Singapore with the hope that the presence of two capital ships would have an additional deterrent effect upon the Japanese. The new CV Indomitable was to have joined these two vessels, but during her shakedown cruise in the West Indies she was damaged by grounding. There Admiralty felt that no other CV could be spared from the ETO. The Dutch had nothing heavier that CLs in the East. America’s allies, it was clear, could do little to redress the unfavorable balance of power in the Pacific. “American naval forces in the Pacific seriously lacked fleet auxiliaries. Planes were few and largely obsolete. Antiaircraft (aac) armament was short in quantity and quality. The American 1.1-inch gun proved so unsatisfactory that the Navy had to turn to the foreign-designed Bofors and Oerlikon guns.…”

op. cit., pp. 647-648.

“…faced ten Japanese.1.”

United States Preparations “In the Far East the situation was even more grave. With the Japanese on Formosa less than 300 miles to the north, on Hainan and in Indo-China to the west, and in the Marianas and the Carolines to the east, the P h i l i p p i n e s w e r e a l m o s t surrounded. In July, 1941 Douglas MacArthur,• then Field Marshall of the Philippine Army, was made Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces Far East. Thereafter there was a rapid build-up in the Philippines both of air and of ground forces, designed to enable the islands to defend themselves by the spring of 1942.”

op. cit., pp. 647-648.


“In the event of war with Japan, it had long been planned for the tiny U.S. Asiatic Fleet to fall back to the Malay Barrier,• for it could hardly be expected to offer any significant opposition. But the increase of U.S. Army air strength in the Philippines gave hope that before long Luzon might be sufficiently secure to permit the fleet to continue operations from Manila.”

Ibid.

“…spring of 1942.”

Text

II. Pearl HarborAttack as viewed from a Japanese plane— Official USN photograph

Hawaiian Islands

Oahu

Hawaiian Islands

Oahu Oahu

Pearl Harbor

October ‘41

Final Negotiations “The negotiations between the US and Japan were foredoomed, for neither government would retreat an inch. They bargained only for time. The US had the advantage of being able to read the Japanese diplomatic correspondence, for American cryptanalysts had succeeded in constructing machines for deciphering the Japanese diplomatic code. Hence Washington knew that the Japanese Foreign Office had set the latter part of November as a deadline for the conclusion of the talks, after which ‘things are automatically going to happen.’ Washington knew also that the Japanese were receiving information regarding the movements of the PacFlt and their berthing in Pearl Harbor, and that Japan was calling for more specific and more frequent reports. “On 26 Nov the US handed the Japanese a note which demanded that Japan evacuate China and support the regime of Chiang Kai-shek….”

Ibid.

“…operations from Manila.”

Final Negotiations

“…support the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. There was no expectation that Japan would accept such demands, and deciphered messages at once indicated that the Japanese regarded the note as ending the conversations. The ambassadors however were to continue the pretense of negotiating….On 27 Nov the Navy Department sent to Pearl Harbor a ‘war warning’ indicating that the Department expected a Japanese move against the Philippines, Malaya, or Borneo. Apparently American officials were so hypnotized by Japan’s obvious preparations to move southward that they overlooked or rejected her capability of striking in another direction as well. ”

Ibid.

Final Negotiations

“By 6 Dec it was known in Washington that the Japanese were sending to their Washington embassy a message for the US State Department breaking off diplomatic relations, the sort of message that in times past had been followed up by a surprise attack on the opposing fleet [e.g., the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, Feb 1904—jbp]. It was known too that Japanese diplomats in London, Honk Kong, Singapore, Batavia [capital of Dutch East Indies, today Jakarta—jbp], Manila, and Washington were burning their secret documents and codes—usually done only when war was imminent. “Thus by Saturday afternoon there was every reason to believe that war with Japan was only hours away. Then before 0400 and 0600 on Sunday 7 December, the Navy Department deciphered instructions to the Japanese ambassadors to deliver their message at 1 PM. One o’clock in the afternoon in Washington would be 0730 at Pearl Harbor.”

Ibid.

“… capability of striking in another direction as well.”

Time Magazine’s cover story on 7 December was on the challenges faced by CNO Adm King.

Coincidence?

The Attack on Pearl Harbor

“Adm Isoroku Yamamoto,…”

op. cit., p.649.

“… afternoon in Washington would be 0730 at Pearl Harbor.”

The Attack on Pearl Harbor “Adm Isoroku Yamamoto, CinC of the Japanese Combined Fleet, had early in 1941 proposed an attack on Pearl Harbor to make it impossible for the US to attack Japan’s flank while she was engaged in the conquest of the ‘Southern Resources Area.’ Details had been worked out in the early fall, and the final decision to go to war was made at an Imperial Conference on 1 Dec. “Essentially the decision was a gamble on an Axis victory in Europe. In the fall of 1941 Rommel was threatening Egypt and the German armies were near Moscow [could see the Kremlin bell towers—jbp]. It seemed likely that the US would be forced to let the Pacific go more or less by default while it faced the greater danger of an Axis triumph in Europe. In the meantime the Japanese would overrun Southeast Asia and the Southern Resources Area, and would protect them and Japan by a defensive perimeter of island air and submarine bases so strong that the US would have to accept the fait accompli. “The attacking force, already at sea when the Imperial Council made its decision, consisted of six CVs—the Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku, and Zuikaku—escorted by two BBs, three CAs, and nine DDs. Its course lay well to the north both to avoid American air patrols and to decrease the chance of meeting merchant shipping. Twenty-seven submarines (SS), of which eleven carried planes and five carried midget SSs to penetrate Pearl Harbor, had gone ahead earlier.”

op. cit., pp.649-650.

“… afternoon in Washington would be 0730 at Pearl Harbor.”


“On 6 Dec, the Japanese CVs received last minute information about the ships in Pearl Harbor. The Enterprise and Lexington were at sea, much to the regret of the Japanese Air Ops Officer, who said he would rather sink two CVs than all eight BBs.2 but VAdm Chūchi Nagumo,• the TF commander, decided to launch the attack as planned.…”

op. cit., p. 650.

“… and five carried midget SSs to penetrate Pearl Harbor, had gone ahead earlier.”

______ 2 The Colorado, ninth BB of the Pac Fleet, was on the West Coast for overhaul.

The Attack on Pearl Harbor“…launch the attack as planned. At 0615 on 7 Dec3 from a position 230 miles north of Oahu, Nagumo began launching the first wave of 183 attack planes.…”

op. cit., p. 650. !3 Hawaii time (zone plus 10 ½ ), West Longitude date.

The Attack on Pearl Harbor“…wave of 183 attack planes.…”


“… 183 attack planes. “At Pearl Harbor there was no premonition of the impending disaster. The warning of 27 Nov had indicated only the Washington expected Japan to make an aggressive move to the south, that is, toward the Philippines or Malaya. Accordingly LGen Walter C. Short,…”

op. cit., p. 650.


“…LGen Walter C. Short, had taken precautions only against sabotage and had so reported to Washington. Adm Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training program. “The Sunday morning calm was slightly disturbed at 0645 when a DD sank a midget SS outside Pearl Harbor, but the report did not lead to a general alert. It was hardly a matter to concern the ships in the security of the harbor. Many officers were having breakfast, and preparations were being made to change the watch when the first Japanese planes appeared. Their hostile character was not appreciated until the first bombs fell at 0755.”

op. cit., p. 650.

Sea Power, p. 650


“The BBs moored east of Ford Island were the principal target. Despite the surprise, American sailors took station with an alacrity that impressed the Japanese pilots but did not seriously disrupt their plans.…”

“…appreciated until the first bombs fell at 0755.”

op. cit., pp. 650-651.

The Attack on Pearl Harbor“…did not seriously disrupt their plans. A torpedo attack on the BBs was followed closely by high-level and dive bombing . The greater part of the damage resulted from this first attack, which was over by 0830. Then after a brief lull came a second wave of 170 fighters and bombers, which concentrated on ships which appeared least damaged. By this time however the Americans were thoroughly alerted, so that the second wave suffered the greater part of the Japanese casualties. “By the end of the attack the Arizona was a total loss. Moored inboard of the repair ship Vestal, which was too small to offer her much protection, she had taken several torpedo and bomb hits early in the action. One bomb exploded in a forward magazine. Surrounded by burning oil, the BB sank quickly, taking with her more than a thousand men.…”

op. cit., pp. 650-651.

The Attack on Pearl Harbor“…than a thousand men. “Of the ships moored in pairs, the outboard vessels suffered severely from torpedoes. The Oklahoma, moored outboard of the Maryland, received three torpedo hits in the first moments of the attack and at once began to capsize. She too was a complete loss and was later raised only to clear the harbor. The West Virginia, outboard of the Tennessee, was also torpedoed early in the action, but prompt counter flooding prevented her from capsizing, and her crew continued to fight as she settled to the bottom with only a moderate list [Navy for ‘tilt’—jbp]. Their inboard partners fared much better. The Tennessee took two bomb hits and was threatened by burning oil from the Arizona, but suffered only moderate damage. The Maryland escaped with only a couple of bomb hits.”

op. cit., pp. 650-651.


