unraveling%20turkey%20v1.1.pdf

Title: Unraveling Turkey. A Collective Volume on Contemporary

Turkish Politics and Society

Collective Volume No. 1

Writers: GizemAlioglu-akmak, EsraDogan, Alba Cicala,StamatisLaskaris,

Nicholas Rossis, NikolaosPapakostas&NikolaosPasamitros

Editors: NikolaosPapakostas, NikolaosPasamitros

Cover Design: AngelosPasamitros, Original Concept: Alex Michas, IroAthanasiou

Copyright Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point 2013

ISBN-798-618-80847-0-4

Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point

38, Thrasyvoulou str., Chalandri

Athens, 15234

Tel. No. +30 2155 403 503

e-mail: [email protected]

url: www.interaliaproject.com

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of

relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place

without the written permission of Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point.

Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point has no responsibility for the persistence or

accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this

publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will

remain, accurate or appropriate.

All opinions expressed in the present publication only imprint views of the

writers and not of the institutions they are affiliated with or of Inter Alia, Civic

Action Meeting Point.

3 Inter Alia, Civic Action Meeting Point, August 2013

Contents

Unraveling Turkey - Introduction 4

GIZEM AKMAK - Disentangling Motives for Public Mobilization

andGovernmental Responses to the Recent Protest Movement

in Turkey 8

ESRA DOGAN The Gezi Protest in Turkey: Emerging

Pluralism or Deepening Polarization? 20

ALBA CICALA - Friend Request Sent: EU Identity and Turkeys

Accession Bid 34

STAMATIS LASKARIS - Action-Reaction or Inaction? Assessing

Turkeys Involvement in the Syrian Conflict 61

NICHOLAS ROSSIS - The Ambivalence between Islamism and

Secularism in Turkey: Trick or Treat? 70

NIKOS PAPAKOSTAS & NIKOS PASAMITROS - Protests, Spheres

of Social Interaction and the Future of the Turkish Civic Society 80

Unraveling Turkey

A Collective Volume on Contemporary Turkish Politics and Society

Inter Alia - Civic Action Meeting Point, proudly presents its first collective

volume of policy and research papers focusing on diverse aspects of

contemporary Turkey.

The choice of subject and the timing of the publication are not so much related

to the recent protest movement and the international attention it raised to the

country, as one would probably think. It is derived from our perception of

Turkey as a country that has been on the crossroad between East and West -

and the respective value systems- for far too long both politically and socially.

Our view of Turkey somewhat resembles the Seljuk motifs that lie on the

cover of this collective volume: charming and multifaceted; unique and

complicated. The recent protests only came as a confirmation of these

characteristics which are largely derived from the countrys unfulfilled

relationship with the West and the uneven role that Turkey aspires in the

East.

Thus, our objective was to address the underlying issue of Turkeys political

and cultural orientation through analyzing the basic contemporary challenges

facing the country. The present collection provides a multidimensional and

multilevel analysis of potentials and threats regarding the maintenance of

peace and the social and political modernization both domestically and

regionally. Our aim is to utilize the existing momentum of social change in

Turkey and contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of the country, the

region, and the world by presenting and promoting original, long-term, and

sustainable perspectives.

The final product that follows bears little resemblance to our initial concept of

publishing a couple of analyses regarding social developments in Turkey.

Following one of the conceptual starting points of Inter Alia, Civic Action

Meeting Point, that is, to optimally utilize peoples skills and energy as an

alternative to material resource constraints, this collection grew both in size

and in expectations. The participation of well-respected scholars who jumped

on board as soon as the idea was forwarded gives us faith in our aspiration to


build on peoples willingness to offer, and fills us with hope about the future.

We thank them all sincerely.

The collection consists of sixarticles (research papers and policy analyses) that

focus on both national and international challenges facing contemporary

Turkey:

DrGizemAlioglou-Cakmak, assistant professor at the University of

Yeditepe, Turkey, analyses the impetus and the political processes

leading up to the escalation of public protest and political crisis.

EsraDogan, PhD Candidate at the Panteion University of Athens, using

personal interviews and the discourse on social media platforms,

attempts to depict the short and medium-term impact of the Gezi

protests on the Turkish society.

Alba Cicala, PhD candidate at the University of Sienna, Italy/ research

associate at Inter Alia C.A.M.P., presents her recent research paper

titled Friend request sent. EU Identity and Turkeys Accession Bid.

Tracing the contours of a wide concept that of European identity, the

Turkish issue is seen through the eyes of the European public, with a view

to disentangle the reasons of mass reactions vis--vis such a sensitive

and long-standing issue.

StamatisLaskaris, peace & conflict researcher (MSc Uppsala

University), examines Turkeys deviation from its foreign policy

doctrine regarding the Syrian conflict and analyzes the conceptual

incompatibility of the, so called, Davutoglu doctrine to the regional

stakes and balance of power.

Dr Nicholas Rossis, PhD in Middle-Eastern and Islamic studies and

research associate at the University of Durham, writes about the

everlasting nexus between secularism and Islamism in the Turkish

society and explores the role of potential inhibitors that do not allow to

Turkey to glide into one of the two sides of the same coin.

Nikos Papakostas, head of the Analysis and Research Departments at

Inter Alia C.A.M.P and Nikos Pasamitros, PhD Candidate at

Panteion University and project coordinator at Inter Alia C.A.M.P.,

present preliminary, conceptual conclusions on the future of the civil

society in Turkey and beyond.


Finally, two opinions about the recent events in Turkey and the political

personality of RecepTayyipErdoan by Nikos Karavasilis(BA graduate in

International and European Studies, University of Piraeus)and

BurakKahraman(Musician & Film Producer, MA in Composing for Film and

TV program, Kingston University's), are posted on the students corner

(www.interaliaproject.com/students.html), and on our blog

(www.interaliaproject.blogspot.gr) thus opening the floor for discussion.

Enjoy the reading. All comments are welcome!

Sincerely,

Nikos Papakostas

Nikos Pasamitros

Inter Alia Editorial Team

Athens, September 10, 2013

Unraveling Turkey Collective Volume on Turkish Politics & Society

GIZEM AKMAK

Disentangling Motives for Public Mobilization and

Governmental Responses to the Recent Protest

Movement in Turkey

Abstract:In late May 2013, protests raised against the plans to replace Gezi Park with the

replica of Ottoman Barracks. In the wake of the events, it was just a small protest - about a

hundred protesters on passive resistance, intending to protect the Gezi Park. The brutal police

intervention attracted further reaction from different segments of the society and the numbers

of protesters were multiplied day by day. The people, who were organized through the social

media, came together in order to demonstrateagainst the government and the disproportional

use of force towards the peaceful protesters. Gezi resistance had a complex background of

motivations and therefore focusing on simplified causes would lead to failure of an accurate

explanation of the phenomenon. In order to understand the motivation of the masses the

profile of protesters should be analyzed first. This study aims to examine the reasons for the

resistance.Analyzing such a new and intense social phenomenon requires taking some steps

back because it is too early to present facts about the political and social impacts or long term

effects. However, accurate assessments can be made on the nature of the resistance which

could be improved by and set grounds for further research.

Gizemakmakis an assistant professor at Yeditepe University, Turkey

Introduction and Context

In late May 2013, protests raised against the Turkish governments plans to

replace Gezi Park with the replica of the Ottoman Barracks. The, so called,

new Project was to builda shopping mall andluxury residences in the form of

19th century Ottoman Barracks. When the Project was first announced, the

NGOs, professional chambers and experts from the field of construction

(architects, mechanics etc.) opposed the initiative. However, the Prime

Minister insisted that the project is put into practice in spite of those reactions.

In the wake of the events, it was just a small protest intending to protect the

Gezi Park which is located in the heart of the city and is the only green space

of the area. About a hundred young demonstrators were on passive resistance

at the park and slept in tents they had set there in order to prevent the

destruction of the park. At about 5:00 a.m. the police were commanded to

remove the activists from the park;they entered the area, moved the protesters

by force and set the tents on fire. The brutal police intervention attracted

further reaction from different segments of the society and the number of

Motives for the recent public mobilization and governmental responses


protesters was multiplied day by day. The people, who were organized

through the social media, gradually formed a sizeable and dynamic resistance

movement against the government that reacted to the disproportionate use of

force towards the peacefuldemonstrators.

