umāpati sivacharyar on pramanya---translation with annotations

USHA COLAS-CHAUHAN

UMAPATI ON PRAMAN•YA

An annotated translation1

In his commentary on the sixth chapter of the Paus.karatantra,2 Umapati3

makes a digression to examine the nature of the validity of cognition.This discussion, conducted in the Navya-Nyaya style, closely follows thetreatment of the same topic in the Tattvacintaman. i and its commentariesin spite of a major doctrinal difference, for it contends that the validityof cognition is known intrinsically.

Umapati begins his investigation with a review of several definitionsof validity which he rejects as deficient and presents the definitionwhich he considers to be sound. He then explains how validity isknown intrinsically, through introspective cognition. Defending thisstandpoint of intrinsicality against criticism, he argues that the validityof cognition cannot be known extrinsically though such is the case withinvalidity. According to him, the production of validity in cognition isextrinsic because it is produced by the presence of certain factors overand above the causes which give rise to cognition. He concludes theinquiry on validity with an examination of the factors which producevalidity in perception, inference, etc.

The text translated here is taken from pp. 511–516 of the Srımatpaus. -karasam. hita (Jnanapadah. ) srımadumapatisivacaryaviracitabhas. yopeta,edited by Ambalavanavalajnanasambandhaparasaktisvami in collabo-ration with Ramasastri, published at Cidambaram in 1925.

NOTES

1 This is a part of my forthcoming translation of Umapati’s commentary on thesixth chapter of the Paus.karatantra. I wish to express my gratitude to Professors S.Sankaranarayanan and K. E. Devanathan from whom I studied several parts of the text.I am grateful to Professors K. Bhattacharya, P-S. Filliozat and R. Balasubramanianfor their observations and encouragement. I also thank Dr. J. Ganeri who read throughthe first draft of this translation and suggested a number of improvements.2 The Paus. karatantra is said to be a subsidiary tantra of the Paramesvaratantra,one of the twenty-six tantras (popularly known as agamas) which are considered asauthoritative texts by the Saivasiddhanta school of philosophy. The Paus.kara is ofspecial interest because its sixth chapter is devoted to epistemology, a subject whichis dealt with only very briefly in the extant Saiva tantras.3 This author is traditionally identified with Umapati, the Tamil Saiva preceptor-author

Journal of Indian Philosophy 30: 305–338, 2002.c© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

306 USHA COLAS-CHAUHAN

of the 14th century. But this identification is to be rejected because the discussion onthe theory of the validity of cognition (praman. ya), inherence (samavaya), absence(abhava) etc. in the Paus.karabhas.ya proves that its author was acquainted not only withthe Tattvacintaman. i and its commentaries including that of Rucidatta, but also withthe criticism of the Tattvacintaman. i which Vyasaraya alias Vyasatırtha (1478–1539)formulated in his Tarkatan. d. ava. According to B. N. K. Sharma (1938), the citationof a verse from the Nyayamr. ta of Vyasaraya by the author of the Paus.karabhas.yaand his polemical style similar to the 15th and 16th century dialectics proves thathe lived probably about the close of the 16th century. See also my forthcomingarticle, “The date of Umapati, the author of the Paus. karabhas. ya”, which discussesthe similitude in reasoning between the Paus. karabhas. ya and the commentaries ofthe Tattvacintaman. i.

TEXT

nanu buddhivr.tteh. kim idam. yatharthakatvam | na tavad arthasadr.syam |yathakathancit sadr.syasya bhrame ’pi sattvat sarvatmana sadr.syasyabuddhivr.ttav apy abhavat |

TRANSLATION

But then, what is this state of possessing truth (or trueness)(yatharthakatva) of a cognition (buddhivr. tti). It cannot be (its) similarityto (its) object1 because similarity in some way or other is also found inerror,2 while complete similarity is absent even in the (true) cognition.3

NOTES

1 For, if the adjective yathartha (which literally means “as the object is”) were tosignify the similarity of the cognition with its object, there would be overpervasionof the definition in error and underpervasion in true cognition.2 Because some aspects of similarity such as existence (sattva), knowability(prameyatva) could be found between an erroneous cognition and the object ofthat cognition since both exist, are knowable, etc.3 Because the cognition of an object is not identical with the object.

TEXT

napi vises.yanis.t.habhavapratiyogidharmaprakarakatvam | ghat.avatbhutalam ityadau bhutalanis.t.hanyonyabhavapratiyogighat.adiprakara-kajnane ’vyapteh. |

UMAPATI ON PRAMAN•

YA 307

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having asits qualifier (prakara),1 a property which is not the counterpositive ofan absence (abhavapratiyogin) located in the substantive (vises.ya);2

for, there would be underpervasion in (true) cognitions such as “theground possesses a pot”. This cognition has pot as its qualifier whichis the counterpositive of a mutual absence (anyonyabhavapratiyogin)3

located on the ground (which is the substantive of that cognition).

NOTES

1 Vises.ya (substantive) is the object which becomes the content of a cognition andprakara (qualifier) is the feature as qualified by which that object is cognized in thatcognition. In the cognition “This is silver”, the object referred to by “this” is thesubstantive and silverness is the qualifier because the object (referred to by “this”)is being cognized as qualified by silverness.2 Thus the trueness of the cognition “This is silver” would consist in its having asits qualifier (prakara), a property (silverness) which is not the counterpositive of anabsence located in the object (of that cognition namely, silver) designated by “this”(vises. ya).3 Mutual absence perceived for example, in the cognition “The ground is not thepot”.

TEXT

napi vises.yanis.t.hatyantabhavapratiyogidharmaprakarakatvam |syamabadaraphaladav idam idanım. raktam ityadibhrame ’tivyapteh. |tatra raktarupasyotpatsyamanataya tadatyantabhavasya tatranangıkaren.atadr.sadharmaprakarakatvat |

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having asits qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of an absoluteabsence (atyantabhavapratiyogin)1 located in the substantive; for, therewould be overpervasion in the error “this is now red” about a blackbadara fruit. Since redness would appear in it (when badara ripens),its absolute absence (that is, the absolute absence of redness) is notadmitted there (that is, in the badara)2 and (consequently) that cognitionhas the above property (namely, redness which is not the counterpositiveof an absolute absence located in the badara) as its qualifier.3


NOTES

1 The underpervasion pointed above is removed by the clause “absolute absence”because although pot is the counterpositive of a mutual absence (anyonyabhava), itis not the counterpositive of an absolute absence (atyantabhava) since it is perceivedon the ground. Thus the revised definition of trueness would include the cognitionin question.2 By the rule that the absolute absence (atyantabhava) of an object cannot occurin a substrate where the prior absence (pragabhava) of the same object is located.See Nyaya siddhantamuktavalı, p. 98.3 Here redness is not the counterpositive of the absolute absence(atyantabhavapratiyogin) located in the substantive (the black badara) simply becausethe absolute absence of redness (raktatyantabhava) cannot be spoken of in the blackbadara which possesses the prior absence of redness (raktapragabhava).

TEXT

napi vises.yanis.t.hasam. sargabhavapratiyogidharmaprakarakatvam |raktam. badaraphalam ityadipramayam avyapteh. | tasyah. pramayah.badaraphalanis.t.hapragabhavapratiyogiraktimarupadharmaprakarakatvat |

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is) its having asits qualifier, a property which is not the counterpositive of a relationalabsence (sam. sargabhavapratiyogin)1 located in the substantive; for,there would be underpervasion in the true cognition “the badara isred” (about a black badara) because that true cognition is predicatedof redness which is a property which is the counterpositive of a priorabsence (pragabhavapratiyogin) located in the badara.2

NOTES

1 Relational absence (sam. sargabhava) here refers to prior absence (pragabhava).This modified definition prevents overpervasion in the error “This is now red” abouta black badara thus: since the qualifier (redness) is the counterpositive of a priorabsence (of redness) (raktapragabhavapratiyogin) located in the substantive (the blackbadara), it could be said that it (namely, redness) is not a property which is not thecounterpositive of that absence (raktapragabhavapratiyogin).2 Redness which is an effect (because it is something which is produced in thebadara), is the counterpositive of its prior absence (pragabhavapratiyogin).


