united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit - montana … · 2018-03-02 · 2 lair v.motl...

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DOUG LAIR; STEVE DOGIAKOS;AMERICAN TRADITION

PARTNERSHIP; AMERICAN

TRADITION PARTNERSHIP PAC;MONTANA RIGHT TO LIFE

ASSOCIATION PAC; SWEET GRASS

COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY

INTEGRITY; LAKE COUNTY

REPUBLICAN CENTRAL COMMITTEE;BEAVERHEAD COUNTY REPUBLICAN

CENTRAL COMMITTEE; JAKE OIL,LLC; JL OIL, LLC; CHAMPION

PAINTING; JOHN MILANOVICH,Plaintiffs-Appellees,

RICK HILL, Warden,Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN MOTL, in his officialcapacity as Commissioner ofPolitical Practices; TIM FOX, in hisofficial capacity as Attorney Generalof the State of Montana; LEO J.GALLAGHER, in his official capacityas Lewis and Clark County Attorney,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 16-35424

D.C. No.6:12-cv-00012-

CCL

OPINION

Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-1, of 43(1 of 70)

LAIR V. MOTL2

Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the District of Montana

Charles C. Lovell, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 21, 2017San Francisco, California

Filed October 23, 2017

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Carlos T. Beaand Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;Dissent by Judge Bea


LAIR V. MOTL 3

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment in anaction challenging Montana’s limits on the amount of moneyindividuals, political action committees and political partiesmay contribute to candidates for state elective office.

The panel held that Montana’s limits, as set forth inMontana Code Annotated § 13-37-216, were both justifiedby and adequately tailored to the state’s interest in combatingquid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The panel heldthat Montana had shown the risk of actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption in Montana politics was more than “mereconjecture.” The state offered evidence of attempts topurchase legislative action with campaign contributions. Thepanel held that contribution limits served the state’s importantinterest in preventing this risk of corruption from becomingreality.

The panel held that Montana’s limits were also “closelydrawn” to serve the state’s anti-corruption interest. Thelimits targeted those contributions most likely to result inactual or perceived quid pro quo corruption – high-end, directcontributions with a significant impact on candidatefundraising. Moreover, the limits were tailored to avoidfavoring incumbents, not to curtail the influence of politicalparties, and to permit candidates to raise enough money tomake their voices heard. Although Montana’s limits were

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It hasbeen prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.


LAIR V. MOTL4

lower than most other states’ in absolute terms, they wererelatively high when comparing each state’s limits to the costof campaigning there. Thus, Montana’s chosen limits fellwithin the realm of legislative judgments the courts could notsecond guess.

Dissenting, Judge Bea stated that the district courtproperly evaluated the evidence submitted by Montana’sofficials and found the officials had not established the onlyconstitutionally permissible and valid state interest sufficientto justify Montana’s campaign contribution limits: theprevention of corruption or its appearance.

COUNSEL

Matthew T. Cochenour (argued), Helena, Montana, forDefendants-Appellants.

James Bopp (argued), Terre Haute, Indiana, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.


LAIR V. MOTL 5

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Montana limits the amount of money individuals, politicalaction committees and political parties may contribute tocandidates for state elective office. The district courtinvalidated these limits as unduly restrictive of politicalspeech under the First Amendment. Because Montana’slimits are both justified by and adequately tailored to thestate’s interest in combating quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance, we reverse.

Montana has shown the risk of actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption in Montana politics is more than “mereconjecture,” the low bar it must surmount before imposingcontribution limits of any amount. The state has offeredevidence of attempts to purchase legislative action withcampaign contributions. Contribution limits serve the state’simportant interest in preventing this risk of corruption frombecoming reality.

Montana’s limits are also “closely drawn” to serve thestate’s anti-corruption interest. The limits target thosecontributions most likely to result in actual or perceived quidpro quo corruption – high-end, direct contributions with asignificant impact on candidate fundraising. Moreover, thelimits are tailored to avoid favoring incumbents, not to curtailthe influence of political parties, and to permit candidates toraise enough money to make their voices heard. AlthoughMontana’s limits are lower than most other states’ in absoluteterms, they are relatively high when comparing each state’slimits to the cost of campaigning there. Thus, Montana’s


LAIR V. MOTL6

chosen limits fall within the realm of legislative judgmentswe may not second guess.

I. Background

A. Montana’s Contribution Limits

In 1994, Montana voters passed Initiative 118, acampaign finance reform package that included thecontribution limits at issue here. I-118’s limits replaced aregime that had been in place since 1975. That regimepermitted individuals and political parties to contribute up tothe following limits:

Table 1: Pre-Initiative 118 Limits

Governor OtherStatewideElection

PublicService

Commission

Legislature City orCounty

Individual $1500 $750 $400 $250 $200

Politicalparty

$8000 $2000 $1000 $250 $200

See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216 (1975) (enacted by No. 23-4795, 1975 Mont. Laws Ch. 481 § 1).

I-118 lowered the cap on individual contributions whileraising the cap on contributions from political parties.1

1 Montana styles its limits on political parties as “aggregate” limits,meaning that a political party is treated as a single entity for contributionpurposes, even if the party is broken down into a number of different localcommittees across the state. See Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-216(2). These


LAIR V. MOTL 7

Although the contribution limits at issue here originate fromI-118, the limits have not remained static. Since I-118’senactment, the Montana legislature has both amended thelimits and indexed them to inflation. See id. § 13-37-216(2003) (raising the limits); Act of Apr. 27, 2007, 2007 Mont.Laws Ch. 328 § 1 (H.B. 706) (indexing the limits toinflation); Admin. R. Mont. 44.11.227. Moreover, unlike thepre-1994 limits, I-118’s limits apply per election (rather thanper cycle), so a contributor may give up to the maximumtwice if a candidate faces a contested primary (once for theprimary and once for the general election). See Mont. CodeAnn. § 13-37-216(5); Mont. Comm’r of Political Practices,Amended Office Mgmt. Policy 2.4 Reinstating Pre-Lair 2016Campaign Contribution Limits at 2 (May 18, 2016) (“Pre-1994 Limits Policy”), http://politicalpractices.mt.gov/content/ContributionLimitPolicy (explaining that the pre-I-118limits applied per cycle).

Table 2 shows the post I-118 contribution limits in 1994(when they were enacted), 2011 (when this lawsuit began)and today. Table 3 compares the pre-I-118 limits to the postI-118 limits as of 2017.

aggregate limits are different in kind from the ones the Supreme Courtstruck down in McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). There, theaggregate limits meant that once an individual’s contributions to allcandidates added up to the aggregate limit, he could no longer give anymoney to any candidates. See id. at 1443, 1448. Montana’s aggregationof political party contributions, by contrast, permits a party to contributeup to the limit to as many candidates as the party wishes.


Ta

ble

2:

Pos

t-In

itia

tive

118

Lim

its2

Gov

ern

orO

ther

Sta

tew

ide

Ele

ctio

nP

ub

lic

Ser

vice

Co

mm

issi

onS

tate

Sen

ate

Oth

er P

ub

lic

Off

ice

1994

2011

2017

1994

2011

2017

1994

2011

2017

1994

2011

2017

199

420

11

201

7

Ind

ivid

ual

/P

AC

$800

$100

0$1

320

$400

$500

$660

$200

$260

$340

$200

$260

$340

$20

0$2

60

$34

0

Pol

itic

alp

arty

$15,

000

$36,

000

$47,

700

$500

0$1

3,00

0$1

7,20

0$2

000

$520

0$6

900

$800

$210

0$2

800

$50

0$

13

00$1

700

See

Mon

t. C

ode

Ann

. § 1

3-37

-216

; A

dmin

. R. M

ont.

44.

11.2

27.

2 Lim

its

sho

wn

are

the

max

imum

per

cyc

le a

ssum

ing

a ca

ndid

ate

face

s a

cont

este

d pr

imar

y. P

er e

lect

ion

lim

its

are

one

half

of t

he a

mou

nt s

how

n.

LAIR V. MOTL8


Tab

le 3

: P

re-I

nit

iati

ve 1

18 L

imit

s vs

. 201

7 L

imit

s

PR

E-I

NIT

IAT

IVE

118

2017

Per

Cycl

eP

er C

ycle

Per

Ele

ctio

n

Ind

ivid

ual

s/P

AC

Gov

erno

r$15

00

$1320

$66

0

Oth

er s

tate

wid

e$75

0$6

60

$33

0

Pub

lic

Ser

vice

Com

mis

sion

er$40

0$3

40

$17

0

Sta

te l

egis

latu

re$25

0$3

40

$17

0

Cit

y o

r co

unty

off

ice

$20

0$3

40

$17

0

Pol

itic

al P

arti

es

Gov

erno

r$8

000

$47,7

00$23,8

50

Oth

er s

tate

wid

e$2

000

$17,2

00$8

600

Pub

lic

Ser

vice

Com

mis

sion

er$10

00$6

900

$3450

Sta

te l

egis

latu

re$2

50$2

800

$1400

Cit

y or

coun

ty o

ffic

e$2

00$1

700

$850

LAIR V. MOTL 9


LAIR V. MOTL10

B. Eddleman

We first addressed – and upheld – the constitutionality ofMontana’s contribution limits in Montana Right to Life Ass’nv. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). ApplyingBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), and Nixonv. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000),we held

state campaign contribution limits will beupheld if (1) there is adequate evidence thatthe limitation furthers a sufficiently importantstate interest, and (2) if the limits are “closelydrawn” – i.e., if they (a) focus narrowly on thestate’s interest, (b) leave the contributor freeto affiliate with a candidate, and (c) allow thecandidate to amass sufficient resources towage an effective campaign.

Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092.

At step one, we held Montana’s limits furthered thestate’s “interest in preventing corruption or the appearance ofcorruption.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, we noted “[t]heevidence presented by . . . Montana . . . [wa]s sufficient tojustify the contribution limits imposed, and indeed carrie[d]more weight than that presented in Shrink Missouri.” Id. at1093. We defined “corruption” or its appearance to includeboth “instances of bribery of public officials” and “thebroader threat from politicians too compliant with the wishesof large contributors.” Id. at 1092 (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S.at 389).


LAIR V. MOTL 11

At step two, we held Montana’s limits were “‘closelydrawn’ to avoid unnecessary abridgement of associationalfreedoms.” Id. at 1093. The limits were adequately tailoredto the state’s “interest in preventing corruption and theappearance of corruption” because they “affect[ed] only thetop 10% of contributions, and . . . the percentage affectedinclude[d] the largest contributions” – those most likely to beassociated with actual or perceived corruption. Id. at 1094. The limits also allowed candidates to amass sufficientresources to wage effective campaigns, as shown bytestimony from candidates and statistics demonstrating theminor effects of the limits on fundraising compared to thelow cost of campaigning in Montana. See id. at 1094–95. The limits, moreover, had caused no significant difference inthe amount challengers were able to raise compared toincumbents. See id. at 1095. We therefore upheld Montana’slimits.

C. Randall

Three years later, the Supreme Court’s decision inRandall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), left Eddleman’sholding on less stable footing. Randall invalidatedVermont’s contribution limits, and a three-justice pluralityled by Justice Breyer proposed a new two-part, multi-factor“closely drawn” test. As we subsequently explained,

[u]nder [the Randall] test, the reviewing courtfirst should identify if there are any “dangersigns” that the restrictions on contributionsprevent candidates from amassing theresources necessary to be heard or putchallengers at a disadvantage vis-a-visincumbents. [Randall, 548 U.S.] at 249–52.


LAIR V. MOTL12

The plurality found four “danger signs” inVermont’s contribution limits: “(1) The limitsare set per election cycle, rather than dividedbetween primary and general elections; (2) thelimits apply to contributions from politicalparties; (3) the limits are the lowest in theNation; and (4) the limits are below those wehave previously upheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas,J., concurring) (listing the plurality’s “dangersigns”). The plurality held, if such dangersigns exist, then the court must determinewhether the limits are “closely drawn.”

The plurality looked to “five sets ofconsiderations” to determine whether thestatute was closely drawn: (1) whether the“contribution limits will significantly restrictthe amount of funding available forchallengers to run competitive campaigns”;(2) whether “political parties [must] abide byexactly the same low contribution limits thatapply to other contributors”; (3) whether“volunteer services” are consideredcontributions that would count toward thelimit; (4) whether the “contribution limits are. . . adjusted for inflation”; and (5) “anyspecial justification that might warrant acontribution limit so low or so restrictive.” Id. at 253–62.

Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2015) (Lair II)(last two alterations in original) (citations omitted). Althoughthis test is in many respects similar to the tailoring inquiry at


LAIR V. MOTL 13

step two of the Eddleman analysis, it does not map perfectlyonto Eddleman.

D. Lair

After Randall, the plaintiffs commenced this actionchallenging Montana’s limits a second time. The districtcourt concluded Randall abrogated Eddleman’s approach toevaluating contribution limits and held Montana’s limits wereinvalid under Randall. See Lair v. Murry, 903 F. Supp. 2d1077, 1093 (D. Mont. 2012). Montana appealed.

Because the district court’s decision came weeks beforea state election, Montana sought a stay pending appeal, whicha motions panel of this court granted in a published decision. See Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012)(Lair I). The motions panel held Randall had not abrogatedEddleman, because no “opinion [in Randall] can bemeaningfully regarded as narrower than another and canrepresent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning.” Id. at 1205 (quoting United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado,399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.), amended by 416 F.3d 939(9th Cir. 2005)). Assuming arguendo Justice Breyer’splurality opinion was controlling, Lair I concluded Randallapplied rather than altered Buckley, the primary decision uponwhich Eddleman had relied. Id. at 1206–08. Finally, evenapplying Randall’s somewhat different “closely drawn”analysis, Lair I concluded Montana’s limits would likelysurvive scrutiny. Id. at 1208–13.