Gezi resistance had a complex background of motivations and political

orientations ranging from secular Kemalists and environmentalists to

nationalists and hardcore leftists. Therefore, focusing on simplified causes

would lead to failure of an accurate explanation of the phenomenon. In order

to understand the motivation of the masses the profile of protesters should be

analyzed first.

This study aims to examine the reasons for the resistance rather than focus on

the course of events and possible political and social outcomes. Analyzing

such a new and intense social phenomenon requires taking some steps and

distance. It is too early to present facts about the political and social impacts

or long term effects. However, accurate assessments can be made on the

nature of the resistance which could be improved by and set grounds for

further research.

Data and Statistics

Academics from Bilgi University issued an online survey addressing the

demonstrators while the protests were at their peak. 3000 people were asked

questions about their reasons for being in the streets, their political leanings,

and how they identifying themselves. Contrary to Prime Minister R. T.

Erdoans claims, 70 % of the protesters did not feel close to any political

organization or party. Despite these facts, Erdoan accused Republican

Peoples Party (main opposition) for provoking the demonstrations and

masses against the government. Also, some other AKP officials claimed that

the resistance was a scenario designed to set grounds for a military

intervention.

The demographic outcomes of the survey indicated that 39.6 % of the

protesters were between 19-25 years old, 24 % was between 26-30 years old.

So, it can be safely stated that they were mostly young people with no



significant political involvement. According to another poll carried out by

Konda, the average age of the demonstrators was 28 years old. This means

that most of them were born after 1980 military intervention. This generation

is called Generation Y" who are more civic-minded, with high degree of self-

esteem, open to change, tolerant to severalty, flexible and with a strong sense

of community (Strauss & Howe 2000).Most significantly since 1980, a

systematic de-politicization process of the youth has taken place

simultaneously by the state and the family. By using instruments such as

schools and the media, the state aimed to prevent young people from

engaging in politics outside the states defined ideological scope

(Alemdaroglu, 2013)1. Also, they had been advised by their families to stay

away from politics and focus on their careers, schools or professions which

are more worth pursuing.

This process created political apathy and a generation indifferent to political

events that regarded politics as a time consuming, worthless, unproductive

activity. Trust for politicians remained low while the military has consistently

been regarded as the most trustworthy institution until today. According to

the Bilgi Survey, 53,76 % of those young protesters had never been involved

in mass demonstration before, and only 15 % of the protesters felt sympathy

towards a political party.

This Picture brings a question to mind: What factors motivated those young

people to pour into the streets in Turkey?

According to the survey, 92,4 % of the protesters were motivated by the

authoritarian attitude of Prime Minister Erdoan. Also, 91,3 % indicated that

the brutal police intervention led them to participate in the resistance.

91.1% of the participants mentioned that they reacted because their

democratic rights were being violated by the government. 84.2 % of the

people were motivated by the self-censorship of the mainstream media in the

name of their broader economic interests, while only 56.2 of the participants

were motivated by mere environmental concerns. Despite the claims of the

Prime Minister, only 7.7 % of the protesters were mobilized by a political

movement or organization (Ynetnews, 24 July 2013).Most of these young

1 All cited internet sources were last accessed on August 1st 2013



people identify themselves as libertarian (81.2 %). 64.5 % of the participants

perceive themselves as secular and 54.5 % as "apolitical".

After giving brief information about the profile of protesters, the remaining

part of this article aims to examine the reasons and the motivation behind the

protest. Some writers tend to explain the discontent by only focusing on

Secular Islamist debate in Turkey. However, this approach fails to include

the other significant factors which are worth evaluating.

Neo-liberal policies and the limitation of the public space

According to Dardot and Laval (2009), neo-liberalism constitutes a notion that

is not constrained to the economy. It involves all the institutions and the

relationships between people, and has an impact on the practices and life

style of individuals. The main norm of this approach is competition", and it

is a life style in which people interact with each other as companies and

institutions. Global competition leads states and its institutions to function as

profit seeking companies.

The nature of neo-liberalism is negatively associated to the nature of

democracy as the notion of democracy is being downgraded to the mere

conduct of periodical elections. Also, it renders controlling and monitoring of

government activities very difficult (Basaran, 2012).Despite the fact that neo-

liberalism requires minimal government intervention, some scholars claim

that, the social and the political actions taken in line with the neoliberal

project usually involves an increase in intervention (Jessop, 2002).

During the AKP rule, Turkey became one of the fastest growing and the 18th

largest economy in the world. The government has been committed to a

fully-fledged neo-liberal economic policy which requires privatization and

trade liberalization.

Privatization is not a new phenomenon in Turkey. Neo-liberal economic

policies were initiated by Turgutzal in the post-military rule and imposed

by the successive governments. However, the privatization attempts

skyrocketed during the AKP government. According to Tansel (2013), the



amount of privatization was around 380 million dollars before 2003, has risen

to 6 billion dollars during Erdoans three terms in office. Banks, oil

refineries, factories, bridges, and public assets havebeen privatized rapidly.

According to Onaran and Giamali (2013), neoliberal policies which

increasingly commercialized public services, created areas of rent for large

corporations, and eroded the living standards and security of a significant

part of the working people. There was a long process of accumulation of

discontent andGezi Park resistance was the insurrection of a new generation,

which had been brought up by the conservative neoliberal authoritarian AKP

regime for more than a decade.

The urban renewal project imposed by the government resulted in the

construction boom and turned the country into a huge construction yard.

Shopping malls were built in every neighborhood, and the traditional districts

were replaced by luxury residences. Some historical buildings in the stiklal

Street (the most popular historical Pedestrian Street of Istanbul) were

converted into shopping malls; an old famous cinema and pastry shop were

forcibly demolished in spite of small-scale protests. When it came to the Gezi

incident, by protecting the last green area in the heart of the city, the

protesters aimed to confront the state-driven privatization of public spaces

and arbitrary treatment of the government with its authoritarian form of neo-

liberalism.

According to Igsiz (2013), AKP officials actually appear to be approaching

Turkey as a product, or more accurately, as a brand name to be protected.

As a byproduct of its neo-liberal stance, the AKP aims to make the name of

Turkey one of the most valuable brands in the world, thus attracting more

foreign investments in Turkey. Hence, Gezi Park resistance was regarded as

an attempt to diminish the brand value of Turkey and the protesters had to be

silenced to protect the image of the country.

Increasing Authoritarianism



A famous quote of Michel Foucault summarizes the relationship between

authoritarianism and resistance as follows, Where there is power, there is

resistance.

The AKP came to power in Turkey in the general elections of 2002, and in the

last general elections held on June 12, 2011, the AKP further increased its

share of the popular vote to 49.8% thus securing 327 parliamentary seats to

form a third-consecutive majority government.

According to Vick (2013), partys first victory in 2002 was a populist triumph

that hoisted Turkish politics from the sterile province of the elites and

empowered by the heartlands devout Muslims. Reinforced by successive

electoral victories Erdoan defanged the Turkish military, along the way a

new cult of personality formed around the premier.

This long period of premiership can be regarded as the transformation of

Erdoan from a populist to an authoritarian leader. Turkey has the largest

number of journalists in detention in the world, according to the Committee

to Protect Journalists, which reports that at least 49 journalists were

imprisoned in 2012 (Daily News, 29/7/2012). The detained journalists were

accused to be affiliated with illegal organizations, and their imprisonment

was never directly based on their writings. Also the generals who were

accused for plotting a coup were sent to prison and were subject to extremely

long judicial processes. Military officials, soldiers, academicians, artists,

authors were arrested for supposedly being the member of terrorist

organization Ergenekon which allegedly aimed to topple the ruling

government. Long detention periods in this prosecution were criticized by

international human right organizations and NGOs (Among others Amnesty

International, 2013). The potential opposition leaders or figures which

challenged the government policies were associated with Ergenekon case,

thus creating a climate of fear to the public.