YA 309

TEXT

ghat.apat.av iti samuhalambanapramayah. ghat.apat.anis.t.habhavapratiyogi-pat.atvaghat.atvaprakarakataya tatravyaptes ca | sam. yogapramayamavyaptes ca |

TRANSLATION

Moreover, (the above definitions are not tenable because) there would beunderpervasion in the true collective cognition (samuhalam. banaprama)1

“these are a pot and a cloth”; for, that cognition has clothness and potnessas the qualifier which are the counterpositives of the absence locatedin the pot and the cloth.2 There would also be underpervasion in thetrue cognition of conjunction (sam. yogaprama).3

NOTES

1 A cognition which has several independent objects as its content.2 Which absence is perceived in the cognitions “The pot is not the cloth” and “Thecloth is not the pot”.3 The above definition of trueness would fail to include the true cognition “The treehas monkey-conjunction” about a tree with a monkey sitting on its branch. Sinceconjunction (sam. yoga) is of incomplete occurrence (avyapyavr. tti) that is, somethingwhich occurs in one part of an entity and not in another part of the same entity,it could be said that the tree has monkey-conjunction as well as the absence ofmonkey-conjunction. Thus the above cognition has monkey-conjunction as its qualifierwhich is the counterpositive of the absence of ‘monkey-conjunction delimited by thetree roots’ which is found in the substantive (the tree).

TEXT

napy arthavyabhicaritvam | tatravyabhicaritvapadasyarthanadhikaran. a-vr.ttitvarthakatve ghat.adyanadhikaran.abuddhau tadvr.tter vartamanatvadavyaptih. | arthasam. bandhanadhikaran. avr.ttitvarthakatve sam. sayavi-paryayader apy arthasam. bandhadhikaran.abuddhivr.ttitvat tadanadhi-karan. avr.ttivad ativyaptih. |

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its)non-deviation from (its) object (arthavyabhicaritvam). If non-deviation (avyabhicaritva) were to signify (the cognition) not being


present in a substrate which is not the substrate of the object(arthanadhikaran. avr. ttitva), there would be underpervasion (in a truecognition for example, that of a pot); for, its operation (the intellec-tual operation in the form of the object which is its content, in otherwords, the cognition) appears in the intellect which is not a substrateof objects like pot; and (to prevent this underpervasion) if it (thatis, non-deviation) be defined as (the cognition) not being present inas substrate which is not a substrate of the relation with the object(arthasam. bandhanadhikaran. avr. ttitva)1 there would be overpervasion(in doubt and error) thus: since doubt and error occur in the intellectwhich is a substrate of the relation with the object (arthasam. bandha),(it could be said that) they do not occur in that which is not its substrate(namely, the substrate of the relation with the object).

NOTE

1 Although intellect is not a substrate of objects like pot, it is a substrate ofintellectual operation that is, cognition. And, since a content-container relation(vis.ayavis.ayibhavasam. bandha) exists between a cognition and the object whichfeatures in it, intellect could, through the cognition which arises in it, be consideredas a substrate of the relation with the object (arthasam. bandha). Thus the modifieddefinition would remove the underpervasion pointed above.

TEXT

napi vises.yavr.ttidharmaprakarakatvam | vahnigunjapunjayoh. imauvahnıti bhrame imau gunjapunjavahnıti vyatyastabhrame cativyapteh. |

TRANSLATION

Nor (is the trueness of a cognition its) having as its qualifier, a property(for example, silverness) which is present in the substantive (for example,in the “this” of the true cognition “this is silver”); for, there would beoverpervasion in the error “these are two fires” about a collection of fireand a heap of gunja1 and in the error of inversion (vyatyastabhrama)(about the same) as “these are a heap of gunja and fire”.2

NOTES

1 A red berry (Abrus precatorius) which is generally used as a measure of weightby jewellers.


YA 311

2 Because these two errors have fireness as the qualifier and fireness is present inthe substantive referred to by the expression “these”.

TEXT

napi prakaranasrayavises.yakatvam | samuhalambanapramayam avyapteh. |

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) not havingsomething as its substantive, which is not the substrate of the qualifier (ofthat cognition); for, there would be underpervasion in a true collectivecognition (samuhalam. banaprama).1

NOTE

1 The cognition “These are a cloth and a pot” about a pot and a cloth, has a potand a cloth as the substantive which are not the substrate of the qualifiers of thatcognition namely, clothness and potness.

TEXT

napi tadvadvises.yakatve sati tatprakarakatvam | atra ghat.atvam itipramayam avyapteh. tatra ghat.avadvises.yakatvabhavat | ghat.atve ghat.aiti bhrame ativyaptes ca | tasmad yatharthakatvam. nirvaktum asakyamiti cet |

TRANSLATION

Nor (can it be said that the trueness of a cognition is its) havinga property as the qualifier, while having something possessing thatproperty as the substantive; for, there would be underpervasion in thetrue cognition “here (that is, in a pot) potness” because it does nothave a substantive possessing pot.1 And there would be overpervasionin the erroneous cognition “pot” in potness.2 Therefore, the state ofpossessing truth (yatharthakatva) (of a cognition) cannot be explained.

NOTES

1 As the possessive suffix vant in the expression tadvat signifies something which isa substrate (adhikaran. a), the substantive (referred to by the word tadvat) is required


to be the substrate of the qualifier according to the definition of trueness; but potness,which is the substantive of the above cognition, cannot be the substrate of pot (whichis the qualifier of the above cognition) nor of any other qualifier. Thus the definitionis defective.2 This cognition would be true according to the definition because it has potnessas its qualifier while having a pot possessing that property (namely, potness) as thesubstantive; but in fact, it is erroneous because a pot does not reside in potness sincequalities, genus, etc. reside in a substance and not vice versa.

TEXT

atrocyate | svavirodhidharmanavacchedenollikhyamanatattatpra-karatattatsam. bandhavadvises.yakatvavacchedena tattatprakarakatvam.yatharthatvam |

TRANSLATION

It is replied that the trueness (of a cognition) is having a particularproperty as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of havingas the substantive something which possesses that particular qualifier(as its property) or a relation with it, which (property and relation)are being apprehended (ullikhyamana) as not delimited by a propertycontrary to them.1

NOTE

1 Thus the trueness of the cognition “This is silver” would consist in its havingsilverness as its qualifier while having as its substantive silver, which is qualified bysilverness or related to silverness; also, these (qualifier and relation) should not bedelimited respectively by a property which is not silverness or by a relation whichis not being apprehended in that cognition.

TEXT

svavirodhidharmanavacchedeneti vises.an.aprayojanam. tv agravacchedenakapisam. yogavadvises.yake mule kapisam. yoga iti jnane ativyaptini-varan.am | na caitad ativyaptinivaran. artham. svavr.ttyavacchedakad-harmavacchedenety evastu virodhipadasahitam. nanpadam. vyarthamiti vacyam | vr.ks.ah. kapisam. yogıty avacchedakamatravis.ayake jnane’vyaptinirasarthatvat |


YA 313

TRANSLATION

The purpose of the clause “not delimited by a property contrary tothem” is to prevent overpervasion (of the definition of trueness) inthe (erroneous) cognition “(the tree possesses) monkey-conjunction atthe roots”1 which (cognition) has (in fact,) a substantive (tree) whichpossesses the property ‘monkey-conjunction delimited by the branch’.It should not be said that this overpervasion could be prevented by theclause “delimited by the property which is the delimitor of its ownpresence”2 and that the words “not” and “contrary” are redundant; for,they are required to prevent underpervasion in the (true) cognition “treepossesses monkey-conjunction” which does not refer to any delimitor.

NOTES

1 In the absence of the clause “not delimited by a property contrary to them”,the definition would apply to this erroneous cognition because it has monkey-conjunction as its qualifier while having the tree which is qualified by and connectedto monkey-conjunction, as its substantive. But since the substantive (tree), which hasmonkey-conjunction delimited by the branch, is being apprehended as delimited bya contrary property (monkey-conjunction at the roots), it is removed from the rangeof the definition of trueness.2 Since the presence of monkey-conjunction is delimited by the branch, the qualifier(namely, monkey-conjunction) could claim to be that which is delimited by theproperty (branch) which is the delimitor of the presence of the monkey-conjunction.

