Understanding Risk Understanding Risk Perception’s Role in the Four Perception’s Role in the Four

Phases of Emergency Phases of Emergency ManagementManagement

FEMAFEMA 10th Annual All-Hazards Emergency 10th Annual All-Hazards Emergency

Management Higher Education ConferenceManagement Higher Education Conference June 4-7, 2007June 4-7, 2007

Emergency Management InstituteEmergency Management Institute

Emmitsburg, MDEmmitsburg, MD

What is Risk? What is Risk?

Multiple Definitions and Multiple Multiple Definitions and Multiple Measures of Assessing RiskMeasures of Assessing Risk

(Probability of an Accident) X (Losses per Accident)(Probability of an Accident) X (Losses per Accident)

R=P (of the Event) X C (Consequences)R=P (of the Event) X C (Consequences)

Risk = Hazard + OutrageRisk = Hazard + Outrage

Case Fatality Rates v. Incidence RatesCase Fatality Rates v. Incidence Rates

The Great Debate: Quantitative v. QualitativeThe Great Debate: Quantitative v. Qualitative

Objective v. Subjective Objective v. Subjective

Risk Perception Risk Perception

Psychometric ModelPsychometric Model Subjective ExperienceSubjective Experience Socially Constructed Socially Constructed Expert/Lay EvaluationsExpert/Lay Evaluations

What are…What are…

The most dangerous occupations? The most dangerous occupations? The most deadly diseases? The most deadly diseases? The most likely criminal threats?The most likely criminal threats? The most dangerous disasters and/or The most dangerous disasters and/or

emergencies? emergencies?

Reconciling Fact and Reconciling Fact and PerceptionPerception

Most Frequent Work-Related Fatalities. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2005)

Fact v. Fiction Fact v. Fiction

Difference in Workplace Fatality Counts. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2005)

Fatality Rates by OccupationFatality Rates by Occupation

Fatality Rates by Occupation. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2005)

The Numbers GameThe Numbers Game

Number and Rate of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (2005)

The Subjective Experience and The Subjective Experience and Risk Risk

Outrage FactorOutrage Factor More Accepted RisksMore Accepted Risks Less Accepted RisksLess Accepted Risks

VoluntarinessVoluntariness VoluntaryVoluntary ImposedImposed

ControllabilityControllability Under an Individual’s Under an Individual’s ControlControl

Controlled by OthersControlled by Others

BenefitsBenefits Clear BenefitsClear Benefits Little or No BenefitLittle or No Benefit

EquityEquity Distributed FairlyDistributed Fairly Distributed UnfairlyDistributed Unfairly

Natural v. Human OriginNatural v. Human Origin NaturalNatural Human CausedHuman Caused

Catastrophic PotentialCatastrophic Potential Random, Scattered EffectsRandom, Scattered Effects Fatalities/Injuries Fatalities/Injuries CentralizedCentralized

Trust in SourceTrust in Source Generated by a Trusted Generated by a Trusted SourceSource

Generated by Distrusted Generated by Distrusted SourceSource

FamiliarityFamiliarity FamiliarFamiliar ExoticExotic

Age of VictimsAge of Victims Affects AdultsAffects Adults Affects ChildrenAffects Children

UnderstandingUnderstanding Self-ExplanatorySelf-Explanatory Poorly UnderstoodPoorly Understood

UncertaintyUncertainty Relatively Known to ScienceRelatively Known to Science Relatively Relatively Unknown/UncertainUnknown/Uncertain

DreadDread Little or no Fear, Terror, Little or no Fear, Terror, AnxietyAnxiety

Evokes Fear, Terror, AnxietyEvokes Fear, Terror, Anxiety

ReversibilityReversibility Reversible Adverse EffectsReversible Adverse Effects Potentially IrreversiblePotentially Irreversible

Personal StakePersonal Stake No Direct Personal ThreatNo Direct Personal Threat Places People Directly at Places People Directly at RiskRisk

Victim IdentityVictim Identity Produces Statistical VictimsProduces Statistical Victims Produces Identifiable Produces Identifiable VictimsVictims

Ethical/Moral NatureEthical/Moral Nature Not Perceived to be ImmoralNot Perceived to be Immoral Ethically ObjectionableEthically Objectionable

Subjective Factors that Influence Risk Perception. Source: Northwest Center for Public Health (2007)

Quantifying Perceived Risk: Expert v. Quantifying Perceived Risk: Expert v. Layperson PerceptionLayperson Perception

