ue revised concept summary

7/30/2019 UE Revised Concept Summary

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Unit of Employment Concepts for Major Combat Operations

Since 1999, the US military has undergone a sweeping evolution driven by operational

experience and new capabilities. In the past, the conduct of operations was divided into

loosely linked major land, sea, and air operations, often conducted with different

objectives. Today, joint operations form an integrated joint fabric and increasingly,operations are integrated at the tactical level. The joint force commander employs air,

sea, space, and special operations forces at the tactical, operational, and theater strategiclevels. The complete integration of joint capabilities allows the joint force commander to

adapt and tailor joint capabilities to the conditions and tasks extant in the theater and joint

operational area (JOA). No single element is decisive; constantly changing combinations

forge decisive campaigns. Employed as an integrated joint force, US forces deploy arange of capabilities unmatched by any potential opponent. Joint and multinational

operations enable actions of other US Government agencies as part of the broader

application of the instruments of national power.

The operational environment requires Army forces that are much more responsive and

tailorable to the needs of the combatant commanders. No single large formation is ableto meet the requirements of full spectrum operations. To meet the needs of the RCC for

land forces, the Army is constantly dismantling its current force divisions and task organizing them into independent task forces, something for which they weren’t

designed. This is coupled with the need to employ land forces at the outset of the

campaign, in completely complementary fashion with other joint capabilities, translatedinto the requirement for much more deployable Army forces.

The nature of modern land operations has changed in terms of geography and time. In

general, operations have become more distributed in space and more simultaneous in

time. At tactical and operational levels, subordinate units operate in noncontiguous areasof operations and conduct nonlinear operations as a matter of routine. This contrasts

sharply with the interlocked and hierarchical arrangement of land areas of operations

prevalent in the past. This change is the result of smaller and more agile forces, quantumimprovements in command and control, and continuing integration of joint capabilities at

lower echelons.

Army forces continue to increase their lethality, meaning that greater effects can be

generated with much smaller forces. This continues the historical impetus of the last 100years. However, the integration of advanced information technologies multiplies the

effectiveness of the individual weapons systems by many times. The antithesis of this

development is the increasing dependence on unconventional means by our enemies.

They are simply unable to match the conventional military capabilities of the US, and the

disparity is growing at an increasing rate. Thus, the frequency of facing large,conventional land forces diminishes even as the need for Army forces for full spectrum

operations increases, when examined as a function of the total force engaged incampaigns.

Note that while the frequency and perhaps likelihood of encountering powerful and

competently commanded ground forces has diminished, it will not disappear. For many

nations, the cost and infrastructure necessary to challenge the US at sea, in the air, or inspace are far greater than that required to field land forces. When and if they challenge

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US interests, their operational center of gravity will be land-based. Therefore, Army

forces must be capable of defeating regional military powers with modernized and

capable ground forces for the foreseeable future.

All these factors presage the requirement for Army forces to execute offensive land

operations early in the campaign, by introducing forces capable of maneuvering to

operational depths in conjunction with other joint capabilities. This is the essence of “operational maneuver from strategic distance.” In order to be deployed and employedswiftly, these forces must be smaller than the two Army Corps that carried out Desert

Storm (over 100,000 troops each), but with corps-like command and control to extend

operations in sufficient depth and strength to dislocate and then defeat enemy forces.Such an operation was planned, but not executed in Operation Iraqi Freedom – the attack

of the TF IRON HORSE, built around the 4th Mechanized Division (including 33,000

troops) to attack along a line of operations from the Turkish border toward Baghdad.

Figure 1 – TF IRON HORSE planned to attack from Turkey to Baghdad, a distance over 500

kilometers, using a mix of brigades and advanced command and control capabilities. TF IRON HORSE

would have been controlled directly by 3 rd Army as CJFLCC.

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To meet joint requirements, the Army is reorganizing its operational forces as shown in

Figure 2 to provide for a mix of land combat power that can be tailored for any

combination of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations as part of integrated joint operations.

Current

Army

XXXX

CORPS

XXX

DIV

XX

BDE

X

Transformed

UEX

UE Y

BDE

Battles & Engagements

Primary Warfighter

JTF/JFLCC/ARFOR

Capable*

Army & Joint

Support

In AOR

Functional array, not pure hierarchy

JTF/JFLCC

Capable*

* With SJFHQ and Joint Manning Doc

Figure 2. The Army is in the process of a complete reorganization into a modular, brigade-based Army.