TEXT

ullikhyamaneti vises.an.adanac ca saks.atsam. bandhavis.ayake lohitah.sphat.ikah. iti bhrame param. parasam. bandhavadvises.yakatvaprayuktaativyaptir nirasta |

TRANSLATION

The clause “being apprehended etc.” prevents the overpervasion (of thedefinition), which a substantive possessing an indirect relation (with itsproperty) would produce, in an error which apprehends a direct relation(for example,) “red crystal”.1

NOTE

1 The cognition “red crystal” about a colourless crystal placed near a read floweris erroneous because the redness which is attributed to the crystal belongs to the


flower with which the crystal is in contact and the relation is ‘inherence in whatis conjoined’ (sam. yuktasamavetasam. bandha). This error, which apprehends a directrelation (inherence or samavaya) between the substantive and its property in asubstantive (colourless crystal) which has an indirect relation with its property(redness), would be considered as valid if the definition does not specify that acognition, to be true, should apprehend the relation as it really exists between thesubstantive and its property.

TEXT

sam. bandhavadvises.yakatvavacchedena tattatprakarakatvam ityuktya ca atra ghat.atvam iti jnane ’vyaptir nirasta | ghat.anasra-yaghat.atvavises.yakatvena ghat.arupaprakaravadvises.yakatvabhave’pi ghat.asam. bandhavadvises.yakatvasya tatra vidyamanatvat | nacedam. rajatam iti bhrame ’tivyaptih. | rajatatvasam. bandhavad-rajatavises.yakatvabhavac chukter eva tatra vises.yatvat |

TRANSLATION

Underpervasion (pointed above) in the (true) cognition “here (that is, ina pot) potness” is prevented by the clause “having a particular propertyas the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having as thesubstantive something which possesses a relation, etc.”. Since it (thatis, the above cognition) has potness, which is not a substrate of pots,as its substantive, it does not have a substantive which possesses thequalifier namely, pot; yet, it has a substantive which is related to pot(which is the qualifier).1 And this (clause) does not lead to overpervasion(of the definition) in the error “this is silver” (about a piece of shell)2

because, it does not have silver which is related to silverness (whichis the qualifier) as its substantive, but has only a shell (which is notrelated to the qualifier namely, silverness) as its substantive.

NOTES

1 By the relation of superstrateness (adheyatasam. bandha) by which potness residesin a pot.2 For, the definition could apply to this error because it has a particular property(silverness) as the qualifier while being delimited by the fact of having as thesubstantive, something (shell) which possesses a relation for example, with shellness,whiteness etc.


YA 315

TEXT

avacchedena tatprakarakatvam ity uktya vyatyasabhrame ’tivyaptih.praks.ipta | tasmin gunjapunjavises.yakatvavacchedena vahnitva-prakarakatvam. vahnivises.yakatvavacchedena ca gunjapunjatva-prakarakatvam. na tu tattatsam. bandhavadvises.yakatvavacchedenatattatprakarakatvam | etadbhinnajnanatvam eva bhramalaks.an.am itidr.s.t.avyam |

TRANSLATION

Overpervasion in the error of inversion (mentioned earlier) is preventedby the clause “having a particular property as its qualifier while beingdelimited etc.”; it (namely, that cognition) has fireness as the qualifierwhile being delimited by the fact of having a heap of gunja as thesubstantive, and a heap of gunja as the qualifier while being delimitedby the fact of having fire as the substantive; and not having a particularproperty as its qualifier while being delimited by the state of havingsomething which possesses relation with that particular property, as thesubstantive. It should be understood that error is nothing but a cognitionwhich is contrary to this (cognition possessing trueness).

TEXT

idan ca buddhivr.ttigatam. yatharthatvarupapraman.yan tu svata evamanasa gr.hyate na tu paratah. | vis.ayavacchedalaks.an.am. sam. vidgatam.praman.yam. svaprakasarupaya sam. vida gr.hyate |

TRANSLATION

And this validity (praman. ya) in the form of the trueness pertaining tointellectual operation (namely, cognition) is only apprehended intrinsi-cally (svatah. )1 that is, mentally and not extrinsically (paratah. ).2 Thevalidity pertaining to consciousness (sam. vit) characterized by specifica-tion by objects is apprehended by the consciousness which is self-luminous.3

NOTES

1 The validity or trueness of a cognition is said to be apprehended intrinsically(svatah. ) when it is apprehended by the same means which apprehend that cognition.


The principal followers of the theory of intrinsicality are the Mımam. sakas. SeeBhat.t.acintaman. i, pp. 16–18; Tarkamr. ta, pp. 70–71. The Prabhakaras who believethat cognition is self-revealing (svaprakasa), hold that the validity of a cognitionis apparent in the cognition when it arises. The Bhat.t.as, who hold that cognitioncannot be apprehended by the senses, reject the theory of the self-luminosity ofcognition. According to them, cognition is inferred by means of cognizedness (jnatata,a special perceptible property which arises in the object when it is cognized) and thesame inference reveals the validity of that cognition. To Murarimistra, also believedto be a Mımam. saka, is attributed the theory that a cognition and its validity areknown by means of introspective perception (anuvyavasaya). The point of view ofUmapati is similar to that of Murarimisra. Some ancient Naiyayikas, followers ofMurarimisra, too, held that the validity of a cognition is known through introspectiveperception. See Visvabandhubhat.t.acarya’s commentary Prabha (pp. 60–61) on thePraman. yavada of Harirama, which identifies a theory of the intrinsicality of thecognition of validity as that of the ancient Naiyayikas. Paks.adhara and Dinakara tooare said to have admitted the intrinsic apprehension of the validity of cognition. SeeMohanty, Gangesa’s theory of truth, pp. 44, 67.2 The validity of a cognition is said to be apprehended extrinsically (paratah. )when it is cognized through means which are different from those which apprehendthat cognition. The Naiyayikas, for example, hold that a cognition is apprehendedmentally, through an introspective perception, but its validity is known by means ofan inference. See Tarkabhas. a, p. 55.3 A distinction is made here between the cognition (buddhivr. tti) which is an intellectualoperation in the form of the object which is being cognized, and the cognition whichis the object-consciousness (that is, the consciousness which is directed to an object)of the knowing self (sam. vit). The former and its validity are known by mind in asubsequent cognition, while the latter and its validity are known by the consciousnesswhich knows itself.

TEXT

tasya buddhivr.ttigatayatharthatvarupapraman.yasya svatograhyatvan namabadhanavatarakalınasvasrayagocarayavallaukikapratyaks.agrahyatvam |

TRANSLATION

The intrinsic apprehension of the validity in the form of the truenessof intellectual operation means:1 (validity) being apprehended, prior tothe appearance of any contrary cognition,2 by all ordinary perceptionswhich cognize its substrate (namely, the substrate of validity).3

NOTES

1 The following statement could be understood to be an inference of which “validity(of a cognition)” is the subject (paks.a) and “being apprehended, prior to the appearanceof any contradiction, by all ordinary perceptions which cognize its substrate” is the


YA 317

thing to be proved (sadhya). The defects of contradiction (badha) and of ‘provingwhat is already proved’ (siddhasadhana) which will be pointed out in the course ofthe discussion could be explained as the defects vitiating this inference.2 Contrary to the cognition which is being apprehended as valid. In other words, thevalidity of a cognition is known intrinsically so long as a cognition which refers toits falsity does not arise; for, any contrariety automatically sets aside the intrinsicalityof the cognition of validity.3 The substrate of validity is the primary cognition (vyavasaya) whose validity isbeing apprehended.

TEXT

idan ca paratastvavadinah. prati sadhanıyam | badhanavatarakalınetivises.an.ena yatra rajate nedam. rajatam iti badhavataras tatra rajatajnana-gocarapratyaks.en.a praman.yagrahan. ad badha iti dus.an.an nirastam| svasrayagocarety anena ghat.ajnanagatapraman.yasya pat.ajnana-gocarapratyaks.en. agrahan. ad badho nirastah. | yavad iti vises.an. abhave cajnanantaropanıtasthale naiyayikenapi manasa praman.yagrahasvıkaratsiddhasadhanam. syat | tannivr.ttyartham. yavad iti |

TRANSLATION

This is to be proved to those who hold that validity is apprehendedextrinsically. It may be objected (by them) that there is failure (of thedefinition of intrinsicality)1 for, when the contrary (that is, sublating)cognition about silver “(I cognized this as silver, but) this is not silver”arises, validity is not known by the perception which has the cognition ofsilver as its content.2 This objection is warded off by the clause “prior tothe appearance of any contradiction”.3 The objection that there is failure(of the definition)4 because the validity of the cognition of a pot is notapprehended by the (introspective) perception which has the cognitionof a cloth as its content, is prevented by the clause “which cognizes itssubstrate”. In the absence of the word “all”, there would be the defectof “seeking to prove that which is already proved” (siddhasadhana)5

because the Naiyayikas also admit that validity is apprehended by mind(that is, intrinsically, in certain kinds of perceptions) when it (that is,the cognition of validity) is brought to it (namely, mind) by anothercognition.6 The word “all” is to prevent this.

