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Elisabeth Uffenh eime r-Lippen s. Rationalized Passion and Passion ate

Rationality: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Reason and the

Passions .

The Review of Metaphysics

Vol. 56, No. 3 (Mar., 2003), pp. 525-558.



RATIONALIZED PASSION ANO PASSIONATE

RATIONALITY THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE R E UN ION

BETWEEN REASON AND THE P ASSIONS

E L I S A B E T H U F F E N H E 1 M E R - L I P P E N S

T W PRESEN CE OP EMOTIONS IN HITMAN UPE

and behavior is undeni-

able. T h e ( a s k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h e r is t o un d e r s t a n d t h e m a n d , n u i r e

p a r t i c u l a r l y , t o f o c u s o n th e c o n f l i c t w i t h r e a s o n t h a t t h e y s e e m l o

c a u s e w i t h i n h u m a n n at u re . H o w e v e r , i n s o f a r a s p h i l o s o p h y d e f i n e s

i t s e l f a s an a t t e n ip t a t ra t i ona l r e f l e c t i on , wh a t i s u l t im ate l y a t s ta ke i s

t h e w a y i n w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y un d e r s t a n d s i t s e lf W h e n w e l im i t o u r -

s e l v e s t o t h e w a y in w h i c h e m o t i o n » a r e p r e s e n t i n h u m a n n a t u r e , d i f -

f e r e n t o p t i o n s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s . I n a d ua l i s t i c m o d e l e m o t i o n s r a n

be sa id to be l ong to the r ea lm o f the b t>dy . T h e y m u s t t h e r e f o r e n e c e s -

s a r i l y h e d o m i n a t e d b y r e a s o n . B o d y i s o p p o s e d t o m i n d , a n d e m o -

t i o n s t o t h e r a t i o n a l An o t h e r a p p r o a c h c o n s i s t s i n b r i n g i n g t h e e m o -

t i on s w i th in the sou l . Th i s l eads to the i dea o f an in te rna l d i v i s i o n o f

the sou l in to a r a t i ona l and i r r a t i ona l pa r t , a so -c a l l ed d i v ide d r eason-

Rea son ha s to Seam ho w t o use the i r r a t i ona l in i t s e l f in an a pp rop r i a te

w a y . T h e m a i n p r o b l e m w i t h t h i s t h e o r y i s t h a t i t r e m a i n s d ua l i s t i c .

T h e in t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f t i ie p a s s i o n s h a s n o t s o l v e d a n y t h i n g . A t h i r d

p o s s i b i l i t y p r e s e n t a i t s e l f w h e n e v e r s o m e k i n d o f un i ty o f b o d y a n d

s o u l i s r e c o g n i z e d . T h e p a s s i o n s o r e m o t i o n s d o n o t a n y m o r e b e l o n g

to the bo dy a l on e o r t o the i r r a t i ona l in the sou l a l on e . Th ey a i e i o h e

l o o t e d i n t h e i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e b o d i l y a n d t h e m e n t a l , I n t h i s

c a s e r e a s o n c a n n o l o n g e r b e p u t o v e r a n d a g a i n s t t h e p a s s i o n s . O n

t h e c o n t r a r y , r e a s o n h a s a n o r i g i n a l r e l a t io n s h i p l o t h e e m o t i o n s . T h e

e m o t i o n s i n t h e i r tu r n a r e n o t r a t io n a l in t h e s t r i c t s e n s e o f t h e w o r d ,

but they a r e c e r ta in l y n o t s t r an ge r s to r a t i ona l i t y . In th i s ca se " r e as on "

i s un d e r s t o o d in a n o t h e r , b r o a d e r s e n s e , b e c a us e w h a t is h a p p e n i n g

h e r e i s m o r e t h a n t h e i n t e r n a ] i z a t io u o f t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e e m o -

t i o n s a n d r e a s o n , d e s c r i b e d a b o v e , w h i c h l e a d s t o a n ir r a t i o n a l a n d

ra t i ona l pa r t o f the sou l . I t u l t im ate l y m ean s a r ed e f in i t i o n o f the

Correspondence to : Depar tment ( i f Phi losophy, Hai fa Univers i ty , Ml ,

Carm el, Haifa 31905, Israel ,

Th e Review p/ M üTpky?ic$ (Sfl (Mardi 2KXKi): RiO^üR Copyright « ¿OÏ} by Tîr^ Jkiirw of

.\f<iiiphifs tea



526 EL I SABETH UFFENHE IMER-L IPPENS

concept of reason itself and a neutralization of the concept of (l ie "ir-

rational."

Thomas Aquinas wrote for die first time in the history of philoso-

phy a systematic treatise on die human passions that considered them

from an anthropological as wel l as from a moral point of view . His

theory of the passions belongs to this third or what we could call

"Aris totelia n" approac h. Th e aim of this article is to bring out the

richness of Aquinas's insights by analyzing his theory within the

broader framework of his anthropology.

A brief look at the existing secondary literature on the passions

according to Thomas Aquinas shows us that the older l i terature on

this topic is historically oriente d. It look s for lhe philosop hical

source s of Thom as's theory in ancient phi losophy. Th e insights of

Thom as are consequently only paraphrased, and brief ly so. More re-

cent studies take a di f ferent approach. Som e of them deal with the

passion s in general. Othe rs either focu s on on e particular passion or

one specific aspect of the passions or try to formulate the impact of

Tho ma s's insights on his ethics in general. Beside s these studies are

also to be mentioned books that discuss lhe passions within the

broader fram ewo rk of another larger topic. These studies do not and

cannot always do justice to the r ichness of Thomas's treatise on the

passions.

1

The relatively meager interest in this topic of medieval philoso-

phy is in a way surprising given die fact that it is a major topic of re-

search in ancient philosop hy. We can refe r here to the work s of Julia

Annas and Martha Nussbaum.

2

Recent studies about so-cal led emo-

1

Anion s the older studies can be mentioned: M ichael Wittman,

Dir

Elhik des HL Thomas mn Aquin (In ihrem systemal ischen Aujbau (larges

teill uud in ikren geschichtUchen, besonders in den antiken (Juellen etfor-

seht) (München: M. Hueber. 1933) and Matthias Meier, Die b'hiv des Tint-

man

von

Aguino Dp Passion bus Anim ai- in queUenan alylischer

Darslellung (Miinster. Aschendorffsche Verlagshuchhandlung, 1912), Ite-

itrtige zur Geschichle der Philosophie des MiltekUlers. Texte nnd Untaran-

chungen,

ed. Cletnens Baeumker, vol. Il , no. 2. The more recent articles

written (mainly) in Knglish, can l>e classified as follows: (1) those studying

the passions in general: Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," in Aquinas's

Moral Theory, ed. Scott McDonald (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998);

(2 ) those focusing on one specific passion: Thomas Dubay, "An Investigation

into the Thomistic Concept of Pleasure," Ne re Scholasticism 36 ( 1962): 75-

99; Cornelius Williams, "The Hedonism of Aquinas,"

lhe Thomist

38 (1974):

257-90; and Albert Zimmerman, "Gedanken «les Thomas von Aquin uher 'de-

fectus li al unii is' und 'timor'," Thomas mn Again: WW * und Wirkiing i m

Lieht neuerer Farschungeti, ed. Albert Zimmermann (Berlin: Walter De



RATIONA LIZED P ASS IO M AM D PASS IONA TF RATIONALITY

5

33

lional Intelligence shou ld also lie noted h^re. These studies* however,

are noi founded upon any historical knowledge. Consequently, lhe

classical philosophical questions abolii the relation between reason

and emotion, or about the piace that the emotions may hold

in

a nifirat

theory,

-art?

OTHlWed.

3

The purpose of (his article is to jr laie the passions to Thomas's

anthropological prestip

positions.

More precisely, [ intend lo show

Gruyter, 1988), 4,3-52; (3 ) articles Uial Investigate the moral relevance of the

passions: Mark D. Jordan. "Aqumas's Construction of a Mrnal Account o f the

Passions," Ftvtibuiyw Xaitsrh rifl. fiir Philosophie uriti Ttifiolufp-e 33 (ly&G);

71-97: Roben C. Roberta, "Thomas Aquinas on ihe Morality of Emotions,*

History qf Philosophy Quarteiiy 9 (J 002): 287-306; Judith Baraci "Aquinas

tin the Hole of Emotion in Murili Judgment sud Aciivity," The Thomìsi 56

CIMI) : Richard, K- Mansfield, "Antec edent Passion and rite Moral

Quality (if Human Acts Acco rdine lo St- Thomas," Ameritan <ktlt&tic 1'fHlti-

s

ophkal Quarterly

71, supplement (1997): cíSÍI—31; 'Chômas Nisters, "Aquinas

on Piss ion s and Diminished R esponsibility,* Jahrbuchfiir ttevht mulfitMk 2

(195)4): £30—fìT; 3rd Claudia Bisen %tiirphy, "Aquinas on Our Responsibility

for Our Em otion *" Medieval Philosophy an d Theotogy S fl fl W h IC3-S0rv (4 )

Among anieles that analyze one spécifie aspect of Tlwmas'a theory <if Khe

emotions can be mention ed Mark P. Droet, 'IntentionalLty in Aqu inas'* The-

ory of limotioiiia,"

International fVtiU>s/tptiíral Qtitiritiiiy

no.