We then heard Montana’s appeal on the merits. See LairII, 798 F.3d at 744. In Lair II, we followed the motionspanel’s holding that Randall did not abrogate Eddleman’sgeneral approach to evaluating contribution limits. Id. at 747.


LAIR V. MOTL14

We also held, however, that the Supreme Court’s decisions inCitizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), andMcCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014), had limited theimportant state interest at Eddleman’s first step to preventing“quid pro quo corruption, or its appearance.” Lair II,798 F.3d at 746. McCutcheon defined quid pro quocorruption as “a direct exchange of an official act for money”or “dollars for political favors” and the “appearance” of quidpro quo corruption as “public awareness of the opportunitiesfor abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financialcontributions to particular candidates.” 134 S. Ct. at 1441,1450 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Eddlemanhad relied on a broader definition of corruption – embracingboth quid pro quo and a generalized “access and influence”theory – Citizens United and McCutcheon underminedEddleman’s holding that Montana’s limits were justified byan important state interest. We therefore remanded for thedistrict court to evaluate Montana’s limits under theEddleman framework, but with the important state interestlimited to preventing actual or perceived quid pro quocorruption.

On remand, the district court held the limitsunconstitutional under both prongs of Eddleman. In thedistrict court’s view, Montana did not provide adequateevidence that its contribution limits further the state’s interestin combating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Thecourt acknowledged evidence of various attempts to obtainpolitical favors through campaign contributions butconcluded these examples were inadequate because they didnot show the attempted corruption succeeded. “The stickingpoint with respect to the evidence Defendants rely upon isthat the quids in each one of the cited instances were eitherrejected by, or were unlikely to have any behavioral effect


LAIR V. MOTL 15

upon, the individuals toward whom they were directed.” Lairv. Motl, 189 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1034 (D. Mont. 2016). UnderEddleman’s “closely drawn” prong, the district courtconcluded the limits both prevented candidates fromcampaigning effectively and were not narrowly focused,“because they were expressly enacted to combat theimpermissible interests of reducing influence and leveling theplaying field.” Id. at 1035. Montana again appealed. Wehave jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

II. Standard of Review

We generally review a district court’s legal conclusionsde novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Lair II,798 F.3d at 745. In the First Amendment context, however,“our review [of the district court’s fact finding] is morerigorous than other cases.” Id. at 748 n.8; see also Randall,548 U.S. at 249 (plurality opinion) (“[C]ourts, includingappellate courts, must review the record independently andcarefully with an eye toward assessing the statute’s‘tailoring,’ that is, toward assessing the proportionality of therestrictions.”). In addition, we “review the application of[the] law to those facts de novo on free speech issues.” LairII, 798 F.3d at 745.

III. Discussion

A. Important State Interest

Under Eddleman, we ask first whether “there is adequateevidence that [Montana’s] limitation[s] further[] . . . [the]important state interest” of preventing actual or perceivedquid pro quo corruption. 343 F.3d at 1092. This step of theinquiry is divorced from the actual amount of the limits – it


LAIR V. MOTL16

is a threshold question whether any level of limitation isjustified. As we explained in Eddleman:

[The plaintiff] does not dispute that[Montana’s interest in combating corruption]is sufficient to justify campaign contributionlimits. Rather, [the plaintiff] argues that thelimits imposed are unnecessarily stringent. . . .

This, however, is not the appropriate inquiry[at step one]. The correct focus . . . is whetherthe state has presented sufficient evidence ofa valid interest, not whether it has justified aparticular dollar amount. The latter inquiry, ifever appropriate, occurs in the second part ofour analysis, in examining whether therestriction is “closely drawn.”

Id.

To satisfy its burden, Montana must show the risk ofactual or perceived quid pro quo corruption is more than“mere conjecture.” Id. (quoting Shrink, 528 U.S. at 392); seeMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (reiterating the “mereconjecture” standard). Montana need not show any instancesof actual quid pro quo corruption. See Thalheimer v. City ofSan Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1121 (9th Cir. 2011). It mustshow “only that the perceived threat [is] not . . . ‘illusory.’” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at27).

This evidentiary burden is lowest where, as here, thestate’s purported interest is neither “novel” nor “implausible.”


LAIR V. MOTL 17

Because the regulations at issue in Shrinkwere similar to those in Buckley, the state’sasserted interest was neither novel norimplausible. Therefore, the Court declined toimpose, let alone articulate, a stringentevidentiary burden. Shrink dealt with directcontributions to candidates, and Buckleyestablished that a limit on the amount of suchcontributions is “only a marginal restrictionupon the contributor’s ability to engage in freecommunication” that can be justified by thegovernment’s interest in preventing “politicalquid pro quo from current and potential officeholders.” 424 U.S. at 20–21, 26.

Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1122 (citations and internal quotationmarks omitted).3

Here, the important state interest requirement is satisfied. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Montana’s interest incombating quid pro quo corruption or its appearance justifiessome level of contribution limit. Indeed, the plaintiffsconceded at oral argument that they believed Montana’s pre-1994 limits were constitutional.

Even if the plaintiffs challenged this conclusion theywould not succeed, because Montana’s evidence shows thethreat of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruption in

3 This conclusion is consistent with the Randall plurality’s decision,which did not suggest Vermont lacked a valid interest in combating quidpro quo corruption. The plurality’s analysis was focused entirely on thetailoring of Vermont’s limits. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 248–60 (pluralityopinion).


LAIR V. MOTL18

Montana politics is not illusory. State Representative HalHarper testified groups “funnel[] more money into campaignswhen certain special interests know an issue is coming up,because it gets results.” State Senator Mike Anderson sent a“destroy after reading” letter to his party colleagues, urgingthem to vote for a bill so a PAC would continue to funnelcontributions to the party:

Dear Fellow Republicans. Please destroy thisafter reading. Why? Because the LifeUnderwriters Association in Montana is oneof the larger Political Action Committees inthe state, and I don’t want the Demo’s toknow about it! In the last election they gave$8,000 to state candidates. . . . Of this $8,000– Republicans got $7,000 – you probably gotsomething from them. This bill is importantto the underwriters and I have been able tokeep the contributions coming our way. In1983, the PAC will be $15,000. Let’s keep itin our camp.

State Senator Bruce Tutvedt stated in a declaration thatduring the 2009 legislative session the National Right toWork group promised to contribute at least $100,000 to electRepublican majorities in the next election if he and hiscolleagues introduced and voted for a right-to-work bill in the2011 legislative session. Finally, a state court found two2010 state legislature candidates violated state election lawsby accepting large contributions from a corporation that“bragged . . . that those candidates that it supported ‘rode intooffice in 100% support of [the corporation’s] . . . agenda.’” See Comm’r of Political Practices v. Prouse, DDV-2014-250


LAIR V. MOTL 19

(1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2016); Comm’r of Political Practices v.Boniek, XADV-2014-202 (1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2015).

In concluding this evidence failed to justify contributionlimits, the district court imposed too high an evidentiaryburden on Montana.4 The court held Montana’s evidence wasinadequate because the attempted corruption did not succeed– the “quids” did not lead to “quos.” See Lair, 189 F. Supp.3d at 1034. But Montana need not show any completed quidpro quo transactions to satisfy its burden. It simply mustshow the risk of actual or perceived quid pro quo corruptionis not illusory, a bar Montana’s evidence easily clears. Montana’s contribution limits are of the same kind as inShrink and Buckley, and they are supported by at least asmuch evidence as was present in those cases. See Shrink,528 U.S. at 393–94 (noting a statement from a legislator “thatlarge contributions have ‘the real potential to buy votes’”;“newspaper accounts of large contributions supportinginferences of impropriety”; an example of a “state

4 Like the district court, the dissent would hold Montana to a morestringent evidentiary burden than our cases or the Supreme Court’s permit. The dissent says Montana must prove the existence of actual or apparentcorruption (Dissent at 37, 38, 41, 42), whereas we – following theSupreme Court – have repeatedly held that all Montana must do is showa “threat” or “risk” of actual or apparent corruption. Eddleman, 343 F.3dat 1092; Farris v. Seabrook, 677 F.3d 858, 865–66 (9th Cir. 2012). Thedissent similarly suggests Montana must show evidence of a completed,successful exchange of dollars for political favors to meets its evidentiaryburden. Dissent at 37 n.1, 38, 40, 41–42. But Montana need only showthat the threat of actual or apparent corruption is “not . . . illusory” or ismore than “mere conjecture.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27; Shrink, 528 U.S.at 392. For example, even if the “destroy after reading” letter did notresult in the successful purchase of a block of votes in exchange forcontributions, it certainly shows that the threat of such arrangements isnon-illusory.


LAIR V. MOTL20

representative . . . ‘accused of sponsoring legislation inexchange for kickbacks’” (but not convicted); and a scandalin which the former attorney general pled guilty to misusingstate property to benefit campaign contributors); Buckley,424 U.S. at 27 n.28 (referencing generic “abuses uncoveredafter the 1972 elections”). Montana, therefore, has offeredadequate evidence that its limits further the important stateinterest of preventing quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance.5

B. “Closely Drawn”

We next address whether “the limits are ‘closely drawn’– i.e., [whether] they (a) focus narrowly on the state’sinterest, (b) leave the contributor free to affiliate with acandidate, and (c) allow the candidate to amass sufficientresources to wage an effective campaign.” Eddleman,343 F.3d at 1092. This tailoring inquiry “ensures the state’scontribution limits are not lower than needed to accomplishthe state’s goal of preventing quid pro quo corruption or itsappearance.” Lair II, 798 F.3d at 740 n.4. In conducting thisinquiry, courts owe significant deference to the legislativeprocess. As Buckley explained, courts have “no scalpel toprobe” these legislative judgments, so “distinctions in degree

5 In reaching the contrary conclusion, the dissent points to no case –and we are aware of none – where the risk of actual or apparent corruptionwas inadequate to justify contribution limits of some level. The plaintiffsthemselves concede Montana’s pre-Initiative 118 limits satisfy the FirstAmendment. Under the dissent’s logic, however, Montana’s evidence isinadequate to justify any contribution limits whatsoever, no matter howhigh. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092 (explaining that the valid interestanalysis is divorced from whether the state has justified the particulardollar amount of the limits at issue). On this record, that unprecedentedconclusion is simply untenable.


LAIR V. MOTL 21

become significant only when they . . . amount to differencesin kind.” 424 U.S. at 30 (citation omitted). Thus, “the dollaramounts employed to prevent corruption should be upheldunless they are ‘so radical in effect as to render politicalassociation ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice[below] the level of notice, and render contributionspointless.’” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink,528 U.S. at 397).

1. Narrow Focus

The first part of the closely drawn analysis is whether thelimits are narrowly focused on Montana’s anti-corruptioninterest. We assess the “fit between the stated governmentalobjective and the means selected to achieve that objective,”McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1445, looking at whether the limitstarget “the narrow aspect of political association where theactuality and potential for corruption have been identified,”Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.

Here, because Montana’s limits target the kinds ofcontributions most likely to be associated with quid pro quocorruption, they satisfy the narrow focus inquiry. First, I-118targeted only the top 10% of pre-1994 contributions inMontana – the high-end contributions most likely to result inactual or perceived corruption. See Eddleman, 343 F.3d at1094. We relied on this fact in Eddleman to conclude thelimits were narrowly focused. See id. Because the I-118limits were not indexed to inflation when Eddleman wasdecided, moreover, today’s limits affect an even smallerpercentage of contributions at the top of the range than theydid at that time.


LAIR V. MOTL22

Second, Montana places the strictest limits on directmonetary contributions to candidates – the type of largessemost likely to effect actual or perceived corruption. SeeShrink, 528 U.S. at 393–94 (focusing on direct contributionsin discussing the evidence of corruption justifying Missouri’scontribution limits). Political party contributions – i.e.,indirect contributions – are capped tens of thousands ofdollars higher. Cf. Randall, 548 U.S. at 256 (pluralityopinion) (imposing the same limits on individuals andpolitical parties cuts against upholding the limits). Moreover,Montana’s “statute in no way prevents [individuals and]PACs from affiliating with their chosen candidates in waysother than direct contributions, such as donating money to acandidate’s political party, volunteering [their] services,sending direct mail to their supporters, or taking outindependent newspaper, radio, or television ads to conveytheir support.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. This, too, showstailoring for the type of contribution most likely associatedwith dollars-for-favors exchanges, without unnecessarilycurtailing other forms of political expression.

The plaintiffs argue Montana could accomplish its goalswith higher limits, but they seek a level of constitutionalprecision the Supreme Court has never required – Montananeed not “fine tune” its limits to stay within the FirstAmendment’s boundaries. As Buckley explained,

Appellants’ first overbreadth challenge . . .rests on the proposition that most largecontributors do not seek improper influence. . . . Although the truth of that propositionmay be assumed, it does not undercut thevalidity of the $1,000 contribution limitation. Not only is it difficult to isolate suspect


LAIR V. MOTL 23

contributions, but, more importantly,Congress was justified in concluding that theinterest in safeguarding against theappearance of impropriety requires that theopportunity for abuse inherent in the processof raising large monetary contributions beeliminated.

A second, related overbreadth claim is that the$1,000 restriction is unrealistically lowbecause much more than that amount wouldstill not be enough to enable an unscrupulouscontributor to exercise improper influence. . . . While the contribution limitationprovisions might well have been [higher insome cases], Congress’ failure to engage insuch fine tuning does not invalidate thelegislation.

