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THE NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRSMONOGRAPHS

The National Defense University Press pub-lishes monographs on the formulation of nationalsecurity policy, the development of military strat-egy, the problems of national mobilization, themanagement of resources for national security, andthe plans for joint and combined operations. Writ-ten by experts in selected policy areas, the mono-graphs are intended to suggest policy alternatives,inform the thinking of national securitydecisionmakers, and stimulate debate anddiscussion throughout the national defensecommunity.

ANTI-NUCLEARATTITUDES INNEW ZEALANDAND AUSTRALIA

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Map 1. The World from New Zealand.


Dora Alves

1985

A National Security Affairs Monograph

National Defense University PressWashington, DC

%il

The National Defense University Press pub-lishes the results of research conducted by researchfellows, faculty, students, and associates of the Uni-F versity and its component institutions, the National

C) War College, the Industrial College of the ArmedForces, and the Armed Forces Staff College. Publi-cations include books, monographs, essays, stud-

0 ies, and reports.

C tParts of this book are protected by copyright14 and may not be reprinted or reproduced without8 *u permission of the copyright owner as specified onc the material.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendationsexpressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor and do not necessarily represent the viewsof the National Defense University, the Departmentof Defense, or any other Government agency.Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Editorial Experts Inc., Alexandria, Virginia,proofread this book under contract DAHC

32-86-A-0009.

NDU Press publications are sold by the US Govern-ment Printing Office. For ordering information, call(202) 783-3238 or write to: Superintendent of Docu-ments, US Government Printing Office, Washing-ton, DC 20402.

First printing, December 1985.vi

Contents

Forew o rd ............................... xi

. The Unravelling of ANZUS ..... 1

II. Mr. Lange As Prime Minister ....... 7The New Zealand Labour Party

Conference ..................... 10The Contretemps .................. 12The Latest Heylen Poll ............. 15

11. Changing Attitudes ................ 17The Trends in Labour Thinking ..... 19The W ellington Kitset .............. 29A Statement of Concern ............ 36The Interim Defence Review ........ 39

IV. Australian Attitudes ................ 41Debate in Parliament ............... 44The M X Tests ...................... 45Anti-Nuclear Adherents and Political

A ffiliatio ns ...................... 48

V. The Changed Alliance .............. 57

Endnotes .............................. 63

vii

Appendix

A. The ANZUS Treaty ................. 67

B. Heylen Polls on Nuclear and DefenseIssu e s .......................... 73

C. The Government of New Zealand'sPosition on Ship Visits ........... 79

D. US Congressional Hearing, March1 9 8 5 ............................ 8 3

E. The Australian Labor Party's Platformon Disarmament ................. 87

viii

Map

1. The World fromNew Zealand ............ Frontispiece

2. Australia, New Zealand, and South-east Asia ....................... 42

3. The Pacific Region ................. 58

Figure

1. 1976 New Zealand Labour PartyPam phlet ....................... 23

2. "Greek Progressive Youth ofAustralia" Poster ....... ......... 51

3. "Disarmament Rally" Notice ........ 53

ix

Foreword

The vast South Pacific, so near to SoutheastAsia and vital sea lines of communications, is ofgreat strategic value to the United States and theWest. Peace in the South Pacific has depended onregional cooperation, primarily under ANZUS-thealliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the UnitedStates. But New Zealand broke alliance ranks whenit refused in early 1985 to allow a US ship to call atits ports following an ANZUS sea exercise. Coupledwith the stern US response of suspending militarycooperation with New Zealand, the incident threwinto doubt the future of the South Pacific accord.

This monograph, by Dr. Dora Alves of the Na-tional Defense University, examines the regionalevents leading to New Zealand's action and the re-sulting furor. Because the center of the incident isthe issue of nuclear arms, Dr. Alves focuses on thegrowth of anti-nuclear attitudes in New Zealand,where the ruling Labour Party adopted an anti-nuclear stance as policy. Dr. Alves' work is both acase study of the interaction of domestic politicswith international treaty obligations and a discus-sion of the strong anti-nuclear attitudes of manySouth Pacific inhabitants.

xi

Once alliances are broken, the author remarks,they are usually difficult to restore to their originalcondition. However, each of the ANZUS membershas expressed hope of New Zealand's returning tofull partnership in the alliance. A healthy regionalalliance remains a key to continued security in theSouth Pacific. Dr. Alves' monograph is valuablebackground reading for those who would betterunderstand the events, attitudes, and positions thatthreaten one of our oldest and most successful se-curity treaties.

Richard D. LawrenceLieutenant General, US ArmyPresident, National Defense

University

xii

Acknowledgment

I would like to express my gratitude to themany people in each of the ANZUS countries whomade the writing of this monograph possible.

DORA Avis

xiii


xv

I

The Unravellingof ANZUS

I n the early spring of 1985, much of the world's at-tention was focused on Europe, where disarma-

ment talks were about to begin and MikhailSergeevich Gorbachev became the new leader ofthe Soviet Union. Thousands of miles away in theSouthern Hemisphere, however, another eventoccurred which attracted less attention but whichmay also have a major impact. New Zealand's PrimeMinister Mr. David Lange and his Labour Govern-ment refused access to the USS Buchanan, effec-tively ending trilateral cooperation within the al-most thirty-four-year-old alliance of Australia, NewZealand, and the United States (ANZUS). TheANZUS Council meeting, scheduled for July inCanberra, was in consequence cancelled, as well asa number of planned allied exerc ise andexchanges.

The sticking point between the United State,and New Zealand occurred when New Zealanddenied a request for the USS Buhanan to make a

I1

The Unravelling of ANZUS

port visit after the Sea Eagle exercises scheduled forAustralian waters in late March. Behind the denialwas the real and politically potent issue of nucleararms. Though the Buchanan is conventionally pow-ered, the New Zealand Labour Party caucus stilltook issue. While it is easy to determine whether aship is nuclear-capable, it is difficult to determinewhether a ship is actually carrying nuclear weaponsat a specific time to the satisfaction of peacegroups. Since Mr. Lange maintains that NewZealanders do not want nuclear weapons on theirsoil or in their harbors, his government will provideport access only to vessels conventionally armed.Yet as a matter of principle, the United States, likeother nuclear powers, neither confirms nor deniesthe presence or absence of nuclear weaponsaboard its ships or aircrafts. Neither side compro-mised, and the resulting confrontation made head-lines throughout the West.

Australia had been aware of the potential forconfrontation when Australian Prime Minister Rob-ert Hawke wrote to Mr. Lange on 10 January that"Australia, as as sovereign nation which must pro-tect its fundamental security interests, has its ownwell-known and clearly expressed position on visitsby US ships."' He reminded Mr. Lange that theANZUS alliance could not have various levels ofcommitment to suit the political needs of the day.The United States also reminded Mr. Lange that theANZUS alliance specifically binds parties under Ar-ticle 2 of the treaty, "to develop their individual andcollective capacity to resist armed attack"-some-thing that the New Zealand Labour Party's platformmakes difficult. (See the treaty at Appendix A.)

2


Though the Western world has been surprisedby the depth and strength of the anti-nuclear feel-ing in New Zealand, 65 percent of the populationlive in self-declared "nuclear-free zones." ManyNew Zealanders see the banning of nuclear weap-ons and delivery systems as the key to avertingnuclear catastrophe. However, a poll taken in mid-February 1985 showed 78 percent of the populationstill in favor of ANZUS.

Since his election in 1984, Mr. Lange had saidrepeatedly that he wished New Zealand to continueas a partner in the alliance, and that his govern-ment's posture was not anti-American. As the crackin the solidarity of the South Pacific developed, Mr.Lange insisted that New Zealand was a "loyal ally, atrue friend," saying that New Zealanders, of all peo-ple, had no desire to see the Soviet Union med-dling in their region.2 After such protestations hisgovernment's decision caused surprise. Access to acombatant vessel of the United States was deniedafter the US government had stated that denial ofport access would be a matter of grave concerntouching the core of the mutual obligations ofallies.

On 6 February 1985, Secretary of State GeorgeP. Shultz, publicly commenting on New Zealand'sgrowing recalcitrancy, said, "We have great affec-tion for the people of New Zealand but also remindthem that those who value freedom have to be will-ing and prepared to defend it." Following sevenmonths' discussion with Mr. Lange's government,the United States will now review its cooperationunder ANZUS on a case-by-case basis; the door has

3


not been closed on New Zealand. All measurestaken are reversible. The US government wants tokeep talking to New Zealand, still considered afriend. The steps taken-such as the reduction inthe flow of intelligence and the cancellation of jointexercises-are limited to security and militaryfieldt.

Nor does the Reagan administration seek toinvoke trade sanctions. However, the executivebranch does not control Congress or individualtrading companies. New Zealand's withdrawal ofcooperation may have an adverse effect on itslargely agricultural economy. At a time when USfarmers are in a particularly difficult situation,imports-dairy products, lamb and beef, wool,fruit, and vegetables-are likely to be reduced froma country many now see as an unreliable ally.

Whatever steps the United States takes, someNew Zealand politicians will claim that they are be-ing "bullied" by a big power. Whatever attitude theUnited States and Australia take in the future to-wards their treaty partner, recent events are likelyto stiffen the New Zealand posture. Such is its na-tional character. On 25 January 1985 Deputy PrimeMinister Geoffrey Palmer said,

New Zealand is not a big country, does notcarry a big stick ... our stand is one of princi-ple, going to be resolutely maintained.... Wewill not bend to their [the ANZUS partners']wishes when our policies are so clearly estab-lished and so resolutely held.

4

The Unravelling of ANZU}S

To understand the rapid unravelling of a closerelationship that had stood the test of time and ofan alliance that had been a factor in keeping theSouth Pacific free of hostile presence, the eventssince Mr. Lange's overwhelming electoral victory inJuly 1984 must be reviewed and the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in New Zealand considered. Be-cause Australia is so important to ANZUS, thisreview will also weigh that country's close relationswith New Zealand, Australian attitudes, and thestrength of anti-nuclear feeling there.

[5

Mr. LangeAs Prime Minister

O n 14 July 1984 the New Zealand Labour Party(NZLP) gained a victory over Sir Robert

Muldoon's National Party.* Sir Robert had called asnap election, declaring that he no longer had amajority, after a National Member of Parliament,Marilyn Waring, announced her intention to voteagainst the government on a nuclear question. Al-though nuclear issues were a campaign topic withpeace groups, some elements of the Labour party,

*The NZLP won a 17-seat majority with 91.9 percent

of those on the rolls voting-the highest turnout since1957. New Zealand's "first past-the-post" voting systemproduced the following results for the four main parties.

Party Seats % of vote % increase/decrease

Labour 56 42.6 + 3.6National 37 35.9 - 2.9New Zealand 0 12.3 + 12.3Social Credit 2 7.7 - 8.4

7

rI

Mr. Lange As Primi, Minister

and the National Federation of Labour, the averageNew Zealander's desire for a change, and Sir Rob-ert's at times abrasive manner also influenced theelection result. The two smaller parties, SocialCredit, which advocated armed neutrality, and theNew Zealand party, which urged the virtual aboli-tion of the armed services, took an anti-nuclearstance. In all, 64 percent of the voters chose partieswith anti-nuclear policies.

As a practical consequence of the election, at

43 Mr. David Lange is New Zealand's youngestprime minister. A lawyer and a Methodist laypreacher, he is reported to be a pleasant and easy

man to work with. Although renowned in NewZealand for his parliamentary skills, he wentunrecognized for them elsewhere until he decid-edly outclassed the Reverend Jerry Falwell in a de-bate at the Oxford Union in February 1985. On thatoccasion Mr. Lange defended the statement thatthe nuclear policies of the Western powers wereimmoral. In May 1982 Mr. Lange, then deputyleader of the Labour party, had said that the ANZUSalliance was designed for the conditions of the1950s and could not be regarded then, or later, as ablank check for nuclear involvement.