Moreover, most of the TV channels, radios, and newspapers are owned by

companies with business activities in different fields. Thus, some journalists

and anchormen who dared to openly criticize Erdoan were fired by the



media bosses whosupported the government in order to protect their business

interests. As a result, while mainstream media become increasingly pro-

government, the alternative media struggle to survive. During the Gezi Park

resistance, the mainstream media were self-censored and avoided

broadcasting the social unrest and the clashes in the street. The famous news

channel CNN Turk was broadcasting a documentary on penguins during the

most violent days of the protests. Since then, the penguins became the symbol

of censorship in Turkey.

The number of students under arrest is also very high. A recent report

prepared by the Solidarity with Arrested Students Platform (2012) says that

there are currently 771 students in prison in Turkey. While most of the

students were accused for making propaganda of illegal organizations, there

are some students who were imprisoned because of advocating free education

by carrying banners. Also, wearing a scarf called poshu was regarded as a

symbol of terrorist organization and a reason for detention.

Erdoan with his patriarchal discourse also interferes in peoples life style and

their choices. By enacting the role of father in the family,the Prime Minister

attempted to micromanage the life styles of the Turkish citizens. According

to Korkman and Akgz (2013), Erdoan embodies a very particular

masculine political persona. With an aggressive, uncompromising, and

domineering personality, he aspires to act as every citizens father, brother,

and husband.

In several occasions Erdoan claimed that each family must have at least

three children, prohibited the sale of alcohol after 10 pm., attempted to ban

abortion, and declared that he aims to create a religious, healthy generation.

He stated that, we do not want to see our youth walking about high and

drunk in the streets. He went even further and said, Go home and drink

there, addressing alcohol consumers (Baydar, 2013).Also, there was an

attempt to ban kissing in public which was regarded as an immoral act by the

conservative government.



The language of order and the attempts to limit everyday life made people

feel threatened as to their freedoms due to blunt interference to their personal

space. The discontent exploded with the Gezi Park resistance which can be

named as Enough is enough movement. Especially, the generation Y who

are highly attached to their personal freedoms felt degraded, restricted and

ignored.

The Uncompromising Stance ofErdoan

The Gezi Park resistance started as a passive protest to save the trees from

destruction. However, the violence that was communicated through the social

media and the use of excessive and disproportional force by the police led

more people to join the resistance. Enormous amounts of tear gas and water

cannons were used in order to push back the protesters. One police officer

and five demonstrators died in the unrest, hundreds of people were injured

and 12 people lost their eye-sight. Clouds of tear gas even affected the people

in their homes and the animals in the streets.

The Prime Minister advocated that polices patience had been tested with all

sorts of provocations. He was justifying the acts of police by comparing

with the Western counterparts:

We have responded with huge democratic patience to street

incidents that took place in our cities in the last two months.

Western police couldnt do it, he said, adding that the polices

attitude towards citizens in Western countries was "much more

backward" compared to that of the Turkish police2.

Erdoan rejected all criticism about the police violence and claimed that those

allegations were the product of a dark propaganda which aims to defame the

Turkish police.

2http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pm-erdogan-says-turkish-police-subject-of-constant-

dark-propaganda-during-gezi-protests.aspx?pageID=238&nID=51367&NewsCatID=338



Erdoan demonstrated a hard line stance and uncompromising discourse

during the resistance. He referred to the protesters as a small group of

looters, vandals, drunken who were destroying public property,

fighting against the state, damaging the countrys international image. There

were widespread calls to start a dialogue with the protesters but rather than

seeking compromise, Erdoan preferred to preserve his tough stance and

language. He answered criticisms by stating, If my reaction is considered too

tough, then I'm sorry. I am TayyipErdoan, and I can't change that". The

Prime Ministers unwillingness to compromise led resistance to spread to

other cities beyond Istanbul, again with increasing numbers of protesters day

by day.

Erdoan warned the protesters by stating "we remained patient, we are still

patient but there's a limit to our patience". He also stated that he was having a

hard time keeping at home the 50 % of the population who voted for him. He

was calling the protesters terrorists and marginal groups and also accused the

famous hotels in Taksim of protecting and harboring terrorist groups. He

continued to blame the foreign powers and the provocateurs and warned the

protesters not to be the part of the game against Turkey.

It can be stated that that the hard line stance of the Prime Minister inflamed

the tension among the country. Prime Minister ignored the protesters

message that regardless of their electoral preferences their voices and

demands ought not to be disregarded.

Concluding Remarks

Gezi Park protest constituted social uprising of ordinary people who wanted

to protect their rights and space. Moreover, people manifested their demand

for having a say in the decisions related to their personal lives. Gezi Park

protesters had different backgrounds and motivations. However, some factors

are more significant than others when the reasons of the protests are

considered. The neoliberal policies imposed by the Erdoan government

which resulted in the high level of privatization and urban development left

people propertyless and limited the public space. Nevertheless, it should be



noted that this is the common problem of neoliberal nation-states to which

Turkey can be regarded as a good example.

The authoritarian stance of the Prime Minister also played a significant role in

inflaming the discontent. His way of doing politics with a highly masculine

discourse and paternalist approach disturbed the people who wanted to

protect their rights and space. In other words, people dislikePrime Ministers

acting like an authoritarian father who gives orders and says what to do and

what not to do. In that context, the culture of fear towards authority has

apparently risen during the past decade of PM Erdoans premiership.

Also, people criticized the governments exploitation of the judicial system to

suppress and pressure the opposition and other probable threats to their rule.

The arbitrary appointments of the party sympathizers into the

significant positions in state institutions, and the capture of all forms of state

apparatus makes the power of the government more apparent. Although

arbitrary appointments and the usage of state apparatus are not new

phenomena in Turkish politics it should be noted that duringthe rule of AKP

they became more widespread and alarming.

The brutal police intervention was another factor that mobilized people3.

Using police force to consolidate state power is also not a new invention.

However, in the particular context, protesters it arguably catalyzed the

resistance. Demonstrators were regarded as the states worst enemy and the

peaceful demonstrators were even associated with the opponent forces in the

battle of Gallipoli 1915 by the police.

Moreover, the discourse of the Prime Minister provoked people and increased

the number of protesters. His wordings threatened the people who already

felt insecure because of the authoritarian tendencies of Erdoan. The

protesters criticized the Prime Minister for his ambition for saying the last

3 Rather indicatively, a father who joined the resistance was asked his reason to be there. The

answer was clear and short I want my daughter not to breath gas in future, therefore Im

continuously breathing gas now.



word on any issue, and his attempts to divide the society as Erdoan

supporters and the minority.

Almost half of the voters in Turkey voted for AKPand its liberal and

democratization promises. He succeeded to get support from different

segments of the Turkish society, but now there are people who are frustrated

from his authoritarian rule and polarization of the society by using

uncompromising discourse.

Finally, comparing the Gezi Park protest with the Arab Spring seems to be

another misinterpretation of the phenomenon. Since the wake of the protests

several commentaries especially in the international media suggest that there

are similarities and even links between the Gezi protests and the Arab Spring.

This seems to be a weak argument since the political systems and social

structures of the two phenomena are not similar. Despite the fact that the

Prime Minister has transformed into a more authoritarian leader in his third

term, it is not accurate to call him a dictator since he came to power through

free elections and still holds the support of significant portion of Turkish

society. His political weakness lies in downgrading democracy to the periodic

conduct of elections and ignoring the demands coming from the people.

While Arab Spring is a process of democratization which intends to establish

free elections, Gezi Park protest poses a demand to improve the quality of

democracy in Turkey, with particular contributions of a growing network of

NGOs, utilization of social media and solidarity among diverse segments

ofthe society, posing a rather promising picture for the future of democracy.