“The California was moored singly. Hit by two torpedoes and a bomb, she later settled into Pearl Harbor mud in a upright position. The Nevada, moored alone at the opposite end of ‘Battleship Row,’ was the only vessel to get under way. Although hit by a torpedo forward, she was able to sortie under a rain of bombs and finally beached herself to avoid the danger of being sunk in the channel. The Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pac Fleet, was in drydock, where she was safe from torpedoes, and she put up such an effective fire that she suffered only a single bomb hit.….”

“…The Maryland escaped with only a couple of bomb hits.”

op. cit., pp. 650-651.

The Attack on Pearl Harbor “…only a single bomb hit. “While the fleet had been the primary objective of the Japanese, they had also attacked the airfields in the area. There the Americans hastily improvised defenses, but they nevertheless took heavy losses in a/c, which had been parked in compact rows as a precaution against sabotage. The Navy lost 80 planes; and of the Army’s 231, only 79 were usable after the attack. The Japanese lost only 29 a/c over the target, but several others crashed in landing on their CVs. “American personnel casualties totaled 3,681, the Navy and Marine Corps losing 2,112 killed and 981 wounded; the Army 222 killed and 360 wounded.….”

The Attack on Pearl Harbor “American personnel casualties totaled 3,681, the Navy and Marine Corps losing 2,112 killed and 981 wounded; the Army 222 killed and 360 wounded. These losses in particular had the effect of uniting the people of the US in a vigorous prosecution of the war that had been forced upon them.•

op. cit., pp. 650-651.


“…the war that had been forced upon them. “From the American point of view, the disaster was less severe than it first appeared, and considerably less than it might have been. The old BBs sunk at Pearl Harbor were too slow either to fight Japan’s newer BBs or to accompany the fast American CVs. Their chief use came for shore bombardment in the last two years of the war, after all but the Arizona and the Oklahoma had been raised and renovated….”

op. cit., pp. 650-651.


“…raised and renovated. Their temporary loss freed trained personnel, of which there was a great shortage, for use in carrier and amphibious (hereafter, amphib) forces, and it compelled the US to adopt the CV tactics that in the long run proved decisive. “In concentrating on ships, the Japanese had neglected the machine shops, leaving repair facilities substantially intact. They had overlooked the 4,500,000 barrels of oil exposed in tank farms near the harbor.• This slowly accumulated fuel reserve was almost irreplaceable in view of America’s European commitments. Without it fleets could not could not have operated from Pearl Harbor for months. The greatest good fortune for the Americans was that their CVs had escaped. The Saratoga was on the West Coast, the Lexington was delivering planes to Midway, and the Enterprise was returning from having delivered planes to Wake. Moreover, very few CA/Ls or DDs had been hit. Thus the ships for fast CV striking forces, the most effective naval weapon of World War II, were left intact.” op. cit., p. 651.

"Reflections on Pearl Harbor " by Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Sunday, December 7th, 1941--Admiral Chester Nimitz was attending an afternoon concert in Washington D.C. He was paged and told there was a phone call for him. When he answered, it was President Franklin Delano Roosevelt on the phone. Pearl Harbor had been attacked. He told Admiral Nimitz that he (Nimitz) would now be the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Admiral Nimitz flew to Hawaii to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. He landed at Pearl Harbor on Christmas Eve 1941. There was such a Spirit of despair, dejection and defeat -- you would have thought the Japanese had already won the War.

On Christmas Day, 1941, Adm. Nimitz was given a boat tour of the destruction wrought on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. Big sunken battleships and navy vessels cluttered the waters everywhere you looked.

As the tour boat returned to dock, the young helmsman of the boat asked, "Well Admiral, what do you think after seeing all this destruction?" Admiral Nimitz's reply shocked everyone within the sound of his voice.

Admiral Nimitz said, "The Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could ever make, or God was taking care of America. Which do you think it was?"

Shocked and surprised, the young helmsman asked, "What do mean by saying the Japanese made the three biggest mistakes an attack force ever made?"

Nimitz explained:

!!!!!!!!"That's why I say the Japanese made three of the biggest mistakes an attack force could make …."

"Mistake number one: The Japanese attacked on Sunday morning. Nine out of every ten crewmen of those ships were ashore on leave. If those same ships had been lured to sea and been sunk, we would have lost 38,000 men instead of 3,800.

"Mistake number two: When the Japanese saw all those battleships lined in a row, they got so carried away sinking those battleships, they never once bombed our dry docks opposite those ships. If they had destroyed our dry docks, we would have had to tow every one of those ships to the mainland to be repaired.

"As it is now, the ships are in shallow water and can be raised. One tug can pull them over to the dry docks, and we can have them repaired and at sea by the time we could have towed them to the mainland. And I already have crews ashore anxious to man those ships.

"Mistake number three: Every drop of fuel in the Pacific theater of war is in top of the ground storage tanks five miles away over that hill. One attack plane could have strafed those tanks and destroyed our fuel supply.

no author. e-Mail received 23 Jul 14

–-Wikipedia; Takeo Yoshikawa

“Over the years, the mysterious spies of Pearl Harbor were always mentioned in passing in history

books.”

Were Japanese-Americans traitors?

1936-after graduating top of his class at Etajima (Japan’sAnnapolis) he served on a CL, SS, and trained for naval aviation before being discharged NPQ for a severe stomach ailment

1937-enrolled in naval intelligence school. Became expert in US Navy, then a junior diplomat after passing an exam in English

27 Mar 41-arrived Pearl Harbor as a consul using a false name. Began extensive spying: ship movements, harbor and base facilities

worked with another Japanese spy in the consulate and Abwehr agent Bernard Kuehn

he reported dissatisfaction with his efforts to recruit any of the 160,000 Japanese-Americans living in Hawaii

his bi-weekly reports helped Yamamoto to finalize the attack plan

the FBI never found incriminating evidence before he was returned to Japan in 1942. He successfully hid during the occupation (1946-50)

–-Wikipedia; Takeo Yoshikawa

“While the Yoshikawa case appeared to retroactively justify the decision to intern Japanese Americans he

himself distrusted the Japanese-American community who in his mind were loyal to America

over Japan.”

III. Guam and WakeThe 1942 film was begun even before the fall of the island to the Japanese

Guam 1898

Wake 1899

Guam and Wake

“Before the end of the day on 7 Dec, Adm Kimmel received word that both Guam and Wake had been attacked by Japanese planes. Guam, in the southern Marianas, well over 3,000 miles from Hawaii and 1,500 from Manila, was flanked by Japanese bases and practically defenseless. Five thousand Japanese put ashore on 10 Dec easily overwhelmed it. Wake however was a different matter. Although it was within bomber range of the Japanese Marshalls to the south, only about 2,000 miles of open sea lay between it and Pearl Harbor. More than a thousand construction workers were engaged in building an air and submarine base on the little atoll.…”

op. cit. , pp. 651-652.

Guam and Wake

“…on the little atoll. About 450 marines equipped with a dozen 3-inch a-a/c guns • and a half dozen old 5-inch guns • constituted the defense.…”

Guam and Wake

“…old 5-inch guns • constituted the defense. On 4 Dec, twelve F4F Wildcat fighter planes • had been flown in from the Enterprise….”

Guam and Wake

“…from the Enterprise. “After the island had been ‘softened up’ by bombers from Kwajalein in the Marshalls, a Japanese force of three CLs and six DDs escorting several transports appeared at dawn on 11 Dec. Cdr Winfield S. Cunningham,• the island commander, ordered the marines to hold their fire until the vessels were well within range. Then they opened up with their 5-inch guns and the Wildcats took to the air. After the marines had succeeded in sinking two DDs and damaging two CLs and two more DDs, the Japanese limped away without putting a man ashore.”

op. cit. , pp. 651-652.

Guam and Wake

“Meanwhile Adm Kimmel had made plans and issued orders for the relief of Wake. The Saratoga under RAdm Frank Jack Fletcher • was to cover the relief force directly while the other two CVs gave indirect support. But there were too many delays. The Saratoga, just arriving at Pearl from the West Coast, could not complete fueling and get under way till noon on the16th. By the 21st she was only 600 miles from Wake, but she then paused for two days to refuel the DDs of her group. There was hesitation at Pearl, where Adm Kimmel’s relief had not yet arrived.

op. cit. , p. 652.

“…without putting a man ashore.

