The Florida State UniversityDigiNole Commons

Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School

October 2013

Bloodied but Bruised: How the World War IIAmerican Army at Kasserine Pass Grew Up inNorth AfricaChris SherwoodThe Florida State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/etd

This Thesis - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at DigiNole Commons. It has been accepted forinclusion in Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigiNole Commons. For more information, please contactlib-ir@fsu.edu.

Recommended CitationSherwood, Chris, "Bloodied but Bruised: How the World War II American Army at Kasserine Pass Grew Up in North Africa" (2013).Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations. Paper 8638.

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

BLOODIED BUT BRUISED:

HOW THE WORLD WAR II AMERICAN ARMY AT KASSERINE PASS GREW UP IN

NORTH AFRICA

By

CHRISTOPHER ERIC JACOB SHERWOOD, SR

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2013

2013 Christopher E. J. Sherwood, Sr.

ii

Christopher Sherwood defended this thesis on October 29, 2013.

The members of the supervisory committee were:

G. Kurt Piehler

Professor Directing Thesis

James Jones

Committee Member

Jonathan Grant

Committee Member

The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and

certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements.

iii

To my brothers and sisters in arms who never made it home!!

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to first thank my adviser, G. Kurt Piehler, for the intellectual guidance,

encouragement, and moral support that helped to make this thesis possible. I am indebted to him

for his infinite patience and support of my career as an Army officer and a scholar. I also thank

him for his personal interest in my research and leadership within the field of military history.

I thank Dr. Richard Sommers and Dr. Conrad Crane of the US Army Military Institute at

Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania for their insightful comments and bibliographic help. In

addition, I thank three archivists, Richard Baker, Shaun Kirkpatrick, and Tom Buffenbarger, also

of MHI, who showed extraordinary patience and diligence throughout my research trip.

I thank my parents, Jeff and Brenda Sherwood, for teaching me to become the person I

am and for their continual support throughout my entire life.

I would like to thank my fellow graduate students, Sean Klimek, Hillary Sebeny, Kyle

Bracken, and Chis Juergens who proofread my thesis and provided thoughtful and insightful

comments. Regardless of any help that I received, I take full responsibility for any errors.

Finally, I could not have done this without the unconditional love and patience provided

by my wife, Allyson. She is the backbone of our family that kept the household running

smoothly even through my deployments, research trips, and long periods of writing. I thank her

from the bottom of my heart for her devotion, sacrifice, and encouragement.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ vi Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... vii

1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................1 2. UNPREPARED .....................................................................................................................20

3. TRAINING ............................................................................................................................80 4. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................134

APPENDICIES ............................................................................................................................142 A. CHRONOLOGY .................................................................................................................142

B. BATTLE ORDER ...............................................................................................................146 C. THE SONG OF THE FIGHTING 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION .........................................152

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................153 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .......................................................................................................162

vi

LIST OF FIGURES

1 Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 ....................................................................................16 2 Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 .....................................................................21 3 Delay and Withdrawal, Sbeitla, 16-17 February ...............................................................38 4 Citation of 2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment following operations in Sbeitla area. LTC Gardiner is in the trench coat near the front of the M4 tank. ................................................47 5 Battles at Kasserine 19-22 February 1943 .........................................................................55 6 American tanks of the 1st Armored Division advance to strengthen Allied positions 20 February 1943 ................................................................................................................................64 7 The tactical solution for a protective front given to General Orlando Ward from the British ..........................................................................................................................................104 8 The War Department Pamphlet coving mine and booby-traps ........................................117 9 The War Department pamphlet displays enemy as devils and emplaces Nazi symbols to build hatred for the enemy. Examples of the cartoon type drawings to keep the attention of soldiers. ........................................................................................................................................119 10 A pictorial display showed the training cycle for the Infantry Replacement Training Center. As the needs of the army changed the training cycle was decreased in 1944 ................123

vii

ABSTRACT

The American Armys first encounter during World War II with the German Army in

North Africa at the Battle of Kasserine Pass resulted in a tactical defeat. Lloyd Fredendall, the II

Corps commander, did not lead from the front and instead preferred to remain at a safe distance

in his man-made command post cut into a mountain over one hundred miles from his forward

positions. After the Wehrmacht launched its attack on 14 February 1943, the American positions

quickly disintegrated and headquarters elements fled to the rear stranding entire infantry units on

mountaintops. As the senior leaders were running for their lives, they ordered field grade

officers to conduct counterattacks against a superior German armor force. These battalion

commanders fought valiantly, but were overmatched and their units became combat ineffective.

Finally, two days into the fight, British General Kenneth Anderson released a substantial

reinforcement element to bolster the lines and slow down the German thrust enough to allow the

American 9th Infantry Division artillery forces to be brought 735 miles to eventually stop Field

Marshall Erwin Rommels offensive. Following the defeat, General Dwight Eisenhower

replaced senior generals who had made glaring tactical mistakes throughout the battle with

capable leaders. The new commanders instilled discipline within the ranks which would play a

critical role in future battles in North Africa.

Eisenhower realized that the men under his command made mistakes throughout the

battle and he was inspired to create changes in combat training. First, lessons had to be collected

from the men at the frontlines. Ike issued training directives based on combined arms lessons

to the units under his command, but he also had a bolder plan to influence the training cycles of

basic training and unit predeployment training in the United States. Armed with combat

experience, Eisenhower flooded the War Department with recommendations to intensify training

viii

to better prepare the units for war. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented immediate

modifications to existing training cycles, but by late summer 1943 training regiments were

infused with battle lessons. The ability of the American Army to change training based on the

lessons it received from the frontlines of North Africa was decisive to success in the North

African, Mediterranean, and European theater of operations.

1

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The American defenses at Kasserine Pass began to collapse on the foggy morning of 20

February 1943 under a renewed German effort led by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, Afrika

Korps commander. Throughout the morning the artillery observers fled their positions because

they thought, this place is too hot.1 Around 1200, the Germans overran the 19th Engineers

command post. Colonel Alexander Stark, ground commander, was determined to hold out, but

by 1700 German grenades were detonating near his command post and he had to crawl out to

save his life. Rommel captured Kasserine Pass, but the pass would not stay in the hands of the

Germans for long.

The baptism of fire for the United States Army in the European theater in World War II

occurred fourteen months after Pearl Harbor during the Battle of Kasserine Pass in February

1943. This should have been enough time for the army to train the American soldiers for their

first battle against the Germans, but the American GIs were inexperienced. The German

offensives Frhlingswind and Morgenluft to capture the mountain passes at Sidi bou Zid and

Gafsa were the Germans final efforts to reclaim the strategic initiative in North Africa. In spite

of German tactical successes, the offensive wavered in the mountains beyond Kasserine Pass and

the Axis forces failed to break out of their vulnerable position in Tunisia. The Battle of

Kasserine Pass was a disastrous tactical loss for the U.S. Army. As the historian Charles

Whiting has noted, Just how ill-prepared the GI Army were and how inexperienced their

generals were became horrifically apparent at the Kasserine Pass where the Germans gave the

1 Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943, 1st ed, The Liberation Trilogy v. 1 (New York: Henry Holt & Co, 2002), 372.

2

new arrivals a really bloody nose.2 The American forces learned valuable lessons and

disseminated them throughout their ranks. Stateside training cycles were changed which allowed

the troops to recover from the tactical defeat and along with British forces evicted the German

forces off the African continent in May 1943.

Literature Review

The Battle of Kasserine Pass emerged as a shocking, massive military loss to Americans

back at home and participating soldiers. Historians wrote about the Battle of Kasserine Pass as a

small portion of the North African campaign where the American Army learned lessons and

leadership changes allowed for future battlefield successes against the Wehrmacht Army.3 This

thesis strives to answer the following questions: What did the U.S. Army learn at Kasserine Pass

and how were these lessons passed throughout the units. It analyzes the decisions that leaders

made throughout the battle. Were they the right decisions? Did that decision cause men to be

unnecessarily killed or captured by the Germans? How did the units filter information down the

chain of command? Did higher headquarters in the rear make tactical decisions or were they

made at the front? This section reviews the literature of notable military historians on the results

of this battle based on three principles of war: the preparedness of the soldiers, learning lessons,

and the role of leadership.