4

( l l rcem-

lier 1991): 449-60; and Martel Ssrot, "God, Emotion and Corporeality: A ITi

omist Perspective," ThtmUt 68(1094 ); GJ-02, ( 5 ) f o r studies to t Irt at

the passions within the larger framework of aunt tier topic: Anthony Kenny,

Aquinas ot i Mivd

(London: Routtedge, 1993); and Eberhaiti Schockenhoft»

Jiimum. //oTJtÍRHí. ¡he anikropologiteiken uiid iJwiitoffischtw {WillidiftgzH

derTiigemtethikÛ&i TW m as vatiAquin (Main t: Maíthl as- Gil I newald-Veriag,

¡SAT). An excep tion is the exce llent book by -lean Porter,

Tlw ttrrwm/

•

>f

Virtue: Hut K/dtfttante of Aquinas for ('fi ristia» K iti ra (I

Autismi I

Ir;

Westimui-

ater/John Kuos Press, líJÍHi). Porter de vo ta ¡i limiteli i tu m her of pages to the

passions bat in an ex trembly insightful way. Afeo lo be nient tonati fiere is the

work

i

if Mielit i Meyer,

Phitosaphy and thé Passionie: Tomxmt n Iliniorj/ i>f

Htotnan Nature (University I'ark: IViinsylvania Hlate University Press, 200Í1),

Meyer combines extended knowledge of the history of philosophy on this

ijtipic with a unique way of reading tex ts and <>f questioning them. Concern-

ing Tiionnas's insights, Meyer limits Idmseif almost exclusively to the differ-

ence between die passiona o f the Iras cible * anil "ctmeupiscihle."

* Julia Anua», Hfüimisfic Philosophy of Mind (California: University of

California Press, 1902); Martha C. Nussbaum, Vu : tYa gUíty i¡f (iintihu'x\

((^anihridge: Cambridge University Press, 1386]) dissions erorf

¡'errvpHota:

Studies in HeUemstic Philosophy of Mind, ftw-eedinga of the 5th Sympo-

sium Helicit stimm , e<l. Jacques Hmniu'hwig and Marti ia C. Nussbaum

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Martha Ç. Nussbamu,

apy nf ftesivc

(Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, l Ji 4)_

3

An exception is: Aaron Ren Zeev, 77^ Su biteli/ c/f fthnntions (Cam-

bridge: MÎT Prísfl, 2000).



528 ELISABETH UFFFNHEIME:R-IJ PPE

N

S

(hai his theoty of the passiona is based upon three fundamental in-

sights oT Eiis ant hrop ology tlial are related amon g th em selves as three

conce ntric circles. First, the passions ai e based upon Thomas's hylo-

morphic conception of m an. Second, Thomas's hytomorpl i ism re -

flect s his Insight thai; man hits a unique position in Go d's creation as a

"con finilim ," a fron tier being, because lit? com bine s in himse lf the sptt^

itual and the material-co rporea world, il

is

theory of Mie passions of

the soul is one of the expressions of the idea that mail is a "medium,"

a horizon. Third, although man is a conf ine b etw een Mio spiritimi aurl

the material world, the fulfil lment of his nature ( j e tos ) is ultimately to

be found in th e spiritual wo rld. Per fect happiness is reached when

the immortal soul reaches the tristo Dpi. In this li fe, how ever , imp er-

fect happiness needs te be realized in and through man's relation to

the material world that is, his body and the external w o r l d Th e pas-

sions as sensitive reactions to the external world are therefore an in-

tegral part of the basic, tele olog ica (ttrectedness of human bring s to -

wa rd their prop er fulfil lmen t. As the passions are not external, not

strangers to man's spéci f ié appetite, they are necessari ly present

when his Jetos is actually realized in and through man's moral activity.

Th e discussion o í the passions can there fure not be about the way in

which reason ran guarantee its freedom over and against the pas-

sions. It mu st rather be concerned with the way in which the passions

form a necessary dimension of rational human nature and its fulfil l-

ment- One should not forget that Thomas considers the passions of

the son to be one of the three principles of human activity (besides

wil l and reason).

4

In order to explain this role and function of the passions, 1 have

divided this article into three m ajor parts. In lhe first part I shall con -

sider in detail 'l i ioma s's definition of "pass ion." The aim is to arrive at

a correct understanding of the passions as well as a deepened insight

into lite implication s of Tho ma s's definition . This will allow us to

show til at Mie passions can he understood only with in a hykïmoiph ic

con cep tion o f human nature. In the sec on d jfart, I shall analyze the re-

lationship Sietween passions and reason. Th e centra] insight that we

want t o d eve lop here is Miat the passions refle ct [he fa ct that man is a

"•Thomas Aquinas, SuTTima Httiologitw 4 vnis. (Tiirin: Marietti,, líM fi), i

li , Q- 78, 3- 1) C- The "e" in Mie referent:™ indicates Mie "roipiis" or boc|y nf

the article.



526 EL I SABETH UFFENHE IME R-L IPPENS

coherent, and extensive account of the passions of the sotil from a

psychologicai as wel l as from a m oral point of view .

Ancient philosophy principally treated the moral aspect of the

passions, and less so, th sir psycho ] ogica l-aiuhr opolo gj cal aspe ct ( fo r

example, Plato, Aristotle, and espe cially the Stoics and Epicurus), in

the Midd le Ages the passions were discussed within lhe frame wo rk of

mora l theo logy. Albertu s Magnus wro te about this topic, but bis in-

sights we re n ot organized into a treatise comparable in sco pe and in-

sight to that of his pupil Thomas/

1

Thomas treats the passioits only briefly iti the first pari of the

Summo. Theologize, in the so-ca lled treatise fin man (<j. HI ). It is in

the first part of lhe second part of the Stimma Tkeahogioe G o r m o se -

cmidae)

(hat Th om as discusses them at length. He first giv es a gen-

eral account that includes I heir definition ami an ex plicit reflec tion

upon their moral quality Then fol lo w s a detailed and Ions discussion

of Lhe individual passions, which js Outstanding for th e psychological

richness of its insights/

1

It is Important to Situale this Ireattsc on [lie pass

tuns

within the

broader framework of the entire prima secundae of lhe ffianma,

which is devoted to an analysis of the principles of the human moral

act. Th e treatise is prereded by the wel l-known treatise concerning

the ultimate goal of man, namely, happiness (qq, - > } , with which

Tho ma s op ens this pEirt of t.ht? Su mm a. He fo llo w s this with a study

of the will (qq. ti-17) and a discussion of lhe moral qualification o f the

human ac t (qq. 18-21), Only then do we find the t.realise on the pas-

sions, which covers about one fourth of

t he

entire

prima seeundae

o f

the

Summa.

This is fol l ow ed immediately by an analysis of lu bit

r>

We will not discuss ¡he historical sources of Thomas's concept of (lie

passions. We can r^fer in this con test tu the studies of Michael Witt man and

Matthias Meier mentioned in noto 1. For the medieval predecessore of I his

theory: Pierre Michaud-Quantin,

Ijíí psyc)iolt)gie de ('art-wife eite.z Albert le

Grand

(Paris; Vrin, 1966)

' Tlioma s wrote also about the passions in earlier works Tor example:

liis Scriptum -auper Setitetüiis Maffix tri- Petri Uimbnrrti (l>ks. 1-2; ed. P. F-

Maiidonnet, 2 vols. [Paris; Lethleilrux, lf)£ítj; bks. 3-4: «I . M. F. Moos, 2 vols.

¡Paris: Lc thielleux . 1933, 10471) (her eaf ter,

In I Sent., In ¡I Sunt.

and so

forth).

Sv e

especially

h <.

3, dist

De Vertíale

(Turin: Marietti, 1953

and various daEes), fifi, aa. 1-10. What needs to be stressed is that both

works discuss the topic of tlie passiona iti tJie context of <lw passion of

Christ- This is not explic itly present in the treatise on the passions in the

Sunuma

theologian.



RAT IO MAU 1 0 PASS I ON AM D P SSlQ NATf. RAT ION AL1T Y 531

(h/ibituji)

and of the virtue s ((pi. 49-fiS), which shows that the virtues,

or at least som e of them , reíate to the passions- Finally, the passio ns

are discussed one last time within the framework of

sin

and its causes,

"de causa peccati ex parte appetitus sensitivi" (q . 77).

The number of questions devoted to a topic docs not always re-

f leet the importan ce it has for Thom as, in this ease, ho we ver , lhe fart

that Th om as at this point in his discussion de vo le s a treatise of such

considerable length to the passions of the soul hears witness beyond

doubt to the importance he attaches to the passions within his moral

theory . Tho ma s is ultimately interested in the passions fro m a moral

point, o f view . A human moral act is only complete if it includes the

emotional dimension that is an integral part o f human nature. Th e

passions are morally neutral and ¡ire

not.

a priori nega tive disturba nces

in tile human soul. Th is much being said, one should, however , lie

awa re lhat Thom as really works out here a com plete anthrop ology of

lhe passions . His insight into the contribution of the emo tions lo the

mora act is based upon the anthropological conviction that lhe emo-

tions arc an integral dimension uf the human being.

Tfic Definition of the. Passions.

Thoma s's conce pt of "passion"

clearly diffe rs from ours. We understand passion to be a strong em o-

tion, mainly of anger or love. In the latter case, passion is related al-

most exclusively to the body and even more to the sexual and erotic,

although it can also be related to enthusiasm Passion belon gs to a se-

mantic field in which an opposition exists between rationality, ref lec-

tion, morality, cairn, control, and conv ention , on the on e hand, and ir-

rationality, absence of reflection, immorality, disturbante, the

unexpected, th e devouring fire, and even the extramarital, on the

other.

According to the everyday use of the term, "passion " has (wo

mea nings , an active and a ¡massive one. When its sou rce is cons ide red ,

"passion* refers to an active, overwh elming p owe r. As such, passion

is a ftiree thai neerls to be tempered or suppressed in one way or an-

other. But "pass ion" also has a passive conn otation insofar as it is

something that one undergoes, that one suffers, without really know-

ing and c oni rol ling its sou rce.

The se tw o aspects of the English word "passion" are to be found

also in Thomas's

passio.

The Latin word has, how ever, a much

broad er meaning. Th erefo re there is a difficulty in translating passio



532 EL ISAB ETH UFFE NH E IM E R-LIPPE N S

by the English "passion." "Em otion " and "a f f ec t* might l ie suggested

he re as translations of "passion," but they also d o not cov er the rich-

ness of the word pa s s w . I have decided, therefore , to st ick to the

word "passion " but 1 must ask lhe reader to leave the m o de rn mean-

ing of (he word behind and U) give careful attention to the meaning it

l ias in Th om as Aquinas'» thou ght

Thomas dist inguishes di f ferent meanings of the word passio o r

the verb pati.. Som etimes l ie di f feren tiates tw o meanings, and at

oi l ier l imes he gives us three.

