united states district court for the eastern district...

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MAHA ALDHALIMI,

an individual

Plaintiff,

Case No.

v Judge:

Magistrate:

CITY OF DEARBORN;

CITY OF DEARBORN POLICE COMPLAINT AND

DEPARTMENT; JURY DEMAND

POLICE CHIEF RONALD

HADDAD, in his official capacity

as City of Dearborn Chief of Police;

JOHN DOE police officers, in their

official capacities;

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________

SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345)

WILLIAM R. THOMAS (P77760)

Akeel & Valentine, PLC

Co-Counsel for Plaintiff

888 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 910

Troy, MI 48084-4736

(248) 269-9595

[email protected]

[email protected]

2:15-cv-12337-DPH-MJH Doc # 1 Filed 06/30/15 Pg 1 of 22 Pg ID 1

mailto:[email protected]


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FATINA ABDRABBOH (P76026)

REEM SUBEI (P92650)

American Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee


930 Mason St.

Dearborn, MI 48124

(313) 581-1201

[email protected]

[email protected]

COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

NOW COMES Plaintiff, Maha Aldhalimi, by and through

undersigned counsel, and for her Complaint against Defendants, states as

follows:

JURISDICTIONAL ALLEGATIONS

1. Plaintiff, Maha Aldhalimi, is a resident of Wayne County, State

of Michigan.

2. Defendants maintain systemic and continuous contacts with

Michigan, reside in Michigan, do business in the State of Michigan, and

committed illegal acts intended to and did deprive Plaintiff of her rights in

the State of Michigan.

3. This instant action arises under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the First

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.




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4. The actions that give rise to the claims asserted occurred in

Wayne County, within the State of Michigan.

5. This Honorable Court has subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s claims based on federal questions jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

6. Venue is proper in this Honorable Court as Defendant conducts

business within the Eastern District of Michigan, is subject to personal

jurisdiction within the Eastern District of Michigan, and a substantial part of

the events giving rise to the claims alleged occurred in the Eastern District of

Michigan. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

PARTIES

7. Plaintiff is female and is a devout Muslim.

8. In accordance with Plaintiff’s sincerely-held religious beliefs,

men who are not immediate family members may not see more than her

face, hands, and feet.

9. In accordance with her sincerely-held religious beliefs, Plaintiff

wears a headscarf or hijab covering her hair, ears, neck, and chest.

10. Defendant City of Dearborn is a municipal corporate body

established by and operating pursuant to a City Charter permitted under the

laws of the State of Michigan.


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11. Defendant City of Dearborn is responsible for establishing

policies and customs for the City of Dearborn Police Department.

12. Defendant City of Dearborn Police Department is responsible

for conducting business and making City of Dearborn arrests and bookings,

and has its principal office located at 16099 Michigan Ave, Dearborn, MI

48126.

13. Defendant City of Dearborn Police Department is a municipal

corporation, duly organized, and carrying on governmental functions in the

County of Wayne, State of Michigan.

14. Defendant City of Dearborn Chief of Police Ronald Haddad

(“Chief Haddad”) is responsible for making and enforcing policies and

customs of the City of Dearborn Police Department.

15. Defendant Chief Haddad was at all relevant times a law

enforcement officer acting under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

16. Chief Haddad was at all relevant times employed by the City of

Dearborn, Michigan, as a police chief. Chief Haddad is sued in his official

capacity.


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17. Defendants John Doe Police Officers (“Officers JOHN DOES”)

were at all relevant times employed by the City of Dearborn, Michigan, as

police officers.1

18. Defendant Officers JOHN DOES were at all relevant times law

enforcement officer acting under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the foregoing paragraphs, as

though fully set forth herein.

20. Plaintiff is a devout Muslim woman who, in accordance with

her sincerely-held religious beliefs, adorns a headscarf, known as a hijab.

21. Plaintiff’s religious beliefs compels her to wear the hijab (a

traditional headscarf) to prevent her entire body and hair, with the exception

of face, hands, and feet, from being seen by men who are not members of

her immediate family.

22. Plaintiff’s religious belief in Islam is sincerely held and her

belief in the mandate of hijab is deeply rooted in Islamic texts and teachings.

1 Plaintiff is “permitted to bring suit against unnamed ‘John Doe’ defendants

until discovery or other information reveals the identity of the party.” Brown

v. Owens Corning Inv. Review Comm., 622 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 2010).

Plaintiff will amend her complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, prior to

the close of discovery, upon learning the identity of the John Doe Officers.


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23. Plaintiff’s hijab complies with the traditional Islamic head

cover in that it covers all of her hair cover and is thus recognizable as a

hijab.

24. Appearing in the presence of male, non-family members

without wearing a hijab is a serious breach of Plaintiff’s faith and a deeply

humiliating and defiling experience in conflict with her sincerely-held

religious beliefs.

25. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was wearing her hijab until being

involuntarily forced to remove it.

26. On September 15, 2014, Plaintiff was stopped by a Dearborn

Police Officer for temporarily parking in a no parking zone outside of

Walmart.