In the official army history, commonly called the green books, George Howe,

Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (1957), reveals the primitive nature of land

2 Charles Whiting, Disaster at Kasserine: Ike and the 1st (US) Army in North Africa, 1943 (Barnsley, S. Yorkshire: L. Cooper, 2003), cover. 3 Rick Atkinson, Orr Kelly, George Howe, and Martin Blumenson all write about the North African campaign and show that Kasserine Pass was the first major battle of the American Army against the German army, but it was just the first of many battles between the two armies. Following the defeat at Kasserine Pass, the American and British Armies engaged the German Army in two months of battle that eventually led to the defeat of German forces in North African. These historians argue that the American army learned lessons following the defeat, but fail to specify the lessons beyond changing basic training length from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks. Instead these historians focus of the leadership changes that swept through the American II Corps where General George Patton and Omar Bradley took over and lead successful attacks against the Germans.

3

and air tactical coordination by the U.S. Army. For instance, during the early months of the

North African campaign American artillery commanders suggested and implemented a

centralized control of gunfire for forward observers, direct, and indirect firing. Howe shows how

the lack of resources in communication and labor also constrained the development of adequate

military techniques. The air-ground coordination improved slightly after Kasserine. Greater

strides were made regarding artillery and infantry coordination when the Americans recaptured

Gafsa in March 1943.4

Martin Blumensons article Kasserine Pass in Americas First Battles, 1776-1965

(1986), believes the army lost at Kasserine Pass due to the United States rampant neglect in

updating and becoming proficient on their weaponry after World War I. As a result, the soldiers

received a punishment from the Germans because of inadequate training in modern tactics and

equipment at the start of World War II.5 Blumenson expands his argument in Heroes Never Die:

Warriors and Warfare in World War II (2002), to include that the soldiers were not trained on

the new equipment and tactics after the U.S. entered into World War II.6

During the invasion of North Africa, the American troops had clearly displayed huge

limitations in training, experience, combat tactics, maneuver, and skills in utilizing their fighting

equipment. Orr Kellys, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch

to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia (2002), implies that the U.S. troops dispatched to North

Africa against Rommels troops underwent a selection process based on availabilitynot skill,

adequacy of artillery, or leadership quality. Accordingly, the most important task during the 4 George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957), 410412, 574. 5 Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., in Americas First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E Heller and William A Stofft, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 226227. 6 Martin Blumenson, Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II, 1st Cooper Square Press ed (New York: [Lanham, Md.]: Cooper Square Press; Distributed by National Book Network, 2001), 226.

4

Battle at Kasserine Pass was squarely upon the Regular Army units of the 1st Armored Division,

the 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, and the National Guards 34th Infantry Division.7 In late

December 1942, the Allied forces had postponed their offensive operations in Tunisia citing a

number of tactically unsound concerns. These included unpreparedness due to poor logistics,

undesirable climatic conditions, poor air and land integration, and long uncovered distances

between battlefronts. With the army strung out all over northern Tunisia, Eisenhower marched

farther south, where he hoped to launch an additional Allied offensive. He utilized the expansive

area between Kasserine and Tebessa to offer the U.S. Army an area of responsibility where they

could gain initial combat experience.

No scholar has explored in depth the lessons learned from Kasserine. In fact, there is

little scholarship focused on articulating the lessons that were learned, how they were

communicated at the frontlines, and changes that were made to training cycles based on feedback

from combat experience. The only exception was Michael Doubler in his work Closing with the

Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (1994), his case study based on the

European Theater of Operations (1944-1945). He affirms that the soldiers ability to learn from

the war and utilize improved warfare techniques contributed to their success throughout World

War II.8

Rick Atkinson, An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942-1943 (2002), suggests

that the soldiers that were sent to North Africa were green troops and were not adequately trained

in their equipment before being sent overseas. Atkinson aims at portraying a U.S. Army that

evolved from the amateurs who fought the Battle of Kasserine Pass to notable veterans after the

7 Orr Kelly, Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia (New York: J. Wiley, 2002), 7. 8 Michael D Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945, Modern War Studies (Lawrence, Kan: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 2.

5

campaign ended in 1943. Indeed, he states that, no soldiers in Africa had changed more

grown morethan [Dwight D.] Eisenhower.9 However, Atkinson failed to specify the lessons

that the soldiers learned at Kasserine and over the course of the campaign in conducting modern

combat. Instead, the author claims that these hard-fought lessons and a change in the corps

leadership allowed for the army to grow up in North Africa and defeat the Germans only two

months after the Battle of Kasserine Pass.10

According to Eisenhowers biographer, Stephen Ambrose, Ikes real problems were

welding these well-equipped Americans into a genuine army, winning the final victory in North

Africa as quickly and as decisively as possible, and in the process holding together the Allied

team, which now included the French.11 Ambrose also portrays Eisenhower as a commander

who had a unique gift for reconciling differences among leaders of a multinational army.

Additionally, he turned aside the British as they tried to relegate American troops to a secondary

role after the GIs performance following Kasserine. Ward Rutherford agrees in, Kasserine:

Baptism of Fire (1970), by pointing out that one of the harsh lessons the general came to learn:

how to restructure his relationships with civilian and military leaders within the Allied

organization. Operation Torch and the Battle of Kasserine Pass stand out as a training front for

Ikes military skills.12

A unit during war, like the II Corps, would have a meager or satisfactory performance

based on the role of its leadership throughout the battle. Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943:

Rommels Last Victory (2006), affirms the most outstanding critique about Eisenhowers skills

lies in his inadequacy to tackle the mismanagement concerns in the II Corps during the Tunisian

9 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 533. 10 Ibid., 1318. 11 Stephen E Ambrose, Eisenhower (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 217. 12 Ward Rutherford, Kasserine: Baptism of Fire (Ballantine Books, 1970), 7.

6

campaign. Despite noticing the weaknesses in Major General Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps

commander, Eisenhower further questioned his own leadership skills by refusing to sack him.

Indeed, he seemed initially averse in the dismissal of Fredendall. However, the General would

later grow into becoming more skillful in such decision-making situations during future military

campaigns.13

Jrg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German

Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II (2011), is highly critical of

the leadership of Fredendall as the principal reason for the defeat at Kasserine. But Muth also

believes that Fredendall became the scapegoat to cover up the massive problems in the Allied

command structure and unclear strategic direction.14 Blumenson agrees with Muth that

Fredendall was one of the most incompetent generals to take charge of a corps during World War

II. In the view of both historians, Fredendall not only failed to effectively communicate with

subordinates over the course of the battle, but also failed to provide a positive example of

personal leadership. Even worse, they criticize these two basic elements of his questionable

leadership were central to his tendency to govern and his unorthodox relationship with General

Orlando Ward.15

This thesis builds on these previous works to revisit the role of leadership and conduct an

analysis of these leaders. Moreover, it uncovers the complex and dysfunctional German

command structure where major decisions had to be made in Rome. Additionally, it expands on

the unpreparedness of the American soldiers by providing new insights into how the U.S. Army

changed stateside training regimens to provide a steady stream of well-trained men, ready for

13 Steven Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943: Rommels Last Victory (Osprey Publishing, 2005), 6667, 90. 14 Jrg Muth, Command Culture Officer Education in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces, 1901-1940, and the Consequences for World War II, 1st ed (Denton, Tex: University of North Texas Press, 2011), l. 5746. 15 Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1967), 31.

7

combat when they arrived. Finding based on extensive research in previously unexploited

primary source materials reveals that Eisenhowers involvement as Supreme Commander of the

Allied Forces in Europe in collecting lessons played a major role in shaping changes to the

training cycles which created an environment for sustained battlefield success. Ike is generally

regarded as a political general with the ability to hold a coalition of Allied forces together

throughout the war, but he must also be looked upon as the man who encouraged making

significant changes within the War Department. Although the American forces suffered their

first tactical defeat, U.S. Army leaders gathered to debate why they were so decisively

overwhelmed, discussed the lessons that they learned, and what they needed to change in order

to defeat the German army in North Africa and beyond. For these reasons, the Battle of

Kasserine Pass served as a distant victory because radical changes swept throughout the entire

American Army.

