TERRORISM

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

VOLUME 6 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 3

November 2001

TERRORISM

Threat Assessment,Countermeasures

and Policy

2

On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act ofwar against our country. Americans have known wars — but forthe past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except forone Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war— but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning.Americans have known surprise attacks — but never before onthousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a singleday — and night fell on a different world, a world where freedomitself is under attack...

This is not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’sfreedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight. This is the fight of all whobelieve in progress and pluralism, tolerance and freedom.

We ask every nation to join us. We will ask, and we will need, the help of police forces,intelligence services, and banking systems around the world. The United States is gratefulthat many nations and many international organizations have already responded — withsympathy and with support. Nations from Latin America, to Asia, to Africa, to Europe, tothe Islamic world. Perhaps the NATO Charter reflects best the attitude of the world: Anattack on one is an attack on all.

The civilized world is rallying to America’s side. They understand that if this terror goesunpunished, their own cities, their own citizens may be next. Terror, unanswered, cannotonly bring down buildings, it can threaten the stability of legitimate governments. We’renot going to allow it...

The course is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty,have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.

George W. BushPresident of the United States of America

Editor's Note: This 20th issue of U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda — planned well before the tragic events of September11th in New York, the Washington, D.C. area, and Pennsylvania — explores major themes in internationalterrorism and its increasingly violent nature through a series of articles, fact sheets and references from expertswithin the United States Government and from the academic and private sectors.

TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT, COUNTERMEASURES AND POLICY

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State

TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT, COUNTERMEASURES AND POLICY

CONTENTS

_ PREFACE 2

By George W. BushPresident of the United States of America

_ FOCUS

SEIZING THE MOMENT 5

By Colin L. PowellSecretary of State, United States of America

TERRORISM: U.S. POLICIES AND COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES 7

By Ambassador Francis X. TaylorOffice of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

THE INSTRUMENTS OF COUNTERTERRORISM 10

By Paul R. PillarNational Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia; National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency

PROTECTING AMERICA AGAINST CYBERTERRORISM 14

By Paul RodgersAssistant Unit Chief, Outreach and Field Support Unit, National Infrastructure Protection CenterFederal Bureau of Investigation

MANY COUNTRIES BENEFIT FROM U.S. ANTITERRORISM TRAINING 18

By Alan O. BiglerDirector, Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. Department of State

_ COMMENTARY

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH 22

By Bruce HoffmanVice President, External Affairs Director, RAND Corporation Washington Office

ANTHRAX AND MASS-CASUALTY TERRORISM:

WHAT IS THE BIOTERRORIST THREAT AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH 25

By Jason PateSenior Research Associate and Manager, WMD Terrorism Database, Monterey Institute of International Studies

BRINGING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 29

By Peter Raven-HansenGlen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School

3

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

4

_ FACT SHEETS

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AMERICAN HOSTAGES 32

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 34

_ A GUIDE TO ADDITIONAL READING

TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT, COUNTERMEASURES AND U.S. POLICY

ARTICLE ALERT 36

Abstracts of recent articles

TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT, COUNTERMEASURES AND U.S. POLICY

BIBLIOGRAPHY 37

Spotlighting other views

TERRORISM: THREAT ASSESSMENT, COUNTERMEASURES AND U.S. POLICY

KEY INTERNET SITES 38

Internet links to resources on related issues

The Office of International Information Programs of the U.S. Department ofState provides products and services that explain U.S. policies, society, and values toforeign audiences. The Office publishes five electronic journals that examine majorissues and trends facing the United States and the international community. Thejournals — Economic Perspectives, Global Issues, Issues of Democracy, U.S. ForeignPolicy Agenda, and U.S. Society and Values — provide analysis, commentary, andbackground information in their thematic areas.

All journal editions appear in English, French, and Portuguese language versions,and selected issues also appear in Arabic, Russian, and Spanish.

A new English-language issue is published every three to six weeks. Translatedversions normally follow the English original by two to four weeks.

The opinions expressed in the journals do not necessarily reflect the views orpolicies of the U.S. government. The U.S. Department of State assumes noresponsibility for the content and continued accessibility of Internet sites linked toherein; such responsibility resides solely with the publishers of those sites. Articles maybe reproduced and translated outside the United States unless the articles carrycopyright restrictions.

Current or back issues of the journals, and the roster of upcoming journals, can befound on the Office of International Information Programs’ International Home Pageon the World Wide Web at “http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/journals.htm”.They are available in several electronic formats to facilitate viewing on-line,transferring, downloading, and printing.

Comments are welcome at your local U.S. Embassy (attention Public DiplomacySection) or at the editorial offices:

Editor, U.S. Foreign Policy AgendaPolitical Security — IIP/T/PSU.S. Department of State301 4th Street, S.W.Washington, D.C. 20547United States of AmericaE-mail: ejforpol@pd.state.gov

Please note that this issue of U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA can be locatedon the Office of International Information Programs’ International Home Page on theWorld Wide Web at “http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1101/ijpe/ijpe1101.htm”.

Publisher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . James Hutcheson

Managing Editor . . . . . . . . . . Merle D. Kellerhals, Jr.

Associate Editor . . . . . . . . . . Wayne Hall

Contributing Editors . . . . . . Ralph Dannheisser

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David Denny

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Margaret A. McKay

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jody Rose Platt

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Terence Scott

Reference Specialists . . . . . Sam Anderson

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rebecca Ford Mitchell

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vivian Stahl

Program Assistant . . . . . . . . Yvonne Shanks

Political Security Intern . . . Amy Hanzelka

Art Director . . . . . . . . . . . . . Min Yao

Graphics Assistant . . . . . . . . Sylvia Scott

Editorial Board . . . . . . . . . . . Judith S. Siegel

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Leonardo Williams

AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

5

The mass murders that were committed on September11 under the direction of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaida network have united the world againstinternational terrorism. Some 80 countries lost citizensin the attacks. From our shared grief and shared resolvecan come new opportunities not only to defeatterrorism, but also to work with other nations on arange of important issues of global concern.

A host of countries and international organizationshave answered President Bush’s call for a worldwidecoalition to combat terrorism — among them NATO,the European Union, the Organization of AmericanStates, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, theOrganization of African Unity, the Arab League, theOrganization of the Islamic Conference, and the U.N.General Assembly and Security Council. Indeed, theSecurity Council unanimously adopted an historicresolution obliging all 189 U.N. member states to stopterrorist travel, money flows, planning and other support,and to cooperate in bringing terrorists to justice.

International terrorism poses a multidimensionalthreat. Our coalition must use every tool of statecraftto defeat it. Some countries will take part in themilitary response against those involved in the atrocitiesof September 11. Others, while not participatingdirectly in military action, will provide logisticalsupport or access to bases and staging areas or overflightrights. And many will contribute to humanitarianefforts to help the millions of innocent Afghans whohave suffered under the Taliban regime — a regimewhich seems to care more about Osama bin Laden and

his terrorists than its own starving citizens. Coalitionmembers also will work to disrupt and destroy terroristnetworks by sharing intelligence and other criticalinformation, cooperating in law enforcement, andcutting off terrorists’ financial lifelines.

This will be a long, hard campaign, measured in yearsand fought on many fronts. For such an effort, ourcoalition will have the flexibility to evolve.

And the very process of participating in this greatglobal campaign against terrorism may well open thedoor for us to strengthen or reshape internationalrelationships and expand or establish areas ofcooperation.

Already, our alliances in Europe, Asia and the WesternHemisphere have been reinvigorated by invocations ofthe collective defense provisions of the NATO,ANZUS and Rio Treaties.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reaction toSeptember 11 marked the beginning of a new period inour bilateral relationship, one in which a new spirit ofcooperation on counterterrorism may also make manyof the tough issues on the agenda more resolvable.Indeed, in the wake of 11 September, it has becomeclear that not only is the Cold War over, but the post-Cold War period is also over.

China has also contributed meaningfully to thisunprecedented global effort. I am confident that as weadvance our counterterrorism cooperation with China

SEIZING THE MOMENTBy Secretary of State Colin L. Powell

“International terrorism poses a multidimensional threat. Our coalition must use every tool ofstatecraft to defeat it,” says Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. “This will be a long, hard campaign,measured in years and fought on many fronts. For such an effort, our coalition will have theflexibility to evolve. And the very process of participating in this great global campaign againstterrorism may well open the door for us to strengthen or reshape international relationships andexpand or establish areas of cooperation.”

_ F O C U S

we will be in a stronger position to sustain meaningfulconsultations with the leadership in Beijing on othersubjects of importance to us.

We have also seized opportunities to improve ourrelations with Pakistan and India. President Musharaffof Pakistan made the strategic decision to end hisgovernment’s support of the Taliban. As a result of theactions taken by Pakistan in support of our campaign,we can see the beginning of a strengthened relationshipthat will grow and thrive in the years ahead.

Well before September 11, President Bush made it clearthat putting our relationship with India on a higherplane is one of his highest priorities. With the strongsupport we have received from the Indian governmentsince September 11, we are seizing the opportunity toaccelerate the pace of change.

Our improved relations with these two South Asianrivals may now present an opportunity for bothcountries to explore new ways of thinking aboutstability on the Subcontinent.

The millions of our fellow Americans of the Islamicfaith, and the ten Muslim nations who lost citizens inthe September 11 attacks, need no convincing that thekillers and their accomplices pervert Islam when theyuse it to justify their appalling crimes. Out of a deepsense of shared humanity, and a chilling appreciation ofcommon vulnerability to terrorism, we see new scopeto strengthen our relations with the Islamic world.

In this global campaign, the United States welcomes

the help of any country or party that is genuinelyprepared to work with us, but we will not relax ourstandards and we will continue to advance ourfundamental interests in human rights, accountablegovernment, free markets, non-proliferation andconflict resolution, for we believe that a world ofdemocracy, opportunity, and stability is a world inwhich terrorism cannot thrive.

Throughout the campaign against internationalterrorism, the dedicated men and women of the StateDepartment at our posts abroad and here inWashington will be on the front lines just as surely asthose who wear the uniform.

We will not let terrorism hijack American foreignpolicy. The President has urged the American people toget back to the business of their daily lives. So too, theUnited States will continue to pursue a fullinternational agenda — from promoting goodgovernance to cooperating with other countries to stemthe HIV/AIDS pandemic, establish a post-Cold Warstrategic framework, launch a new trade round, andfoster peace in the Middle East.

Terrorism has cast a shadow across the globe. But theglobal resolve to defeat it has never been greater and theprospects for international cooperation across a broadrange of issues has never been brighter. As PresidentBush said the other day when he visited the StateDepartment: “Out of this evil will come good.Through our tears we see opportunities to make theworld better for generations to come. And we will seize them.” _

6

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

September 11, 2001 is a day that will redefine history.Before the tragic events of that date occurred, articlesappeared in journals and newspapers accusing the U.S.Government of overstating the terrorist threat. This isno longer the case. The terrorist attacks that werelaunched on that day in New York, Virginia, andPennsylvania claimed victims from some 88 nations,from our close neighbors Canada and Mexico tocountries as far away as Australia and Zimbabwe, andin large numbers from India and Pakistan. For manycountries, including the United States, Britain,Germany, and Switzerland, the horrors of September11 claimed the most lives of any terrorist incident intheir history. For the United States, it was the bloodiestday in America since the 1862 Civil War Battle ofAntietam.

The attacks may have been conceived as a blow againstAmerica, but in reality they were attacks against all ofhumanity and civilization itself.

The war we are waging will be a long struggle withmany dimensions. Our goal is to eliminate theinternational terrorist threat to people, installations,and other interests. We will do this by:

• Smoking out terrorists from their hiding places,• Draining the swamp where terrorists find safe haven,• Pressuring states to stop supporting terrorism,• Preventing planned terrorist attacks, and• Bolstering the capabilities of our friends and allies to

combat terrorism.

The nations of the world are banding together toeliminate the terrorism scourge. Numerous multilateralorganizations have issued declarations of support,including the United Nations, the European Union,the Organization of American States, the Organizationfor African Unity, the Organization of the IslamicConference, and the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation forum, and many others have expressedtheir strong solidarity.

