unconventional hydrocarbon controversies in france and...

Sébastien Chailleux – ECPR 2015

Sébastien Chailleux

Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po Bordeaux, Université de Bordeaux et EDSP2

Département de sociologie, Université Laval de Québec

[email protected]

ECPR, Montréal, 2015

Unconventional hydrocarbon controversies in France and Quebec: containment of arguments and policy

framing

Introduction

Shale gas and shale oil started to be of interest in the early 2000s, mainly in the United States, due to technical

innovation and the increasing price of gas and oil. The exploitation of these bedrock hydrocarbons1 requires the

combined techniques of hydraulic fracturing (a.k.a. fracking) and horizontal drillings. France and Quebec are thought to

possess extensive resources (US Department of Energy, 2013) that companies have wanted to explore and extract since

the late 2000s. The eventuality of such exploitation created a controversy on the environmental and social impacts of

this industry. In fact, while in the USA and western Canada, shale gas and shale oil are considered an economic

opportunity, in France and Quebec, they were constructed as an environmental threat.

State of the art

Chateauraynaud (2011), Chateauraynaud and Debaz (2012), Terral (2012) have described the flash mobilization in

France in spring 2011, while Chateauraynaud and Zittoun (2014) explained how the ban on hydraulic fracturing resulted

from the loss of the argumentative struggle by the industry’s proponents. In Quebec, Batellier and Sauvé (2011)

showed the main stakes of the initial controversy. In the 2014 strategic environmental assessment (SEA), three

sociological studies showed the lack of social acceptability in a multidimensional frame (Fortin and Fournis, 2013), the

negative public opinion towards the gas industry (Montpetit and Lachapelle, 2013) and the across the associative

spectrum dimension of the Quebecker mobilization (Bherer et al., 2013). Those studies focused on a short timeline to

describe the mobilization. My goal in this paper is to extend the description of the controversy over time to understand

how its frame evolves with the institutional instruments mandated to assess the risks and opportunities of shale gas

exploitation and how the controversy spillovers on unconventional hydrocarbons and mining legislation.

Public policy on shale gas and research question

1 Bedrock hydrocarbons regroup shale gas, shale oil, coalbed methane and tar sands, they are considered as unconventional hydrocarbons because they are not in localized reservoirs and need particular techniques to extract them from the bedrock (a sedimentary rock which produces hydrocarbons from decomposing marine algae buried, pressured and heated underground).


In Quebec, shale gas is first framed as an economic opportunity by the Liberal Government which supported the

industry through tax reductions and a friendly legal frame. Shale gas is explored since 2006 and a first wells produced

gas in 2008 in Becancour. However, no impacts studies were done and no regulation framed the use of hydraulic

fracturing. The Government was then pressured to mandate public hearings (Bureau d’Audiences Publiques sur

l’Environnement or BAPE: Bureau of public hearings on the Environment) in 2010 after a year of growing protests from

local committees and ENGO. The controversy is framed here as an issue of social license to operate. The BAPE led to a

de facto moratorium during the administrative assessment of the industry but did not constitute a clear political

decision. The BAPE committee concluded in 2011 to the lack of knowledge and refused to advice for a legal frame.

Instead, it asked for the creation of a strategic environmental assessment (SEA) which worked from May 2011 to

January 2014 and produced more than 70 studies on various aspects of the industry. Social mobilization continued

during the SEA with popular campaigns stressing the rejection of the industry by the local population and through

municipal regulation (the Reglement Saint Bonaventure) which prohibited underground chemicals injection nearby

water wells (passed by a hundred of municipalities). In 2012, the Parti Québécois was elected and the Marois

Government promised a 5-year moratorium but was unable to pass it. Instead it passed a reform of the subsurface

mineral right which gives a little bit more power to municipalities on land use decision. The Liberals came back to

govern in 2014 and reformed the water protection regulation which precludes municipal bylaws to regulate oil and gas

companies water intakes and frames the use of hydraulic fracturing (allowing it in low density areas). Based on new

scientific evidences, new public hearings occurred in 2014 with a wider scope on the opportunity of the shale gas

industry. This second BAPE advised the Government not to strive towards this industry because of social unacceptance,

economic unprofitability and environmental risks. Finally after five years of protests, opponents saw their claims on

shale gas recognized in the institutional forum. However, even then, there is no legal moratorium on shale gas in

Quebec, the industry is only put on the ice based on social unacceptability of the project and economic unprofitability

of the industry due to a low price of gas in North America.

In France, the controversy started with social mobilization in early 20112. Shale gas licenses have been issued in 2010

and shale oil licenses since 2008. The Government first mandated an administrative committee to assess the industry

but, with the growing social unrest, Representatives started their own informative committee and drafted bills to ban

unconventional hydrocarbons exploration. Finally, the UMP’s bill from C. Jacob passed which only framed hydraulic

fracturing as a threat. The controversy is here framed as a technological risk. Within 6 months, shale gas went from an

unknown resource to the media headlines and the object of a bill. The ban locked out any possibility to exploit shale gas

and even weakened the conventional hydrocarbons industry by casting distrust on oil and gas projects. This led to the

activation of a pro-exploration coalition which tried to preserve the possibility of exploring hydrocarbons without using

hydraulic fracturing. This coalition tried to reopen the debate through the publication of various reports but they did

not succeed. The ban nevertheless did not address two other claims purported by opponents which are the necessary

reform of the subsurface mineral right and the question of energy orientations.

2 Social mobilization was ignited by Green Representatives in Southern France which was targeted by shale gas licenses but the controversy rapidly concerned local committees of citizens, municipal councils and ENGO. The controversy spread to the Paris basin concerned by shale oil licenses. Opponents stressed the opacity of the decision process and also the uncertainty about the environmental and social risks related to hydraulic fracturing and the whole shale industry for agricultural and tourism-oriented lands.


We faced two apparently opposed political and social processes: In France, the public problem is the technique used to

extract shale gas. French representatives first took a harsh stance when they banned hydraulic fracturing pressured by

social mobilization but without neither much consultation nor scientific state of the art. Then some of them tried to

reopen the controversy through technical assessments of alternative techniques. In Quebec, the public problem is the

social license to operate. Public hearings were at the heart of the institutional process but the Liberal Government

framed narrowly the debate over the economic opportunity. The SEA then included some of the opponents’ concerns

and concluded to a weak economic profitability and to the threat the industry lies on GHG emissions. The second public

hearings finally discredited the industry as no social acceptance is met. In both countries, the final decision is the non-

development of shale gas extraction (through a technical ban in France and social refutability in Quebec). However, it is

striking to see how similar arguments did not enter the institutional forum the same way while purported by relatively

similar actors, and, on the other hand, it is interesting to show if there is some differences in the storylines of the

stakeholders, both proponents and opponents to shale gas.