Basic References

AlemdarogluAya (18 June 2013). From Cynicism to Protest: Reflections on Youth

and Politics in Turkey. Retrieved from

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/contributors/147150

Amnesty International (2013).Turkey: Decriminalize Decent Time to Deliver on the

Right of Freedom of Expression, Amnesty International Publications, London



BaydarYav. (1 June 2013). Erdoan Remains Defiant as Instanbul Protest Widens,

ALMONITOR. Retrieved from: http://www.al-

monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/istanbul-protests-Erdoan-defiant-

turkey.html#ixzz2aZFZmAF6

Daily News (29 July 2012) Number of Arrested Students on the Rise in Turkey.

Retrieved from: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/number-of-arrested-students-

on-the-rise-in-turkey.aspx?pageID=238&nid=24337

Dardot, P & Laval Ch. (2009). La Nouvelle Raison du Monde: Essaisur la

socitnolibrale, Revue du MAUSS permanente, 4 fvrier 2009

Isz As. (2013). Brand Turkey and the Gezi Protests. Authoritarianism, Law and

Neoliberalism, Dars Jadaliyya. Retrieved from

http://dars.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12939/brand-turkey-and-the-gezi-

protests_authoritarianis

Jessop B. (2002). Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical

Perspective, Antipode, Vol. 34 (3), pp. 452-472. Retrieved from:

http://www.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/research/publications/papers/jessop-liberalism-

neoliberalism.pdf

Kurtulus, Z &Aciksoz, S. C (22 July 2013). Erdoans Masculinity and the Language of

the Gezi Resistance. Retrieved from

http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/12367/Erdoan%E2%80%99s-masculinity-

and-the-language-of-the-gezi

Onaran Oz. &Giamali, An. (2013). Authoritarian Neo-liberalism Hits a Wall in Turkey,

New Left Project. Retrieved from:

http://www.newleftproject.org/index.php/site/article_comments/authoritarian_neoli

beralism_hits_a_wall_in_turkey

Tansel, C. B. (2013). The Gezi Occupation: Confronting Authoritarian Neo-liberalism,

From the Desk Drawer. Retrieved from http://adamdavidmorton.com/2013/06/the-

gezi-park-occupation-confronting-authoritarian-neoliberalism/

Vick K. (24 June 2013).Erdoans Paradox: Turkish Leader Struggles between

Authoritarianism and Democracy, Time World. Retrieved

from:http://world.time.com/2013/06/24/Erdoans-paradox-turkish-leader-struggles-

between-authoritarianism-and-democracy/

William Strauss, Neil Howe (2000). Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation. New

York, NY: Vintage. pp. 213237. ISBN 0-375-70719-0.



Ynetnews (24 July 2013). Turkish Media Struggle with Lawsuits, Government Oppression.

Retrieved from: http://t24.com.tr/haber/gezi-parki-direniscileriyle-yapilan-anketten-

cikan-ilginc-sonuclar/231335


ESRA DOGAN

The Gezi Protest in Turkey: Emerging Pluralism or

Deepening Polarization? Abstract:This article aims to unravel the nature of the Gezi Protests` consequential imprints

on the Turkish society and to offer certain preliminary assumptions regarding the change in

relationships between various societal segments in line with the discussions of increased

pluralism and/or polarization. The key findings ultimately suggest that the Gezi resistance

movement on one hand has advocated the spirit of `pluralism` and `tolerance`, and on the

other, has brought to the surface dangerous signs of deepening polarization within society.

This hazardous situation has been incited both by the marginalizing and divisive discourse of

Prime Minister Erdogan, and by the polarizing rhetoric of a number of Gezi supporters and

its opponents, which is by and large spread through the channels of social media.

EsraDoganis a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and History at Panteion

University, Athens.

Introduction

Not far from memory, only a few months ago1, the eyes of the world had

centered on a tiny little park in the heart of Istanbul, the largest and most

cosmopolitan city of Turkey. Since then, Turkey has been gripped by the

country`s biggest political uprising in the post-1980 [coup] period, the so-

called `GeziParki protests`, drawing great concerns from those who follow the

developments in Turkey closely and bringing to the surface suspicions over

the consolidation of the democracy in the country.

Needless to say, the Gezi protests` and their possible consequences for the

future of the country have been largely contested by international and

domestic political circles. Many have questioned what kind of impacts the

protests would engender considering the existing political system and

whether the Gezi resistance would turn into a lasting political movement.

Some have claimed that the protests were far from successful due to their

failure to produce any material outcomes in the political structure of Turkey

(for instance: Bilgin, July 2013; Kanbolat, June 10, 2013). It is in fact true that

from the Gezi incidents there has emerged neither any political movement

nor any political leader so far and the Prime Minister RecepTayyipErdogan

and his party, Justice and Development Party (AKP), still enjoys a substantial

base of popular support.

Hence, from the outset, it may seem like not much has changed in Turkey,

yet, in reality such an outlook is trapped in a very narrow perspective missing

the big picture. It is indeed palpable that the Gezi Protests have generated

1Editors note: the collective volume which includes the present paper was published in September

2013.

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significant impact on the society in Turkey, above all, over the relationships

between various societal segments composing it, as well as their interaction

with the state and the government. Particularly, it is frequently noted that the

Gezi Park protests have created an environment of plurality, advocating

tolerance and understanding. Yet, there are also concerns that after the

protests society in Turkey is being more and more polarized, harboring

prejudice and hatred among the ones holding opposing views on the matter.

Although it is indeed too early to shed a clear light on the nature and extent

the influence the Gezi protests impacted with regards to the course of social

transformation in Turkey, it is still possible to offer particular preliminary

assumptions regarding the discussions of increased pluralism and/or

polarization of the society in line with the consequential imprints of these

protests.

Gezi: The Signs of Emerging Pluralism in Turkey

In the recent protests in Turkey, the participants comprised a very diverse

group, cutting along ideological, class, gender, ethnic and religious lines.

There were liberals, feminists, leftists, nationalists, traditional Kemalists,

conservatives, anti-capitalist Muslims and those ordinary citizens who were

not fitting into any substantial categorization. Among these `categorically

obscure` citizens were doctors, bankers, lawyers, journalists, engineers, civil

society activists, actors, musicians, politicians, high-school and university

students, housewives, the unemployed and street children etc.

Indeed, the recent protests brought together certain groups and segments of

Turkish society, which would have been considered beyond imagination only

a few months ago. It was unanticipated for many to witness that the fans of

rival Turkish football teams were standing shoulder to shoulder, posing to the

cameras with their uniforms on. What was even more surprising was that the

representatives of the Kurdish parties and the members of the left-wing

nationalist youth organization, Turkish Youth Unity, were sharing a camping

area and protesting together. As ElifSafak (June 21, 2013), a prominent

Turkish woman author, noted: "Suddenly a Kurdish nationalist was helping a

Turkish nationalist escape from police; a conservative sang side by side with a leftist;

an Alevi shared a platform with a devout Sunni. Women were at the forefront: mostly

young, but also middle-aged; there were students, professionals and housewives; some

covered their heads, but most didnt." Similarly, a Gezi protestor who attended

the protests in Ankara told me that she found a chance to interact with

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various people. "Some even belonged to those ideological or social groups whom I

had never considered talking with before," she said.2

It is also remarkable to underscore at this point that Erdogan`s marginalizing

rhetoric has undeniably been a facilitating factor in the creation of a collective

identity among the Gezi protestors. Particularly, the term `capulcu` (roughly

translated as `looters`) used by Erdogan to describe the protestors was

humorously adopted by the street demonstrators and online activists in a

collective manner and became a `term` of ùnifying identity` for the protestors

despite their visible differences. After someone sprayed on a wall in Taksim

'Everyday I`m Chapulling`,3 a video clip with the same motto hit the internet.4

Since then, it has become very popular among the internet users of the Gezi

supporters to share messages such as Ì am a capulcu, as well.`,Ì have chapulled

today`, Ì will be chapulling soon` , `Keep calm and be a capulcu` etc. One of

Turkeys leading businessmen CemBoyner, head of Boyner Holding (June 5,

2013), supported the movement by holding a banner, reading: Im neither

rightist, nor leftist. Im a capulcu.