Guam and Wake

“…had not yet arrived. “The Japanese, quickly recovering from their initial repulse, sent agains Wake on 23 Dec a new and stronger force covered by three CAs. Meanwhile Nagumo, returning from his attack on Pearl, had detached two of his CVs, the Hiryu and Soryu, to give air support to the landing. Planes from these CVs on the mornings of the 21st and 22nd destroyed the last planes on the island. Before light on the 23rd the Japanese l/c came ashore, chiefly at points where the marines’ artillery could not be brought to bear, while the bombarding CAs remained outside the range of the 5-inch guns. After a struggle against hopeless odds, the defenders were forced to surrender.”

op. cit. , p. 652.

The “Seabees”

“On Wake and at other American bases civilian construction workers had been exposed to enemy attack without having either the training or the legal right to defend themselves. To remedy this situation, the Navy authorized the creation of Construction Battalions—the famous ‘Seabees.’ Men of various construction trades were enlisted with appropriate ratings and were given military training. Often going ashore with assault waves, these men performed vital functions in the Pacific war, from building bases and airfields to repairing equipment. In their hands the bulldozer became one of the instruments of victory.”

Ibid.

“…forced to surrender.

Command and Strategy “The US replied to the Japanese attack by declaring war on 8 Dec, whereon Japan’s allies, Germany and Italy, declared war on the US. The new situation led to several command and administrative changes in the Navy. In mid-December Adm Chester W. Nimitz • was appointed CinC Pac Fleet (Cincpac). The following Apr he was also made CinC Pacific Ocean Areas (Cincpoa), which gave him authority over the entire Pac theater except for Gen MacArthur’s Southwest Pac Area and the inactive Southeast Pac. Nimitz was a tow-haired blue-eyed Texan of the Naval Academy class of 1905. Tactful and modest, sound in his judgment of men and events, he was to prove a thoroughly fortunate choice. “ Adm King’s first instructions to Nimitz, on 30 Dec, defined his tasks as: !!!!In broader terms, American strategy was to hold against any further Japanese encroachment a line running from Dutch Harbor through Midway to Samoa; thence to New Caledonia and to Port Moresby, New Guinea. To gain time for establishing this line Adm Hart’s Asiatic Fleet was to be sacrificed in a delaying action in the Netherlands East Indies.”

Ibid.

“…instruments of victory.

(1) Covering and holding the Hawaii-Midway line and maintaining communications with the west coast. (2) Maintaining communications between the west coast and Australia, chiefly by covering, securing, and holding the Hawaii-Samoa line, which should be extended to include Fiji at the earliest practicable date.

Text

IV. Allied RetreatHMS Repulse leaving Singapore—she will be sunk along with the modern BB HMS Prince of Wales on 10 December as the Japanese advance

Beginning the Allied Retreat “The US Asiatic Fleet was in fact only a modest TF. Its flagship and most powerful vessel was the Houston (CA-30).…”

op. cit., pp. 652-653..

“…delaying action in the Netherlands East Indies.”

Beginning the Allied Retreat“…the Houston (CA-30). She was seconded by the 17-year-old CL Marblehead.…”

op. cit., pp. 652-653..

Beginning the Allied Retreat“…CL Marblehead. When the CL Boise • arrived in Manila with a convoy early in Dec she also was ‘impressed’ into the fleet.…”

op. cit., pp. 652-653..

Beginning the Allied Retreat

“… ‘impressed’ into the fleet. These CA/CLs were supported by 13 flush-deck, four-stack DDs of the 1917-18 class.…”

op. cit., pp. 652-653..


“…the 1917-18 class. Twenty-nine SSs contributed a strong defensive element. It had been fully expected that the Japanese would attack the Philippines and Adm Hart • had dispersed his fleet accordingly. The Marblehead with eight DDs and a tender had been sent south to Borneo in Nov. The Houston and the Boise were in the relatively safe waters of the central Philippines. “News of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached Manila at 0300 8 Dec, east longitude date. On orders from Adm Hart, RAdm William A. Glassford at once gathered several ships around the Houston and Boise and started south. Lacking dependable intelligence of enemy targets, the Army’s 33 B-17s, of which only half had been transferred from Luzon to the comparative safety of Mindanao, were not sent to Formosa [colonialist name for Taiwan—jbp], as the Japanese feared they might. The Army fully expected a dawn raid, and American planes took to the air on an early alert. But bad weather over Formosa delayed the Japanese take-off, and when the pilots finally arrived over Luzon they found the American planes on their fields in neat rows. Asa in Hawaii, the a/c were largely destroyed on the ground. With this loss there vanished any real hope of repelling a Japanese invasion.”

op. cit., pp. 652-653..


“…ground. With this loss there vanished any real hope of repelling a Japanese invasion. “The attack on the Philippines was only one of several simultaneous Japanese moves in the Far East. IJA troops that had been poised in Indo-China at once overran Thailand, where there was little resistance. On 8 and 9 Dec forces from Hainan landed at Kota Bharu on the Malay Peninsula and began a rapid advance toward Singapore. The report of the landing at Kota Bharu caused Adm Tom Philips RN to take the BB Prince of Wales and the BC Repulse north, escorted by four DDs….

op. cit., pp. 653-654..

Beginning the Allied Retreat“…escorted by four DDs. Although the hard-pressed RAF warned that it could provide no land-based cover, Phillips, feeling that the RN could not stand idly by in the hour of crisis, made the gallant decision to go ahead. He arrived too late to catch the Japanese transports. Then acting upon a false report of a Japanese landing further south, he stayed too long within range of Japanese planes based in Indo-China. He had been shadowed for some time when the main attack came in a little before noon on 10 Dec. Both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse took several hits, capsized, and sank. Adm Phillips was among those lost….”

Ibid.


“…among those lost.” “The sinking of these two capital ships—the first ever sunk by aerial bombing while under way at sea—eliminated the possibility of serious naval opposition to the Japanese advancing on Singapore. By 19 Dec the invaders had reached the Straits of Malacca. “On the same day that the Japanese sank the Prince of Wales and the Repulse, they made on the Cavite Naval Yard near Manila a heavy air attack that substantially destroyed the base. This attack also coincided with the first Japanese landings on Luzon, designed to secure airfields to support an advance on Manila. At Aparri on the north coast the Japanese, harassed by bad weather and by the remnants of the USAAF, put their men ashore hastily and departed without unloading their heavy equipment. A similar combination of bad weather, air opposition, and local resistance delayed for a day an attempt to land on the northwest coast near Vigan.” Ibid.

Beginning the Allied Retreat“…land on the northwest coast near Vigan. “As Gen MacArthur expected, the main Japanese landing came in the Lingayan Gulf, on the west side of Luzon above Manila. Japanese transports from Formosa entered the Gulf on 21 Dec. American SSs, hampered by shoal water, had little success in intercepting. A few Army planes and Navy PBYs annoyed the convoy, but despite bad management the Japanese got their men ashore and with the help of the Vigan detachment, which had marched south to help, overcame resistance. On Christmas Eve the Japanese put another force ashore on the east coast opposite Manila. “MacArthur, already withdrawing from Manila, declared it an open city and moved his forces in a wheeling movement toward Bataan, while the Navy hastily moved from the city such material as it could. RAdm Francis W. Rockwell, Commandant of the 16th Naval District, moved into the fortified island of Corregidor, and on the 26th Adm Hart left by SS to join his fleet in the south.…”

Ibid.


“…the south. Five days later the last of the American SSs left Manila.. On 2 Jan the Japanese entered the city unopposed. “The stubborn defense of Bataan and Corregidor • was important morally at a time when quick and easy enemy successes were all too frequent, and it had the important practical effect of denying Manila Bay to the Japanese, but it did not delay their advance to the Indies.• As early as 17 Dec they had landed on Borneo• to begin seizure of its oil fields, and three days later in the Philippines they had landed at Davao Gulf,• Mindanao, which became an important base for further thrusts to the south.

Ibid.


“…the south. Five days later the last of the American SSs left Manila.. On 2 Jan the Japanese entered the city unopposed. “The stubborn defense of Bataan and Corregidor was important morally at a time when quick and easy enemy successes were all too frequent, and it had the important practical effect of denying Manila Bay to the Japanese, but it did not delay their advance to the Indies. As early as 17 Dec they had landed on Borneo• to begin seizure of its oil fields,…”

Ibid.

BORNEO


“…the south. Five days later the last of the American SSs left Manila.. On 2 Jan the Japanese entered the city unopposed. “The stubborn defense of Bataan and Corregidor • was important morally at a time when quick and easy enemy successes were all too frequent, and it had the important practical effect of denying Manila Bay to the Japanese, but it did not delay their advance to the Indies.• As early as 17 Dec they had landed on Borneo• to begin seizure of its oil fields, and three days later in the Philippines they had landed at Davao Gulf,• Mindanao, which became an important base for further thrusts to the south.

Ibid.

MINDANAODAVAO

The Japanese Advance into the Netherlands East Indies

“Thus in little more than two weeks from the outbreak of war the Japanese had moved into and past the Philippines. The pattern of their multi-pronged advance was becoming clear. One line followed the Asiatic coast from Indo-China to Malaya and Singapore. A second thrust followed the west coast of Borneo south toward Sumatra.…”

op. cit., pp. 654 & 656.