The Strategic Background

Before looking at what occurred at Kasserine Pass, an understanding of what brought

these forces together there needs to be addressed. North Africa was a marginal theater of

operations for both the United States and Germany, but their allies coaxed both into military

operations. In Germanys case, Italy attempted to expand its African colonies in 1940, but the

British swiftly rebuffed that endeavor. The humiliating Italian fiasco in Africa prompted Adolf

Hitler to dispatch Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the Desert Fox, in February 1941 with a

small armor force. The Deutsches Afrika Korps victories against the overstretched British

Eighth Army resulted in additional reinforcements for Rommel, but never enough for a pivotal

advantage. Meanwhile, Hitlers military attention shifted eastwards towards Russia.

8

The British saw North Africa as vital to maintaining their imperial commitments in

Africa and the Middle East. Control of the Suez Canal was deemed vital in order to provide the

lifeline to India. This was accomplished by maintaining a small army and a large navy, but the

trade off was that Britain could not challenge Germany in North Africa while keeping the bulk of

the army in Britain to guard against a possible Axis invasion. Once the risk of a German

invasion of the United Kingdom abated in late 1940, Britain bolstered its commitment in Egypt

with the purpose of driving the Axis forces off the continent. The desert warfare throughout

most of 1941 and 1942 in North Africa remained at an impasse, with the battle lines shifting

back and forth whenever either country enjoyed temporary advantages in supplies, forces, and

new equipment. In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, so the prospects for

continuous supplies and support for the Afrika Korps diminished. The Russian theater of

operations became the Wehrmachts main effort and the balance of forces in North Africa shifted

to Britains favor by the summer of 1942.16

Following Hitlers declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, British

Prime Minister Winston Churchill tried to convince Franklin D. Roosevelt of the benefits of a

Mediterranean strategy. Mark Stolers Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (2003) describes the intense debate Roosevelt

and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had in 1942 over the direction of American strategic efforts in

1943 whether to maintain a Germany first or shift to the Pacific. The JCS wanted a Pacific-first

strategy against Japan which Roosevelt overruled to emphasize the need of defeating Hitler

before shifting emphasis to the Pacific. The U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General George C.

Marshall, objected to an invasion of North Africa and instead strongly favored dedicating

resources for an invasion France as early as possible, preferably in 1943. The British were 16 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 78.

9

unwilling to launch such an invasion and the U.S. lacked the resources to insist for a major land

campaign in France in 1943. In place of an immediate cross channel invasion of France, the

British progressively influenced Roosevelt to participate in Mediterranean operations after a

series of conferences as a means to keep pressure on the Wehrmacht.17 Additionally, Joseph

Stalin also advocated combat action by the Americans to open up a second front because his Red

Army had borne the brunt of German attacks for more than a year and could use some relief.

Roosevelt finally acceded to British pressure and ordered plans drawn up for a North Africa

invasion.18

Operation Torch

Operation Torch was the codename for the Anglo-American invasion plans for North

Africa. The aim of Operation Torch was to squeeze the Axis forces out of North Africa from the

western side as the British drove the Germans from the east. Throughout the summer of 1942,

Rommel attacked the British Eighth Army, led by General Bernard Montgomery, in Egypt and

was only sixty miles from the Nile River when Montgomery stopped Rommels advance at El

Alamein in August 1942. Armed with 300 new Sherman tanks recently received from the United

States, Montgomery counterattacked Rommel on 23 October 1942 at the second battle of El

Alamein, and secured a victory that started a 1,500 mile retreat by German and Italian forces

through Libya. The Allied landing, Operation Torch, was executed on 8 November 1942 at three

locations against the Vichy French in North Africa by a primarily American force. Although

there was some resistance in a few locations, by and large the landing took place without serious

opposition.19

17 Mark A Stoler, Allies and Adversaries the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and US Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill, N.C.; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 8486. 18 Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 1213. 19 Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., 241243; Blumenson, Heroes Never Die, 426.

10

Hitlers reaction to the Allied landing was predictable: the Wehrmacht occupied the

remainder of France. Philippe Ptain remained as Chief of State Vichy France, but this left the

situation in the French colonies such as Tunisia and Algeria in doubt. With Rommel retreating

from Egypt, Hitler dispatched a second German contingent under General Hans-Jrgen von

Arnims, 5th Panzer Army, to occupy the Tunisian bridgehead. A contest developed to see who

would seize Tunisia firstKenneth Andersons British 1st Army, marching from Algeria, or the

5th Panzer Army, arriving in Tunisia by aircraft and ships from Italy. The Germans won the race,

and by the middle of December, a stalemate had developed along the Tunisian frontier, with the

Allies still too weak to launch well-organized offensives and the German forces too poorly

supplied to drive the Allies back into Algeria. Additionally, bad winter weather bogged forces

down and the Allies presumed a major offensive would wait until the spring. Meanwhile,

Rommel disregarded instructions that he stage a defense in Libya and he moved most of the

German units and some of the better Italian units into Tunisia by February 1943, safeguarded

behind the French-built Mareth Line.20

Opposing Plans

German plans. With Rommels forces on the verge of joining the 5th Panzer Army in

Tunisia, the Germans knew that they could not stay on the defensive. On 9 February 1943,

General Albert Kesselring, German commander of the Mediterranean theater, and General

Vittorio Ambrosio, the Italian Chief of Staff, flew to Tunisia to discuss upcoming plans.

Rommel saw the weakness in the Allied defensive positions and wanted to attempt one last

operation before he returned to the Fatherland to receive medical treatment. The Allied defenses

in Tunisia were still weak and inexperienced American forces held the southern flank. Rommel

dismissed the inexperienced U.S. Army as Britains Italians and believed that a concentrated 20 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 1112.

11

attack would easily pierce the American lines.21 If the plan succeeded, the supply depot in

Tebessa could be taken and Andersons 1st Army would also be threatened.22

Von Arnim argued that Rommels ambitious plans lacked the necessary resources and

that his more limited offensive, Operation Kuckucksei, would pressure both the Americans and

the British lines. After discussing the issue with Kesselring, Ambrosio proposed a compromise

on 11 February. Instead of a unified attack directed by Rommel, Ambrosio wanted von Arnim

and Rommel to conduct two complementary attacks separately. Von Arnim would drive through

the Fad Pass with Operation Frhlingswind, surging towards Sidi bou Zid and driving the allies

off the Eastern Dorsal mountain range. Rommel was given two additional days to reset his

forces before he launch the second spoiling attack, dubbed Operation Morgenluft, that would

take Gafsa, sixty miles to the south. The Afrika Korps was too weak from their retreat to

conduct an attack without reinforcements, so von Arnim would launch his attack and then

transfer the 21st Panzer Division back to Rommel for his operations. Ambrosio and Kesselring

left open the issue of a further advance into the Western Dorsal until the first phase of the attacks

had been undertaken. The precise date of Frhlingswind was left to von Arnim, as the cold,

rainy winter weather in early February had been turning the battlefield to mud, inhibiting a

Panzer advance.23

On the Axis side, Rommel has been portrayed as a strong-willed figure who was

respected by most of his soldiers. However, Bruce Watson as points out in Exit Rommel: The

Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (1999), his leadership skills raised concern at the Battle of 21 Helmuth Greiner, Diary Notes Fron 12 August 1942 to 17 March 1943, n.d., 16 February 1943, The George Howe Collection, Box 7, NARA II, College Park, MD. 22 Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 1st American ed. (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, 1953), 393; Albert Kesselring, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Kesselring (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1989), 149151. 23 Christopher F Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia (London: Spearman, 1975), 174; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 322; Charles Whiting, Kasserine: First Blood (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 159. Rommel and Von Armin had first met each other eighteen years earlier and did not care for each other and their relationship had not improved over time.

12

Kasserine Pass due to his indecisiveness in selecting a battlefront following the break through at

Kasserine. Furthermore, Rommel was quick to resign to fatigue and his incapability of working

with von Armin prompted the German-Italian forces to loose their aggressive posture and retreat.