Since he became prime minister, Mr. Lange hasactively sought an international audience. He hasstressed that anti-nuclear feeling in New Zealand is"mainstream"; that New Zealand does not have thestrategic value of Australia because it is withoutminerals or ioint facilities with the United States;that neither he nor his government is anti-American. Mr. Lange has linked the anti-nuclear

8

Mr. Lange As Prime Minister

ship position with the proposal for a Pacificnuclear-free zone and condemnation of French nu-clear testing, both popular positions in the SouthPacific.

Yet in the opinion of Secretary of State Shultz,speaking immediately after the ANZUS Councilmeeting of 16-17 July 1984 and after the NewZealand elections, there was nothing torenegotiate; if US ships could not go to NewZealand, ANZUS was virtually meaningless. Mr.Lange at first thought the differences might be re-solved, though he maintained firmly that NewZealand would not see the visit of nuclear ships be-fore the next election-or the end of ANZUS.

The following August, a Heylen Poll (AppendixB) showed New Zealand against nuclear weapons inthe South Pacific and uneasy about ANZUS; 69 per-cent wanted the government to renegotiate thetreaty. On 28 August, at the South Pacific Forum inTuvalu, Australia's proposal for a nuclear-freezone-described by Mr. Hawke as the primary ob-jective of his government-was unanimously en-dorsed. (The treaty has since been signed 6 August1985 at a Forum meeting at Rarotonga.) The conceptis based on the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco which al-lows passage through air and sea space in accord-ance with international navigation treaties. Each Pa-cific nation would decide unilaterally whether toaccept nuclear ships for port visits or in its territo-rial waters. More work is being done on the pro-posal. The South Pacific Forum also unanimouslycondemned continuing French nuclear testing atMururoa and Fangataufa, about 800 miles from

9


Tahiti. At the Forum, Prime Minister MichaelSomare of Papua New Guinea, who had congratu-lated Mr. Lange on his initiative at the Common-wealth Heads of Government meeting in PortMoresby, urged Pacific nations debating nuclearship policy to consider the area's reliance on theUnited States for security.

In September 1984 Mr. Lange thought it au-gured well that the United States' position hadsome flexibility. Sir Wallace Rowling, who precededMr. Lange as leader of the NZLP and is now the Am-bassador to the United States, said that ANZUS wasno longer relevant in its present form and thatreplacing it "would mean starting from scratch."

THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR PARTYCONFERENCE

It was against this background that the NZLPConference took place 9 September 1984. A largemajority called for New Zealand to withdraw fromANZUS and urged that the defense budget be cutfrom 2 to 1.5 percent of the gross national product.The secret debates on defense motions producedthe resolution that New Zealand forces be with-drawn from military exercises with nuclear powers;that New Zealand forces be withdrawn from over-seas deployment outside the Pacific, except thoseunder United Nations' sponsorship; that the battal-ion in Singapore be withdrawn within a year; thatthe US Air Force use of Harewood Air Base (thestaging point for scientific expeditions to Antarcticaregularly replenished by US military cargo aircraft)should be terminated; that military operations and

10


intelligence with Indonesia and the Philippines bediscontinued; and that the Rapid DeploymentForce, proposed by the National government, bedisbanded. A call to withdraw New Zealand defenseattaches from the Association of Southeast Asia Na-tions (ASEAN) was defeated.

Defence Minister Frank O'Flynn feared thatother countries might misinterpret the conference'sresolutions while Mr. Lange cautioned against a"witch hunt" concerning fears of covert CIA action.Shadow Foreign Minister Warren Cooper castigatedthe "harebrained naivete of conference delegates,"suggesting that the Labour government was hell-bent on taking the country into the insecurity of thenon-aligned Third World. The Social Credit leader,Bruce Beetham, commented on the degree of influ-ence wielded by the anti-American extreme left ofthe Labour party.

Talks between the United States and NewZealand continued through the fall of 1984. TheUnited States administration did not wish to seemto put pressure on Mr. Lange, who had drawnstrong criticism from the left wing of his party whenhe spoke of reaching an accommodation. The USadministration made sure that New Zealand scien-tists were briefed on nuclear matters, and the roleof ANZUS in an interlocking system of Western co-operation was clarified. Close cooperation amongAustralian, New Zealand, and US defense person-nel continued as before.

Early in December Mr. Lange, expecting a blan-ket request followed by specific ship requests from

11


the US government, asserted that nuclear-poweredships were "not going to come" and that NewZealand was reassessing its stand on nuclear weap-ons. Mr. Lange thought that the United States,fearing a rebuff, would not request access for nu-clear ships. In mid-December Frank O'Flynn spokeof the government as actively considering ways toavoid "total stalemate."

THE CONTRETEMPS

On 17 January 1985, the US government askedfor the conventionally powered destroyer USSBuchanan to visit New Zealand, and, after some de-bate, the New Zealand government said that it wasunable to reach a decision. (See Appendix C for aclear statement of the New Zealand governmentposition.) The US government then asked for a "de-finitive response" by 11 February. On 4 February,after a meeting with the full parliamentary caucusof his party, Prime Minister Lange announced aturndown of the Buchanan. There were reports thathe asked for another ship-one that would not giverise to assertions that the integrity of the NewZealand posture had been compromised. ANZUSbegan to unravel.

Although Mr. Lange said that his country in-tended to remain committed to ANZUS, Secretaryof Defense Caspar W. Weinberger characterizedthe New Zealand stand as a serious attack on the al-liance and spoke of the New Zealand governmentas "following a course that can only be of greatharm to themselves." Mr. Hawke told reporters on10 February that Australia was not interested in a

12


new treaty with the United States, saying, "Thetreaty will remain there ready for resumption of fulloperations between the three of us, if and whenthe government of New Zealand were to change itsposition."' A commentator in Wellington pointedout that Mr. Lange had little room to maneuver indealing with a Caucus many of whose members hadbeen elected on one issue-nuclear ships.

Through its response the US governmenthoped to signal anti-nuclear and other movementsseeking to diminish defense cooperation amongWestern allies that such a course would not becost-free in terms of security relations with theUnited States. Predictably, for many NewZealanders the issue had now become a matter ofnational pride.

After meeting with Deputy Assistant Secretaryof State William A. Brown in Los Angeles, Mr.Lange said that by cancelling exercises and cur-tailing intelligence, the United States was deliber-ately severing long-standing ties with his Labourgovernment and hoping that a new governmentwould reverse his policy.

In Wellington on 5 March 1985 Deputy PrimeMinister Geoffrey Palmer insisted that the basic ob-ligation of Article 4 of the treaty remained and thatno one had yet withdrawn from the treaty. In fact,the ANZUS alliance has not been formally abro-gated but is in an inactive status. Asked whether itwere fair to say that, with ANZUS now under threat,New Zealand might need to review radically itswhole foreign policy as well, Mr. Palmer replied,

13

Mr. Lninge As Prime Minister

"No," but asserted that the government would bannuclear weapons in New Zealand and that no pres-sure would cause the government to retreat fromits stance.4

When Sir Wallace Rowling presented his cre-dentials to President Reagan in the first week ofMarch, the President told him, "it is our deepesthope that New Zealand will restore the traditionalcooperation that has existed between our twocountries." US officials were apparently not inter-ested in the suggestion that New Zealand could in-crease its activities in the Pacific to compensate torthe denial of ship visits. Through the ambassador,New Zealand reminded the United States that therecould be a series of counter-productive effects. SirWallace added, "it you want to stir up a nationalis-tic fervor in a country, you couldn't do a betterjob. "

Meanwhile, the United States and Australia re-affirmed their conclusion, reac hed at the ANZUS1984 Council meeting, that port and airfield accessare essential to the continuing effectiveness of thealliance. The two countries agreed that, unless NewZealand changed its position on port access, theproposed Canberra meeting would not be produc-tive. They also con(luded that the banning (i USvessels from New Zealand ports was not (onsistentwith strengthening ANZUS or enhancing regionalstability. Hearings convened in the US House ofRepresentatives in mid-Mar h reaffirmed the bene-fits of ANZUS but called for New Zealand to ( hangeits policy (Appendix )).

14

Mr. Ling'(e As I merf( Minister

THE LATEST HEYLEN POLL

The Heylen Poll on Nuclear and Defense Issuesconducted on 23 March 1985 (Appendix B) was thefirst one taken after the extent of the US reaction tothe nuclear ban was known. Fifty-two percent ofthe population approved of the ban on nuclear-powered vessels in New Zealand ports. Approval ofthe ban on nuclear weapons rose from 73 to 77 per-cent. When asked to choose between breaking de-fense ties with the United States-the first time thisquestion had been put-or allowing ships thatmight be nuclear-armed into New Zealand ports, 45percent were for breaking the defense ties, 45 per-cent for allowing the ships in, with 10 percent un-decided. In addition, 53 percent did not think NewZealand had been treated unfairly by US officialsfollowing the ban; 53 percent felt that New Zealandhad not neglected its share of responsibilities un-der ANZUS, while 69 percent believed that if NewZealand were attacked tomorrow the United Stateswould still come to New Zealand's aid. Thirty per-cent believed that the US defense ties increased therisk of an attack on New Zealand, while 62 percentdisagreed with that position.

15

ill

Changing Attitudes

n February of 1985 Ameri(ans were surprised tolearn the extent of the support hor pea(e move-

ments and anti-nu(lear movement, in NewZealand. However, more than five years ago a Sen-ior Leturer at the Victoria University, Wellington,had suggested that attitudes in New Zealand were(hanging. In dealing with "An Alternative View ofANZUS," Stephen Levine said that ANZUS might beregarded as the kind of defensive and parochialpower bloc whir h the movement toward a morepeaceful world had to seek to overcone. -

Americans remember New Zealanders as val-iant fighters in two world wars and in Korea andVietnam. They like to think of the laconic Kiwi, ofthe type who placed a ramshackle sign "NONE" be-fore a small New Zealand unit on a hill in Koreawhen farther down the hill a very spit-and-polishUS Infantry tented (amp had proclaimed itself "Sec-ond to None." Americans find it difficult to under-stand New Zealand's present preo(cupation withthings anti-nulear. Moreover, when the evidenceof worldwide So)viet attempts to perietrate peace

17

Changing Attitudes

movements is so strong, it is also difficult, from theUS point of view, to disregard the possibility thatNew Zealand's good intentions might bemanipulated.

It is a matter of record that the Soviet ambassa-dor to New Zealand was expelled in 1980 for per-sonally passing money to the Socialist Unity Party(SUP), a group which aims to build socialism onrevolutionary lines and to undo ANZUS. This partyhas strong support among seamen and the dockers'unions; SUP members are in leading positions inthe Federation of Labour umbrella union confeder-ation. Then, too, unilateralist and pro-Soviet tend-encies in the unions have increased since SirThomas Skinner's retirement from the Federationof Labour in 1980. His place was taken by Jim Knoxwho, with the Australian John Halfpenny, holds aprominent position in the Pacific Trade Union Fo-rum. This group was inspired by the World Federa-tion of Trade Unions conference at Prague in 1978with the idea of influencing nascent Pacific tradeunions. Tony Neary, who has fought against com-munism in New Zealand trade unions for somethirty years, has been quoted as saying that thecommunist influence in the unions has never beengreater." Mr. Lange summoned the Soviet ambassa-dor to New Zealand and told him in the strongestterms that the New Zealand government was grav-ely offended by attempts by communist states topaint New Zealand's action as supportive of non-democratic interests.

18

Changing Attitudes

THE TRENDS IN LABOUR THINKING

It is difficult to separate the anti-nuclear cur-rent from a more general pacifist sentiment in theNZLP, which takes pride in being the party of"peace, equality, and justice." Looking back as faras 1969, the emphasis in discussion of external af-fairs within the Labour party (then out of office) wasfocused on aid and the reduction of poverty withinthe region. The party considered economic, social,and military cooperation, but rejected the idea thatNew Zealand should take part in military conflictsoverseas. Labour would not accept the Omegalong-range navigation system unless it were underthe unconditional control of the New Zealandgovernment.