I thus seek to answer the following question: why the French opponents successfully saw their discourse over hydraulic

fracturing translated into policy while the Quebecker opponents waited five years to obtain a similar outcome (without

any clear policy decided yet), whereas both used quite the same argumentation? I demonstrate first that the weight of

the argumentation in the public debate is closely related to the position and power of its bearer. Then I also show that

the narratives struggles occurred in multiple levels over time and that the apparent success of the opponents on shale

gas silenced their claims over governance reform and energy orientation.

Theoretical approach

I used the concept of discourse coalition (Hajer, 1993) to frame the stakeholders under two umbrellas: one regroups

the proponents of the industry, the other the opponents. “A discourse coalition is the ensemble of a set of story lines,

the actors that utters these story lines, and the practices that conform to these story lines, all organized around a

discourse.” (Hajer, 1993: 47). I described how the coalitions are constructed in both cases and how they evolved over

time. I also analyzed which storylines are the most powerful to influence public policies by tracing them through the

diverse reports and policies implemented between 2009 and 2015.

Methodology

This study is based on 24 semi-directive interviews recorded in 2012 and 2013 in France and 16 interviews recorded in

2013 in Quebec, on communication documents (pamphlets, reports and websites) from the stakeholders involved and

on almost 2400 press articles in six newspapers (2009 to 2012). I selected a sample of representative stakeholders for

each category (companies, activists, elected officials, experts) based on their discourse, modes of action, and presence

in the debate. I sought to understand their influence on public decision by isolating their arguments and looking for

them in the media and the official documentation. The discourse coalitions are produced given the interviewees

responses which allow the categorization into two separate sides. I also backed the categorization on the storylines

bear by actors in the media and, for the Quebec case, on the memoirs sent to the 2010 BAPE.


I then compare the institutional instruments used to manage the controversy in France and Quebec. I selected the

various committees mandated to assess the issue and the legal reforms engaged to frame issues related to the shale

gas controversy.

Instruments of public action: Quebec : -Report 273 of Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement [bureau of public hearings on the environment] (BAPE, 2011) -Report 307 du BAPE (BAPE, 2014) -Strategic environmental assessment (EES, 2014) -Reform of the subsurface mineral right (Loi 70, 2013) -Reform of the water protection regulation (RPEP3, 2014) France : -Parliamentary information mission: report Gonnot-Martin (2011) -Legislative committee on the bill no 3301: report Havard-Chanteguet (2011) -Jacob Act prohibiting the use of hydraulic fracturing (Loi 835, 2011) -Information mission of the Conseil général de l’industrie, de l’énergie et des technologies [General council of industry, energy and technology] (CGIET) and the Conseil général de l’environnement et du développement durable [General council of the environment and sustainable development] (CGEDD) (CGIET/CGEDD, 2012) -Information mission of the Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques [Parliamentary bureau of scientific and technological choices assessment] (OPECST, 2013)

Two analyses are conduced when the instrument gave birth to a report, a qualitative one which underlines the

discourses and narratives of the reports, and a quantitative one which focuses on the 1100 interviews and 1385

bibliographical sources of the reports. I categorize the interviews and the references given the status of the sources:

administration, industry, association, science, law or media.

Major facts Quebec France 2008: Shale gas is produced in Bécancour 2004: Licenses for coalbed methane are granted 2009: AQLPA asks for a moratorium 2010: Licenses for shale gas are granted 2010: The first BAPE is mandated / creation of multiple local citizens’ committees

2011: Protests arisen / local governments support the opposition / Jacob Act prohibits hydraulic fracturing / Cancelation of the controversial licenses

2011: Publication of the BAPE report / start of the SEA / multiplication of protests

2012: Election of the F. Hollande and the Parti Socialiste

2012: Maple Spring and electoral defeat of the Liberals 2013: Second report on the mineral right reform / Publication of various pro industry reports

2013: Mineral right reform by the Parti Québécois (Marois Government)

2014: Election of the Liberal Couillard Government / Publication of the SEA report and the second BAPE report / Reform of the Water Protection Regulation

This paper first describes the discourse coalitions engaged in the controversy and what kind of narratives they bear. I

then analyze how the instruments of public action reframed the controversy in both cases and what kind of narratives

they supported. The final discussion tackles the issue of the impacts of both discourse coalitions on the overall public

policy concerning unconventional hydrocarbons and mining legislation (which applies to the hydrocarbons industry).

The discourse coalitions in the controversy

The shale gas controversy materializes a divide between two coalitions of stakeholders and actors. The divide is

different in France and in Quebec but the same storylines can be found amongst actors with different weight in the

3 Règlement sur les Prélèvements d’Eau et leur Protection : Water intakes and protection regulation


public debate. I highlight those storylines from the discourse supported by the stakeholders I interviewed and from the

press analysis and the various documents published by the actors of the controversy. I am therefore able to point out

two discourse coalitions which can be described on two layers: a first one strictly focuses on the shale gas controversy,

the second one embeds more general worldviews on energy and development model which are mobilized to

strengthen and linked together the arguments over shale gas.

France, a weak argumentation from a small pro-exploration coalition

In France, at the beginning of the controversy in the end of 2010, the shale gas industry is not supported by many

actors. In fact, its opportunity is weak and it concerned only 3 licenses. However, the shale oil industry is more

important with a dozen of licenses and nearly 40 under assessment. Some civil-servants and scientists from specialized

research centers spoke out to show the necessity of allowing the exploration but they were silenced by the political

necessity of calming down the social mobilization. The discourse favorable to shale gas was mainly based on the

American experience at that time. The media analysis shows that the shales industry is considered as a new Eldorado

that could provide jobs, royalties and an improvement of the trade balance. In the aftermath of the 2008 subprime

crisis, the economic growth that could lie underground is seen by some proponents as an opportunity to seize upon. A

study from Sia Partners tried to assess those economic benefits but the figures were based on mostly unknown actual

resources and soon became quite controversial. With no actual data on the amount of resources recoverable,

proponents lacked argumentative capacity to impose the economic opportunity behind the shale gas industry.

The other major storyline at the beginning of the controversy is about hydraulic fracturing which is deemed well-

mastered by oil and gas companies. Engineers and geologists tried to voice their opposition to the opponents’ discourse

framing this technique as a new dangerous way of exploiting dirtier sources of fossil-fuels. Those actors were attacked

on their know-how and tried to replicate by underlining the decade-long use of fracking and the few accidents compare

to the high number of wells drilled in the USA. This storyline, supported by professionals, was not purported by top

officials when the social mobilization grew and when it became salient that a ban on hydraulic fracturing was the only

way to demobilize the opponents. Following the literature on blame avoidance (Weaver, 1986), policymakers faced an

issue of uncertainty and they took a harsh stance based on precaution principle to avoid further question of their ability

to prevent public health and environmental risks. This technical defense of the industry did not compete with the more

global argumentation from the opponents and did not resonate in the media either once the social mobilization grew

bigger. However, this technical storyline came to be supported in the official reports. Once the alert on fracking is gone,

the technical argumentation came back to the surface to try to impose a “neutral” assessment of the risks.