I recently traveled to Brussels where I met with theNorth Atlantic Council. I made the case that the al-Qaida organization led by Osama bin Laden wasresponsible for what happened on the 11th ofSeptember. I traced the history of this organization, itsrecent activities, and the events that occurred just priorto and just after the 11th.

In response, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertsonstated that the facts contained in the briefing were“clear and compelling” and point “conclusively to an al-Qaida role in the attacks.” As a result of the briefing,NATO concluded that the attacks were directed fromabroad and will “therefore be regarded as an actioncovered by Article V of the Washington Treaty, whichstates that an armed attack on one or more of the alliesin Europe or North America shall be considered anattack against them all.” This was the first time ArticleV was invoked in the history of the NATO alliance.

NATO allies have agreed to provide the United Stateswith the wide range of assistance that we had requested.This includes unlimited use of their airspace, base

7

TERRORISM: U.S. POLICIES AND COUNTERTERRORISM MEASURES

By Ambassador Francis X. TaylorCoordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

“The war we are waging will be a long struggle with many dimensions,” says Ambassador Francis X.Taylor, the State Department’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Our goal is to eliminate theinternational terrorist threat to people, installations, and other interests.”

facilities, seaports, logistics, extra security for U.S.forces in Europe, intelligence sharing, and earlywarning aircraft. AWACS surveillance planes belongingto NATO are currently patrolling the skies overAmerica as a result of the Article V invocation.The Organization of American States invoked the RioTreaty, which also covers collective self-defense. OASforeign ministers, meeting in Lima, Peru on the day ofthe attacks, were the first to condemn them.

The Organization of the Islamic Conference — themost important and comprehensive grouping ofMuslim states, 56 in all — strongly condemned thesavage September 11 attacks and unequivocallydeclared that terrorism is never sanctioned by Islam.We believe the face of terror is not the true face ofIslam. Terrorism is a perversion of religion, and thosewho hijacked our airplanes on September 11 alsohijacked the faith they claim.

Other nations, great and small, have made pledges andcontributions to what is a global response to a globalattack. We have received numerous offers ofdiplomatic, political, police, intelligence, and militarysupport. We have what amounts to a coalition ofcoalitions, with some nations forging ahead to denyterrorists access to banking systems, for example, andother nations more active in other areas. Individualmembers are dedicated and are holding steady. Ourchallenge will be to hold the coalitions together untilthe campaign is successful.

FORGING THE TOOLS TO FIGHT TERROR

This campaign will be unlike others we have fought.The battles are as likely to be fought in smallconference rooms among bankers, at border crossingpoints, or in forensic laboratories as over the skies ofsome hostile power. Our victories will be counted inthe drying up of financing, the withering of politicalsupport, the rounding up of terrorist cells — not in theconquest of foreign land.

TERRORIST FUNDING

The September 11 terrorists apparently had enoughmoney to make their preparations many months, if not years, in advance. Funding is a critical element in recruiting supporters and launching large-scale

terrorist operations. We need to dry up terroristfundraising and money transfers.

The first shot in the war against terrorism was fired onSeptember 24 when President Bush signed executiveorder 13224. This shot froze the assets of 27 terrorists,terrorist organizations, and terrorist financiersassociated with al-Qaida and blocks U.S. transactionswith such persons or entities. The Executive Order waslater amended to include 39 additional names ofpersons and organizations known to conduct orfinancially support terrorism. In addition, the assets ofall 22 of the FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorists are nowsubject to this blocking order. Additional names willbe added in the months ahead.

A previous Executive Order, in effect since 1995 andrenewed each year since, includes such groups asHizballah and HAMAS, as well as al-Qaida, thatrepresent a terrorist threat to the Middle East peacenegotiations.

On September 28 the U.N. Security Councilunanimously adopted resolution 1373, which isbinding on all states under international law. Thisresolution goes to the heart of how terrorism operates.It obliges all member states to deny financing, support,and safe haven to terrorists. It will also expandinformation sharing among U.N. members to combatinternational terrorism. A Security Council follow-upmechanism has been set up to monitor compliance on acontinuous basis.

This effort has already yielded results. The UnitedStates has frozen some $4 million and is reviewingmany other accounts. We have received reports ofmillions of additional dollars being frozen around theworld. Other nations are still seeking to identifyterrorist assets that they have pledged to block. In all,111 nations — more than half the world — have actedto choke off the oxygen of money for terrorists, andthis is only the beginning.

Another important tool in countering terroristfundraising is formally designating groups as ForeignTerrorist Organizations, or FTOs. Designation ofFTOs makes it a criminal offense for persons subject toU.S. jurisdiction to knowingly contribute funds orother material support to such groups. U.S. law also

8

9

allows freezing of the groups’ assets and denial of visasfor their leaders and other members. Secretary of StateColin Powell designated 28 such groups, including al-Qaida, in early October.

Using tools like these, we have urged other countries totighten up their own laws and regulations to curbterrorist fundraising and money transfers. GreatBritain already has done so, and countries such asCanada, Greece, India, and the Philippines have newlaws or proposed counterterrorism legislation in variousstages of consideration.

In addition, the administration is making ratification ofthe 12 U.N. conventions against terrorism a highpriority. These cover a range of activities, such ashijacking, hostage taking, bombing, and terrorismfinancing. The conventions form a strong legalframework for fighting terrorism.

OTHER MEASURES

There are a number of other tools that we have beenusing to counter terrorism, and we are sharpening andimproving them in this new struggle.

We are utilizing training-related programs to helpcombat terrorism overseas and thus help protectAmericans living and traveling abroad. The StateDepartment’s Antiterrorism Training Assistance (ATA)program in which we train foreign security and lawenforcement officials is a pillar of this effort. Theprogram not only provides training but also helpspromote our policies and improve our contacts withforeign officials to achieve our counterterrorism goals.We have trained more than 20,000 officials from over100 countries to date. We are hoping for additionalfunding for the ATA program in the wake of theSeptember 11 attacks to permit us to accelerate thepace of this training.

We also have developed a Terrorist InterdictionProgram (TIP), which utilizes sophisticated computer

data base systems and improved communications tohelp identify potential terrorists who try to crossinternational borders. This program will be mosteffective in countries that are major transportationhubs.

The Department’s contribution to the interagencycounterterrorism research and development program,the Technical Support Working Group, also helps tomake advances in explosives detection and other areasand bolster our cooperative R&D efforts with other key allies.

We have proposed increasing our “Rewards for Justice”program, which pays up to $5 million for informationthat prevents a terrorist attack or results in the arrest ofa terrorist. This important program saves lives and putsterrorists behind bars.

Many challenges lie ahead. Maintaining theinternational coalition will be one. However, in themonths that have elapsed since these nationsproclaimed their solidarity against terrorism, thecoalition has gotten stronger. Another challenge will beto counter the notion held in some quarters thatOsama bin Laden is some type of hero and that theUnited States is somehow the aggressor. I believe, that,through active public diplomacy, we can effectivelyconvey the message that bin Laden is evil, and hisactions are a manifestation of evil. Moreover, theUnited States has no designs on foreign real estate. Weare not an invading force. But we will forcefully attackthe terrorist network that represents a threat to us all.

The horrific events of September 11 require a broadbased, long-term strategic campaign, in concert withthe nations of the world that abhor terrorism. Togetherwe will root out and bring to justice those that useterrorism. We are in for a long haul. As PresidentBush has told the world: “Whether we bring ourenemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies,justice will be done.” _

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

10

Every tool used in the fight against terrorism hassomething to contribute, but also significant limits towhat it can accomplish. Thus, counterterrorismrequires using all the tools available, because no one ofthem can do the job. Just as terrorism itself ismultifaceted, so too must be the campaign against it.

Counterterrorism involves far more activities than thosethat bear the “counterterrorist” label. Even before theattacks of 11 September 2001 made the subject aseemingly all-encompassing concern for the UnitedStates, it involved the efforts of many differentdepartments and agencies. Counterterrorism includesdiplomacy designed to harmonize the efforts of foreigngovernments on the subject. It includes theinvestigative work of numerous law enforcementagencies and the related legal work of prosecutingterrorist crimes. It involves measures by financialregulatory bodies to interrupt terrorist funding. As theallied military operations begun over Afghanistan inOctober 2001 remind us, it, at times, includes the useof armed force. Information gathering by intelligenceagencies is another major part of counterterrorism.And all of these functions aimed at actively counteringterrorist operations are in addition to the manydefensive measures, taken by the private sector as wellas by various levels of government, designed to protectagainst terrorist attacks.

DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is critical to combating moderninternational terrorism which, in many respects, knows

no boundaries. Terrorist groups have increasinglyspread their reach around the globe. Combating aterrorist network like the one that includes Osama binLaden’s al-Qaida group requires the cooperative effortsof many countries because the network operates inmany countries. Effective counterterrorist diplomacy isthe glue needed to hold these efforts into a coherentwhole rather than being merely disjointed parts. Thebuilding of a counterterrorist coalition following theattacks of 11 September is only the most recent andconspicuous demonstration that the United Statesneeds the help of foreign partners in countering even those threats directed specifically against theUnited States.

Counterterrorist diplomacy is not just the responsibilityof professional diplomats in foreign ministries.Officials performing other specialized, andcounterterrorist-related, functions have to cooperateextensively with foreign counterparts to do their jobs.Regulatory agencies responsible for the security of civilaviation and other modes of transportation, forexample, have to perform what is, in effect, adiplomatic function to accomplish the necessarycoordination where their security systems intersect withthose of other countries. Customs and immigrationofficials must do the same.

Most of this specialized cooperation is bilateral, butmultilateral diplomacy also has contributions to make.It can provide broad sanction for measures that wouldhave less legitimacy if taken by an individual state. TheUnited Nations Security Council has done so, for

THE INSTRUMENTS OF COUNTERTERRORISMBy Paul R. Pillar

National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South AsiaNational Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency

Counterterrorism, which involves an array of activities that exceed the term “counterterrorism,”includes effective use of diplomacy, law enforcement, financial controls, military power, andintelligence gathering, says Paul R. Pillar, a national intelligence officer for the Near East and SouthAsia with the National Intelligence Council. “Every counterterrorist instrument is difficult to use.Using them well together is even more difficult. But using them all is critical in the fight againstterrorism.”

example, with resolutions (beginning with Resolution1267 in 1999) pertaining to the Taliban’s support toterrorism based in Afghanistan. Multilateral diplomacy— including resolutions of the U.N. General Assemblyand a dozen international conventions on terrorism —also strengthens an international norm againstterrorism. Some of those conventions, such as onesdealing with hijacking of aircraft, also provide a basisfor practical cooperation on matters where nationaljurisdictions may overlap.

The limitations of diplomacy as a counterterrorist toolare obvious. Terrorists do not change their behavior indirect response to a treaty or U.N. resolution. Butdiplomacy supports all of the other tools, whether bybroadening the moral force behind them or providingan international legal framework for their use.

CRIMINAL LAW

The prosecution of individual terrorists in criminalcourts has been one of the most heavily relied uponcounterterrorist tools. The United States has placedparticular emphasis on it, with the bringing of terroriststo justice for their crimes being a longstanding tenet ofU.S. counterterrorist policy. Non-U.S. courts have alsoplayed significant roles. A Scottish court sitting in theNetherlands was used to try two suspects accused ofbombing Pan Am flight 103 in 1988.

Use of the criminal justice system can help reduceterrorism in several ways. Imprisoning a terrorist forlife (or executing him) obviously prevents him fromconducting any more attacks. The prospect of beingcaught and punished may deter other terrorists fromattacking in the first place. Even if not deterred, themovements of terrorists still at large can be impeded bythe knowledge that they are wanted men. The dramaand publicity of a criminal trial may also help to sustainpublic support for counterterrorism, demonstrate agovernment’s resolve to go after terrorists, andencourage other governments to do the same.

A limitation of applying the criminal justice system toterrorism is that the prospect of being caught andpunished does not deter some terrorists. That prospectis obviously irrelevant to suicide bombers, and perhapsalso to other low-level operatives who feel a comparable

level of commitment and desperation. High-levelterrorist leaders — who typically stay farther removedfrom the scene of the crime and are more difficult tocatch — may care little about whether the underlingsare caught.