In tracing these trends and the growth of anti-nuclear sentiment, reference is to discussions be-tween members of the NZLP, mostly from nationalconferences, and not to formally accepted partypolicy. The salient points are summarized from La-bour party conferences since 1969. By 1970 the La-bour party itself wanted a more clearly defineddefense policy and began to envisage New Zealandas an independent, though cooperative, nation.While rejecting armed neutrality, Labour politicianswanted the opportunity for New Zealand to evalu-ate each situation critically so that any action takenwould reflect the country's own national interests.Some supported the periodic review of troops sta-tioned in Malaysia and Singapore (a useful link,through the Five Power Defense Agreements, withASEAN).

19

Changing Attitudes

Gradually through the 1970s, Labour party poli-cies began to emphasize aid for developing coun-tries and to suggest that New Zealand, as a countrylocated outside the main power blocs, should useits influence morally and economically in world af-fairs. Other ideas emerged as well. New treatiesshould be non-military pacts of friendship, andNew Zealand should disband or withdraw from mil-itary alliances. The NZLP would allow the defenseforces to serve overseas only as part of a UNpeacekeeping force or where clearly obligated un-der the terms of a treaty. Opposition to the Omeganavigation system increased among party members,along with the desire for a "qualified alignment"with ANZUS. One argument focused on reducingthe armed forces (to be composed entirely of ca-reer personnel), suggesting that such forces shouldperform more civil defense tasks.

Particularly influential in reshaping NewZealand politically were the actions taken by theThird Labour Government, headed by Norman Kirkfrom 1972 until his untimely death in 1974. His lead-ership had a strong and lasting effect on the NZLP.New Zealanders are proud of his steps to protestfurther French nuclear testing and of NewZealand's endeavors to protect the small island na-tions. At the UN, New Zealand proposed a nuclearweapons-free zone in the Pacific, condemned thetests, and demanded their cessation. New Zealandeventually took the case to the International Courtof Justice. In December 1975 the General Assemblypassed Resolution 3477, seeking to establish the Pa-cific weapons-free zone. New Zealand asked thenuclear powers and the Secretary General to sup-

20

Changing Attitudes

port these initiatives. The New Zealand frigate sent,with Australian support, into the testing area in1973 captured the attention of the world andhelped to drive the testing underground. To cir-cumvent the nuclear powers extending their mili-tary control of the oceans, New Zealand stronglysupported the Seabed Arms Control Treaty.

In 1973 the members of the Labour party con-ference declared their abhorrence of war but didnot act upon suggestions to curtail the US Air Forceand Navy use of Harewood and to create a NewZealand Peace Force. Efforts were made to organizeall the Pacific nations to support the establishmentof a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region. Still,by 1975, when Mr. Rowling had succeeded Mr. Kirkas Prime Minister and Leader of the ParliamentdryLabour Party, though anxious to strengthen the Nu-clear Non-proliferation Treaty, the party did notsupport the idea that New Zealand should declareitself neutral. The Manifesto stated, "The defensivealliance formed with Australia and the United Statesof America through the ANZUS Treaty will bemaintained.",7 At the same time, the NZLP wasagainst establishing any more foreign military unitsin New Zealand and wanted the existing ones re-moved. Labour party members stressed independ-ence in foreign affairs and, for the first time,pushed through at the annual conference a motionthat no foreign warships or aircraft that normallycarried, or could be carrying, nuclear weaponswould be permitted to visit New Zealand, or use itsfacilities. A proposed zone of peace in the Indianand Pacific Oceans received strong support, andthe party was eager to hasten the Pacific nuclear

21

Changing Attitudes

weapons-free zone. The NZLP members urged thestrengthening of the Antarctic Treaty to prevent thecontinent's nuclear contamination, and they deter-mined that no ship containing nuclear waste shoulddock in New Zealand en route to the Antarctic.

The Labour party lost office at the 1975 generalelections. By 1976 opposition to all nuclear-powered ships and nuclear power stations hadhardened, and members of the NZLP were begin-ning to consider how the exclusion of nuclear-powered ships would affect membership inANZUS. The NZLP decided that under a Labourgovernment foreign military establishments wouldnot be allowed in New Zealand except for agreedpeaceful research projects. As the seventies woreon, the abolition and destruction of all atomic, bio-logical, and chemical weapons was discussed. Theidea of a Portfolio of Peace and the establishmentof a Chair of Peace Studies in a New Zealand uni-versity were considered. In 1976 the NZLP pro-duced a pamphlet Labour Wants a Nuclear-FreeNew Zealand, from which Figure 1 is taken, whichillustrates the tone and content of Labour thinkingat that time. The print run of 120,000 was the largestthe NZLP had produced up to that time.

As the Labour Party Policy Council debated theadoption of a non-aligned foreign policy and thepossibility of withdrawing from alliances with statespossessing nuclear weapons, some members pro-posed that the United States should be informed ofthe development of NZLP thinking and NewZealand support for a nuclear-free zone in theSouth Pacific.' A South Pacific regional conference

22

Changing Attitude's

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Changing Attitud s

to declare a nuclear-free zone was proposed, to beheld under UN auspices. The NZLP hoped to pro-mote a more independent New Zealand withgreater contacts with the Third World.

Since his government has come to power, Mr.Lange has said more than once that New Zealandrejects the idea of being defended by an ally usingnuclear weapons. Significantly, in 1978 before theUN General Assembly held a special session on dis-armament, the New Zealand National governmentestablished a National Committee on Disarmamentmade up of a cross-section of non-governmentalorganizations. The Committee demanded that thegovernment should declare that it would not coun-tenance another nation using nuclear weapons indefense of New Zealand.

Clearly, Labour's commitment to peace, neu-trality, and disarmament was growing in 1978. How-ever, the detailed manifesto also committed Labourto maintain armed forces capable of fulfilling NewZealand's obligations as a treaty partner. Then camean Auckland Standing Committee on Disarmamentand endorsement of the New Stockholm Peace Ap-peal. The Policy Council considered the suggestionthat the Antarctic nuclear ban should be extendedby 10 degrees annually until the whole southernhemisphere were nuclear-free. Support facilities orservices for Trident and Poseidon submarine weap-ons systems became a topic of discussion. But in1978 the NZLP lost the election, and in 1979 therewere no proposals on international affairs or de-fense at the party conference.

24

Changing Attitudce

In 1980 members of the Labour party expressedthe feeling that steps taken by Norman Kirk awayfrom dominion status were being obscured; theywanted New Zealand to create its own independentrelationships with other nations and to control itsown destiny. The division of the world into powerblocs was thought to create tensions over political,economic, and military barriers, causing conflictand violence. Though accepting that it identifiedwith the Western bloc, the NZLP decided that thenext Labour government would not follow a courseset by others. Instead, it would stake out its own in-dependent course, based on its own assessments,while striving for friendly relations with all nations.In supporting SALT, the party pressed for discus-sions on the decrease in arms production, sales,and stockpiles. The party was now focusing onarms control as well as environmental hazards.

Earlier proposals for the support of peace wereunderscored by the party members. Since defenseties outside the UN were to be shunned, partymembers considered the point that a non-alignedforeign policy might entail withdrawing fromANZUS. While friendly relations with the UnitedKingdom, the United States, and Australia werethought desirable, party members did not wishthese to preclude New Zealand's independent rolein world affairs, especially in the South Pacific andSoutheast Asia. It was suggested that the portfolioof defense should include the promotion of peaceand disarmament and that New Zealand should be-come involved in actively promoting an arms-treeworld.

By 1982 a desire to declare all New Zealand ter-ritory, including the Exclusive Economic Zone,

25

Changing Attitudes

nuclear-free came to the fore. In addition to theprotests over French testing, the NZLP protested Ja-pan's dumping of nuclear waste in the Pacific andurged that all such waste should be stored aboveground and inspected. The pacifist trend in someLabour thinking was apparent in the comments oftwo party members in the National Business Reviewin early 1982. The superpowers, they said, werelocked in a deadly struggle and remaining in a mili-tary alliance with one of them impeded NewZealand's flexibility to maneuver. To them, devisingtactics to disengage from a security arrangementthat had outlived its usefulness presented an excit-ing challenge.

As fears of a nuclear confrontation swelled, thePeace and justice Forum, Wellington Labour Re-gional Council, produced a discussion paper onANZUS, which will be summarized in the next sec-tion. Forum members wished to take a lead ineducating the public and stimulating opinion onthe dangers of nuclear armament. The NZLP de-cided to support the unilateral withdrawal of NewZealand from all alliances with nuclear powers in anattempt to reverse the arms race. Reliance wouldbe placed on the UN's powers of arbitration and onregional pacts of non-aggression and peace. At thetime of the Falklands crisis, the Labour party op-posed the National party's policy that, it felt, mightlead to possible involvement in war, and it also op-posed the idea of offering Britain direct or indirectassistance-although the party did agree to contrib-ute to a UN peacekeeping force.

In 1983 it was stressed that Labour's task was toproduce an independent foreign policy that wasclearly formulated in Wellington-" not Washing-

26

(hanging Attitudes

ton, nor London, nor Canberra." Independenceand the anti-nuclear stance were declared to benonnegotiable. Positive policy alternatives weresought and the NZLP boldly declared that if the al-lies were unable to accept its anti-nuclear stancewhen Labour came to power, the allies wouldthemselves have to withdraw from existing arrange-ments, since New Zealand's future bargaining posi-tion would be weakened should it walk away fromthe alliance.

The NZLP hoped for an alliance that had as-pects other than military, and it emphasized thefact that ANZUS does not require members to ac-cept visits from particular types of ships or aircraftand does not commit New Zealand to defend otherareas, such as the Indian Ocean. (This is correct,but the preamble to the treaty refers to a commondesire on the part of the signatories "to declarepublicly and formally their sense of unity, so thatno potential aggressor could be under the illusionthat any of them stand alone in the Pacific area."Despite the differences among them, it was thesense of a security community that was hitherto im-portant to the three ANZUS signatories.)

Throughout 1983 all of the peace and anti-nuclear positions that had been formulated earlierdrew growing support within the NZLP: more em-phasis on the threat nuclear te(lhnology posed tothe environment; stronger opposition to thestockpiling and testing of nu(lear weapons; louderrejection of nuclear-armed or -powered ships; a de-mand that New Zealand should not permit anycommunication system within its territory thatwould be used for military benefit of any foreign

27

Chainging Attitudes

power; and a suggestion that any visiting militaryvessel should be boarded and examined by appro-priate people to determine that no nuclear weap-ons were aboard. One suggestion proposed thatNew Zealand embassies be required to work in apractical way to support nuclear disarmament. TheLabour party's policy sought a posture of neutralitybetween major power blocs. New Zealand's de-fense needs were to be centered in regional SouthPacific arrangements. The naval and air forceswould constitute a coastguard service for the Exclu-sive Economic Zone and the nuclear-free zone. Allforeign establishments for military purposes wouldbe banned by a future Labour government, andpurported scientific research facilities would haveto be open to the public and subject to inspectionby peace movement scientists and research techni-cians. August 6 would become a National Day ofPeace, and observed as a public holiday to draw at-tention to peace issues and the need to alleviateworld poverty.

In 1983, the year preceding the snap election,there was considerable Labour debate over nuclearships: the Caucus supported the party's policy inApril, and in May several regional party confer-ences also supported the policy. Mr. Lange at firstsuggested that the concept of a nuclear-free zonewas not his highest priority-he was more inter-ested in securing adequate housing, transportation,and education for all the people-but later in theyear he made a statement that was closer to theparty position. Among those who saw a threat tothe ANZUS alliance if US ships were refused accessto New Zealand ports, some turned the debate intoa trade issue. They contended that by accepting nu-

28

Chang/ng Attitudes

clear ship visits, New Zealand could assure itself ofcontinued access to US markets. A large groupmaintained that matters of principle (the anti-nuclear stand) should not be abandoned for tradeconsiderations.