“…thrusts to the south.


“Thus in little more than two weeks from the outbreak of war the Japanese had moved into and past the Philippines. The pattern of their multi-pronged advance was becoming clear. One line followed the Asiatic coast from Indo-China to Malaya and Singapore. A second thrust followed the west coast of Borneo south toward Sumatra. From Davao the Japanese advanced through both Makassar and Molucca Straits,• taking important points along the way. Their ultimate objective was Java, richest and most highly developed of the Indies, with a population as great as that of England. “The Japanese moved by a series of amphib landings on islands that had almost no interior communications, so that control of the sea and air was decisive. Their method was to seize a key point where they could take over or develop an airfield that would provide air support for the next move. Allied defenses were spread so thin that the Japanese had little difficulty in building up local superiority. For the most part they employed only modest forces and seldom required CV support.

op. cit., pp. 654 & 656.


“… seldom required CV support. “ By early Jan 42 the US Asiatic Fleet had fallen back to the Netherlands East Indies. On the 10th British Gen Sir Archibald P. Wavell arrived in Java to take supreme command of the American, British, Dutch, and Australian (ABDA) forces in the area. Adm Hart was given the naval command, while the air and army commands went to the British and Dutch respectively. But the ABDA command, facing insuperable difficulties, was never able to function effectively, nor was it able to work out a unified strategy.”


“As the Japanese advanced in a vast pincers movement on Java via the waters east and west of Borneo, it appeared that the ABDA forces might be able to exploit their interior position by striking first at one and then the other of the divided Japanese forces. But throughout Jan Allied naval vessels were so much in demand for convoying that it was impossible to form a striking force. Consequently Adm Hart had available only a few US vessels when in late Jan reconnaissance reported a Japanese convoy approaching the Borneo oil port of Balikpapan. On the night of the 23rd these ships steamed up Makassar Strait. En route the Boise struck an uncharted pinnacle rock, which put her out of the campaign, while the Marblehead developed turbine trouble. Proceeding without any CA support, four DDs in a surprise attack sank a patrol craft and four of the dozen transports present, besides damaging several others. This daring night raid was the only successful surface action fought by Allied forces during the entire Netherlands East Indies campaign….” ! op. cit., p. 656.

“…work out a unified strategy..


“…Netherlands East Indies campaign. “After this, Japanese control of the air prevented adequate Allied reconnaissance while it assured the Japanese complete knowledge of all ABDA movements. As a result ABDA forces were swung between the two arms of the Japanese advance without being able to strike effectively at either, and were often turned back short of their objective by Japanese planes. While Dutch ships were drawn to the west by a mistaken report, a Japanese force supported by CVs Soryu and Hiryu and two BBs took Amboina, • anchor of the Dutch east flank. Soon afterward the Japanese occupied Kendari in southeastern Celebes, and planes from the two CVs based there. These planes on 3 Feb bombed Surabaya, the principal Allied naval base in Java, and destroyed most of the Dutch fighter a/c in the vicinity.”

op. cit., p. 656.


“By this time the task of reinforcing Singapore had been completed and an ABDA striking force had been formed of vessels released from convoy duty. In it initially were the US CA/Ls Houston and Marblehead and four American DDs, the Dutch CLs De Ruyter and Tromp, and three Dutch DDs. Command was given to Dutch RAdm Karel Doorman.…”

Ibid.

“…Dutch fighter a/c in the vicinity.


“…RAdm Karel Doorman. These vessels escaped damage in the attack on Surabaya, but next morning as Doorman led them forth to attack a Japanese force reported reassembling at Balikpapan, they were discovered by Japanese planes. In a prolonged attack in Madoera Strait, the Houston received a hit that put her after turret out of commission for the rest of the campaign, while the Marblehead was so badly battered that she had to return to the US.…”

Ibid.


“…return to the US. “Doorman next had to turn his attention to the Japanese western force. With five CLs and ten DDs he rushed to the relief of the great oil port of Palembang in eastern Sumatra, but when he arrived off Banka Island on the night of 13 Feb he was met with repeated air attacks. Although no ship of his force was hit, several were shaken by near misses, and he retired without accomplishing anything.• “In mid-Feb Adm Hart surrendered command of the ABDA naval forces to Dutch VAdm Conrad Helfrich and returned to the US….”

Ibid.


“…returned to the US. Singapore surrendered on 15 Feb.• After that the Japanese were ready to close the pincers on Java, which they had started softening up by daily bombings.”


“Doorman had just returned from Banka Island when word came that the Japanese were landing on the island of Bali at the opposite end of Java. Doorman determined at least to hit the Japanese transports before they could withdraw, but because his ships were now divided between Surabaya and Tjilatjap he decided to attack in three successive waves. For once the ABDA vessels outnumbered the Japanese warships, but the lack of concentration nullified this advantage. In the attack on the night of 19 Feb, a Dutch DD was sunk and the CL Tromp badly damaged without inflicting damage on the Japanese….” op. cit., pp. 656-657.

“…by daily bombings..


“By now Java was nearly isolated, and the Japanese set about cutting her last links with Australia. They first seized Timor, through which the Allies had been staging fighter planes from Australia to Java. Then on 19 Feb Adm Nagumo’s CVs raided Darwin, principal port of northern Australia.• The Japanese planes sank a dozen ships in the harbor including the US DD Peary, and virtually destroyed the docks and warehouses. The battered city was evacuated before nightfall, and the port of Darwin was abandoned as a naval base.”

op. cit., pp. 656-657.

“… Japanese.

Text

V. Battle of the Java Sea"Exeter sinking" by Photo taken from a Japanese aircraft - Imperial Japanese Navy; this photo was captured by U.S. Forces on Attu Island, Alaska in 1943 and became U.S. Navy photo 80-G-71199 now in the U.S. National Archives,

available via wwiiarchives.net. Licensed under Public domain via Wikimedia Commons - https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Exeter_sinking.jpg#mediaviewer/File:Exeter_sinking.jpg

The Battle of the Java Sea

“Gen Wavell, convinced of the futility of attempting any further defense of Java, left on the 25th, thus dissolving the ABDA command and leaving the Dutch to coordinate the continuing defense as best they could. By this time the Japanese were poised for the final attack. To the northwest RAdm Jisaburō Ozawa was waiting near the Anambas Islands with 56 transports and cargo vessels and their escorts….”

op. cit., pp. 656-657.


“…and their escorts. To the northeast RAdm Shoji Nishimurā • was waiting in Makassar Strait with 41 transports and a CL/DD covering force….”

op. cit., pp. 656-657.

The Battle of the Java Sea“…a CL/DD covering force. “Doorman, after two days patrolling along the north coast of Java to intercept any landing attempt , on the morning of 27 Feb was returning to Surabaya with his striking force for rest and refueling when a report came of Japanese transports west of Bawean Island. Although his crews were near exhaustion, there was nothing to do but put about for the ultimate battle.

op. cit., pp. 656-657.


there was nothing to do but put about for the ultimate battle. “Doorman’s CA/CLs were in column, the flagship De Ruyter in the lead, followed by the British Exeter, the American Houston, the Australian Perth, and the Dutch Java. Three British DDs screened the van, two Dutch DDs were on the port flank, and four American DDs brought up the rear. Half an hour after leaving Surabaya, Doorman sighted the enemy in two groups on his starboard bow, moving SW as if to cross his course.…”

Ibid.


“…SW as if to cross his course. One group consisted of a CL leading ten DDs, the other of two CAs and one CL, with a squadron of DDs.…”

op. cit., p. 657.


“… a squadron of DDs. Fire was opened at 28,000 yards, beyond the range of the CLs. Although the Japanese enjoyed the advantage of air spotting, for some time they scored no hits. Then an 8-inch shell struck the Exeter, slowing her and forcing her to turn out of column.…”

op. cit., p. 657.


“…turn out of column.The following vessels, assuming that Doorman had ordered a turn, also swung to port, throwing the Allied line into confusion and presenting their broadsides to Japanese torpedoes. By good luck or maneuvering all escaped except one of the Dutch DDs, which took a torpedo, broke in two, and sank.…”

op. cit., p. 657.


“…two, and sank. When the Japanese closed in for the kill, a British DD was sunk by gunfire as she covered the damaged Exeter….”

op. cit., p. 657.


“… a squadron of DDs. Fire was opened at 28,000 yards, beyond the range of the CLs. Although the Japanese enjoyed the advantage of air spotting, for some time they scored no hits. Then an 8-inch shell struck the Exeter, slowing her and forcing her to turn out of column.• The following vessels, assuming that Doorman had ordered a turn, also swung to port, throwing the Allied line into confusion and presenting their broadsides to Japanese torpedoes. By good luck or maneuvering all escaped except one of the Dutch DDs, which took a torpedo, broke in two, and sank.• When the Japanese closed in for the kill, a British DD was sunk by gunfire as she covered the damaged Exeter.• The other CLs withdrew and re-formed under cover of a torpedo attack by the American DDs.

op. cit., p. 657.