7

Fo r the sake of clarity, thre e mean ings

shou ld he distinguished. Only tw o of them w ill he relevant for an un-

derstanding of lhe "passions of the sou l . "

The mos t common (cotmttunUer dicta) meaning of passio,

which Thomas sometimes says to be an improper otte ( i m pro p r i e ) , is

" to rece ive " (recipere). Th is mean ing is related to the Gre ek patmn.

The act of receiv ing something always involves two paittes, namely,

an active agent ( f l^e ns ) and a receiving patient (pattens). Th e pal tent

rec eiv es the ag ent and as a result of that is activate d by the agen t and

evfii i brought to perfection o r ful f il lment.

8

"Pass ion" in this sense is a

m o v e m e n t (mo ins ) , a process in which a transit ion is made from po-

tency to act. It is importan t that it is not the activity of the agent thai

consti tutes "passion" but the receiving activ i ty of the patient," This

meaning of "passion* is used by Th om as iti orde r to understand anil to

explain the apprehensive act of the senses and the Intel lect sense per-

ception and understanding are essentially a passive reception of the

kno wn object. Tho ma s expands this passive Quali ty, how ever, far be-

yon d the human be ing eve ry thing in this physical u niverse Can

pati.

More precisely, in Tiioni;is's universe, created reality, insofar as it is

create d, alw ays possesses a certain de gr ee of potentiality. And this

'Fo r thi; differen t meanings

oíj jfj í/ arai JXXSÍÚ): hi If Seni-,

d. 19, q. 1, a.

3, c; In i

Sfínt.

, d . 17, q, 2, a. 1, ad 5; De Vertíate, q, 26. a, ], c and a, c; Iti It

¡te Anima,

icct. 11, 365-6;

(J- QMdtibeUftes

2, q, 7, a, I, c ;

ST

I, q. 97, a.

2 ,

c;

•STMí, q 22, a, 1, c and q. 11,a, I, c, In .STI, q. 79, a, 2,

C

,Thomas writes: "iiati

tripliciter dlcitur. Uno modo prnpriisime, sei tiret quando ali quid nemovetur

ab CO, i|Uf>d conv erit aibi xciindnn n untura

m

. ant scniiidtim propriasu indi

nattonem... Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aUquis pati ex co , quod

aliquis ab ipso abjkitur, aive sit ei convenie na, sive non conveniens-. . Ter*

t jouìodo, d ir iti ir aliqiud pati coni [ini rute r, ex lltìc so lo quod id qtiod est ili pn-

lentia ad

a Liquid,

recipit illud ad quod erat in puten ti», absque Ime

qui iti

illiq-

uid ubjiciatur,"

«J9T MI, q. 22, a 1,

C;

ST

1, q . 70, a

2,

C;

ST I ,

Q-

07,

a.

2. f i

' Í T I - H . q . 41. a.

1,

c ,



534 ELISA BET H UFF ENNE IMER-LIPPEN S

meaîiing of the word

passio

is basic for Thomas's understanding of

the liassions

of the

soul will

lie

explained in the next subsection.

I l io third and most proper meaning of "passion" or

passio pn?p-

rie dicta is again b aw d ori the relationship b etwe en an agent and a

patient and on the comb ination of receiving and letting go. On ce

again, the impact on the snbji?ct. (iocs not affect its substantial form

for there is no chang e in the sulisLmt.ial identity of the subjec l. Th e

diffe ren ce betw een the second and the ihird meaning consists in this:

that the change is said to have only a neg ative effe ct.

17

According to

the descriptions and exa m ples of Thom as, the harm can do ne on

tw o levels: on the level of the natural disposition o f something and on

the level of its natura mov emen t,

1

* Con cern ing the tiatural dispo si-

tion uf something, Thom as says tliat the reception of an external, con-

trary form can affe ct the natural quality or disposition of a being. For

example, when water is warmed up, it loses its natural quality of

"coldness"; tn become sick goes against man's natural disposition to

h ealthy; to b e sad go es against man s natii ral disposition to be

happy. Other exam ples of Thom as arc pain, despair, and fear.

l i

But a

passion no t only harms the naturai disposition of a being. Even mo re

than that; a passion may prevent the natural movement of a being

from reaching its specific

fu [filli

in ml o r go al

3 1

f o r example , when a

stone is prevented from falling down, its natural movement remains

unfulfilled. The same happens when man is prevented from exercis-

ing the activity of his will. Sadness can also b e mention ed here agaitir

the centripetal m ovement of the heart and the body that accom pan ies

this passion is completely opposed to man's vital movement, which

consists in a centrifugal movement of the heart and the parLs of the

body Th ere for e sadness can som etim es even be fatal.

21

This third meaning of "passion" has little or nothing to do with

the first, w he re "passion" means reception. On the contrary, in its

most proper meaning, this ihird sense of "passion" entails suffering.

Passion can imply lhat llie natural disposition of an individual sub-

» $ r u n , ft . 31, a. ] , ad

3;

ST ML

q. 22,

a.

1,

a ST Ml, q 30, a Î, c; ST1-H,

q. 41, u. 1, c.

i"

Qiriut$tivn#$ quodlibetalrx,

q. 2. a. 7,

c; iST I,

q. 7t), a. 2, c.

*»ST

I ,

q.

79, a.

2,

c ; .STI, q. 97. a. 2,

C; De. Veri tate, q. 26, a.

3,

c.\ De Veri-

ate,

q, ZÜ a. 3, c ,

& Dr Veri taie,

q.

26, a.

L,

t ¡ ST

l,

q. 79,

a.

2, c;

,ST

H i, q. 37, a. 4, i.

™ ST

I-n, q. 37, a. 4, c; J>

Vertíale,

q. 20, a.

tU

h

ç;

ST (-]], q.

48, a

4,

ad 3i



RAT I ON A LI ZED PA S SIO N A ND PAS SIO N ATF RAT I ON A L IT V 53 5

stance is harmed, but even more (han that; it can cause <ui individuai

substance to be impeded from fulfil l ing ite natural Inclination and

reachin g its natural end. It is clea r fro m 111 is l liat the co nce pt of "pas-

sion " présupposés the metaphysical idea of Ideo logica l nature. Th e

importan ce o f this point shall becom e clear in the third part of this

JM

-

per.

The three meanings of

passio

or

pati

discussed above are appli-

cable not only to the human being but also to the creai inn as a wliule

ffirst meaning}, or to the material beings in particular (second and

third mea ning ). When Thom as discusses the passions nf the human

soul, he uses the second and i h ini mean ing? of the wo rd. Ho w he ran

do so and what thLs implies for his understanding of human passion

wil l beco me clear in (he fol lowing sections,

/ l a s s i e s o f l d the 'Body. In the precedin g I have touche d upon

but not developed a basic insight of Thomas regarding the passions.

Passions in the proper sense of the word (second and third meanings)

presuppose matter or, more speci fical ly, corporea l i ty. Only that

wh ich has a material or bodily dimens ion can be sulyect. to pa ss ion

u

because matter and body are characterized by their possibility of re-

ceivin g or losing a form . Thus passion as a qualitative chan ge is only

possible in that which is material,

What does this mean for a being com posed of ma tter and form, of

lïody and soul, as is the I LU man being? Th om as wr ites that ill this case

the passions are "accidental" to the form, that is, to the human soul,

£ l

This statement needs to be understood correctly within the frame-

work of the most hasic presupposition of Thomas's anthropology,

namely, his hylom orphic co ncep tion of man. A human being is a sub-

stantial unity of body and souL Given this, it is clear that Th om as will

say that the human passions can not be found in Hit

-

soul pe r se or in

the body alone . The passions are p er se predicated of the human be-

ing as a hylom orphic unity Th ey are consequ ently only per aeddens

predicate d of the soul alone. Strictly speaking, for Tho ma s, passions

that belong on ly to the intellectual-spiritual level are no t real passions.

Passions that belong only to the bodily realm are not real human pas-

sions either. What is at slake here is the question, "What is the sub ject

H

.STM l , q. 22, a. 1, ad 1;

De Vertíate,

q. 26, a.

2, c.

H I, q, 22, 3. I, c; De Veritas q, 2G, a , 2, c and ãd J; q. 2fi, a, 3, c.



RATIONALIZED PAS S IO M AMD PASS IONATF RATIONALITY 533

the soul are in the first place reactions. Th e act of receiving a forni,

however, goes hand in hand with lhe "letting go

1

' o f another form atid

wilh (he pursuit of the f irst one. Th e agent (hat elicits this pursuit has

suc il an influence on Lite

patiens

that he is pulled out of himself

(iroAi)^

1

attracted as it were by thai,

agens.

Passion

r sults

n the vic-

tory of lhe agent ove r (he patient, which Thom as also characterizes a s

some kind of assimilation/

1

* All this explains why the passion of the

sogl i s moved (morns ) and movement ( m oun t ; ). Il is a motus mov-

en s

t

a reaction-action.

3

" This implies thai a passion of the sou l is not a

"naturai" movement, in the sense thaL il finds i ls origin in ail internal

bodily need, as do the mo vem ent s of the vege tative soul Rather, it is a

reaction to an external agent or stimulus. Passions of the soul are ba-

sically reaction s of the unity of body and soul to the externa l world.

In summary, what has been said above enables us to formulate a

general de scription o f the passions of the soul. First, passion is al-

wa ys a "moved movement" ; i t i s a reaction-action.

Pa s s i o n

i s evoked

by an attractive object and results in a modification in the subject.

Thus passions are reactions to li ie externa l world. Secon d, Thomas 's

theory of the passions finds its first and most basic presupposition in

his hylomorphic view of man. There for ti the passions are psych oso-

matic changes. They consist of simultaneous chang es in body and

soul. More now needs to he said regarding the nature of these

changes or move men ls.

