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THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY AND ...____, QVERH EAD ;( . RECONNAISSANCE

The U-2 and OXC\RT Programs, 1954 - 1974

Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach

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Approved for Release: 2013/06/25

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The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance:

The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-197 4

co o 19009 4 Approved for Release: 2013/06/25

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance:

The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-197 4

Gregory W. Pedlow and

Donald E. Welzenbach

History Staff Central Intelligence Agency

Washington/ D.C.

1992


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+Chapter 1 Searching for a System

The Need for High-Altitude Reconnaissance ............................................ 1 Early Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance ....................................... ............ 2 New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance ........................................... 4 The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft ............. .. 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13

Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ................ ..................... .......... 17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19 The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel... ...................................... 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar. ...................................................... 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282 .............................. 24 The Technological Capabilities Panel ................................................. 26 Project Three Support for the lockheed CL-282 ... ........................... 27 A Meeting With the President ............................................................. 32 CIA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282 .................................. 33

+Chapter 2 Developing the U-2

The Establishment of the U-2 Funding Arrangements for Project AQUATONE

39 43

Major Design Features of the U-2 .. .................... ...... .. .............. ............... 45 The Development of the Camera System 48

for Testing the U-2 .............................. ....... .. ....... ..... .. ... .... 56 for the U-2 59

for

60 61 66 68


Hiring U-2 Pilots ......................................................................................... 73 Pilot Training ............................................................................................... 75 Final Tests of the U-2 ................................................................................ 76 Three Fatal Crashes in 1956 ..................................................................... 79 Coordination of Collection Requirements ............................................... 80 Preparations To Handle the Product of U-2 Missions ......................... 82 The Impact of the Air Force Project GENETRIX Balloons ................... 84 AQUA TONE Briefings for Selected Members of Congress ................. 88 The U-2 Cover 89

+Chapter 3 U-2 Operations in the Soviet Bloc and Middle East. 1956-1958

The Deployment of Detachment A to Lakenheath ............................... 94 The Move to Wiesbaden ........................................................................... 95 President Eisenhower's Attitude Toward Overflights ............................ 96 First Overflights of Eastern Europe ...................................................... 100 First U-2 Flights Over the Soviet Union ............................................... 104 Soviet Protest Note .................................................................................. 109 The End of the Bomber Gap .................................................................. 111 Tactical Intelligence From U-2s During the Suez Crisis .................... 112 Renewed Overflights of the Soviet Union ........................................... 122 Radar-Deceptive "Dirty Birds" ................................................................ 128 The New Detachment C .......................................................................... 133 Detachment B Flights From Pakistan .................................................... 135 The. Decline of Detachment A ................................................................ 139

142 Declining Overflight 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U-2 147 More Powerful Engines for the U2 149

lebanon, 1958 152 the U2 153

157

+Chapter 4 The Final Overflights of the Soviet Union, 1959-1960


Chapter 5 U-2 Operations After May 1960

U-2 Operations in Latin America ........................................................... 197 U2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion ........................................ 197 Aerial Refueling Capability for the U-2 ............................................ 198 U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis .............................. 199 U2s Over South America .................................................................. 211

U-2 Operations in Asia ............................................................................ 211 Detachment C and the Indonesian Revolt of 1958 ........................ 211 China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958 .......................................... 215 U-2 Support for DDP Operations in Tibet ....................................... 216 U-2Cs for Detachment C ..................................................................... 217 U-2 Crash in Thailand ......................................................................... 219 End of Detachment C Operations ..................................................... 219 Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam .............. 221 New Detachment on Taiwan ............................................................. 222 Use of Detachment H Aircraft by US Pilots ................................... 230 U-2s in India ......................................................................................... 231 Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate Resources in Asia ........... 233 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H ................................ 237

~""'n'~"'" Over PRC Nuclear Plants ....................... 238 240

The End of U2 ............................. 242 Peripheral Missions by Detachment H ............................................. 244 Operation SCOPE SHIELD Over North Vietnam ............................. 246

Improvements in U-2 Technology ......................................................... 247 Modification of U2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment ................... 247 Use of Carrier-Based U2 To Film a French Nuclear Test Site ... 249

251

Intended Successor: OXCART. 1956-1968

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New Technologies Necessitated By OXCART's High Speed ............. 279 Designing the OXCART's Cameras ........................................................ 281