Both storylines, technical and economic, can be found in the CGIET-CGEDD report, mandated in February 2011 but only

published in March 2012, and they were debated during the discussion over the ban between April and June 2011.

During those debates, uncertainty over hydraulic fracturing overcame the potential benefits of the shales industry. The

ban is thus seen as a way of cooling down the social mobilization of ENGO, local authorities and committees and a

general disapproval of the industry. With no established companies, the shales industry was only virtual at that time,

and the ban did not hurt any important economic interests. The ban of hydraulic fracturing is thus seen as a good


political solution because it narrows down the frame only on a technological risk, preserves the conventional

hydrocarbon industry and delays the reform of the subsurface mineral right.

A majority of Representatives passed the ban on hydraulic fracturing but on the right-wing as well as on the left-wing,

supporters of shale industry become louder afterward. The ban activated a pro-exploration coalition gathering mostly

representatives, scientists and engineers from research centers and professional associations. The gas companies tried

to respond to the ban through legal actions (Total attempted to claim its Montelimar license back, Schuepbach sued the

ban up to the Constitutional Council but without success) but they soon stopped communicating about shale gas,

preferring to defend their conventional oil and gas licenses4. In fact, only a partial application of the ban is implemented

since 2011, experimentation and exploration are not supported by policymakers while a strict prohibition of hydraulic

fracturing and a harsh assessment of the oil and gas licenses are put in place. The pro exploration coalition then tried to

influence a more favorable climate over the hydrocarbon industry. This coalition was particularly active to influence

various reports published on shale gas from 2012 to 2015 (Gallois report, 2012, Académie des sciences, 2013, OPECST,

2013, Montebourg report, 2015). Analyzing those reports, we note that they called upon quasi exclusively oil and gas

companies and their professional association to assess the industry: the majority of the people heard are from the pros’

coalition, and the majority of the references came from the same actors. So those reports tried to deny the opponents

the right to influence the policy, they excluded most of the anti fracking coalition members from the debate. In the end,

those reports supported a pro-unconventional hydrocarbons stance and advised the government a cautious process of

exploring, experimenting and then exploiting if the resources are in fact present and can be extracted safely and

profitably. Although F. Hollande assured the opponents in 2012 that no further exploration would occur for the next 5

years, the Industry Minister, A. Montebourg, also tried to reopen the controversy many times. N. Sarkozy of whom

Government passed the ban in 2011 also recently declared his will of allowing shale industry if he is elected in 2017.

However, despite those the support of powerful actors, the debate over hydraulic fracturing and the shale gas industry

did not reopened since 2011.

Three other storylines emerged over time within this coalition. They can be considered more as worldviews because

they did not address only the shale gas controversy. They supported the shale gas discourse as well as they linked the

industry to other claims. The first one can be summed-up with the idea of a market-based production of energy. This is

a response to opponents who criticized the shales industry as contradictory with an energy transition towards

renewables. Most of the proponents I interviewed acknowledged the necessity of an energy transition but they

stressed the importance of pursuing the exploration of fossil-fuels to be able to cope with the international increasing

demand of energy at least until 2050. Following that point, the same actors supported the coalbed methane

exploration in Lorraine and Nord-Pas-De-Calais. Even if opposed by the same network of activists, the coalbed methane

industry does not used hydraulic fracturing and it is strongly supported locally by the different political actors. Coalbed

methane, as well as shale gas, benefits from a green image constructed by the gas industry over time to present gas as

a bridging-fuel toward renewables. Unconventional oil and gas are perceived by the proponents as a gift to overcome

the peak oil and secure economic growth.

4 Following the ban, conventional oil and gas licenses came to be opposed, and some of them had not been renewed because of social mobilization: Brignolles license in Mediterranea, Moussière license in Jura for example.


The local translation of the opportunity of a gas industry (shale gas in Ardeche vs coalbed methane in Lorraine) shows

how important the construction of a local network of supporters is. With no local supporter in the South-East, the shale

gas industry was interpreted as a top-down imposition by the central State while the same central State left the

economic development to the local administration since a couple of decades. So a major gap appeared between

tourism and agriculture-oriented areas and the Central State imposing an industrial future for those areas. In Lorraine,

the coalbed methane controversy is weaker because the industry is embedded in a regional planning over the

reindustrialization of the area supported by economic actors and political officials.

The second worldview addresses the question of the governance of the policy subsystem. Proponents did not want to

put the Code Minier upside-down. At the DGEC, a civil-servant said “the reason why the reform is not implemented is

because we [generally speaking] understand that most of the novelties we wanted to add are already integrated.”5 This

idea transpired from the debates over the reform of the Code Minier when representatives stressed the necessity to

keep the decision-making at the central State level to be able to manage the “general interest”. Only incremental

changes in the governance are supported such as upstream information for local authorities. Proponents of exploration

rather support a simplification of the licenses issuance which can take up to 18 months. While the shale gas controversy

reactivated the issue of reforming the subsurface mineral right, this solution was not supported by the proponents of

the industry. In fact, they mostly delayed this reform to cut its ties with the shale gas controversy in order to maintain a

status quo. They failed to prevent the ban on fracking but they succeeded to delay the reform, engaged in 2011 but

which is still not passed.

The third storyline is about attacking the opponents by qualifying their attitude as “obscurantism”. This rhetoric is

particularly visible in the OPECST report which denounced opponents as anti-scientific progress because they are

opposed to exploration and experimentation over alternative techniques. This is an attempt to disqualify the

opponents to reenter the debate by denying their ability to be responsible actors to discuss the future of the French

energy mix. This is also a strategic move to qualify the ban as the result of an emotional mobilization, so the reopening

of the debate appears necessary based on “neutral” technical data only the industry and research centers can provide.

The storyline is particularly present in the French debate compare to the one in Quebec.

Quebec: struggle, defeat and rebirth of the pro-exploitation coalition

In Quebec, the shale gas industry is supported by oil and gas companies gathered in their new professional association

(created in 2009). More than 20 companies shared more than 400 licenses. Few are from Quebec, they mostly came

from Western Canada, USA and Australia. They also recruited lobbyists to influence representatives at the parliament.

More than 40 lobbyists are registered at the Parliament by the oil and gas association, and a fair part of them have

been recruited amongst the ranks of the Liberal party (chief of staff of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Natural

Resources sub-ministers, etc.). Liberals (Parti Liberal du Quebec: PLQ) are clear supporters of the industry but it is also

true for Representatives of the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ), and even amongst the Parti Québécois (PQ). A majority

of Quebec Representatives criticized the governance led by Liberals but they did not directly denounce the goals of

5 Interview with a member of DGEC, november 2014


extracting fossil fuels. Liberals wished to replicate the American shales boom in according royalties exemptions in 2009

for five years. The Minister of Natural Resources spoke of “an opportunity not to be missed.” The storyline over

economic benefits is much stronger in Quebec and purported by numerous actors. Quebec was one step ahead France

in the industrial process. Exploration was done for four years and has proven the exploitation could be interesting. So

some economic actors started to build plans for their businesses, trade chambers or employers’ council supported the

industry as they saw profitability. Parapetroleum industries also supported shale gas as they saw potential economic

benefits. Same thing for some municipalities which supported the industry stressing they will bring jobs and royalties to

their local economies. The CEGEP (high school) of Thetford Mines even purported the industry based on the formation

it could offer to future industry’s employees. The importance of the economic discourse has to be put under the light of

the share of natural resources exploitation in Quebec compare to France. Even if the hydrocarbon industry is new

Quebeckers are used to exploiting minerals or forests to produce wealth. The issue is that the shale gas industry is

situated in the most populated and agricultural areas while mining industry is active mostly in the north of the province,

far from urban areas.