Th r Pass i ons as Movem ents nf the Soul Th e first question to be

asked conc erns the location of the passions of (he soul. Th om as

points ou t that the passions of the soul an' no ti o be found in the vege-

tative soul, n i l s d ntension of the soul has an autonomous mo vem ent

tow ard an object, atid is never excited by an objec t, Th e v egeta tive

soul is the complex of powers of the soul that explains the activities

through which lhe human being as corporeal being cares for its sur-

vival as an individual being or as belonging to a certain kind. Its move-

menus are not reactions to external reality. Th e passions hav e to be lo-

cated, therefore, either in the sensitive or in the rational so

til

Goth

possess a cognitive pow er and an appetitive p owe r.

11

ST MI, q. 22, a, 1,C.

E

De Vvritate,

q.26, a 1, c;

ST

I II, q, 41, a I, c,

« S T I , q. SO, a- 2, e; Da Veri(et/>, q 26, a. 1, e .



526 EL I SABETH UFFENHE IMER -L IPPENS

Acco rding to Ti lom as the passions as 'm ov ed move men t" aie not

to be found In the cogn itive powe rs of the soul, What characterizes

the cognitive, apprehending powers is the fact (hat (hey assi m i iate the

know n obj ec t Kno wledg e is the assimilation of the known in the

knowing subject.*

1

One can also put it this wa y: the goa l of know l-

edge is taking the known object into the soni SMUtìdum madam ani-

iïiùe. In contradistinction to this, die appetii i ve pow ers draw the soul

out of i tself toward an objec t.* ' This f i ls die description n f a pa ssion

given above

(tmhi mi id quad est agenti.i).

These distinctions imply some interesting insights of Thomas.

First, passion itself is not knowle dge. Th e passions do tiol instruct us

about the obje ct that am uses the passion. Seco nd, this dews not ex-

clud e the fact dial a passion is alwa ys the result of kn ow ledg e. Striv-

ing toward an object necessari ly presupposes the guidance o f knowl-

ed ge because th e object tliat is striven aft er Ls necessa rily a kn own

objec t (comp are be low). Third, "passion" as a psychosomal ic change

dif fer s essentially from lhe intellectual activity of a human being, Ris -

ii

ioti is a reaction t o the external wo rld; it sh ow s ho w man stands in

this wo rld. T o be a human being mea ns not only to have intellectua l

kno wled ge o f lhe world; it means also to react to tin? world in (hat all-

enco mp assing reactio n of body and soul which is a passion. Fourth,

this implies also that knowledge itself has no direct impact upon the

wo rld. It needs the help of the appetitive po we rs in order to reach the

world.

We still have not determined whether the fiassions are to be

found in the sensitive appetitive power or in the rational appetitive

pow er, but tl ie answer is obvious from what precedes, f iecause the

passions belong necessarily to the

oompositiam

of body and soul, only

in thai power of the soul which stands in an original relationship to

the body can the passions be located. This immediately excludes tile

rational appetite. In Thom as's view , only [he sensitive app el ite is re-

lated to ihe body, or, more specifically, to lhe heart and so to ihc

whole body.*

1

The passions belon g to the sensitive appetite, wh ich

stands at the crossroa d, as it were, betwe en body and soul.

w

ST I-ÍI, q, '¿'¿, 3- 2 , c. In general for the differenc e h dw sp i knowledge

and appetite: ST I, q. 16, a 1, cj ST Í, q. 81, a. 1, c¡ De Ventate, q. 22, a. 10, c

and (j. i, a.

Z,

c;

Dp Veri-late,

q. 2fi, a. 3, <:.

« S T H I,

q. 22,

a. 2, c .

V'Ite Veniate, q . 26, a, 3, c¡ STI, q. 20; a. 1, ¡id I;S T MI, q. 22, a . %, ad 3.



RATION ALIZED PA SS IO N AND PASS ION ATE RAT fO MAL

I TV

539

We can summarize this section in this way, Th e passions of the

soul arc to be found neither in the vegetative soul noi iti the rational

cognitive or appetit ive power but exclusively in the sensitive appeti-

tive pow er of the soul. A passion is a reaction-action on the level o f

Hie sensitive soul anil is necessarily accompanied by a physical

chan ge. Th e passion itself is not a cognitive act, but it needs to ix

1

aroused by some kind of knowledge, as does every appetitive act.

KTUiwUidge at Did Basis of Du> l 'aasi&tìs. One of the basic presup-

positions of Thomas's thinking about reality is that it is characterised

by a universal teleology - This teleo log y in its turn presuppo ses God 's

intellect, which gives each particular reality its proper end and also o r-

gan izes the means toward that end. This relationship betw een th e te-

leology o f di is world and the intellectual kno wled ge of G od is oniy one

application of Thomas's broader i usigli t o f the relationship betw een

apprü te and know ledge: appetite necessari ly presupposes k now ledge.

Nothing can be striven after that is not known in one way or another,

Thomas uses this insight also to explain the sensitive appetite: just

like any other app etit e it presu ppose s know ledge, Its objec t lias to tie

a "known" object/

37

This know ledge can either have an external ora n Internal source.

The external sources for sensitive knowledge are the five external

senses. Por the internal sources of kn owledge, Thom as points to one

of the internal senses, namely, the "imagination," and also to reason,

Knowledge based on the external senses is much more limited in its

scope than knowled ge based on the inner sourre of kn ow ledge .^ This

becomes clear if we consider the imagination.

' Imagina tion" has two meanings in the writings of Thoma s, t in

die one hand, it is the stock or Information built up by sensible con-

tents as they have b een provide d by the f ive externa l senses, imagina-

tion in human beings also involves what is called fantasy, that is, the

possibility that human beings hav e of co mbin ing already available sen-

sible contents,

;i>

Imagination in this tw ofo ld sense can offe r sensible,

cognitive contents, which in turn can arouse the appetit ive mo vem ent

of the sensible soul or the passions.

a T

ST l, q. 80, a

2,

c; q, 81, & I, c. "Appetib ile vero non movei appetì tuoi

nisi iipprehensuiiT;

D e

l/(¡n'íitf,(| 25.

a. 1,

c.

I,

q,

" 8,

a. <1

c.



540 EL ISA BET H UFFF.NHE lMEH-L IPPENS

Wliat is interesting is thai Tho ma s accepts not only direct, and in-

direct, sensible kn ow led ge as a basis for the passions but ¡Uso Intellec-

tual know ledge Because intel lectual knowled ge is mo re general and

abstract, it needs the help of the ini agi nation fh orde r to convert, the

abstract thoughts into concrete images.

10

Thomas g ives ILS the exa m

pie of the believin g intellect. It acce pte the exis ten ce of punishm ent

for sins in the aft erlife in a cogn itive wa y, but it is through th e help of

the imagination that it pictures a burning fire (ignis miens) ami a hit-

ing worm ( t e m & rodens) wi th Hie resul t that ¡nan is ove rcom e by

fear.

11

To com plete this account, we need to add the fol low ing points.

While it is true that knowledge of an object is a necessary condition

(condii? 0 sive qv(t non) fo r the arousal <jf a mo vem ent o f the sensi-

tive soul, it is, ho we ver , not a su Tic ent con dition Kn ow led ge itself

do cs not cause us to have passions. Passion requ ires that the ob j ee l

known be presented as attractive or as répugnant (ratio app etibilità-

t i s ) , The kno wn o bject must l ie grasprd as attractive, as wo rth str iv-

ing after, or as repellant and worth fleeing from . In othe r word s, the

knowledge of (he objeel must be accompanied by

A

va lu& judgment.

yi

The p ow er that judges the attractiveness of a ktiown obje ct at the sen-

sitivi; level is called the estimative power (wis tu-stirtaitinA) in the ani-

mal and the cogitative power

(vi$ cogitativa)

in man. Th e tris UÍÍSÍÍ"-

m a t i v a in the animal is an internal sense, inseparably connected lo

the external sen ses H Is a "uii l itar ian" sense because il ultimately

serves the existenc e and survival of the animal,* ' For exam ple, w hen

the îamh sec s a wo lf, it flees, it do es so not because it perceiv es lhe

beautiful co lo r of the skin of the Wolf, bill because it instinctively rec-

ogn izes the wol f as its natural enemy. Th e lamb "understands

1

' what

is not visible, thai is, the w o lf s threat to its life. Cliarac teristic of the

animal is that its estima tive pow er is an instinctive po we r. Th e animal

possesses instinctive patterns of judgm ent and consequen tly of reac-

tion-action.

1

*

m

ST I

II, q- 30, a 3, ad 3{

Ik Ventate, q.

a 4, c.

De Vertíate* q 26, 3, ¡id 13-

^"ISIiçut imaginado foniiae sine aestimnatioite convenienti ve noe ivi,

non rnovet appetitimi senaitivum; ita nee appretietuio veri $iiu>

ration e

boni

et appetibilis";

ST

I II, q. a. 1, ad 2. Sec also

ST

I, q_

lí>

a l, ad 2

« S T I , q. 78, a.

4

c; n l i h

A n i m a

lect. 13,39R

ST 1, q, 78, a. 4, e; De Ventate, q. 2S>, a . 1, c.



RATIO MAL [ZED PA SSIO N AN D PASS IONATE RATIONAL V 541

In man, this sam e po w er is called die vis cogitativa. It is a sensi-

t ive power,

buL

one directly connected to universal reason Thom as

calls this pow er also the

ratio iitferiorfe,

the

ratio particvlaris,

or the

inieUectus passivas.