In 1984 the NZLP held a Victory ConventionConference after its first electoral success in eightyears. Immediately it was proposed that thereshould be a Commission of Peace, similar to theCommission for the Environment, headed by a min-ister and with a staff of ten people. A much greatereffort would be made to educate the general publicin peace issues, and the government would formu-late legislation and mount diplomatic iiitiatives fora nuclear weapons-free zone in the South Pacific.Protests were to be made to the United States forbreaking the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, andfor contravening the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.Labour reaffirmed the earlier proposals concerningthe defense forces and determined to support theefforts of other nations to establish nuclear-freezones.

This review of the evolution of Labour thinkingabout peace and anti-nuclear positions over theyears shows the NZLP consciously reiected the fre-quently expressed view that ANZUS contributes tofeelings of political and psychological security inSoutheast Asia and the South Pacific.

THE WELLINGTON KITSET

In 1983, the members of the Peace and JusticeForum of the Wellington Labour Regional Council

29

Changing Attitudes

put together a kitset*with the goal of presentingmaterial for discussion and contributing to the de-bate on the liabilities and benefits of ANZUS. A re-view of the kitset's salient points indicates thestandpoint regarding peace issues of some Labourparty members in the capital city. To give a clearidea of the standpoint of one group disseminatingits ideas to party members, the following brief re-view summarizes the text and quotes directly fromit, without subjective comment or analysis.

The Introduction states that the contents arerecommended to party members as educationalmaterial "about the defence of New Zealand andthe part New Zealand has played and can play inthe campaign for international disarmament."" Thedetermination to be leaders in the nuclear discus-sion traces its roots to the founding of the Labourparty as a coalition of Socialist parties, tradeunions, and peace groups in '1916. The paper ex-presses confidence that the present strategy willwin public support, as well as voicing the party's vi-tal ethical principles, since the peace movementhas never before been so voicing accepted and sobroadly based. Its authors see an opportunity tolead the people of New Zealand and the South Pa-cific to non-alignment and a nuclear-free zone.

In summarizing the historical setting otANZUS, the kitset maintains that the treaty was "en-

*"Kitset" is a local term for an impromptu discussion

paper. It is usually applied to the material, the bits andpieces, used to construct a simple piece of furniture. Al-though not normally applied to educational or politicalinformation, the term is used here by analogy.

30

(1),inging Attitude,

tirely political in conception; the Americans wantedto show the world in its NOk campaign (f (old warpropaganda, that there was an anti-comnmunist hlo(in the Pacific." Implying that ANZUS is not a mili-tary commitment for the defense of New Zealand,the kitset suggests that membership in ANZUSjustifies a likely scenario for an attack on NewZealand because of links with the United States. A(-cording to the section "Myths of IDeterren (c andhe Soviet Th reat," though d uring the Berl in and

Cuba crises the USSR seemed an imminent dangerto Europe anid the United States, hindsight and his-torical analysis lead to altered view,. Whether nuL-clear dleterrenceo. has prevented ( ontli( t is irrelevantto the present arm,, ra( e. After Some (dis( ussn11Onthe potential effe( ts of nU( lear war, the w( tion(on( Iluds,,

AnivotIi( k%11 h (JL~a rely Iao (,,, the t r~t (it thesetao( t, la (iisas t(r t( mank '.in rd rid rial U re as theresult ot i nu tear strikel musLt (C& eaeIo sPOrt tOW use or po )sess(rl it of( 1lear \Neapron,,, or stanmd ( oideried ot oni(oniig an1appa1)lhlng p)Otential'Vd e I the ( or1(Idusion is,

made ea s er to hea r hv the wv\ e he liin glprobahilit\ that real and erierg.eti( (lisarifa-merit by the Wes-t Would resul1t in the LISSRrelieving itselt Ot a hurdenI that, t'(0110noniii aIand morally, it ( an ill afford to ( arr\ .

1h(' authors, in ( onsidiering New, /ealand as amember of a nuclear alliari e, are dis-turbed by USmilitary ac tivities on New Zealand 50)i I. -1 hey saythat the Naval Communications Unit at Harewoodhas the capability toi act as a high fre(quenIo\ (Onl-municalions ba k-up for the US Navy in the Pa-ific should Aust ralia's North-West( Cape Station be

31

Changing Attitudes

disabled by nuclear attack. They also raise a ques-tion as to whether US military aircraft of the 61stMilitary Aircraft Wing could carry nuclear weaponswhen they use the Harewood Air Base. And sincethe Black Birch US Naval Observatory Transit CircleStation is involved in mapping celestial movementsand positions, the authors, citing the US Navy's re-quest to Congress for funding, note that observa-tory data would be especially appropriate to accu-rate targeting of the Trident II submarine-launchedballistic missiles, the first in the South Pacific withthe capacity to hit targets in the Soviet Union. Thecompilers of the kitset also worry about the possi-bility that US submarines with a first-strike capabil-ity may profit from underwater sound propagationexperiments in which New Zealand naval and airforces have taken part.

As to the principle of forward defense and NewZealand's contribution to the stability of the South-east Asian states, the discussion paper takes theview that there is nothing sacred about stability,saying,

Though we are under some obligation to propup anticommunist regimes in the region, it isnot clear as to which are any more savourythan the communist states. We do not havethe political understanding or military powerto deal with the tensions in this region.

The authors also fear that were military assistancegiven to the Philippines it could be directed by themilitary regime against guerrilla forces which, if al-lowed to contest elections, might win majority sup-port from the Filipinos.

32

Changing Attitudes

The kitset views involvement in wars on foreignsoil as immoral. It notes the warnings from MiddleEast governments that followed New Zealand par-ticipation in the Sinai peacekeeping force. In theauthors' view, there is economic self-interest intrading with all and in being non-aligned in foreignconfrontations, "military alliances make us enemieswith countries, which, even if they may not be ourfriends, can at least be lucrative markets."

Thus, the ANZUS treaty is of doubtful value toNew Zealand since "if we were attacked by anothercountry the US would assist us only if it was in theirIsic) interests to do so. If it was not, they would notsupport us, regardless of ANZUS. In either instancethe Treaty is irrelevant." This is not the place for ananalysis of the reasons which cause the authors ofthe kitset to consider nuclear confrontation in theSouth Pacific a serious possibility; however, thekitset reports that nuclear warships are nuclear-armed and environmentally hazardous, quoting areport for the US Fund for Constitutional Govern-ment released in 1983 on leaked radiation anddumping practices. The authors are convinced thatunless nuclear warships and power stations arebanned, the NZLP will have no credibility in its en-deavors to support the Pacific peoples' wish to endFrench testing, Japanese dumping, and superpowerconfrontation in the region.

After describing the consequences of a nuclearattack on New Zealand, the kitset authors claim thatby tacitly accepting the protection of US nuclearweapons New Zealand becomes a nuclear target;but by remaining in ANZUS while banning thewarships, they argue, New Zealand would remain a

33

Changing Attitudes

target in a nuclear war since the USSR could not al-low even non-military allies of the United States tobe the focus of a post-war recovery of the Westernbloc. "If we choose sides in a nuclear war, we mustaccept the consequences" is the kitset'sconclusion.

As an alternative, the kitset posits abandoningUS super-technology, moving into a non-alignedworld, and relying on conventional rather than nu-clear weapons, while taking advantage of NewZealand's geographical isolation, the stability of theSouth Pacific, and the absence of territorial dis-putes with any country. The kitset states,

The Soviets have never staged a major am-phibious landing in its history Isic) and wouldbe hard-pressed to do so now. Its Isicl navalarmament is weighted heavily in favour ofantiship and anti-aircraft missiles, with fewships carrying the gun or assault rocket artil-lery necessary for an opposed marine landing.

The kitset advocates an integrated defense pol-icy "built on non-alignment between major powerblocks which, with our geographic position, wouldmake us very unlikely to be involved in global con-flict." In advocating a civilian-based defense forNew Zealand, the paper's authors admit to oneproblem: getting rid of the war system. To find aregional alternative to ANZUS, they suggest a rolesimilar to Singapore's. The authors consider thatjust because New Zealand spurns a superpower alli-ance it is not defenseless: "Our best defence is aforeign policy which will not participate in un-bounded militarism ... prosperity and social justicein our region is the surest foundation for peace."

34

Chang'ing' Attitudes

These were only some of the opinions of a re-gional branch of the NZLP in 1983. An official ac-count of "eight months of Labour progress vs. eightyears of National neglect," lists the NZLP's achieve-ments from Agriculture to Youth."' The reportnotes, among other achievements in foreign affairs,Mr. Lange's attendance and address at the UN Gen-eral Assembly in September 1984, and his addressemphasizing commitment to the test ban treaty tothe Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. "NewZealand's stance in international affairs," accordingto the report, "is ... earning respect as being an in-dependent and principled policy reflecting NewZealand's interests." Barely two months before, theUN Secretary General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cueller,congratulated Mr. Lange, saying the Labour policywas very much along the lines of the UNphilosophy.

Mr. Lange's soaring popularity at home maypuzzle Americans who tend to regard him as a po-litical naif, though he is seen differently from a NewZealand perspective. He leads the moderate factionof the Labour party, he has captured the worldspotlight as the articulate and gallant underdog,and he has been nominated for the Nobel PeacePrize. The loss of popularity by Mr. J. K. McLay,who displaced Sir Robert Muldoon as leader of theNational party, has weakened the Opposition. Re-cent polls trace a steady fall in popularity for Mr.McLay, who had challenged Mr. Lange's statementthat the FFG 7-class frigates might be regarded asnot being nuclear, noting the inconsistency and"utter hypocrisy" of the Labour party.'' Mr. McLayhad also said that the trust that formerly character-ized the ANZUS agreement could not be

35

(hanging Attitudes

reestablished overnight, and that even if the Rea-gan administration were convinced that it was deal-ing with a more temperate New Zealand, therewould still be Congress to convince.

New Zealand has an area of 104,600 squaremiles (27.1 million hectares) and a population ofabout 3.2 million. In that setting, as Sir WallaceRowling has emphasized, the anti-nuclear state-ments of professional groups have been importantin molding public opinion. Their statements haveprobably had more impact than the fraternal visitsof the Greens from the Federal Republic ofGermany or peace activists from Australia.

A STATEMENT OF CONCERN

An example of the contributions made by pro-fessional groups is one statement of the NewZealand Ecological Society. This scientific society,drawing its membership largely from research andteaching institutions, was founded in 1951 "to pro-mote the study of ecology and the application ofecological knowledge in all its aspects." The soci-ety's three earlier papers had considered beech for-ests, population policy, and nuclear power. Thepresent study, called the Environmental Conse-quences to New Zealand of Nuclear Warfare in theNorthern Hemisphere, is a statement of concernsummarizing published information available up toJuly 1984.12

The society considers that the generation ofdust and smoke, lowered temperatures, depletionof the ozone layer, increased ultra-violet radiation,

36

(hanging Attiudes

and severe climatic changes would have more seri-ous effects than radioactive fallout. The statementalso tries to identify issues requiring action in NewZealand.

The council of the society suggests that NewZealanders should help in local, regional, and glo-bal forums to reduce and eliminate eventually thethreat of nuclear war "not just for the human spe-cies but for all life on the planet." Scientists are es-pecially responsible for clarifying to the generalpublic the consequences that would follow a nu-clear explosion. The council holds that a nuclearwar, even the nuclear arms race, may be preventedby assembling information to show how extensiveand enduring will be the chaos in the world's natu-ral systems after a nuclear explosion. The councilrecommends wider public exposure in the mediaand in the educational system to nuclear issues,and it endorses the 1955 statement of concern is-sued in the names of Lord Bertrand Russell and Dr.Albert Einstein.