27. Upon checking Plaintiff’s identification and registration, the

Police Officer realized that Plaintiff had a warrant for her arrest for an

unpaid parking violation.

28. The Police Officer arrested Plaintiff and transported her to City

of Dearborn Police Department.

29. Prior to being booked and processed by Defendants, Plaintiff’s

son, Mohamed Alakoli, arrived at the police station.


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30. Mr. Alakoli informed the officers that Plaintiff wears a hijab in

accordance with her sincerely-held religious belief and cannot be seen

without it by non-relative males.

31. Mr. Alakoli was assured that Plaintiff would not be ordered to

remove her hijab in the presence of non-relative males.

32. Thereafter, Officers JOHN DOES, who are male, took Plaintiff

to a room for a booking photograph.

33. Officers JOHN DOES ordered Plaintiff to remove her hijab for

a photograph.

34. Plaintiff started crying and did not comply.

35. Plaintiff repeatedly asked not to be forced to remove her hijab.

36. Plaintiff stated that she could not remove her scarf because of

her religion.

37. In response, Officers JOHN DOE ordered Plaintiff to remove

her hijab or it would be removed involuntarily against her will.

38. Plaintiff was shivering and crying from the humiliation and

distress of the encounter and orders.

39. Reluctantly, involuntarily, and against her sincerely-held

religious belief, Plaintiff removed her hijab, in the presence of a male, non-

family member.


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40. Defendants’ policies, customs, and conduct violates Plaintiff’s

rights as secured under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

41. On information and belief, Defendant City of Dearborn and its

employees and agents prohibited Plaintiff from wearing her religious

headscarf pursuant to a City of Dearborn custom, practice, or official policy.

42. Alternatively, based on information and belief, Defendant City

of Dearborn and its employees and agents prohibited Plaintiff from wearing

her religious headscarf pursuant to a custom, practice, or official policy

implemented by Defendant Chief Haddad or other officers employed by the

City of Dearborn or the City of Dearborn.

43. Officers JOHN DOE, knowing that Plaintiff wore a hijab for

religious purposes, forced her to remove it against her sincerely-held

religious beliefs.

44. Defendants failed to accommodate or otherwise provide an

exemption or exception for Plaintiff’s sincerely-held religious beliefs.


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COUNT I

VIOLATION OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE

AND IMPRISONED PERSONS ACT, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc



46. The RLUIPA provides, in relevant part, the following: “No

government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 of

this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,

unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that

person- (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)

is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental

interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).

47. Plaintiff is a “person” as defined under the RLUIPA.

48. At all relevant times, Plaintiff was residing in or confined to an

institution when the events transpired.

49. Plaintiff’s wearing of a hijab is a sincerely-held religious belief.

50. At all relevant times, Defendants were covered under the term

“Government” as defined under the RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-

5(4)(A)(i)-(iii).


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51. At all relevant times, Defendants’ Police Station where the

immediate events transpired is a federally funded “institution” as defined

under the RLUIPA (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)) and the Civil Rights of

Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §

1997(1)(B)(ii)-(iii)).

52. Defendants’ acts or omissions, policies and customs, while

Plaintiff was residing in or confined to the Police Station substantially

burdened her religious exercise of wearing covering all her body except her

face and feet from non-relative males.

53. Defendants’ acts or omissions, policies and customs, do not

further a compelling government interest.

54. Defendants’ acts or omissions, policies and customs, are not the

least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.

55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts

and omissions, Plaintiff has sustained damages, and has suffered and

continues to suffer mental anguish, physical and emotional distress,

humiliation, and embarrassment.


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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Honorable Court to

enter a judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and against Defendants, for damages

in whatever amount Plaintiff is found to be entitled; preliminary injunctive

relief followed by a permanent injunction; declaratory judgment; costs and

attorneys’ fees wrongfully incurred to bring this action; and any other

damages, including punitive damages as provided by applicable law.

COUNT II

VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983



57. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Civil action for deprivation of rights:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action

brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be

granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory

relief was unavailable.

58. Under the First Amendment, Plaintiff has the right to freely

exercise her religion.


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59. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits any person acting under color of

state law, custom, or usage, to deprive a citizen of rights secured by the

Constitution.

60. Defendants’, at all relevant times herein, were acting under

color of state law.

61. Defendants’ deprived Plaintiff of her right to freely exercise her

religion.

62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of 42

U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff has sustained damages, and has suffered and

continues to suffer mental anguish, physical and emotional distress,

humiliation, and embarrassment.








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COUNT III

CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE EQUAL PROTECTION

OF THE LAW IN VIOLATION OF 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)



64. The unidentified Police Officers who ordered Plaintiff to

remove her hijab for the booking photograph and other Defendants

conspired to violate Plaintiff rights as guaranteed under the Constitution.

65. Defendants conspired for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff and,

the class of Muslim women similarly situated to Plaintiff, of equal privileges

of exercising religious beliefs under the law.