It. evalua tes the attractiveness o f an ob jec t iti a

typically rational, discursive manner ("inquiriendo et conferendo"5, al-

though the contents of its thoughts are particular ("collativa hilen-

tionum paitieiLlariiu iT). Wh at is importa nt, how ever , is thai it has a di-

rect relationship to universal reason and as such judges an ohjcct

against a comprehensive or overall background,

fr

'

Let us summ arize what has been said abov e. % the "passions o f

lhe soul* Thomas Aquinas understands all the movements of lhe ap-

pel i live pow er of the sensitive soul

4

® including those with n egativ e ef-

fects. These ap petitive movem ents are not an expression in die soul

of the needs of the body, as are the movem ents of the vegetative so ul

They are modifications on the level of the sensilive soul, resulting

from the kno wled ge of an external object. This knowledge- is a combi-

nation of a sensation or sensc-cxp erience o f som e kind and a judg-

ment on the sensitive level. Th e obje ct that amuses the passions is

neve r a m ere material o bje ct. It is a "know n" object, that is evaluated

fo r its attractiveness or repulsiveness. In mat) this evaluation is sub-

je ct to reason. The passions of the Soul always presup pose the close

relationship betw een body and-tout and are there fore, alwa ys and nec-

essarily, accompanied by bodily changes. Thom as's theory of the pas-

sions of the soul presupposes and reflects hylomnrphism as a theory

about the

re

lation betw een hody

ati t E

sou I. His 1 ylom<

> rpl i ism bel <

mgs,

however, to die more fundamental anthropological insight that man is

a "frontier" between the material and die spiritili J world. 1 shall de-

vel op this last idea in die secon d part of this article.

II

The Relationship between Passion and Reason. We understand

Thom as's theory o f lhe passions of the soul to rest upon three major

prestipposi

i ions,

the first and most, central

o f

which is his hylomor-

phlc view of man, as w e sho wed in section 1 of this paper. This view

Fût

the

d ifference lMtwt>eii the V H

cogitativa

and the t i ¡

azstimativn

see

ST

M l, q. 74, a 3, ad 1

L

ST

I, q. 81, a, 3, c;

D* Verità e,

q. 14, a. I, ad 9;

ST

1.

q. 78, a 4, c

« S T ï

11, q. 5fi,

a .2, c

and a 5, e; S T

I I I ,

q. 24,

a

2

sad

a.

3.



542 EL ISAB ETH IJFEENHEIMER -L IPPENS

in inni Includes and contains two basic insights, namely, Mint, man has

only one soul wilh three dimensions or fonctions (vegetat ive , sensi-

tive, and ration al) and that a "pol i t ical" relation, so to speak, exists be-

tw een th e sensitive and the rational dimension a of lh e human soul, It

is precisely this latter and seco nd insight thai ma kes clear that the by -

lom orpliic v iew o f mail can be fully understood only if seen in relation

to a second major presupposition of Thomas, namely, that man is a

"front ier" being. I

JM

me focu s on this in the second part of my paper.

I will begin by examining a basic distinction that Tim

mas

makes

conc erning the passions. He states repea tedly that the passion s of

man can be looked at in two ways. First, Insofar as they are com mo n

to man and animal; second, Insofar as they an* naturally directed to-

ward reason.

17

In the first case, il seems that abstraction is made of

the rationality tha i chara cterizes the human being- Passion as com-

mon to man and animal would be a natural, insti nel ve pa ttern of re-

spons e to the externa l world- My interpretai i on is that Thomas does

not merely in lend to stress Uve fact that passion s are com m on U> men

and animals, liather, he aims to bring forwa rd the impulsive, utimedi-

ated aspect of the passions, which ihey can show in the absence of

reason (compare be l ow ) . Seco nd, these sam e passio ns can he under-

stood as being attuned in a natural way to reason and to its command

and contro

I.

It is only in this sec on d ease that justice is don e to the

specific human character of the passions.

Let me deve lop this secon d point in more detail. Tha t lhe pas-

sions have this kind of relationship tu reason is based upon Thomas's

insights into the nature of reason itself. According u> Thomas, ' rat io-

nal" refers not only to that which is rational per se , in itself, or essen-

tially, as is man's intellect {vntetleetits), reason ( r a t i o j j and will (vol-

untas). "Rat ional" i s a lso that which par t ic ipates in r e a s o n . M a n

distinguishes himself from the animals not only by that which is es -

sentially reasonable but also by thai which participates in rational-

ity.^ Such is tile case with lhe sensitive so ul In contrast to the veg e-

*

7

See, fo r example: ST I II, q. ¡50, a- 3, c: S TI II, q 56, a c; ST I II, q 24,

a. 1, c and ad Ij STl-H , q "4, a 3. ad 1.

For the difference between rational par essentiunt and rational pur

participation?»* s e i In I Erhin., lec t 20,240, and 242; hi Hi Stmt,, d. 23, q. 1,

a. 3, sol I.

w

"IHIomo distinguimi' a bnitìs non solum in eo quod est rationale es-

sentials ter, sed etiam in eo quod est rationale per jiArticipalionew";

hi Hi

Sent, d. 33, q, 2, a 4, sol. 2, ad 4. See also /rc // Ethic., iect, 20, 240.



RAT IONAL IZED PASS IO M AM D PASS IONATF RATION ALITY 533

tative soul, w hich is by definition n on rational, the sens itive soul by

definition participates in rationality.

What does this participation entail for the passions and for rea-

son? Acco rding to Thom as, the sensitive soul can obey reason

(potest

obedire t r i l i on i ) and is meant to obey reason (nata es t obedire ra-

tions, subject us rationis, sequit rationem

My its very nature the

sensitive soul is directed toward reason and open to its influence.

Even more , the participation o f the sensitive soul in reason mean s that

the sensitive soul is capa ble of and "willing " to be con trolle d by reason

and to obe y the orde rs of reason. From the point of vie w of reaso n,

this participation means that reason's field of activity is extended be-

yon d the strictly rational. If this original, mutual relationship b etw een

reason and the passions of the soni did not exist, the Influence of rea-

son on the passions would be an act of violence, and further, the pas-

sions would never be alile to constitute a positive contribution to the

human act.

Tho ma s describe s in detail the points of contact bet wee n the pas-

sions and reason (wh ich aLso includes die will). The y are found at

both the level of sensitive knowledge and the level of sensitive appe-

ti te. With respect to sense-knowledge, Thom as holds that imagination

( in the sense of fantas y) and the sensitive po wer of judgment

(vis cog-

itativa) hav e ait imm ediate contact w ith universal reason, as 1 have

men tioned a bov e. Th e sensitive appetite, in turn, is directly related to

the will or rational appetite. Th e actual execu tion of the sensitive ap-

petite through the moving p owe r (tris motiva) ultimately needs the ap-

proval of Uie will.

51

The meaning of this original relationship betwee n reason and pas-

sions now bec om es clear. First, it indicates that man does not have to

be subject to his passions as such. Th e imm ediacy o f his reaction to

extern al stimuli can be broke n. Human beings can w ait in ord er to re-

act to the world. The y can respond a l a future point of time and in a

differen t place. Passions are most certainly not instincts.

Second, if we know that Thomas accepts that man as a rational

being has a natural striving toward his specific end or

lelos,

then the

original relationship between reason/will and passion meatus that the

' ST MI, q. 24, a. 1, ad 2; S T MI, q. 74, a 3, c and ad 1; S T I-1I, q. 50, a 3,

ad 1 and ad 3; .STI-II, q 56, a. 4, c; /te

Veri ate,

q. 25, a 4, c and a 5, c and ad 5.

51

.ST I, q. 81, a. 3, c.



526 EL ISABETH UFFENH EIMER-L IPPENS

sensitive appetite is an essential dimension of man's natural appetite.

The passions, therefore, should be understood as Intrinsic (o the tele-

ology of man, to his original appetite for the fulfil lment, realization,

and completion of his human nature. This point will be developed in

section

The passions, however, are not to be characterized only by their

being attuned to reason and will. Human beings exp erie nc e them as

an

i rid;

1

[i;

indent force and as having an eno rmo us pow er. We all know

how we are som etimes overw helm ed by strong feel ings,Thomas

give s seve ral reasons fo r this. First, passions are a react ion l o an ex-

ternal world of changing objects, and precisely because of that, they

have an unpred ic)atile and unco ntrollable nature. Mo reo ver, we have

to take into account the fact thai the passions have a relationship tu

Ehe body. Th ai relationship pi^vcn ts their being comp letely attuned

to reason. What is meant here by "bo dy " is the bod ily dispo sition

(qtuüUúX, d i spos i t i f corporis) that is proper to any particular man

and not the bodily change that naturally accompanies a passion.™

Man's bodily disposition can explain (lie presence of certain passions,

For example, someone might be prone to the passion of anger on the

basis of his bndily disposition Ultimate ly, ho we ver , it is Original sin

that stands as the origin of this rebellious dimension of the passions.

Original sin broke the harmony between passions and reason.

It is apparently this rebellious aspect of the passions of the soul

that Thomas wants to bring to the fore when he considcis the pas-

sions as som ething com mo n to man and animal- His aim, in otiter

word s, is not to sho w that we have passion s a<i do the animals, but

rather that the passions have a dimension of something uncontrolla-

ble, not subjec ted to reason, insofar as they depe nd upon the external,

unpredictable wo rld and

upon

the body. This

overwhelming

pow er of

the passions is precisely experienced by man whenever the right rela-

tion between passions and reason is absent

It is the interplay between the openness of the sensitive soul to-

ward reason, on the one hand, and the independence of the passions,

on tilc oilier, that Thomas has in mind when he calls the relationship

between the passions and the rational soul a "political" relationship,

lie distinguishes—as did Aristotle— this politica l relationship from a

« ST 1-11, 4. 17, a, 7. c; S T I , q, 81, a. 3, ad 2

a

ST

HI, q. 17, a. 7, c and ad ; art 2; S7 'IMI, q. 15(1, a. 1,

ç - [to VmUate,<\

25, ¡i. 4,

ad

5; ST I

I],

q- 4G,

a

5,

c.



RATION ALIZED PASS IO M AMD PASS IONATF RATIONALITY 533

despotic: one.

w

Characteristic o f this relationship is a récogn ition by

the ruling party of the independence and the right of self-determina-

tion of the ruled party and the refo re also lhe right to contradict. At

the sanie time, the ruler remains nder and will try to con vin ce his sub-

jects that i t is worthwhi le to l ive according to his prescriptions or

comma nds, When Thom as says that the passions are reasonable

per

participatUmem, or that there exists a "po litic ar relationship be-

tween reason and the passions, he means one and tiie sam e tiling. Th e

passions are b y nature subjec t to reason, ho it only partially.