424 U.S. at 29–30. Here, especially given that the plaintiffsdo not dispute the constitutionality of the pre-1994 limits,they ask us to police a “distinction[] in degree,” not a“difference[] in kind.” Id. at 30 (noting the differencebetween $1,000 and $2,000 was a distinction in degree). Thisis a legislative judgment we decline to second guess.6

6 At oral argument, the plaintiffs contended Montana must justify thechange between the pre-1994 limits and today’s limits. Everycontribution limit case of which we are aware, however, evaluates thecurrent limits, and the plaintiffs point to no authority suggestingotherwise. In Randall, for example, the Court evaluated Vermont’sexisting limits without discussing whether the change from Vermont’sprevious regime was justified. See 548 U.S. at 237, 239, 248–63 (pluralityopinion). Even if the change in limits were relevant, for the reasons wehave discussed the difference between the pre-1994 limits and today’s


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We acknowledge Montana’s chosen dollar amounts mightappear low, but they are not constitutionally suspect. First,Montana’s limits are not an outlier compared to other states’limits:

Table 4: 2015–2016 Limits on Contributions toGubernatorial Candidates7

State Limit

Montana $1320 per cycle

Alaska $1000 per cycle

Colorado $1150 per cycle

Delaware $1200 per cycle

Massachusetts $1000 per calendar year

Rhode Island $1000 per calendar year

Second, even if the limits are low in absolute terms, theyare quite reasonable compared to the low cost of campaigningin the state. Montana to the present is “one of the leastexpensive states in the nation in which to run a politicalcampaign.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094. When contributionlimits are viewed in relation to the cost of campaigning for astate house seat, Montana’s limits are proportionally higher

limits is not constitutionally significant. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.

7 See Nat’l Conf. of State Legs., State Limits on Contributions toCandidates 2015–2016 Election Cycle (July 31, 2015), www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/state-limits-on-contributions-to-candidates.aspx.


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than both the federal limits and those of 12 other states.8 Table 5 shows contribution limits relative to the cost ofcampaigning in the nine states within the Ninth Circuit:

Table 5: Maximum Contributions as a Percentage of

Total Fundraising in 2010 State House Races9

State Avg. Total Limit Ratio

Montana $8,231 $320 3.89%

Alaska $36,870 $1000 2.71%

Arizona $37,411 $410 1.1%

California $355,789 $7800 2.19%

Hawaii $26,956 $2000 7.42%

Idaho $17,245 $2000 11.6%

Nevada $74,634 $10,000 13.4%

Oregon $116,536 none n/a

Washington $85,039 $1600 1.88%

8 For state senate races, Montana’s limits are proportionally higherthan both the federal limits and those of 14 other states.

9 For simplicity’s sake, the term “state house” refers to the lowerchamber of the state legislature, even if a given state calls its lowerchamber something else.


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Montana’s limits are low only if we ignore the low cost ofcampaigning in the state. Once that reality is factored in,Montana’s limits fit well within the mainstream.

Third, Montana’s limits are reasonable compared to thesize of a typical contribution in Montana. In 2010 state houseraces, for example, the average individual contributed about$90, when the per cycle limit was $320. In the 2008 race forgovernor, the typical contribution was only $185, when theper cycle limit was $1200. Thus, in addition to targeting onlythe top 10% of contributions, the limits do not come close tocurtailing the average contributor’s participation incampaigns.

Fourth, Montana’s limits are reasonably keyed to theactual evidence showing a risk of corruption in Montana. Inhis “burn after reading” letter, written shortly before I-118was passed, Senator Anderson suggested a political actioncommittee could obtain political favors from an entire blockof legislators through contributions totaling just $8,000. Evenadjusted for inflation, that is only a few hundred dollars perlegislator. If such contributions can corrupt the legislativeprocess, Montana’s limits are anything but an exaggeratedresponse to the risk of actual or perceived corruption thatexists in the state.

We should not – and indeed cannot – be in the business offine tuning contribution limits for states. These judgmentsare for state lawmakers to make (including voters actingthrough the initiative process). As judges, our limited role isto ensure that a state chooses limits that are not “so radical ineffect as to render political association ineffective, drive thesound of a candidate’s voice below the level of notice, andrender contributions pointless.” Shrink, 528 U.S. at 397.


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Because Montana’s limits satisfy this standard, we hold theyare narrowly focused.

The district court concluded otherwise because, in the1994 Voter Information Pamphlet attached to I-118, theinitiative’s sponsors argued “[t]here is just way too muchmoney in Montana politics” and urged voters to pass I-118 toprevent “[m]oney from special interests and the wealthy”from “drowning out the voice of regular people,” reasonsthat are inadequate to justify contribution limits underMcCutcheon. The district court thus concluded the Montanavoters who approved I-118 acted with an impermissiblemotive, meaning the limits “could never be said to focusnarrowly on a constitutionally-permissible anti-corruptioninterest.” Lair, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 1035. We disagree.

The district court incorrectly cast the narrow focus test asa motive inquiry that looks at the voters’ underlying intentwhen they enacted the limits. The narrow focus test,however, is a tailoring test, not a motive test. It measureshow effectively the limits target corruption compared to howmuch they inhibit associational freedoms – i.e., whether the

limitation focuses precisely on the problem oflarge campaign contributions – the narrowaspect of political association where theactuality and potential for corruption havebeen identified – while leaving persons free toengage in independent political expression, toassociate actively through volunteering theirservices, and to assist to a limited butnonetheless substantial extent in supportingcandidates and committees with financialresources.


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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28; see Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094(analyzing fit without reference to underlying voter intent). We are aware of no case looking to underlying legislative orvoter intent in making this evaluation. Although there issome logic that the sponsors’ goal behind I-118 revealssomething about the limits’ fit, the actual content and effectof the limits – which, as discussed, target the contributionsmost likely to generate corruption or its appearance – bettershow their tailoring. We therefore disapprove the districtcourt’s reasoning.

2. Contributors’ Ability to Affiliate with Candidates

The closely drawn inquiry next assesses whether thecontribution limits “leave the contributor free to affiliate witha candidate.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092. Montana not onlypermits such affiliation through direct monetarycontributions, but also “in ways other than directcontributions, such as donating money to a candidate’spolitical party, volunteering . . . , sending direct mail . . . , ortaking out independent newspaper, radio, or television ads toconvey . . . support.” Id. at 1094. The plaintiffs effectivelyconcede that contributors may associate with candidates,arguing only that some contributors would like to give morethan the limits allow. Thus, Montana’s limits satisfy prongtwo of the closely drawn analysis.

3. Candidates’ Ability to Campaign Effectively

The final part of the closely drawn inquiry asks whetherMontana’s limits prevent candidates from amassing sufficientresources to campaign effectively. Eddleman held they didnot, see 343 F.3d at 1095, and we see no reason to reach adifferent conclusion.


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To begin with, the evidence from Montana candidatesshows the limits do not prevent effective campaigning. Montana Secretary of State Mark Cooney testified, “I don’tfeel that the limitations . . . have been harmful to mycandidacy at all.” Representative Harper testified the limitshad “[j]ust negligible effects” on his campaigns. Anothercandidate testified he raised more money after the limits werein place than before. Although one candidate initiallytestified the limits made it “more difficult” for him to raiseenough money, he later clarified he “didn’t mean that [hiscampaigns] were ineffective.” He explained, “I mean I didwhat I had to to win. If my opponents would have beentougher and I felt that I needed to, I would have raised moremoney, gone out and done the work that I needed to to runthat effective campaign.”

One candidate witness (Mike Miller) did suggest thelimits made his campaigns ineffective, but the facts belie hisclaim. Between 2008 and 2014, Miller’s campaigns receivedmaxed-out contributions from only seven of hisapproximately 200 contributors, and Miller won all four ofhis elections.

Statistical data confirm that the limits do not preventeffective campaigning. Plaintiffs’ expert Clark Bensenopined that “a high proportion of maxed-out donors” wouldbe an indicator that “the limits were too low.” Suppl.Excerpts R. 109 (“Bensen Report”). In Montana, however,maximum contributions are relatively rare. In 2010 statehouse and senate races, for example, 85% of individual


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contributors gave less than the statutory limit.10 Politicalparties contributed below the limit 78% of the time. Numbersfrom other years and other races are comparable. This lowproportion of maximum contributions shows the limits do notunduly inhibit candidate fundraising.

The plaintiffs argue competitive elections provide theproper context for evaluating contribution limits, and theypoint out that the percentage of maximum contributions incompetitive elections is higher, about 29%. The plaintiffs arecorrect that the plurality opinion in Randall focused oncompetitive races rather than average ones. See 548 U.S. at255–56. But this focus was based on the potential advantagecontribution limits might grant incumbents in competitiveraces. See id. Because these races tend to be moreexpensive, challengers may need to rely on largecontributions more than incumbents do, so overly strict limitscould disproportionately affect challengers. See id. at 256.

The plaintiffs, however, have not shown this problemexists in Montana. Incumbents and challengers incompetitive races have virtually the same percentage ofmaxed-out contributors. See Bensen Report at 101 (“Therewas very little difference with respect to incumbency [versuschallengers]” as to who relied on maximum or near maximumcontributions in competitive races.); cf. Randall, 548 U.S. at253–55 (citing to an expert report, also by Clark Bensen,showing Vermont’s contribution limits significantly reducedchallenger fundraising in competitive races). Indeed, wenoted in Eddleman that “the average gap between the total

10 1,402 maximum donations; 4,469 donations below the maximumbut above the $35 reporting threshold; estimated 3,768 donations belowthe $35 threshold, assuming an average contribution of $20.


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amount of money raised by incumbents and challengers forall legislative races was only $65.00 per race.” 343 F.3d at1095.

Three other circumstances underscore the tailoring ofMontana’s limits to avoid unduly favoring incumbents. First,Montana permits political parties to contribute far more thanindividuals and PACs. As the plaintiffs’ own expert testified,political parties give predominantly to challengers inMontana, whereas PACs contribute more often toincumbents. In Randall, by contrast, Vermont imposedidentical limits on parties, individuals and PACs, reflectingan incumbency bias cutting against the limits’constitutionality. See 548 U.S. at 256–57 (plurality opinion). Second, Montana’s limits apply per election, rather than percycle, meaning a contributor may give up to the limit twice ifa candidate runs in a contested primary. Because challengersgenerally face contested primaries more often thanincumbents, per election limits mitigate the incumbentfundraising advantage. This, too, distinguishes this case fromRandall, where Vermont’s per cycle limits were a “dangersign” of the limits’ unconstitutionality. See id. at 249. Third,by prohibiting “incumbents from using excess funds from onecampaign in future campaigns,” Montana “keeps incumbentsfrom building campaign war chests and gaining a fundraisinghead start over challengers.” Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1095. The anti-challenger bias that animated the plurality inRandall simply is not present here.

In sum, challengers and incumbents alike remain capableof running effective campaigns in Montana. Even if somecandidates might prefer to seek fewer, larger contributions tomeet their fundraising needs (rather than more numerous,smaller contributions), when “a candidate is merely required


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‘to raise funds from a greater number of persons and tocompel people who would otherwise contribute amountsgreater than the statutory limits to expend such funds ondirect political expression,’ the candidate’s freedom of speechis not impugned by limits on contributions.” Id. at 1091(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21–22). We hold Montana’slimits do not prevent candidates from amassing sufficientresources to campaign effectively.

* * *

Montana’s limits are closely drawn to further the state’simportant interest in preventing actual or perceived quid proquo corruption. Montana has shown the risk of quid pro quocorruption in Montana is not illusory. Its chosen contributionlimits are narrowly focused; they do not prevent contributorsfrom affiliating with the candidates of their choosing; andthey do not prevent candidates from raising the moneyneeded for effective campaigning, whether the candidate is anincumbent or challenger and whether the race is competitiveor average. We hold, therefore, that Montana’s limits surviveFirst Amendment scrutiny. The district court erred byholding otherwise.

C. Randall

Even if we were wrong in Lair II to hold Eddlemancontrols our evaluation of Montana’s contribution limits, wewould reach the same conclusion under the plurality’sdecision in Randall. The Randall test first looks for “dangersigns” that the limits prevent candidates from raising enoughmoney to be heard and challengers from raising enough tocompete against incumbents. See 548 U.S. at 249–52(plurality opinion). The plurality found four such “danger


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signs” in Vermont’s limits: “(1) The limits are set perelection cycle, rather than divided between primary andgeneral elections; (2) the limits apply to contributions frompolitical parties; (3) the limits are the lowest in the Nation;and (4) the limits are below those we have previouslyupheld.” Id. at 268 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)(listing the plurality’s “danger signs”).

If these “danger signs” exist, a court then assesses

“five sets of considerations” to determinewhether the statute was closely drawn:(1) whether the “contribution limits willsignificantly restrict the amount of fundingavailable for challengers to run competitivecampaigns”; (2) whether “political parties[must] abide by exactly the same lowcontribution limits that apply to othercontributors”; (3) whether “volunteerservices” are considered contributions thatwould count toward the limit; (4) whether the“contribution limits are . . . adjusted forinflation”; and (5) “any special justificationthat might warrant a contribution limit so lowor so restrictive.” [Randall, 548 U.S.] at253–62.

Lair II, 798 F.3d at 743 (first alteration in original) (citationsomitted).

The motions panel in Lair I addressed each of these“danger signs” and “considerations” at length, concludingthat Randall likely “would not have mandated a differentresult in Eddleman.” 697 F.3d at 1208; see id. at 1208–13.