Brigades will be the principal means of conducting battles and engagements. Two complementary higher

echelons will replace the existing structure of divisions, corps, and army headquarters

Brigades

Brigades will be the principal means of conducting engagements. The principal tactical

unit of the modular Army will be the combined arms maneuver brigade combat team

(BCT). Three standard brigade combat team designs make up the maneuver power of the

modular Army – Heavy Brigade Combat Teams, Infantry Brigade Combat Teams, andStryker Brigade Combat Teams. These maneuver brigade combat teams include organic

battalion-sized maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and logistics subunits. Beginning in

2014, the Army will modernize maneuver brigade combat teams with Future CombatSystems (FCS). FCS-equipped maneuver brigade combat teams will have greater

lethality and be easier to deploy and sustain than anything in the current force. The

organization of modular brigade combat teams will facilitate conversion to FCS.

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RSTA

BSBBTB

Brigade Troops

Heavy Brigade

RSTA

BSBHHC

Brigade Staff

Stryker Brigade

X

BSBBTB

Brigade Troops

Infantry Brigade

RSTA

X

Brigade Combat TeamsX

Figure 3. Three types of brigade combat teams form the maneuver striking power of the modular Army

A mix of other brigades supports the UEx and the brigade combat teams. These brigadesinclude an aviation brigade, reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)

brigade, a maneuver enhancement (ME) brigade, a fires brigade, and a sustainment

brigade. These brigades will be organized as combined arms and single branch units

intended to support the maneuver brigade combat team and carry out specific tasks insupport of echelons above the brigade. Figure 4, below, shows the various supporting

brigades

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281100 AUG 04 UE Update to CSA v 4.1 7

HHCGS ATK

U

ASLT CL IV

Organic AssignedII II II II

ASB

II

ASB

II

X

MFMF

CannonCannon

II

BSB

II

BSB IORocket/Missile

I

HHB

Organic Assigned

TBD

Rocket/Missile

I II

ATK

I

TAB

I

TAB

XX

BSB MP EOD CA MANE

HHC

II II

Assigned Attached or OPCONOrganic

XX

I

I

II

INTEL

II

INTEL UAVR

A

Hunter

SOF

I I I

HHC SPT LRSD

Attached or OPCON

X

Organic

IIII

BTB

II

BTB

HR AMMO MAINT S&STRANSFIN

MED

Organic Assigned Attached

I I I

HHC SPT

II

BTB

II

BTB

MED

II

SPT

II

SPT

X

SUST

X

SUST

X

Modular Army Support Brigades

Aviation Fires

Maneuver

Enhancement

RSTA Sustainment

Figure 4. Modular supporting brigades extend the depth and duration of Army operations. RSTA stands

for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition

Higher Echelons

Between now and 2010, two higher headquarters will replace the existing structure of divisions, corps, and echelons above corps. These headquarters are currently designated

UEx (primary warfighting), and UEy (theater operational land force and joint support).

While the tendency is to think of these echelons as linear improvements to the divisionand corps, they are not. Both higher echelons will be complementary, modular entities

designed to employ tailored forces within integrated joint campaigns.

UEy

The UEy will be the Army theater-level headquarters for each Regional CombatantCommander. The UEy consolidates most of the functions performed by corps and Army

Service Component Command into a single operational echelon. It will be the primary

vehicle for Army support to the entire region. It supports Army, Joint, and multinationalforces deployed to a joint operational area. The UEy commander performs the functionsand tasks of the Army service component commander (ASCC) when the UEy is under the

COCOM (Combatant Command, Command Authority) of a Regional Combatant

Commander. In major combat operations, where the regional combatant commander isthe joint force commander, the UEy may become the joint force land component

commander (JFLCC) and exercises operational control over tactical forces. When

required for contingencies, the UEy provides a JTF-capable headquarters.

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As the ASCC, the UEy is responsible for administrative control (ADCON) of all Army

forces in the AOR. The ASCC also integrates Army forces into the execution of theater

engagement plans, and provides Army support to joint forces, interagency elements, andmultinational forces as directed by the regional combatant commander. This is shown in

Figure 5:

SupportingBrigades

SupportingBrigades

JTF

JCMOTF

JFLCC/

ARFOR

J FMCC J SOTF JFACC

AAMDC

UEy units provide

tailored support to the

JFC; provide ADCON

and most Army support

to other Services

(ASOS)ADCON and ASOS

UEx

UEy

JPOTF

ASCC

OPCON

TSC SIG CMD MI CA SupportingBrigades

JLTF

Figure 5: The UEy exercises administrative control (ADCON) of Army forces and provides Army support

to other services (ASOS) for other members of the joint talks force.

For major combat operations or theater war, the UEy may provide the joint force land

component commander (JFLCC) and headquarters. At the same time, the UEy will

continue to perform the ASCC functions. The illustration below shows a UEy as aJFLCC.