Prosecuting a terrorist also poses the practical difficultyof assembling sufficient legally admissible evidence toconvict him. At least in U.S. courts, that is a higherstandard than acquiring enough information to befairly sure, from an intelligence or policy perspective,that someone is a terrorist. Direct evidence of thedecisions or orders issued by terrorist leaders isparticularly hard to come by. The physically dispersedplanning and decision making of international terroristgroups means many of the actions leading to a terroristattack were taken outside the country where the attackoccurs and outside the jurisdiction of the leadinvestigators.

The need for international cooperation in applyingcriminal law to terrorists is obvious. It involves notonly acquisition of evidence for use in court but alsothe extradition or rendition of fugitives to stand trial inthe country where they are charged.

FINANCIAL CONTROLS

The funding that evidently made it possible for theperpetrators of the attacks in September to train andtravel as they prepared for their operation hashighlighted efforts to interdict terrorist money. TheUnited States uses two types of financial controls tocombat terrorism: the freezing of assets belonging toindividual terrorists, terrorist groups, and statesponsors; and the prohibition of material support toterrorists. Money is also the subject of the most recentmultilateral treaty on terrorism: the Convention on theSuppression of the Financing of Terrorism, which wasopened for signature in January 2000.

Cutting off terrorists’ funding faces two majorchallenges. One is that — notwithstanding theimportance of financial backing to the Septemberhijackers — most terrorism does not require large-scalefinancing. Less money is involved than in illegalnarcotics, arms trafficking, and some othertransnational criminal activities. The other challenge isthat the flow of terrorist money is extremely difficult to

11

track. False account names, the use of financialintermediaries, and commingling of funds forlegitimate and illegitimate purposes are the rule. Muchmoney gets moved through informal arrangementsoutside any formal banking system.

Despite these challenges, more could be accomplishedto impede terrorists’ financial operations. The TreasuryDepartment’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)provides focus and direction for U.S. efforts on thissubject, but most of the financial activity, even ofgroups targeting the United States, takes place outsideU.S. jurisdiction. The creation in other governmentsof offices similar to OFAC and the close cooperation ofsuch offices would make a further dent in terrorists’financial activity.

MILITARY FORCE

Modern, precision-guided munitions have made armedforce a less blunt and more useful counterterroristinstrument, but one whose use is still appropriatelyrare. Several countries have used military force withvarying degrees of success over the last three decades torescue hostages. More recently the military instrumenthas been employed to retaliate against terrorist attacks.The United States has used its armed forces forretaliation following terrorist attacks by Libya in 1986,Iraq in 1993, and Osama bin Laden in 1998.

A military strike is the most forceful possiblecounterterrorist action and thus the most dramaticdemonstration of determination to defeat terrorists.The major limitation of military force is that terroristassets, unlike conventional military assets, do notpresent large, fixed targets that can readily be destroyed.With the terrorist threat now coming much more fromgroups than from states, there are even fewer targets tostrike, either to damage terrorist capabilities or to deterfuture terrorism.

The U.S. and British military operations begun inAfghanistan in October go beyond any previouscounterterrorist use of military force, in that theyconstitute not just retaliation but an effort to clean outthe prime source and safe haven of a terrorist network.In their goal and scale, they have the potential forhaving a substantially greater effect on terrorism than

any previous use of armed force. Success inAfghanistan will depend on political as well as militarychapters of that country’s history yet to be written.Even with success in Afghanistan, however, the militaryoperations there do not directly touch the portions ofthe al-Qaida network that reside elsewhere, and, thus,must be part of a broader counterterrorist effort thatdoes address those portions.

INTELLIGENCE

The collection and analysis of intelligence is the leastvisible but in some ways the most importantcounterterrorist tool, and is rightly thought of as the“first line of defense” against terrorism. But thisinstrument also has its limitations, chief of which isthat the type of very specific, tactical intelligencerequired to thwart terrorist plots is rare. That kind ofactionable information is difficult to collect because itrequires penetration of groups that are small, suspiciousof outsiders, and very careful about their operationalsecurity.

Most intelligence about terrorist groups is fragmentary,ambiguous, and often of doubtful credibility. Analysisis thus almost as much of a challenge as collection. Thecontribution of intelligence is not so much to providecoherent pictures of impending terrorist operations butrather a more strategic sense of which groups pose thegreatest threats, which times and which regions presentthe greatest dangers, and what sorts of targets andtactics are most likely to be used.

The limitations of counterterrorist intelligence mean itshould not be relied upon as a foolproof indicator ofwhere threats do and do not exist. But the guidance itprovides in managing the risks from terrorism isinvaluable, from decisions on site security to broaderpolicy on allocation of counterterrorist resources, aswell as being essential to the functioning of all the othercounterterrorist instruments.

PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

The instruments discussed here must be wellcoordinated. Used together wisely, they produce awhole that is greater than the sum of the parts. If notwell coordinated, they can work at cross-purposes.

12

13

Enforcement of criminal law may get in the way ofintelligence collection, for example, and military actioncould disrupt either law enforcement or intelligencegathering.

The United States accomplishes day-to-daycoordination through sub-cabinet committees, cross-assignment of personnel, and other formal andinformal mechanisms centered in the National SecurityCouncil and involving the Departments of State,Defense, Justice, and Treasury, the intelligence agencies,and other elements. The best arrangements forcoordinating counterterrorism will vary from onegovernment to another, but effective coordinationshould reflect three principles. One is that all of the

relevant ministries or agencies — including thoseresponsible for military affairs, internal security,intelligence, and foreign affairs — need to be involved.Second, leadership should come from the center, suchas a cabinet office or equivalent to the U.S. NationalSecurity Council. And third, the various officesinvolved need to develop everyday habits of workingtogether that will become second nature and pay offduring a crisis.

Every counterterrorist instrument is difficult to use.Using them well together is even more difficult. Butusing them all is critical in the fight against terrorism.

_

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

THE WAR ON TERRORISM

With the destruction of the World Trade Center Towersand the attack on the Pentagon September 11th andthe continuing anthrax attacks, the United States hasentered a new age of terrorism that targets bothcivilians and soldiers in a war with no rules and no clearending. There has been a steady progression towardthis point by such events as the 1988 bombing of PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, the 1989Hannover Hackers case, the 1994 Citibank fraud case,and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.

Although the means and ends have evolved throughouthistory, the central elements of terrorism — fear, panic,violence and disruption — have changed little. As theworld enters the 21st Century, terrorism remains avexing problem — an anachronistic fixture of humanrelations as paradoxically human and inhuman in theThird Millennium as it was before the dawn ofrecorded history. While terrorists once generally usedacts of terrorism as a means to publicize their causes,the operational objectives in the more recent attacksfocused on producing the maximum destruction,casualties and impact.

THE CYBER DIMENSION

Today, tremendous destructive potential fits into easilytransported packages (bombs, nerve gas and biological

agents), and the computers that are connected to theInternet can be attacked from any point on the globe.The threat of retaliation, effective against nations, is lessso against small and elusive groups who strikeanonymously and have no territory to hold at risk.

The need for the heightened security of criticaloperations has grown markedly in recent years as aresult of the escalation in the use of informationtechnology to improve performance, increasedcompetitive pressures from deregulation andglobalization, and the concentration of operations in asmaller number of facilities to decrease costs, with theresulting reduction in redundancy and reserve capacity.

The Computer Security Institute (CSI), whichconducts an annual Computer Crime and SecuritySurvey with the participation of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation's (FBI) Computer Intrusion Squad in SanFrancisco, has reported in its 2001 survey that thelosses of 186 respondents totaled approximately $378million. These losses are based on serious computersecurity breaches detected primarily by largecorporations, government agencies, and universities.

Security breaches detected by respondents include adiverse array of attacks such as: unauthorized access byinsiders, denial of service attacks, system penetration byoutsiders, theft of proprietary information, financialfraud, and sabotage of data and networks. Supervisory

14

PROTECTING AMERICA AGAINST CYBERTERRORISMBy Paul Rodgers

Assistant Unit Chief, Outreach and Field Support Unit, National Infrastructure Protection CenterFederal Bureau of Investigation

“Although the means and ends have evolved throughout history, the central elements of terrorism —fear, panic, violence and disruption — have changed little,” says Paul Rodgers of the NationalInfrastructure Protection Center at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Today, tremendousdestructive potential fits into easily transported packages (bombs, nerve gas and biological agents),and the computers that are connected to the Internet can be attacked from any point on the globe....The need for the heightened security of critical operations has grown markedly in recent years as aresult of the escalation in the use of information technology to improve performance, increasedcompetitive pressures from deregulation and globalization, and the concentration of operations in a smaller number of facilities to decrease costs, with the resulting reduction in redundancy andreserve capacity.”

Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems areparticularly vulnerable when they use the Internet tomonitor and control processes at remote sites. Such apractice is employed in a wide variety of industriesincluding chemical, petrochemical, oil and gas, foodprocessing, pulp and paper, pharmaceuticals, water andwastewater, transportation, energy management, andother manufacturing applications.

Financial losses of course will not be restricted to thetheft of proprietary information, financial fraud andother criminal offenses. As more commerce isconducted on-line, civil law suits will increase in whichclaimants seek downstream damages for networkintrusions based on legal theories such as a lack of the“due diligence” owed to stockholders, customers,suppliers, and other innocent third party victims.

China and Russia have publicly acknowledged the rolecyber attacks will play in the “next wave of militaryoperations.” Two Chinese military officers havepublished a book that called for the use ofunconventional measures, including the propagation ofcomputer viruses, to counterbalance the military powerof the United States. Thus, information warfare hasarrived as a new concept in military operations. Thechallenge now is to prevent this weapon from beingturned against the United States.

PCCIP

In response to these growing critical infrastructurevulnerabilities, President Clinton in 1996 establishedthe President's Commission on Critical InfrastructureProtection (PCCIP) to study the critical infrastructuresthat constitute the life support systems of the UnitedStates, determine vulnerabilities and propose a strategyfor protecting them. The commission in its 1997report, Critical Foundations: Protecting America'sInfrastructures, pointed out that critical infrastructureassurance is a shared responsibility of the public andprivate sectors.

PDD 63

The report, implemented in 1998 by PresidentialDecision Directive (PDD) 63 on Critical InfrastructureProtection, declares that federal facilities should beamong the first to adopt best practices, active risk

management, and improved security planning, therebypresenting a model for industry to follow voluntarily.The PDD calls for the creation of a strong partnershipwith the business community and state and localgovernments to maximize the alliance for nationalsecurity.

The directive also provided for the establishment of theNational Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in1998 by the conversion of the Computer Investigationand Infrastructure Threat Assessment Center into thenucleus of NIPC. NIPC (http://www.nipc.gov) fusesrepresentatives from the FBI, the Departments ofCommerce, Defense, Energy, Transportation, theIntelligence Community, and other federal agencies,and the private sector into an unprecedentedinformation sharing effort.

NIPC's mission is to detect, warn of, respond to, andinvestigate computer intrusions that threaten criticalinfrastructures. It not only provides a reactive responseto an attack that has already occurred, but proactivelyseeks to discover planned attacks and issues warningsbefore they occur. This task requires the collection andanalysis of information gathered from all availablesources (including law enforcement and intelligencesources, data voluntarily provided, and open sources)and dissemination of analysis and warnings of possibleattacks to potential victims, whether in the governmentor the private sector.

The National Infrastructure Protection and ComputerIntrusion Program (NIPCIP) consists of FBI agentswho are responsible for investigating computerintrusions, implementing the key asset initiative, andmaintaining liaison with the private sector. There areabout 1,300 pending investigations in the field, rangingfrom criminal activity to national security intrusions.Many of these cases have a foreign component to themrequiring close coordination with FBI legal attachesaround the world.

ISACS

PDD 63 also launched a major vehicle for informationsharing by encouraging the owners and operators of thecritical infrastructures to establish private sectorInformation Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) togather, analyze, sanitize and disseminate private sector

15

information to both industry and the NIPC. Thedecision to establish an information sharing center isdetermined by the private sector participants.