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We agree. Montana’s limits apply per election, not per cycle. The lowest limits do not apply to political parties. The limitsare not the lowest in the nation; they are higher than Alaska’s($1000 per cycle for governor), Colorado’s ($1150),Delaware’s ($1200) and arguably Massachusetts’ ($1000 percalendar year) and Rhode Island’s ($1000 per calendar year). Although Montana’s limits are lower in absolute terms thanthose the Court has previously upheld, they are significantlyhigher than those the Court struck down in Randall ($400 percycle for governor). They are also higher as a percentage ofthe cost of campaigning than the federal limits Buckleyupheld.11 Montana’s limits do not favor incumbents orprevent challengers from fundraising effectively. Politicalparties may contribute far more than individuals and PACs;they also may provide campaigns with paid staffers, whosewages are not counted against the party’s contribution limits. See Mont. Admin. R. 44.11.225(3). Contributors mayvolunteer for campaigns and otherwise express their supportin ways beyond direct contributions. Finally, Montana’s

11 As discussed above, Montana’s limits are particularly modest whenthe cost of campaigning is taken into account – a useful way to measurea maximum contribution’s impact on a campaign. A maximumcontribution in Montana accounted for 3.89% of the total amount a 2010state house candidate raised. This percentage was higher than thepercentage for the federal limits (0.5% across all House of Representativesraces), the dollar amounts of which the Court approved in Buckley. Montana’s limits are also proportionally higher than those in Alaska(2.71%), Arizona (1.1%), California (2.19%), Colorado (1.1%),Connecticut (2.19%), Delaware (1.91%), Florida (0.87%), Massachusetts(2.14%), Michigan (0.94%), Tennessee (3.78%), Washington (1.88%) andWisconsin (2.98%). Thus, although Montana’s limits are on the low sidein absolute terms – but not an outlier – they are relatively high given thelow cost of campaigning in the state.


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limits are adjusted for inflation. Accordingly, Montana’scontribution limits would survive scrutiny even if Randall governed.

IV. Conclusion

Our Constitution permits contribution limits to serve thenarrow but vital purpose of preventing actual or apparent quidpro quo corruption in politics. Because the limitationsimposed by Montana Code Annotated § 13-37-216 bothfurther that interest and are adequately tailored to it, theysatisfy the First Amendment.

REVERSED.

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Our representative government requires and relies on theready flow of ideas between elected legislators and the voters. Those ideas are mostly transmitted during election campaignsby advertisements and organized rallies, examples of freespeech, neither of which come free. Contributors to thecampaigns want their ideas made known and accepted by thecampaigning legislators. Restrictions on citizens’ campaigncontributions limit their ability to make their ideas known andto influence the legislators to accept and further those ideas. For these reasons, our First Amendment law permits limits onsuch contributions only if the restrictions are closely drawnto a valid, important state interest. Courts must carefullyscrutinize such limitations. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S.Ct. 1434, 1451 (2014) (“the First Amendment requires us toerr on the side of protecting political speech rather than


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suppressing it” (citation omitted)). Here, the district courtproperly evaluated the evidence submitted by Montana’sofficials and found the officials had not established the onlyconstitutionally permissible and valid state interest sufficientto justify Montana’s campaign contribution limits: theprevention of corruption or its appearance. Thus, Irespectfully dissent.

In Montana Right to Life v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085,1092 (9th Cir. 2003), we upheld Montana’s campaigncontribution limits under a two-part test: 1) the contributionlimits must respond to a valid important state interest and2) the contribution limits must be closely drawn to thatinterest. In that decision, we recognized that discouraging“undue influence” gained over legislators by contributorsthrough their contributions could be a valid important stateinterest. 343 F.3d at 1096–97. As we recognized in Lair v.Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2015), the SupremeCourt’s plurality decision in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230(2006), which held Vermont’s campaign contribution limitsunconstitutional under the First Amendment, did not alterEddleman’s framework because no opinion received thesupport of a majority of the justices.

If Citizens United had not been decided the way it was,the Montana officials’ claims here of a valid important stateinterest would make this an easy case for reversal. ButCitizens United changed all that because it narrowed what canconstitute a valid important state interest (at Eddleman’s firststep) to only the state’s interest in eliminating or reducingquid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The SupremeCourt explained in FEC v. National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee that “[t]he hallmark of corruption is thefinancial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors.” 470 U.S.


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480, 497 (1985). The mere prevention of influence onlegislators by contributors is now not a valid important stateinterest that could justify campaign contribution limits. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010); see alsoMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1441. As such, only the avoidanceof corruption or the appearance of corruption remain as astate interest valid and important enough to limit the freespeech rights of contributors exercised through theircontributions to their legislators.

To establish this sole valid important state interestdefendants here must demonstrate that the existence of actualor apparent quid pro quo corruption is more than “mereconjecture” and is not “illusory.”1 Eddleman, 343 F.3d at1092. While an appellate court’s review of a district court’sfactual findings is more rigorous in the First Amendment

1 A common sense understanding of quid pro quo corruption suggeststhat it is limited to exchanges in which a politician personally pocketsmoney in exchange for an official action that violated the politician’sobligations of office. The notion that contributions to a candidate’scampaign fund, one of the key mechanisms by which constituentsinfluence their elected representatives, could ever constitute part of animproper exchange for an official act seems implausible since thecontribution of funds to a campaign to effect influence is their expectedand proper purpose. Despite this, the Supreme Court has earlierrecognized that quid pro quo corruption includes occasions when“[e]lected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations ofoffice by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions ofmoney into their campaigns.” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460–61(quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at497 (emphasis added)). As such, under Supreme Court precedentcontributions made for the permissible purpose of influencing legislatorscan apparently constitute quid pro quo corruption in certain circumstances. Such influence is improper corruption when, in fact, the legislator actscontrary to his legal obligation(s). In our record, there is no evidence ofsuch an illegal act.


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context, our prior precedent has confirmed that we stillreview such factual findings with some deference. SeeNewton v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 930 F.2d 662, 670 (9th Cir.1990) (“[W]e must simultaneously ensure the appropriateappellate protection of First Amendment values and still deferto the findings of the trier of fact.”); see also PlannedParenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of LifeActivists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1066–70 (9th Cir. 2002). Becausethe district court entered judgment on cross motions forsummary judgment, however, a de novo standard of reviewas to the existence of a material triable issue of fact properlyapplies here.

A close examination of relevant evidence from the recordmakes clear that the district court’s finding that defendantsfailed to carry their burden to prove the appearance orexistence of quid pro quo corruption at the first step ofEddleman, as narrowed by Citizens United, was correct evenif reviewed under a de novo standard. That is because therecord here is devoid of any evidence of exchanges of dollarsfor political favors – much less for any actions contrary tolegislators’ obligations of office – or any reason to believe theappearance of such exchanges will develop in the future.

First, consider the letter sent by Senator Mike Andersonto his party-colleagues, urging them to vote for a bill so thatmoney from certain political action committees wouldcontinue to flow to the Republican Party’s coffers. None ofthe record evidence shows that any legislator accepted thedeal articulated by Senator Anderson and, despite fiveseparate investigations, Anderson himself was never found tohave engaged in any unlawful practices. Eddleman, 343 F.3dat 1093. Rather than actual or apparent quid pro quocorruption, the event shows rejection of temptation. Next,


LAIR V. MOTL 39

consider the offer to contribute $100,000 to the RepublicanLegislative Campaign Committee in exchange for Republicanlegislators’ support for a right-to-work bill, as testified to bySenator Bruce Tutvedt. This offer also did not constitute quidpro quo corruption because the Republican legislatorsrejected it. Further, they likely would have introduced andsupported such a right-to-work bill regardless of this offer, asit was consistent with their political party’s policy position. More importantly, even had certain legislators accepted theseoffers (as Representative Hal Harper’s generalized testimonysuggests sometimes occurred), such actions would appear toconstitute nothing more than the trading of influence andaccess, which are critical mechanisms through which ourpolitical system responds to the needs of constituents. SeeCitizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 910 (“that speakers may haveinfluence over or access to elected officials does not meanthat these officials are corrupt”).

Similarly, the Montana state court decisions referenced bydefendants do not establish actual or apparent quid pro quocorruption. These include:

• The Montana Supreme Court held in 2013 that a PublicService Commissioner unlawfully accepted financial giftsfrom power companies that “would tend to improperlyinfluence a reasonable person in [the Commissioner’s]position,” a number of which payments the Commissionerreturned to the contributor shortly after they werereceived. Molnar v. Fox, 301 P.3d 824, 832 (Mont.2013).

• Two Montana state trial court decisions found that two2010 legislative primary candidates violated statecampaign finance laws by accepting corporate


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contributions in return for promising 100 percent supportfor the corporations’ agenda and without properlyreporting such contributions. Comm’r of PoliticalPractices v. Boniek, XADV-2014-202 (1st Jud. Dist.Mont. 2015); Comm’r of Political Practices v. Prouse,DDV-2014-250 (1st Jud. Dist. Mont. 2016).

None of these cases involved bribery or the improper tradingof official acts by violating a legislator’s legal obligations formonetary contributions. Two of these cases (Boniek andProuse) were default judgments against individuals whonever even made it to a general election (each lost in theRepublican primaries), making quid pro quo corruption ineach circumstance impossible as neither candidate ever heldany office from which to grant official favors. Although theMontana court that adjudicated Boniek and Prouse labeled theconduct in both of these cases as “corruption,” the court didnot delineate which official actions taken by defendants inthese cases constituted an illegal official act, define what“corruption” meant in this context, or explain how thisfinding was related to the legal claims against defendantsbefore that court. Moreover, defendants Boniek and Prousealready held out-spoken conservative positions on issues likeright-to-work, abortion, guns, and government, meaning thatany official acts they may have taken to further the interestsof conservative contributors had they been elected wouldhave been consistent with their longstanding policy positionsand not primarily motivated as an exchange of an illegalofficial act for campaign contributions.

Finally, the declaration of Montana’s Commissioner ofPolitical Practices (Jonathan Motl) that numerous cases ofquid pro quo corruption occurred in Montana was rebutted bysworn declarations from the very politicians and political


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candidates who, according to Motl, engaged in quid pro quocorruption. Given defendant Motl’s position asCommissioner of Political Practices, which gives him broadauthority to investigate political misdeeds, see Montana CodeAnnotated § 13-37-111, it is surprising, to say the least, thatthe only enforcement actions against purported quid pro quocorruption in Montana cited by defendants are the above-referenced, non-starter cases for violations of campaignfinance or ethics rules. One would expect that if quid pro quocorruption was as widespread as Commissioner Motl asserts,he could point at least to some actual court convictions forbribery or other forms of quid pro quo corruption.

Taken together, a detailed examination of the evidenceoffered by defendants establishes that the district courtconcluded correctly that the record evidence failed to proveany actual quid pro quo corruption. This still leaves thepossibility that the evidence in the record establishes theappearance of corruption in Montana. As Buckley v. Valeoexplained, “[o]f almost equal concern as the danger of actualquid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance ofcorruption stemming from public awareness of theopportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of largeindividual financial contributions.” 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976);see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450. In other words, theappearance of quid pro quo corruption is the “publicawareness of the opportunities for abuse.” For the veryreasons discussed above, however, none of the recordevidence establishes the existence of any opportunity for quidpro quo corruption or other abuses. Where is the evidencethat a legislator caused the re-routing of a freeway to benefita commercial landowner, who had paid the legislator’svacation travels? Where is the evidence that an airportconstruction contractor was awarded a contract, and had


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remodeled the legislator’s home at little or no cost to thelegislator? Rather, the record makes clear that Montanapoliticians often rejected even efforts by certain interests toinfluence or access legislators, that even seemingly minorviolations of campaign finance laws by unelected primarycandidates were rigorously punished, and that Montana’sCommissioner of Political Practices consistently reviewed thepropriety and legality of the actions of politicians, politicalcandidates, and various interest groups. In other words, theonly reasonable inference that may be drawn from the recordevidence is that there were few opportunities for abuse and,therefore, scant public awareness of such opportunities. Assuch, on this record the existence of actual or apparent quidpro quo corruption is, at best, “illusory” or “mere conjecture,”such that defendants have not met their burden to establish avalid important state interest to justify the contribution limitsat issue in this lawsuit. Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092.

While it is admittedly difficult at times to distinguishbetween proscribed corruption and acceptable influence,given the important First Amendment interests at stake whenrestricting political speech we are obliged to scrutinizecarefully whether a valid important state interest exists beforeupholding the constitutionality of such restrictions. SeeMcCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1451 (“The line between quid proquo corruption and general influence may seem vague attimes, but the distinction must be respected in order tosafeguard basic First Amendment rights.”). Although thereis admittedly some common sense to the notion that limitingthe amount of money citizens may contribute to politicalcandidates inherently forestalls corruption, because so doingalso restricts speech our federal constitution requires a greaterevidentiary showing than made on this record before a statemay restrict political speech through campaign contribution


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limits. While the panel majority’s opinion pays lip service tothe changes in the Eddleman framework rendered by CitizensUnited, the contents of its analysis at Eddleman’s first stepdemonstrate it has failed to account substantively for thischange.

In footnote 5, the majority opinion notes that “[u]nder thedissent’s logic…Montana’s evidence is inadequate to justifyany contribution limit whatsoever, no matter how high.” Thisis quite correct. Absent a showing of the existence orappearance of quid pro quo corruption based on objectiveevidence, the presence of a subjective sense that there is a riskof such corruption or its appearance does not justify a limit oncampaign contributions. Restrictions on speech must bebased on fact, not conjecture.

Because I do not think defendants established theexistence of a valid important state interest at step one of theEddleman framework, I respectfully dissent.