Interestingly enough, the storyline over the mastering of hydraulic fracturing is less blatant until the public hearings.

Proponents even underlined the necessity of improving the legal frame which is perceived weak because it did not

frame hydraulic fracturing and thus give a grasp to the critique. The companies wanted to develop “harmonious

relationships with local communities”, they stressed the importance of communicating and informing the local

population. So they supported in a certain way the critics made by opponents over the inadequate legal frame and the

lack of planning from the Liberal government (the argument over a strong legal frame to assure a safe development is

more present in the BAPE memoirs than the argument over the mastering of hydraulic fracturing). Underlining the

importance of a legal frame has to be understood as a way of securing the social license to operate which is the central

frame of the controversy in Quebec. Of course, industrial actors stressed they mastered their techniques but it is not a

core argument as it is in France.

The Liberal government also attempted to link the shale gas industry to energy transition, showing that it could favor

the development of transportation based on gas instead of oil (especially for trucks). They relied on the green discourse

that favored biomethane for decades and tried to apply it on shale gas. They followed the global discourse over gas

broadcast by the Energy Information Agency and the American Department of Energy which frame natural gas as a

bridging-fuel towards renewables. Proponents thus used the argument that the Quebec shale gas is particularly clean

and does not need refining which decreases its potential of GHG emission compare to other American shales. They also

stressed that Quebec is well connected to the North-American pipelines network and so could play a key role in

distributing its gas to its neighbors. This storyline finally failed because of the drop in the price of gas since 2009 (the

gas was at its highest level in 2008 (13$/MBTU) and it dropped at 4$/MBTU in 2009 and even 2$/MBTU at its lowest in

2012 to stabilized around 4$ since). Quebec has higher environmental and social regulation which reduces its

competitiveness with Pennsylvania which has gone all out for shale gas.

The Liberal government also purported the industry as a way of maintaining the social state in Quebec. They indirectly

responded to western provinces critics over the burden of the social spending in Quebec with are partially financed by


the interprovincial equalization (the wealth of tar sands exploitation of Alberta are partially redistributed to Quebec

through this mechanism). The proponents continued this storyline in developing identity argumentation. Following the

nomination of the former Prime Minister, Lucien Bouchard, as president of the Oil and Gas Producers of Quebec, they

framed the development of the shale gas industry as a way of shaping the identity of the province for the decades to

come, comparing shale gas to hydroelectricity which had open new territories to economic development and shaped

the identity of Quebec in the sixties (leading to the Revolution Tranquille and to the development of the independence

movement). This last storyline had echoed in the Parti Quebecois and even amongst opponents such as Daniel Breton

(an environmental activist who became shortly Minister of Environment in 2012 under the Marois government) who

opposed the private development of shale gas but who can support a public development of such resources. This will

resurface during the Marois Government (2012-2014) which will support the development of the oil industry for the

same reason.

Those proponents also relied on general worldviews that concerned more than the shale gas controversy. These

worldviews are closed to the French’s ones. The idea of a market-based energy economy is strong even amongst

moderate opponents, as for example the president of a Regional Council on the Environment said “a territory should

not be worried about having energy surplus but it should worries if it had not enough energy”6. In this view, proponents

also stressed the particular localization of Quebec in the gas pipelines network of the north eastern America. This

allowed them to defend the idea that even without much local consumption of gas, Quebec could sell its gas to the

Americans.7 This liberal worldview is stronger in Quebec that it is in France.

Then, the second worldview is based on the “staple” model developed by Hessing and Howlett (1996) showing than the

Canadian natural resources policies are shaped by an iron triangle management favoring strong relationships between

provincial-federal representatives, ministries and companies which give only a few room to local authorities and

environmental associations. This is based on the history of Canada when private companies bear the costs of “opening”

the land to settlers by exploiting natural resources to export them outside the country. This model is not explicitly

defended by the proponents of shale gas but it is actually implemented through the “Loi sur les mines” which is quite

irritating for opponents. The shale gas industry is in fact legally framed following the free mining principle which allows

oil and gas companies to expropriate owners unwilling to grant access to their lands for mining exploration. This legal

frame is even more permissive than the French one.

A final step of this coalition should be described. The institutional process over shale gas impeded the companies to

continue exploration and exploitation (a de facto moratorium applied during the public hearings and the SEA from 2010

to 2014). Furthermore, the price of gas dropped by four fold between 2008 and 2010, meaning that an exploitation of

the Quebec gas was not profitable anymore. So gas companies started to leave the province (only 14 companies’

representatives participated to the 2014 BAPE compared to 65 in 2010). However, on the same period, the oil industry

developed: the shale oil industry on Anticosti Island and the conventional oil industry in Gaspésie. Interestingly enough,

in 2012, the Liberals were defeated and the new government of the Parti Quebecois showed its opposition to shale gas

6 Interview with a member of a CRE, november 2014 77 The prime consumer of gas in Quebec is the aluminum industry which is situated outside the range of the gas pipelines network for its main part.


but it subsidized the shale oil exploration on Anticosti with 56 millions $, buying a share on the profits if an exploitation

would occurred (following on that point the idea of public benefits from the exploitation of resources). In fact, a

controversy on the circumstances of the issuance of Anticosti’s licenses was ongoing since 2008 when the State

electricity company Hydro-Quebec concluded a secret agreement with Petrolia on those licenses. In buying back a

share of the profits, the PQ Government tried to defuse opposition. The following Liberal government which came back

to power in 2014 pursued the support to the oil industry, and it passed a reform of the Water protection regulation

that allows the use of hydraulic fracturing (500m to water wells providing less than 500 people which is the case of that

island only populated by 200 inhabitants). The discourse here was that the shale gas industry was neither profitable nor

acceptable but that the exploitation of oil was still profitable and that it would concerns less inhabited area, reducing at

the same time the potential local opposition. This is the situation of the hydrocarbon industry in Quebec in 2015. The

political solution is to put the shale gas on ice because three consecutive committees have declared it unprofitable,

unacceptable and uncertain (however without a clear decision: the Prime Minister refused a moratorium). In the same

time, shale oil industry is supported while it uses the same technique but the perceived risk are lower (the Prime

Minister said that deers’ problems are less an issue that the ones of the population of Montérégie). The frame of the

controversy is very different from the French’s one because it is not hydraulic fracturing the major issue but the

unacceptability of the shale gas industry. So, hydraulic fracturing can be legally framed if it does not threat “human

consumption of water”.