ISACs have been established for the criticalinfrastructure sectors of banking and finance,information and communications, energy, emergencylaw enforcement and fire services, railroads, and watersupply. NIPC promotes the sharing of informationwith these ISACs and encourages the establishment ofISACs by the remaining sectors.

INFRAGARD

The InfraGard Program is a NIPC effort to build acommunity of professionals who have a strong interestin protecting their information systems. Members havethe opportunity to share information with othermembers, utilize the law enforcement expertise of theFBI and other law enforcement agencies thatparticipate in the program, and draw on the analyticalcapabilities of the NIPC. The InfraGard includesrepresentatives from private industry, academicinstitutions, and other federal, state and localgovernment agencies. It is the most extensivegovernment-private sector partnership for infrastructureprotection in the world. A key element of theInfraGard initiative is the confidentiality of reportingby members. Much of the information provided by theprivate sector is proprietary and is treated as such.

The NIPC plans to promote the expansion of theInfraGard program to other countries, such asAustralia, Canada, New Zealand and the UnitedKingdom.

WARNING PRODUCTS

The NIPC sends out advisories on an ad hoc basis,which are infrastructure warnings to address cyber orinfrastructure events with possible significant impact.These are distributed to partners in private and publicsectors. The NIPC works in close cooperation with theFederal Computer Incident Response Capability(FedCIRC) to assist federal civil agencies with handlingof computer incident responses, and to provide bothproactive and reactive security services.

KEY ASSET INITIATIVE

The NIPC role is further strengthened by its Key AssetInitiative (KAI), which maintains a database ofinformation concerning key assets within each FBI fieldoffice's jurisdiction, establish lines of communicationwith key asset owners and operators to shareinformation and work with them to improve theircyber and physical security, and enhance ongoingcoordination in the protection of critical infrastructurewith other federal, state and local government entities.Listing key assets in the database continually increases,and as of November 1, 8,806 key assets were identified.

TRAINING

Over the past three years, NIPC has provided trainingfor over 4,000 federal, state, local and foreigngovernment investigators through nine core trainingcourses that deal with basic cyber investigations,understanding operating systems, aspects of UNIX, andCisco Routers. These courses are conducted both atthe FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia and around theUnited States. The NIPC's training programcomplements training offered by the FBI's TrainingDivision as well as training offered by the Departmentof Defense and the National Cybercrime TrainingPartnership.

INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH

The FBI has established a growing internationalpresence in order to enhance capabilities to counter abroad range of threats, including internationalterrorism. The FBI currently maintains Legal Attaché(LEGAT) offices in over 40 countries. Forwarddeployment of FBI personnel has proven a veryeffective means to establish liaison with counterpartsecurity and intelligence services and to coordinate FBIinvestigative resources when U.S. interests are attackedor threatened.

The NIPC also maintains an active dialogue with theinternational community, to include its participation inthe Trilateral Seminar of the International Cooperationfor Information Assurance in Sweden and the Group ofEight (G-8) Lyon Group (High Tech Crime Subgroup).NIPC personnel have met with government authorities,

16

both in the US and abroad, from Australia, Canada,Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Norway,Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and othernations over the past year, to discuss infrastructureprotection issues with their counterparts. Finally, theNIPC Watch Center is connected to the watch centersof several allies.

The NIPC staff includes government officials on detailfrom Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, andit welcomes requests from other U.S. allies forrepresentation on its staff for broadening internationalcooperation. The NIPC role was further enhanced bythe issuance of recent executive orders on cyberprotection and homeland security.

CIP INFORMATION AGE EXECUTIVE ORDER

Following the September 11th attacks, President Bushon October 16 issued Executive Order 13231 onCritical Infrastructure Protection in the InformationAge, which established the President's CriticalInfrastructure Protection Board to coordinate theprotection of information systems that involve federalcritical infrastructures, and to cooperate with the

private sector and state and local governments in theprotection information systems that involve theircritical infrastructures.

The order also established a panel of approximately 30corporate chief executive officers to advise the presidenton the security of information systems supporting theprivate sector and state and local governments.

CONCLUSION

The threat of cyberterrorism will grow in the NewMillennium, as the leadership positions in extremistorganizations are increasingly filled with younger,“Internet-savvy” individuals. Most worrisome is apotential coordinated attack on national criticalinfrastructures. While the United States has not yetexperienced this sort of attack, it is not hard toanticipate such a threat from the intrusions we haveseen. Cyber attacks know no national boundaries andare truly international in scope and effect.International cooperation and information sharing iscritical in order to more effectively respond to thisgrowing threat. _

17

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

The U.S. Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) isactively training foreign police and security forcesthroughout the world to combat, deter, and solveterrorist crimes in their countries. In the process theprogram is improving both bilateral and internationalcooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Since its inception, ATA has trained over 25,000students from 117 different countries, which has had asizable impact in the fight against internationalterrorism. In the year 2000 alone, ATA trained 2,741students from 42 countries (conducting 117 courses in20 different subject categories), initiated programs infive new countries, participated in 11 technicalconsultations and conferences, conducted five programevaluations, and performed 20 needs assessments. Inthe coming years, especially in light of the recenthorrific terrorist attacks in New York and Washington,ATA will undergo a major program expansion and isplanning accordingly.

During the early 1980s following several seriousterrorist incidents throughout the world, it becameevident that in countries where such incidents hadoccurred, many local police and security forces lackedthe necessary expertise and equipment to deter andrespond in an effective manner. Therefore in 1983, theU.S. Congress authorized the establishment of a specialprogram designed to enhance the antiterrorism skills offriendly countries by providing training and equipmentnecessary to deter and counter terrorist threats.Congress established the Antiterrorism Assistance

Program under an amendment to the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961, which provides its legislativemandate and assigns responsibility for itsadministration to the State Department’s Bureau ofDiplomatic Security (DS).

DS Agents, who are sworn federal law enforcementofficers, serve as the Regional Security Officer (RSO) at U.S. embassies and other diplomatic missionsthroughout the world. In this capacity, they areresponsible for the security of U.S. facilities andpersonnel inside the embassy compound, and forensuring the safety of personnel beyond its walls,including all U.S. citizens that may travel to or visitthat country. In order to manage these responsibilities,an RSO must establish and maintain close contacts andworking relationships with the host country’s securityofficials, who are tasked with providing externalprotection and support to the U.S. embassy and staffunder long-established diplomatic protocols. Wheregaps in a country’s capability are noted, the ATA canoffer expert assistance.

NEEDS ASSESSMENT IS FIRST STEP

At the embassy’s request, and with the concurrence ofthe Department of State and with the consent of thehost country, ATA will send a team of subject matterexperts (SMEs) to conduct an extensive and thoroughneeds assessment of the country’s security and policeforces. Drawing experts from federal, state and evenlocal law enforcement agencies, ATA sends teams to

18

MANY COUNTRIES BENEFIT FROM U.S. ANTITERRORISM TRAINING

By Alan O. BiglerDirector, Antiterrorism Assistance Program,

Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State

The State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA) has trained over 25,000 foreignpolice and security forces from 117 different countries in measures designed to combat, deter, andsolve terrorist crimes in their countries. ATA Director Alan O. Bigler says that “in the process theprogram is improving both bilateral and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism.”

provide a critical look at the host nation’s key securityand law enforcement units. In conducting a needsassessment visit, the experts will frequently meet withsenior government and police officials, visit variousunits, talk to members of the police, and witnesscapabilities demonstrations in order to determine thetype of training and equipment the country will needto meet its particular terrorist threat.

The assessment team considers five basic areas, whichare seen as fundamental in any nation’s defense againstterrorism. Collectively they establish the framework fordetermining a country’s ability to deter and respond toterrorist threats. In general terms, this frameworkinvolves the government’s ability to:

• Enforce the law, preserve the peace, and protect lifeand property;

• Protect its national leadership, the seat and functionsof government, and its resident diplomatic corps,including that of the United States;

• Control its international borders;• Protect its critical infrastructure; and• Manage crises that have national implications.

Upon return, the SMEs compile a report that ispresented to ATA’s Training Board for review. Inaddition, a comprehensive country plan is developedthat outlines a specific program of training courses andequipment for that country.

Specific assistance is designed to meet identified needsin a variety of police and internal security disciplines.This assistance program is intended to improvefunctional police skills, mid-level supervision, senior-level management and leadership.

TRAINING IN FUNCTIONAL CATEGORIES

Essentially, ATA training is divided into four separatefunctional categories: Crisis Prevention, CrisisManagement, Crisis Resolution, and Investigations.Each of these four categories contains a number ofcourses. For example, training in the category ofInvestigations is provided through a number ofspecialized courses, two of which are Post-BlastInvestigations and Terrorist Crime Scene Investigations,while training in the category of Crisis Resolution

could be in the form of a course in HostageNegotiations.

The bulk of antiterrorism training is provided in theform of highly specialized courses conducted in theUnited States at one of ATA’s several training locations.Course lengths vary from two to five weeks, dependingon the subject. Typically, class sizes are held to no morethan 24 students. Professional instructors teach courseswith simultaneous interpretation into the country’snative language by highly experienced interpreters. Inaddition, course materials are translated into the nativelanguage and alphabet, providing students withreference materials they can retain for future use aftertheir return.

In addition to the standard package of courses available,ATA also provides specialized training, consultations,and advisory assistance to address significant securitythreats. Based on specific, compelling needs, thisassistance is often in the form of police administration,management and planning, police instructor training,judicial security, and modern interview andinvestigative techniques.

ATA also provides limited amounts of specializedequipment. The majority of this equipment isincidental to the courses provided. For example,students who attend the bomb disposal course are givenrender-safe tools during their training, which theyreturn home with. In addition, where there is acompelling need, and when funds are available, ATA isauthorized to provide specialized equipment to meetpressing needs. Although it is presently limited inscope, ATA hopes to expand its equipment grantprogram in the future to meet the specific needs of itsparticipant nations.

HUMAN RIGHTS

A country’s human rights record is a critical element forATA participation. In full compliance with the LeahyAct, the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy,Human Rights, and Labor participates in determining acountry’s eligibility for participation. Assistance may besuspended if the country’s record of human rightspractices falls below acceptable standards. U.S.embassies scrupulously screen proposed training

19

candidates to ensure that no abusers of human rights orofficials involved in corrupt practices are permitted toattend training. In addition, ATA instructionincorporates and stresses human rights values andpractices in its courses through teaching modern andhumane treatment of suspects and members of thegeneral public encountered during police operations.

NEW INITIATIVES

Anti-Kidnapping

In response to a widespread problem of kidnapping forransom in Colombia and several other Latin Americancountries, ATA is developing a comprehensive anti-kidnapping training program. The new trainingprogram will begin with a kidnapping incidentmanagement course that brings together expertinstructors with extensive experience in the field toteach a country’s security forces, police and governmentagencies how to manage an incident of kidnapping forransom. ATA anticipates there will be a great deal ofinterest in this type of training.

Pipeline Security

In response to concerns expressed by several CentralAsian countries, ATA is developing a course that willteach energy pipeline security. Given the vastpetroleum resources in the region, and the need for anextensive pipeline network for export, the governmentsof this region are increasingly concerned with theirsecurity. ATA hopes to have a pilot course availablewithin the near future to help address their concerns.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

A major new area of training for ATA addresses theproblems of managing the effects of a terrorist attackusing chemical, biological, or radioactive materials,which are referred to as WMD. Such attacks presentsignificant problems that are new, different, and ofmuch greater scope than terrorist incidents involvingconventional weapons.

Courses have been developed and implemented to trainforeign “first responders” — police officers, firefighters,paramedics, and emergency room staff — to cope with

the complications of responding to terrorist attacksusing chemical, biological, or radioactive weapons.These types of attacks can be more deadly than the1998 massive truck bombs that destroyed the U.S.embassies in East Africa and the recent attacks on theWorld Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon.The ATA “first responder” program mirrors the U.S.Government’s domestic program. As much as possible,the training and equipment will be the same as thatprovided to first responders in the United States.