66. The Police Officers acted in furtherance of the conspiracy when

they ordered Plaintiff to remove her hijab and continued to order her to do

so after she resisted.

67. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ wrongful acts

and omissions, Plaintiff has sustained damages, and has suffered mental

anguish, physical and emotional distress, humiliation, and embarrassment.


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COUNT IV

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 65



69. Defendants’ conduct as alleged above was extreme, outrageous,

and intolerable in a civilized society.

70. Defendants’ actions were intention and made with reckless

indifference to Plaintiff’s rights and sensibilities.

71. Plaintiff’s right to the free exercise of her religion was infringed

upon and substantially burdened by Defendants’ actions.


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72. Defendants’ policy, practice, and customs of forcing Muslim

woman to remove their hijabs while being processed into police custody is

unlawful and infringes upon the right of Plaintiff and other Muslim women,

to freely exercise their religion without it being substantially burdened by

the government.

73. Defendants’ policy, practice, and customs caused and continue

to cause Plaintiff and other Muslim women harm.

74. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, as well as the

other legal and equitable powers of this Honorable Court, Plaintiff is entitled

to the issuance of an injunction enjoining Defendants from continuing their

policy, practice, or custom of forcing Muslim women to remove their hijab

while being photographed and processed into police custody, in violation of

federal law and the United States Constitution.

75. In the absence of injunctive relief, Plaintiff and other similarly-

situated Muslim women will continue to suffer irreparable harm.

76. The issuance of an injunction is not likely to cause substantial

harm to others because Defendants are capable of processing Muslim

women into custody and photographing them without violating these

women’s right to freely exercise their religion.


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77. Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of

her claims.







COUNT V

DECLARATORY RELIEF

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 57 AND 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202



79. Defendants’ conduct as alleged above was extreme, outrageous,

and intolerable in a civilized society.

80. Defendants’ actions were intention and made with reckless

indifference to Plaintiff’s rights and sensibilities.

81. Plaintiff’s right to the free exercise of her religion was infringed

upon and substantially burdened by Defendants’ actions.


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82. Defendants’ policy, practice, and customs of forcing Muslim

woman to remove their hijabs while being processed into police custody is

unlawful and infringes upon the right of Plaintiff and other Muslim women,

to freely exercise their religion without it being substantially burdened by

the government.

83. Defendants’ policy, practice, and customs caused and continue

to cause Plaintiff and other Muslim women harm.

84. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and 28 U.S.C.

§§ 2201-2202, as well as the other legal and equitable powers of this

Honorable Court, Plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief that Defendants

infringed upon and substantially burdened Plaintiff’s right to freely exercise

her religion—and continue to do so against other similarly-situated Muslim

women—in violation of federal law and the United States Constitution.

85. Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of

her claims.


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Respectfully submitted,

AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC

s/ Shereef H. Akeel

By: Shereef H. Akeel P54345

William R. Thomas P77760


888 West Big Beaver Road

Suite 910

Troy, MI 48084

Telephone: (248) 269-9595

[email protected]

[email protected]




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AMERICAN ARAB

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

COMMITTEE

s/ Fatina Abdrabboh

By: Fatina Abdrabboh P76026

Reem Subei P92650


930 Mason St.

Dearborn, MI 48124

Telephone: (313) 581-1201

[email protected]

Date: June 30, 2015 [email protected]




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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION

MAHA ALDHALIMI,

an individual

Plaintiff,

Case No.

v Judge:

Magistrate:

CITY OF DEARBORN;

CITY OF DEARBORN POLICE DEMAND FOR

DEPARTMENT; JURY TRIAL

POLICE CHIEF RONALD

HADDAD, in his official capacity

as City of Dearborn Chief of Police;

JOHN DOE police officers, in their

official capacities;

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________

SHEREEF H. AKEEL (P54345)

WILLIAM R. THOMAS (P77760)

Akeel & Valentine, PLC


888 West Big Beaver Road, Suite 910

Troy, MI 48084-4736

(248) 269-9595

[email protected]

[email protected]




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FATINA ABDRABBOH (P76026)

REEM SUBEI (P92650)

American Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee


930 Mason St.

Dearborn, MI 48124

(313) 581-1201

[email protected]

[email protected]

JURY DEMAND

NOW COMES Plaintiff, Maha Aldhalimi, by and through

undersigned counsel, hereby demands a Trial by Jury of the above-

referenced causes of action.

Respectfully submitted,

AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC

s/ Shereef H. Akeel

By: Shereef H. Akeel P54345

William R. Thomas P77760


888 West Big Beaver Road

Suite 910

Troy, MI 48084

Telephone: (248) 269-9595

[email protected]

[email protected]






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AMERICAN ARAB

ANTI-DISCRIMINATION

COMMITTEE

s/ Fatina Abdrabboh

By: Fatina Abdrabboh P76026

Reem Subei P92650


930 Mason St.

Dearborn, MI 48124

Telephone: (313) 581-1201

[email protected]

Date: June 30, 2015 [email protected]




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