This description of both pros coalitions gave us a contrasted picture of the cases. In France, the coalition has scarce

members who only developed a weak argumentation. Despite an inconsistent support from top officials such as the

Minister of Industry, the proponents of resources exploration failed to impose their policy on shale gas. In Quebec, the

coalition is much larger with many storylines developed over time. The support of the Liberal government weighted in

the delay of the public decision: the first BAPE is only about the sustainable development of the industry”. However,

the blind support of the Liberals became counter-productive in 2011 because it generated a global distrust over the

industry and the institutional control over it. The industry failed to develop but mostly because of its unprofitability and

unacceptability. In the same time, the shale oil industry is developing with quite the same political support the shale gas

industry had in 2009.

A strong opposition in Quebec facing resistance and a tradition of natural resources exploitation

In Quebec, the opposition emerged from local mobilization and by the work of the Association Quebecoise de Lutte

contre la Pollution Atmospherique (AQLPA). Over time, the mobilization integrated more than a hundred of local

citizens’ committees, the majority of the ENGO, many municipalities and local authorities. The first storyline is about

the threat related to hydraulic fracturing for water consumption and pollution. It is also about the risks on public health

and air pollution. The argumentation over air pollution will grow bigger over time whereas the one about the threat on

water consumption will decrease. The opponents did not claim at first for a ban but for a moratorium during impacts

studies. They wanted to know more precisely about the risks they will be submitted to if they accepted this industry to

thrive. Opponents published a first document summing-up their worries in 2010 and uncertainty over the risks is a


major storyline. The first consensus amongst opponents is there about uncertainty and the need of information, and

not, as it is the case in France, about claiming for a ban and a definitive refusal of the industry.

The second and finally more important storyline is about denouncing the precipitation of the government to develop

the industry and the lack of information. Related to this storyline is another one about the inadequacy of the legal

frame favoring the free mining principle. A narrative divide exists between institutional opponents, such as elected

officials, and activists. Fortin and Fournis (2013) showed how governance issues were the most common claims

amongst institutional actors whereas critics of the development model were mostly supported by individuals and

associations during the 2010 BAPE. So we observe two lines of criticism, one follows the governance issues related to

the opacity of the decision process, the other is related to paradigmatic choices of development. Those two lines are

found on two layers of discourse, one concerning specifically shale gas, the other includes the worldview about the

policy decision. This issue of governance is thus central for the majority of actors: this is the consensual claim (the other

storylines supported this claim but were not publicized by all the actors). Opponents claimed that the ministries did not

have sufficient inspection staff, that they lack expertise but also that the royalties will be ridiculous due to the friendly

legal frame offering tax reduction. Moreover they denounced, backed by many media reports, the collusion between

liberals staff and the shale gas industry. The close and strong ties between the government and the industry played

against the shale gas industry because they gave the impression of friends with benefits and that the industry was not

for the public good but for private profits.

A third storyline concerned the threat for the local economy mainly based on agriculture which is particularly supported

by the agriculture union and the municipalities. In interview, those actors stressed that they are not against the

industry but they opposed it because they did have either enough information or enough proof that it won’t hurt their

local economy. Those actors underlined the absence of a global plan of development: “we want to know if we say yes

to one wells of we are saying to 10 or 100 wells.”8 In the same storyline, they criticized the absence of debate on the

network of pipelines needed to export the gas, for them this network is a bigger obstacle because of its impact on their

lands. This storyline is absent in the French debate whereas it is quite irritating for local stakeholders in Quebec. This

showed the unpolitical opposition in Quebec compared to a social mobilization finally owned by greens and far-left

activists in France. Those storylines are not focused on black and white choices such as a ban on fracking but they

underline the necessity of information and deliberation over common goals.

Two worldviews transpired from the debate over shale gas. The first one concerned the governance, as we just saw

opponents denounce the inadequacy of the legal frame. They wished for more power to local authorities, municipalities

wanted to be able to have a veto power on certain municipal areas and to exclude them from mining prospection.

The second worldview concerned energy transition. Quebeckers did not see the point of developing a gas industry

whereas they produced 95% of their electricity with hydropower which is state-owned. They wished for the

development of renewables instead, but small scale projects.

A strong flash mobilization facing almost no resistance in France

8 Interview with a member of UPA, November 2014


In France, opponents to the shale industry are composed of a share of the local inhabitants gathered in committees and

associations, ENGO, municipal, general and regional councils concerned by the licenses as well as some

Representatives. The mobilization is mainly bottom-up even if it built upon existing activists’ networks in the South-East

(networks constructed on GMO and nuclear controversies). J. Bové played a key role with other greens representatives

in shaping the first networks of opponents and in giving to the opposition movement a public image (which became

controversial after the ban because Bové’s image led to politicize the opponents whereas some of them did not agree

with Bové on other subjects). The structure of the social mobilization is quite similar than in Quebec. The only

difference in the structure is the quick support from national representatives accorded in the case of France. However,

we can note differences in the main storylines. Contrary to Quebeckers, French opponents directly claimed for a ban on

hydraulic fracturing and the cancelation of the contested licenses. They based their argumentation on the work realized

by Quebeckers a year before. Quebeckers built piece by piece the argumentation over shale gas through interaction

with Americans and Western Canadians opponents. Quebeckers had to structure their discourse for the public hearings

in Fall 2010. French reutilized this argumentation and thanks to Quebeckers they directly possessed an already

structured discourse.

The first storyline is also about hydraulic fracturing and the threats it represents for underground water and the public

health of the neighboring inhabitants. However, they added specific concerns related to the areas concerned. In the

South East, a network of potholers assisted by hydrogeologists underlined the karstic structure of the Ardeche

underground that generated greater difficulties to a safe cementation of wells. Local authorities, for example de Conseil

General de l’Ardeche, built water regulation impeding the use of hydraulic fracturing. In the Paris basin, the threat for

water consumption of nearly 10 million of inhabitants pushed the water agency to advice for a ban. Uncertainty over

pollution was exacerbated by the broadcasting of the American documentary Gasland which put images on the risks

related to water pollution. This documentary participated to the generation of an alert which became so loud that only

a ban could cool down the social mobilization and the generalized worries about hydraulic fracturing. Gasland

contributed to frame the risk mainly on the technique used and not to whole industry. This frame is further maintained

by a split in the opponents’ network following the ban. In the fall 2011, the association No Fracking France is created to

provide scientific information to officials about the risks related to hydraulic fracturing and the shale gas industry. It is

created to balance the influence of the “collectifs” movement which accused of being a political instrument of the

Greens and the Parti Socialiste. The association then focused only on fracking and refused to advocate for energy

transition or mining regulation reform. It contributed thus to frame the controversy on the narrow technological issue

while the “collectifs” movement on the contrary tried to open the controversy on other claims since the ban precluded

their main argument over fracking.