Terrorist Financing

The ATA program, working with experts in otheragencies, is developing programs to help foreignofficials to counter terrorist fund raising. In recentyears, international terrorist organizations have reliedless and less on state sponsors for their financing andother material support. However, many of these groupshave founded charities and service organizations asfronts through which they seek contributions frompeople who believe they are for legitimate purposes.Some terrorist groups also operate legitimate businessesas front companies to raise money or facilitate transfers.A course designed to teach investigators how to trace,follow and link terrorist groups with their funds hasbeen developed and was presented to a test country inJuly 2001. This pilot course was very well received andshould become available for general offering.

ATA Results and Impact

ATA training provides the participant country policeand security forces with a cadre of trained officersfamiliar with American values and thinking, on whomthe RSO and other U.S. officials can rely in times ofcrisis. ATA training has also been widely credited withincreasing the confidence, and in turn, theprofessionalism of students who have completed thetraining. In many countries, follow-up programreviews have determined that these officers have notonly grown in skill and confidence, but also haveadvanced beyond their peers in promotion and staturedue to the knowledge and training gained from theirATA training.

In addition to providing individual students withenhanced training, there are numerous examples where

20

ATA training has directly thwarted or solved severalmajor terrorist incidents or major crimes. For example,in one country, ATA-trained police, using thetechniques they learned during Surveillance Detectiontraining, arrested two terrorists with a bomb in theirpossession outside the home of a judge. In another, anATA-trained Police Crisis Response Team was deployedto the presidential palace of a country during anattempted coup d’etat, thus thwarting an overthrow ofthe government. In still another, a graduate of the ATAcourse in Police Crisis Management was called upon to

respond to a crisis situation at a nightclub that wasfirebombed with 13 people killed and numerous othersinjured. This officer attributes his ATA training incrisis management as key to his ability to handle thesubsequent panic and confusion of the situation.

Connecting with ATA

To learn more about ATA, the program office operatesits own Internet Web site, which can be found athttp://www.diplomaticsecurity.org. _

21

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

22

THE 9/11 ATTACKS IN CONTEXT

Until September 11th, a total of no more than perhaps1,000 Americans had been killed by terrorists either inthis country or abroad since 1968 — the year creditedwith marking the advent of the modern era ofinternational terrorism when the Popular Front for theLiberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al flighton July 23. To put the events of that tragic day furtherin context, until the attacks on the World Trade Centerand Pentagon, no terrorist operation had killed morethan 500 persons at one time.1 Whatever the metric,the enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneoussuicide attacks of that day eclipse anything we havepreviously seen — either individually or in aggregate.Accordingly, for that reason alone, September 11thargues for nothing less than a re-configuration of bothour thinking about terrorism and how we both prepareand organize to counter it. Such a change is amplyjustified by the unique constellation of operationalcapabilities evident in that day’s tragic attacks: showinga level of planning, professionalism and tradecraft rarelyseen among the vast majority of terrorists and terroristmovements we have known.2 Among the mostsignificant characteristics of the operation were its:

• ambitious scope and dimensions;• consummate coordination and synchronization;• professionalism and tradecraft that kept so large an

operation so secret; and• the unswerving dedication and determination of the

19 aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonlykilled themselves, the passengers and crews of the four

aircraft they commandeered and the thousands ofpersons working in or visiting both the World TradeCenter and the Pentagon.

The significance of the September 11th incidents froma terrorist operational perspective is that simultaneousattacks — using far more prosaic and arguablyconventional means of attack (such as car bombs, forexample) — are relatively uncommon. For reasons notwell understood, terrorists typically have notundertaken such coordinated operations. This wasdoubtless less of a choice than a reflection of thelogistical and other organizational hurdles that mostterrorist groups are not able to overcome. Indeed, thiswas one reason why we were so galvanized by thesynchronized attacks on the American embassies inNairobi and Dar es Salaam three years ago. Theorchestration of that operation, coupled with itsunusually high death and casualty tolls, stood out in away that, until September 11th, few other terroristactions had: bringing bin Laden as much renown asinfamy in many quarters.

TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM AFTER SEPTEMBER 11TH

By Bruce HoffmanVice President, External Affairs Director, RAND Corporation Washington Office

The enormity and sheer scale of the simultaneous suicide terrorist attacks on September 11 eclipsesanything previously seen — either individually or in aggregate, says Bruce Hoffman, vice presidentand director of the RAND Washington office. “It calls, unquestionably, for a proportionate responseof unparalleled determination and focus such as we see today in our actions both in the United Statesand abroad, as well as one that utilizes the full range of formidable tools at our disposal —diplomatic, military, and economic.”

_ C O M M E N T A R Y

1. Approximately 440 persons perished in a 1979 fire deliberately set by terrorists at amovie theater in Abadan, Iran.

2. Nor is this a particularly “American-centric” view in reaction to the stunning andtragic events of two months ago. For example, an old friend and colleague, who is oneof Israel’s leading counterterrorist experts, and who has long experience in military, thegovernment and academe was totally shocked by the September 11th attacks —specifically, their coordination, daring and lethality — remarking: “Never could I haveimagined that terrorists could or would do that” (telephone conversation, 17September 2001). I am also reminded of a conversation with a senior, highly decoratedSri Lankan Armed Forces brigade commander and military intelligence operative whoonce explained in great detail the “difficulties of pulling off even a successful,significant terrorist attack” (discussion, Batticola, Sri Lanka, December 1997)-not least the four orchestrated suicide aircraft hijackings and crashes that occurred onSeptember 11th.

During the 1990s, perhaps only one other (presumablyunrelated) terrorist incident evidenced those samecharacteristics of coordination and high lethality: theseries of attacks that occurred in Bombay in March1993, where a dozen or so simultaneous car bombingsrocked the city, killing nearly 300 persons andwounding more than 700 others.3 Indeed, apart fromthe attacks on the same morning in October 1983 ofthe U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut and a nearby Frenchparatroop headquarters, and the IRA’s near-simultaneous assassination of Lord Mounbatten andremote-control mine attack on British troops inWarrenpoint, Northern Ireland, in 1979, it is hard torecall many other significant incidents reflecting suchoperational expertise, coordination and synchronization.

WHERE WE WENT WRONG IN FAILING TO

PREDICT THE 9/11 ATTACKS

Accordingly, we were perhaps lulled into believing thatmass, simultaneous attacks in general, and those ofsuch devastating potential as we saw in New York andWashington on September 11th, were likely beyondmost capabilities of most terrorists — including thosedirectly connected to or associated with Osama binLaden. The tragic events of that September daydemonstrate how profoundly misplaced suchassumptions were. In this respect, we perhapsoverestimated the significance of our past successes(e.g., in largely foiling most of bin Laden’s terroristoperations during the period between the August 1998embassy bombings and the November 2000 attack onthe USS Cole) and the terrorists’ own incompetenceand propensity for mistakes (e.g., Ahmad Ressam’sbungled attempt to enter the United States fromCanada in December 1999). Indeed, both moreimpressive and disturbing is the fact that there waslikely considerable overlap in the planning for theseattacks and the one last November against the USSCole in Aden: thus suggesting a multi-track operationaland organizational capability to coordinate major,multiple attacks at one time.

Attention was also arguably focused too exclusivelyeither on the low-end threat posed by car and truckbombs against buildings or the more exotic high-endthreats, involving biological or chemical weapons orcyber-attacks. The implicit assumptions of much ofour planning scenarios on mass casualty attacks were

that they would involve germ or chemical agents orresult from widespread electronic attacks on criticalinfrastructure and that any conventional or lessextensive incident could be addressed simply byplanning for the most catastrophic threat. This left apainfully vulnerable gap in our anti-terrorism defenseswhere a traditional and long-proven tactic — likeairline hijacking — was neglected in favor of other, lessconventional threats, and the consequences of using anaircraft as a suicide weapon seem to have been almostcompletely discounted.

In retrospect, it arguably was not the 1995 sarin nervegas attack on the Tokyo subway and nine attempts touse bio-weapons by Aum that should have been thedominant influence on our counterterrorist thinking,but a 1986 hijacking of a Pan Am flight in Karachi,where the terrorists’ intentions were reported to havebeen to crash it into the center of Tel Aviv, and the1994 hijacking in Algiers of an Air France passengerplane by terrorists belonging to the Armed IslamicGroup (GIA), who similarly planned to crash the fuel-laden aircraft with its passengers into the heart of Paris.The lesson, accordingly, is not that we need to beunrealistically omniscient, but rather that we need to beable to respond across a broad technological spectrumof potential adversarial attacks.

We also had long consoled ourselves — and had onlyrecently begun to question and debate the notion —that terrorists were more interested in publicity thankilling and therefore had neither the need nor interestin annihilating large numbers of people. For decades,there was widespread acceptance of the observationmade famous by Brian Jenkins in 1975 that, “Terroristswant a lot of people watching and a lot of peoplelistening and not a lot of people dead.”4 Even despitethe events of the mid-1980s — when a series of high-profile and particularly lethal suicide car and truck-bombings were directed against American diplomaticand military targets in the Middle East (in one instanceresulting in the deaths of 241 Marines) — manyanalysts saw no need to revise these arguments. In1985, Jenkins, one of the most perspicacious and acuteobservers of this phenomenon, again noted that,

23

3. Celia W. Dugger, “Victims of ‘93 Bombay Terror Wary of U.S. Motives,” NewYork Times, 24 September 20014. Brian Michael Jenkins, “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict” inDavid Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds.), International Terrorism and World Security(London: Croom Helm, 1975), p. 15.

“simply killing a lot of people has seldom been oneterrorist objective . . . Terrorists operate on the principleof the minimum force necessary. They find itunnecessary to kill many, as long as killing a fewsuffices for their purposes.”5 The events of September11th prove such notions now to be wishful thinking, ifnot dangerously anachronistic. On that day, bin Ladenarguably wiped the slate clean of the conventionalwisdom on terrorists and terrorism and, by doing so,ushered in a new era of conflict, more bloody anddestructive than before.

Finally, bin Laden himself has re-written the history ofboth terrorism and probably of the post-Cold War era— which he arguably single-handedly ended onSeptember 11th. At a time when the forces ofglobalization, coupled with economic determinism,seemed to have submerged the role of the individualcharismatic leader of men beneath far more powerful,impersonal forces, bin Laden has cleverly cast himself(admittedly and inadvertently with our assistance) as aDavid against the American Goliath: one man standingup to the world’s sole remaining superpower and ableto challenge its might and directly threaten its citizens.To his followers, bin Laden has proven to be the fabledright man in the right place at the right time:possessing the vision, financial resources, organizationalskills, and flair for self-promotion to meld together thedisparate strands of Islamic fervor, Muslim piety, andgeneral enmity toward the West into a formidableglobal force.

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE

The concept of proportionality has long governedAmerican counterterrorist policy. Its Americanproponents argued, and our many allies throughout theworld expected, that the American military responsewould be commensurate with the terrorist attack thatprovoked it. Thus, in 1986, when the Qadhafi regimewas implicated in the bombing of a West Berlindiscotheque frequented by American soldiers, theUnited States retaliated with airstrikes directed againstLibyan military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi —

including Muammar Qadhafi’s living quarters — in anattempt to eliminate the Libyan leader himself.Similarly, in 1998, when bin Laden was identified asthe architect of the massive truck bombings of theAmerican embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S.launched nearly 100 cruise missiles against his trainingcamps in Afghanistan — also in hopes of killing him— as well as against a pharmaceutical factory allegedlylinked to bin Laden and believed to be manufacturingchemical weapons in the Sudan. Two Americans hadlost their lives in the discotheque bombing and twelvein Nairobi. In the latter case, the response may havebeen insufficient. But our situation today leaves noroom for quibbling.

As previously noted, the enormity and sheer scale of thesimultaneous suicide attacks on September 11 eclipsesanything we have previously seen — either individuallyor in aggregate. It calls, unquestionably, for aproportionate response of unparalleled determinationand focus such as we see today in our actions both inthe United States and abroad, as well as one that utilizesthe full range of formidable tools at our disposal —diplomatic, military, and economic. While muchattention is currently focused on the military optionsbeing exercised in South Asia, they are only oneinstrument that the United States can bring to bear inthe struggle against terrorism. Our efforts need to befully coordinated, sustained, and prolonged. They willrequire commitment, political will, and patience. Theymust have realistic goals and not unduly raise or createfalse expectations. And, finally, they must avoidcosmetic or “feel-good” physical security measures thatcontribute only tangentially, if at all, to the enhancementof national as well as international security.