NOTES

1 Or badha, a fallacy of reasoning which occurs when the subject (paks.a) (“validity”in this inference) is devoid of the thing to be proved (sadhya) (“being apprehended


by all ordinary perceptions which cognize its substrate”); the inference could be saidto be defective because validity is not apprehended by the introspective cognition ofan error. This is prevented by the clause “prior to, etc.”.2 It was stated that validity is apprehended by all ordinary perceptions which cognizethe substrate of validity; but the cognition which apprehends a sublating cognition doesnot also apprehend its validity. The introspective perception of the above cognitiondoes not reveal that the cognition of silver as non-silver is erroneous.3 In other words, the cognition which cognizes validity (namely, the introspectivecognition) should not have error, doubt etc. as its content.4 Or the fallacy of badha; validity cannot be said to be known by an ordinary perceptionsince the validity of the cognition of a pot is not known by the introspective cognitionof the cognition of a cloth.5 Siddhasadhana is a defect because it is futile to set about to prove somethingwhich is already proved and accepted by the opponent. It is also an obstacle toinference because it dispels all doubts about the presence of the thing to be proved(sadhya) in the subject (paks.a) and consequently, removes the desire to infer.6 According to some Naiyayikas, a cognition (jnanalaks.an. a) is the contact by whichvalidity is apprehended. They explain that when the cognition “This is water” arises,its validity is known through the inference “My cognition ‘this is water’ is validbecause it produced an exertion leading to satisfaction” and it (namely, the cognitionof the validity of the cognition) leaves the impression “I possess a cognition whichis valid”. When this impression of validity is revived, that is, when this cognition isremembered, mind cognizes the self, the cognition which inheres in the self as wellas the validity which is an attribute of that cognition. This validity which inheres inthe cognition is not perceivable through ordinary means, but through jnanalaks.an. a,which is a contact which gives rise to an extra-ordinary perception of the contentsof a cognition (here, memory).

TEXT

prameti samanyalaks.an. adijanyajnanavis.ayatvam adaya siddhasad-hanavyavr.ttyartham. laukikapratyaks.eti |

TRANSLATION

The clause “ordinary perceptions” prevents the defect of “seekingto prove that which is already proved” because (according to theNaiyayikas) validity is known by mind in the cognition “(this cognitionis) valid” which is produced from extra-ordinary perception through auniversal (samanyalaks.an. apratyasatti) etc.1

NOTE

1 The extra-ordinary contact samanyalaks.an. apratyasatti admitted by some Naiyayikasby which, in the perception of a universal (for example, potness in a pot), all otherparticulars which possess the same universal are known. Thus validity could be said


YA 319

to be known mentally that is, intrinsically, through extra-ordinary perception by aperson who would have experienced any one instance of validity in the past. In orderto remove the defect of siddhasadhana, it is specified in the definition that validityis known through ordinary perception and not by extra-ordinary perception only asit is held by the Naiyayikas. The expression “etc.” should refer to the third kind ofcontact admitted by the Naiyayikas namely, the merit produced by yogic practices(yogaja) through which the yogins have extra-ordinary perception of everything.

TEXT

praman.yasya svatastve praman.am anuvyavasayasamagry eva |tatha hi svavr.ttivartamanajnanagocaratvam eva tadgocarajnanasyalaukikapratyaks.asya | tadr.san ca yada utpadyate tada svavis.a-yıbhutajnanopanıtam. vises.an.am. vises.yam iva ca tatsam. bandhamapy avagahamanam evotpadyate | anyatha idam. rajatatayajanamıti purovartini rajatatvasya prakarataya bhanan na syat |bhasamanavaisis.t.yapratiyogitvasyaiva prakaratvarupatvat |

TRANSLATION

The totality of the causal conditions (samagrı) which give rise tointrospective perception is the means which proves that validity is knownintrinsically. To explain, it is nothing but an ordinary perception whichapprehends a cognition,1 apprehending the cognition which is presentin its mode (as its content). And when such (introspective) perceptionarises, it arises apprehending the substantive (of the primary cognition,for example, “this”), the attribute (silverness), as well as their relation(inherence) which are brought to it by the (primary) cognition whichforms its content. If not, silverness would not appear as the qualifier (ofthe cognition) of a given object (in the introspective cognition) as “Iknow this (namely, the substantive of the primary cognition) as silver”;for, only that relational adjunct (vaisis. t.yapratiyogin) which is beingcognized (bhasamana), becomes the qualifier (or a cognition).2

NOTES

1 That is, an introspective perception (anuvyavasaya) which is a cognition of acognition.2 The grammatical instrumental case employed in the expression “as silver” (rajatataya)proves that the introspective cognition apprehends the substantive (of the primarycognition namely, the object referred to by the “this”) as qualified by silvernessbecause a word, by which the existence of a particular state of an entity is indicated,


assumes the instrumental case. So it is proved that the introspective cognition graspsthe substantive of the primary cognition as qualified by its attribute. If this werenot the case, the introspective cognition would be that of a collective cognition as“I know this and silverness” and not that of a qualified cognition as “I know (thisas) silver”. Thus the introspective perception cognizes validity because it cognizesan attribute (for example, silverness) which forms the qualifier in the cognition of asubstantive (silver) which possesses that attribute.

TEXT

jnanavis.ayataya tadvattvasya grahe ’pi svatantryen.a na graha iti cet tarhianumitau praman.yavagamo ’pi naiyayikasya viruddhyeta | jalajnanam.prama samarthapravr.ttijanakatvad ity atrapi jnanavis.ayataya tasyagr.hyaman.atvat svatantryen.a grahan.am. na syat |

TRANSLATION

Now, it may be objected that, although the property of possessing ‘that’(tadvattva)1 is apprehended as the content of a cognition,2 it is notcognized independently. It is answered that the Naiyayika theory thatvalidity (of a cognition) is known through inference3 too would beprevented by the same (objection). This is because validity cannot beclaimed by them to be cognized independently because in the inference(proposed by them), “(This) cognition of water is valid, because itpossesses the capacity of producing successful activity” also, it iscognized as the content of a cognition.

NOTES

1 The cognition of the property of possessing ‘that’ (tadvattva) signifies the cognitionof validity because the cognition that the substantive (for example, silver) possesses‘that’ means that it possesses the attribute (silverness) which is the qualifier of thecognition (“This is silver”).2 That is, validity is known as the content of an introspective cognition.3 See Tarkabhas. a, p. 56.

TEXT

nanu praman.yasya svata eva gr.hyaman.atve jnane praman.yasyasam. deho na syat | dharmijnanena tadgatapraman.yasyapi gr.hıtatvat |dharmijnananudaye ca karan. abhavena sam. sayasyaivanudayaprasangat |dharmijnanena praman.yasyagrahe ca svatastvabhangapatter iti cen na |


YA 321

TRANSLATION

But then, (it may be objected that) if validity were cognized intrinsically,doubt about the validity of a cognition (as “Is this cognition valid ornot?”) would not arise. For, when the substantive (dharmin)1 is cognized,its validity also is cognized; and, if the cognition of the substantive(dharmijnana) does not arise (that is, if the substantive is not known),doubt too would not arise since the cause (which gives rise to doubt)does not exist;2 and if the substantive is known but not its validity,intrinsicality would break down. If it is said so, the answer is, no.

NOTES

1 Here, the substantive (dharmin) is the primary cognition (vyavasaya) whose validityis under discussion. The objection is three-fold: if a cognition is known, its validityalso is known; if a cognition is not known, doubt about its validity would not arise;and, if a cognition is known but not its validity, the claim to intrinsicality wouldfail.2 Because the doubt “Is this cognition valid or not?” cannot arise if the cognitionis not known.