“… DDs. “After a futile thrust toward the Japanese transports in the growing darkness, the striking force again approached Surabaya about 2100. At that point the American DDs, their torpedoes expended and low in fuel, returned to port. There they found the Exeter, accompanied by the surviving Dutch DD….”

Ibid.


“… surviving Dutch DD. “As the remainder of the striking force steamed west along the Java coast, one of the British DDs blew up and sank—probably the victim of a Dutch mine field laid that afternoon without Doorman’s knowledge….”

Ibid.


“…without Doorman’s knowledge. Turning north, Doorman passed through the areas where the Dutch DD had been sunk and detached his last DD to pick up survivors. Then with his four remaining CLs he continued his thrust to the north and at 2300 • again encountered the Japanese covering force….”

Ibid.


“…encountered the Japanese covering force. After 20 minutes of firing, the Japanese launched torpedoes that caught both the De Ruyter and the Java….”

Ibid.

The Battle of the Java Sea“… the De Ruyter and the Java. As his flagship sank, Doorman signaled the Houston and the Perth, all that remained of his striking force, to retire to Tandjong Priok (the harbor of Batavia), which they reached safely a little after noon the next day….”

Ibid.

Ibid.

The Retreat from Java

“The Allied vessels surviving the battle were now divided between Surabaya and Tandjong Priok, with strong Japanese forces between. The problem was how to withdraw from the Java Sea, for the enemy now controlled all the exits.…”

Ibid.

“The Allied vessels surviving the battle were now divided between Surabaya and Tandjong Priok, with strong Japanese forces between. The problem was how to withdraw from the Java Sea, for the enemy now controlled all the exits. Only the four American DDs escaped. Leaving Surabaya on the night of the 28th, they slipped through Bali Strait • and after a brief skirmish with Japanese DDs made their way to Australia.…”

Ibid.

“The Allied vessels surviving the battle were now divided between Surabaya and Tandjong Priok, with strong Japanese forces between. The problem was how to withdraw from the Java Sea, for the enemy now controlled all the exits.• Only the four American DDs escaped. Leaving Surabaya on the night of the 28th, they slipped through Bali Strait • and after a brief skirmish with Japanese DDs made their way to Australia. Because the Exeter’s draft was too great to permit her to follow the same route, she was sent west to Sunda Strait, but on the way she and two escorting DDs were intercepted and sunk.…”

HMS Exeter (CA-68) 1931-28 Feb 42

She fought against the German pocket battleship Graf Spee at the 1939 Battle of the River Plate, suffering extensive damage that caused a long refit. Having been rebuilt, she was sent to the East Indies where she was sunk by the Japanese in 1942

Ibid.

“The Allied vessels surviving the battle were now divided between Surabaya and Tandjong Priok, with strong Japanese forces between. The problem was how to withdraw from the Java Sea, for the enemy now controlled all the exits.• Only the four American DDs escaped. Leaving Surabaya on the night of the 28th, they slipped through Bali Strait • and after a brief skirmish with Japanese DDs made their way to Australia. Because the Exeter’s draft was too great to permit her to follow the same route, she was sent west to Sunda Strait, but on the way she and two escorting DDs were intercepted and sunk. The Houston, the Perth, and a Dutch DD left Priok on the evening of the 28th. They had almost reached Sunda Strait when, an hour before midnight, they encountered a Japanese landing force. The Allied CA/Ls sank or forced the beaching of four transports before the enemy covering force closed in and overwhelmed them.”

Ibid.


“…made their way to Australia. Because the Exeter’s draft was too great to permit her to follow the same route, she was sent west to Sunda Strait, but on the way she and two escorting DDs were intercepted and sunk.• The Houston, the Perth, and a Dutch DD left Priok on the evening of the 28th. They had almost reached Sunda Strait when, an hour before midnight, they encountered a Japanese landing force. The Allied CA/Ls sank or forced the beaching of four transports before the enemy covering force closed in and overwhelmed them.”

Ibid.


“…and overwhelmed them. “The few Allied vessels based on Tjilatjap, on the south coast of Java, were authorized by Adm Helfrich to withdraw on 1 Mar. Nagumo’s CV-BB force operating south of Java intercepted a few, including two US DDs and a gunboat, but most reached Australia. “The Japanese had begun landing on Java on the night of 28 Feb. Batavia and Surabaya fell quickly, and by 9 Mar the Japanese were in possession of the entire island. The ABDA forces had been expended to gain time, and they had bought little enough of that. But it is adversity that brings out the true quality of men and of navies. There is nothing finer in US Naval history than the performance of the Asiatic Fleet in the face of overwhelming odds.”

Ibid.

Holding the Line in the Pacific

“While the ABDA fleet was buying time at the price of its own extinction, Allied forces elsewhere were stiffening the line that the US was determined if possible to hold. This required reinforcing the essential bases on the route between the US and Australia and then a build-up of forces in Australia itself. VAdm Herbert F. Leary USN had arrived in Australia early in Feb to take command of an Anzac (Australian-New Zealand) force, created on the recommendation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff [the heads of the US & British Imperial armed forces, Ike called them the Charlie-Charlies, hereafter CC—jbp] after it became apparent that the ABDA forces were doomed. On 17 Mar MacArthur arrived at Darwin [having left Corregidor before its surrender—jbp], designated at the request of the Australian government to take command of the Southwest Pac Area, for which the US had assumed responsibility. Already he was planning on a return to the Philippines, but for a moment he was a general without an army….”

op. cit., pp. 659-660.


“Although the US was on the defensive, American strategy was far from passive. As Adm King put it, American policy was ‘hold what you’ve got and hit them when you can.’For the time being the hitting was to be done by the SSs and the CVs. Immediately after the Pearl Harbor disaster, the Yorktown had been ordered from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Her arrival brought the American CV strength in the Pacific up to four, but on 11 Jan the Saratoga was torpedoed by a Japanese SS 500 miles southwest of Oahu. She was able to make port, but repairs kept her out of the war for five critical months. “Fortunately for the Allies, the Japanese did not make most effective use of their CVs during that interval. Upon Nagumo’s return from Pearl Harbor his force was sent to support operations in the South. To cover the left flank of their advance the Japanese had already occupied the British Gilbert Islands in early Dec 41, and in the latter part of Jan they sent their CVs for an unnecessary softening up of Rabaul, at the northern end of New Britain, in preparation for a landing on the 23rd.…”

“…without an army.

op. cit., pp. 659-660.


“Meanwhile there was considerable apprehension at Pearl Harbor that the Japanese might move from the Marshalls and Gilberts against Samoa. Accordingly reinforcements were dispatched to that group, and two CV forces were sent to hit the Japanese bases. While RAdm Fletcher’s • Yorktown group on 1 Feb raided Makin in the northern Gilberts and Jaluit and Mili in the southern Marshalls,….”

“…landing on the 23rd.

op. cit., p. 660.


VAdm Wm F. Halsey’s • Enterprise group penetrated farther into the Marshalls to attack Wotje, Malœlap, and Kwajalein….”

“… in the southern Marshalls,

op. cit., p. 660.


VAdm Wm F. Halsey’s • Enterprise group penetrated farther into the Marshalls to attack Wotje, Malœlap, and Kwajalein. Adm Nagumo’s CVs had just returned from Rabaul to Truk, the major Japanese base in the Carolines, when news of the attacks sent them on a futile chase after the Americans. Damage done by the American raids , particularly that on Kwajalein, was severe enough to make the Japanese concerned for the safety of Japan itself. Accordingly they detached the Shokaku and the Zuikaku from Nagumo’s group for a defensive patrol of Japanese waters, thus immobilizing one third of their most effective striking force….”

Ibid.

“At the time of the fall of Singapore in mid-Feb both the US and Australian governments were apprehensive that the Japanese might advance from Rabaul to attack New Caledonia and the New Hebrides. Consequently VAdm Wilson Brown’s Lexington group was temporarily assigned to Leary’s Anzac force and undertook an attack on Rabaul. But on his approach on 20 Feb the force was attacked by Japanese planes. With surprise lost, Brown abandoned the strike.

“…most effective striking force.

Ibid.


“The critical situation in the SoWestPac was responsible for an attempt to divert the Japanese by an attack on Wake. Adm Halsey, whose ready courage in undertaking such risky missions endeared him to Nimitz, • struck Wake with planes of the Enterprise group on 24 Feb, then pressed on to attack Marcus Island, less than a thousand miles from Tokyo.”