Watson stands out as the only historian who believed the Battle of Kasserine Pass was a German

loss because their offensive was stopped repeatedly on 21 and 22 February 1943 by the Allied

forces.24

Allied plans. After losing the race for Tunisia, General Dwight Eisenhower wanted to

regain the initiative. He created an initial plan for the employment of the II Corps dubbed

Operation Satin. The 1st Armored Division would conduct mobile raids towards Sfax and Gabs

in order to disrupt Rommels supply lines, the Germans primary concern. Anderson was

skeptical of such a risky venture and convinced Eisenhower to cancel the operation.25

From Andersons perspective, the II Corps and the central Tunisian fronts were

secondary concerns. His main focus was the British sector and defeating von Arnims 5th Panzer

Army in northern Tunisia. Intelligence assessments supported the idea that the offensive would

take place in the British sector. The top-secret ULTRA intelligence gathering system intercepted

a radio message from the Luftwaffe commander on 31 January which showed von Arnims plans

for Operation Kuckucksei in detail. Eisenhowers G-2 intelligence officer, British Brigadier

General E.E. Mockler-Ferryman, concluded that the main German threat would come through

the Fondouk Pass and threaten the flank of the British positions.26

On 4 February, Mockler-Ferryman received another ULTRA message about Rommels

more ambitious attack plans. The G-2 concluded the previous intercept was an approved plan

where Rommels plan was only a proposal of possible action. Mockler-Ferryman again

24 Bruce Watson, Exit Rommel: The Tunisian Campaign, 1942-1943 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999), 7093. 25 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 270272, 282283. 26 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 35.

13

misconstrued later decrypted ULTRA messages and these bolstered Andersons belief that the

pending German attack would come against his lines. Eisenhowers British intelligence officer

was fully dependent on the ULTRA intercepts and dismissed the tactical intelligence he was

receiving.27

The Americans on the other hand were out collecting intelligence through more

traditional methods of ground and aerial reconnaissance. The II Corps G-2 estimate stated on 25

January 1943, Rommel can be expected to act offensively in southern Tunisia as soon as rested

and rearmed and prior to arrival of the 8th Army before MARETH line in threatening strength

and state of supply. Note his superiority in Infantry over II Corps.28 By 4 February, Colonel

Benjamin Monk Dickson, the II Corps G-2, reported that the combat power was building up

behind a screen of Italian forces in the II Corps sector near Gafsa and a strike could occur in

conjunction with an offensive through Fad Pass. Each day, Fredendalls intelligence officer

flew over the German position in an observation plane accompanied by four fighters. Dickson

saw that the supply dumps were growing and large armored units were moving towards the

American position.

Finally, Fredendall called Anderson to say that he was convinced that Rommel would

launch the attack through his area within a day or two with an estimated four armored divisions.

Fredendall forcefully requested that his CCB be released to him to meet the very obvious threat.

Anderson replied, Fredendall, arent you getting jittery? Fredendall said, Shit and hung up

the phone, knowing he would not get his men.29 On 13 February ULTRA revealed the attack

would occur the following day and that the 21st Panzer Division was deploying to its forward

position. Again, the intelligence officer decided this information meant the Fondouk attack.

27 Ibid., 3536. 28 Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, n.d., 39, The Benjamin A. Dickson Collection, USMA. 29 A.E. Schanze Papers, n.d., 24, The A. E. Schanze Papers, MHI.

14

Mockler-Ferryman forwarded this information to Anderson who alerted his units of the threat,

particularly around Fondouk. Furthermore, Anderson thought the Germans might stage feign

attacks so the French and the II Corps were also alerted.30

Leaders and disposition of the II Corps. General Dwight Eisenhower oversaw the allied

strategic situation leading up to the battle from his command post in Algeria. His primary focus

was on the invasion of Sicily, so he left the tactical situation up to his subordinate commanders.

British General Harold Alexander was selected to lead a new command, the 18th British Army, at

the Casablanca conference to oversee the Tunisian theater with an assumption of command date

of 20 February. In the northern sector, Anderson was temporarily given command of the

Tunisian front. The French, led by General Alphonse Juin, were stationed directly south of the

British. Juin was not under the command of Anderson and instead reported directly to

Eisenhower. The American II Corps, commanded by General Lloyd Fredendall covered the

southern flank, where the Germans offensive occurred.31 Under his command was General

30 Zaloga, Kasserine Pass 1943, 3537. 31 General Lloyd Fredendall is one of the few people who had the distinction to fail out of West Point two times. He first entered West Point on 11 June 1901, but failed out of mathematics course. The following year, Fredendall again secured entrance to the academy and once again failed out due to poor mathematics skills. For the third year in a row Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming recommended entrance but this time West Point denied admission. Fredendall decided to attend Massachusetts Institute of Technology where he improved his mathematics skills. In those days, commissions in the Army could be obtained through passing competitive examinations which Fredendall passed in 1906 to earn his commission. The Casablanca conference was held from January 14 to 24, 1943, to plan the Allied European strategy for the next phase of World War II. In attendance were U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and representing the Free French forces, General Charles de Gaulle, and General Henri Giraud. Premier Joseph Stalin had declined to attend, due to the ongoing conflict in Stalingrad. The conference agenda addressed the specifics of tactical procedure, allocation of resources and the broader issues of diplomatic policy. The debate and negotiations produced what was known as the Casablanca Declaration, and what is, perhaps, its most historically provocative statement of purpose, unconditional surrender. The doctrine of unconditional surrender came to represent the unified voice of implacable Allied willthe determination that the Axis powers would be fought to their ultimate defeat and annihilation. Roosevelt, under the advisement of General George Marshall, US Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, lobbied for a cross channel invasion of Europe. Churchill felt the time was not opportune, and favored an Allied assault on Sicily. Throughout the conference Roosevelts attention was prominently focused on the Pacific war front and faulted the British for what he felt was not a full commitment against the Japanese entrenchment. The Italian strategy was agreed upon, a compromise between the two leaders, Roosevelt acceding to the Churchill approach for Europe. Churchill, in turn, pledged more troops and resources in the Pacific and Burma to

15

Orlando Ward of 1st Armored Division, who had four combatant commands (CC), designated by

letters.32

Fredendall was a leader focused on the security of his command post and ordered his

corps level engineers to build a fortified area that was designed to withstand Axis aerial attacks.

The command post was over one hundred miles from the front and drilled into the side of a

mountain. Additionally, the headquarters was located fifteen to twenty feet back into the hole.

Command posts needed to be mobile in tank warfare and near the frontlines; Fredendalls had

neither of these qualities. He also did not leave his command post often and when he created his

defensive plans for the Eastern Dorsal mountain range it was done with map reconnaissance.

Moreover, the II Corps commander personally placed units down to the battalion level.33

Additionally, Fredendall micromanaged his subordinates and even emplaced units to

establish specific defensive positions around Fad Pass in his 11 February orders. Ward arrived

at Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) John Waters, 1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, position with a

letter in hand. Ward told the field commander, Waters, Ive got a letter from Fredendall and

here is where he wants the antitank guns; here is where he wants the tank destroyers; here is

where he wants your tanks, and here is where he wants your infantry. Ward said, Never have I

reinforce positions. America would provide assistance to the British in the Pacific by supplying escorts and landing crafts. 32 George F Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, Divisional Series 11 (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1979), 108. The four commands under the 1st Armored Division were CCA, CCB, CCC, and CCD which had elements of infantry attached. The 1st Armored Division had been split up and its CCB, led by General Paul Robinett, had been detached to help bolster the French position further north. The 1st Armored Division was a triangular division with CCA and CCB being the tank regiments and CCC organized around the Armored Infantry Regiment which allowed the division to either attack with three prongs or two prongs if the infantry were in direct support of the tanks. The CCD was the divisional artillery that provided artillery support to the other combat commands inline with the division commanders priorities. 33 Lloyd Fredendall, Defense of Faid Position, February 11, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; Omar Nelson Bradley and Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldiers Story, 1st ed. (New York: Holt, 1951), 154; John Waters, Senior Officer Oral History Program, n.d., 187188, The John Waters Collection, Box 2, MHI.