The implications of this "political relations hip" between reason

and the passions are enormous and need to be examined in detait-

They concern not only Thomas's anthropology but also the very foun-

dations of his moral theory. I will point out five of these imp lications.

( ) The passions of the soul are never to be considered as mere

instincts in man. They do not belong to an "irrational

sun I"

that stands

ove r and against a rational soul. Rather, what defines die passions is

that they contain in themselves lh e tension between the rational and

the nonrational. Passions have a dimension that can be labeled as

*nonratìonal" or "uncontrol lable," This dimension has only to do with

the origin of the passion, thai is, with the object that arouses the pas-

sion and w ith the kind of response that the passion is. The obje ct as it

is presented to the sensi t ive apat i te e i ther by die senses or by the

imagination (in the first sense as a sloc k of inform ation ) is beyond the

influenc e of man's reason. The same can be said about the sp eci fic

kind of sensitive response (hat is psych osom atic in nature. On the

other hand, passion is "control lable" insofar as

tìnta

spontaneous

movement participates in and is open to reason, through the influence

of reason on the Imagination (bene as fantasy) and especially on the

cogitative pow er Th e inf luence of (he wil l on the execu tive pow er

can also be added to that™

(2 ) The faci that Thomas locates the tension between rational and

nonrational within the passions themselves does not mean thai lhe

prob lem o f the passions is an internal problem o f the soul. Ultimate ly

what can be called the most basic tension in the human being is

41

For the difference between despotic and political relationship, I can

refer tu the following lexts: ST I II , q. 9, a 2, ad 3; ST M l, Q. 56, a, 4, ad ST I

II,q, 17, a

7,

C;S71, q.

BJ,

a. 3, e (most complete text).

^ 'A ct us au tem sen s i lat ita t s mm est p e r f id f in potes laU

1

nost r i l , h i

quo d p r o v e n it jud ic iu m rat i f ia is : est Lamen a liqual i t er in nost ra potentate , in

qu an tu m sensu a l i t a s ra t i on i suh j ic i lur" ; /V a. 5, c.



526 EL ISABETH UFFEN HEIMER-L IPPENS

concentrated m the passions: namely, the tension between the body

and the external, material world, on the one hand, and the soul or the

spiritual, on the other hand. The passions an? not only an ex press ion

of Thom as's Iso m orp his m . They reflect his anthropological ennrep-

fion of

man ;LS

a

frontier

being, an intellectua l being shun ling in a ma-

terial reality, a being standing on the horizon of the

spiritual and

the

material world.

1

*

1

(3) A political ruler considers if lo he one of his primordial and

essential tasks not only to relaLe to his own needs and activities but

also toa el with responsibility toward his autonom ous Subjects. In the

same way does man's reason necessarily relate not; only to ils own ac-

tivities and go;d s but to those oik Hie

sensitive

level

a s

well .

The

rela-

tionship to the passions is an essential co m pon ent n ftli c rationality of

the human being. Ho we ver, this does not change the fact thai reason

is the niler in this relation ship,

(4) T he influence of reason upon lhe passions must he seen as an

attempt to heighten the reasonable as¡>eet of the passions and to

lessen their unpred ictable and uncontrollable character. This can

only be done by chiuigiug passion from a mere reaction-action into a

reaction-action thai fila in with the overall goals of human nature,

What this means is tliat the object that causes the passions, and that

belon gs either to the external w orld or to one's ow n b ody, escapes ev-

ery attempt of reason to control It. The sam e applies to the speci i c

kind of mov em ent that the passion is. Mere reason can have no influ-

ence because passions are a specific kind of reaction of the sensitive

appetite, Reason

r

an only influe nce passions by influencing lhe eva l-

uation that accom pan ies lhe knowled ge that arouses the passions. By

subordinating their floal to a m ore universal or a more ove rall human

goal, reason breaks the immediacy of their reaction with respect to

time and place.

(5 ) The p olitical relation betwe en reason and the passions means

that the passions do not need to af fe ct the freedo m , the responsibility

fo r the human act. A human being remains responsible fo r his acts

even w hen he acts under the influence of a passion, Only in very rare

ca w s w here the passions remove man's rat ionality and free wil l docs

w

See for diis topic: Gerard Verbtke, "Man as a Trontier" according to

Aquinas," in

Aquinas ami Problems

o f

H is Time.

(Leuven: University Press;

Til e

llague: Martinas N jh of f, 1976), 106^223.



RATIONALIZED PAS S ION AN D PASS ION ATE RATIONALITY 547

acting out of passion annihilate completely the individual's responsi-

bility

for the

act.

m

The Impl icat ions o f th is for Thomas 's mora l theory are obv ious .

First, insofar as the passions have a pol i t ical re lation to reason "by na-

ture," Lhey are by def init ion neither a disturbing factor (perhiri)a-

(iones animae)

nor mora l ly bad. Th ey are not by nature directed

against reason even though they poss ess an aspec t of ind epe nd enc e

and can escape the contro l o f r eason. Accordin g ly , mora l l i f e doc s not

mean a suppression of the passions but rather their integration within

the or iginal human str iv ing for ful f i l lment. The peculiar character of

the passion s as a reaction to the extern al w orld is ne ver d iminu i ed,

justas in a proper pol i t icai re lationship the peculiar character of the

ruled sub ject is neve r denied . The m 1er, on the contrary, can only try

to accommodate the nature and character o f the subjec ts w i thin his

ow n goa ls and a ims. Hege l ' s technica l term aa jheben , which m eans to

e l iminate (on a lower l e v e l ) so as to preserve by l i f t ing up to a higher

level , is apr op os h ere.

Ill

Po&itive and Negative Aspects oj the Relationship between Re a-

son and the Passions Th e purpos e o f th is l bird part, of my article is lo

po int out that according to Tho ma s d ie pass ions can and should form

an integral part of the human, rational str iv ing for sel f-ful f i l lment in

this l i fe . I wi l l sh ow this by consider ing conse cutiv ely th e posit ive and

negative aspects of the relationship between reason and the passions.

I wi l l si

art

wi lh th e pos it ive inf luen ce of reason o n the passions. T h e

or iginal "pol i t ica l" re lationship bet we en Hi cm mea ns f irst That reason

is given a control l ing

and

governing role with regard to the passions of

the so u l Such a role presupp oses not only that the passions can be

contro l led but a lso thai lhey need to be contro l led. The se tw o d imen-

sions have to be analyzed further.

As said above, that reawn can control the passions presupposes

the openness of

the

passions toward reason.

the

perspective of

ST

I-H

P

q. 77. a. 7, c , Responsibility* then, lo r one's actions is com-

pletely absent

when

One's âCliOilS Aré ciwaed by a natural cause and not by

die will The example of Thomas mentions illness, which is clearly mental ill

rie-ss.



526 EL ISABETH UFFEN HEIMER-L IPP ENS

reason, fil is implies that the relation to the sensitive app etite is an es-

sential aspect of reason . Con sequen tly, its act of con trol is nev er an

act of violence.

That reason needs to che ck the passions rests on the idea that the

passions do not automatically contribute to the human act insofar as

they lack an intentai mechanism of control and can, therefore, In-

come a destruct ive fon e/

18

They do need the guidance of reason to

guarantee their

contribution

to the moral act of man. The immediacy

of the emotional reaction both in time and space might certainly

hinder man front reaching his overall rational goal.

3

* We can here re-

fer to the first part of this article, where we pointed out that the pas-

sions (in the third sense) can hinder a being from exercising its natu-

ral movem ent tow ard its goal.

It is very important, howev er, to understand what T hom as means

by this "co ntr ol" of reason. We must stress that Th om as speak s al-

ways of the "mitigation" of the passions and never of their total exclu-

sion. When he doe s use the ver i) "to suppress " in relation to the pas-

sions, he refers only to the lack of rational order that must be

repelled , not to the passions as such. One must kee p in mind that the

passions arc not by nature perturtmtinncs aniinae

The role of reason consists in the "rationalization" of the pas-

sions. Th is means the deve lopm ent o f their original capacity fo r re-

sponding to the comm and of reason. Only these "rational ized" pas-

sions are natural for man as man, that is, as a rational l»eing. Th os e

passions that transcend the limits of reason are

contra naturain

for

man.

61

Man reaches a higher degree of com pleteness o r ful f i llment i f he

organizes everything that is jter se and per participaiionem rational

according to his reason as root source (radix). * In othe r wor ds,

Thomas does not promote the rational knowledge of our passions as

an ideal. He rather prom otes the rationalization of the human affe c-

tions, in the sense of achieving an internal permeation and not an

'* For this point see In III Snit., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, c.

59 N

[P|erfecta virtus m oral is non totaliter tolht passiones, sed ordinal

eas:

t em ¡Minti

enim

est cowvpiscere, sirut nportet et quae opoHet,

ut dici-

tur in III

Eth \ S T

I, q. 95, a. 2, ad 3. See also:

ST

I II, q. 34, a 1, ad 2;

hi III

Sent., d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, c.

W

ST H I, q. 24, a 2, c. See also texts referred to in note 44.

*>

ST

Ml, q 82, a. 3, ad 1 ;

ST

MI, q. 88, a. 3. ad 3.

n

ST MI, q 24, a. 3, e.



RAT IONAL IZED PASS IO M AM D PASS IONATF RATIONAL ITY 533

extern Ell form wf control , Thom as wants nifi ti t f ) achieve a State in

which lie gives the right emotional responses to the surrounding

world. Thus, the discussion of (he ¡KLSS ÍO I I » Can only he com plete d hy

a discussion of the virtues. It is with the help of the virtues that the

passions can contribute constantly to the attainment of the ultimate

goal of man.