The protestors in Gezi Park, and in the parks in several other cities,

established tented camps with numerous makeshift facilities ranging from

food centers to libraries. Hence, the park occupations soon turned into `social

gathering areas where people from different backgrounds came together to

share ideas, music, artwork, as well as tangible products, such as books and

food. As a well-known Turkish director, Cagan Irmak, stated in a television

program in CNN; Kids there read books, played guitars and sang. They met and

loved each other." Although the protestors have represented differing opinions

and views regarding a variety of issues in Turkey, they could still succeed to

experience a `community` life in small public areas, promoting the

recognition and acceptance of differences.

The protestors have called this political coalescence and social sensitivity

based on ùnity albeit differences` as `the Gezi spirit`. One of the most striking

examples of this emerging spirit of tolerance and pluralism has been the

recognition and the respect that the LGBT community has gained among the

participants of the Gezi protests. Belonging to a community facing great

prejudice and oppression, they have not only found a chance to communicate

2Author`s Note: This interview and the other interviews and/or dialogues noted in this article are held

in August 2013 through phone or skype (with two exceptions being face-to-face dialogues in Athens) 3Chapulling: The protesters created an English verb, that is derived from the Turkish word `capulcu`,

with a rough meaning of `fighting for rights` and `resisting pressure`. 4The abovementioned video can be watched from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNsUHvxRp_A.

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with those who harbored prejudice against them, but also have acquired

considerable support for their grievances. Consequently, with the

involvement of the Gezi Park demonstrators, the LGBT pride parade on the

30th of June in Istanbul succeeded in attracting almost a hundred thousand

people, making this pride parade the biggest one held in Turkey so far.

One might also argue that with the Gezi resistance movement certain

prejudices experienced by the Kurdish and Turkish constituencies of society

have begun to shatter. After a military shooting on the 28th of June that killed

an 18-year old protestor, MedeniYildirim, during the demonstrations against

the building of a new military police station in the Kurdish town of Lice,

thousands of people, many carrying Turkish flags and some being Turkish

nationalist strong-holds, marched and shouted slogans in cities of Istanbul,

Ankara and Adana in support of Kurdish grievances. Undoubtedly, these

`Resist Lice` protests underlying the fraternity of Turkish and Kurdish people,

has had a symbolic meaning that is difficult to underestimate.

Moreover, the Gezi Park movement has created an atmosphere of public

dialogue and open exchange, which is vitally important in a society where the

fear of oppression stands in the way of expressing contrasting opinions. After

the occupation in Gezi Park was dispersed by the police on the 15-16 of June,

people have started to gather in other public parks of Istanbul, as well as of

other cities, like Izmir, Ankara, Mersin etc. and have organized public forums

in order to discuss the resistance and the recent developments in Turkey.

These `agora style` public forums, with volunteering speakers taking turns to

express their ideas, have resembled a new quest for the reconsideration of

democracy in Turkey based on the celebration of diversities.

Additionally significant, the Gezi protests have revealed that a new type of

activism has been born among young and educated people, mainly from

urban middle class. These young activists, referred to by some as 'the internet

generation', are those who were largely perceived `apolitical` before the

protests due to their non-involvement in political activities. According to a

survey conducted by EsraErcanBilgic and ZehraKafkasli (in T24 June 4, 2013),

two academics from Istanbul Bilgi University, between June 3 and 4 in Gezi

Park, more than half of the respondents (63.6%) were between the ages of 19

and 30 and the majority of the protestors (70 %) said that they did not feel

close to any political party. The young Gezi protestors, who feel themselves

alienated from the existing political structure, have defined themselves as

`libertarians' in favor of individual liberties, human rights and freedom of

thought and expression. These young people are indeed the ones who can

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embrace Alevi, Christian and Jewish traditions, Kurdish culture and the

LBGT grievances, even if they do not belong to any of these oppressed

minority groups (Schubel, July 9, 2013). The notion of `pluralism` generated

among this youth has no complete reflection in the mainstream politics so far,

yet, it gives important signals for the emergence of new political values

celebrating tolerance and freedom for every individual.

In light of the abovementioned facts, it is apparent that the Gezi resistance

movement has paved the way for the questioning of the quality of democracy

in Turkey, nourishing the spirit of `pluralism` as a force countering the

political power of majoritarianism and the threat of authoritarianism.

However, how successfully these emerging values of tolerance and diversity

have been internalized in Turkish society is yet questionable. In fact, some

political circles have approached the vision of 'pluralist unity ' of the Gezi

Park protests with great suspicion, claiming that the àlliance` of the

protestors is guided by their anti-government sentiments and so is bound to

remain 'artificial'.

In retrospect, the fact that the protestors have had an anti-government stance

does not override the existence of an increasing tolerance and integration

among various segments of the population. Given that Turkish society is

extremely diverse, such promotion of `pluralism` at the societal level must be

regarded a very positive development. Still, following the Gezi protests, the

situation in Turkey has not been as bright as one would hope, since the threat

of deepened `polarization` among two opposing camps of the Gezi resistance

has emerged.

Gezi vs. AKP: The Dangers of Polarization in Turkey

The Gezi resistance movement has allowed people from different groups and

backgrounds to form an àlliance`, not organized around a political party or a

leader, but pivoted around a set of ideas such as resistance to perceived

àuthoritarian majoritarianism` and a fight for greater freedom. However, this

àlliance` of protestors has been far from representative of the entire

population in Turkey. In fact, there has been a considerably large segment

within society, typically the AKP supporters, who have displayed discontent

towards the Gezi protests and the protestors.

These opposing stances towards the movement indeed have begun to define

someone`s belonging to one of the two particular groups, one of the Gezi

protestors, on the one hand, and one of the Gezi opponents - roughly

meaning the AKP supporters- on the other. The divisions between these two

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groupings have further been deepened, as both sides utilized the rhetoric of

`being victimized' in the design of their `self-images`. Consequently, even

though the Gezi resistance movement has advocated the rhetoric of

`pluralism` and `tolerance`, it has also brought to the surface dangerous signs

of rising polarization within society. This perilous situation has been

triggered both by the autocratic and divisive discourse of Prime Minister

Erdogan and by the polarizing rhetoric of a number of Gezi supporters and its

opponents, which is by and large spread through the channels of social

media.

Since the beginning of the Gezi protests, Prime Minister Erdogan has taken a

tough stance towards the protestors. In his party's parliamentary group

meeting on the 11th of June, he asked: "Were we supposed to kneel before them?"

and then added: "They can call me harsh, but this TayyipErdogan will not change

(Binhbaum, June 12, 2013)." Although he claimed in the same speech that

AKP had been "the party of the 100 percent," his statements were far from being

conciliatory. He assertively argued that the Gezi movement was nothing, but

an international conspiracy against Turkey and the protestors were pawns in

a wider game. Such claims have been also supported by the government-

sided media. For example, a YeniSafak newspaper columnist, BercanTutar

wrote that "Gezi Project is a project beyond Turkey," claiming that behind the

protests are those who are willing to prevent Turkey`s development (Tutar,

July 30, 2013). As such, Erdogan, getting the support of his party and certain

media organs, has chosen to equate the Gezi protestors with terrorists and

vandals, if not merely the figureheads of them. His accusing and

uncompromising attitude has undeniably generated a more deepened feeling

of alienation among the protestors, who have felt that their voices were

unheard and their demands largely ignored.