Commissioner of Political Practices Policies and Procedures

Amended Office Management Policy 2.4 Reinstating Pre-Lair 2016 Campaign Contribution limits Adopted: May 17, 2016; First amended on May 18, 2016; Second amended on May 26, 2016 Introduction The Federal District Court, in the Matter of Lair v. COPP No. 6:12-cv-00012-CCL, issued its Order on May 17, 2016 declaring that the limits imposed by Montana law on contributions to candidates for Montana public office are unconstitutional. The Federal Court’s Order has voided the limits on contributions. The contribution limits voided by the Federal Court were set by a November 1994 vote of Montana voters approving Initiative 118. The new limits set by I-118 amended limits were then set out at §13-37-216 MCA. In response to the Federal Court’s Order the Commissioner adopts the following amended policy. Policy The Commissioner hereby recognizes that Montana law reinstates the larger contribution limits in place under §13-37-216 MCA before those limits were amended by the now voided portion of I-118. The Commissioner notes that the Policy is adopted under the reasoning, authority and direction set by the Montana Supreme Court in State ex. rel. Woodahl v. District Court, 162 Mont. 283, 290, 511 P.2d 318, 322 (1972): '[a]n unconstitutional amendment to a law leaves the section intact as it had been before the attempted amendment." This issue is further addressed by AG Opinion Vol. 51, No. 2. I. Individual Contribution Limits The Court’s Order struck 13-37-216(1) MCA (2011) applying limits to individuals. The amounts for individual contributions set by §13-37-216 MCA before the now voided amendment by I-118 are as follows:

$1,500 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $750 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $400 limit for candidates for PSC, District Court Judge, and State Senator

cited in Lair v. Motl, No. 16-35424 archived on October 18, 2017

Case: 16-35424, 10/23/2017, ID: 10626873, DktEntry: 47-2, Page 1 of 22(44 of 70)

$250 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative)

Subsection (4) of §13-37-216 MCA (2011) sets an inflation factor based on the consumer price index in place in the year of 2002. The inflation factor was set by the Montana legislature independent of changes made by I-118. The Commissioner applies the inflation factor for the reason that it was not challenged by the Lair litigation and appears to be unaffected by the Court’s Order. Applying a 1.326 Inflation Factor to the reinstated pre-I-118 limits sets the following limits on individual contributions to a candidate for election in 2016:

$1,990 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $990 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $530 limit for candidates for PSC, District Court Judge, and State Senator $330 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative)

It is noted that the limits set by §13-37-216 MCA prior to amendment by I-118 were single limits covering both the primary and general election. Accordingly, the Commissioner adopts the above as a single limit for contributions to a 2016 Montana candidate for public office. II. Political Committee Contribution Limits, Other than Political Parties. The Court’s Order struck 13-37-216(1) MCA (2011), the subsection of law applying limits to political committees other than political party committees. The amounts for political committee contributions set by §13-37-216 MCA before the now voided amendment by I-118 are as follows:

$8,000 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $2,000 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $1,000 limit for candidates for PSC $600 limit for a candidate for the state senate $300 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative and District Court Judge)

Applying the inflation factor discussed above, the reinstated limits for political committees other than political party committees are:

$10,610 limit for Gubernatorial candidates $2,650 limit for Other Statewide Office candidates $1,330 limit for candidates for PSC $800 limit for a candidate for the state senate



$400 limit for any candidates for any other Montana public office (including State Representative and District Court Judge)

It is noted that the limits set by §13-37-216 MCA prior to amendment by I-118 were single limits covering both the primary and general election. Accordingly, the Commissioner adopts the above as a single limit for contributions to a 2016 Montana candidate for public office. III. Political Party Contribution Limits The Court’s Order of May 17, 2016 struck 13-37-216(3) MCA (2011), the subsection of law applying limits to political party committees. On May 25, 2016 the Court issued its further Order staying the effect of this part of the Order as to Montana’s 2016 elections. Accordingly, political party contribution limits for 2016 elections were and are those set by 44.11.227 ARM: Office Contribution Limit – Per

Election Governor/Lieutenant Governor $23,850

Other Statewide offices $8,600

PSC $3,450

State Senate $1,400

All other Elected Offices $850

This Policy, with any amendments, is in effect barring further legislative or judicial action that might affect the contribution limits, including the completion of litigation in the matter of Lair v. COPP No. 6:12-CV-00012-CCL. Failure to adhere to these contribution limits will be treated as a violation of Montana’s campaign practice laws.



Stat

e Li

mits

on

Cont

ribut

ions

to C

andi

date

s 20

15-2

016

Elec

tion

Cycle

Indi

vidu

al

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

St

ate

Part

y C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

PAC

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Co

rpor

ate

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Un

ion

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Al

abam

a Al

a. C

ode

§ 17

-5-1

et s

eq.

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Alas

ka

§ 15

.13.

070

and

15.1

3.07

4(f)

$ 500

/can

dida

te/y

ear

Aggr

egat

e am

ount

s ca

ndid

ates

may

acc

ept f

rom

no

n -re

siden

ts:

$20,

000/

year

/gub

cand

idat

e $5

,000

/yea

r/Se

nate

ca

ndid

ate

$3,0

00/y

ear/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

$100

,000

/yea

r/gu

b ca

ndid

ate

$15,

000/

year

/ Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $1

0,00

0/ye

ar/H

ouse

ca

ndid

ate

$5,0

00 m

unici

pal

$ 1,0

00/o

ffice

/yea

r

Cont

ribut

ions

from

out

-of-

stat

e PA

Cs p

rohi

bite

d

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Arizo

nab,

e, 1

A.

R.S.

§ 1

6-90

5 an

d 16

-91

9

$5,0

00/s

tate

wid

e or

le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

Aggr

egat

e co

ntrib

utio

ns

acce

pted

from

all

polit

ical

part

ies a

nd o

rgan

izatio

ns

cann

ot e

xcee

d:

$80,

000

– st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e $8

,000

– le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

“Sup

er”

PACs

2 :$10

,000

/sta

tew

ide

or

l egi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate/

year

Re

gula

r PAC

s:

$5,0

00/s

tate

wid

e or

le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e/ye

ar

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion cy

cle

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Arka

nsas

A.

C.A.

§ 7

-6-2

03

$2,7

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na $2

,700

/can

dida

te/e

lect

iona

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

1 The

Ariz

ona

Citiz

ens C

lean

Ele

ctio

ns C

omm

issio

n ha

s file

d su

it in

Mar

icopa

Cou

nty

Supe

rior C

ourt

to b

lock

the

incr

ease

d lim

its, c

laim

ing

that

the

legi

slatio

n es

tabl

ishin

g th

em (H

B 25

93, 2

013)

vi

olat

ed th

e Vo

ter P

rote

ctio

n Ac

t, w

hich

bar

s the

legi

slatu

re fr

om m

akin

g ch

ange

s to

any

vote

r-ap

prov

ed la

ws w

ithou

t a se

cond

pop

ular

vot

e or

a 3

/4th

s vot

e o

f the

legi

slatu

re. T

his l

itiga

tion

coul

d re

sult

in a

n in

junc

tion

that

pre

vent

s the

new

lim

its fr

om g

oing

into

effe

ct. C

andi

date

s are

resp

onsib

le fo

r acc

eptin

g on

ly u

p to

the

lega

l max

imum

pur

suan

t to

law

and

cand

idat

es sh

ould

ch

eck

with

thei

r ele

ctio

n of

ficia

l as t

o th

e la

w’s

stat

us. T

he p

re-H

B 25

93 li

mits

wou

ld b

e $9

12/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

and

$440

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

per e

lect

ion

cycle

. 2 I

n Ar

izona

, a P

AC th

at h

as re

ceiv

ed co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om 5

00 o

r mor

e in

divi

dual

s in

amou

nts o

f $10

or m

ore

in a

one

-yea

r per

iod

may

qua

lify

as a

“Sup

er P

AC.”

Qua

lifica

tion

is va

lid fo

r tw

o ye

ars.

(Ariz

. Rev

. Sta

t. §1

6-90

5(I))

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Calif

orni

ae

Gov.

Cod

e §

8530

0 et

seq.

For e

lect

ions

hel

d on

or a

fter

Jan .

1, 2

013:

$2

8,20

0/gu

bern

ator

ial

cand

idat

e

$7,0

00/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$

4,20

0/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Unlim

ited

For e

lect

ions

hel

d on

or a

fter

Jan .

1, 2

013:

“S

mal

l Con

trib

utor

” Cm

tes3 :

$28,

200/

gube

rnat

oria

l ca

ndid

ate

$1

4,10

0/st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e

$8,5

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

Regu

lar P

ACs:

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Colo

rado

e

Cons

titut

ion

Art.

XXVI

II

Effe

ctiv

e 3/

15/1

1 - 2

015:

$5

75/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$200

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

Limits

dou

ble

for a

cand

idat

e w

ho a

ccep

ts v

olun

tary

sp

endi

ng li

mits

if h

is/he

r op

pone

nt h

as n

ot a

ccep

ted

the

limits

and

has

raise

d m

ore

than

10%

of t

he li

mit.

Am

ount

s per

ele

ctio

na

Effe

ctiv

e 3/

15/1

1 - 2

015:

$6

15,0

75/g

ub. c

andi

date

$1

23,0

00/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$22,

125/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$15,

975/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

Note

: Co

ntrib

utio

ns b

y a

cand

idat

e to

his/

her o

wn

cam

paig

n , a

nd u

nexp

ende

d co

ntrib

utio

ns ca

rrie

d fo

rwar

d to

a su

bseq

uent

ele

ctio

n cy

cle, a

re tr

eate

d as

co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om a

pol

itica

l pa

rty

and

are

subj

ect t

o th

e po

litica

l par

ty li

mits

. Par

ty

limits

cann

ot b

e do

uble

d fo

r ca

ndid

ates

who

acc

ept

volu

ntar

y lim

its.

Amou

nts a

re p

er a

pplic

able

el

ectio

n cy

cle.

Limits

effe

ctiv

e 3/

15/1

1 -

2015

: “S

mal

l Don

or” C

omm

ittee

s:4

$6,1

25/g

ub &

stat

ewid

e ca

nd

$2, 4

25/le

gis.

cand

idat

e Re

gula

r PAC

s and

Fed

eral

PA

Cs:

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Proh

ibite

d5 Ca

n co

ntrib

ute

thro

ugh

PAC’

s es

tabl

ished

by

the

orga

niza

tion

3 In

Calif

orni

a, a

“sm

all c

ontr

ibut

or co

mm

ittee

” is a

com

mitt

ee w

hich

has

bee

n in

exis

tenc

e fo

r at l

east

six m

onth

s, re

ceiv

es c

ontr

ibut

ions

from

100

or m

ore

pers

ons i

n am

ount

s of n

ot m

ore

than

$2

00 p

er p

erso

n, a

nd m

akes

cont

ribut

ions

to fi

ve o

r mor

e ca

ndid

ates

. (Ca

l. Go

vt. C

ode

§852

03)

4 In

Colo

rado

, a “s

mal

l don

or co

mm

ittee

” mea

ns a

ny p

oliti

cal c

omm

ittee

that

has

acc

epte

d co

ntrib

utio

ns o

nly

from

nat

ural

per

sons

who

eac

h co

ntrib

uted

no

mor

e th

an $

50 in

the

aggr

egat

e pe

r ye

ar.

5 Cor

pora

tions

are

pro

hibi

ted

from

don

atin

g m

oney

from

thei

r tre

asur

y, b

ut a

re p

erm

itted

to e

stab

lish

inde

pend

ent e

xpen

ditu

re co

mm

ittee

s or p

oliti

cal c

omm

ittee

s with

the

sam

e co

ntrib

utio

n lim

its a

s PAC

s

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Conn

ectic

utb

Ct.G

en.S

tat.

§ 9-

611,

9-

613

and

9-61

5 Up

date

July

201

3

$3,5

00/g

uber

nato

rial

cand

idat

e $2

,000

/oth

er st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e $1

,000

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $2

50/H

ouse

cand

idat

e $3

0,00

0 ag

greg

ate/

indi

vidu

al

to a

ll ca

ndid

ates

and

co

mm

ittee

s per

Ct.

Gen.

Sta

t. §

9-61

1(d)

. Al

l am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

$50,

000/

gube

rnat

oria

l ca

ndid

ate

$35,

000/

othe

r sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $1

0,00

0/Se

nate

cand

idat

e $5

,000

/Hou

se ca

ndid

ate

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

$5,0

00/g

uber

nato

rial

cand

idat

e $3

,000

/oth

er st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e $1

,500

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $7

50/H

ouse

cand

idat

e Ag

greg

ate

limits

on

cont

ribut

ions

by

PACs

to

cand

idat

es:

$100

,000

/ele

ctio

n by

a P

AC

esta

blish

ed b

y a

busin

ess

entit

y

$50,

000/

elec

tion

by a

PAC

es

tabl

ished

by

an

orga

niza

tion

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Proh

ibite

dd

Proh

ibite

dd

Dela

war

e 15

Del

. Cod

e §8

010

to

8013

$1,2

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$600

/oth

er ca

ndid

ate

All a

mou

nts p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

$75,

000/

gub e

rnat

oria

l ca

ndid

ate

$25,

000/

othe

r sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $5

,000

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $3

,000

/Hou

se ca

ndid

ate

All a

mou

nts p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

eci

ted

in L

air v

. Mot

l, N

o. 1

6-35

424

arch

ived

on

Oct

ober

18,

201

7


In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Fl

orid

a Fl

a. S

tat.

§ 10

6.08

$3,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/le

gisla

tive

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

(Effe

ctiv

e 11

/1/2

013)

A ca

ndid

ate

for s

tate

wid

e of

fice

may

not

acc

ept

cont

ribut

ions

from

par

ties

whi

ch in

the

aggr

egat

e ex

ceed

$25

0,00

0, a

nd n

o m

ore

than

$12

5,00

0 of

that

am

ount

may

be

rece

ived

du

ring

the

28 d

ays p

rece

ding

an

ele

ctio

n.