16

seen anything like this before. Here I am, division commander of the 1st Armored Division, and

all I have left to command is the medical battalion. Everything is taken away from me, put

~

~~

~

~~~~~~~

~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~

~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~

~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~

~~~~~~~~ ~~~

~

~~~~~~~ ~~~ ~ ~~~~~

~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~

~~~~~~~

~~~~~

~~

~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~

~~~~~

~~~

~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~

~~ ~

~~~~~~~~

~~~~~~~ ~~~~

~~

~~~~~

~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~

~~~

~ ~~

~~

~~ ~~~~~~~~

~~~ ~~ ~

~~~~~~

Figure 1 Tunisian Front, Mid-January 1943 [Courtesy of the U.S. Army Center for Military History]

17

around here, there and everywhere. Combat command here, combat command there, etc.34

Ward had essentially been stripped of his command and was just a messenger for Fredendall who

was in effect commanding the 1st Armored Division for Ward.35 The proper Army technique

taught at the Command and General Staff college at Fort Leavenworth was to issue orders to

defend a specific sector and allow the subordinates flexibility on how to accomplish the given

mission. This exemplifies of one of the flaws of his leadership because Fredendall was

micromanaging his subordinate units and from the distance of his sheltered command post.

When recommendations were sent up the chain of command to move positions based on lower

leaders ground assessment, they were all denied and told to maintain their positions.

Good army leaders need to visit the men at the front in order to have a better

understanding of the tactical situation, and also to talk with the men of their units about how they

were getting along. Eisenhower left his headquarters late on 12 February 1943, and arrived at

the II Corps headquarters in Tebessa around 1200 on 13 February for an inspection of the

frontlines. The commander was shocked to discover the fortified command post that the

engineers had spent three weeks working to build. Eisenhower asked an engineer working on the

structure if they had first assisted in building the frontline defenses. The young staff officer

replied, Oh, the divisions have their own engineers for that!36 This appalled the commander

and remained the only time throughout the war where he saw a divisional or higher command so

concerned about their own safety that they built an underground shelter.

Anderson also visited Tebessa to consult with Fredendall and Eisenhower, but he first

met with Dickson, the II Corps G-2, who argued that the tactical intelligence pointed to a

German attack coming from Gafsa and possibly Fad, not Fondouk. Overly confident due to the

34 John Waters, SOOHP, 590. John Waters was the son-in-law to General George S. Patton. 35 Lloyd Fredendall, Defense of Faid Position. 36 Dwight D Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1948), 141.

18

ULTRA intercepts, Anderson dismissed the accounts that the Germans would not attack the

esteemed British and announced, Well, young man, at least I cant shake you. Turning to

Fredendall, he added, You have an alarmist and a pessimist for a G-2.37 During the briefing

with Ike, Anderson stated that he believed that the attack would come in his sector at the

Fondouk pass. This allied command assumption about the location of the attack was nearly fatal.

Anderson abruptly left later in the day when his staff reported that a German attack in their

sector was imminent due to additional ULTRA intercepts.38

A visit by the commander of North Africa to the front lines was ceremonial and

subordinate commanders were called back from their men to brief Eisenhower. Waters had been

called back to CCA command post on the evening of 13 February to brief Colonel Peter Hains,

1st Armored Regiment commander, and Brigadier General Raymond McQuillin, CCA

commander, on the current situation at his position. Earlier in the day, Hains and Waters

reconnoitered a back trail leading to Fad Pass and tried to observe the German side of the

mountain. However, German aircraft appeared and chased them off the mountain before getting

eyes on the enemy position which further raised suspicions about German activity. The G-2

personnel said, Dont worry, theres not going to be any attack tomorrow morning through Fad

Pass. The attacks going to come at Fondouk and Pichon. Waters said, okay and turned to

ask, General McQuillin, suppose I wake up in the morning and I find that an attack is under way

from Fad and its an Armored Division of the Germans. McQuillin responded, Oh, Waters,

dont suggest that. With the lack of guidance Waters said, Okay, General thats it and left the

command post before Eisenhower showed up to return to his position at the frontlines.39

37 Benjamin Dickson, G-2 Journal: Algiers to the Elbe, 40. 38 Lucian King Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 1st ed. (New York: Dutton, 1954), 154; Bradley and Herman Finkelstein Collection (Library of Congress), A Soldiers Story, 25. 39 John Waters, SOOHP, 191192.

19

After dusk following the briefing, LTC Russell F. (Red) Akers, II Corps G-3 staff officer,

escorted Eisenhower, not Fredendall himself, to the 1st Armored command post to discuss the

disposition of their troops and the situation of their reserves. Around midnight, Eisenhower

traveled to CCA command post and met with McQuillin, who briefed that his reconnaissance

elements had occasionally met with Germans, but had noticed no change in German disposition

or patrols. Eisenhower left the front lines around 0300 on 14 February to return to the II Corps

headquarters where he planned to talk to Fredendall about the disposition of his troops, as it was

not customary to tell subordinates several levels down, but instead use the chain of command.40

It is interesting to note that Eisenhower chose to visit that day, as the Germans on the other side

of the mountain were preparing to attack in just a matter of hours.

Eisenhower found a number of disturbing details on the visit that can be attributed to a

lack of discipline and complacency of the frontline soldiers. At one point, a commander told Ike

that minefields had not yet been emplaced on his front with the excuse that infantrymen had been

on the scene for only two days. This commander explained with a sense of arrogance that he had

already drawn up a mine emplacement plan on the map and would start on the morning of 14

February. Meanwhile, the Americans had learned that the Germans were able to prepare strong

defensive lines, with minefields, within two hours of arrival at a location.41 Obviously, this

lesson had not made its way down to the frontline commanders yet and Eisenhower directed that

he fixed it immediately. By the time Eisenhowers group arrived back at the II Corps

headquarters that morning, the German assault had already begun.

40 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155. 41 Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 141142.

20

CHAPTER TWO

UNPREPARED

In battle, you can do three thingsgo forward, stop, or fall back. If you fall back,

you are lost; if you stop, you are shot up. You must go forward. If you go

forward, you can envelop or go straight ahead. If you go dead ahead, you will

usually suffer many casualties, probably get turned back and lose the fight, so you

go around and envelop under the cover of firefire often and accuratelyfire and

maneuver.

George S. Patton, Jr42

Valentine Day Attack of Sidi bou Zid

Instead of directly commanding the operation, General Jrgen von Arnim selected his

chief of staff, General Heinz Ziegler, to oversee Operation Frhlingswind. Ziegler conducted a

reconnaissance during the early morning hours of 14 February 1943 to observe Fad Pass and

noticed no activity on the American side. It appeared to Ziegler that the Americans did not have

knowledge of the German attack and that their plans had indeed been kept secret. The Germans

had scouted the routine of the G Company, 1st Armored Regiment, commanded by Major

Norman Parsons, for a week and observed at the same time everyday these men guarding the

pass dismounted their tanks to eat breakfast. This was the designated assault time. On Sunday

14 February the Germans started preparing at 0400 and assaulted through the pass around 0630

with a force of one hundred MKIV Panzer tanks, and MKVI Tiger tanks with infantry and 88mm

42 LTC J. S. Switzer and LTC R. W. Curtis, Observers Report, August 22, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI.

21

~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~

~ ~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~ ~~~

~ ~

~~~ ~~~~

~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~

~~~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~

~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~

~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~

~ ~~ ~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~~

~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~~

~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~ ~ ~ ~~~

~~~~

~~~~

~

~

~

~~~~~

~~

~~

~~~ ~

~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~ ~ ~~ ~

~~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~ ~ ~

~~~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~

~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~

~~ ~ ~~~~~~

~

~~

~~

~~~~~~~~

~~~~ ~

~ ~~~~~

~~~

~~~~ ~~~~~

~ ~~

~ ~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

~

~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~

~

Figure 2 Battle of Sidi bou Zid, 14-15 February 1943 [Courtesy of U.S. Army Center for Military History]

22

antitank guns in tow, supported by an artillery bombardment under the cover of a dust storm

directly into LTC John Waters position.43

When Waters returned from his overnight meeting with Brigadier General Raymond

McQuillin, CCA commander, he ordered Parsons to send a tank patrol out immediately to help

cover Fad Pass and create a listening post. Parsons reported that his men were in position with

an established outpost when they were actually three or four miles short of the pass. The