The second storyline is about the identity of the areas concerns. For most of the south-eastern opponents, the shale

gas industry is in total contradiction with the economic development based on agriculture and tourism. They forcefully

criticized this industry imposed by the central state that had decentralized land and economic planning to lower

administrative levels and that was erasing decades of development because of a new resources found underground.

This question of identity is particularly blatant in the French case compared to the Quebec one. This is underlined by

grassroots actors as well as by representatives who did not accept the work of a generation could be thrown away to


favor short-term economy such as the shale gas industry (a shale gas wells produces 90% of its gas within 5 years). The

identity storyline participated to link together actors with different worldviews and balanced the political partisanship

denounced by some opponents.

The third storyline is closely related to the second one as it concerned the governance of such industry. Opponents

criticized the opacity of the decision because the legal frame did not foresee the opportunity to consult local

representatives and population for exploration project. They claimed for a reform of the subsurface mineral right which

is related to their worldview, described by a green representative as the necessity of an “environmental and territorial

democracy”. They had difficulties to publicize this storyline because they lack media and political support since the ban.

Compared to Quebec, no storyline over collusion resonate amongst opponents even if some of them criticized a

struggle of local inhabitants against the Parisian elites. Finally their last storyline which is also related to a worldview

concerned the development of renewables instead of looking for new resources of fossil-fuel.

Compared to the Quebec case, the position of the French opponents is much stronger because all the different streams

of mobilization converged at the same time. In Quebec, all the stakeholders and actors came to oppose the industry

one after the other. In France, the convergence is simultaneous. French opponents benefited from a momentum that

gathered ENGO, local authorities, local inhabitants, their local representatives but also their national ones. In Quebec,

national representatives from the Parti Quebecois really supported opponents once they were already well organized

and they claimed for a moratorium in October 2010, after the Liberals mandated the BAPE. This is a major difference in

the balance of power between the two coalitions which explained why it took more than a year to Quebeckers to set

the agenda on shale gas whereas in France the institutional translation of the opponents’ discourse is quasi

systematical. The compromise fixated on the governance issue in the case of Quebec whereas it was on the ban of

fracking in the case of France. The frame on the shale gas controversy is thus about social license to operate in Quebec

(what legal frame can allow the industry to drill?) while it is about technological risk in France (what technique can

allow the industry to drill?).

The argumentation of identity is also central in France whereas in Quebec this is a storyline of the proponents of shale

gas. In that case, opponents had hard time to gather the diversity of actors under a same banner because if the

structure of mobilization is similar in both cases, in Quebec, the differences were more visible between institutional

actors, opposing the industry through a denunciation of governance, and environmental activists and local committees,

criticizing a model of development. In France, those differences also existed but they did not have time to be

exacerbated since the ban passed right away (the differences did in fact appeared once the ban is passed).

A final factor explaining the differences between both cases is the institutional path dependency. In Quebec, the BAPE

is a central institution in every environmental controversy. This was the obligatory passage point. The BAPE is also

related to the frame on social acceptability. The first mandate allowed the consultation of the opponents and could

have led to legal reform bettering the governance and implementing “harmonious relationships with local

communities”. This solution failed because the pro industry discourse was to uncertain, it lacked factual data to support

its claims which were deconstructed by opponents. Then the solution was to reduce uncertainty through scientific

assessment. The SEA is more innovative as it had no legal definition under the Quebec law, but it is becoming a regular


institution with the increased development of energy projects (before the SEA on shale gas, there had been a SEA on

hydrocarbon in the Saint Lawrence River, and after that three SEAs are on-going: on the oil of Anticosti, on oil of the

Gulf of Saint Lawrence and on the global hydrocarbon industry). Despite the attempts of the Charest Government to

influence the committee of the SEA through its composition, the SEA finally concluded against most of the arguments

purported by the industry. This scientific assessment then gained the validation from the public participation in the

second BAPE, so the industrial discourse was mostly defeated. But even then, no political decision came to close the

door to the gas industry or to fracking.

In France, public participation is not sine qua non of an environmental controversy. The institutional path dependency

mostly concerned the tendency of centralization of decision concerning public policies and the tendency of lawmaking

for any issue. However, interestingly enough, the legislative process was really quick compared to other controversies,

partly due to the on-coming General elections of 2012, and partly due to the absence of strong proponents of the

industry. In the same time, the frame on technological risk oriented the path of the controversy towards informative

instruments such as the CGIET-CGEDD mission or the OPECST committee which tried to give their expertise. This

technocratic approach mostly failed because the ban institutionalized a group of supporters in the shape of the anti

fracking network. Opponents became the defenders of the ban even if they did not find it sufficient enough whereas

proponents failed to oppose the partial implementation of the Jacob Act because their solution would have reactivate

the social mobilization the government wanted to keep at large.

A total success of the opponents’ coalition?

A decreasing and fragmented mobilization in France

In France, the success of opponents over hydraulic fracturing is blatant. Even if the Jacob Act which bans hydraulic

fracturing also authorizes experimentation and foresees an annual revision of the ban, the only article of the bill really

implemented is the ban. Despite the attempts of many representatives to reopen the debate, through reports, public

speeches, discrete amendments to other bills (the 2015 bill on energy transition integrated an amendment on the

necessity of exploring the unconventional hydrocarbons resources but after an online flash mobilization of opponents,

it was excluded), the ban stands strong.

However, the opponents’ claims evolved since the beginning of the controversy, they opposed to the whole

unconventional hydrocarbon industry, including coalbed methane which they failed to curtail the development. They

faced a difficult position since the ban passed, their mobilization decreased because the most activist’s areas of the

south-east have seen their licenses removed. Following the ban, the three contested shale gas licenses of Montelimar,

Villeneuve-de-berg and Nant have been canceled but not the shale oil licenses of the Paris basin (the oil companies

declared they won’t use hydraulic fracturing and that they will focus on the conventional oil). The local committees

stayed active but the active membership dropped.


Furthermore, a split inside the opponents occurred at the Fall 2011 between the local committees and a movement led

by No Fracking France. The latter accusing the others to be politicized whereas the goal of No Fracking France is to

tackle the issue from a scientific point of view. In fact the association tried to provide scientific information to local

representatives through various conferences, and did not wish to address politically the question of energy transition.

More globally, French opponents lose their main storyline over hydraulic fracturing with the ban. They then have

difficulties to broadcast their other storylines about energy transition and the governance reform. They still obtained

certain successes with the cancelation or the non-deliverance of various licenses in the south but they failed to assert

their other storylines.