TEXT

jnane dos.ajanyatvasam. sayad eva sam. sayopapatteh. | anyatha tavapimate apraman.yasam. deho na syat | apraman.yasam. dehasya tadvattva-bhavasam. sayaparyavasannataya tadvattvagrahin. a adhyavasayenapratibandhat | na ca vacyam. sam. dehat purvam. vyavasayanasatpratibandhakabhavena sam. saya utpadyata iti | virodhiniscayasyevatajjanitapramus.t.asam. skarasyapi sam. sayapratibandhakatvat | anyathaniscite ’rthe tr. tıyaks.an.e sam. sayapatteh. |

TRANSLATION

Doubt (about the validity of a cognition) arises merely due to thedoubt (of the cognition) being produced from a defect.1 If this werenot the case, doubt about the invalidity (of a cognition) would notarise even according to your theory; for, (also according to you, theNaiyayika,) doubt about invalidity, which arises from (the defect in theform of) a doubt about the absence of the property of possessing ‘that’(tadvattvabhava), is prevented by (the absence of the defect in the formof) the cognition which grasps the presence of the property of possessing


‘that’ (tadvattva). It should not be explained (by the Naiyayika) thatsince the primary cognition (which cognizes tadvattva and obstructsdoubt) is destroyed before doubt could come into being, the conditionswhich prevent doubt are destroyed and thus, doubt arises;2 for, likethe cognition of the absence (of an obstruction) (which inhibits doubt),undeleted impressions produced from that (cognition) also inhibit doubt;if not, doubt would arise in the very third moment3 even about a wellcognized object.

NOTES

1 That is, the doubt “Is my cognition caused by a defect or not?” would give riseto the doubt about the validity of the cognition which forms its content, as “Is mycognition valid or not?”2 The Naiyayikas believe that all cognition last three moments: those of origination,duration and cessation. They explain that doubt about a cognition could originateonly when that cognition (which cognizes tadvattva and obstructs doubt) is existent,that is, when it is in its second moment. Since the doubt-obstructing cognitionand doubt thus differ by one moment, doubt could arise at the moment when thedoubt-obstructing cognition is in its third moment, that is, when it is destroyed.3 That is, as soon as the cognition which obstructs doubt is destroyed.

TEXT

kinca dos.ajanyatvasya sam. sayaprayojakatve durasthajaladijnana ivakaratalamalakadijnane ’pi praman.yasam. dehasya tadahitarthasam. dehasyacapattes ca |

TRANSLATION

Further, if being produced from a defect were not the cause of doubt, asin the case of the cognition of water in a distant place (for example, amirage), in the case of the cognition of an amalaka berry in one’s ownpalm too, doubt would arise not only about the validity of the cognitionbut also about the object, (which doubt about the object is) broughtabout by it (namely, by the doubt about the validity of the cognition).1

NOTE

1 Because, the doubt about the validity of the cognition “Is my cognition of berrytrue or not?” would naturally lead to the doubt about the object of that cognition as“Is that a berry or not?” In other words, if the presence of a defect were not accepted


YA 323

as the cause of doubt, it would arise about all cognitions and all cognized objectsirrespective of the excellent conditions like the proximity of the object, attention ofthe knower, etc. which give rise to valid cognitions.

TEXT

kinca dharmijnanasya sam. sayajanakatvam eva na svıkriyate yenapraman.yasam. deho na syat | na ca vacyam. dharmijnanasyasam. sayajanakatve pathigacchato nanavr.ks.endriyasannikars.e ’pivr.ks.avises.aniyatasam. sayanupapattir iti | dharmijnanahetutvavadimate ’pyasya dos.asya tulyatvat taddhetubhutadharmijnanam api sarvavis.ayakam.kimiti notpadyata iti vaktum. sakyatvat | vis.ayamahatmyaderniyatavis.ayadharmijnanaprayojakatve niyatavis.ayakasam. sayajanane ’pitasyaiva hetutvat |

TRANSLATION

Moreover, the very principle that the cognition of the substantive is thecause of doubt is not admitted, by which (cognition of substantive),doubt about validity is said to arise.1 It should not be said (by theopponent) that if the cognition of the substantive were not admittedas the cause of doubt, it would be difficult to explain why, in spite ofthe contact of the sense of sight with many trees by a person goingalong a path, doubt arises about only a particular kind of tree (as “Isthis a jackfruit tree or not?”); for, this criticism is also applicable tothe upholder of the theory that the cognition of the substantive is thecause; because it is possible to retort: why is it that the cognition of thesubstantive which is the cause (of doubt) does not arise about all (treesbut only about a particular tree)? If (it were said that the perceptionof) the distinctive characteristics of objects (vis. ayamahatmya) is thecause which gives rise to the cognition of the substantive of a particularobject (and not of another object), then (it is replied that) the same(namely, the perception of the distinctive characteristics of objects) isthe cause of doubt about a particular object.

NOTE

1 This answers the objection raised above, namely, if the cognition of the substantivedoes not arise, doubt about its validity would not occur.


TEXT

na ca vis.ayamahatmyadınam ananugatatvad anugatam. dharmijnanameva hetur iti vacyam | ananugatatve ’pi tes. am. kl.ptatvat dharmijnanasyakalpyamanatvat | kinca dharmijnanam. prati vis.ayamahatmyadınam.hetutve ’pi janyatavacchedakam. dharmijnanatvam eva na tusam. sayanyadharmijnanatvam. gauravat | tatha ca dharmijnanatvasyasam. saye ’pi vidyamanatvat tes. am. sam. sayahetutvam. kl.ptam eva |

TRANSLATION

It should not be said (by the opponent) that, since the distinctive char-acteristics of objects, etc.1 vary, the cognition of the substantive whichis constant towards all (doubts) could be the cause (of doubt); forit is not acceptable; although they vary, they are established (kl.pta)(as the cause) while the causality of the cognition of the substantiveis to be proved. Moreover, even if (the perception of) the distinctivecharacteristics of objects, etc. be admitted as the cause of the cogni-tion of substantive (as it is claimed by the opponent), the delimitorof the property of having origination (janyatavacchedaka) (in otherwords, the delimitor of effectness) is only substantive-cognition-ness(dharmijnanatva) and not substantive-cognition-ness-which-is-other-than-doubt (sam. sayanyadharmijnanatva)2 for, it is cumbrous. And sinceit (namely, dharmijnanatva) also exists in doubt,3 it is settled that they(that is, the distinctive characteristics) are the cause of doubt.

NOTES

1 “Etc.” would include other causes such as defective senses, distance between thesenses and the object, absence of attention etc. which give rise to doubt.2 That is, the delimitor of the effectness (which is found in the effect, namely,the cognition of the substantive) should be only substantive-cognition-ness(dharmijnanatva) and it should not be qualified by the attribute ‘other-than-doubt’(sam. sayanyadharmijnanatva) which would preclude doubt.3 Since the cognition of substantive forms one of the alternatives in doubt, and hassubstantive-cognition-ness as its delimitor, the causal relation between the distinctivecharacteristics of objects and doubt is maintained even if distinctive characteristicsof objects be held to be the cause of the cognition of the substantive.

TEXT

nanv evam api sam. sayakaran. ıbhutadharmijnanagocaratvanibandha-nanupapattiparihare ’pi sam. sayenaiva svasrayagocarabadhanavatara-


YA 325

kalınalaukikapratyaks.atmakena praman.yasyagrahan. ad badhah. | na catatra praman.yasyapi kot.itvad grahan.am astıti vacyam | evam apyapraman.yatadabhavasam. sayena praman.yasya kot.itvenapy agrahan. adbadhasya tadavasthatvad iti cen na |

TRANSLATION

It may be said that, even after the resolution of the difficulty connectedwith the apprehension of the cognition of the substantive which is said tobe the cause of doubt, there is failure (of the definition of intrinsicality)because validity is not apprehended through doubt (about validity, as “isthis cognition valid or not?”) although it is an ordinary perception whichapprehends the substrate (of validity namely, the primary cognition)and which arises prior to the appearance of any contrary cognition.1

It should not be said that since it (namely, validity) forms one of thealternatives, it is apprehended there (namely, in doubt); for, it may bepointed out that in spite of being one of the alternatives in the doubtof invalidity and its absence (in the doubt “Is this cognition invalid ornot?”), validity (which is the absence of invalidity) is not known. Andthe criticism of failure remains. If it is said so, the answer is, no.

NOTE

1 Thus the two conditions required for intrinsicality of the apprehension of validityare present in doubt.

TEXT

badhanavatarakalınatve sati tadvattvabhavopasthitisamagryanuttara-kalınatvasya vivaks.itatvat | sam. sayasya ca tadvattvabhavavis.ayakatayatadupasthitisamagryuttarakalınatvat | tasmat svatastve badhakabhavadyuktam. svatastvam |

TRANSLATION

The cognition (referred to by the definition) is meant to be that whicharises “prior to the appearance of any contrary cognition” while beingthat which arises “prior to the appearance of the totality of conditionsleading to the cognition of the absence of the property of possessing‘that’ (tadvattvabhava)”; since doubt has the absence of the property


of possessing ‘that’ as its content,1 it occurs after “the appearance ofthe totality of the conditions leading to the cognition of the absenceof the property of possessing ‘that’ (and therefore, it does not cognizevalidity). Thus, as there is no hindrance to intrinsicality, it is proved tobe sound.