In conclusion, it must be appreciated that the struggleagainst terrorism is never-ending. By the same token,our search for solutions and new approaches must beequally continuous and unyielding, proportional to thethreat posed by our adversaries in both innovation anddetermination. _

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.

24

5. Brian Michael Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA:The RAND Corporation, P-7119, July 1985), p. 6.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

INTRODUCTION

The unprecedented terrorist attacks on September 11and the subsequent series of anthrax attacks haveushered in a new era of terrorism in the United States.Although there previously have been relatively large-scale terrorist attacks in America, such as the 1995Oklahoma City bombing, the coordination, planning,and scale of the September 11 attacks demonstrate thatmass-casualty terrorism has reached the U.S. homeland.

Even bioterrorism is not a new phenomenon in U.S.history. In 1984 a cult in a small Oregon town usedsalmonella to contaminate salad bars in an effort toinfluence a local election. The cult, which chose anincapacitating rather than lethal agent, succeeded inmaking 751 people ill, but no one died. In 1994 and1995, four men, all members of an extremistantigovernment group in Minnesota called the PatriotsCouncil, were the first people ever convicted ofpossession of a biological agent for use as a weaponunder the 1989 Biological Weapons Antiterrorism Act.The men acquired the protein toxin ricin, which isderived from castor beans, possibly to use against locallaw enforcement and federal officials. Although thePatriots Council plan was never carried out, the groupwas heavily influenced by rightwing extremist ChristianIdentity ideology, similar to the ideology thatinfluenced Timothy McVeigh.

Even though both bioterrorism and large-scaleconventional terrorism were threats to the United Statesprior to September 11, the events of the last twomonths have shown that a quantum leap in terroristtactics may be occurring. Trends in terrorism over thepast 15 years indicate that loosely linked transnationalnetworks motivated primarily by religious ideologiesseeking mass casualties are replacing more “traditional”terrorists who are motivated primarily by politics —such as creating a homeland or seeking justice forperceived oppression by the target state. Theseominous trends suggest the potential for mass-casualtyattacks, and because biological agents could be used inthis fashion, the potential for mass-casualtybioterrorism may be at hand.

This article reviews the historical context of the currentanthrax attacks, paying special attention to looking atthe current situation in broad perspective. Then itexplores why the United States is so vulnerable to thistype of terrorism and offers policy recommendations toaddress these vulnerabilities.

THE CURRENT ANTHRAX ATTACKS

In spite of hundreds of anthrax hoaxes since 1998, therecent anthrax attacks are an unprecedented event.Never before in U.S. history has a biological warfareagent been used in war or peacetime against Americans.

25

ANTHRAX AND MASS-CASUALTY TERRORISM: WHAT IS THE BIOTERRORIST THREAT AFTER SEPTEMBER 11?

By Jason PateSenior Research Associate and Manager, Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Project

Monterey Institute of International Studies

“Trends in terrorism over the past 15 years indicate that loosely linked transnational networksmotivated primarily by religious ideologies seeking mass casualties are replacing more ‘traditional’terrorists who are motivated primarily by politics,” says Jason Pate, a senior research associate at theMonterey Institute of International Studies. “These ominous trends suggest the potential for mass-casualty attacks, and because biological agents could be used in this fashion, the potential for mass-casualty bioterrorism may be at hand.”

26

It is no surprise that anthrax is the agent of choice,from both technical and political perspectives. On thetechnical side, anthrax is the prototypical biologicalweapons agent — it is relatively easy to produce, it isextremely virulent, and the infection is not contagious,so the outbreak will not spread beyond those affecteddirectly. Most importantly, anthrax forms ruggedspores when exposed to environmental stresses, andthese spores facilitate processing and weaponization.

From a political perspective, since 1995 there has beenvery high-level political and media attention given toanthrax. In the mid-to-late 1990s, there were greatrevelations that Iraq, the Soviet Union and later Russia,and South Africa had created extensive biologicalweapons programs including work on anthrax. Inaddition, the U.S. military anthrax vaccine programgenerated extensive controversy over safety allegationsthat have not been proven in any clinical trials. Finally,the well publicized arrest of a rightwing extremist in1998 for suspected anthrax possession — he possessedonly the harmless anthrax vaccine strain — opened thefloodgates for hundreds of anthrax hoaxes nationwide1998-2001. During the entire period 1995-2001,hundreds of media, academic, and government reportshighlighted the vulnerability of the United States tobiological terrorism, perhaps emphasizing to potentialterrorists not only that the United States was notprepared to deal with bioterrorism, but also that theAmerican public was terrified of the possibility.

A number of issues are critical to understanding thebioterrorist threat beyond September 11, includingdetermining who used the anthrax and why they usedit. The quality of the anthrax used in the recent attackshas been a matter of discussion. Clearly, the anthraxwas processed using relatively sophisticated techniques,and there are some indications that chemical additiveswere added to help make the spores more effective.These technical details seem to point to theinvolvement of a state in the attacks. However, morequestions than answers remain. Without knowing who perpetrated the attacks, it is very difficult toprepare for the future. Do the perpetrators have alimited supply of anthrax, or do they have an ongoingproduction capability?

Perhaps even more important is the motivation of theattackers. Thus far, the attacks have not been designedto affect large numbers of people and have beenaccompanied by warning letters identifying both thatan attack had occurred and what agent was involved.In addition, the letters do not represent an effectivedelivery system — very few people have been affected.Future larger-scale attacks may not come with suchclear indicators. In order to maximize casualties,anthrax attackers would not announce that an incidenthad occurred. Rather, people would begin exhibitingsymptoms and would die, and it would be up to thepublic health system to identify that an attack hadoccurred, by which time it would probably be too lateto save many victims.

In sum, the recent anthrax attacks occurred in ahistorical context. Although the attacks areunprecedented, they should not necessarily come as asurprise. Fortunately, the attacks have been verylimited, but the potential exists for a much larger-scaleaerosol delivery resulting in mass casualties.

WHY THE UNITED STATES IS VULNERABLE

TO MASS-CASUALTY BIOTERRORISM

The United States is a vast, open society that by its verynature is vulnerable to terrorism in general. U.S.borders are open to both goods and people, interstatemovements are virtually unregulated, and there hasnever before been a good reason to implement changes.Of the range of terrorist threats — from truck bomb toplane hijacking to anthrax attack to smallpox epidemic— that could cause mass casualties, the United States isperhaps least able to deal with bioterrorism. Whereassecurity measures can be implemented at airports toeliminate the possibility of a repeat of September 11,and potential target structures can be made lessvulnerable to conventional attack, there is no quick andstraightforward solution to the bioterrorism problem.

One of the reasons the United States is so vulnerable tobioterrorism is because successive federal, state, andlocal governments in the country have allowed the U.S.public health infrastructure to deteriorate over the lastthree decades. After successful pathogen eradicationcampaigns, the advent of powerful antibiotics, and the

emergence of a largely healthy middle and upper class,public health in the 1970s did not seem a high priorityin an era of budget cuts. Today, the public healthsystem across the United States barely has enoughfunding, staff, and other resources to manage day-to-day issues, much less crises caused by either naturaloutbreaks or bioterrorism. The United States simplydoes not have the capacity to manage a disease outbreakaffecting hundreds or thousands of people.

At the international level, there are very few tools thatare effective against the bioterrorist threat. The 1972Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) isthe main international treaty governing biologicalweapons. Other mechanisms exist, such as theAustralia Group, which attempts to provide guidelinesfor technology exports related to biological weaponsproduction. But the Australia Group has limitedenforcement power and does not include certain keystates of concern. In addition, the Group limits onlyrelatively large-capacity equipment; this does notaddress the possibility of smaller-scale clandestineproduction. The BWC itself has no enforcement ofverification regime, and although a draft Protocol wassubmitted to the BWC’s Conference of States Partiesthis year, the United States refused to sign thedocument, effectively halting work on augmenting thetreaty’s ability to enforce its provisions. A BWCReview Conference is scheduled for November 2001,although it is unclear whether there will be any moreprogress toward a verification agreement.

However, even with U.S. signature and a completedProtocol, it is far from clear that the BWC would doanything in the fight against bioterrorism other thanhelp to build and strengthen the international normagainst biological weapons. Indeed, the treaty text doesnot address terrorism but focuses instead on the threatfrom states.

At the national policy level, the concepts of deterrenceand foreign policy that were so useful during the ColdWar do not apply to the threat of bioterrorism. Whenthe adversary is an elusive network of enigmatic diehardoperatives completely dedicated to their cause, it isnearly impossible to design a strategy to respond.Terrorists rarely have targetable assets, either financially

or militarily. Efforts to freeze terrorist financial assets are hampered by the vastness of the internationalbanking system, and only in cases where states aresupporting terrorists is it possible to find a militarytarget. All attempts to destroy al-Qaida’s infrastructureare laudable, and the United States should continue topursue the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks.But it is crucial to remember that these efforts havelimited value.

In sum, the vulnerability of the United States tobioterrorism, the lack of effective international means,and ingrained Cold War foreign policy concepts makeresponding to the bioterrorist threat exceedinglycomplex and challenging.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policies to address the bioterrorist threat come in threebroad categories: addressing terrorism generally,responding to a mass-casualty bioterrorist incidentspecifically, and maximizing all available internationaloptions.

The United States should continue to use all means atits disposal to eliminate the current terrorist threat fromal-Qaida and related organizations. This includesraising the costs of sponsoring terrorism so high thatterrorists will not be able to operate easily; maximizingintelligence operations directed against terrorism; andmaking it clear that terrorism is unacceptable, in orderto deter future attacks. In addition, the United Statesshould work very closely with its international partnersto coordinate efforts designed to reduce the biologicalweapons threat. Security will be increased if the taboosagainst biological weapons are strengthened and theinternational community works together to address the threat.

There are limits to what the United States can donationally and internationally to address bioterrorism.Therefore, policymakers should accept that it isimpossible to eliminate completely either the terroristthreat or the threat from bioterrorism. It is thereforehighly critical that the United States prepare itself todetect and respond to a bioterrorist incident. This includes steps to:

27

• Immediately augment the public health system. Thisincludes increasing funding and resources that willenable the public health system to increase itscapacity.

• Design and implement an extensive surveillancenetwork for disease outbreaks.

• Link all health providers to the Internet, and createonline resources that will serve as the centralrepository for disease information. Real-time datawill enable health officials to monitor public healthand identify critical developments before they becomeunmanageable.

• Upgrade laboratory capabilities so that many morelabs have the ability to identify pathogens usingstandardized procedures which will also need to bedeveloped.

• Educate and inform all health-care providers torecognize the signs and symptoms of suspiciousoutbreaks. _

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.)

28

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

29

The history of lawless police states leaves little doubthow one would respond to a terrorist attack. Thegovernment would declare a national emergency toinvoke new “emergency” powers and measures. Alreadysecretly tracking many citizens, the police wouldexpand surveillance in a search for the attackers. Theywould quickly arrest suspects, potential witnesses, andmaybe dissidents and critics as well. The arrestedwould be held in isolation and possibly abused to makethem talk. Finally, the authorities would first secretlydecide who is guilty (or who should be called guilty)and afterwards announce that judgment in show trials,followed by execution or long terms of imprisonment.

A lawless response would be swift and seeminglyefficient because it could be decided personally by oneor a few men whose orders are “law” to their underlings.

The United States has responded to terrorist attackswith the same tools of criminal justice: surveillance,arrest, detention, and trial. But in a state ruled by lawrather than personal fiat, these tools are not crafted byPresident Bush and his counselors. They were insteadauthorized by pre-existing laws in the U.S.Constitution, legislation enacted by Congress, andexecutive regulations. Furthermore, with fewexceptions, the only U.S. “emergency powers” are onesgiven the President by laws which Congress haspreviously passed, not ones he gives himself because hethinks it necessary. And if the tools provided by lawprove to be too slow and cumbersome to meet theterrorist threat, they must be changed by a publiclegislative process, not by presidential order.