Furthermore, Erdogan has tried to appeal to his own supporters by igniting

religious sentiments while portraying the Gezi protestors as `anti-Islamists"

with no respect for religion. In particular, he has adamantly argued that the

protestors in Istanbul consumed alcoholic beverage in a mosque in

Dolmabahce, albeit the fact that the mosque`s muezzin denied this allegation

(Cumhuriyet June 26, 2013). In speeches during his counter rallies he also

noted that the protestors treated some women wearing headscarves

disrespectfully. Playing the religious victimhood card, Erdogan indeed

attempted to represent the Gezi protests as a conflict between two ideological

camps based on religion. As a political scientist, Vernon Schubel, correctly

depicts though, "while many of the protestors have been critical of what they see as

the AKP`s desire to force its own vision of Islam on the rest of the populace, these

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protests have been mainly about authoritarianism, not religion." (Schubel, July 9,

2013) It is also noteworthy to underline here that a group of people calling

themselves `anti-capitalist Muslims` were among the participants of the

protests, criticizing the perceived autocratic attitude of the government and

its neo-liberal policies (Akyol July 17, 2013).

Undeniably, Erdogan`s stance has neither embraced the plurality of society in

Turkey nor has it been constructive in compromising with the demands of the

protestors and calming down the events. He instead has kept referring to his

electoral power, reminding of the hegemony of the majority in the Turkish

parliamentarian system. For instance, in his interview with the press on June

2nd, he claimed that his party AKP had the right to make the decision for Gezi

Park, saying "We are a party which perceived 21.5 million votes. Almost 50 percent.

Aren`t we supposed to have the final say?" Such discourse of Erdogan certainly

has been perceived by many as only being willing to pander to his own

electorates and thus failing to embrace those who do not vote for him.

Incrementally, but noticeably, Erdogan`s dismissive rhetoric towards the

protests has marginalized the situation, deepening the polarization between

the supporters of the Gezi protests and the AKP supporters. In particular, it

seems that his portrayal of the protestors as vandals, terrorists, anti-Islamists

and extremists has been well accepted and substantially backed by some of

his supporters. To remind, upon Erdogan`s arrival to Istanbul airport on the

7th of June, thousands of people chanted that they were ready to "smash the

protests" in Taksim, shouting fierce slogans like "Taksim, do not tire our

patience," and "The hands targeting the police shall be broken".

Although it is very difficult to generalize at this point, it seems that a very

common attitude among the AKP`s bases towards the protestors has been

disapproving and/or accusing. A number of young AKP supporters that I

interviewed told me that they have disapproved of the way that the

protestors have chosen to show their discontent. They have claimed that the

protestors have damaged the public areas and have provoked the police,

creating an atmosphere of `chaos` in Turkey. Such views have been more

fiercely displayed by the online users of AKP bases, who have attempted to

distribute their ideas through social media. In social networking sites, such as

Facebook and Twitter, one can frequently read the comments of numerous

people criticizing the Gezi protests as unlawful and condemning the

protestors to be extremists, if not violent provocateurs. Such statements, in

fact, have been very much in line with Erdogan`s discourse over the Gezi

incidents.

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Indeed, the general belief among the AKP supporters is that the Gezi protests

are less about freedoms, but more about their intentions to topple the

government in an undemocratic way. An AKP supporter I recently talked

with said `I do not believe in the sincerity of the Gezi protestors. They claim they

want freedom for everyone, but then, where were all these masses when girls wearing

headscarves were not allowed to enter their universities? They just want to bring

down the most successful Prime Minister in Turkish history." One can also read in

social networking sites such statements claiming that when today`s AKP

bases had faced many attacks on their religious views, particularly after the

28th of February 1998 [so-called post-modern coup], they had sought their

demands through democratic elections.In a BBC interview, another AKP

supporter, C. Ozdemir, expressed a similar stance: "They [meaning the Gezi

protestors] say Erdogan is getting too involved in people's lives. They can't produce

specific examples of this, other than saying he told people to have three kids...What

they really want is for the prime minister to resign...Why don't the protesters go and

form a new party and run against the governing party?"(BBC News Europe June

13, 2013) Being aware of his electoral supremacy, Prime Minister Erdogan has

also frequently noted that the protestors should look for their rights in the

ballot boxes, not in the streets.

On the other hand, the supporters of the Gezi Park protests have felt

themselves neglected by Erdogan`s government, seeing that the election

results have been dividing the country in half, as AKP voters and non-AKP

voters and believing that only the former has enjoyed the government's

attention . They have complained that not only the government, but the AKP

supporters have been failing to understand their aspirations, as well as their

demands for greater freedom. A young GeziParki protestor in Istanbul said to

me: "I wish rather than believing in the media that is under the domination of

government and labeling people accordingly, these AKP supporters had sought the

truth themselves. In Gezi Park was the democracy that Turkey needed and they failed

to see that." In a similar manner, a placard in Gezi Park called the AKP

supporters to act indulgently, stating::"the `other` one out of every two in my

country, my dear brother, my other half, I call out to you. My resistance is not to you,

but to the one who ignores me believing in the power of your vote. I do not want you

to think like me, I just want you to think" (Haber Arti Turk, June 7, 2013).This

message was highly circulated around social media by those online activists

who wanted to draw attention to the need of empathy and support from the

AKP electorates.

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However, notable is the fact that not all the Gezi supporters have advocated

mutual understanding and tolerance towards the AKP supporters. There have

been those protestors and online activists who have taken a tough stance

towards the ones backing Erdogan and the Turkish riot police, which they

have considered `enemy` figures. Three months ago, I met someone`s

facebook status that read, "Those who still justify this attack [meaning the riot

police`s attack on the protestors] and claim that the police and the prime minister are

right, I call you to resign from humanity." Within the last three months, a great

number of similar messages were spread through Facebook and Twitter by

those who believed that the AKP electorates were acting ignorant, if not

inhumane. A Gezi demonstrator that I had randomly met in Athens pointed

to this widely shared perception of the protestors: "They [meaning the AKP

supporters] are either illiterate people who are easily manipulated by the government

or are certain profiteers pursuing their own ends or interests."

In fact, the perceived illiteracy and ignorance of AKP supporters have been

objects of derision among a group of Gezi supporters. For instance, the

speeches of certain people who have been interviewed in a counter rally of

AKP in Kazlicesme on the 17th of June have become sources of laughter for

those online Gezi activists who have shared videos on YouTube and messages

in social media in a mocking and demeaning manner. Without a doubt, such

heavy criticisms and mockeries towards the AKP electorates have reinforced

the divisions between the opposing sides, making numerous people more

opposed to the protestors` standpoints. In a BBC interview, an AKP supporter

and an academic, Z. Goktas, denounced the Gezi protestors, saying "The

protestors are failing democracy, not advancing it. They are condemning anyone who

disagrees with them and actively brand pro-European voters ignorant and bigoted."

(BBC News Europe June 13, 2013)

At this point, one might easily recognize the possible negative consequences

of the social media networks that have become very important platforms for

sharing information and ideas. Given that the mainstream media with its

alleged political allegiances with the government has not been regarded a

trustworthy source of information by many in Turkey, social media has been

the main tool to ignite the collective action of the protestors during the recent

incidents. Unfortunately though, as abovementioned examples have

displayed, social media has been vulnerable to extremist attitudes,

exaggerated sentiments and marginal ideas harbored by opposite approaches

regarding the Gezi protests. Consequently, social networking sites have been

effective instruments for those on each extreme who have wished to exchange

provocative writings and to escalate issues nourishing further prejudice and

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separation in the society. Nevertheless, blaming social media for the unrest

and polarization in the country and calling it `a menace`, like Prime Minister

Erdogan has done, is not a feasible solution for mitigating the tensions and

overcoming the hostilities within society in Turkey. As, the columnist and a

TV figure, TahaAkyol correctly pointed out in a television programme in

CNN Turk, "There are many who spread hatred and lies through social media, but

there are as many ordinary citizens who express their sentiments and views through

it. Social media is the voice of pluralism. If we accept modernity and democracy, we

have to accept social media." (Katik, June 4, 2013)

Certainly, there is also an undeniable populace who neither has been able to

identify themselves with the Gezi protestors, nor has associated themselves

with the anti-Gezi stance of the government and its supporters. As such, a

young Turkish man I interviewed frankly complained about the ongoing

situation in Turkey: "People around me are expecting me to take a side, yet I do not

believe I have to. I am trying to understand both sides, and in my opinion they both

have certain arguments which are justifiable and unjustifiable." Similarly, Murat

Mentes, a columnist known for his conservative stance and his close attitude

towards the AKP, wrote in his column that following his relatively

sympathizing comments for the protestors he has gained the hatred of both

the supporters of the government and of the Gezi protestors. Mentes noted

that "I believe not only me, but many of us have been lost in an endless Purgatory."