NOTE

1 In the alternative “or not (valid)”.

TEXT

paratastvan tu nopapadyate | prathamikapraman.yanumiter anvayinava vyatirekin. a va asam. bhavat | praman.yarupasadhyasya purvamaprasiddhatvena vyaptigrahasam. bhavena karan. ıbhutasadhyajnanasya-bhavena ca tadubhayanavatarat |

TRANSLATION

Extrinsicality (with regard to the cognition of validity) on the otherhand, cannot be maintained because the first inference of validity1 canbe drawn neither positively nor negatively. These two (namely, thepositive and negative inferences) cannot arise because the invariableconcomitance (vyapti) cannot be determined as the thing to be provedby the inference namely, validity, is hitherto unknown (aprasiddha),2

and because the cognition of the thing to be proved which is the cause(of inference), is non-existent.

NOTES

1 Which makes validity known for the very first time.2 The invariable concomitance (vyapti) which is the cognition of an unfailing relationbetween the reason (hetu) and the thing to be proved (sadhya) cannot arise if oneof them is not known.

TEXT

na capraman.yabhavarupam. praman.yam. sadhyaprasiddhim. vinapyapraman.yarupapratiyogiprasiddhya sadhayitum. sakyate yadvyapakataya


YA 327

hetvabhavo gr.hıtah. tadabhavena tadabhavas siddhyatıti vacyam |apraman.yasyapi paratastvena tat prasiddher apy abhavat | kincaapraman.yabhavanumitav api praman.yanumiter anupapadac ca |

TRANSLATION

It should not be said that although validity, which is the absence ofinvalidity, is not known as the thing to be proved, it could be knownthrough the cognition of (its) contrary namely, invalidity (apraman. ya)1

in the following manner: as pervading which, the absence of the reasonis cognized,2 by the absence of the same,3 the absence of that is known.4

This (explanation) is not acceptable; for, invalidity also is extrinsic andthat too is (hitherto) unknown (as the thing to be proved).5 Moreover, inspite of the demonstration of the inference of the absence of invalidity,the inference of validity remains unexplained.6

NOTES

1 That is, if a positive concomitance (anvayavyapti) which is composed of therelation between the reason and the thing to be proved cannot be formed because thething to be proved is not known, a negative concomitance (vyatirekavyapti) whichis composed of the relation between the absence of the thing to be proved and theabsence of the reason could be formed because they are known.2 While the thing to be proved is the pervader and the reason is the pervaded in apositive concomitance, the absence of the reason is the pervader and the absence ofthe thing to be proved is the pervaded in a negative concomitance. Thus the absenceof the capacity of producing successful activity pervades the absence of validityin the negative concomitance: “wherever there is absence of validity, there is theabsence of the capacity of producing successful activity”.3 By the absence of the absence of the reason means, by the absence of the absenceof the capacity of producing successful activity; in other words, by the capacity ofproducing successful activity.4 Since the absence of the reason pervades the contrary (namely, absence of validity),the absence of the absence of the reason should pervade the absence of that contrary(which is, validity). Therefore validity, which is the thing to be proved, is known.5 Thus the criticism that the thing to be proved is unknown (aprasiddha) remainsunanswered.6 Because the subject-matter of the two inferences is different.

TEXT

na ca tadvattvader jnanantaren.opanaye manasa praman.yagrahen.asadhyaprasiddhir vaktum. sakyata iti vacyam | tathatve tannya-yena vyavasayasyapy upanayakatvavises.en.a anuvyavasayenapi


praman.yagrahapattya praman.yasvatastvasya nivarayitum asakyatvat |evam. praman.yanumitihetubhutadahasamarthyavadvises.yakatvadir apidurgraha ity anupapannam. paratastvam |

TRANSLATION

Nor should it be said that the thing to be proved (by the inferenceof validity) is known since validity is apprehended by mind whenthe property of possessing ‘that’ (tadvattva) is brought to it by anothercognition;1 for if it were the case, (it should also be admitted that) sincethe primary cognition (which makes the property of possessing ‘that’known to the introspective perception) too is a cognition which bringsanother cognition (upanayaka), validity could be known through anintrospective perception; (and) it would not be possible (for the opponent)to deny the intrinsicality of the cognition of validity. Further, (inference isnot a proof to extrinsicality also because) it is not possible to ascertainthat the cognition which gives rise to the inference of validity hassomething which possesses the capacity of burning (dahasamarthyavat)as its substantive.2 Thus extrinsicality (with regard to the cognition ofvalidity) is not sound.

NOTES

1 For example, through the memory of validity produced from latent impressions.2 That is, in the case of the inference of validity “My cognition of fire is truebecause, etc.”, it cannot be proved that the cognition of fire, which is the substantive(vises. ya) of the inference, has an object which possesses the capacity of burning as itscontent. It is not known mentally because mind cannot know external objects directly;perception cannot be the means because it would render the cognition of validityintrinsic, nor inference is the means because it would require another inference toprove the nature of its own object thus leading to infinite regress. Therefore thevalidity of a cognition cannot be known through inference.

TEXT

apraman.yan tu parato jnayate | na capraman.yasyaprasiddhatvaduktanyayena kathan tadvis.ayakanumitir iti vacyam | badhopanıtetadabhavavattve manasa tadgrahasam. bhavat | na caivam apraman.yasyasvatastvapattir anuvyavasayenapi tadgrahan.asam. bhavad iti vacyam |tadabhavavattvasya vyavasayanupanıtatvenanuvyavasayasya tatra-samarthyat |


YA 329

TRANSLATION

Invalidity (of cognition), however, is known extrinsically (throughinference). It should not be said that since invalidity (which is the thingto be proved) is unknown, it cannot be inferred for the reasons discussedabove; for, it is possible to know it mentally in the property of possessingthe absence of ‘that’ (tadabhavavattva) revealed in a sublating cognition(badha).1 It should not be said that this would render the cognitionof invalidity intrinsic as it (namely, the cognition of the property ofpossessing the absence of ‘that’) could also be apprehended by means ofan introspective perception; for, introspective perception is inoperativein that matter because the property of possessing the absence of ‘that’is not brought to it by the primary cognition (vyavasaya).2

NOTES

1 Invalidity, in the form of the property of possessing the absence of ‘that’;(tadabhavavattva), is known when an error is realized, for example, as “I perceivedthis object (shell) which possesses the absence of ‘that’ (absence of silverness), aspossessing ‘that’ (possessing silverness)”. When the latent impressions left by thisexperience of error are kindled, invalidity is remembered and forms the thing to beproved of the inference “This cognition is invalid because, etc.”.2 In other words, the incapacity of an introspective perception to apprehend anythingwhich is not brought to it by the primary cognition (which forms its content) provesthat the invalidity of a cognition cannot be known intrinsically.

TEXT

utpattau tu praman.yasya paratastvam eva | jnanasamanyasamagryatirik-takaran.ajanyatavacchedakatvam. pramatvasya paratastvam iti yavat |

TRANSLATION

The origination (utpatti) of validity (in a cognition) however, is onlyextrinsic.1 The extrinsicity of validness (with regard to its origination)means its (that is, of the validity) being the delimitor of the propertyof having origination (janyatavacchedakatva) from a cause which isdifferent from the totality of the general causal conditions which giverise to cognition (jnanasamanyasamagrı).2


NOTES

1 Umapati explains that the validity of a cognition is produced not by the causeswhich produce that cognition but by an additional factor namely, an excellence (gun. a).2 That is, validity is produced by a cause which is over and above the commoncauses like attention, conjunction of the sense with the object etc. which give rise tocognition in general. And this is proved through the inference of which the subject(paks.a) is “validity”, the thing to be proved (sadhya) is “being the delimitor of theproperty of having origination from a cause which is different from the totality ofthe general causal conditions which give rise to cognition” and the reason (hetu) is“because while there being no obstacle, it possesses the property of being present inall (its) effects”. This inference, which proves that validity in a cognition is generatedby a particular cause, also leads to the comprehension that the particularity of thatcause consists is the presence of an excellence (gun. a) in it.