American observation post guarding the pass was quickly overrun, so the men of G Company did

not radio or shoot the pre-arranged rocket signal that would have resulted in a preplanned

artillery barrage of the pass.44

When General Friedrich von Broich led the 10th Panzer Division tank assault through the

Fad Pass, the Germans also maintained aerial supremacy throughout the day. The German air

came on station at 0715 onwards, with a combination of Stukas (dive-bombers) and Jabos

(fighter-bombers) to add to the discomfiture of the new boys.45 The Allies were only able to

scramble four different lines of aircraft missions to try to interdict the German fighters at Fad,

but were outnumbered and did not inflict much damage. The majority of the American aerial

fleet was already tasked to conduct normal bombing missions over the Mediterranean Sea where

they ran into a large fleet of Axis air transport and were able to shoot down five planes trying to

resupply Tunisia.46

43 10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, February 1943, 14 February , Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid, n.d., B22, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 2, MHI; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 339; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 30 January-22 February 1943., 248252. 44 John Waters, Senior Officer Oral History Program, n.d., 192193, The John Waters Collection, Box 2, MHI; George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957), 411. 45 Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 203; Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrap, 1951), 197. The Luftwaffe had 371 available planes for the offensive. 46 10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 14 February; Shores, Fighters Over Tunisia, 204.

23

Waters listening post failed to report the attack, but the sound of the artillery barrage

alerted Colonel Peter Hains, commander 1st Armored Regiment, of activity and he requested

information since he could not see because a sandstorm decreased visibility. Hains called

Waters and asked, whats going on over in your part of the world? We hear a lot of shooting in

that direction. Waters responded, Ive received no reports yet of anything going on. I havent

heard any fire and I have no reports of anything. Waters was interested in finding out what

Hains heard, and climbed the hill to see what he could discover. Once Waters reached an

observation point he reported, I can hear some shooting far out there. There is a strong wind

blowing, sand is blowing right towards me, a sand and dust storm. I cant see anything.47

Waters then tried to raise Major Parsons for an updated situational report; however, the major

was not with the tank. Well, where the hell is he? screamed Waters. The tanker on the radio

replied, I dont know. Hes not out here.48 Waters sent his messenger to Parsons tent and

found the commander still asleep in his bed and woke him as the German tanks poured through

Fad Pass. Parsons got in his tank and went out towards his company only to find they had

already moved. Parsons tank was shot soon afterwards and he failed to provide any intelligence

about the attacking force.49

Meanwhile, Waters scaled the hill again to gain a better vantage point and thirty or forty

tanks emerged out of the dust to the front and another sixty tanks to the rear. Waters quickly

grasped the gravity of the situation and ordered his fifteen light M3 Stuart, Honey tanks, forward

47 John Waters, SOOHP, 596. 48 Ibid., 205. 49 CCA G3 Operational Reports, February 14, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI.

24

to block and delay, but their 37mm gun did not penetrate the German armor and proved no match

compared to the German 75mm and 88mm guns.50

Once past the initial resistance the Germans split into pre-arranged formations to circle

the hill of Djebel (DJ) Lessouda.51 As the 10th Panzer Division rounded DJ Lessouda Hill, they

took a tactical pause to try and coordinate the encirclement of Sidi bou Zid with the 21st Panzer

Division; however, the 21st Panzer Division was delayed so Broich was ordered to press forward.

In the lead tank, Major Helmut Hudel became nervous and feared he was entering a trap.

Additionally, he was nervous because he knew the Sherman 75mm gun could penetrate the

Panzer III and IV models at 1,500 meters where his 50mm gun shells would bounce off the

Shermans. Soon after the assault was renewed, Oberfeldwebel Graf Augustin destroyed a

retreating Sherman with his Tiger tank (Panzer VI) at the range of 2,700 meters during the

assault toward Sidi bou Zid.52 The German attack proceeded better than planned, nevertheless

they still had not secured their daily objective but did have the Americans scrambling.

At this point, Waters lost radio contact with his entire element except the artillery and

higher headquarters. CCA called again and said they heard vehicles rumbling toward

Lessouda. Another call reported enemy tanks. Pete Hains called again and said, There must be

something going on. There is an awful lot of firing out there in front of you now. Its

50 Whiting, Kasserine, 174. The railroads leading into Tunisia were inadequate because they were narrow-gauged and in some parts of the country the tunnels were only big enough to allow the light tank to go thorough and not the medium. The medium tanks had to be driven overland. While other railroad lines were wide-gauge. This created logistical challenges that prevented the Allies from having the proper force in place to prevent the Germans from defeating them at Kasserine Pass. The MK4 panzer tanks had a 75mm main gun while the MK6 Tiger tanks had a 88mm main gun. 51 Djebel means mountain in Arabic and is abbreviated through US documents as DJ. Allied commanders used Djebel since all of their maps used the tem or its abbreviation. 52 10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 14 February; Helmut Hudel and Paul Robinett, The Tank Battle at Sidi Bou Zid; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, 148; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 189; Volkmar Khn, Rommel in the Desert: Victories & Defeat of the Afrika-Korps, 1941-1943, Schiffer Military History (West Chester, Pa: Schiffer Pub, 1991), 193. Hudel was in a Panzer III, medium tank. This tank was stopped being produced in 1943 since it became obsolete with the lack of fire power provided by the 50mm gun and the lack of armor.

25

increasing. Waters climbed the hill for the third time and could hear the firing, but the dust

again blocked his view. Waters ordered the artillery to open fire. The artillerymen asked, Well

where are they [German tanks]? Well, theyre under our minimum range. We cant hit them.

Theyve gotten in under us. Waters told the artillery to move back and said, If you cant fire,

move back to where you can.53 Somehow the artillerymen were able to get around the sixty

German tanks and continued fighting, but Waters and the remainder of the infantrymen still on

the hill were not so lucky.

Despite the dire situation, Waters unrelentingly kept Hains informed throughout the day;

however, he understood that he was in a grim situation with the infantry surrounded in the

mountains by 0950.54 Waters told Hains, The war was over for us. Well sit here and do the

best we can to report to you whats going on and try to keep in communication and be a source

of information. All the armored support was gone and the infantry was stranded. Hains replied,

Well, good luck to you, John.55 Waters was not the only unit in this dismal condition.

Colonel Thomas Drake, 168th Infantry Regiment commander, had his men split between

two mountains around Sidi bou Zid. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Robert Moore, 2nd Battalion,

168th Infantry Regiment was on the same hilltop as Waters while Drake and 3rd Battalion, led by

LTC John Van Vliet, were ten miles south on DJ Ksaira which were not mutually supporting

positions. As the German tanks flanked around DJ Lessouda, motorized infantry units,

approximately a battalion, moved to the base with towed 88mm guns around 0900. These

infantrymen started infiltrating throughout the base of the mountain but dug defensive positions

when they came within small arms range of Moore. Although surrounded, the men of 2nd

Battalion maintained high levels of morale because they controlled the coveted elevated

53 John Waters, SOOHP, 600, 204, 213. 54 CCA G3 Operational Reports, 14 February. 55 John Waters, SOOHP, 603.

26

ground.56 Waters was surrounded by Germans and wanted to link up with the infantry who were

holding the ground at the top of the hill. He sent his half-track driver to inform Moore of

Waters position and that he would join Moore at night. The driver came back and said, Sir, I

couldnt get up there and I got shot.57 The infantry were scared and shooting at any moving

targets.

At 1130, the German infantry attacked G Company on the right flank of Lessouda. An

intense small arms firefight ensued that stopped the assault cold. Additional enemy artillery and

infantry were brought up and another assault occurred at 1400 across a bigger front. This time

the Germans managed to overrun half of F Company and captured one platoon and a heavy

machine gun section before being driven back with heavy losses. In the meantime, Moore had

lost radio contact with the regiment but the last order from Drake was to hold the line at all costs.