“…Brown abandoned the strike.

op. cit., pp. 660-661

“By the time of the raid on Marcus, Allied naval forces had abandoned Java. Japanese bombing of points in New Guinea, including Port Moresby, and of Tulagi in the lower Solomons seemed to portent a further advance to the south or southeast. To check any such move, Adm Brown was given a force built around the Lexington and Yorktown to make another attempt against Rabaul, which the Japanese were rapidly developing into a major base. But a report of Japanese landings on 8 Mar at Lae and Salamaua on the northern side of the New Guinea tail caused Brown to shift his attack to those points. Launching from south of Papua, he achieved surprise by sending his planes over the Stanley Mountains and scored some successes against the few Japanese vessels still present.”

“…a thousand miles from Tokyo.

op. cit., p. 661.


“While the US and Anzac forces were thus attempting to check Japanese expansion to the south and east, the British were facing a similar problem in the west. In mid-Jan the Japanese had advanced from Thailand to begin their invasion of Burma. By early Mar, Rangoon, the capital and key to lower Burma , had fallen, leaving the British the difficult task of withdrawing from upper Burma into India. In the latter part of Mar the Japanese protected the left flank of their advance by occupying the Andaman Islands, which put them in a position to threaten India.…”

“…Japanese vessels still present.

op. cit., p. 661.


“…to threaten India. Then to render their sea route to Burma doubly secure they sent Nagumo’s force to hit the British in the Indian Ocean. “ When VAdm Sir James Somerville,• the former commander of Force H at Gibraltar, arrived at Ceylon at the end of Mar to replace Adm Phillips, he had at his disposal CVs Indomitable, Formidable, and Hermes, five BBs, and a number of CA/Ls and DDs. On paper this was a respectable force, but the CVs were of limited capacity and the BBs old and slow. Shortly after his arrival, Somerville received a warning that the Japanese would attack Ceylon about 1 Apr. He at once concentrated his force south of Ceylon, searched for three days, and then on 2 Apr retired to a secret base in the Maldive Islands. “Meanwhile Nagumo had entered the Indian Ocean with virtually the same CV force that had raided Pearl Harbor. On Easter Sunday, 5 Apr, his a/c raided the British base at Columbo, Ceylon and shortly afterward sank H.M. CAs Dorsetshire and Cornwall, which had sailed the day before to join Somerville. Four days later Nagumo raided Trincomalee, Britain’s other base in Ceylon, and that same afternoon sank at sea the CV Hermes and an accompanying DD. At both places the Japanese easily overwhelmed the weak British air opposition with negligible losses to themselves.”

Ibid.


“VAdm Takeo Kurita had in the meantime entered the Bay of Bengal with six CAs and a CVL and pounced upon merchant shipping. In the first nine days of Apr 42, Japanese air, surface, and SS forces sank four British warships and 135,000 tons of merchant shipping. “After this disaster Britain practically abandoned the Indian Ocean. Somerville sent his four slowest BBs to east Africa, while with the Warspite and his two remaining CVs he covered sea communications between India and the Persian Gulf. But there was serious apprehension that his base at Bombay might not long remain secure, for it appeared that a Japanese invasion of Ceylon and India might be imminent. Churchill asked that the USN undertake some action that might force the Japanese to draw their CVs back to the Pac, and arrangements were made for American vessels to join the British Home Fleet so that reinforcements might be sent to India….”

“…losses to themselves.

Ibid.


“It was only by coincidence that the British plea for a diversion in the Pacific was followed by the most daring of the series of the US CV raids, the Halsey-Doolittle raid on Tokyo on 18 Apr. The plan was for the newly-arrived CV Hornet, accompanied by the Enterprise and a CA/L-DD screen, under the over-all command of Adm Halsey, to carry 16 Army B-25s to within 500 miles of Japan. The planes, manned by volunteers, were to hit targets in Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe, cross Japan, and land on friendly airfields in China. But while the CVs were still 650 miles from Japan they encountered Japanese picket boats that reported their presence. Rather than abandon the raid Col James H. Doolittle USA decided to launch at that distance.…”

“… sent to India.

“…Waves were breaking over the Hornet’s bows and the CV was pitching badly when Doolittle led his planes off. Not one of the pilots had ever taken off from a CV deck before; yet somehow every one succeeded in getting his big, heavily-loaded plane into the air….”

op. cit., pp. 661-662.


“There was only scattered opposition, and none of the American a/c was lost over Japan, but on arriving over China in the dark, 15 of the planes were lost in crash landings or when their crews abandoned them by parachute. The only plane to land safely was impounded by the Russians at Vladivostok. Of the 80 men who left the CV, 71 survived the raid. “The physical effect of the raid on Tokyo was slight. Few of the Japanese public even knew that the city had been bombed, but Japan’s rulers knew and were disturbed. The raid was to have an important effect on strategic developments. “None of the early raids inflicted really significant damage, but their moral effect on both sides was important. They seriously alarmed the Japanese rulers, while for the Americans they did much to dispel the gloom and defeatism engendered by the Pearl Harbor attack and to create a feeling that the US was fighting back.”

“…into the air.

Ibid.

“… fighting back.”

Japanese Strategic Decisions

“The conquest of the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, Burma, and Malaya, completed by the spring of 1942, had required only about half the time the Japanese had anticipated and had cost them only a few thousand casualties. In the entire campaign they had lost no naval vessel larger than a DD. “The rapidity with which the Japanese had achieved their main objectives left them without a decision as to their further strategy….”

op. cit., p. 662.

“…their further strategy. Apart from consolidation of conquests to date, the three possibilities were to move westward against Ceylon and India, to move southward against Australia, or to move eastward against Hawaii. The first two were advocated by elements of the naval General Staff, while Yamamoto • and his Combined Fleet Staff espoused the third course. But the Japanese army, with its eyes upon the continent and Russia, objected to committing the large number of troops necessary for either of the first two. Hence the Naval General Staff worked out a more modest plan for isolating Australia by moving from Rabaul to Eastern New Guinea and down the Solomons and the New Hebrides to New Caledonia, the Fijis, and Samoa….”


op. cit., p. 662.

“…Fijis, and Samoa. “The first steps of this new Naval General Staff plan had already been taken with the landings at Lae and Salamaua in early Mar, and preparations for the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi were under way by Apr. But Yamamoto and his staff, arguing that the destruction of the US CVs was essential to Japanese security in the Pac, insisted on early ops against Midway and the Aleutians that would be sure to draw out American naval forces. In early Apr they secured the reluctant consent of the Naval General Staff. The date and other details of the Midway op were still in dispute however when the Doolittle raid seemed to prove the soundness of Yamamoto’s argument. On the recommendation of the Naval General Staff the Imperial General Staff on 5 May ordered the Midway op for early June. “Thus through compromise the Japanese had adopted two concurrent strategies which were destined to over-extend their forces. The first, the Naval General Staff’s campaign to isolate Australia, was to lead to the Battle of the Coral Sea and eventually bring American marines to Guadalcanal, while Yamamoto’s thrust toward Hawaii was to result in the Battle of Midway.”


Text

V. Battle of the Coral SeaUSS Lexington Under Attack, 1113 8 May 42—photographed by an unknown Japanese pilot—Wikipedia

op. cit., pp. 662-663.

“The occupation of Port Moresby and Tulagi had originally been planned for Mar, but the appearance of US CV forces in the southwest Pac had caused the Japanese to delay the op till early May so that the Fourth Fleet might be reinforced by the CVs Shokaku • and Zuikaku • from Nagumo’s force and the CVL Shoho from the Combined Fleet.• !!!!!

The Battle of the Coral Sea

op. cit., pp. 662-663.

“…Shoho from the Combined Fleet…. “The Japanese wanted Port Moresby in order to : !!!They wanted Tulagi, across the sound from Guadalcanal in the lower Solomons, to use as a seaplane base both to : !!To the Allies the retention of Port Moresby was essential not only for the security of Australia but also as a springboard for future offensives. “In the Japanese plan [Op MO—jbp] a Covering Force built around the 12,000-ton CVL Shoho was first to cover the landing at Tulagi, then turn back west in time to protect the Port Moresby Invasion Force, which was to come down from Rabaul and around the tail of New Guinea through the Jomard Passage….”


1) safeguard Rabaul and their possessions in New Guinea, 2) to provide a base for neutralizing airfields in northern Australia, and 3) in order to secure the flank of their projected advance toward New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa.

1) cover the flank of the Port Moresby op and, 2) to support the subsequent advance to the southeast.

op. cit., pp. 663-664.

“…Passage. There were close support forces for both landings, and in addition a Striking Force centered on the Shokaku and Zuikaku was to come down from Truk • to deal with any US forces that might attempt to interfere with the op.…”


op. cit., pp. 663-664.

“…with the op. Land-based a/c were counted on for scouting and support. Altogether there were six separate naval forces engaged in this dual op. Such complex division of forces was typical of Japanese strategy throughout most of the war. So far, against a weak and disorganized enemy, it had worked well, and it was not inconsistent with concentration so long as the forces were properly coordinated and sufficiently close together to render mutual support. But when the Japanese disregarded these two important conditions they met with disaster.


op. cit., pp. 663-664.