TEXT

yadyapi pramatvasya karyamatravr.ttidharmatvadhetor avacchedakatvam.sadhayitun na sakyate nılaghat.atvanityajnanatvadau vyabhicarat tathapibadhakabhave sati karyamatravr.ttidharmatvad ity anena tat sadhanıyam |

TRANSLATION

Although the “being the delimitor, etc.” of validness cannot be provedthrough the reason “because it possesses the property of being present inall (its) effects” since it deviates in the case of bluepotness (nılaghat.atva)and non-eternal-cognition-hood (anityajnanatva),1 it could be provedthrough (the reason) “because while there being no obstacle, it possessesthe property of being present in all (its) effects”.

NOTE

1 That is, the reason “because it possesses the property of being present in all (its)effects” is not invariably connected with the thing to be proved “being the delimitor,etc.” because the reason is seen in non-eternal-cognition-hood and bluepotness (whichare present in their respective effects namely, cognition and bluepot) but the thing tobe proved is not found in them. Non-eternal-cognition-hood and bluepotness are notdelimitors of the property of having origination from a cause (karan. ajanyatavacchedakaor more simply, karyatavacchedaka that is, delimitors of effectness) because they arenot, as it will be explained, delimitors of effectness found in non-eternal-cognitionand bluepot respectively. Thus the clause “while there being no obstacle” specifiesthat the reason operates provided there is no obstacle to the presence of the thingto be proved (sadhya) in the subject (paks.a).


YA 331

TEXT

badhakabhavapadena badhakasamanyabhavo na vivaks.itah. sam. digdha-siddhiprasangad vises.yavaiyarthyac ca | kim. tv avacchedakantaro-papannakaryatvadhikaran.avr.ttitvarupabadhakasvavacchinnayavatkaryavr.ttikaryatvapratiyogikaikakaran.atvasam. bhavarupabadhakadvayabhavovivaks.itah. | tatradyavises.an.ena nılaghat.atve anityajnanatve ca dvitıyenadravyatve ca vyabhicaro nirastah. |

TRANSLATION

The clause “while there being no obstacle” does not signify theabsence of all obstacles for, it would lead to (the defect of) the non-establishment (of the reason) due to the (absence of) the object of doubt(sam. digdhasiddhi)1 and to the futility of the substantive (namely, thereason itself) (vises.yavaiyarthya).2 It only signifies the absence of twokinds (of obstacles): the obstacle of the nature of presence in the substrateof an effectness (that is, in an effect) (karyatvadhikaran. avr. ttitva) whichis (also) produced from another delimitor (avacchedakantara)3 and theobstacle of the nature of the impossibility of being the unique-causeness(ekakaran. atva) with reference to the effectness residing in all effectsdelimited by it.4 The first part (of the reason namely, “while therebeing no obstacle”) prevents failure with regard to bluepotness andnon-eternal-cognition-hood and the second (part of the hetu namely,“because it possesses the property of being present in all (its) effects”)prevents failure with regard to substanceness (dravyatva).5

NOTES

1 “The object of doubt” is the subject (paks.a) of inference in which the presence ofthe reason is known and the presence of the thing to be proved is doubted, whichdoubt induces an inference. The clause “while there being no obstacle” cannot signifythe absence of all obstacles because such absence could be ascertained only afterthe inference has arisen, but it would at the same time, remove the doubt whichinduced the inference. Thus the reason would be rendered futile due to the absenceof the object of doubt and due to the absence of the inference itself.2 If the adjective (vises.an. a) “while there being no obstacle” were to exclude everyobstacle, the reason would be unnecessary. In other words, this adjective could replaceall reasons of all inferences for, in the absence of an obstacle, anything could proveanything else.3 Bluepotness is not a delimitor of effectness because its presence in the effect(blue pot) is due to the fact that it (namely, the effect) has another delimitor: pot isproduced from the causes which are delimited by potness and blue colour is producedfrom the causes which are delimited by blueness.


4 Non-eternal-cognition-hood too cannot be a delimitor of effectness because it cannotbe the sole cause of all effects which are delimited by it (that is, all cognitions)since cognitions have multiple causes.5 The first part of the reason specifies two kinds of obstacles whose absence isessential for the reasoning to be valid but it does not refer to the obstacle “presencein those which are not effects” (akaryavr. ttitva). Therefore the second part of thereason is required to remove substancehood (dravyatva) and other eternal entitieswhich are not effects (akarya) from the scope of the inference.

TEXT

na ca vacyam. pramatvasya nityavr.ttitvat karyamatravr.ttitvam asiddhamiti | tadvadvises.yakatve sati tatprakarakatvarupabuddhivr.ttigatayathar-thatvasya paks. ıkr.tatvat |

TRANSLATION

It should not be said that since validness (which is the subject of theinference) is eternal, it cannot be qualified with (the reason) “presencein all (its) effects”; for, the subject (of this inference) is the true-ness pertaining to the intellectual operation which is of the nature ofhaving ‘that’ (for example, silverness) as its qualifier (tatprakaraka)while having something possessing ‘that’ (the same silverness) as thesubstantive (tadvadvises.yaka).1

NOTE

1 That is, the subject of the inference is a particular instance of validness for example,the validity of the cognition “this is silver” which has silverness as its qualifier whilehaving silver possessing silverness, as the substantive and not validness which is auniversal (jati) and which, being eternal, can neither be produced from any causenor be an effect.

TEXT

yadyapi pramatvavacchedena nanugatam. kincit karan.am astitathapi pratyaks.apramatvadyavacchinnanam eva paks. ıkr.tatvat tatracanugatakaran.asya sam. bhavan na dos.ah. | tatha hi pratyaks.apramayam.bhuyo ’vayavendriyasannikars.o gun.ah. |


YA 333

TRANSLATION

Although a particular cause which is common to all instances ofvalidity does not exist, this (inference) is not fallacious1 becausethe subject (paks.a) of this inference is that which is delimited bythe property of being a true perceptual cognition etc. and becausethese (namely, perceptual cognition, inferential cognition etc.) have(a respective) common cause (which produces validity in them). Toillustrate, conjunction of the sense of sight with all aspects (of theobject) (bhuyovayavendriyasannikars.a) is the excellence (gun. a) (whichproduces validity) in perceptual cognition.

NOTE

1 This inference could be said to be defective since the subject (paks.a) (that is,validity) does not possess the thing to be proved (being produced from an excellence)because validity in all cognitions is not produced by a single excellence. This criticismis replied.

TEXT

anumitipramayam. yadyapi yatharthalingaparamarsasya gun.atvanna sam. bhavati vahnimati parvate bas.pe dhumabhramaj jayamana-vahnyanumiteh. pramatvat gandhapragabhavavacchinnapaks.akanumiteh.saty api yatharthalingaparamarse bhramatvac ca tathapy abadhitatva-prama sadhyavadvises.yakatvavacchedena hetuprakarakam. jnanam. vagun.ah. |

TRANSLATION

A true consideration (lingaparamarsa)1 cannot be said to be the excel-lence (which produces validity) in the inferential cognition becausethe inference of fire about a fiery hill, although produced from theerroneous perception of mist as smoke, is true2 while, in spite of a trueconsideration, the inference possessing a subject (paks.a) delimited bythe prior non-existence of fragrance (gandhapragabhava) is false;3 yet,the cognition of being not contradicted (abadhitatva)4 or the cognitionwhich has the reason as the qualifier while being delimited by the factof having something possessing the thing to be proved (by that reason)as the substantive5 is the excellence (in inferential cognition).


NOTES

1 Consideration (lingaparamarsa) is the cognition that the reason which is invariablyconnected with the thing to be proved, is present in the subject; for example, “Thishill possesses smoke which is invariably connected with fire” is the considerationwhich gives rise to the inferential cognition of the presence of fire on the hill.2 That is, since a true consideration “This hill possesses smoke which is invariablyconnected with fire” could be produced from an erroneous perception which apprehendsmist as smoke, it cannot be claimed to be the excellence which gives rise to validityin inferential cognition.3 The consideration “This newly made pot is pervaded by mud which is invariablyconnected with fragrance” is valid because mud which is invariably connected withfragrance is present in the pot but the conclusion from this consideration namely,“This newly made pot is fragrant” is erroneous because according to the Nyayadoctrine, all substances originate bereft of qualities and the qualities which inherein them are subsequently produced in it. See Tarkabhas. a, p. 30.4 Thus, in spite of a consideration based on an error, the first inference is validbecause it is not contradicted (for fire, the thing to be proved, is found on the hill,the subject). And, in spite of a true consideration, the second inference is not validbecause it is contradicted (for fragrance, the thing to be proved, is not found in thenewly made pot, the subject).5 The cognition “This pot is pervaded by mud which is invariably connected withfragrance” has the reason (“being pervaded by mud which is invariably connectedwith fragrance”) as the qualifier, but does not have the substantive possessing thething to be proved (fragrance) because a newly made pot does not yet possessfragrance. The inference is not valid because it lacks excellence. The inference offire produced from an erroneous consideration “This hill possesses smoke which isinvariably connected with fire” is valid because it possesses excellence since the hill(the substantive) has fire which is the thing to be proved by that inference.