It is important to remember that not only thefar left radical elements in New Zealand societysupport the peace and anti-nuclear movements, buta broad spectrum of the population, often per-suaded by literature from the scientific or near-scientific community. Peace Movement Aotearoa(the Maori name for New Zealand) is thecoordinating body for 300 peace groups, and whilethe veteran's association could not be described asa peace movement, the chairman's reply to amessage from the Australian Returned Services'League helps to show the tenor of New Zealandthinking. It was reported in the press on 31 January

37

Changing Attitudes

1985 that the President of the Australian organiza-tion, Sir William Keys, wrote to his New Zealandcounterpart saying that if one partner to ANZUSwanted its benefits, without the risks, there wouldbe doubts about the future of the alliance. FromNew Zealand Sir William Leuchars responded ex-pressing full support for the nuclear warship ban,saying New Zealand had an elected governmentwhich would make its own decisions in the inter-ests of the country, and face up to the politicalconsequences.

Government spokesmen in New Zealand havecontended that the credibility of ANZUS should nothinge on an occasional ship visit. (The occasionalship visit to Auckland stirs up a lot of emotion. Be-cause the harbor is in the middle of the city, a visit-ing ship is highly visible.) New Zealanders, in gen-eral, feel that their record and reliability as alliesshould carry more weight within the alliance. Fromthe US point of view, the stress by anti-nuclear NewZealanders on the question of ship visits calls intoquestion the whole defense posture, since the La-bour government is unable to accept that the secu-rity alliance may well be instrumental in keepingthe South Pacific from becoming a theater for nu-clear confrontation. Certainly the democraticallyelected New Zealand government has the right toformulate its own policy. But, at the same timeAmericans have difficulty forgetting that Mr. Langehas said things such as, "The issue is whether, in itsrelationships with other countries, the UnitedStates might find those other countries saying,'Look, New Zealand has stood up, now we don'twant you either.' That's the real issue."" Thoughhe delivered those words in the euphoria of vic-

38

Charigi, Attitudes

tory, later in the year Mr. Lange admitted that NewZealand had been unable to convert even itsnearest neighbor, Australia, to this line of thinking.

THE INTERIM DEFENCE REVIEW*

The New Zealand Ministry of Defence recentlycompleted an urgent review of defense require-ments in the light of the government's non-nuclearpolicy, a review intended to form a basis fordecisionmaking over the coming years. One prod-uct of it is the announced increase of $75 million indefense spending, though it is not at present clearhow long a period that sum will be spread over. Re-garding ANZUS, the report states that the disagree-ments with the United States have not altered La-bour's fundamental interests. In the thirdparagraph, on "ANZUS and Security," the reportreiterates a view we have seen before:

The government's policy on nuclear ship visitshas not (hanged the security risk to NewZealand. In strategic terms, any threat that diddevelop would also affect Australia and almostcertainly the United States as well. The funda-mental guarantees afforded by ANZUS remainvalid. This is recognized by Australia and theUnited States.

After outlining New Zealand's immediate andpractical requirement to ensure by its own actionsand through cooperation with its neighbors,

*Citations are from the unclassified version of the

interim review.

39

Changing Attitudes

including Australia, that the South Pacific does notbecome an area of instability and conflict, the re-port calls for "a new fabric of cooperation ... to bedeveloped with both our South Pacific neighboursand our ANZUS partners, based on a clear defini-tion of New Zealand's interests and policy of self-reliance." This theme is stressed again in paragraph11, which follows the statement that Australia isNew Zealand's closest ally and that good relationswith Australia are fundamental to New Zealand'sforeign policy and are increasingly important do-mestically. The emphasis on Australian-NewZealand ties continues with a call for a joint role inthe South Pacific.

40

/VAustralian Attitudes

A ustralia's position has been made difficult bythe events of February 1985. New Zealand is

Australia's close neighbor and long-standing ally.There is frequent cross-Tasnan travel, and the twoantipodean countries look on each other as"mates." Although Australians respect the NewZealand desire to further nuclear disarmament,most seem to feel that New Zealand is not really at-tuned to the real world and that it has acted fool-ishly in breaking up a perfectly good allian(e for amatter of principle when there are no apparentgains for peace in the stand taken. The safety rec-ord of US nuclear-powered or -capable warships is,after all, as easily verifiable as the Soviet build-up atCam Ranh Bay and Da Nang.

The Australian Labor Party (ALP) government,continuing the policy declared in opposition,wishes the US ships, whether nuclear-powered ornuclear-capable, to use Australian port facilities intransit. It opposes home porting of foreign war-ships in Australia, and the launching operations in-volving nuclear weapons from Australian territory. "

41

Japan

Pepes Aepubhc of China >eoJR epubkiSof Korea (

a'mTarwan Province

Hong Kong

SThaia \ 1

/PhilippinesMalaysia ~ -

~A '~ Papua New Guinea

Source(: Do(ra Alves,, The, AN/US. Partners (Washingt()n,DCZ: C:enter fo)r Slrate(, a n c Iin t erna t i ona I,, ILId I V,,.G;eorgetown University, 1984), p. -1. Coptyright - bv Thel{ ( enterfor Strategi( and Internatio)nal Studies. Used h permission.

Map 2. Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia

42

Australian Attitudes

The USS Buchanan, the ostensible cause of thefuror, not only called at Rabaul, Papua New Guinea,on the way to take part in the Flying Fish exercise,but also docked in Sydney on 4 March despite theprotests of local unions and the peace groups. Aspart of its alliance responsibilities under ANZUS,Australia accepts port visits and hosts joint facili-ties; thus Prime Minister Hawke's careful answeringof questions in the Australian House of Representa-tives in February 1985 affords insights to Australianpolitical thinking. The Opposition had raised ques-tions concerning the efforts of Premier Cain in Vic-toria and Premier Wran in New South Wales torestrict ship visits in Melbourne and Sydney. Mr.Hawke stated,

The Government regards access to Australianports for United States vessels as being essen-tial to the effective functioning of ANZUS....Nuclear ships are permitted to visit thoseports where the necessary contingency safetyregulations could be met in the unlikely eventof a reactor accident.

He went on to point out that there is no operationalrequirement for every type of US ship to visit everyAustralian port. ' Mr. Hayden, acknowledging thatAustralia could not escape the consequences of amassive nuclear exchange between superpowers,said that Australia had a liability to engage in proce-dures which could discourage and deter nuclearexchanges from taking place, and such was the roleof US-Australian joint facilities at Pine Gap andNurrungar.

43


DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT

During t;e debates which followed his returnto Australia after changing his mind about sup-poiig the MX tests, Mr. Hawke made it very clear; p. .liament that he regretted the differences thathad arisen between the United States and NewZealand and underscored that he thought it veryimportant that no one in parliament should say ordo anything which might lead to a worsening ofthose relations." '

As regards the joint facilities, the Australian La-bor government is proud that it took the Australianpeople into its confidence by explaining the rolethat the facilities play in deterrence as Mr. Hawkedid on 6 June 1984. The Hawke government feelsthat the facilities contribute to the deterrence ofnuclear war by enabling the timely knowledge ofdevelopments that have military significance, forexample, the provision of early warning informa-tion from space satellites about missile launchers.They also contribute to monitoring as part of verifi-cation of compliance with the previous arms con-trol agreements.

When ANZUS was debated the same day in theAustralian Senate, Senator Gareth Evans, speakingfor the Labor party and for the Labor party in gov-ernment, stated that the party's support for ANZUSwas complete and unequivocal. He quoted twostatements made by Cabinet on 12 February, "Fed-eral Cabinet today reaffirmed Australian Govern-ment policy on the basic issues ot the Australia/USAlliance, ANZUS Treaty and on disarmament and

44

Australian Attitude

deterrence," and, "There was also general agree-ment that both the Australia/US Alliance and theneed to do all in our power to ensure the maximumpossible progress on disarmament were essential toAustralian foreign policy." He condemned the atti-tude of the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Peacock,saying that his had been the kind of behavior overthe last few weeks calculated to tear apart not onlyAustralia and New Zealand bilateral relationships,but the whole delicate interrelationship among thethree treaty partners. Senator Evans pointed outthat it had for a long time been well understood bythe Australian people that ANZUS was fundamentalto their security. 17

THE MX TESTS

The United States wished to launch an un-armed missile from California to descend in the Pa-cific in order to test accuracy and performance fac-tors for 6,000 miles. The Fraser government hadagreed to give support for mobile telemetry shipsoperating in international waters. US surveillanceplanes would have operated from a Sydney base tomonitor the last stages of the flight. In 1983 the La-bor Prime Minister and Defence Minister agreed tothe test so long as it was outside the Australian200-mile zone. The party and the public were nottold. The "crisis" was provoked by a series of care-fully timed media leaks during Mr. Hawke's visitoverseas.

In the House of Representatives the coalition inopposition was seeking to make political capital

45


from Mr. Hawke's "backdown on the MX missilecrisis." The Australian press took the matter farmore seriously than the Reagan administration had.Officials in Washington agreed that the refueling ofa few planes and support of a ship were not vitalmatters. History will determine whether Mr. Hawkemade the right decision when he retreated,whether it was better to give a little at that time inorder to preserve a great deal more, or whether hisvolte face simply served to encourage the left andwould prove, as Mr. Peacock, the Leader of the Op-position, claimed, a springboard for the left's nextstep.

Today Mr. Hawke has a problem with factionswithin his party that will call for his considerablepowers of conciliation. Some members of the Laborparty and some Australians would welcome a breakwith the United States. The left wing of the partycharacterized the prime minister's statement as "ex-traordinary" when Mr. Hawke said in an interviewearly in March that he would not want to be PrimeMinister if central elements of the alliance, such asport access for nuclear ships and Australian hostingof joint facilities with the United States, wererepudiated. "'

Mr. Hawke has said that the alliance relation-ship with the United States is central and that theLabor party will do everything to maintain it. Theprime minister also wants the capacity of Australianand New Zealand defense to remain undiminishedin the South Pacific, which is less stable than it was.Mr. Hawke has said that it would be "an act ofmutual insanity" if the United States, New Zealand,

46


and Australia did something to reduce the capacityof ANZUS in that area.

Appointed by the new defence minister, Mr.Kim Beazley, to make a 12-month study of defenseissues, Mr. Paul Dibb observed, "The prospect of abreakup of the ANZUS treaty would be of enor-mous benefit to the USSR's worldwide interests ...Nothing would be more welcome than the dissolu-tion of ANZUS involving as it does such close alliesof the United States." Yet Australia, because of itssize, geography, and many other factors, is lesseasy to influence than New Zealand. Anti-nuclearsentiment is not concentrated on one issue. Thereis overlapping between groups whose prime inter-est is conservation, anti-uranium mining, Aboriginalrights, peace issues, women's issues, youth, andopposition to the joint facilities. There are ties be-tween peace groups in Australia and New Zealand,and, reportedly, the left wings of the two Labor par-ties provide mutual support.

However, without a doubt the ALP's platformon nuclear disarmament is a strong one (AppendixE). Anti-nuclear feeling dates back quite a long way.Among the new policies introduced by the Whitlamgovernment (1972-1975) was the decision thatAustralia would neither develop nor acquire nu-clear weapons. A World Disarmament Conferencewas discussed during Whitlam's visit to Moscow inJanuary 1975, the first such visit by an AustralianPrime Minister. However, Whitlam was luke-warmwhen New Zealand's Norman Kirk sought his sup-port for a Pacific nuclear-free zone because hethought it would contradict the alliance defenseposture. A pacifist-youth connection developed

47


during the Whitlam years and anti-American senti-ment increased. The ALP had been prompt tooppose the Vietnam war; when the war situationdeteriorated, the party picked up credibility andvotes. Although Mr. Hawke has said that there is noevidence to support the allegation, suggestions thatthe CIA had a hand in the fall of the Whitlam gov-ernment persist.

ANTI-NUCLEAR ADHERENTS AND POLITICALAFFILIATIONS

Today, teachers' unions and young people arestrong supporters of the anti-nuclear movement,and there are plans for anti-nuclear education inthe schools. (A survey conducted by the AustralianDemocrats before the last election found most sup-port for nuclear issues coming from the 18-35 agegroup and from women.) The first Hawke electionwas helped by the reduction in the voting age, butthe creation, on 17 June 1984, of the Nuclear Dis-armament Party (NDP), with Peter Garrett, a singerwith the Midnight Oil group, heading the NewSouth Wales branch, drew voters from the ALP farmore than from the opposition parties. The ALP canill afford to have single issue groups, such as NDP,"hiving off." The NDP polled 6.8 percent of the to-tal national Senate vote, and the charismatic Mr.Garrett narrowly failed to win a New South WalesSenate seat. Jo Valentine of West Australia won theparty's only Senate seat. Now, six months later, theparty is split and its credibility undermined with al-legations of Trotskyist infiltration.