Opponents faced a more organized pro-exploration coalition which successfully framed the issue over the need of

scientific and technical research. The storyline over the emotional status of the ban and the necessity of, at least, look

out at the amount of resources and the possibility of alternatives techniques found an institutional echo in various

reports between 2012 and 2015. In those reports, the problematization is about how to reopen the debate. The

authors of those reports (civil-servants or representatives) mainly consulted oil and gas companies and research

centers to assess the issue, they also referred mostly to engineering and geosciences expertise to respond to their

questions. This pro exploration coalition swayed those informative instruments and successfully excluded the

opponents to be valid actors to discuss with about the issue. Their storyline is quite present in the media at the end of

2013 and polls showed an increased openness of the “public opinion” toward experimentation and exploration. No

actual project emerged yet except for a framework agreement between the BRGM and the CNRS for the geological

mapping of the French territory in 2013. However, the storyline over “obscurantism” gained weight whereas at the

same time the position of the anti-fracking coalition decreased in power.

An active coalition against hydrocarbon in Quebec without political support

In Quebec, the success of opponents is more debatable. They obtained a de facto moratorium in 2010 when the first

BAPE started but this is not inscribed anywhere. Even after the second BAPE which advised the government not to

develop the shale gas industry due to social unacceptability, economic unprofitability, technical uncertainty and

environmental threat (mainly GHG emissions), the Liberal government refused a moratorium. The Prime Minister

stated that he did not like the word moratorium because “once passed, it is really hard to reverse a moratorium.” The

French case gives him reason. So, Quebeckers saw the possibility of the development of the shale gas industry

decreased but mainly because of its temporary unprofitability and unacceptability.

Policymakers as well as the media translated the conclusion of the 2014 BAPE mostly on the basis of economic

unprofitability (partly due to an inadequate legal frame which did not allowed a fair share of royalties for the State) and

social unacceptability. The question of hydraulic fracturing and the uncertainty of its impacts stressed in the report

were mostly silenced. In fact, in July 2014 – four months before the publication of the BAPE report – the Liberal

government reformed the water protection regulation in order to put a legal frame on hydraulic fracturing. This

regulation enforced a stricter protection of water but made exceptions for oil and gas companies: municipalities can

regulate water wells excepted when it concerned oil and gas companies, this is human water consumption which is

concerned (not farming and wild animals water consumption), the separating distances between a water wells and a


gas/oil wells are 500 meters when the water wells provides less than 500 people, it is also of 400 meters under the

underground water whereas companies stressed in the public hearings that the safety distance in the industry was

1000 meters. This regulation is criticized by opponents because it is specially framed to allow shale oil exploration on

Anticosti Island (few inhabitants, shallow oil shale). In the end, the opponent succeeded to curtail the shale gas industry

because it was situated in an inhabited area but they failed to ban hydraulic fracturing. There, the frame over social

acceptability is clear.

Quebeckers obtained impact studies but their claims also evolved since 2009, like their French counterparts, they

opposed to hydraulic fracturing and to the transformation of the province into a producer of fossil-fuel. On those

points, they failed to impose their argumentation. However we must note that the long struggle of Quebeckers pushed

them to stay active, to develop their repertoire of action (municipal bylaw, letters campaigns, public demonstrations,

etc.) and to stay visible in the media. The development of other projects over shale oil, pipelines or oil harbors enlarged

their discourse which became very integrated over the idea of the refusal of the transformation of the province into a

fossil-fuel producer. This led to a minor split in the movement because the interprovincial gathering of local committees

separated between an association focusing only on the shale gas controversy and another one enlarging its claims to

the whole hydrocarbons industry. Both movements continued to collaborate which was not the case in France.

The global discourse versus the fragmentation of the political action

The success of both opponents discourse coalitions is not total. In both cases, their discourse set the political agendas.

In France, first, hydraulic fracturing is banned, then a reform of the Code Minier is launched (still on-going) and a

debate over energy transition occurred. In Quebec, a moratorium and impacts studies were implemented, a reform of

the Loi sur les Mines occurred and three debates over energy orientations were launched. However, with the exception

of the French ban, the outcomes of both the subsurface mineral right reforms and the debated over energy did not

follow the argumentation of the opponents.

The Marois government (PQ) – allied with shale gas opponents between 2011 and 2013 - successfully reformed the Loi

sur les Mines in 2013 which has been a controversial reform between the PQ and the PLQ for four years. However this

reform is a compromise because the PQ government needed to coalesce with the CAQ to obtain a majority to pass the

reform. The reform implemented stricter environmental regulation, mandatory information and it even gives to

municipalities to possibility of excluding some areas to mining prospection. However on that last point which was a

central claim of municipalities during the shale gas controversy, the Minister of Natural Resources keeps a final veto,

and this only concerns mining project as the government wished to pass a special bill on hydrocarbon (still not passed).

On the mandatory information on the amount of royalties paid to the ministries for example, the Couillard government

(PLQ) came back on most of the improvement and finally most of the information have to be released to the ministries

but not to the general public. Even if the reform is a small step, it was cheered by environmentalists who struggled over

this for a decade. Opponents to shale gas allied with a coalition over the subsurface mineral right reform. They

benefited from a mutual reinforcement of their position, the Coalition pour que le Quebec ait meilleure mine benefited

from the support of the national structures opposing shale gas, whereas shale gas opponents saw one of their storyline

addressed in the Parliament. The debate over the governance reactivated the mobilization which was cooling down


after the election of the Parti Quebecois in September 2012 who promised a moratorium. It allowed the Quebeckers to

stay mobilized and present in the media. In the end, the storyline over governance was the major one during the

controversy and it came to be addressed politically whereas their other storylines did not meet any public policy

improvement (shale gas is not produced but not because of a specific policy decision). Nevertheless, the gains obtained

on governance are little, and if some ENGO cheered the reform, shale gas opponents still complained about the legal

frame which is still very favorable to extracting companies.

The ongoing French reform of the Code Minier follows a similar path. After two reports (Gossement, 2011; Tuot, 2013),

the project is still debated. In the latest version, the major improvement was about more upstream information on

exploration projects and better royalties sharing with local authorities. The creation of High Council of the Mines

including ENGO is uncertain and its composition unknown. In any way the project foresees the possibility of

decentralized the issuance of the licenses and a veto power for municipalities. The representatives debating the project

stated that the general interest should prevail on local interests. In both cases, the iron triangle prevailed on an

inclusion of new actors in the decision. Shale gas opponents were quite absent of this debate. The Tuot Committee

consulted with ENGO but most of the stakeholders were from France Nature Environnement which not the most critical

ENGO and not a central actor of the anti shale gas coalition. Their lack of visibility impeded them to force their way to

assert their storyline about the necessity of local authorities’ empowerment on land planning concerning mines and

hydrocarbons industry. The storyline over governance was less central in the French’s discourse and it was addressed

after the ban so the opponents had less opportunity to influence the debate compared to the Quebec case.

On the side of energy transition which was an important worldview backing the opponents’ discourse, the debates

generally concluded on an incremental evolution towards renewables. In France, the debate occurred between 2012

and 2015 and led to a bill that mostly addressed the question through CO2 emission reduction, better insulation of

buildings and future objectives of reduction but it did not explicitly close the door to fossil-fuel exploration. French

opponents were not represented as a coalition against the shales industry even if ENGO participated to the debates.