TEXT

sadhyasam. dehasthalıyanumitav api sam. dehasya sadhyam. sepramatvenabadhitatvapramayan na vyabhicarah. | ghanagarjitasthalesadhyapramityabhave ’pısvarıyasadhyapramam adaya vyabhicaronirakartavyah. | sadhyavadvises.yakatvavacchedenety uktya yatravahnimati avahnimati ca imau vahnimantav iti samuhalambananumitirjayate tatraikam. se pramatvam aparam. se ca bhramatvam upapannam |

TRANSLATION

The feature “being not contradicted” is also present in the inferencewhere the presence of the thing to be proved is doubted (as “This hillhas fire or some luminous object”) because doubt is true with regardto that part which concerns the thing to be proved.1 Although there isthe absence of the cognition of the thing to be proved in the case of


YA 335

the (inference from the) roar of thunder,2 (the inference is not defectivebecause) God possesses the cognition of the thing to be proved.3 Thecollective inferential cognition “these two are fiery (because they aresmoky)” about something which possesses fire and the absence of fire(for example, a heap of gunja and fire),4 could be considered as partlyvalid and partly invalid; but this is prevented by the adjective “whilebeing delimited by the fact of having something possessing the thingto be proved, as the substantive”.

NOTES

1 Since the substantive (hill) possesses the thing to be proved (fire) in the form ofone of the alternatives namely, “has fire”, it could be said that the cognition is notcontradicted.2 When, on hearing a thunder, a person in a confined area may spontaneously inferthe presence of clouds in the sky. Such inferences are said to arise without thedesire to infer on the part of the person and without any cognition of the thing tobe proved.3 Since it is believed that God knows all things to be proved, the requirement thatthe substantive should be known to be that which possesses the thing to be provedis fulfilled even if the thing to be proved is not known to the person who infers.4 This cognition has a substantive (that which is referred to by the expression “thesetwo”) which possesses the thing to be proved (that is, fire) as well as the absence ofthe thing to be proved (for it also has gunja which is not fire) which would renderthe cognition both valid and invalid. Since it is specified that an inference, to bevalid, must have a substantive which possesses the thing to be proved, this inference,whose substantive (paks.a) also possesses the absence of the thing to be proved, isnot valid.

TEXT

sabdapramayan ca vaktr.vakyarthayatharthajnanam. gun.ah. | nacapaurus.eyavedajanyapramayam. badhah. | tatrapy etadanurodhenasavaktr.katvakalpanat |

TRANSLATION

True cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker is theexcellence (which produces validity) in verbal authority (sabda). Truecognition derived from Veda which is not uttered by a human being isnot excluded (from this demonstration) because their being uttered bysomeone is accordingly assumed even in that case.1


NOTE

1 Since validity in verbal authority is generated by the excellence in the form ofthe true cognition of the meaning of the utterances of the speaker and since Veda isvalid, its validity too is caused by the true cognition of the meaning of the utterancesof the speaker who is God.

TEXT

na ca yogyataya eva tatra gun.atvam astv iti vacyam | tasyasam. sar-garupatve atıtanagatadisthale vyabhicarat | ananvayaniscayaviraharupatvebhramasadharan.yena gun.atvayogat | ekapadarthasam. sarge aparapadartha-nis.t.hatyantabhavapratiyogitvapramavises.yatvabhavarupatve anyonya-bhavagarbhayogyatasthale vyabhicarat | tadapeks.aya vaktr.vakyartha-yatharthajnanasya laghutvac ca |

TRANSLATION

It should not be said that (semantic) compatibility (yogyata) only isthe excellence (which generates validity) in verbal authority. For, if it(namely, compatibility) were of the nature of connection (sam. sarga)(between the word meanings of a sentence), there would be failure withregard to the instances of the past, future etc.1 And if it were defined asthe absence of the cognition of incompatibility (ananvayaniscayaviraha),it is not fit to be an excellence because it is also found in error.2 Andif it were defined as a word sense not being the content of a truecognition which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence foundin the sense of the other (correlative) word,3 there would be failure(namely, underpervasion) in the case of compatibility comprising ofmutual absence.4 Moreover, the true cognition of the meaning of theutterances of the speaker is more parsimonious.

NOTES

1 The connection between words of the past and future cannot be known becausethey do not exist.2 Because there could be erroneous statements which are devoid of incompatibility.3 For example, words are semantically fit in the statement “Wets with water” becausethe sense of the word “wets” is not the content of a cognition (for example, “burns”)which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (the absence of burning) foundin the sense of the word “water”. The words “Wets with fire” on the other hand, arenot fit because the sense of the word “wets” is the content of the cognition (wetting)


YA 337

which is the counterpositive of an absolute absence (the absence of the capacity ofwetting) found in the sense of the word “fire”.4 Since it is specified that the counterpositive is that of an absoluteabsence (atyantabhavapratiyogin), the counterpositive of a mutual absence(anyonyabhavapratiyogin) is excluded from the definition. Thus it would not applyto the valid sentences in which a word sense is not the content of a true cognitionwhich is the counterpositive of a mutual absence found in the sense of the other(correlative) word.

TEXT

na ca sam. sargarupayogyatavis.ayakapramaya eva gun.atvam astv itivacyam | tasyah. niyatapurvavartitvasyakl.ptataya niyatapurvavartitayakl.ptasya vaktr.vakyarthayatharthajnanasyananyathasiddhimatram.kalpanıyam. laghavat | evam anyatrapi gun.ah. kalpanıyah. |

TRANSLATION

It should not be said that the cognition (that is, the awareness of thepresence) of compatibility of the nature of connection (between wordmeanings) is the excellence (in verbal authority). While its invariableprecedence (niyatapurvavartitva) is to be proved, the true cognition ofthe meaning of the utterances of the speaker whose invariable precedenceis already proved, requires only its non-superfluity (ananyathasiddhi)established1 and so, it is parsimonious. Excellence should likewise beassumed also in other cases.2

NOTES

1 For, a cause is that which invariably precedes its effect and is not superfluous thatis, not too remotely related to the effect. See Tarkabhas.a, p. 28.2 Umapati does not discuss the excellence which produces validity in implication(arthapatti) which is admitted by the Paus.kara as an independent means of knowledge(praman. a).

REFERENCES

Sanskrit Works

Karikavalı of Visvanathanyayapancananabhat.t.acarya with the Nyayasiddhantamuktavalı,Dinakarı and Ramarudrı, ed. by Atmaram Narayan Jere, Krishnadas Sanskrit Series22 (Varanasi: Krishnadas Academy, 1988).


Tarkabhas. a of Kesava Misra with the Tarkabhas. aprakasika of Cinnam. bhat.t.a, ed. byDevadatta Ramakrishna Bhandarkar, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 84 (2nded., Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1979).

Tarkamr. ta of Jagadısa Tarkalam. kara, ed. by Jiban Krishna Tarkatirtha with his Vivr. tti,Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1974).

Praman. yavada of Harirama Tarkavagısa with the Prabha of Visvabandhubhat.t.acarya,Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series 35 (Calcutta: 1964).

Bhat.t.acintaman. i of Gagabhat.t.a, ed. by Rama Krishna Sastri Patavardhana, TheChowkhamba Sanskrit Series (Benares: 1900).

Other Works

Mohanty: 1989. Jitendranath Mohanty, Gangesa’s Theory of Truth, Containing theText of Gangesa’s Praman. ya (jnapti) vada with an English translation, explanatorynotes and an introductory essay. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (2nd revised ed.).

Sharma: 1938. B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, “The date of Umapati’s Paus.kara-bhas.ya”,The Poona Orientalist, vol. 3, no. 2 (July, 1938), pp. 65–68.

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umāpati sivacharyar on pramanya---translation with annotations

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