Risk of DeathRisk of Death LaypersonLayperson ExpertExpert

Nuclear Nuclear PowerPower

11 2020

SmokingSmoking 44 11

X-RaysX-Rays 2222 77

Electric PowerElectric Power 1818 99

Police WorkPolice Work 88 1717

AlcoholAlcohol 66 33

Mountain Mountain ClimbingClimbing

1515 2929Adapted from Ordering of Perceived Risk for 20 Activities and Technologies. Source: Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read et al (1979)

Risk Perceptions, Risk Perceptions, Consequences, and Consequences, and

Communication: the Explosion Communication: the Explosion at JWR, Inc.’s No. 5 Mineat JWR, Inc.’s No. 5 MineSeptember 23, 2001September 23, 2001

Brookwood, AlabamaBrookwood, Alabama

BackgroundBackgroundMine No. 5 and JWR, Inc.Mine No. 5 and JWR, Inc.

Mine No. 5 is the Mine No. 5 is the deepest vertical shaft deepest vertical shaft in North Americain North America

2,140 feet deep2,140 feet deep Over 9 miles longOver 9 miles long Runs along the Blue Runs along the Blue

Creek coal seamCreek coal seam Opened in 1979, Opened in 1979,

closed in 2006closed in 2006

Considered one of the Considered one of the most “gassy” mines in most “gassy” mines in the U.S. the U.S.

Owned and operated Owned and operated by Jim Walters by Jim Walters Resources, Inc. Resources, Inc.

Company has annual Company has annual payroll >100 million payroll >100 million dollars, employs dollars, employs >1400, and produces >1400, and produces 7 million tons of coal 7 million tons of coal each year each year

The AccidentThe Accident

Sunday, September 23, 2001Sunday, September 23, 2001 Idle maintenance dayIdle maintenance day Less than 10% of the normal workforce was Less than 10% of the normal workforce was

working the 3-11 shift (32 workers in the working the 3-11 shift (32 workers in the mine)mine)

Miners working in unfamiliar areas of the mineMiners working in unfamiliar areas of the mine Accident occurred during “normal” cribbing Accident occurred during “normal” cribbing

activitiesactivities Components of a normal accident led to a Components of a normal accident led to a

double explosiondouble explosion

The First ExplosionThe First Explosion Roof collapses in section 4, onto a scoop Roof collapses in section 4, onto a scoop

battery (5:10 P.M.)battery (5:10 P.M.) Shortly thereafter, the arching battery Shortly thereafter, the arching battery

ignited a large amount of methane gas, ignited a large amount of methane gas, causing an explosion (5:20 P.M.)causing an explosion (5:20 P.M.)

No one killed during this explosionNo one killed during this explosion Three miners sustained minor or moderate Three miners sustained minor or moderate

injuries and one miner was seriously injuries and one miner was seriously injuredinjured

Human error, lack of communication, and Human error, lack of communication, and operator failure (JWR’s) contributed to a operator failure (JWR’s) contributed to a second more powerful explosionsecond more powerful explosion

CommunicationCommunication

Miner involved in first explosion contacted the Miner involved in first explosion contacted the control office (CO) within ten minutes of the control office (CO) within ten minutes of the explosion and advised:explosion and advised:

that there had been an explosionthat there had been an explosion section 4 was damagedsection 4 was damaged there was a large amount of gas/dust presentthere was a large amount of gas/dust present one man was badly injured one man was badly injured that all electrical currents should be turned offthat all electrical currents should be turned off

Lack of CommunicationLack of Communication

CO contacted 911, supervisors, and CO contacted 911, supervisors, and Lifeflight, but lost contact with minersLifeflight, but lost contact with miners

Asked a supervisor at the other end of Asked a supervisor at the other end of the shaft (40 minutes away) to the shaft (40 minutes away) to investigateinvestigate

Did not issue a mine-wide evacuation or Did not issue a mine-wide evacuation or indicate to the 28 other miners in the indicate to the 28 other miners in the mine that they were in imminent dangermine that they were in imminent danger

Best IntentionsBest Intentions

After the first explosion, with limited After the first explosion, with limited knowledge of what occurred and knowledge of what occurred and little guidance from the command little guidance from the command office, 12 miners who were in office, 12 miners who were in unaffected areas of the mine rushed unaffected areas of the mine rushed to the aid of the sole injured miner to the aid of the sole injured miner remaining in section 4 remaining in section 4

The Second ExplosionThe Second Explosion

Occurred nearly an hour after the first Occurred nearly an hour after the first (6:15 P.M.)(6:15 P.M.)