SURVEILLANCE

The U.S. Constitution protects the people from“unreasonable searches and seizures.” To be reasonable,a search — whether conducted physically in the homeor electronically by wiretap or other communicationsintercept — must ordinarily be pre-approved by anindependent judge on evidence showing that there isprobable cause to believe that evidence of a crime willbe found. Evidence obtained in violation of thesestandards can be thrown out of court. But the U.S.Supreme Court has recognized that collecting securityintelligence is different from collecting evidence of acrime, partly because it is needed to prevent spying orterrorism and not just to solve completed crimes.Congress has therefore enacted a law permittingindependent judges to authorize surveillance for thepurpose of collecting foreign intelligence on a lessershowing of probable cause. The government need onlyshow that there is probable cause to believe that thetarget of the surveillance is a foreign agent orinternational terrorist.

Such foreign intelligence surveillance was already beingconducted before the September 11 attacks on theUnited States, and, indeed, had produced crucialevidence against the terrorists who were ultimately triedfor the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies inTanzania and Kenya. But the law before September 11also restricted some surveillance. U.S. newspapersreport, for example, that before September 11 thegovernment was unable to make the showing requiredto obtain surveillance of one of the men now suspected

BRINGING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

By Peter Raven-HansenGlen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, The George Washington Law School

“Bringing terrorists to justice under the rule of law is a slow, cumbersome, inefficient business,” saysGeorge Washington Law School Professor Peter Raven-Hansen. Nevertheless, the United Statescontinues to apply the rule of law in the investigation and prosecution of the global war on terrorism.“The United States has responded to terrorist attacks with the same tools of criminal justice:surveillance, arrest, detention, and trial.”

30

of participating in the September 11 attacks. Inaddition, the pre-September 11 foreign surveillance lawwas technologically obsolete in some respects. It wasintended to apply chiefly to traditional telephonewiretaps and was not well-suited to email and othermeans of communications developed since the law was enacted.

The Bush administration therefore sought changes inthe law from Congress after the September 11 attack.Because the U.S. lawmaking process is public, so wasthe ensuing debate in Congress and in the U.S. massmedia. Defenders of privacy resisted many of thechanges sought by the Administration, and proponentsof greater security promoted them. In the end, somecompromises were made in a new law expandingsecurity surveillance. Yet the new law still falls short ofthe unrestricted surveillance which we would expect ina police state. An independent judge must still approvesecurity surveillance, it must still be directed at foreignagents or international terrorists, with specialprotections for U.S. citizens in many cases, and it is still not open-ended.

ARREST AND DETENTION

In the first seven weeks of its investigation of theSeptember 11 attacks, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation detained over 1,100 persons. But theU.S. Constitution protects a person from unreasonable“seizure” — arrest and detention — as well as fromunreasonable search. There is no law which allowsgeneral “preventative detention” — detaining a personindefinitely in order to prevent him from committing acrime in the future — except for enemy aliens in war.The police may stop someone for questioning only onreasonable suspicion that he has been or is involved incriminal activity and may detain him only temporarilybefore charging him with a crime.

The arrest of most of the 1,100 met this standard, butnot because they were reasonably suspected of beinginvolved in the September 11 attack. Instead, theywere arrested on suspicion of committing what the U.S.Attorney General called “spitting on the sidewalk”:minor crimes like traffic violations, using falseidentities, or credit card fraud. Detention without bailfor persons suspected of such minor crimes is unusual;

often even conviction for such crimes carries no jailsentence. Consequently, the “spitting-on-the-sidewalk”detentions have been the subject of growing debate inthe media, and defenders of civil liberties have insistedthat the government is really embarked on anunprecedented and legally controversial policy ofpreventative detention to meet the threat of terrorism.

Another 200 detainees are aliens who are reasonablysuspected of violating their immigration status in theUnited States, by, for example, overstaying their studentvisas. Before September 11, however, persons suspectedof minor “overstays” were hardly ever detained for morethan a short period while they awaited immigrationproceedings. The continued detention of such aliens inthe September 11 investigation has also been criticizedas preventative detention.

Nevertheless, there is an essential difference betweenthe wholesale and unrestricted round-up of suspectsand dissidents which we would expect in a lawlesspolice state and the September 11 detentions. It is thatthe U.S. government has been obliged publicly tojustify its arrests by law, even if its justifications havebeen criticized. In addition, the detainees have rightsunder U.S. law while they are detained. A detainee hasthe right to call a lawyer, and if the detainee is chargedwith a crime, he has a right to have a lawyer appointedfor him at government expense. The Department ofJustice has asserted that each detainee has beeninformed of this right, although questions remainabout how easy it has been for detainees to exercise theright. Detainees also have a right to be protected fromphysical abuse during their detention. No one has yetcredibly complained that this right has been violated.

Under the rule of law, it is usually preferable to changelaw when it no longer meets perceived social needs thanto bend it, let alone break it. In fact, the AttorneyGeneral did ask Congress for new authority to detain aperson indefinitely if he had reason to believe that theperson was a terrorist or was likely to commit a terroristact. Despite the terrorist emergency, Congress rejectedthat request, doubting that such an expansion ofdetention authority was necessary or constitutional.Instead, it has given him new but limited authority todetain aliens for short periods before startingimmigration proceedings against them.

31

TRIAL

The U.S. Constitution guarantees a bundle ofimportant rights to a person charged with a crime.First, and perhaps most important, he has the right to aspeedy and public trial. He has the right to confrontthe witnesses and see the evidence against him. He hasa right to a lawyer at the government’s expense. He hasthe right to ask for a jury of impartial ordinary citizensto decide whether the evidence shows his guilt “beyonda reasonable doubt.” And he has the right to see anyevidence which the government has found which mightshow his innocence.

These rights were afforded the terrorists who were triedin U.S. courts for the 1993 World Trade Centerbombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the1998 embassy bombings. In the latter case, forexample, lawyers for defendants — indicted along withOsama bin Laden as members of the al-Qaida network— succeeded during a five-month trial in having somecriminal charges dismissed, some surveillance declaredunlawful, and some evidence against them thrown outof court. Nevertheless, after hearing 205 witnesses, thejury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendantswere guilty of bombing the U.S. embassies.

Despite the government’s unbroken record of success interrorist prosecutions, however, they have not beenproblem-free. A major drawback in trying terrorists isthat some of the evidence against them (or which theyare entitled to see) may have been obtained from secretintelligence sources and methods. Disclosure of theevidence may jeopardize such sources and methods. Inone terrorism prosecution, for example, the governmenthad to disclose evidence which had been obtained byan electronic intercept of a communication by the alQaeda network. Within a short time after the disclosure,the network reportedly stopped using that channel ofcommunication and the intelligence source was lost.

The obvious solution to this risk — keeping theevidence secret from the terrorist defendant and hislawyers — is prohibited by U.S. law. In non-criminalimmigration proceedings to remove suspected terroristaliens from the United States, however, the governmenthas tried to use secret evidence when it was necessary toprotect intelligence sources and methods. This use of

secret evidence, however, may also be unlawful. At leastthree lower courts have rejected immigration decisionsin such cases on the ground that using secret evidenceviolates the right of aliens to the due process of lawguaranteed by the Constitution. But these decisionsdid not dictate whether the government is permitted touse secret evidence in other parts of the country, andthe Supreme Court — which could decide thisquestion for the entire nation — has not yet done so.

Consequently, before September 11, some members ofCongress proposed a law which would have prohibitedthe immigration authorities from using secret evidence.After September 11, the support for such a law has, atleast temporarily, evaporated. Courts must thereforecontinue to decide case by case whether secret evidencecan be used in immigration proceedings until theSupreme Court or Congress settles the question.

CONCLUSION

Bringing terrorists to justice under the rule of law is aslow, cumbersome, inefficient business. It may even bean unsuccessful business, if essential evidence isexcluded because it was obtained by unlawfulsurveillance, if the government decides that it cannotrisk disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, or ifthe proof does not show guilt beyond a reasonabledoubt (even though it shows that it is more probablethan not that defendant is guilty). But as the SupremeCourt once said in deciding to free a terrorist who hadbeen unlawfully tried during the Civil War:

The power of punishment is alone [available] throughthe means which the laws have provided for thatpurpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an immunityfrom punishment, no matter ... how much ... crimes mayhave shocked the ... country, or endangered its safety.By the protection of law human rights are secured;withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy ofwicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people.

In its quest for protection from terrorists, the UnitedStates will never give up the protection of law. _

(The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. Government.)

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

32

The Office of Counterterrorism, headed byAmbassador Francis X. Taylor, coordinates all U.S.Government efforts to improve counterterrorismcooperation with foreign governments. TheCoordinator chairs the Interagency Working Group onCounterterrorism and the State Department’s terrorismtask forces to coordinate responses to majorinternational terrorist incidents that are in progress.The Coordinator has primary responsibility fordeveloping, coordinating, and implementing Americancounterterrorism policy.

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

• First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike nodeals;

• Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes;

• Third, isolate and apply pressure on states thatsponsor terrorism to force them to change theirbehavior; and

• Fourth, bolster the counterterrorism capabilities ofthose countries that work with the U.S. and requireassistance.

The United States Government will make noconcessions to terrorists holding official or private U.S.citizens hostage. It will not pay ransom, releaseprisoners, change its policies, or agree to other acts thatmight encourage additional terrorism. At the sametime, the United States will use every appropriateresource to gain the safe return of American citizenswho are held hostage by terrorists. Hostage-taking isdefined under international law (InternationalConvention Against the Taking of Hostages, adoptedDecember 17, 1979) as the seizing or detaining andthreatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain aperson in order to compel a third party to do or abstainfrom doing any act as an explicit or implicit conditionfor the release of the seized or detained person.

It is internationally accepted that governments areresponsible for the safety and welfare of persons withintheir borders. Aware of both the terrorist threat andpublic safety shortcomings in many parts of the world,the United States has developed enhanced physical andpersonal security programs for U.S. personnel and hasestablished cooperative arrangements with the U.S.private sector. It also has established bilateral counter-terrorism assistance programs and close intelligence andlaw enforcement relationships with many nations tohelp prevent terrorist incidents or to resolve them in amanner that will deny the perpetrators benefits fromtheir actions.

The United States also seeks effective judicialprosecution and punishment for terrorists andcriminals victimizing the United States Government orits citizens and will use all legal methods to these ends,including extradition. U.S. policy and goals are clear,and the United States Government actively pursuesthem alone and in cooperation with othergovernments.

The United States Government believes that payingransom or making other concessions to terrorists inexchange for the release of hostages increases the dangerthat others will be taken. Its policy therefore rejects alldemands for ransom, prisoner exchanges, and dealswith terrorists in exchange for the release of hostages.At the same time, it will make every effort, includingcontact with representatives of the captors, to obtainthe release of the hostages.

The United States strongly urges American companiesand private citizens not to pay ransom. It believes thatgood security practices, relatively modest securityexpenditures, and continual close cooperation withembassy and local authorities can lower the risk toAmericans living in high-threat environments.

The United States Government is concerned for thewelfare of its citizens but cannot support requests that

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: AMERICAN HOSTAGES

_ F A C T S H E E T S

33

host governments violate their own laws or abdicatetheir normal law enforcement responsibilities. On theother hand, if the employing organization or companyworks closely with local authorities and follows U.S.policy, U.S. Foreign Service posts can actively pursueefforts to bring the incident to a safe conclusion. Thisincludes providing reasonable administrative servicesand, if desired by the local authorities and theAmerican organization, full participation in strategysessions. Requests for United States Governmenttechnical assistance or expertise will be considered on acase-by-case basis. The full extent of United StatesGovernment participation must await an analysis ofeach specific set of circumstances.