(Mentes, July 26, 2013)

Concluding Remarks

It is difficult to deny that the Gezi Protests of June 2013 have left a significant

imprint on Turkish history. Although the eruption of such unprecedented,

spontaneous and large protests has not posed a real threat to the reign of

Erdogan and his government, it has signaled a visible transformation in

society, particularly in the relationships between various societal segments

and in their interaction with the state and the government. To remind

though, the recent incidents` concrete implications for the country will be

only revealed in the long term and this present analysis did not offer more

than preliminary presumptions. Additionally, it has not been possible to

make precise generalizations on the subject, given the lack of adequate data

on hand. Still, based on some preliminary observations, this article has

represented both the conspicuous signs of increasing pluralism and tolerance

among certain societal segments in Turkey and of deepening polarization

among certain others.

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To summarize, on one hand, it has been indeed very fascinating to witness in

Turkey that large numbers of people from different tracks of life have come

together developing a common cause against what they have perceived as

the growing authoritarianism of Erdogan and his government. Undeniably,

the heterogeneous nature of the Gezi protests and the protestors` quest for

greater freedom for everyone testify that a growing consciousness of

pluralism has surfaced in Turkey. Yet, it is also true that the `unity` of the

Gezi protestors is mainly guided by their anti-government sentiments, thus

rendering the extent and scope of `cooperation` and `integration' of these

protesting actors from various societal segments questionable. It is, thus, so

far unclear if the political values promoting tolerance and diversity will be

able to be successfully carried out by today`s protestors in the long term and

will be consolidated in the wider country.

On the other hand, with the Gezi protests have surfaced perilous signs of

rising polarization among the two opposing camps of the movement, the Gezi

supporters and the AKP supporters. Noticeable is the fact that both the AKP

supporters and the Gezi supporters feel and portray themselves victimized

and somehow oppressed. The former group members recognize themselves

as the victims of the 28th of February memorandum process that have

attacked their certain religious freedoms. Moreover, there is a wide

perception among them that the Gezi protests have been a supplementary

attack on their elected prime minister, as well as on their conservative values.

The latter group claims that their life styles and individual freedoms have

been frequently assaulted either by the acts or the discourses of Erdogan`s

government. They accuse the government for being excluded in the political

decision-making processes and for being subject to disproportionate police

force in their peaceful protests. The repeated use of `we` and `they` by both of

the opposing sides of the Gezi movement has been indicative of the creation

and consolidation of divisive and exclusive images of 'Self' versus 'Other'

within the society. The polarizing rhetoric has been reinforced and widely

spread in the social media, in particular, by those who have taken more

extreme standpoints on the matter and by those who have wished to

manipulate the existing ruptures in the society. More importantly, Erdogan`s

uncompromising and potentially conflict-ridden stance has driven a wedge

between AKP supporters and the rest of Turkey, engendering great risks of

polarization in the country.

Turkey is indeed a country full of contrasts and differences. True, the

elimination of prejudices and overwhelming political sensitivities that create

deep cleavages among its population is not easy and in reality needs

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substantial time. However, the `spirit` of pluralism advocated by Gezi can be

a primary tool to transform Turkey into a more consolidated democracy,

bringing certain issues considered `taboos` into public forum. Surely, the

lion`s share of responsibility for building compromise among the multiple

political stakeholders and for bridging the divisions at different levels of

society rests at this moment on Erdogan and his government. It is in fact

extremely significant that Erdogan abandons his polarizing discourse and

divisive policies and, rather, comprehends the message delivered by the Gezi

protests that the pluralist perspective of democracy must be adopted.

No doubt, Turkey will continue to pass through some troublous times. Not

only has it witnessed one of the biggest civil unrests in its history which left

the country dangerously polarized, but it has also found itself in an awkward

position with the ongoing civil wars in Syria and Egypt. The conflicts in the

Middle East, which have carved up the regions` societies between diverse

ideologies and political loyalties, should indeed be considered as a warning

for Turkey of the horrific consequences of deep polarization within its society

and its political spectrum. To put it differently, the recent developments

inside and outside Turkey, indicate that that a culture of tolerance must be

preserved in its society, and consensus-building must be encouraged in its

body politics. To what extent this is understood by the Turkish government

and internalized by its society, will determine the level of stability and

democratic development in the country in the future.

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ALBA CICALA

Friend Request Sent: EU Identity and Turkeys

Accession Bid

Abstract: Departingfromconsideration about the multidimensionality oftheidentitynotion especially when

associatedwiththequalificationEuropean,thispaperaimstoaddressastillunder-

researchedareaofpublic opinion.Infact, in spiteof

numerousstudiesconductedonpublicsupportforEuropeanintegrationandits determinants,little

researchhasbeensofarcarriedoutaboutEuropeancitizensattitudestowardscandidate countries

particularlyTurkey.Tracingthecontoursof the various paths mass support may

follow,Turkeystroubled accession bid wouldbe seenthroughthe

eyesoftheEuropeanpublic,withaview todisentanglethe reasonsofmassreactionsvis--

vissuchasensitive andlong-standingissue.Adoptingasimple statistical researchdesign,

particularexpectationsaboutthemultifacetednatureofEuropeanidentityandattitudestowardsit

would be tested.FurtherinatimewhenTurkey

seemstohavebeencutofftheEUpoliticalagenda,thispaperaimstoputthe matterback tothefore,in

order tounderstandthistopicsspecificimplicationsfor thedevelopmentofaEuropeandemos.In

truth,a

morecarefulunderstandingofEuropesambivalence,refractedthroughitsmanifoldidentities,liesat

the crossroadsofcompetingEuropeanpolitical projectsandsocio-economicprocesses.

Alba Cicala is a PhDCandidate in Comparativeand EuropeanPoliticsUniversity

ofSiena([email protected])

Introduction and Theoreticalframework

WhatisEurope?Geographically,Europe

couldbeconsideredasthesharpandinhomogeneousendof the

Eurasianlandmass.Sincenoconsensusisfoundoverwhere thispart

actuallybegins,the plainact ofcallingitacontinentcouldbe

evenconsideredasasortofabuseoflanguage.

Nonetheless

eversincetheEuropeanUnion(EU)wasborn,theterritoryoftheEUhasbecome

synonymouswiththecontestedwordEurope.Moreover,successiveEUenlarge

mentshaveledto

theinclusionofstateswhicharemoredifferentiatedamongstthemselves,bothfro

mageographical andaculturalviewpoint.

Accordingtothe

TreatyofRome,astatemustbeEuropeaninordertojointheUnion:infact,article 237

Friend Request Sent: EU Identity and TurkeysAccession Bid


of this treaty states1that any European State may apply to become a member

of the Community.

Thelatterprovisionlogicallyimpliesatleasttwostraightforwardconclusions:(1)a

nystatewhich

findsitselfindoubtofitsEuropeanidentitycanestablishalegalrightto European-

nessbyjoining theEU;(2)

onceastatehasbecomememberoftheEU,thereisasortofsilentassentamong

memberstates,whichcometorecognizesomekindofasimilarifnotcommon

courseinhistory, anintertwinedpastanda

definitewilltodevelopacommonfuture;inconcreteterms,afeelingof

commonheritage originatesfromtheEUmembership.

Inspiteofthisclaim,however,thementionedtreatyandsubsequentEUtreatieshav

edeliberately avoideddefiningthetermEuropean.Toallintents andpurposes

while itisgenerallyaccepted that enlargementisafiniteprocessthe

exactlimitsofEuropeassuchhaveremainedquiteambiguous.

Relatedtothiscircumstance

forwhatTurkeyisconcerned,oneofthemainpointsuponwhichthe

focusofattentionhasbeenlocatediswhetherthis

countryactuallysharestheabovementioned Europeancommonheritage.