With respect to the ways in which reason lias to control or to di-

rect the passions, Tho ma s distinguishes tw o possib ilities™ First,

whenever a pa s s i o n attrai:Is o ne strongly toward something (tmhi mi

aliitd),

the task of reason con sists In refraining thai passion

(reprim-

ere, refrenare, temperare, repellere). Reaso n see ks to obtain that on e

do es not fo llo w this passion as it is; it seek s to introdu ce an element of

ref lection, distance, delay, and above al l moderatimi of the exc ess ive

character of that passion. Thom as gives us here the exam ples of con •

cupiscentia, spes, and irrr. For exam ple, when o ne loses him self in an

uncontrol led need to consume enormous quantities of food and be-

com es "ad dicted" to the jo y this provides him, then reason has the

task of repelling this urge insofar as it lacks the prop er relation t o rea-

son. Its tactics may include interrupting the imm ediacy o f the urge by

presenting the art of eating within a larger framework of human well

being and a hierarchy o f values related to that.

A seco nd poss ibility that calls for ihe Intervention of rea son is the

cast: In which one is pulled away from his normal aciivity by his pas-

sion (trahit ab eó). The iole of reason (hen consists in encouraging

the rtght passion (Jvmare). Thom as gives the exam ple of fear (timor)

that needs to be overco me by forti tude

(fortitudo).

iîic Negative hijlwm cc of tica son on the Passions.

In what pre-

cedes, ï have discussed the positive role or "control" of reason over

the passions. In this regard, die passions need reason in order to co n-

ti l bui e to the human act. Th is aspect of the relationship betw een pas-

sions and reason is probably die best known and tht: most obvious to

tis. Tliomas also recognizes, however, another aspect of this relation-

ship: the negative or harmful influence of reason over the passions.

This point has almost never been elaborated in the secondary litera-

ture,

« S T I M , q 141, ¿ A c .



526 EL I SABETH UFFENHE IME R-L IPPENS

Thom as points out that reason has a negative inf luence ov er the

passions in an act ive and in a passive way . First of ail, reason is capa-

ble of arousing the passions in an active and conscious way and can

even command them (

inst igare, provocare,

and

imperate).

T i lomas

is here thinking about die fact that human reason can provide the ob-

ject that arouses the passions.

64

For exam ple, we can think of some-

one who gets himself excited and angry by thinking about something.

As pointed out above, this happens in die absence of a concrete ob-

ject through die help of imagination.

In a more passive way, reason can have a negative influence inso-

far as i t doe s not repress a sudden passion ( r e p r i m e r e , repellere, and

coercere). What happens here is that reason doe s not make any effo rt

to subsume the particular evaluation that accompanies the passion

under its mo re universal conside rations. For examp le, on e can los e

himself in feelings of lust and, aldiough con sciou s of this, refrain fro m

making the slightest effo rt to sto p this indulgence.

11

'

1

The issue of the negative influence of reason over the passions

can be better explained if we look at the distinction which Thomas

makes between the so-called natural and nonnatural passions of the

soul."® The difference between "natural" and "nonnatural" Ls based on

the origin or cause of die passion. Th e cause of the passion is to be

found as well in the object that arouses the passion as in the subject:

die object arouses the passion, but every passion presupposes a pa-

üent, a subjec t that unde rgoes the passion. Th e question Thomas

raises concerns the way in which the object and subject of the pas-

sions can be considered "natural."

07

Acco rding to Thomas, the natural

object is that which contributes to the conservation of the self and the

spec ies on a primordial level. "Na tural" here means vital: that is, fo od ,

drink, or the sexual obje ct. When w e sjieak abou t "natural" with re-

spect to the subject of the passion, different options are present.

M

iS T I, q. 81, a. 3, c; ST I II. q. 74. a. 5, c and a. 6, c.

^" [R at to ) [d|eficit autem in directions passionimi interionim dup liciter.

Uno m odo, quando iniperat ¡Ilícitas passiones: sicut quando hom o ex deliber

alione provocai stbi motum irae vel roncupiscentiae. Alio modo, quando

non reprimit illicitum passion is motum: sicut cum aliquis, postquam deliber-

a v i quod motus passionis insurgens est inordinatus, nihilominus circa ipsiini

immuratili', et ipsum non expellit";

ST

I-li, q. 74, a. 6. c.

""'The following texts are important for this point:

ST

MI, q. 30. a. 3 and

a. 4; q. 31, a. 7, c; q. 41, a. 3, c; q. 77. a. 5.

07

ST MI, q. 46, a 5. c.



RA T IO M AL I ZED PAS S IO N AN D PASS I ON ATE RAT ION AL IT Y 551

"Nal il ral" can refer to Llm generic nature (if man, thai is, insofar ¡is be

is a living being, it can, however, also refer to lhe speeific nature of

mail, that is, liis rational nature. Finally, il. may r efer to lhe i urli vidua

nature. At this point only the generic nature of man is relevant to ou r

discussion: w e re fer to the human being as subject of the passiona in-

sofa r as he is a mere living being. On this vi tai level the conservali on

of his life, bolh on the individuai level and on that of the species, is

what matters*

6

When we bring the objective and the subjective sides of the pas-

sions together, natural passions can bo called "necessary" because

they have an immediate link to the conservation of the subject, on the

most basic level of its existen ce. For thai Same reason they can be

said to have a utilitarian cha racter. Tho ma s says also that the natural

passions presuppose an "absolute apprehension" of what th e obje ct Is

of my passion: he means here an immediate, nondel iberate grasp of

what is appropriate on this level.

The above description of the natural passions is needed In order

to understand what the nonnatural liassions are- They diffe r fro m the

natural passions with respect to their subject, objcct, and way of

thinking involve d Th é subject, of die se nonnatural passions is not any

mo re man as a bei ng belonging

t o t

he genus of living b e

ings

Itather, it

Is man as a rational being. Conce rning the ob ject of these passions»

Thomas distinguishes three kinds of rational objects: ( 1) The spec i f ic

rational objects such as (he contemplation of truth

(contemplado -

iLatis) and the virtuous act.® (2 ) l h e ob jects of the natural passions,

For example, the appetite for, and the enjoyment of, natural objects

such as food, drink, and sexual objects, can become rational because

these objects can become the objects of a rational, conscious striv

ing.

711

But ( 3 ) the rational passion can aiso strive for nonnatura) ob-

jects, objects lhat are considered to be beyond, pmeter, the natura

otyects,

71

What Th om as has in mind here are the superfluous varia-

tions of the natural and necessary object s. Th ey are obje cts that are

no longer of vital importance for the individual human being's life or

for the human species Som e exam ples would be: ref ined foo d, luxury

banquets, selected wines, rich clothing, and also sex nal perversi fin or

^S H -l i , q. 30, a c ; ST I - [ [

f

q 4 6

l

a.5 ,c an d* 31, a. 7,c.

" S T H I , q. 31, a. 7, c.

K

ST I-Í , q. 30, a 3, ad I; q. 31, a. 3, c ,

11

ST I I I , q. 30, a 3, c



55 ? EL I SABETH UFFENHE lMER-L IPPENS

pornograp hy, it is no tew orth y here thai it is human being s them-

selves w ho invent these val iants Tho ma s uses such verbs as artinve-

nire

or

excogitarv

h e r e . T h e kind o f know ledge invo l ved here is noi

any more an "absolute

1

' apprehension but "del iberative" k now ledge.

Tliornas does not particularly esteem the influence of delibera-

tive reason in this last case. This be com es clear wh ene ver h e distin-

guishes between natural and nonnatural desire for, and pleasure m,

ob jec ts of vital impo rtance . Natural desire and pleasure are describ ed

as "limited ," and the non natural as "unlimited."

19

The naturai passions

are limited in actit. it is the right kind of striving after and enjo yin g o f

objects of vital

i in

porta

nee.

A natural passion has a well-dete rmin ed

goal and reaches it in a certain, determined w ay. Tho ma s does not ex-

clude, howeve r, I hat these natural passions can be unlimited per sw-

çessionem.

The re is a potential endlessness/infinity in the absorp tion

of an object. Let us take the exam ple of food One does not eat only

once. Rather, characteristic of lhe intake of food is that it is an aci

that has to be done over and over again. "

Thom as d ef ines die nonnatural passions— in contradistinction to

the natural passions— as unlimited

perse,

Th ey have a relation to rea-

son that cat ries iti itself th e p ow e r of the infinite.™ This infinit e is,

how ever, a negative infinity. When a man, for exam ple, loves money,

he will try not only to become rich but to be as rich as possible. He

loses the right hierarchy b etwe en mea ns and ends. What ough t to be

a means becomes an end in itself, while the insight about the proper

end is tost. Thus it is obvious that the distinction between naturili and

nonnatural passions presupposes a value-statement about Lhe hierar-

chy of means and eints and has much to do with the distinction be-

tween heaven and eaith, between the bodity and the spiritual.

Th e differ en ce betwee n the naturai and the nonnatural pa ssions

sh ow s us that. Tliom as reco gnize s the possibility of a n egative influ-

ence of reason upon the passions. Man is capable of distorting his

passio ns "Distortion" here does not mean an internal change in the

passions for reason cannot alter the passions in th e sen se that it. can-

not change the nature of the passions as a very spec i f ic kind of reac-

tion toward the external world. Rather, "distor f ion" here means a

^Iliid

73

#7'Ml, <]. 30, a. 4, c .

7i

ST I-l i, (j. 30, a. 4, c¡ ST I II, q. 33, a. 2, e

«S TI -l i , q, 30, a c c a n i i ari 2,



RAT IONAL I ZED P ASS IO M AMD PASS IO NATF RAT IONAL ITY 533

"misuse" w hich arises in ils turn rrom a wr ong use of rationality. In

stead of integ rality the passions iti man's striving for the

fulfill

meni of

his rational nature, he makes his wrong rationality a servant of the

passions. He ne glects his ow n rational nature.