Around 1600, a German officer approached the lines with an offer to accept the surrender which

Moore quickly dismissed. The German artillery barrage continued into the night before it

diminished. Concurrently, Drake and Van Vliet spent the day under heavy enemy artillery fire

but did not receive any infantry attacks.58

Meanwhile, civilian Arabs neared Waters position and were looking at his half-track.

Waters told Hains, Ive got to get breakoff communications. Im going to dismantle the radio

and Ill hide the parts so that if I can get back to it, Im going to come back to you. I will then go

into the next little ditch and hide out there until dark. Then Im going to join Brown. Around

56 History of the 168th Infantry for Period Novemebr 12, 1942 to March 15, 1943, n.d., 168, RG 407, Box 9576, NARA II, College Park, MD.; Captain Jack Lake, The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Fad Pass, 12-21 February 1943, n.d., 1618, Donovan Research Library, http://www.benning.army.mil/library/content/Virtual/Donovanpapers/wwii/index.htm. 57 John Waters, SOOHP, 210. 58 Captain Jack Lake, The Operations of the 168th Infantry, 2d Battalion (34th Division) Fad Pass, 12-21 February 1943, 1718; 2d and 3d Battalion, 168th Infantry History, February 3, 1943, 1416, 21, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 1, U.S. Army center for military history, http://history.army.mil/books/Staff-Rides/kasserine/Vol-I-Part_1.pdf.

27

1600, Waters heard someone walking up the wadi (dry river bed) towards him and thought it was

Captain Jim Fraser, his assistant S-3. Waters stood up to discover that three or four Arabs were

leading a patrol of Germans directly towards him. They were fifteen feet away from Waters and

shot a burst from their guns without aiming from the hip and missed. Instead of killing Waters,

he was taken prisoner for the remainder of the war.59

As the fighting progressed throughout the morning, Eisenhower arrived at the II Corps

headquarters and was briefed on the attack at Fad Pass but the information was so vague that the

theater commander had no idea that this was the Germans main effort. Furthermore, McQuillin

was preparing a counterattack and there was no other action reported on the front so Eisenhower

thought it was a local assault that CCA could handle. Eisenhower then took a nap for a few

hours before he left to return to his command post in Constantine starting at 1130. Along the

way Eisenhower and Lieutenant General Lucian Truscott, deputy commander in charge of

advanced command post for Ike, stopped to visit the famous Roman ruins at Timgad. When

Eisenhower arrived at the advanced command post by midafternoon he was appalled to learn at

the devastation of the days failures.60

McQuillin did not have a clear operational picture of what occurred from his command

post, but was determined to react. He thought a quick counterattack would drive the Germans

back so he ordered LTC Louis Hightower, 3rd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, to clear up the

situation at 0730.61 Hightower moved his battalion, consisting of two tank companies and part

59 John Waters, SOOHP, 212. Waters thought the infantry commander was named Brown but it was actually Robert Moore. 60 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 155; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 142143. The stop to visit the ruins shows how slowly information traveled to higher headquarters. Five hours after the Germans assaulted through the gap, II Corps did not have the situational awareness to understand that the attack was a large scale German offensive and not a small or minor local attack. If II Corps had the proper situational awareness, Eisenhower would have directed the fight, ordered Anderson to send reinforcements, put his staff to work, and not stop to take in the historic sights on his return trip. 61 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 341342.

28

of A Company, 701st Tank Destroyer Company east to resecure Fad Pass. He parked his tank,

named Texas, on top of a small hill to observe the enemy movement around the pass. From this

observation point, he noted one hundred German vehicles approached from the east. Hightower

reported around 0930 to McQuillin that the Germans decisively outmatched his force and that he

could only fight a delaying action. As the day progressed it became apparent to CCA that a

second panzer unit, the 21st Panzer Division, came through the Maizila Pass twenty miles to the

south with the intent to envelope the Americans at Sidi bou Zid.

Throughout the morning, Hightower and his men fought in a zigzag pattern while moving

back towards Sidi bou Zid. Unknown to Hightower, this town served as the primary objective of

the assaulting Germans and his tanks received the brunt of their attack. The relentless onslaught

of German panzers and anti-tank guns slowly bled Hightowers battalion, but the skillful

maneuvers executed by the battalion allowed McQuillin and the rest of his command to escape

Sidi bou Zid before the Germans encircled the town. Hightower held his ground against the 10th

Panzer Divisions advance from the east, but he was overwhelmed when the 21st Panzer

Divisions lead elements attacked from the south.62

While Hightower created time, McQuillin made a withdrawal of his CCA headquarters to

avoid the encirclement, but had left two battalions of 168th Infantry Regiment behind Axis lines.

When CCA retreated from Sidi bou Zid they reestablished their command post at a road

intersection that became known as Kerns Crossroads. Meanwhile, Colonel Thomas Drake

had requested permission to withdraw his position at 1130. CCA sent a situation report to

division that said, Enemy tanks closing in and threatening both flanks and cut off Drake. Any

orders? First division stated to Wait. Then the orders came down for Drake to continue on

62 CCA G3 Operational Reports; Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides, 143165; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 340342; Howe, Northwest Africa, 411415; Blumenson, Kasserine Pass, 149153; Kelly, Meeting the Fox, 188191.

29

your mission. Drake knew he was in a dire situation, but no German infantry threatened his

position yet so he could hold out. Again at 1408 Drake requested to retrograde off the

mountaintops. Division replied, Too early to give Drake permission to withdraw. The last

orders to the 168th Infantry Regiment was to continue to hold your position.63 The higher

command did not have a well-defined understanding of the tactical situation, but from Drakes

vantage point he had a clear operational picture that showed the Germans had not just defeated

the Americans, but done so with ease. One of Drakes flaws as a leader was that he placed too

much faith in requesting and waiting for orders and not in taking battlefield initiative to serve the

welfare of the men under his command.

Meanwhile, Sergeant Clarence Coley, radio operator of Texas, could not contact any of

the remaining tanks of 3rd Battalion, so Hightower recognized the desperate situation and

maneuvered his lone tank into position to engage ten advancing enemy tanks from the south.

Hightower ordered his driver to stop and popped up out of the tank commanders hatch to spot

his gunners shots with his binoculars. The tank crew worked feverishly to destroy the panzers

as they advanced towards their position. Soaked in sweat the loader shoved round after round of

75mm ammunition into the breach of the gun every three to four seconds. Hightower and his

gunner, Corporal Austin Bayer, worked together to adjust their shots. The tank commander

shouted you shot over the turret bring it down! You got him, next tank to the left!64

As the ammunition racks dwindled, Sergeant Coley scrambled to dig additional rounds

out of the hull while German rounds struck the skin of the Sherman. The Germans grew closer

and anticipation heightened among the crew, cramped in their steel box filled with the acrid

63 CCA G3 Operational Reports; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 334346; Watson, Exit Rommel, 77; W. G. F Jackson, The North African Campaign, 1940-43 (London: Batsford, 1975), 339. 64 I am speculating on Hightowers exact words, but I base this on personal combat experience and the detailed account of the fight by Hightower.

30

smell of spent shell casings, fuel, and sweat. The loader yelled over the rumble of the engine

that a round had gotten stuck in the gun. Defenseless, Hightower ordered the tank to move to a

wadi for protection, but before the vehicle moved, a German shell smashed and penetrated

Texas turret. The round punctured the gas tank, leaked fuel all over the crewmen and

ammunition, and ricocheted through the tank barely missing everyone. As the projectile lay

there spinning and sputtering fire Hightower yelled, Now is the time to git.65 As Texas erupted

into a fireball the crew sprinted away.66 The Germans secured their objective of Sidi bou Zid

and halted their advance for the day while the Americans had suffered heavily with Hightowers

battalion now being combat ineffective with forty-eight of fifty-two Sherman tanks destroyed.