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UExUEy_251200Aug04 17

PSYOP

Major Combat OperationsUEY as JFLCC / ARFOR

MaritimeSpecialOperations

Air

Theater

Sustainment

Command

xx Theater

Signal

Command

JFLCC/

ARFOR

RCC

SupportingBrigades

xxx

MEF

UEy

UExUEx

Support to Joint & Multinational forces

MN

Civil

AffairsMilitary

Intelligence

SUST

Figure 6. The UEy is designed to be the JFLCC for a major combat operation while continuing Army

support within the theater

UEx

The primary war fighting headquarters will be the UEx. The UEx combines the functions

of today’s division with the tactical responsibilities of the corps. The primary task of the

UEx is to direct the operations of the subordinate brigades. The UEx is not a fixed

formation. It is a completely modular command and control entity designed to exercise

command and control over various brigades. The UEx will not have any organic forces beyond the elements that make up the headquarters. The UEx can be the JFLCC for

smaller contingencies, or become the JTF headquarters for smaller contingencies, withappropriate joint augmentation.

In major combat operations, UEx typically operates along a line of operations or in an

area of operations to establish the military conditions required for the successful

conclusion of the major land operation or joint campaign. The UEx controls up to sixmaneuver brigade combat teams in high and mid-intensity combat operations, but may

control more maneuver brigade combat teams in protracted stability operations. The

brigades may include any mix of heavy, infantry, Stryker, and eventually FCS-equipped brigade combat teams.

The UEx has no fixed structure beyond the UEx headquarters, so not all types of brigades

may be present in an operation. In some operations, the UEx may control more than one

of a particular type of brigade. The UEx may also control functional groups, battalions, or even companies, but normally these will normally be task organized to one of the

brigades. The important point is that the UEx is not a standard force, but it is tailored to

the mission. Figure 7 illustrates two possible UEx organizations, but many more

combinations are possible.

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X XX

X

SUST

XX

Each UEx is tailored for a specific

operation; the composition of the

UEx is completely variable

Example: Stability Operations

1 Brigade Combat Team 5 Supporting Brigades

SUST

XX XX X

Example: Offensive Operations

XX

XX X

5 Brigade Combat Teams 5 Supporting Brigades

Stryker Infantry

Heavy

Stryker Aviation

Maneuver Enhancement

Reconnaissance,Surveillance,

Target Acquisition

Sustainment

Sustainment

Reconnaissance,Surveillance,

Target Acquisition

Maneuver

Enhancement AviationFires

Figure 7. UEx will be tailored according to operational requirements. Here, two UEx configurations areshown. This could be two different UEx in the same phase of an operation, or one UEx in different phases.

Intermediate Tactical Echelon

If and when the campaign expands and entails the use of significant land forces in

decisive offensive operations, the operation may require an intermediate land echelon between the UEx controlling brigade combat teams and the land component. This could

be based on complexity, multinational requirements, the use of more than one UEx on a

line of operations, or span of command. When required, one UEx may become anintermediate tactical headquarters under the JFLCC, with OPCON of two or more UEx or

other large tactical formations. The UEy will tailor the intermediate UEx headquarters

with the appropriate commander, staff, communications, and units to allow it to functionas an intermediate headquarters over other UEx. The modularity of the UEx allows the

Army to meet the needs of the JFC without excessive force structure for this requirement.

Figure 8 depicts this possibility:

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xxx

xx

RCC

UEy JFMCCJSOTF

x

x

x

Theater Sust

Command

Theater Signal

CommandMI

Host Nation

ArmyJFC assigns 3-star

commander to

UEx from CONUS

Additional

brigades

controlled by

intermediate

UEx

UEy as JFLCC;

UEx as

Intermediate

Tactical

Headquarters

UEx UEx

UEx

JFLCC

MEF

JFACC JFMCC

MN

CA

Figure 8. The scale, complexity and span of command of major offensive operations may require an

intermediate warfighting headquarters. When required, one UEx becomes the intermediate HQ.

Modular Army Forces Controlled by other Services

The modularity designed into Army forces allows other service headquarters to receiveand employ Army brigades directly, without an intervening Army headquarters. The

figure below illustrates Army forces OPCON to a MEF for an offensive operation. TheUEy, with its assigned commands, continues to exercise ADCON, for the maneuver enhancement brigade, while providing Army capabilities (for example NETOPS) in a

supporting role to the MEF. This is only one example. Other examples may include the

OPCON of a missile-heavy fires brigade to the JFACC, or a tailored sustainment brigadeto the JSOTF.

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MEF

XXX

X

HHC

l ll

MP

ll ll ll

CA

ll

EOD

TEU

BIDS

P

SPT

Army Maneuver

Enhancement

Brigade

OPCON

UEy

ADCON

Army support

Figure 9. The MEF controls a Maneuver Enhancement brigade tailored for support tot the Marine

Expeditionary Force (MEF) ashore.

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