A number of communists and former commu-

nists are prominent in the NDP, and NDP election

48

Australian Attaiudes

handouts were produced by the printer of the com-munist Tribune. The party platform calls for theclosing of all US bases in Australia; prohibition ofthe stationing of nuclear weapons in Australia ortheir passage through sea and air space; and thetermination of all mining and export of uranium,even to the repudiation of all commitments offormer governments. The platform calls to mindPaul Dibb's comment,

Unlike NATO, ANZUS does not directlythreaten the national security of the Sovicehomeland with military attack. But the roles otNorth-West Cape, Pine Gap, and Nurrungarsuggest that it is in the Soviet Union's inter-ests to see them removed from Australiathrough political pressure. Moreover,Moscow would like to see the United Statesprevented from using port and air facilities inthe region for its naval warships and militaryaircraft. "'

In most states the Communist Party of Australiadecided to advocate first preference for the NDP inthe Senate. (Australia has a system of voting inwhich it is compulsory to mark the ballot paper soas to indicate the order of preference of all candi-dates. When a candidate receives an absolute ma-jority at the first count, he is elected and thesecond preferences are ignored. If no one gains anabsolute majority at the first count, the secondpreferences of those who voted for the candidatewith the lowest first preference vote are distrib-uted. The procedure is repeated until one candi-date emerges with an absolute majority.)

49

Australian Altitudes

lean Melzer, a former secretary of the VictorianLabor Party, former Labor senator, former memberof the Communist party, having connections withseveral anti-nuclear groups, is prominent in theNDP. From their published statements, it wouldseem that Jean Melzer and her associates wish touse the NDP as a broad movement supporting far-left and Marxist causes. Melzer has asked the gov-ernment to call for the closing of the Cam RanhBay, Subic, and Clark bases and has asked the gov-ernment to state whether it would guarantee thatthe United States would not use nuclear arms inAustralia's defense. The "(;reek Progressive Youthof Australia" festival (Figure 2), at which Melzer wasa guest speaker, is an example of a rally appealingto young Australians.

The Campaign for International Cooperationand Disarmament (CICD) has a rather similar phi-losophy to the NDP. The pro-Moscow SocialistParty of Australia has urged its members to occupyleading positions in the peace movement, to en-courage party committees to produce and distrib-ute peace leaflets, to collect signatures for peacepetitions, and to establish peace committees in thefactories. The development of anti-imperialist tend-encies among workers and unionists taking part inpeace demonstrations has been advocated.

While the numbers and strength of the com-munists who are active in the peace movementshould not be exaggerated, their organizationalskills and the impact of their emotive, easilygrasped slogans should not be underestimated.The- organizers frequently achieve the appeal ofthe anti-Vietnam war campaign in the United States50

8th FESTIVAL GP.Y.A. 1985Youth for Peace

Progress and Participation

IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GREEK PROGRESSIVE YOUTH OF AUSTRALIA(G.P.Y.A.) 8TH FESTIVAL, A WEEK-END CONFERENCE WILL BE HELDTO LOOK AT ISSUES OF PEACE, MULTI-CULTURALISM. UNEMPLOYMENTAND PROJECTIONS OF GREEK-AUSTRALIAN YOUTH.

DURING THE PEACE SEMINAR, SPECIAL EMPHASIS WILL BE GIVENTO RECENT ALLEGATIONS THAT PINE GAP IS BEING USED TO SPYON AND INTERCEPT COMMUNICATION IN GREECE. AN ACCOUNT WILLBE GIVEN ON THE GREEK COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE TO 1HESE

ALLEGATIONS AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S EXPLANATION ON THEQUESTIONS RAISED BY THE GREEK COMMUNITY

GUEST SPEAKERS WILL BE JOAN COXSEDGE, M.L.A. VICTORIA FOR THEAUSTRALIAN LABOR PARTY AND JEAN MELZER, FOR THE NUCLEARDISARMARMENT PARTY.

THE SESSION ON PEACE WILL BE HELD AT 11.00 AM Ar PRINCESHILL HIGH SCHOOL, ARNOLD ST., CARLTON NORTH. ONSATURDAY, THE 27TH DAY OF APRIL.

THE GREEK PROGRESSIVE YOUTH OF AUSTRALIA

Figure 2. "Greek Progressive Youthof Australia" Poster

51


in the late sixties. Last August, to give an example, aCountry Peace Groups Conference (Figure 3) hadtwo days of group reports, seminars, workshops,theater, and music with the aim of putting ruralpeace groups in touch with each other andstimulating peace marches in small towns that hadnot seen a march since the boys returned from theVietnam war. The peace groups have a well-orchestrated media campaign. Peter Garrett got agreat deal of pre-election free publicity. Suchgroups also display the disturbing, but effective,tendency to exaggerate numbers. The headcount of"protesters" in Freemantle in 1984 included notonly apolitical shoppers but also members of a UScarrier's crew, who had paused to listen to thepeace movement's rock band.

Professional assessments of nuclear questionshave an impact in Australia as they do in NewZealand. One example from the Australian profes-sional literature is the product of the IndependentCommittee of Enquiry into the Nuclear Weaponsand Other Consequences of Australian UraniumMining, which was produced in time for the July1984 Federal ALP Conference." Major donations to-wards production of the report were made by theNuclear Free Zone Secretariat and the AustralianConservation Foundation.

While some groups wage a compaign of fearand others disseminate anti-American propaganda,there is no comparable campaign to correct flagrantmisstatements of fact or to defend the alliance.There are no discussion papers to provide a focusfor pro-United States sentiment (though there is a

52


Il M SUN MAC 31

A~~SSEBETESR ADN

STO MX TESTS

Fiur 3. Diaa ntRaly"oice

NO TOMAH5W


ROCK THE BOATRALLY FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ON MARCH 31

On Patem Sunday (AP1. 15t 1984. ove 250 000 Ausratrans took to fIts hlrets to call to, oharrtnent and St SuDSAustralra s involvement in preparations to, nuclear oar More reetlp just one one erritro Avstet trv~wedeclared their support for 3nuclear-free Australia

Across the Tasmran. the poope and the go-enment of New Zealandt otred wror other, Sooth Psxrtic valtonl 10Showe the ot10 that ia indeed posile to del heIn nuctear powers By banning the rsts .1 nuctear txSlhrp. NewZeaanders have made a stand tor 1 nu la iamaen it s time to make Outs

t 96 saw the growth and sienhenngsh vf the Ausrari.an d~iaaen moement AuStratI, howenar, thOVh lTeANZUS aliranOc txith the Uorted Stte remains vtatly inolved in prepaatots for -uv9s, war

THE AUSTRALIAN CONNECTIONNg Missie Teats

T he MX msitle is the most ;oteni mtssrte yet dlenetoped :nd is geoOr -s n a tirht strike By votnsenitnto the testing of the missite rnthe PnoriC Austratia has approved a major escalation ofthe arms rave

Nactee Weapons Is w- Pon.a

INvvlear armed warshrps rutmki-,ad A,52 bobregolari visit Australia The warships and ISuthains ofthe US Paciiic fleet are norw bong ited wiin the TOteAt4AW nulear cuis missile - A hrgnry accurae dsadlyand PrOnvoire nactear weapon Thepresenc 1e ieTomaha in PornPhrltio Bay would makte Methora Ph"intnuclear targetNuorlea, Baa.,

The numerous US taviits on Our -01 do not con~lct In -v d0fence or to nuclear caleterec Sot to US planefor A winnable nuclear war North Wes Calm tNurungar and 1 tenIV apgradad Pne Gap tactv har, kinSprigs are high prioit nuclear taret Orhe Sovet Union The Walsonr hase -n -tban xselbouaett.contrbutes to the targeting of Sovitnoi rtiae

Uractam

.Withovut raniumthere Could bend nuclear sai , eiair ie n noeth utai o s nnperactors can alspoeused inthe Oroductrn I1 nulear weaponsRoitows.SuhAstaaisptieyI.

world s largest uraniu mine

VOTE WITH YOUR FEETOn SUNDAY MARCH 31 demand a fu ieio ear tree from nucea weapons anrfsn eM

Oaning nuclear ship ors closing dow, -in- rI-e and ir gtemn n n of yt ura niu kustekMwould be making a genuine conrbuto li -di amrnt ,n oregion We wnuld p makin ou stendo tondpeace* The solutio-smI oar hartds

RALLY TREASURY GARDENS t 00 P M0n attend launch-ng of peace Iotila -- sar1g from Stelsee P-S , 30 .~ m powered ^rn and -se 111"la

I 35 pm opoweted craft) heath PNO radial march to ciy trom Station Pie 12 30 P mJONup - People for Nuclear Orsarinamnor~ -inerre pro Sovet nor pro USA We ar. p8~drerm~nreot aed eq

tered pour suppot

To PEOPLE FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENTPO Boxa 3? Carton South 3053Phone 603 28461 would! lke

Fuaher onforthaltoe to help wth the marh

7o epotreotPNO (%ItO nddusSb 5oncesluor To donate to the expenses of PND (t antoose S

Name

Adeess Ph"n

Figure 3. "Disarmament Rally" Notice (continued)

54

Australian Attitudcs

group called Friends of ANZUS) or to provide bal-ance for the targeted sections of the population.

As Professor Henry S. Albinski has pointed out,at the Hearing before the House Subcommittee onAsian and Pacific Affairs 18 March 1984 (AppendixD), Australian public support for the ANZUS alli-ance is more extensive and solid than that of NewZealand. It would be electorally self-defeating for amajor Australian political party to follow the NewZealand [abour Party's lead."

55

V

The Changed Alliance

T he growth of anti-nuclear sentiment in NewZealand, not confined to the NZLP alone, has al-

tered the status of the alliance. New Zealanderswere genuinely surprised that the United States re-acted so strongly to the rejection of the USSBuchanan. The anti-nuclear movement had longbeen urging the rejection of nuclear ships. ThoughMr. Lange had known since July 1984 that he wouldhave to choose between refusing warship entry andthe alliance, he did not make the ramifications ofthe choice clear to the public in New Zealand. Per-haps only now are New Zealanders realizing thatthe United States, involved in global, rather thanregional strategy, is urging a positive position-solidarity.

The US position is that the ANZUS partnersstand together in a positive defensive alliance asSoviet military strength in the Pacific grows arid asdanger spots in the Philippines, the South ChinaSea, and New Caledonia develop (Map 3). 1he goalof the ANZUS signatories has always been to defer

57

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2 42

z 0

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580


small conflicts that may escalate to the alarming col-lisions all nations wish to avoid.

In February 1985 fears surfaced in Washingtonthat other allies with strong anti-nuclear move-ments might follow New Zealand's lead. That hasnot happened. Among the European EconomicCommunity countries, New Zealand is only impor-tant to the United Kingdom. Nations that have ex-perienced centuries of diplomacy and balance ofpower assessment recognize the realities of the glo-bal alliance system, and they believe that a treaty isa treaty. With the Soviets at their backs, they haveput up with the inconveniences of an alliance for along time.

In Asia there is perplexity. Japan, another na-tion with the Soviets at its back, and conscious ofits dependence on sea traffic, has managed to findan accommodation. The Asian nations all well un-derstand the ANZUS role in maintaining the sealines of communications (SLOCs). Singapore hasexpressed ASEAN's sentiments at the unravelling ofANZUS. Indonesians, bound to praise "national re-silience," admit to a feeling that "having ANZUSdown there" was comfortable. In the Pacific onlyVanuatu refuses nuclear ships. Some of the smallerislands might be ambivalent-but geography makesit unlikely that they would be put to the test. Mostof the Pacific island nations, following the lead ofFiji, have said that they like to feel that ANZUS issupporting them, because they know that neithereconomically nor militarily can they do much ontheir own.