The German units could have attacked the undefended road west of Sidi bou Zid. Field

Marshall Erwin Rommel staged in the south preparing for his thrust, operation Morgenluft,

towards Gafsa where he advocated to von Arnim to follow up on his tactical success. At this

success, I urged the Fifth Army, which was in charge of the operation, to push straight on during

the night, keep the enemy on the run and take Sbeitla. Rommel further noted in his diary,

Tactical successes must be ruthlessly exploited. A routed enemy who, on the day of his flight,

can be rounded up without much effort, may reappear on the morrow restored to his full fighting

power. 67 Conversely, von Arnim decided not to heed this advice and instead waited for the

65 Single U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in Tunisia, New York Times, February 21, 1943. 66 CCA G3 Operational Reports; African Campaign--1st Armored Regiment, July 10, 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI; Single U.S. Tank Fights 10 Germans: Machine Named Texas Stages Alamo of Its Own to Save 300 Lives in Tunisia. The following titles also have summaries of this action. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division, Old Ironsides,; Atkinson, An Army at Dawn; George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West, United States Army in World War II: The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Dept. of the Army, 1957); Martin Blumenson, Kasserine Pass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1967); Kelly, Meeting the Fox. 67 Rommel, The Rommel Papers, 398.

31

allied counterattack in the morning. Thus, the 21st Panzer Division did not follow up the

retreating Americans until the night of 16 February.

American Counterattack 15 February

During the evening of 14 February, the allied command did not have a clear picture of

what happened throughout the day. There were serious intelligence failures because CCA had

failed to identify the 10th Panzer Division as the unit that advanced through Fad Pass. In fact,

the 10th Panzer Division was not positively identified until 1226, 15 February.68 Thus, General

Kenneth Anderson assumed that this was a feint attack and believed that the 10th Panzer Division

would still make the main push in his northern sector which prevented Anderson from ordering

reinforcements to the American southern sector. Fredendall pleaded with Anderson to release

CCB for a planned counterattack the next day. At first Anderson did not want to release any of

CCB. Finally, Anderson relented to Fredendalls appeal and allowed one medium tank battalion

to join the mornings counteroffensive. Anderson was more interested in preventing the

Germans from piercing a soft underbelly gap, as II Corps retreated, into the British sector of the

Maktar valley than in helping the Americans. So he authorized elements from the 34th Infantry

Division to withdraw from Fondouk and Pichon and established a new defensive position at

Sbiba.69 Thus, the Americans were left to fend for themselves on the morning of 15 February.

The loss of the effectiveness of CCA at DJ Lessouda necessitated the immediate

withdrawal of 2nd Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment, LTC James Alger, from CCB to report to

Colonel Robert Stack, CCC commander, and conduct a counterattack. On Sunday evening at

2010 Anderson sent Fredendall a message, As regards action in Sidi bou Zid: concentrate

68 The 81st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion G3 Logs 12 to 26, February 1943, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 1, MHI. 69 Truscott, Command Missions, a Personal Story, 156.

32

tomorrow on clearing up situation there and destroying [the] enemy.70 By the time the orders

got down to 1st Armored Division, Ward wrote in his diary that [I] did not like it much, but he

did not protest the order or firmly request larger reinforcements.71 Instead, LTC Alger, a twenty-

nine year old West Point graduate from Massachusetts, was tapped to lead the assault to retake

the town of Sidi bou Zid, destroy the German armor, and rescue the stranded infantrymen with a

force that was weaker than the counteroffensive the previous day. The only available assets to

Alger were an artillery battalion (minus one battery) and 1st Infantry Battalion, 6th Infantry

Regiment.72 Ward wrote in his diary, Alger [was] more or less on [his] own [with] many AT

[anti-tank] guns against him.73

Alger listened to advice from his old boss and readied his men before launching the

assault against the entrenched Germans. Before Brigadier General Paul Robinett, CCB

commander, released Alger, he cautioned him against precipitate action or rat racing as it was

called in the Division; but I [Robinett] doubt that he really understood the power of the enemys

guns.74 From approximately 0600 until 1300, Alger prepared his unit for the forward

movement and included a two-hour rehearsal. The planned counteroffensive covered thirteen

miles of flat open desert terrain with wadis. No prior reconnaissance was conducted. At 1300,

LTC James Alger led the attack, according to then-current Army doctrine, with his tanks

advancing in a line across the field with mounted infantry and artillery in support. The Germans

had set a trap and expected a larger force so they delayed their response until they knew this

small force was the entire counterattack heading their direction. The American maps on hand

70 First Army to II Corps, February 14, 1943, RG 331, AFHQ microfilm, AFHQ G-3 Forward, R-100-D, 319.1, NARA II, College Park, MD. 71 Orlando Ward, Diary, February 15, 1943, The Orlando Ward Collection, Box 10, MHI. 72 Atkinson, An Army at Dawn, 350. LTC Algers task force reported to Robert Stack, CCC commander, for this operation. 73 Ward, Diary. 74 Paul Robinett, Armor Command (McGregor & Werner, 1958), 157.

33

did not show these obstacles, and Alger was forced to transform his formation into a single

column at the initial obstacle. The Germans started harassing the Americans with aerial

bombardments and after twenty minutes the assault configuration was reestablished and Alger

slowed the rate of travel as they approached the second wadi. Additionally, Alger was waiting

for a promised air attackthat did not comeon Sidi bou Zid which would have provided

updated intelligence on the enemy disposition.75

At this point, the Germans fired airburst artillery rounds above the most likely crossing

points of the wadi to disrupt the advance, thus causing the tanks to button up.76 Usually, the

tank commander kept his upper torso exposed to maintain maximum situational awareness;

however, overhead-exploding rounds forced the tanks into greater protection mode. Despite the

limited visibility, Algers D Company located and destroyed six hidden German guns positioned

to cause havoc at the crossing site. The tanks clambered out of the second wadi and made for the

third and final wadi before the town.

Alger decided to leave one reserve tank company at the second wadi and traversed the

final wadi before Sidi bou Zid while heavy German artillery continued to rain down. By 1530,

Alger snatched the village after personally destroying two German tanks, the destruction of

numerous gun positions, and continued towards the stranded infantrymen to the east. The

battalion command had accomplished one of his objectives but the success was short-lived.

Subordinate commanders reported to Alger between 1545 and 1555 that enemy tanks were

approaching the town from both the north and the south. With the American flanks exposed, the 75 10th Panzer Division, War Diary, 14-22 February 1943, 15 February; 21st Panzer Division War Diary, February 1943, 15 February, Kasserine Pass Reading Volume 1 part 2, U.S. Army center for military history; LTC James D. Alger Papers, January 10, 1991, The James Alger Collection, USMA; Historical Record of CCC, 1st Armored Division 23 January to 19 February 1943, February 1943, 15 February, Microfilm, New records: Records of the War Departments Operations Division 1942-1945 part 1, series A, Reel 2, MHI. 76 The term button-up refers to a tank crew closing all of its hatches. This posture affords maximum protection for the crew but greatly reduces visibility to the narrow viewing slits. Tank commanders do not like to take this posture unless survival dictates.

34

German tanks launched a surprise assault. The Americans struggled to maneuver and the

Germans killed and destroyed the Americans within their designated kill zone area. At 1651

Colonel Stack asked Alger for an updated situational report and what help he needed. Alger

replied, Still pretty busy.77 An enemy round soon severed the radio antenna and this was the

last report Alger sent to Stack. By 1808, Colonel Stack ordered a retreat and only the infantry

and artillery were able to make it back to the American lines.78 Alger preformed well with his

lack of reconnaissance and intelligence on the German forces. Furthermore, Andersons

insistence on reclaiming Sidi bou Zid without releasing Brigadier General Paul Robinetts CCB

to 1st Armored Division led to an unnecessary, second horrific American defeat in as many days.

The counterattack had failed before dusk, but Fredendall did not call Truscott to report on

the operation until the following morning 0800, 16 February. The II Corps commander reported,

The picture this morning does not look too goodInformation is still confusing but G-3 has

them [1st Armored Division] on the phone getting the latest information. I will have a full report

and will call you back in a few minutes. A little later, Fredendall called again to pass on the

news about the devastating loss of Algers battalion.79 Even at the early stages in this battle, the

II Corps commander was not an engaging or involved leader. He did not leave his command

post to personally follow up on the counteroffensive or even call 1st Armored Division to request

an update before he went to bed for the evening on 15 February. Worse he called higher

headquarters first thing in the morning even before he asked his operations staff what occurred

during t