“…they met with disaster. “In the Coral Sea, Japanese coordination was to be provided by a unified command. VAdm Shigeyoshi Inouye,• Commander Fourth Fleet, was to direct all forces, including land-based air, from Rabaul. The Allied command was not so well integrated. The battle was to be fought in Gen MacArthur’s SoWestPac Theater (SWPTO), but it was understood that any fleet action would remain under Adm Nimitz’ strategic control. The result was that Allied land-based air and naval forces were under separate commands without effective coordination.


op. cit., pp. 663-664.

“…effective coordination. “Since the Pearl Harbor attack,the US had broken the Japanese naval code [J-25—jbp] and thus possessed the enormous advantage of accurate and rather detailed intelligence concerning the enemy’s plans. Even so, it was no easy matter to gather sufficient forces to meet the threat to Port Moresby. The Saratoga was still in Puget Sound undergoing repairs for the torpedo damage sustained in Jan. The Enterprise and Hornet did not return to Pearl from the Tokyo raid till 25 Apr. Although they were hurried on their wayASAP, there was little likelihood they could reach the Coral Sea n time to play a part. The only CVs immediately available were Adm Fletcher’s Yorktown force, which had been in the South Pac for some time, and RAdm Aubrey W. Fitch’s • Lexington group, fresh from Pearl.…”


“From Noumea, New Caledonia came the CL Chicago,…

‘…while RAdm J. G. Crace RN • brought CA HMAS Australia • and CL Hobart • from Australia.”

op. cit., pp. 663-664.

“…effective coordination. “Since the Pearl Harbor attack,the US had broken the Japanese naval code [J-25—jbp] and thus possessed the enormous advantage of accurate and rather detailed intelligence concerning the enemy’s plans. Even so, it was no easy matter to gather sufficient forces to meet the threat to Port Moresby. The Saratoga was still in Puget Sound undergoing repairs for the torpedo damage sustained in Jan. The Enterprise and Hornet did not return to Pearl from the Tokyo raid till 25 Apr. Although they were hurried on their wayASAP, there was little likelihood they could reach the Coral Sea n time to play a part. The only CVs immediately available were Adm Fletcher’s Yorktown force, which had been in the South Pac for some time, and RAdm Aubrey W. Fitch’s • Lexington group, fresh from Pearl. From Noumea, New Caledonia came the CL Chicago,• while RAdm J. G. Crace RN • brought CA HMAS Australia • and CL Hobart • from Australia. The Japanese, overconfident from their long series of easy successes, assumed that a single CV Div was sufficient to support their new advance.”


op. cit., p. 664.

“… their new advance.. “The two American CV groups, which had been ordered to join under Fle tcher ’s command, made contact in the southeast Coral Sea on 1 May.…”


op. cit., p. 664.

“…Coral Sea on 1 May. Two days later Fletcher received a report of the Japanese landing o n Tu l a g i . L e a v i n g t h e Lexington group to complete fueling, he headed north with the Yorktown group, and during the 4th made a series of air attacks on the Tulagi area that sank a few minor Japanese naval craft.…”

The Battle of the

Coral Sea

op. cit., p. 664.

“…Japanese naval craft. He then turned back south and formally merged his two groups on 6 May.• The two CVs were to operate within a single circular screen of CA/Ls and DDs. Adm Fitch, b e c a u s e o f h i s l o n g experience with CVs, was to exercise tactical command during air ops.”


Ibid.

“…during air ops. “Fletcher’s uniting of his forces was luckily timed , for the Shokaku and Zuikaku with their escorts, having swung around the southeastern end of the Solomons, had just entered the Coral Sea. The Japanese Striking Force was commanded by VAdm Takeo Takagi,…”


“…during air ops. “Fletcher’s uniting of his forces was luckily timed , for the Shokaku and Zuikaku with their escorts, having swung around the s o u t h e a s t e r n e n d o f t h e Solomons, had just entered the Coral Sea. The Japanese Striking Force was commanded by VAdm Takeo Takagi, with RAdm Tadaichi Hara commanding the CVs….”


Striking Force was commanded by VAdm Takeo Takagi, with RAdm Tadaichi Hara • commanding the CVs. Takagi, in coming around the Solomons, hoped to catch the American CVs in a sort of pincers movement. He almost succeeded, for on the evening of the 6th he was rapidly overhauling the American force, then refueling, and was actually within 70 miles of the Americans when he turned north….”


Ibid.

“…when he turned north. “At dawn on 7 May, the American TF was cruising on a northwesterly course south of the Louisiades, which form an extension of the New Guinea tail. A little before 0700, Fletcher detached three CA/Ls and three DDs under Adm Crace and ordered them to push on to the northwest while the CVs turned north. The detached vessels were to prevent the Port Moresby Invasion Force from coming through Jomard Passage, regardless of the fate of the American CVs, which Fletcher expected would come under attack during the day. In sending Crace forward however, Fletcher was depriving a part of his force of CV air cover and at the same time further weakening his already weak CV aac screen. “Thus far neither Takagi nor Fletcher was sure that the other was in the area, though Fletcher had info that three Japanese CVs were involved in the op. Takagi was depending on land-based searches which actually sighted the American CV force but failed to get word through. Fletcher’s air searches were defeated by bad weather to the northeast, where the two Japanese heavy CVs were operating.”


op. cit., pp. 664-665.

“…CVs were operating. “To the northwest however the weather was clear, and early on the 7th reports began to come in from American scout planes searching in this direction. At 0815 a pilot reported ‘two CVs and four CAs’ not far north of M i s i m a I s l a n d , w h e r e u p o n F l e t c h e r ordered attack groups launched from both his CVs.…”


op. cit., pp. 664-665.

“…both his CVs. The 93 planes were well on their way before the scout returned and it was discovered that the report was an error due to improper encoding—that the scout had meant to report two CAs and two DDs. “Fletcher made the courageous decision to let the attack proceed, probably thinking with the Japanese Invasion Force nearby there must be some profitable targets. His boldness was rewarded at 1022 by a report which placed an enemy CV with several other vessels only 35 miles southeast of the point toward which the strike had been sent.… “The Americans came upon the Shoho about 1100 and, in the first attack ever made by American planes on an enemy CV, smothered her with 13 bombs and seven torpedo hits, which sent her down within a few minutes.…”


op. cit., pp. 664-665.

“…CVs were operating. “To the northwest however the weather was clear, and early on the 7th reports began to come in from American scout planes searching in this direction. At 0815 a pilot reported ‘two CVs and four CAs’ not far north of Misima Island, whereupon Fletcher ordered attack groups launched from both his CVs.• The 93 planes were well on their way before the scout returned and it was discovered that the report was an error due to improper encoding—that the scout had meant to report two CAs and two DDs. “Fletcher made the courageous decision to let the attack proceed, probably thinking with the Japanese Invasion Force nearby there must be some profitable targets. His boldness was rewarded at 1022 by a report which placed an enemy CV with several other vessels only 35 miles southeast of the point toward which the strike had been sent.… “The Americans came upon the Shoho about 1100 and, in the first attack ever made by American planes on an enemy CV, smothered her with 13 bombs and seven torpedo hits, which sent her down within a few minutes. Upon their return, Fletcher decided to withhold a second strike until the other two enemy CVs were located. Moreover, he suspected that the enemy knew his position, and it seemed likely that he would soon come under attack.”


op. cit., p. 665.

“…would soon come under attack. “The Japanese failed to attack Fletcher on the 7th only because of a series of errors which by evening reached the fantastic. Before 0900 on the 7th, Inouye, directing the Japanese op from Rabaul, had reports of two American CV forces. One was Fletcher’s; the other, some 45 miles to the west, was in fact Crace’s CA/L-DD force. Then came a report from Takagi of a third American CV in the eastern Coral Sea. This last was actually the oiler Neosho, which had been detached from Fletcher’s force the evening before and was proceeding with the DD Sims toward a rendezvous.…”


op. cit., p. 665.

“…toward a rendezvous. “At 0950 Japanese navy planes took off from Rabaul to a t tack the westernmost of the US forces.• The Japanese pilots returned with reports that they had sunk a BB and a CL. Actually Crace’s force survived without damage both this attack and another by B-26’s from Australia which mistook his vessels for Japanese….”


op. cit., p. 665.

“ … v e s s e l s f o r Japanese. “The identification of the Neosho as a CV had a serious effect on Japanese ops, for Hara at once launched a full attack upon the hapless oiler and her escort. The Sims with three hits went down with most of her crew.• The Neosho took seven but remained afloat until her crew was taken off four days later….”


op. cit., p. 665.

“…four days later. “This erroneous attack left Tagaki and Hara facing a critical situation. As night approached, the weather closed in, but Hara was determined to destroy the American CVs before they could further damage the Invasion Force. Selecting 27 pilots best qualified in night ops, he sent them out at 1615 [4:15 pm] ….”