Asamatteroffact,the identityissueappearsevenmore

crucialwhendealingwiththe case ofTurkey andRussia.Bythe way

whileRussiahasnorealinterestinjoiningtheEUforthetime beingshown,

TurkeyhasinsteadbeenanassociateEUmembersince1963,labelingfullmembersh

ipasaforeign policypriority.Therefore,thedebateonTurkeysEuropean-

nessasaprerequisite forenteringthe

EuropeanUnionsoonbecameacrucialquestion,withspecialregardtotherelateddi

sputedquestion

oftheexistenceofarealEuropeanidentity.ConcerningTurkishEUaccessionbid,

thematterwas settled at an EUSummit held in Helsinki (December 1999),

when Turkey was accepted as a legitimatecandidatecountry.

1Fulltextavailableathttp://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf



Assome scholarspointout(Arvanitopoulos

andKeridis2011),HelsinkishiftedthequestionfromessentialistconsiderationsofTurkey

sEuropean-nesstofunctionalistconsiderationsofTurkeyspreparedness.

Atthattime,theEuropeanleaders,inoppositiontoEuropeanpublicopinion,agree

dthatTurkeyisa European nation

nodifferentthanothercandidatecountries,atleastaccordingtotheTreatyof

Rome.Forthesereasons,itseemsthatTurkey'scandidacyliesattheverycoreofEuro

pe'sidentity politics,andthisissueappearsalsoasakey-

elementforthedefinitionoftheEuropeanidentity concept.

Although identityper se stems from the conceptual world of ideas, it entails

proved material

consequencesanddistinctpoliticalresults,whereforeitsmeaningcouldbedefined

ashistorically constructed

andsociallyconditioned.Inparticular,actorsperceptionsofself,otherandthei

r

operationalcontextarealsoproductsofsocialinteraction(CheckelandKatzenstei

n2009).Some

strandsoftheconstructivisttheory,forinstance,enquireintotheroleofideas,theim

pactofshared beliefs,the effectsofdominantdiscourses

andtheprocessesofcommunicativeactionintheformation of identities (Risse-

Kappen 1996).Thence, the contemporaryconstruction ofsymbols,norms,

perceptions andbeliefsystemsbecome crucialtothestudyofEuropeanidentity

(Christiansen1997). Further, a full understanding of Europes ambivalent

concept lies at the junction of competing European political projects andsocial

processes (Checkeland Katzenstein2009): indeed, the processes of

constructing a EU identity and a European identityoverlap.Various forms

of politicizationarere-definingandexpandingthese

intersections,involvinganumberofdifferent actors and processes.In particular,

bureaucrats crafting aEurope focusedon Brussels, and academics

theorizinganewkindofEuropeanallegiance,playakey-role inthisdiscourse.

Besides

atamomentinwhichEuropehasbeendramaticallytransformedbothbytheadditio



nal processesofenlargementandthe re-

emergenceofreligiousandcivilizationissues,whosecontrasting

pointstendtobecomesharperandbitterintimesofeconomicandsocialcrisis

competingvisions

arelikelytoemergeofwhatitmeanstobeEuropean,particularlyinsensitivecontext

ssuchasthose involvingTurkeystroubledEUaccessionpath.

Fromahistoricalviewpoint,Europeanidentityisdeeplyrootedinnationalexperie

nceandisquite

likelytoremainsointhefuture,eveniftheinstitutionsoftheEuropeanUnionwereto

berelatively unaffectedbythe

exigenciesofnationalistactivism(CheckelandKatzenstein2009).Startingfrom

thisoutlook,collectiveidentitiesare

saidtobeformedinthepublicsphere:recentempiricalresearch

findings(Pausch2011)leadtotheconclusionthattheabsenceofaEuropeanpublics

pherepoints

directlytothelackofacollectiveEuropeanidentity.Questioningthefunctionandth

esenseofa

Europeanpublicsphereisessential,totheextentthatsomescholarsconsideridentit

y-buildingasits main function (Risse2003).

The concept of Europe could naturally be thought of as a politically-charged

concept, which consequentlyfindspersistentcontestation:Europeasaspatial-

temporalimaginedcommunityis

delineatedthroughverydiversepoliticalandideologicalprojects.Moreover,schol

arshavebecome

awareoftheconstructed,imaginarynatureofcollectiveidentities(Anderson1990).

Eachnotionof Europehasarelativelywide spectrumofothers,andthence

variousformsofinclusionandexclusion, fromthewell-

knownnotionofafortressEurope,tothe communityunderthe so-calledrule

oflaw, andaEuropewithrelativelyopenborders(CheckelandKatzenstein2009).

WithspecificregardtoTurkey,thedebateoveritsprospectiveaccessiontotheEUha

srevealedthat theexistingEuropeanself-understanding whichat

timesconstricts theexternalborders toa political-



normativebasisbymeansoftheexclusiveculturalnotionofidentity

hasbeenputinto

question.IncontrasttothediscourseuponEasternEuropeanexpansion,inwhichac

onsensusonthe

reunificationofEuropegenerallyprevailed,inthecaseofTurkey,onthecontrary,

identityhasbeen usedinanexclusivesense, inordertodenyitsEuropean-ness

anditsentranceintotheEU. Accordingtothe

viewstillpredominating,Turkeyisnotseentobesharingthe historicalrootsthatthe

restof theEUhasincommon.Thence,itisseenasa

politically,culturallyandhistoricallyother.

Turkeysother-

nessisessentiallyderivedfromthedichotomybetweenIslamandChristendom

whichremainsthemajorculturaldifferencebetweentheEUandTurkey.Asamatte

roffact,the concerns about Turkey generallystemfroma narrowperception of

this countryas apoor and populousIslamicnationwitheconomic,

social,culturalandpoliticalproblemsrelatedtoadoptingand

effectivelyinternalizingthe valuesof theEuropeanstatesystem(Canan-

Sokullu2011b).

Inthepast,somescholars(Huntington1993)claimedthattheidentificationofEurop

ewithWestern Christendom provides a clear criterion for the admission of

new members to the western organizations.

SomepoliticiansevenclaimedthattheEUbordersof shared values,cultureand

identitywouldbebreachedbyTurkishmembership.Onthecontrary,thereareother

actorswhodo notsharethisskepticview,astheformerUKPrime

MinisterTonyBlairwhosuggested,more constructively,that

TurkishmembershipwouldaddtoEuropesmulticulturalassets,andthatthe

inclusionofaMuslimcountry

wouldfacilitatetherapprochementbetweenWesternandEastern

civilizations(Canan-Sokullu2011a).

Relatedtothis,whileearlypublicopinionresearchassumedthatEuropeanidentity

was anelementof moregeneralattitudestowardsEuropeanintegration

somethingclosetothenotionofsupport

laterresearchacknowledgedtheimportanceofdistinguishingEuropeanintegratio



nasentailingmore

complexconceptualizations,mostlydealingwiththestructureofthebeliefsystemt

hatcitizenshold towardsEurope(Sanderset al.2012).

In a harsh time for theEU both from political and economical standpoints,

precisely when identitarianissuesseemtobe somehowcutoff the

politicalagenda,leavingroomformoreconcrete mattersofinternalcohesion

orevensurvival,thepresentpapermaintainstheusefulnessofamore in-

depthanalysisof

thedeterminantsofEuropeanpublicopinionsattitudeswhendealingwithan

issuesuchasTurkishuneasypathtowards accession.

Therationalethatinspiresthisstudyistwofold:first,the

beliefthatbehindcontroversialpointssuch

astheTurkishoneishiddentheessenceandfoundationofmanyEUhistory-

makingdecisions

thencespeciallyinthecurrentcriticalcontextitmaybeimportanttobringtheissuea

gaintolight; secondly,thepaperwouldaddmuch-

neededempiricalevidencestotheliteratureaboutthedynamics

ofpublicattitudestowardcandidatecountries(Cana

unraveling%20turkey%20v1.1.pdf

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