Australia values ANZUS, despite the cantanker-

ous outbursts from the far left and the threats of

59


sustained pressure from those who, like PeterGarrett, hailed the refusal to allow support for MXtesting as a "victory for the anti-nuclear party." TheALP's campaign to clarify why the joint facilities arehelpful in nuclear issues, should do much to dif-fuse the hostilities that have been aroused in somecircles against US cooperation at North-West Cape,Pine Gap, and Nurrungar. Prime Minister Hawkehas said that relations with the United States arestronger than at any time since World War II. Se-nior US officials have concurred. Neither Australianor the United States wants ANZUS as a trilateralrelationship to end; for the time being they willleave an empty chair, and carry on. The Australianshave been at pains to pour oil on the troubledwaters and have been steadfast in their efforts atquiet diplomacy. Australia, besides having eco-nomic ties with New Zealand, and shared responsi-bilities in the Pacific, had expected closer defenselinks. New Zealand has backed out of the proposedjoint submarine project. In Australia, attention willnow focus on the budget. If Mr. Hawke shows firm-ness and his policies prevail, he will recoup someof the support lost over the MX retreat, and theleft's forces will not be dominant.

If the three signatories of ANZUS all wish thealliance to continue, something would be gained byeach country defining exactly what is important tothem in the relationship. This is not likely to bringabout a solution. Mr. Lange has domestic politicalproblems and is not able to follow Australia inembracing a complementary policy of peace anddisarmament coupled with support of a nuclear de-terrent. Unfortunately, when once an alliance ik

60


broken, not only the posture of the signatorieschanges, but the perception of other nationschanges and it is hard to return to the status quoante.

The US view is well summarized in the wordsof Mr. Paul D. Wolfowitz, then Assistant Secretaryof State for the Far East and Pacific, speaking at theNational Defense University's Pacific Symposium inFebruary 1985:

Our regional alliances are important in pre-venting small conflicts from even starting; andsince it is from small conflicts that the greatestdanger of big ones arise, these alliances areimportant for preserving nuclear peace. Themutual commitments that these alliances en-tail help to avoid the kind of isolationism thatbrought on the last world war. For these rea-sons, ironically, the effect of New Zealand'saction, small though it may be, is exactly op-posite to its announced purpose of reducingthe risk of nuclear war .... With words, NewZealand assures us that it remains committedto ANZUS. But by its deeds, New Zealand haseffectively curtailed its operational role in thealliance. A military alliance has little meaningwithout military co-operation. New Zealandcan't have it both ways.

Americans, who have lived with the conscious-ness of the dangers of nuclear war for a long time,have difficulty in realizing that for New Zealandersthe horrors of a possible nuclear holocaust out-weigh all other historical or strategic perceptions.After seven months of consultations and a numberof encouraging signals from the New Zealand Prime

61


Minister, Americans are puzzled that Mr. Lange notonly withdrew from allied cooperation but accusedthe United States of hoping to bring in anothergovernment.

The US government has made its point-that itdoes not acquiesce in alliance bad faith; now itmust show the world that it has patience and flexi-bility. Because the future response to emergencieswill suffer from the interruption of planing, con-sultation, and exercising with New Zealand, theUnited States must take steps that will prevent adegradation of the surveillance of the SLOCs. A sta-ble security community in place in the Pacific is thebest card to bring to the negotiating table to call ahalt in the arms race and to achieve a step in the di-rection so devoutly desired by the anti-nuclearactivists.

62

Endnotes

1. Statement, Canberra, 25 January 1985. See also Han-sard, Representatives, 25 February 1985. (Editor's Note:Hansard is the record of parliamentary proceedings inAustralia.)

2. Interview, Los Angeles, 27 February 1985.

3. Statement, Canberra, 10 February 1985.

4. Deputy Prime Minister's press interview, Wellington,5 March 1985.

5. John Henderson, Keith Jackson, Richard Kennawav,eds. Beyond New Zealand; The Foreign Policy of a SmallState. (Auckland: Methuen, 1980), pp. 52-56.

6. Melbourne Herald, 1 March 1985.

7. 1975 New Zealand Labour Party Manifesto, p. 28.

8. See Assistant Deputy Secretary for Defense James A.Kelly's testimony before hearing of the House Subcom-mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Chairman, Rep.Stephen J. Solarz, 18 March 1985. 99th Cong., Ist Sess.

9. Introduction to Alternatives to ANZUS ... A Paper forDiscussion. (Wellington, Peace and Justice Forum ot theWellington Labour Regional Council, 1983).

63

10. Early Achievements of the Fourth Labour Govern-ment, July 1984-85 (Wellington: Prepared by the Parlia-mentary Labour Party Research Unit, 1 April 1985).

11. Canberra Times, 22 March 1985.

12. The Environmental Consequences to New Zealand ofNuclear Warfare in the Northern Hemisphere (Welling-ton: New Zealand Ecological Society, 1984).

13. Lange, Interview on TV program "Sunday," 29 July1984.

14. Hayden, Hansard, Representatives, 27 February 1985.

IS. Hawke, Hansard, Representatives, 27 February 1985.

16. The text of the (omplete debates is found in Han-sard, Senate and Representatives, 27 February 1985.Other relevant material is in Hansard 22 and 25 February1985.

17. Senator fvans had inserted in Hansard the results oftIhe review of ANZUS undertaken by the Labor party on(orning to power in 1983. Senator Evans emphasized thathe saw Australia's commitment to the larger Western al-lian(e and treaty arrangements as the best way to secureultimate nuclear disarmament. Two days earlier, he hadbeen asked about a motion put forward by the Austra-lian Capital Territory (that is, Canberra) branch of theAustralian Labor party which stated that the alliancepresents contradictions with Labor policy. The motionhad been seconded by Senator Ryan, the Minister of Id-u ation. Senator Evans said that it had been a matter ofinternal discussion at a party forum and in no way(hanged the party's position.

Australian parliamentary debates are (onducted with

64

a good deal of spirit. The "MX" lebate a, \trc uc'lulbecause it gave the government a (han( to a it,posture regarding AN/US verv( lear. lhe go('rnrm(entalso had the opportunity to point out thath, ie onl tini.that any ban had been plaed upon an (element i theUS defense tor(e entering the ( ountrv v as during the(Liberal) government of William M(Mahon in 1971 v henit banned nuclear-powered warships, his mUst have at-forded the ALP some satistation sin( e Mr. fan Sil( lair,the Leader of the National Party, the other halt (o the 0(-

alition, had reminded the house that in 1970 Mr. Hawkehad signed an advertisement (alling tor the end of theANZUS.

18. The Australian, 7 Mar( h 1985.

19. Quoted by B. A. Santamaria in his ( onment,

Sydney, 12 March 1985.

20. Australia and the Nuclear Choi(e. 1 he IndependentCommittee of Enquiry into Nuclear Weapon, and OtherConsequences of Australian Uranium Mining (Svdne\':Total Environment Centre, 1984).

21. Testimony at hearing 18 Mardh 1981), 99th Cong., 1stSess. Henry S. Albinski, Director Australian Studies (en-ter, Pennsylvania State University.

65

Appendix A

The ANZUS Treaty

TRIAY BETWEFN THE GOVIRNM[NTS OF NEWZLAEAAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA CONCERNING SECURITY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purpose and principlesof the Charter of the United Nations and their desire tolive in peace with all peoples and all Governments, anddesiring to strengthen the fabrk of peace in the PacificArea,

Noting that the United States already has arrange-ments pursuant to which its armed forces are stationedin the Philippines, and has armed forces and administra-tive responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the com-ing into force of Japanese Peace Treaty may also stationarmed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preser-vation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand asmembers of the British Commonwealth of Nations have

67

military obligations outside as well as within the PacificArea,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their senseof unity, so that no potential aggressor could be underthe illusion that any of them stand alone in the PacificArea, and

Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for col-lective defence for the preservation of peace and secu-rity pending the development of a more comprehensivesystem of regional security in the Pacific Area,

Therefore declare and agree as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter ofthe United Nations, to settle any international disputesin which they may be involved by peaceful means insuch a manner that internatio-ial peace and security andjustice are not endangered and to refrain in their inter-national relations from the threat or use of force in anymanner inconsistent with the purposes of the UnitedNations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective ofthis Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means ofcontinuous and effective self-help and mutual aid willmaintain and develop their individual and collective ca-pacity to resist armed attack.

68

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in theopinion of any of them the territorial integrity, politicalindependence or security of any of the Parties is threat-ened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pa-cific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to itsown peace and safety and declares that it would act tomeet the common danger in accordance with its consti-tutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as aresult thereof shall be immediately reported to the Secu-rity Council of the United Nations. Such measures shallbe terminated when the Security Council has taken themeasures necessary to restore and maintain interna-tional peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on

any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attackon the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or onthe island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacificor on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in thePacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be inter-preted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations

69

of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations orthe responsibility of the United Nations for the mainte-nance of international peace and security.

Article VII

The parties hereby establish a Council, consisting oftheir Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to considermatters concerning the implementation of this Treaty.The Council should be so organized as to be able tomeet at any time.

Article VIII

Pending the development of a more comprehensivesystem of regional security in the Pacific Area and thedevelopment by the United Nations of more effectivemeans to maintain international peace and security, theCouncil, established by Article VII, is authorized tomaintain a consultative relationship with States, RegionalOrganizations, Associations of States or other authoritiesin the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposesof this Treaty and to contribute to the security of thatArea.

Article IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accord-ance with their respective constitutional processes. Theinstruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon aspossible with the Government of Australia, which willnotify each of the other signatories of such deposit. TheTreaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratificationsof the signatories have been deposited.

70

Article X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. AnyParty may cease to be a member of the Council estab-lished by Article VII one year after notice has been givento the Government of Australia, which will inform theGovernments of the other Parties of the desposit of suchnotice.

Article XI

This Treaty in the English language shall be depos-ited in the Archives of the Government of Australia. Dulycertified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Gov-ernment to the Governments of each of the othersignatories.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipoten-

tiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day ofSeptember, 1951.

For Australia:PERCY C. SPENDER

For New Zealand:C.A. BERENDSEN

For the United States of America:DEAN ACHESONJOHN FOSTER DULLESALEXANDER WILEYJOHN J. SPARKMAN

71

Appendix B

Heylen Polls onNuclear and Defense

IssuesLabour government pol- 4th 9th 23rdicy to ban nuclear- August February Marchpowered vessels from 1984 1985 1985New Zealand ports % % %

Approve 45.4 52.3 51.8

Disapprove 45.9 37.2 40.9Neither/don't know 8.7 10.5 7.3

100.0 100.0 100.0

Labour government pol-icy to ban the entry ofnuclear weapons intoNew Zealand % % %

Approve 70.4 73.4 70.0

Disapprove 18.4 18.5 18.0Don't know 5.2 8.1 4 8

100.0 100.0 100.0

N 'ote': Only the firt IwO, qLestions hadJ beeon me erel p I-tr

Otsly. Maxi111um sampling error (-limated to be, i' . I 'at tIe

95"% (ontidenc level..Sour c: /tv vn Poll: Nu(lear ,ind ' (Je me (s t i,

Mar(h 1985. Prepar(d hor Iyc Wit n(,, , N(,%w, I(,lhvioI(n Nc '\/ealanld.