An energized track haulage block light An energized track haulage block light system ignited the second explosionsystem ignited the second explosion

Second explosion fueled in part by the Second explosion fueled in part by the large amount of methane gas large amount of methane gas released during the roof collapse and released during the roof collapse and first explosionfirst explosion

The AftermathThe Aftermath

List of Injured Miners. Source: United Mine Workers of America (2002)

The AftermathThe Aftermath

Area Affected by Explosions. Source: United States Mine Rescue Association ( 2002)

Two Versions of Cause and Two Versions of Cause and BlameBlameUMWAUMWA

A failure to adequately control the mine A failure to adequately control the mine roofroof

A failure to have the mine properly A failure to have the mine properly examined for hazardsexamined for hazards

A failure to properly vent the mineA failure to properly vent the mine A failure of the mine operator to comply A failure of the mine operator to comply

with the Mine Act and a failure of the with the Mine Act and a failure of the MSHA to effectively enforce the Mine ActMSHA to effectively enforce the Mine Act

UMWA’s Accident Findings. Source: UMWA’s Report on JWR’s No. 5 Mine Accident (2002)

Two Versions of Cause and Two Versions of Cause and BlameBlameMHSAMHSA

Failure of JWR to:Failure of JWR to: DDetermine the seriousness of the roof etermine the seriousness of the roof

conditions at Section 4conditions at Section 4 Failure to contain rock dustFailure to contain rock dust Failure to adequately inspect mineFailure to adequately inspect mine Failure to initiate a mine-wide evacuationFailure to initiate a mine-wide evacuation Failure to de-energize all electrical circuits Failure to de-energize all electrical circuits

entering Section 4entering Section 4

MSHA Accident Findings. Source: John R. Correll, Deputy Assistant Secretary, MHSA (2002)

Fall OutFall Out Internal investigation of MHSA District Internal investigation of MHSA District

1111 Emergency Temporary Standard issued Emergency Temporary Standard issued

nationwide on December 12, 2002nationwide on December 12, 2002 Nearly $500,000 in fines levied by Nearly $500,000 in fines levied by

MHSA at JWR, Inc.MHSA at JWR, Inc. Multiple lawsuits on behalf of Multiple lawsuits on behalf of

decedent’s family members— settled decedent’s family members— settled out of court in 2005out of court in 2005

Mine closure in December, 2006Mine closure in December, 2006

Emergency Temporary Emergency Temporary StandardStandard

Requires that a designated Requires that a designated responsible person take charge in responsible person take charge in any mine emergency and evacuate any mine emergency and evacuate the mine if there is imminent danger the mine if there is imminent danger to the minersto the miners

Only properly trained and equipped Only properly trained and equipped persons essential to respond to the persons essential to respond to the emergency may remain undergroundemergency may remain underground

FATALGRAMFATALGRAM

Best PracticesAlways ensure that the roof and ribs are stable at electrical installations.

Ensure that stoppings are well constructed and maintained.

Ensure that roof and ribs are closely evaluated during the required examinations and always be aware of changing conditions.

Fatalgram, JWR Inc.’s No. 5 Mining Accident. Source: MSHA (2002)

What Does this Mean for What Does this Mean for Emergency Management? Emergency Management?

Understanding risk perception helps the EM Understanding risk perception helps the EM understand public prioritiesunderstand public priorities

The EM becomes cognizant of how risk perception The EM becomes cognizant of how risk perception impacts behaviorimpacts behavior

The EM better understands risk amplification and The EM better understands risk amplification and attenuationattenuation

Understanding risk perception is important when Understanding risk perception is important when developing appropriate education and developing appropriate education and communication strategiescommunication strategies

Risk Perception and Emergency Management. Source: Adapted from Clinton Jenkin’s Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm

(2006)

What Does this Mean for What Does this Mean for Higher Education? Higher Education?