A le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e ca

n ac

cept

up

to $

50,0

00 e

ach

from

the

natio

nal o

r sta

te

exec

utiv

e co

mm

ittee

of a

pa

rty,

or u

p to

$50

,000

from

th

e co

unty

exe

cutiv

e co

mm

ittee

of a

par

ty.

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Geor

giae

O.C

.G.A

. § 2

1-5-

41 to

43

Limits

last

adj

uste

d 12

/201

0 Re

gula

r prim

ary

or g

ener

al:

$6,3

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$2,5

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Ru

n -of

f: $3

,700

/sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $1

,300

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Haw

aii

H.R.

S. §

2: 1

1-35

7, 1

1-35

9

$6,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$4,0

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$2,0

00/H

ouse

cand

idat

e Co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om a

ca

ndid

ate'

s im

med

iate

fam

ily

are

limite

d to

$50

,000

in a

n el

ectio

n cy

cle, i

nclu

ding

loan

s.

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Idah

o §

67-6

610A

$5,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/le

g ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

$10,

000/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$2,0

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Illin

oise

10 IL

CS 5

/9-8

.5

$5,4

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

n cy

cle

Any

cand

idat

e w

ho re

ceiv

es

bene

fit o

r det

rimen

t fro

m

inde

pend

ent e

xpen

ditu

res i

n ex

cess

of t

he a

mou

nts b

elow

is

exem

pted

from

all

cont

ribut

ion

limits

: $2

50,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$100

,000

/can

dida

te fo

r any

ot

her o

ffice

A

cand

idat

e an

d th

eir

imm

edia

te fa

mily

mem

bers

(s

pous

e, p

aren

t, or

child

) can

m

ake

unlim

ited

cont

ribut

ions

to

that

cand

idat

e’s c

ampa

ign.

An

y ca

ndid

ate

who

se

oppo

nent

is se

lf-fu

nded

is

exem

pted

from

cont

ribut

ion

limits

. A se

lf-fu

nded

ca

ndid

ate

is an

indi

vidu

al w

ho

cont

ribut

es $

250,

000

to h

is or

he

r ow

n st

atew

ide

cam

paig

n in

an

elec

tion

cycle

, or

$100

,000

for a

ll ot

her e

lect

ive

offic

es. C

ontr

ibut

ions

mad

e to

a

cand

idat

e by

imm

edia

te

fam

ily m

embe

rs a

re a

lso

cons

ider

ed “s

elf-f

undi

ng.”

Unlim

ited

if ca

ndid

ate

is no

t se

ekin

g no

min

atio

n in

a

prim

ary

elec

tion.

Fo

r can

dida

tes r

unni

ng in

a

prim

ary:

$2

15,8

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1

34,9

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

134,

900

$80,

900/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

Un

limite

d fro

m a

pol

itica

l pa

rty

durin

g Ge

nera

l or

Cons

olid

ated

Ele

ctio

n Un

limite

d du

ring

Prim

ary

Elec

tion

Cycle

whe

n ca

ndid

ate

is no

t see

king

no

min

atio

n Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle.

$53,

900

per e

lect

ion

cycle

Sa

me

limit

appl

ies t

o a

cont

ribut

ion

from

one

ca

ndid

ate

com

mitt

ee to

an

othe

r

$10,

800p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

$10,

800

per e

lect

ion

cycle

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Indi

ana

Ind.

Cod

e §

3-9-

2-4

et se

q.

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

$5,0

00 in

the

aggr

egat

e to

st

atew

ide

cand

idat

es

$2,0

00 in

the

aggr

egat

e to

Se

nate

cand

idat

es

$2,0

00 in

the

aggr

egat

e to

Ho

use

cand

idat

es

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er y

ear

Sam

e as

corp

orat

e lim

its

Iow

a Io

wa

Code

§ 6

8A.5

03

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Proh

ibite

dd Un

limite

d

Kans

as

K.S.

A. §

25-

4153

$2,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$500

/Hou

se ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

For a

cont

este

d pr

imar

y el

ectio

n, sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its.

Unlim

ited

in u

ncon

test

ed

prim

arie

s and

gen

eral

el

ectio

ns

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Kent

ucky

K.

R.S.

§ 1

21.0

25, 1

21.0

35,

and

121.

150

$1,0

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na Un

limite

d Ag

greg

ate

Limits

: No

cand

idat

e ca

n re

tain

par

ty

cont

ribut

ions

whi

ch in

the

aggr

egat

e ex

ceed

50%

of t

otal

co

ntrib

utio

ns o

r $10

,000

(w

hich

ever

is g

reat

er) i

n an

el

ectio

n cy

cle.

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Ag

greg

ate

Limits

: No

cand

idat

e ca

n re

tain

PAC

co

ntrib

utio

ns w

hich

in th

e ag

greg

ate

exce

ed 5

0% o

f tot

al

cont

ribut

ions

or $

10,0

00

(whi

chev

er is

gre

ater

) in

an

elec

tion

cycle

. 121

.150

(23)

(a)

Proh

ibite

dd

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Loui

siana

La

. R.S

. § 1

8:15

05.2

$5,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$2,5

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

Unlim

ited

Regu

lar P

ACs:

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

“Big

” PAC

s6 : Do

uble

the

amou

nt o

f in

divi

dual

lim

its

Cand

idat

es su

bjec

t to

follo

win

g ag

greg

ate

limits

on

all P

AC co

ntrib

utio

ns

acce

pted

for t

he p

rimar

y an

d ge

nera

l ele

ctio

ns co

mbi

ned:

$8

0,00

0/st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e $6

0,00

0/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Mai

neb,

e 21

-A M

.R.S

.A. §

1015

$1,5

75/g

uber

nato

rial

cand

idat

e

$375

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate7

Indi

vidu

al co

ntrib

utio

n lim

its

do n

ot a

pply

to co

ntrib

utio

ns

in su

ppor

t of a

cand

idat

e by

th

at ca

ndid

ate,

or t

hat

cand

idat

e’s s

pous

e or

do

mes

tic p

artn

er.

Indi

vidu

als l

imite

d to

$25

,000

ag

greg

ate

cont

ribut

ions

to a

ll ca

mpa

ign

finan

ce e

ntiti

es p

er

cale

ndar

yea

r. Th

is lim

itatio

n do

es n

ot a

pply

to

cont

ribut

ions

in su

ppor

t of a

ca

ndid

ate

by th

at ca

ndid

a te

or th

at ca

ndid

ate’

s spo

use

or

dom

estic

par

tner

.

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

6 In

Loui

siana

, a “B

ig P

AC” i

s a P

AC w

ith o

ver 2

50 m

embe

rs w

ho co

ntrib

uted

ove

r $50

to th

e PA

C du

ring

the

prec

edin

g ca

lend

ar y

ear a

nd h

as b

een

cert

ified

as m

eetin

g th

at m

embe

rshi

p re

quire

men

t. 7 I

n M

aine

, can

dida

tes w

ho a

re e

nrol

led

in a

pol

itica

l par

ty m

ay co

ntrib

utio

ns o

f up

to $

375

from

an

indi

vidu

al. I

ndiv

idua

l con

trib

utio

ns to

une

nrol

led

cand

idat

es a

re u

nlim

ited

for p

rimar

y el

ectio

ns.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Indi

vidu

al

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

St

ate

Part

y C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

PAC

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Co

rpor

ate

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Un

ion

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

M

aryl

and

Md.

Cod

e §

13-2

26 a

nd

13-2

27

Effe

ctiv

e Ja

n. 1

, 201

5 $6

,000

/can

dida

te

$24,

000

aggr

egat

e to

all

cand

idat

es

Amou

nts a

re p

er 4

-yea

r el

ectio

n cy

cle

Tran

sfer

lim

it:

$6,0

00/4

-yea

r ele

ctio

n cy

cle

In-K

ind

Cont

ribut

ions

: Lim

ited

to a

n am

ount

equ

al

to $

1 fo

r eve

ry tw

o re

gist

ered

vo

ters

in th

e st

ate,

rega

rdle

ss

of p

oliti

cal a

ffilia

tion,

to a

sin

gle

cand

idat

e. L

imit

is pe

r 4-

year

ele

ctio

n cy

cle.

$6,0

00/c

andi

date

/4-y

ear

elec

tion

cycle

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Mas

sach

uset

ts

G.L.

Ch.

55,

§ 6

, 6A,

7A

and

8

$100

0/ca

ndid

ate

$12,

500/

indi

vidu

al a

ggre

gate

lim

it on

cont

ribut

ions

to a

ll ca

ndid

ates

Re

gist

ered

lobb

yist

s may

onl

y co

ntrib

ute

up to

$2

00/c

andi

date

Am

ount

s are

per

cale

ndar

ye

ar.

$3,0

00/c

andi

date

/yea

r No

lim

it on

in-k

ind

cont

ribut

ions

Regu

lar P

AC o

r Peo

ple'

s Co

mm

ittee

:8

$500

/can

dida

te

Cand

idat

es ca

nnot

acc

ept

aggr

egat

e co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om

regu

lar P

ACs t

hat e

xcee

d th

e fo

llow

ing

amou

nts (

Peop

le’s

Com

mitt

ees a

re e

xem

pt fr

om

the

aggr

egat

e lim

its):

$150

,000

/gub

erna

toria

l ca

ndid

ate

$18,

750/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$7,5

00/H

ouse

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s per

cale

ndar

yea

r.

Proh

ibite

dd Sa

me

as P

AC li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

8 In

Mas

sach

uset

ts, a

"Peo

ple'

s Com

mitt

ee” i

s a P

AC th

at h

as b

een

in e

xiste

nce

for s

ix m

onth

s, ha

s rec

eive

d co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om in

divi

dual

s of $

156

(adj

uste

d bi

enni

ally

; thi

s am

ount

is fo

r 201

3-20

14) o

r les

s per

yea

r, an

d ha

s con

trib

uted

to fi

ve ca

ndid

ates

.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Mich

igan

M

.C.L

. § 1

69.2

46, 1

69.2

52

and

169.

254

$6,8

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$2,0

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/H

ouse

cand

idat

e Al

l am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle

$750

,000

/gov

erno

r or

lieut

enan

t gov

erno

r sla

te w

ith

publ

ic fu

ndin

g $1

36,0

00/g

over

nor o

r lie

uten

ant g

over

nor s

late

w

ithou

t pub

lic fu

ndin

g $1

36,0

00/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$20,

000/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$10,

000/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

Polit

ical C

omm

ittee

s:

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

. In

depe

nden

t PAC

s9 : $6

8,00

0/st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e $2

0,00

0/Se

nate

cand

idat

e $1

0,00

0/Ho

use

cand

idat

e Al

l am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle

Proh

ibite

dd

Proh

ibite

dd

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

9 In

Mich

igan

, an

“inde

pend

ent c

omm

ittee

” mus

t hav

e fil

ed a

stat

emen

t of o

rgan

izatio

n at

leas

t 6 m

onth

s bef

ore

the

elec

tion

in w

hich

the

com

mitt

ee w

ishes

to m

ake

cont

ribut

ions

; mus

t hav

e su

ppor

ted

or o

ppos

ed 3

or m

ore

cand

idat

es fo

r nom

inat

ion

or e

lect

ion;

and

mus

t hav

e re

ceiv

ed co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om a

t lea

st 2

5 pe

rson

s.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

Indi

vidu

al

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

St

ate

Part

y C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

PAC

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Co

rpor

ate

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Un

ion

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

M

inne

sota

M

inn.

Sta

t. §

10A.

27 a

nd

211B

.15

Elec

tion

segm

ent l

imits

:10

$4,0

00/g

over

nor –

lieu

tena

nt

gove

rnor

slat

e $2

,500

/AG

cand

idat

e $2

,000

/SO

S or

aud

itor

cand

idat

e $1

,000

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

Non-

elec

tion

segm

ent l

imits

: $2

,000

/gov

erno

r-lie

uten

ant

gove

rnor

slat

e $1

,500

/Att

orne

y Ge

nera

l ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/S

ecre

tary

of S

tate

or

Audi

tor c

andi

date

$1

,000

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e n/

a fo

r Hou

se ca

ndid

ates

Ca

ndid

ates

who

hav

e sig

ned

a pu

blic

subs

idy

agre

emen

t are

al

so su

bjec

t to

a lim

it (e

qual

to

five

tim

es th

e el

ectio

n se

gmen

t lim

its a

bove

) on

the

amou

nt o

f per

sona

l fun

ds

they

can

cont

ribut

e to

thei

r ow

n ca

mpa

ign.

Am

ount

s are

per

2-y

ear

elec

tion

segm

ent.