If a U.S. private organization or company seeks releaseof hostages by paying ransom or pressuring the hostgovernment for political concessions, U.S. ForeignService posts will limit their participation to basicadministrative services, such as facilitating contactswith host government officials. The host governmentand the U.S. private organization or citizen mustunderstand that if they wish to follow a hostageresolution path different from that of United StatesGovernment policy, they do so without its approval or

cooperation. The United States Government cannotparticipate in developing and implementing a ransomstrategy. However, U.S. Foreign Service posts maymaintain a discreet contact with the parties to keepabreast of developments.

Under current U.S. law 18 USC 1203 (Act for thePrevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, enacted October 1984 in implementation ofthe U.N. Convention on Hostage-Taking), seizure of aU.S. national as a hostage anywhere in the world is acrime, as is any hostage-taking action in which theUnited States Government is a target or the hostage-taker is a U.S. national. Such acts, therefore, aresubject to investigation by the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation and to prosecution by U.S. authorities.Actions by private persons or entities that have theeffect of aiding and abetting the hostage-taking,concealing knowledge of it from the authorities, orobstructing its investigation, may themselves be inviolation of U.S. law. _

Source: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department ofState.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

34

The designation of state sponsors of terrorism by theUnited States — and the imposition of sanctions — isa mechanism for isolating nations that use terrorism asa means of political expression. U.S. policy seeks topressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renouncethe use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, andbring terrorists to justice for past crimes.

Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syriacontinue to be the seven governments that the U.S.Secretary of State has designated as state sponsors ofinternational terrorism.

The following list of terrorist groups is presented in twosections. The first section lists the 28 groupsdesignated by the Secretary of State on October 5,2001 as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs),pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration andNationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism andEffective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The designationscarry legal consequences:

• It is unlawful to provide funds or other materialsupport to a designated FTO.

• Representatives and certain members of a designatedFTO can be denied visas or excluded from the UnitedStates.

• U.S. financial institutions must block funds ofdesignated FTOs and their agents and must reportthe blockage to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The second section lists other terrorist groups that wereactive during 2000. Terrorist groups whose activitieswere limited in scope in 2000 are not included.

I. DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST

ORGANIZATIONS

1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

2. Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

3. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

4. Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)

5. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)

6. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)

7. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)

8. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)

9. Hizballah (Party of God)

10. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)

11. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)

12. Kahane Chai (Kach)

13. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)

14. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

15. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

16. National Liberation Army (ELN) — Colombia

17. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

18. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

19. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine(PFLP)

STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

35

20. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)

21. al-Qa’ida

22. Real IRA (RIRA)

23. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)

24. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)

25. Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17November)

26. Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army/Front(DHKP/C)

27. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)

28. United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia(AUC-Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)

Legal Criteria for Designation

1. The organization must be foreign.2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity as

defined in Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigrationand Nationality Act.

3. The organization’s activities must threaten the securityof U.S. nationals or the national security (nationaldefense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) ofthe United States.

II. OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR)

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

First of October Antifascist Resistance Group(GRAPO)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of Mohammed)

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

New People’s Army (NPA)

Orange Volunteers (OV)

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)

Red Hand Defenders (RHD)

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) _

Source: “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000” annual report, “Foreign TerroristOrganizations” (FTOs) 2001 biennial report, Office of the Coordinator forCounterterrorism, U.S. Department of State.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

36

Cotter, Michael W. TRACKING DOWN THETERRORISTS: REGIONAL ALLIES HAVE THEIROWN AXES TO GRIND (American Diplomacy, vol. 6,no. 4, Fall 2001, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/articles/cotter_track/cotter_track.html)

The author, a former Ambassador in Turkmenistan,discusses various issues surrounding the tentative anti-terrorism coalition formed in the aftermath of the terroristattacks on September 11th. He notes that many ofAfghanistan’s Central Asian neighbors (among themIsrael, Russia, Iran, India, and Kyrgyzstan) have pledgedsome degree of support for the United States and thecoalition, but he calls into question their motives for themove. He suggests that the many hidden agendas amongthe allies of the United States may make “tracking downthe terrorists” a complex task. Cotter explains that strongand sustained political leadership as well as an organizedand focused policy of diplomacy will be required in orderto maintain a cohesive and cooperative coalition.

Weiss, Aaron WHEN TERROR STRIKES, WHOSHOULD RESPOND? (Parameters, vol. 31, no. 3,Autumn 2001, pp. 117-133)

In this article the author assesses the best respondent toterrorist attacks against America. The U.S. military’sorganization, discipline and mission-oriented culture havetraditionally made it the first choice for policymakersseeking immediate action in a crisis. However, overdependency upon the military in a terrorist attack coulddecrease the military’s ability to perform its primarywarfighting role and, thus, increase the terrorist threat tothe United States. Weiss views local agencies as the betterrespondents to a terrorist attack, supplemented with goodplanning, training and equipment. In light of theSeptember 11th terrorist attack on America, the author’sviews are timely as counterterrorism policies, structuresand appropriations are enacted.

Laqueur, Walter POSTMODERN TERRORISM(Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5, September/October 1996,http://www.foreignaffairs.org/Search/document_briefings.asp?i=19960901FAEssay4222.xml)

Historian Walter Laqueur believes the contemporaryenvironment offers a bewildering multiplicity of terroristsand potentially terrorist groups and sects. Until now,terrorists were largely nationalists and anarchists, as well asextremists of the left and right. But in the current age,Laqueur says terrorism has found new inspiration for theusers of pure violence. He says that history indicates thatterrorism more often than not has little political impact,and that when it has an effect it is often the opposite ofthe one desired. He notes that 99 out of 100 terroristattempts are likely to fail, but “the single successful onecould claim many more victims, do more materialdamage, and unleash far greater panic than anything theworld has yet experienced.”

Pipes, Daniel WAR, NOT ‘CRIMES’ (National Reviewvol. LIII, no. 19, October 1, 2001, pg. 12)

Daniel Pipes argues that “[t]he time has come for aparadigm shift, toward viewing terrorism as a form ofwarfare.” The consequences, which should follow fromsuch a shift, Pipes writes, include targeting organizationsand governments, which stand behind terrorists, and“relying on the armed forces, not policemen, to protectAmericans.” The United States, Pipes asserts, mustestablish a reputation for “certain and nasty” retributionagainst any terrorists who target Americans. _

The annotations above are part of a more comprehensive Article Alert offered onthe International Home Page of the Office of International InformationPrograms, U.S. Department of State:“http://usinfo.state.gov/admin/001/wwwhapub.html.”

Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and PolicyARTICLE ALERT

_ A G U I D E T O A D D I T I O N A L R E A D I N G

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

37

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilitiesfor Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction(The Gilmore Commission). TOWARD A NATIONALSTRATEGY FOR COMBATING TERRORISM. SantaMonica, CA: Rand, December 15, 2000. 191p.

Alexander, Yonah; Swetnam, Michael S. USAMA BINLADEN'S AL-QAIDA: PROFILE OF A TERRORISTNETWORK. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2001. 160p.

Badolato, Ed. HOW TO COMBAT TERRORISM (TheWorld & I, vol. 16, no. 8, August 2001, pp. 50-53)

Cameron, Gavin; Pate, Jason; Vogel, Kathleen.PLANTING FEAR (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol.57, no. 5, September/October 2001, pp. 38-44)

Combs, Cindy C.; Slann, Martin. ENCYCLOPEDIA OFTERRORISM. New York: Facts on File, 2001. 368p.

Cordesman, Anthony. TERRORISM, ASYMMETRICWARFARE, AND WEAPONS OF MASSDESTRUCTION: DEFENDING THE U.S.HOMELAND. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 456p.

Crenshaw, Martha. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICYAND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (Studies in Conflictand Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 5, September 2001, pp. 329-337)

Dempsey, James X. COUNTERTERRORISM ANDTHE CONSTITUTION (Current History, vol. 99, no.636, April 2000, pp. 164-168)

Juergensmeyer, Mark. TERROR IN THE MIND OFGOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF RELIGIOUSVIOLENCE. Berkeley: University of California, 2000.332p.

Kozlow, Christopher. COUNTER TERRORISM.Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 2000. 285p.

Lesser, Ian O. COUNTERING THE NEWTERRORISM. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999. 176p.

Parachini, John. NON-PROLIFERATION POLICYAND THE WAR ON TERRORISM (Arms ControlToday, vol. 31, no. 8, October 2001, pp. 13-15)

Perl, Raphael. TERRORISM, THE FUTURE, AND U.S.FOREIGN POLICY. Washington: CongressionalResearch Service, Library of Congress, October 16, 2001.16p.

Pillar, Paul R. TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGNPOLICY. Washington: Brookings Institution, 2001.272p.

Rashid, Ahmed. TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL,AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA. NewHaven, CT: Yale University, 2001. 288p.

Stern, Jessica. THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS.Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1999. 214p.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations.STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE: ACOMPILATION. Washington: Government PrintingOffice, September 26, 2001. 114p.

U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. TERRORISM IN THE UNITEDSTATES. Washington: Government Printing Office,2000. 68p.

U.S. Department of State, Counterterrorism Office.PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM. Washington:Government Printing Office, April 2001. 81p.

U.S. General Accounting Office. COMBATINGTERRORISM: SELECTED CHALLENGES ANDRELATED RECOMMENDATIONS. Washington:Government Printing Office, September 2001. 218p.

U.S. General Accounting Office. CRITICALINFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. Washington:Government Printing Office, April 2001. 108p.

U.S. Government. CONPLAN: INTERAGENCYDOMESTIC TERRORISM CONCEPT OFOPERATIONS PLAN. Washington: GovernmentPrinting Office, January 2001. 43p.

U.S. National Commission on Terrorism.COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OFINTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. Washington:Government Printing Office, June 2000. 44p. _

Terrorism: Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and PolicyBIBLIOGRAPHY

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

38

Center for Defense Information: Terrorism Projecthttp://www.cdi.org/terrorism/

Center for Nonproliferation Studies: Terrorismhttp://cns.miis.edu/research/terror.htm

Center for Strategic and International Studies: HomelandDefense http://www.csis.org/burke/hd/index.htm

The Centre for the Study of Terrorism and PoliticalViolencehttp://www.st-and.ac.uk/academic/intrel/research/cstpv/

Council on Foreign Relations: Terrorism Resource Centerhttp://www.cfr.org/Public/media/attack.html

The Counter-Terrorism Pagehttp://www.terrorism.net/home.asp

The Henry L. Stimson Center: Chemical and BiologicalTerrorismhttp://www.stimson.org/cwc/terror.htm

The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism http://www.ict.org.il/institute/ict.htm

National Security Institute: Counter Terrorismhttp://nsi.org/terrorism.html

Studies in Conflict and Terrorismhttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/tf/1057610X.html

Terrorism and Political Violencehttp://www.frankcass.com/jnls/tpv.htm

Terrorism Research Centerhttp://www.terrorism.com/index.shtml

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response http://www.bt.cdc.gov/

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency: The War on Terrorismhttp://www.odci.gov/terrorism/index.html

U.S. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Officehttp://www.ciao.gov/

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Diplomatic Security:Overseas Security Advisory Councilhttp://www.ds-osac.org/

U.S. Department of State: Counterterrorism Officehttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/

U.S. Department of State: Diplomatic Security Service:Rewards for Justicehttp://www.dssrewards.net/

U.S. Department of State: Foreign Terrorist Organizationshttp://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/

U.S. Department of State: International Security:Response to Terrorism http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: Counter-Terrorismhttp://www.epa.gov/swercepp/cntr-ter.html

U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: NationalInfrastructure Protection Center http://www.nipc.gov/

U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Fact Sheet:Terrorismhttp://www.fema.gov/library/terror.htm

U.S. Mission to the U.N.: Political and Security Affairs:Terrorismhttp://www.un.int/usa/terror.htm _

Terrorism:Threat Assessment, Countermeasures and PolicyKEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that the U.S. Department of State assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below; such responsibility resides solely with the providers.

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE VOLUME 6 • NUMBER 3 • NOVEMBER 2001

TERRORISM

U.S. FOREIGN POLICYA G E N D A

VOLUME 6 AN ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE NUMBER 3

November 2001

TERRORISM

Threat Assessment,Countermeasures

and Policy