73

23rdMarch

Would prefer ... 1985

Breaking defence tieswith US 44.8

Allowing ships thatcould be nuclear-armed into NZ ports 45.3

Don't know 9.9

100.()

Attitudes to nuclear and Neither/defence issues Agree Disagree don't know

NZ has been treatedfairlv by US offi(ial,following the NZ banon nuclear ship, 18.) 5, 3.0 9.1

If NZ was atta{ ked to-morrow, the US wouldstill (ome to our aid 68.5 17. 14.5

NZ has neglected hershare ot responsibili-ties under the ANZUSagreement l. 53.4 15. 3

Having defence ties withthe US increases therisk of attack on NZ 10.4 02.0 7.6

NZ should expand itsown armed forces anddefence systems 44.6 47.5 7.9

NZ is unlikely to ever be

attacked 18.1 47.1 14.,

74

Attitudes to nuclear and Neither/defence issues Agree Disagree don't know

In a nuclear war be-tween the major pow-ers, most people livingin NZ would survive 15.6 65.9 18.5

It is likely that there willbe a major nuclear warwithin the next 15years 23.4 53.8 22.8

75

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Appendix C

The Government ofNew Zealand's

Position on Ship Visits

The speech of the US Ambassador to NewZealand of 5 March 1985 was carried in the maga-zine New Zealand Listener. Mr. Lange's corre-sponding statement appeared in the 13 April issueof the magazine and gives the government of NewZealand's views of the US and New Zealand posi-tions regarding ship visits.

In the face of the New Zealand Govern-ment's determination to persist in its intentionto exclude nuclear weapons, the US made arequest for a port visit by a vessel which ap-peared to comply with New Zealand's policy.The difficulty for the New Zealand Govern-ment was that the Americans could not allowthemselves to be seen to be complying withNew Zealand's policy. The American defenceposture requires the presentation of their ves-sels as at any time capable of defensive action

79

with nuclear weapons, whether or not anygiven vessel is at any given time nucleararmed. Whatever vessel came to NewZealand, that vessel could not, in terms of thatposture, be allowed to be identified as un-armed with nuclear weapons. It was for thatreason that the US had previously made plainits reservations about any proposal to legislateto exclude nuclear weapons from NewZealand waters. Any such action was incom-patible with the American wish to protect theuntrammelled movement of its nuclearcapacity.

American reluctance to send a vessel toNew Zealand which would not only be un-armed with nuclear weapons but which wouldbe seen to be unarmed with nuclear weaponsforced the New Zealand Government's hand.To accept a vessel which was the subject ofAmerican assertions as to its nuclear readinesswould effectively defeat the New Zealand pol-icy, whether or not any given vessel was nu-clear armed. The only tenable position left tothe New Zealand Government was to accept avessel which it could establish from its ownresources was not nuclear armed. An exami-nation was made which could establish nomore than the broad probability that a particu-lar vessel was not nuclear armed. The possibil-ity that nuclear weapons were present couldnot be conclusively eliminated, and for thatreason the New Zealand Government de-clined the application for a port visit.

The disappointment which was felt byboth sides at this point in the proceedings wasunderstandable. The US reaction was stern. It

80

has severely curtailed its defence and intelli-gence co-operation with New Zealand. Whilethe ANZUS alliance remains formally in place,considerable questions have been raisedabout the structure and future direction of theNew Zealand military and intelligence effort,not to mention the conduct of our interna-tional relations.

The political problems posed by theAmerican action are acute. The National party,which has pledged to return New Zealand to"full and active membership of the ANZUS al-liance," cannot do so without at the least be-ing seen as admitting nuclear weapons to NewZealand. Such an action would satisfy some el-ements of opinion in New Zealand but itcould not restore any kind of consensus aboutthe ANZUS alliance. The Labour Governmentmust accommodate the deep-seated feelingsof insecurity which have been awakened bythe attenuation.

Of the defence relationship with the US:

The possibility of consensus about NewZealand's defence arrangements lies in the de-velopment of a credible defence posture inthe context of effective military relationshipswith the conventional forces of other powers.There is scope for that development withinthe framework of the ANZUS alliance, if theUS will accede to it; failing that, there is scopein the relationships New Zealand maintainswith the armed forces of other nations,Australia not least.

It is clear that the building of a consensusabout New Zealand's defence and security

81

terests will not be rapidly achieved. The ele-ment of partisanship will not be easily elimi-nated and will continue to obscure ourcommon interest. It is in that interest that acareful and serious examination and assess-ment of New Zealand policy in defence andinternational relations should be made.

82

Appendix D

US CongressionalHearing, March 1985

OPENING STATEMENT BY STEPHEN 1.SOLARZ, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SUBCOM-MITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,18 MARCH 1985

Since the end of WW II and the coming into force ofthe ANZUS alliance, the South Pacific has been an areaof exemplary peace and progress. The test of any secu-rity arrangement is to deter a prospective enemy fromaggressive excursions. Accordingly ANZUS belongs withNATO and the US-Japan Treaty on the list of successfulinternational peace keeping arrangements.

ANZUS has enjoyed strong bipartisan support in theUnited States right from the start when it was signed forus by four distinguished statesmen-Dean Acheson,John Foster )ulles, Alexander Wiley and John Sparkman.An important component of this unwavering US commit-ment to ANZUS has been the manifest resolve of ourTreaty Partners. For generations, Australian, NewZealand and Ameri(an servi( e men and women haveserved gallantly side by side defending freedom the

83

world over, and continue their efforts today in a wide va-riety of places and functions. All Americans take greatpride in the intimate and cooperative relations that wehave with Australia and New Zealand, our sister democ-racies in the South Pacific.

Faced with growing Soviet military power, thus farnot materially constricted by the arms control efforts ofthe West, the United States and its allies share the bur-den and benefits of a worldwide system of security ar-rangements dedicated and successfully managed to de-ter Soviet aggression. NATO, the US-Japan SecurityTreaty, and ANZUS constitute an interlocking global de-fense against the Soviet Union.

Each component nation of this worldwidepeacekeeping structure happily is free to decide how inaccord with its political processes it will fulfill its treatyobligations. Accordingly, it is with full respect for NewZealand's democratic system that we today address thedecision that the government of New Zealand hasmade-in effect to ban 80 percent of the US navy fromits ports.

This hearing also provides us with an opportunity toreview the basis for ANZUS, a-, originally constituted in1952, and its rationale for today. The United States hasentered into many defense commitments over the yearsand too seldom reviews them to determine their appro-priateness to contemporary circumstances.

What should be the American reaction to this end-ing of coopeation in an important area by a tried andtrue ally? How significant in military and political terms isNew Zealand's action to the security interets of the USand its allies? Should the US do anything in an open andhonorable way to try and persuade the Government andpeople of New Zealand to reconsider their position?

84

RESOLUTION BY THE US HOUSE OFREPRESENTATIVES

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Sen-ate concurring),

Section 1. Obligations Under the ANZUSTreaty.

It is the sense of the Congress that so long as NewZealand is not fulfilling all its responsibilities under theSecurity Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and theUnited States of America-

(1) the United States should consult with the otherparties to that Treaty, the Governments of Australia andNew Zealand, with a view toward convincing the Gov-ernment of New Zealand to change its present policy re-garding visits by United States naval vessels; and

(2) if a successful resolution of this issue is notachieved, the United States should then consult with theGovernment of Australia about formally terminating thatTreaty, while continuing to fully maintain, on a bilateralbasis, security relations between the United States andAustralia in accordance with the terms of that Treatv.

Section 2. Maintaining Friendly Political andEconomic Relations.

It is further the sense of the Congress that theUnited States should maintain the sort of friendly politi-cal and economic ties with New Zealand which theUnited States maintains with many countries whichshare our democratic commitments and values and withwhich the United States may not have (ooperative secu-rity relationship.

85

Appendix E

The Australian LaborParty's Platform

on Disarmament

6. DISARMAMENT

The threat of nuclear war is a threat to the existenceof humanity. If it should occur, no country will escapethe devastating consequences, the full extent of whichare incalculable, but are likely to go beyond the immedi-ate effects of nuclear explosions to include a climatic ca-tastrophe of monstrous proportions.

The struggle against this threat should not be leftjust to the superpowers and the other nuclear weaponsstates. Since all nations would suffer from their folly, allnations have the right to be involved in seeking to avertthe danger.

Source: Australian Labor Party Platform Constitution andRules as Approved by the 36th National Conference,Canberra 1984. Published by R. F. McMullan, NationalSecretary, Australian Labor Party (Burton, AustralianCapital Territory, 1984).

87

I I I I I Il - _

The upsurge of anger and trustrations among ordi-nary people throughout the world against the nuclearmadness is justified. ()nv it ordinary people demon-strate consistentlhy their insisten( e that this madness bestopped will the ,vorldt's leaders mo)ve to take action tobring it to a halt.

for the A t, tralian I ai)()( (,) ernminent, there (an beno higher pririt\ tha, ,it( lear arms ( tititrol and disarm-ament. If we tail in this,. %%c ,il oin e\t hing.

General and ( ()pifetc (iarmrniametnt i, the onlh \' ato eliminate the threat ()I ilti( lear war. lhis,\ wasrecognised in the Report ()I the lailme ( )mnision aridis a view supported b% the I al()r ( Poivernment.

As the Palme ()mnlissi nin als(o re (ognse, total niu-clear disarmamernt will not ( orme either quic klv or bI

unilateral action, but onlv I)v negotiation and agree-merit. It is therefore imperative that while the Gov-ernment pursues vigorously the goal of total nucleardisarmament, it should also support in the interim themost stable nuclear balance attainable. The Governmentshould oppose all technological developments and stra-tegic nuclear doctrines which destabilise that balance.For this reason, the Government rejects doc trine, of nu-clear war-fighting and limited nuclear war: nu( tlear v,'arcannot be limited and cannot he won.

Labor supports a mutual and verifiable treee on nu-clear weapons testing, production and development as ameans of breaking the upward spiral ot the arms rma e.

A freeze on nuclear weapons should be only thefirst step. It must be followed by negotiations whic h aimfor deep cuts in the high stock piles of nu( lear weapon,,.The immediate goal must be the most stable possiblebalance at the lowest possible level ot nu( lear weapns;

88

the ultimate goal must remain their completeelimination.

The Australian Labor government will seek to de-velop regional initiatives to pursue the cause of nucleardisarmament including regional conferences and otherinitiatives in support of the creation of nuclear freezones in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and South EastAsia.

Finally Labor recognises the importance of the activeinvolvement of all sections of the labour movement indiscussions and serious dialogue with the peace move-ment and action to promote understanding and create apositive climate for nuclear disarmament and support forpositive new government initiatives towards this mostcrucial goal.

89

The Author

Dora Alves was born in England and educated at St.Anne's College, Oxiord University. She holds graduatedegrees from American University and the Catholic Uni-versity of America. As a naval analyst she has specializedfor some years in Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacificarea. Dr. Alves has travelled and le(tured in Australiaand the Pacific region. She is the author of numerous ar-ticles and of the definitive ihe ANZIJS PartnersGeorgetown Univerfity Center for Strategic and Interna-

tional Studies, 1984).

91

UNCLASSIFIED F/G 5/4 *.

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11125 f11.4 1-16

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ANTI-NUIFAR AITIIuIIms

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Composed with text and display lines in OptimaCover art by Laszlo [. Bodrogi

Figure and map mechanicals by lames L. Price

Special Credits

Editorial Reader: Captain Herbert Smith,US Air Force Academy

NDU Press Editor: George C. Maerz

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Lieutenant General Richard D. Lawrence, US ArmyPresident

THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Colonel John E. Endicott, US Air Force

Acting Director

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Frederick Kiley, Director

Colonel Robert Kvederas, USA Joseph E. GoldbergAssociate Director Professor of Research

Lieutenant Monica M. Cain, USNDeputy Director for Administrationi

Laura W. Hall, Executiv'e Secretary Ken Robinson. Office ManagerCecelia Giles, Office Assistant Yvette Hemphill. Office Assistant

Major Donald Anderson, USAFDeputy Director for Production

George C. Maerz, Senior Editor

Dora Alves, Writer-Editor Janis Bren Hietala. Writer-EditorThomas Gill. Writer-Editor Edward H. Seneff 11, Writer Editor

L. J. Conk, Production Superrisor

Pat Williams, Lead Editorial Clerk Carol A. Valentine. Editorial ClerkDorothy M. Mack, Editorial Clerk

TF ATE

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