The policy of local committees is not to participate to institutional participatory instruments. They distrust any

centralized institutional debates since they fear to be instrumentalized. The composition of the not-yet-implemented

assessment committee foreseen in the Jacob bill under-powers the opponents’ coalition, same thing for the different

committees which worked on shale gas, they consulted them to take notice of their arguments but they mostly did not

address them the way they would hope. The refusal of a common participation to national debates such as the one on

energy transition decrease their power to influence the conclusion. It also weakens their position created during the

2011 mobilization. If the controversy institutionalized their movement and gave them a new identity, the empty chair

policy weakened their ability to weight on the debate and to broadcast their claims. Individual participation did not

allow to link energy transition and the shales industry controversy at least in the national media. The horizontal

structure of the movement which did not presented a unique spokesperson did not favor a strong position in the

debates. Hence, the view of energy transition emerging from the 2015 bill is closer to the pro-exploration coalition

storyline on the necessity of an incremental energy transition that did not close the door to fossil-fuel at least for a

couple of decades.


In Quebec, three debates occurred in 2011, 2013 and 2015. The more ambitious report was the one from the PQ which

was published in 2014, a couple of months before the defeat of the PQ. It suggested quite radical energy orientations to

free the province from its dependency on fossil-fuel. It shows the inadequacy of developing hydrocarbons projects and

at the same time aiming GHG emission reduction. It also stressed the electricity surplus of Quebec and the costs of that

surplus for the Quebeckers. This report supported almost all the storylines of the opponents’ coalition. One of the

authors knew well the shale gas issue and he had ties with a critical geologist over the shales industry who obtained a

strong media and political attention between 2012 and 2014. The opponents’ coalition had a strong position when this

report is drafted because they had the support of the Marois government, at least on the shale gas issue (because the

Marois government also supported the shale oil development). However, this report was put in a shelf by the following

Liberal government which launched a new consultation with narrower objectives. During those consultations, the

coalition of opponents did not have the opportunity to assert its storylines. The outcomes of this consultation are not

known yet but the Prime Minister recently declared a 80% CO2 emission reduction in 2050. An objective celebrated by

environmental activists but they also underlined the inadequacy between this objective and the ongoing oil projects. So

there is a contradiction between a pro green discourse and pro fossil-fuel policies during the mandate of the Couillard

Government. Hence, like in the French case, the view of energy transition dominant in the Liberal government is closer

to the pro-exploitation coalition who supports the necessity of developing fossil-fuel to allow economic growth until

renewables will be fully operational for transportation and industrial production.

In the end, the storylines of both coalitions have been translated into policies. Opponents succeeded to set the agenda

based on their storylines (shale gas-governance-energy transition) but they did not successfully influence the contents

of policies. Proponents of shale gas have been defeated on their exploration-exploitation projects but they maintained

their position on the governance and energy orientations policies.

Conclusion

We see that the influence over public policies is a difficult set of storylines and power position of its bearers. In the case

of France, the strong position of anti-fracking actors led to a rapid ban in 2011 whereas quite the same argumentation

had hard time to be heard in Quebec. In both cases, the conclusion is the non development of the shale gas industry

but based on different justification. In the French case, the shale gas industry is precluded due to technological risk

whereas in the case of Quebec, the industry is precluded due to unprofitability and social unacceptability. We thus see

two distinct framings. Quebeckers did not succeed to obtain a ban on hydraulic fracturing despite a long process of

public hearings and scientific studies which all supported their storylines. The fragmented participation of opponents

over time explained this difficulty but the strongest resistance of proponents in Quebec reduced the influence of

opponents in the public debate. This is also mainly because the major storyline in Quebec was about governance

reform, and that the common compromise was about policy change in the Loi sur les mines more than on the ban on

fracking. On the governance storyline, opponents obtained a policy reform because they were coalesced strongly on

that point. On the contrary, in France, the major storyline was about fracking, so opponents succeeded on that point

but they then failed to influence the governance reform which was confined by pro-exploration coalition’s members.

The third storyline/worldview of opponents about energy transition equally failed to be transformed into policymaking.


Their discourse was diluted in a global debate which tended to support the incremental energy transition purported by

the pros’ coalitions.

Differences in storylines also explained the dissimilarities between cases. In fact, the storyline about identity is a strong

argument which is found amongst opponents to shale gas in France and mostly amongst proponents in Quebec. Same

thing for the economic storyline which is weak in the pros’ coalition’s discourse in France and it is mostly used by

opponents to stress the local damages on economies; whereas in Quebec the storyline is strongly mobilized by

proponents. Those findings backed the classical conclusion in political science about the strength of a unique and

common claim purported by social mobilizations (Guigni, 2004), but the stress put on both argumentation and the

position of its bearers allowed the analysis to unravel the mechanism of construction and transformation of the

storylines across cases and over time. We thus note that the same storyline mobilized by weak or strong actors won’t

obtain the same policy outcome (e.g. reform of governance), and that the same strong or weak actors can mobilized

the same discourse but failed according to the resistance they met (e.g. threat related to fracking). Finally, the

sequential broadcasting of storylines is important to influence public policies. If the opponents saw their initial

storylines shaped the political agenda, they did not influence it once their storylines encompassed an opposition to the

whole unconventional hydrocarbons industry. They lose the momentum to assert this storyline. In Quebec, we saw that

opponents gained support of their storyline over shale gas but they then failed to obtain such support for shale oil.

Same conclusion can be made on the governance reform in France which was addressed once the ban was

implemented so the opponents had lost their dominant position. And same thing for the shales industry’s proponents

in France who lose the struggle because they did not mobilized soon enough in the controversy. They can only engaged

in damage control once the ban is passed and tried to preserve their capacity to explore conventional hydrocarbons.

The unconventional hydrocarbons controversies in France and Quebec are only one aspect of the wider debates over

climate change and energy transition. Opponents in both countries succeeded in curtailing the development of the

industry but they partially failed to impose an actual energy transition policy orientation as other types of

unconventional fuels are being explored. This conclusion backs Hajer’s (1993) on acid rain management in Britain

pointing only a slight adaptation of markets and policies to new environmental issues. Opponents’ storylines help to set

the agenda and even to obtain specific gain for activists but they tend to fail to influence normative issues and global

policy dominated by path dependency and a core-set of actors supportive of the status quo. Same controversies burst

in many countries around the globe as unconventional resources are situated almost everywhere: Algerian opponents

recently succeeded in stopping In Salah shale gas exploration, the State of New York passed a moratorium, same thing

for New Brunswick. Storylines bear by those opponents are powerfully supported by local population, however those

storylines have difficulty to be heard by policymakers who are quite dominated by industry’s proponents’ worldviews

about fossil-fuel as the engine of modern economy. The coproduction of a social order concerning energy policy leads

to believe in conflicting compromise which allows limited setbacks for the hydrocarbons industry but do not address

the normative questions of a new energy policy exiting from fossil fuels exploitation.


References

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