Th e Negative h\}himce of tke Passions on Reason. Thomas d is-

ti tisses

far less and certainly far less directly die wa y in which reason

rail disturb the passions than he does the way in which the passions

are apt to disturb rational activity, What is of im porta nce here is that

he distinguishes the degree of intensity of the influence of lhe pas-

sions from the way in which ihe passions disturb reason. Conc erning

the intensity of the passions, he distinguishes

I h

re e levels of distur-

bance.

Ts

In the first level of disturbance, reason can be absorbed by the

passions in such a way that its normal use (ustts) becom es impossible.

In this case n an loses his typically human insight. Me deg ener ates hy

follow ing the impetus of his passion. He functions without any kind of

rational reflection and will. He loses himself in his passions instead of

actively controlling his actions. Th om as gives the follo win g exa mp les.

Excessive hatred or concupiscence can bring man "out of bis mind"

(ambits ) and turn him Into a madman

{fañosas).

Th e same can hap-

pen in the case of anger, Tear, and happiness, t-lesrly, in instances

such as these, the m oral quality of the act is diminished and the sinful-

ness of the act is mitigateti because the

indi

viri nal is less ration al,

and responsible for his acts. There are, however, very few situations

in which the passions completely annihilate (lu- moral responsibility

of man, as Thomas pointa out in his discussion of Ihe causes of sin.

H e considers man in m ost cases responsible for his acts as well as for

his passions.

The second level can be called no disturbance

at

all from the pas-

sions. In an idea] situation, die sensitive soul is wh olly su bject to rea-

son Within a biblical perspective, this was die case befor e original

sin. Thi s indicates ili

at

ihe tension between reason and passions is

not primordial iti man but is the result of the- first sin that destroyed

the harmony betw een body and soul. Only die virtuous individual ap-

proaches this ideal situation to the extent that he controls bis sensi-

tive appetites completely.

''.S'JTMI,q. i o ,a 3 , c a n d a d 2



526 EL I SABETH UFFENHE IMER -L IPPENS

The third type of disturbance ref lects our ordinary exp erienc e in

daily life. Reason can be disturbed by the presence of the passions,

but at the sanie time it is not comp letely abso rbed by diem . It ran

cont rol and organ ize diem w ithout suppressing them. In this situation

the passions can be an instigation to sin but never a sufficient cause.

Note here that the passions at stake are antecedent passions in that

they precede the rational act but do not fol low it (compare below).

This diird type of disturbance can be understood better by connecting

it to the way in which the passions disturb reason. Tho ma s distin-

guishes three ways in which this can take place: by contrariety (per

contmrietatem),

by distraction

(per distmctwnem),

and by binding

(per ligationem).

In the first case, where the passions disturb by contrariety (per

contmrietatem),

Tho ma s has in mind that die passions can appe ar in

a sudden w ay and with an enormous po wer and strength, even be fore

reason can pronounce its judgment or exerc ise i ts inf luence. Any

consequent rational judgmen t is disturbed and even "cloud ed." The

passions fol low the sense-know ledge or imaginary kn owle dge and the

sensitive judgment

(vis cogitativa).

Th e individual fails to pe rce ive

the particular ob ject o f the passion in the universal light of reason and

the right principles of human action. His particular sens itive striving

is not part of a larger rational striving.

Contraríelas

here means

"against moral reason and its order."

7

" It is clear that Th om as has in

mind here contrariety to practical reason.

The antecedent passions disturb reason, however, also in another

way: they disturb ¡>er distractionem. Because Thom as accepts that

the powers of the soul are all rooted in one soul, he also accepts the

principle of die balanc e of energy bet ween the po we rs of the soul. In-

vesting in the sensitive appetite happens on account of the act of the

rational appetite. For exam ple, when on e invests all his ene rgy in his

passion, for example, fear, lie then w eakens the possibi li ty o f st riving

afte r something in a rational way.

7

"

The negative inf luence of the passions can also be described in

terms of the objec t that is striven after. Insofa r as man is domin ated

by his passions, something might seem convenient to him which nn-

77

.ST M l, q. 77, a. 2. c; q. 33, a. 3, c; q. 34. a. 1, ad 1.

n

ST

I-II, q. 77. a. I .e.

79

ST I II, q. 77, a 1, c; .ST I-II, q. 33. a. 3, c; ST IMI. q 153, a 5. c.



RAT IONAL IZED PASS IO M AMD PASS IONATF RATIONALITY 533

tier normal circumstances would not be considered so. The will might

follow this information and therefore strive after objects that it would

not seek under normal circumstances.

Finally, the passions disturb reason in a third w ay, nam ely,

perli-

galionem.

As mentioned above, a bodi ly or corporeal change accom -

panies every passion. Even though reason do es not use and need the

corporeal organs in its own activity, it presupposes the activity of the

sensitive powers. These are disturbed, however, when die body is dis-

turbed. When one experie nce s passions, his body is also inv olved.

This bodily change in its turn can have a negative influence upon the

activity of reason. Thom as gives the fol lowing exam ple: the vehement

eff ec t of anger upon the heart and the external limbs prohibits the nor-

mal formation o f a judgme nt of reason. Thom as also points to drunk-

enness, sleep, and cotvjugal sex as bodily activities that disturb the ac-

tivity of reason and will in a fundam ental, though temp orary, way."

0

The Positive Contribution of the Pansions to the Rational Act.

Passions disturb reason and its activity insofar as they precede ratio-

nal activity. The y can, how eve r, have a positive and enriching role in

human activity insofar as they fo llow reason and the rational app etite.

A first possibility is that the intensity of man's will flows over into his

sensitive appetite

{per modum irdundantiae).

This passive move-

ment is possible because of the internal connection between the pow-

ers of the soul."' We can t hink here about some bod y wh o is intellectu-

ally involved in teaching but also develops a genuine emotion of liking

his students. Ano ther exa mp le of Thom as is that of justice: an act of

justice can be followed by intellectual joy and by happiness on a sensi-

tive level. One can feel genuine happiness when doing an act of jus-

tice. A second possibility is that man cons ciously and actively

chooses

(per modum electionis)

to bec om e affec ted by an appropri-

ate passion (qffiri). In litis case the passions fol low the rational judg-

ment close ly and the result is an increased m oral goodness.** Th om as

gives the fol lowing examp les. When an individual al lows himself to

feel a mo derate fear, his fear does not disturb his rational activity and

m

ST I II, q. 33, a 3, c and ad 3; q. 48, a. 3, c; q 77, a. 2, c; ST MI, q. 34, a 1,

ad I.

*' See

ST

II I. q. 59, a. 5. c;

tie Veritate,

q. 26, a. 3. ad 13. For a general

text on

reitumlantin

see

lie Veritate,

q. 2fi, a. 10, c.

". ST I- li, q. 24, a 3, c and ad 1.



RAT IONAL IZED PASS IO M AMD PASS IONATF RATIONA LITY 533

nal world to become part and parcel of lhe overall striving lo realize

one's full human po tentialities.

Man has to take responsibility, as a rational being, for bis pas-

sions. No t to do so me ans ultimately to go against his nalurai m ove-

m en t toward fulfil lment, of his telos- This is fatal fo r man as a rational

being in this wo rld.

IV

Q m rji ts îo n. Th e aim of this article lias been to articulate an un-

derstanding of the passions of the soul within (he larger framework of

the anthropology of Thomas, i have stressed Thom as's I s o m o r-

phism, his insight into man as a "frontier

3

being, and his (ecological

understanding o f man's nature. I wan ted to show that the prob lem o f

the relationship between reason and the passions is not a problem of

how to guarantee the rationality, freedom, and responsibility of man

over and against the passions as movements of the irrational part in

him self Rather, given the basic fact that reason and passions have an

original "political" relationship, reason has naturally and necessarily

to relate to that which, though not.essential|y rational, is s o by partici-

pation, to that which, though not automatically cooperating, is by na-

ture capa ble of coopera ting. This means that the passions can and

should in principle become part of the human striving for fulfil lment.

We can here refer to what was said in section I of this article: a pas

sion is capable not only of changing the natural disposition of a being

bul also of impeding its natural impetus or natural inclination. T o

avo id this is precis ely the lask of reaso n. It lias to take up its respons i-

bility to ward the passion s so that they can b ecom e part of this natural

inclination. This do es not imply that reason has to suppress the spe-

ci fic kind o f rea ction t o the extern al w orld that, is the pa ssion, or that,

it has to deny the relationship of ihe passions to die body, or that it.

cannot reco gnize the speci f ic goals of the passions. Taking up respon-

sibility toward the passions as appetites of the sensitive level is to in-

sert them Into die ove rall striving o f the human being towa rd his ratio-

nal com pletion , Their particular goal lias to bec om e part, of the

bro ade r» hum an-rational telón. Th e passio ns <ue to be nega ted only in-

sofar as they do not take into consideration their original relationship

to reason and also ins ofar as they are the result of a disorde red ratio-

nality. The y are, how ev er, nec essarily u> be presei~ved by right reaso n



558 EL ISABETH UFFENHEJMER-LfPPENS

on

a

higher level, with iJieir ow n go als subsum ed within ihe fram e-

wo rk of the goals of reason.

T o pul it in a differ ent way , the human act is a rational act, It is

rational only to the extent, that it allo ws its rationality lo ex tend to ev -

erything that is rational ami that participa tes in rationality. It fo l lows,

therefore, that the passions constitute ore of the three principles of

ihe human act.airing with reason and will.

A consequence of ih is is that Ihe moral com pletio n o f m an in this

life includes I hat man gives a prope r place to that in himself which re-

lates to the body, to the external wo rld, and, as such, to the un predict-

able. Right mora l behavior entails not the suppres sion of the passion s

but the development of the right attitude toward these sensitive appe-

tites and to every thing they stand for. it means making the passions

o f the soul an integral dimension o f our ethical life Only then will the

harmony and balance between the two dimensions that characterize

us as human beings be reached and wil l man show the impressive

weal th uf "be ing h u m a n. *

Jenisatcm

uffenheimer-lippens rationalized passion and passionate rationality thomas aquinas 2003 .ocr

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