Part

y co

mm

ittee

s may

co

ntrib

ute

up to

10

times

the

limits

impo

sed

on in

divi

dual

s Ca

ndid

ates

are

subj

ect t

o th

e fo

llow

ing

aggr

egat

e lim

its o

n co

ntrib

utio

ns re

ceiv

ed in

the

2013

-14

elec

tion

cycle

from

pa

rty

com

mitt

ees a

nd

term

inat

ing

prin

cipa

l ca

mpa

ign

com

mitt

ees:

$4

0,00

0/go

vern

or-li

eute

nant

go

vern

or sl

ate

$25,

000/

Atto

rney

Gen

eral

ca

ndid

ate

$20,

000/

Secr

etar

y of

Sta

te o

r Au

dito

r can

dida

te

$10,

000/

legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Ag

greg

ate

cont

ribut

ions

from

po

litica

l com

mitt

ees o

r po

litica

l fun

ds, l

obby

ists,

and

indi

vidu

als w

ho co

ntrib

ute

or

loan

mor

e th

an ½

the

year

ly

cont

ribut

ion

limit

cann

ot

exce

ed th

e fo

llow

ing

amou

nts:

$7

00,0

00/g

over

nor-

lieut

enan

t gov

erno

r sla

te

$120

,000

/Att

orne

y Ge

nera

l ca

ndid

ate

$80,

000/

Secr

etar

y of

Sta

te o

r A u

dito

r can

dida

te

$6,0

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$12,

000/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

Proh

ibite

dd Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Miss

issip

pi

Miss

. Cod

e §

97-1

3-15

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

$1,0

00/c

andi

date

/yea

r Un

limite

d

Miss

ouri

Mo.

Rev

. Sta

t. §

130.

031

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

10

Min

neso

ta’s

SF 9

91 (2

013)

div

ided

ele

ctio

n cy

cles i

nto

two-

year

per

iods

, and

mad

e lim

its a

pplic

able

to a

two-

year

per

iod

rath

er th

an a

sing

le y

ear.

The

limit

is hi

gher

for t

he tw

o-ye

ar p

erio

d du

ring

whi

ch a

n el

ectio

n is

held

for t

he o

ffice

, and

low

er d

urin

g a

non-

elec

tion

two-

year

per

iod

for c

andi

date

s tha

t ser

ve a

four

- or s

ix-y

ear t

erm

.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

Indi

vidu

al

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

St

ate

Part

y C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

PAC

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Co

rpor

ate

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

Un

ion

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

M

onta

na e

, 11

M.C

.A. §

13-3

5-22

7 an

d §1

3-37

-216

$1,9

90/g

uber

nato

rial s

late

$9

90/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

nd.

$530

/sen

ate

cand

idat

e $3

30/h

ouse

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle

$23,

850/

gube

rnat

oria

l sla

te

$8,6

00/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

nd.

$1,4

00/s

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$850

/hou

se ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

$10,

610/

gube

rnat

oria

l sla

te

$2,6

50/o

ther

stat

ewid

e ca

nd.

$800

/sen

ate

cand

idat

e $4

00/h

ouse

cand

idat

e Ca

ndid

ates

lim

ited

to to

tal

cont

ribut

ions

from

all

PACs

: $2

,800

sena

te ca

ndid

ates

$1

,700

hou

se ca

ndid

ates

Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle

Proh

ibite

d Pr

ohib

ited

Nebr

aska

N.

R.S.

§ 32

-160

4 an

d 32

-16

08

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Neva

da

§ 29

4A.1

00 a

nd C

onst

. Ar

t. 2

§10

$5,0

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

New

Ham

pshi

re

R.S.

A. §

664

:4

To ca

ndid

ates

not

agr

eein

g to

ab

ide

by sp

endi

ng li

mits

: $1

,000

/ele

ctio

na To

cand

idat

es a

gree

ing

to

abid

e by

spen

ding

lim

its:

$5,0

00/e

lect

iona

To ca

ndid

ates

not

agr

eein

g to

ab

ide

by sp

endi

ng li

mits

: $1

,000

/ele

ctio

na

Unlim

ited

to ca

ndid

ates

who

ag

ree

to e

xpen

ditu

re li

mits

Sam

e as

par

ty li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its12

Pr

ohib

itedd

New

Jers

eye

N.J.S

.A. §

19:

44A-

11.3

$3,8

00/g

uber

nato

rial

cand

idat

e $2

,600

/legi

slativ

e ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

No li

mit

on co

ntrib

utio

ns b

y st

ate,

coun

ty, m

unici

pal a

nd

legi

slativ

e le

ader

ship

co

mm

ittee

s Na

tiona

l par

ty co

mm

ittee

: $8

,200

/ele

ctio

na

$8,2

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

11M

onta

na’s

cont

ribut

ion

limits

hav

e be

en th

e su

bjec

t of o

ngoi

ng li

tigat

ion

over

the

last

seve

ral y

ears

. See

the

Mon

tana

Com

miss

ione

r of P

oliti

cal P

ract

ices w

ebpa

ge fo

r lat

est i

nfor

mat

ion.

12 C

orpo

ratio

ns a

re n

o lo

nger

pro

hibi

ted

from

mak

ing

polit

ical c

ontr

ibut

ions

und

er N

ew H

amps

hire

law

des

pite

the

lang

uage

of N

H RS

A 66

4:4.

Tha

t ban

was

dec

lare

d un

cons

titut

iona

l by

a fe

dera

l di

stric

t cou

rt in

199

9. A

June

6, 2

000

lett

er fr

om D

eput

y At

torn

ey G

ener

al S

teve

n M

. Hou

ran

indi

cate

s tha

t the

lim

its o

n in

divi

dual

con

trib

utio

ns n

ow a

pply

to co

rpor

ate

cont

ribut

ions

as w

ell.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

New

Mex

icoe

N.M

.S.A

. § 1

-19-

34.7

$5,4

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$2

,500

/non

-sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

$5,4

00/e

lect

iona

Sam

e as

par

ty li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

New

Yor

ke El

ectio

n La

w, §

14-

114

and

14-1

16

Regu

lar L

imits

, Prim

ary:

$6

,500

-$19

,700

/sta

tew

ide13

$6

,500

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $4

,100

/Ass

embl

y ca

ndid

ate

Fam

ily Li

mits

, Prim

ary14

: $5

23-$

137,

978/

stat

ewid

e $2

0,00

0-$4

1,57

7/Se

nate

ca

ndid

ate

$12,

500-

$17,

061/

Asse

mbl

y Re

gula

r Lim

its, G

ener

al:

$41,

100/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$10,

300/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$4,1

00/A

ssem

bly

cand

idat

e Fa

mily

Lim

its, G

ener

al:

$278

,609

/sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $3

0,07

9-$5

7,30

4/Se

nate

ca

ndid

ate

$12,

500-

$24,

871/

Asse

mbl

y Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

n cy

cle.

Max

imum

cont

ribut

ions

by

an

indi

vidu

al li

mite

d to

$15

0,00

0 in

th

e ag

greg

ate

per c

alen

dar y

ear.

Proh

ibite

d in

prim

ary

elec

tion

Unlim

ited

in g

ener

al e

lect

ion

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its, w

ith

exce

ptio

ns (s

ee b

elow

) Co

rpor

atio

ns a

re li

mite

d to

$5

,000

per

yea

r in

aggr

egat

e co

ntrib

utio

ns to

NY

stat

e ca

ndid

ates

and

com

mitt

ees.

Ca

ndid

ates

may

acc

ept

corp

orat

e co

ntrib

utio

ns o

f up

to $

5,00

0 an

nual

ly d

urin

g ea

ch y

ear o

f an

elec

tion

cycle

, so

long

as t

he to

tal

cont

ribut

ions

from

the

corp

orat

ion

do n

ot e

xcee

d th

e el

ectio

n cy

cle’s

regu

lar

limits

on

indi

vidu

al

cont

ribut

ions

, and

the

corp

orat

ion

does

not

exc

eed

its a

ggre

gate

lim

it of

$5,

000/

ye

ar to

all

cand

idat

es a

nd

com

mitt

ees.

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

13 Li

mit

is ba

sed

on a

form

ula:

pro

duct

of n

umbe

r of e

nrol

led

vote

rs in

cand

idat

e’s p

arty

in st

ate

(exc

ludi

ng v

oter

s on

inac

tive

stat

us) x

$.0

05, b

ut n

ot le

ss th

an $

6,50

0 or

mor

e th

an $

19,7

00

14 S

epar

ate

limits

app

ly fo

r con

trib

utio

ns fr

om a

ll fa

mily

mem

bers

in th

e ag

greg

ate.

Lim

it is

base

d on

a fo

rmul

a: t

otal

# o

f enr

olle

d vo

ters

on

activ

e st

atus

in ca

ndid

ate’

s par

ty in

the

stat

e/di

stric

t x

$0.0

25.

“Fam

ily” i

s def

ined

as a

chi

ld, p

aren

t, gr

andp

aren

t, br

othe

r, sis

ter,

and

the

spou

ses o

f tho

se p

erso

ns. C

ontr

ibut

ions

from

the

cand

idat

e an

d th

e ca

ndid

ate’

s spo

use

are

not l

imite

d.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Nort

h Ca

rolin

ae N.

C.G.

S. §

163

-278

.13,

16

3-27

8.15

and

163

-27

8.19

$5,0

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na Un

limite

d Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Nort

h Da

kota

§

16.1

-08.

1

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Ohi

oe O

.R.C

. § 3

517.

102,

35

17.1

04 a

nd 3

599.

03

$12,

532.

52/c

andi

date

/ el

ectio

na

$706

,823

.95/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$140

,988

.82/

Sena

te

cand

idat

e $7

0,18

1.10

/Hou

se ca

ndid

ate

In-k

ind

cont

ribut

ions

un

limite

d Al

l am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Pr

ohib

itedd

Proh

ibite

dd

Okl

ahom

ae 21

OS

§ 18

7.1

et se

q. a

nd

Ethi

cs C

omm

issio

n Ru

les

§2.2

3, §

2.31

, §2.

33, §

2.37

,

$2,7

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

n $2

5,00

0/st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e

$10,

000/

othe

r sta

te e

lect

ive

offic

e Am

ount

s are

prio

r to

gene

ral

elec

tion

$5,0

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

n A

PAC

that

has

bee

n re

gist

ered

for l

ess t

han

a ye

ar

prio

r to

a pr

imar

y O

R ha

s fe

wer

than

25

cont

ribut

ors:

$2

,500

per

ele

ctio

n

Proh

ibite

dd

Proh

ibite

dd

Ore

gon

O.R

.S. §

260

.160

to 1

74

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Penn

sylv

ania

25

Pa.

Sta

t. §3

253

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Proh

ibite

dd

Proh

ibite

dd

Rhod

e Is

land

R.

I.G.L

. § 1

7-25

-10.

1

$1,0

00/c

andi

date

/ yea

r In

divi

dual

s lim

ited

to $

10,0

00

in a

ggre

gate

cont

ribut

ions

to

cand

idat

es, P

ACs a

nd p

arty

co

mm

ittee

s per

yea

r

$25,

000/

cand

idat

e/ye

ar

In-k

ind

cont

ribut

ions

un

limite

d

$1,0

00/c

andi

date

/ yea

r An

nual

agg

rega

te li

mit

of

$25,

000

to a

ll re

cipie

nts

Proh

ibite

d Pr

ohib

ited

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Sout

h Ca

rolin

a S.

C. C

ode

§ 8-

13-1

300(

10),

8 -13

-131

4 an

d 8-

13-1

316

$3,5

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na in

ea

ch p

rimar

y, ru

noff,

or

spec

ial e

lect

ion

in w

hich

a

cand

idat

e ha

s opp

ositi

on a

nd

for e

ach

gene

ral e

lect

ion;

if a

ca

ndid

ate

rem

ains

uno

ppos

ed

durin

g an

ele

ctio

n cy

cle, o

ne

cont

ribut

ion

limit

shal

l app

ly.

$50,

000/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$5,0

00/o

ther

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

subj

ect t

o th

e sa

me

exce

ptio

ns d

escr

ibed

at l

eft.

$11,

500/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$7,6

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sout

h Da

kota

S.

D.C.

L. §

12-

27-7

$4,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

cale

ndar

ye

ar

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Tenn

esse

ee

Tenn

. Cod

e §

2-10

-302

$3,8

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,5

00/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Bo

th a

mou

nts a

re p

er

elec

tiona

Cand

idat

es li

mite

d to

ag

greg

ate

amou

nt fr

om a

ll po

litica

l par

ty co

mm

ittee

s:

$374

,300

/sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $5

9,90

0/Se

nate

cand

idat

e $3

0,00

0/Ho

use

cand

idat

e Al

l am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na

$11,

200/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$ 11,

200/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$7,4

00/o

ther

cand

idat

es

No m

ore

than

50%

of a

st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e’s o

r $1

12,3

00 o

f a le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e’s t

otal

co

ntrib

utio

ns m

ay co

me

from

PA

Cs

All a

mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Sam

e as

PAC

lim

its

If a

corp

orat

ion

give

s mor

e th

an $

250

in th

e ag

greg

ate

to

cand

idat

es, i

t mus

t reg

ister

as

a P A

C an

d m

ake

all f

urth

er

cont

ribut

ions

thro

ugh

the

PAC.

It m

ay tr

ansf

er u

nlim

ited

amou

nts f

rom

its c

orpo

rate

tr

easu

ry to

the

PAC.

Sam

e as

PAC

lim

its

A un

ion

mus

t reg

ister

as a

PA

C be

fore

mak

ing

cont

ribut

ions

to ca

ndid

ates

.

Texa

s El

ectio

n Co

de, §

253

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

Utah

Ut

ah C

ode

§ 20

A-11

-101

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Verm

ontb

17 V

SA §

2805

$4,0

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,5

00/S

tate

Sen

ate

$1,0

00/S

tate

Hou

se

Unlim

ited

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Virg

inia

Va

. Cod

e §

24.2

-945

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Unlim

ited

Was

hing

tone

RCW

§ 4

2.17

.610

et s

eq.

WAC

§ 3

90-0

5-40

0

$1, 9

00/g

uber

nato

rial

cand

idat

e $9

50/le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e Am

ount

s are

per

ele

ctio

na Du

ring

the

21 d

ays b

efor

e th

e ge

nera

l ele

ctio

n, n

o co

ntrib

utor

may

don

ate

mor

e th

an $

50,0

00 in

the

aggr

egat

e to

a st

atew

ide

cand

idat

e or

$5

,000

in th

e ag

greg

ate

to

any

othe

r can

dida

te o

r a

polit

ical c

omm

ittee

, inc

ludi

ng

polit

ical p

arty

com

mitt

ees.