Ibid.

“…at 1615 [4:15 pm]. “It was not a bad gamble, for in the bad weather and poor visibility the Japanese actually passed near Fletcher’s force. The American combat air patrol (CAP), vectored [i.e., directed on a specific bearing—jbp] out by radar, intercepted the Japanese planes and shot down nine. An hour later several of the returning Japanese, mistaking the American CVs for their own, actually attempted to join the Yorktown’s landing circle until American gunners shot down one and drove off the others. The Lexington’s radar showed planes circling as if for a landing about 30 miles to the east, which seemed to indicate that the Japanese CVs were very close indeed. Of the Japanese striking group, ten had been shot down, and eleven others went into the water in attempting night landings on their CVs. Hara recovered only six of his 27. “The pilots of these planes reported the American CVs only 50 or 60 miles away. Thus each of the opposing commanders were aware of the proximity of the other. Both seriously considered a night surface attack, and both abandoned the idea because they hesitated to weaken their screens with an enemy near. Thus the main action of the Battle of the Coral Sea was postponed another day. “Actually the distance between the two forces was greater than either commander imagined, for postwar plots show that they were never closer than 95 miles.”


op. cit., pp. 665-666.

“Thus far the antagonists had been together in the Coral Sea for two days, and had twice come within a hundred miles of each other without exchanging blows. On the evening of 7 May each of the opposing commanders felt that the enemy was uncomfortably close. There was every likelihood that a decision would be reached the next day. During the night Fletcher withdrew to the south and west, while Takagi moved north. For both commanders everything depended on locating the enemy as promptly as possible on the morning of the 8th. Both launched searches a little before dawn, and the scouts of each reported the other almost simultaneously a little after 0800. “The contest of 8 May started on curiously even terms. Each force contained two CVs. Fitch had available 121 planes, Hara 122. The Americans were stronger in bombers, while the Japanese had a preponderance in fighter and torpedo planes. The Japanese pilots had more combat experience, and their torpedoes were better. In another respect the Japanese enjoyed a significant advantage. By moving south through the night Fletcher had run out of the bad weather area…on the 8th his force lay exposed under clear skies, while the Japanese remained in the frontal area, under the protection of clouds and rain squalls. “Essentially the battle consisted of a simultaneous exchange of strikes by the two CV forces. Between 0900 and 0925 both American CVs launched their attack groups….”

The Battle of May 8

“…than 95 miles.

Ibid.

“…their attack groups. That of the Yorktown, consisted of 24 bombers with two fighters, and nine torpedo planes with four fighters, departed first. About 1030 the dive bombers found the Japanese CVs with their escorts in loose formation. While the pilots took cloud cover to await the…torpedo planes, the Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall. Hence the attack fell only on the Shokaku. “When the torpedo planes approached, the SBDs began their dives. Although the attack was well coordinated, it was only moderately successful. The slow American torpedoes were easily avoided. but the dive bombers succeeded in planting two bombs on the Shokaku. Of the Lexington group, which which departed about ten minutes later than the Yorktown’s, the 22 dive bombers failed to find the target. Only the eleven torpedo planes and the four scout bombers found the enemy. Again American torpedoes were ineffective, but the bombers succeeded in adding another hit….These three hits put the Shokaku out of action for the time being; because the damage to her flight deck prevented her from recovering her planes,”

The Battle of May 8

op. cit., p. 666.

“…Takagi detached her, ordering her to proceed to Truk. “The Japanese had sent off their group of 70 attack planes and 20 fighters at about the same time as the American launching. Although the American radar picked them up at 70 miles away, only three fighters succeeded in intercepting them before the attack. At a distance of 20 miles, still having met no interference by American fighters, the Japanese planes divided into three groups, two of torpedo planes and one of bombers. “The two American CVs were together in the center of their circle of screening vessels, but evasive maneuvers gradually drew them apart. The screen divided fairly evenly, but this breaking of the circle undoubtedly contributed to the Japanese success. “The Yorktown, which came under attack first, successfully evaded torpedoes launched at her and took only a single bomb hit, which did not significantly impair her fighting effectiveness. But the Lexington, larger and less maneuverable, fell victim to an ‘anvil’ attack on both bows simultaneously and took two torpedoes on the port side, which flooded three boiler rooms. Two bomb hits, received at almost the same time, inflicted only minor damage. The list caused by the torpedo hits was quickly corrected by shifting [fuel] oil. Her engines were unharmed, and her speed did not fall below 24 knots. To her pilots returning from their strike she appeared undamaged. “As the American force began to recover its planes it appeared that they had won the battle….”

The Battle of May 8

op. cit., pp. 666-667.

“…won the battle. Both CVs were operational with combat effectiveness essentially unimpaired. On the other hand, the Shokaku had been put out of action and was already withdrawing. Because the Zuikaku had been unable to take on all the Japanese planes, many had to be jettisoned.…”

The Battle of May 8

“…had to be jettisoned. Adm Hara had only nine a/c fit for further ops, while Fitch could still put into the air 37 attack planes and twelve fighters. “Even if Fletcher and Fitch been aware of their advantage they could not have seized it, for at 1247 there was an explosion deep inside the Lexington, caused apparently by vapor from ruptured gasoline lines touched off by a spark from a generator. At first the full danger was not apparent, and the Lexington continued landing her planes. But at 1445 there was a more severe explosion.…”

The Battle of May 8

“…more severe explosion. Fires passed rapidly out of control and the CV was forced to call for assistance. The Yorktown took aboard the Lexington planes that were in the air, but there was no opportunity to transfer those already on the Lexington. With the ship burning furiously and shaken by frequent explosions there was no choice but to ‘get the men off.’ Abandonment was orderly,• and after it was completed a DD was detailed to sink the CV. She fired five torpedoes to send the Lexington down at 1956…”

The Battle of May 8

op. cit., pp. 666-667.

“…down at 1956. “The Japanese pilots who returned from the attack reported sinking both CVs, and Hara was sufficiently sanguine to forward that estimate to his superiors. This comfortable belief undoubtedly influenced both Takagi’s decision to detach the damaged Shokaku and Inouye’s decision to withdraw the entire Striking Force. But even though he imagined both American CVs had been destroyed, Inouye still deemed it necessary to postpone the Port Moresby invasion, apparently because he felt unable to protect the landing force against Allied land-based planes.”

The Battle of May 8

op. cit., p. 667.

“…the landing force against Allied land-based planes. “Adm Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet, did not acquiesce n the Japanese retirement. At 2400 he countermanded Inouye’s order and directed the Striking Force to advance and annihilate the remaining American forces. Takagi thereupon put about and searched to the south and east. But Fletcher was by this time safely out of reach.”

The Battle of May 8

Results “Thus the first CV battle of the war, the first naval battle in history where the opposing ships never came within sight of each other, closed with the Japanese holding the field and the Americans in retreat. Tactically the Coral Sea was by a slight margin a victory for the Japanese, of although they lost substantially more planes than the Americans and suffered twice as many casualties, the loss of the 30,000 ton Lexington far outweighed the sinking of the 12,000 ton Shoho, and the Japanese destroyer and small craft sunk at Tulagi scarcely balanced the loss of the Neosho and Sims. Strategically however the US had won. For the first time since war began, Japanese expansion had been checked. The Port Moresby Invasion Force had been obliged to withdraw without reaching its objective. “The battle had other important consequences. The strategic success helped the US morally by taking some of the sting out of the surrender of Corregidor, which came on 6 May, during the battle. More important, the damage to the Shokaku and the necessity for reforming the battered air groups of the Zuikaku kept those two CVs out of the Battle of Midway, where their presence might have been decisive.”

NIMITZ COMMANDER IN THE PACIFIC 18 May 42

Go originated in China more than 2,500 years ago. It spread to Japan, via Korea, in the 7th century AD. It spread from Imperial circles to the general public by the 13th century. It became associated with military strategy much as chess did in the West.!!!!!!A general observation about the condition for victory is that the player who maintains the sente [being on offense, forcing the other to respond defensively] for the greater number of moves will win the game. !This helps explain the doctrinaire aggressiveness of the Japanese militarists.!But in June, 1942, the sente is about to pass to the gaijin [the ‘round-eyes,’ the Westerners].! And that’s another story…!

jbp

The Japanese Strategy Game—Go

The two players alternately place black and white playing pieces, called "stones", on the vacant intersections (called "points") of a grid of 19×19 lines .… The objective of the game is to use one's stones to surround a larger total area of the board than the opponent. Once placed on the board, stones may not be moved, but stones can be removed from the board if captured; this is done by surrounding an opposing stone or group of stones by occupying all orthogonally-adjacent points. Players continue in this fashion until neither player wishes to make another move; the game has no set ending conditions. When a game concludes, the territory is counted along with captured stones …to determine the winner. Games may also be won by resignation.—Wikipedia

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