Additions to Curriculum: Additions to Curriculum:

Social PsychologySocial Psychology CommunicationCommunication EpidemiologyEpidemiology Occupational Health and SafetyOccupational Health and Safety

Communicating RiskCommunicating Risk

Know Your AudienceKnow Your Audience Don’t be Afraid to Frighten PeopleDon’t be Afraid to Frighten People Acknowledge UncertaintyAcknowledge Uncertainty Share DilemmasShare Dilemmas Give People Things to DoGive People Things to Do Speculate — ResponsiblySpeculate — Responsibly Stress Magnitude Rather than ProbabilityStress Magnitude Rather than Probability Release Messages Early and with CandorRelease Messages Early and with Candor Guide Adjustment Reaction — “New Guide Adjustment Reaction — “New

Normal”Normal”Communicating Risk. Source: Perspectives in Health Magazine (PAHO), Peter Sandman and Jody Lanard (2005)

Questions? Comments? Questions? Comments?

References References Jenkin, C. (2006) Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm. Jenkin, C. (2006) Risk Perception and Terrorism: Applying the Psychometric Paradigm. Homeland Security Affairs. 2Homeland Security Affairs. 2 (2). 1-12. (2). 1-12.

Retrieved March 1, 2007, from Retrieved March 1, 2007, from http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.2.6http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=2.2.6..

Northwest Center for Public Health. (2007) Northwest Center for Public Health. (2007) Risk CommunicationRisk Communication. Retrieved April 20, 2007, from. Retrieved April 20, 2007, from http://www.nwcphp.org/riskcomm/intro_erc/resources/ofactor.htmlhttp://www.nwcphp.org/riskcomm/intro_erc/resources/ofactor.html

Sandman, P.M., & Lanard, J. (2005). Bird Flu: Communicating the Risks. Sandman, P.M., & Lanard, J. (2005). Bird Flu: Communicating the Risks. Perspectives in Health, 10Perspectives in Health, 10 (2), 2-9. (2), 2-9.

Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. (1979). Rating the Risks. Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B. & Lichtenstein, S. (1979). Rating the Risks. Environment 2Environment 2 (3). 14-20. Revised in Slovic, P. (ed). (2000). (3). 14-20. Revised in Slovic, P. (ed). (2000). The Perception of RiskThe Perception of Risk. Sterling, VA: Earthscan.. Sterling, VA: Earthscan.

United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2005). United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2005). Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Charts 1992-Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries Charts 1992-20052005. Retrieved. Retrieved May 1, 2007, from http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#chartsMay 1, 2007, from http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#charts

United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2002, December 11). United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2002, December 11). DOL News Release,DOL News Release, USDL USDL (02-689). Retrieved March 2, 2007, from (02-689). Retrieved March 2, 2007, from http://www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2002/NR021211http://www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2002/NR021211, HTM, HTM

United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2002, December 11). United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2002, December 11). Report of Investigation: Report of Investigation: Fatal Underground Coal Mine Explosion September 23, 2001.Fatal Underground Coal Mine Explosion September 23, 2001. Retrieved February 27, 2007, from http: Retrieved February 27, 2007, from http: www.msha.gov/fatals/2001/jwr5/ft101c2032light.pdfwww.msha.gov/fatals/2001/jwr5/ft101c2032light.pdf

United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2003, January 24). United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Administration. (2003, January 24). Internal Review of MSHA’s Internal Review of MSHA’s Actions at the No. 5 Mine Jim Walter Resources, Inc. Brookwood, Tuscaloosa County, AlabamaActions at the No. 5 Mine Jim Walter Resources, Inc. Brookwood, Tuscaloosa County, Alabama. Retrieved February 28, . Retrieved February 28, 2007, from http: 2007, from http: www.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2003/MSHA-IR-JWR5.pdfwww.msha.gov/MEDIA/PRESS/2003/MSHA-IR-JWR5.pdf

United States Mine Rescue Association (n.d.). United States Mine Rescue Association (n.d.). Death Underground.Death Underground. Retrieved February 26, 2007, from http:// Retrieved February 26, 2007, from http:// www.msha.gov/REGS/FEDREG/FINAL/2002finl/02-31358.htmwww.msha.gov/REGS/FEDREG/FINAL/2002finl/02-31358.htm

United Mine Workers of America, Department of Occupational Health and Safety (n.d.). United Mine Workers of America, Department of Occupational Health and Safety (n.d.). Jim Walter Resources #5 Coal Mine Jim Walter Resources #5 Coal Mine Disaster: September 23, 1001.Disaster: September 23, 1001. Retrieved march 1, 2007, from Retrieved march 1, 2007, from http://www.umwa.org/brookwood/UMWA_JWR_Report.pdfhttp://www.umwa.org/brookwood/UMWA_JWR_Report.pdf