Th

is in

clude

s a ca

ndid

ate'

s pe

rson

al co

ntrib

utio

ns to

hi

s/he

r cam

paig

n. T

he st

ate

com

mitt

ees o

f pol

itica

l pa

rtie

s are

exe

mpt

ed fr

om

this

limit.

Aggr

egat

e co

ntrib

utio

ns fr

om

a st

ate

part

y ce

ntra

l co

mm

ittee

to a

stat

ewid

e or

le

gisla

tive

cand

idat

e m

ay n

ot

exce

ed $

.80

x num

ber o

f re

gist

ered

vot

ers i

n ca

ndid

ate’

s dist

rict.

Thi

s lim

it ap

plie

s to

the

entir

e el

ectio

n cy

cle.

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

A

PAC

that

has

not

rece

ived

co

ntrib

utio

ns o

f $10

or m

ore

from

10

or m

ore

WA

regi

ster

ed v

oter

s dur

ing

the

past

180

day

s is p

rohi

bite

d fro

m m

akin

g co

ntrib

utio

ns.

Proh

ibite

d fo

r cor

pora

tions

no

t doi

ng b

usin

ess i

n W

ashi

ngto

n st

ate.

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its fo

r W

ashi

ngto

n co

rpor

atio

ns.

Proh

ibite

d fo

r uni

ons t

hat

have

few

er th

an 1

0 m

embe

rs

who

resid

e in

Was

hing

ton.

Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its fo

r W

ashi

ngto

n un

ions

.

Wes

t Virg

inia

§

3-8-

8 to

12

$1,0

00/c

andi

date

/ele

ctio

na Sa

me

as in

divi

dual

lim

its

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Pr

ohib

itedd

Sam

e as

indi

vidu

al li

mits

Cont

inue

d on

nex

t pag

e

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

In

divi

dual

C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Stat

e Pa

rty

Can

dida

te

Cont

ribut

ions

PA

C C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Corp

orat

e C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Unio

n C

andi

date

Co

ntrib

utio

ns

Wisc

onsin

§ 11

.01

et se

q.

$10,

000/

stat

ewid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1,0

00/S

enat

e ca

ndid

ate

$500

/Ass

embl

y ca

ndid

ate

A mou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

An

indi

vidu

al m

ay n

ot

cont

ribut

e m

ore

than

$10

,000

in

a ca

lend

ar y

ear t

o an

y co

mbi

natio

n of

Wisc

onsin

ca

ndid

ates

or p

oliti

cal

com

mitt

ees.

Aggr

egat

e lim

it on

am

ount

ca

ndid

ates

may

acc

ept f

rom

al

l pol

itica

l par

ty co

mm

ittee

s, in

cludi

ng le

gisla

tive

cam

paig

n co

mm

ittee

s, in

an

elec

tion

cam

paig

n :

$700

,830

/gub

. can

dida

te

$22,

425/

Sena

te ca

ndid

ate

$11,

213/

Hous

e ca

ndid

ate

Addi

tiona

lly, t

he m

axim

um

amou

nt a

legi

slativ

e ca

mpa

ign

com

mitt

ee ca

n gi

ve w

ithou

t re

duci

ng co

mm

itte e

co

ntrib

utio

ns is

: $6

,900

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $3

,450

/Ass

embl

y ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

$43,

128/

gub.

cand

idat

e $1

,000

/Sen

ate

cand

idat

e $5

00/A

ssem

bly

cand

idat

e Ag

greg

ate

limit

on a

mou

nt

cand

idat

es m

ay a

ccep

t fro

m

PACs

and

cand

idat

e co

mm

ittee

s (gr

ants

from

the

Wisc

onsin

Ele

ctio

n Ca

mpa

ign

Fund

also

coun

t aga

inst

this

limit)

: $4

85,1

90/g

ub. c

andi

date

$1

5,52

5/Se

nate

cand

idat

e $7

,763

/Hou

se ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

ion

cycle

Proh

ibite

d Pr

ohib

ited

Wyo

min

g W

yo. S

tat.

§ 22

-25-

102

Effe

ctiv

e 20

13-2

014:

$1

,000

/can

dida

te/e

lect

iona

Effe

ctiv

e Ja

n. 1

, 201

5:

$2,5

00/s

tate

wid

e ca

ndid

ate

$1

,500

/oth

er ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

No in

divi

dual

may

mak

e m

ore

than

$25

,000

(inc

reas

es to

$5

0,00

0 ef

f. Ja

n. 1

, 201

5) in

to

tal c

ontr

ibut

ions

dur

ing

a tw

o-ye

ar e

lect

ion

cycle

.

Unlim

ited

Effe

ctiv

e 20

13-2

014:

Un

limite

d Ef

fect

ive

Jan.

1, 2

015:

$7

,500

/sta

tew

ide

cand

idat

e $3

,000

/oth

er ca

ndid

ate

Amou

nts a

re p

er e

lect

iona

Proh

ibite

dd Pr

ohib

itedd

(a)

Prim

ary

and

gene

ral a

re co

nsid

ered

sepa

rate

ele

ctio

ns; s

tate

d am

ount

may

be

cont

ribut

ed in

eac

h el

ectio

n.

(b)

Cand

idat

es p

artic

ipat

ing

in th

e pu

blic

finan

cing

may

not

acc

ept c

ontr

ibut

ions

afte

r qua

lifyi

ng fo

r pub

lic fu

nds.

Lim

its li

sted

are

for c

andi

date

s not

par

ticip

atin

g in

pub

lic fi

nanc

ing

prog

ram

. (d

) Di

rect

corp

orat

e an

d/or

uni

on co

ntrib

utio

ns a

re p

rohi

bite

d an

d/or

use

of t

reas

ury

fund

s and

/or d

ues i

s pro

hibi

ted.

In

thes

e st

ates

, the

law

spec

ifica

lly sa

ys th

at n

othi

ng p

reve

nts t

he

empl

oyee

s or o

ffice

rs o

f a co

rpor

atio

n fro

m m

akin

g po

litica

l con

trib

utio

ns th

roug

h a

PAC,

usin

g fu

nds f

rom

an

acco

unt t

hat i

s sep

arat

e an

d se

greg

ated

from

corp

orat

e ac

coun

ts.

Such

cont

ribut

ions

ar

e su

bjec

t to

the

sam

e lim

itatio

ns p

lace

d on

oth

er P

ACs.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


Sour

ce:

Natio

nal C

onfe

renc

e of

Sta

te Le

gisla

ture

s La

st u

pdat

ed O

ctob

er 2

015

Okl

ahom

a an

d M

onta

na u

pdat

ed M

ay 2

016

This

data

is p

rese

nted

for i

nfor

mat

ion

purp

oses

onl

y an

d sh

ould

not

be

cons

ider

ed le

gal a

dvice

.

(e)

Cont

ribut

ion

limits

are

adj

uste

d fo

r inf

latio

n at

the

begi

nnin

g of

eac

h ca

mpa

ign

cycle

.

cite

d in

Lai

r v. M

otl,

No.

16-

3542

4 ar

chiv

ed o

n O

ctob

er 1

8, 2

017


1 Post Judgment Form - Rev. 08/2013

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Office of the Clerk 95 Seventh Street

San Francisco, CA 94103

Information Regarding Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings

Judgment • This Court has filed and entered the attached judgment in your case.

Fed. R. App. P. 36. Please note the filed date on the attached decision because all of the dates described below run from that date, not from the date you receive this notice.

Mandate (Fed. R. App. P. 41; 9th Cir. R. 41-1 & -2)

• The mandate will issue 7 days after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for rehearing or 7 days from the denial of a petition for rehearing, unless the Court directs otherwise. To file a motion to stay the mandate, file it electronically via the appellate ECF system or, if you are a pro se litigant or an attorney with an exemption from using appellate ECF, file one original motion on paper.

Petition for Panel Rehearing (Fed. R. App. P. 40; 9th Cir. R. 40-1) Petition for Rehearing En Banc (Fed. R. App. P. 35; 9th Cir. R. 35-1 to -3)

(1) A. Purpose (Panel Rehearing):

• A party should seek panel rehearing only if one or more of the following grounds exist: ► A material point of fact or law was overlooked in the decision; ► A change in the law occurred after the case was submitted which

appears to have been overlooked by the panel; or ► An apparent conflict with another decision of the Court was not

addressed in the opinion. • Do not file a petition for panel rehearing merely to reargue the case.

B. Purpose (Rehearing En Banc) • A party should seek en banc rehearing only if one or more of the following

grounds exist:



► Consideration by the full Court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions; or

► The proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance; or ► The opinion directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another

court of appeals or the Supreme Court and substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an overriding need for national uniformity.

(2) Deadlines for Filing:

• A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).

• If the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party in a civil case, the time for filing a petition for rehearing is 45 days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(1).

• If the mandate has issued, the petition for rehearing should be accompanied by a motion to recall the mandate.

• See Advisory Note to 9th Cir. R. 40-1 (petitions must be received on the due date).

• An order to publish a previously unpublished memorandum disposition extends the time to file a petition for rehearing to 14 days after the date of the order of publication or, in all civil cases in which the United States or an agency or officer thereof is a party, 45 days after the date of the order of publication. 9th Cir. R. 40-2.

(3) Statement of Counsel

• A petition should contain an introduction stating that, in counsel’s judgment, one or more of the situations described in the “purpose” section above exist. The points to be raised must be stated clearly.

(4) Form & Number of Copies (9th Cir. R. 40-1; Fed. R. App. P. 32(c)(2))

• The petition shall not exceed 15 pages unless it complies with the alternative length limitations of 4,200 words or 390 lines of text.

• The petition must be accompanied by a copy of the panel’s decision being challenged.

• An answer, when ordered by the Court, shall comply with the same length limitations as the petition.

• If a pro se litigant elects to file a form brief pursuant to Circuit Rule 28-1, a petition for panel rehearing or for rehearing en banc need not comply with Fed. R. App. P. 32.



• The petition or answer must be accompanied by a Certificate of Compliance found at Form 11, available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms.

• You may file a petition electronically via the appellate ECF system. No paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise. If you are a pro se litigant or an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, file one original petition on paper. No additional paper copies are required unless the Court orders otherwise.

Bill of Costs (Fed. R. App. P. 39, 9th Cir. R. 39-1)

• The Bill of Costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment. • See Form 10 for additional information, available on our website at

www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms. Attorneys Fees

• Ninth Circuit Rule 39-1 describes the content and due dates for attorneys fees applications.

• All relevant forms are available on our website at www.ca9.uscourts.gov under Forms or by telephoning (415) 355-7806.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

• Please refer to the Rules of the United States Supreme Court at www.supremecourt.gov

Counsel Listing in Published Opinions

• Please check counsel listing on the attached decision. • If there are any errors in a published opinion, please send a letter in writing

within 10 days to: ► Thomson Reuters; 610 Opperman Drive; PO Box 64526; Eagan, MN 55123

(Attn: Jean Green, Senior Publications Coordinator); ► and electronically file a copy of the letter via the appellate ECF system by using

“File Correspondence to Court,” or if you are an attorney exempted from using the appellate ECF system, mail the Court one copy of the letter.


http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/




http://www.supremecourt.gov/

http://www.supremecourt.gov/

Form 10. Bill of Costs ................................................................................................................................(Rev. 12-1-09)

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

BILL OF COSTS

This form is available as a fillable version at: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/forms/Form%2010%20-%20Bill%20of%20Costs.pdf.

Note: If you wish to file a bill of costs, it MUST be submitted on this form and filed, with the clerk, with proof of service, within 14 days of the date of entry of judgment, and in accordance with 9th Circuit Rule 39-1. A late bill of costs must be accompanied by a motion showing good cause. Please refer to FRAP 39, 28 U.S.C. § 1920, and 9th Circuit Rule 39-1 when preparing your bill of costs.

v. 9th Cir. No.

The Clerk is requested to tax the following costs against:

Cost Taxable under FRAP 39,

28 U.S.C. § 1920, 9th Cir. R. 39-1

REQUESTED

(Each Column Must Be Completed)

ALLOWED

(To Be Completed by the Clerk)

No. of Docs.

Pages per Doc.

Cost per Page*

TOTAL COST

No. of Docs.

Pages per Doc.

Cost per Page*

TOTAL COST

Excerpt of Record

$ $

$

$

Opening Brief $

$

$

$

Answering Brief $

$

$

$

Reply Brief $

$

$

$

Other** $ $ $ $

TOTAL: $ TOTAL: $

* Costs per page: May not exceed .10 or actual cost, whichever is less. 9th Circuit Rule 39-1.

** Other: Any other requests must be accompanied by a statement explaining why the item(s) should be taxed pursuant to 9th Circuit Rule 39-1. Additional items without such supporting statements will not be considered.

Attorneys' fees cannot be requested on this form. Continue to next page


http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/uploads/forms/Form%2010%20-%20Bill%20of%20Costs.pdf

Form 10. Bill of Costs - Continued

I, , swear under penalty of perjury that the services for which costs are taxed were actually and necessarily performed, and that the requested costs were actually expended as listed.

Signature

("s/" plus attorney's name if submitted electronically)

Date

Name of Counsel:

Attorney for:

(To Be Completed by the Clerk)

Date Costs are taxed in the amount of $

Clerk of Court

By: , Deputy Clerk


united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit - montana … · 2018-03-02 · 2 lair v.motl...

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