Pilots for OXCART .................................................................. 283 Selection of a Testing Site for the OXCART ....................................... 283 '"'l!""''v of the First OXCART ................................................................ 286

Changes in the Project Management .................................................... 286 OXCART's First 288 Speed-Related Problems .......................................................................... 290 New Versions of the OXCART ............................................................... 291 The Question of Surfacing a Version of the OXCART ...................... 292 Additional Problems During Final 295 Discussions on the OXCART's Future Employment ........................... 297 First A-12 Deployment: Operation BLACK SHIELD ............................. 304 The End of the OXCART Program ........................................................ 307 Possible Successors to the OXCART ..................................................... 312 Summary of the OXCART Program ...................................................... 313

+chapter 7 Conclusion

U-2 Overflights of the Soviet Union ..................................................... 315 Participation of Allies ln the U-2 Program ........................................... 319 U2s as Collectors of Tactical Intelligence ........................................... 319 Advances in 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program on the CIA. ....... 321

+Appendix A: Acronyms ............................................................................ 325

+Appendix B: Key Personnel

+Appendix C: Electronic Devices Carried by the U-2

327

335

0\letflioli'lts of the Soviet Union, ............................ 337 May 1960

+ APPendiix E: Unmanned Reconnaissance Pr11tee1:s + Bibliogr~tphy


Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL)

National Security Information Unauthorized Disclosure Subject co Criminal Sanctions

Dissemination Control Abbreviations NOFORN (NF) Not releasable to foreign nationals NOCONTRACT (NCJ Not releasable to contractors or contractor/

PROPIN (PR) Caution-proprietary information involved ORCON (OCl Dissemination and extraction of information

REL. This information has been authorized for re-

WN WN!NTEL-Intelligence sources and meth-

FOREWORD

This History Staff Monograph offers a comprehensive and authorita-tive history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program, which from 1954 to 1974 developed and operated two extraordinary aircraft, the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It describes not only the program's technological and bureaucratic aspects, but also irs politi-cal and international context. The manned reconnaissance program, along with other overhead systems that emerged from it, changed the ClA's work and structure in ways that were both revolutionary and permanent. The formation of the Directorate of Science and Technology in the 1960s. principally to develop and direct reconnais-sance programs, is the most obvious legacy of the events recounted in this study.

The authors tell an engrossing story. The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and A-12 OXCART projects reveals how the manned reconnaissance program confronted problems that still beset successor programs today. The U-2 was an enormous technological success: its first flight over the USSR in July 1956 made it immediately the most important source of intelligence on the Soviet Union. Using it against the Soviet target it was designed for nevertheless produced a persistent tension between its program managers and the President. The program managers, eager for cover-age. repeatedly urged the President to authorize frequent missions over the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower, from the outset doubt-ful of the prudence and propriety of invading Soviet airspace, only reluctantly allowed any overflights at all. After the Soviets shot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, President Eisenhower forbade any further U-2 flights over the USSR. Since the Agency must always assess a covert operation's potential payoff against the diplomatic or military cost if it fails. this account of the U-2's em-ployment over the Soviet Union offers insights that go beyond overhead reconnaissance programs.

Indeed, this study should be usefu l for a variety of purposes. [ t is the only history of this program based upon both full access to CIA records and extensive class ifi ed interviews of its partic ipants. The authors have fo und records that were nearly irretrievably los t and have interv iewed participants whose personal recollec tions gave in-formation available nowhere else . Although the story of the manned

reconnaissance program offers no tidy model for imitation, it does reveal how resourceful managers coped with unprecedented techno-logical challenges and their implications for intelligence and national policy. For this reason, the program's history provides profitable reading for intelligence professionals and policymakers today.

Many people made important contributions to the production of this volume. [n the History Staff's preparation of the manuscript, Gerald Haines did the final revision, i ]again demon-strated her high talent as a copy editor, and! 1provided staunch secretarial support throughout. As usual, we are Indebted to more members than we can name from the Publications, Design, and Cartography Centers in the Office of Current Production and Analytic Support, whose lively interest in the publication went far beyond the call of duty. Their exceptional professional skill and the masterly work of the Printing and Photography Group combined to create this handsome volume.

Donald E. Welzenbach, who began this study, and Gregory W. Pedlow. w_ho completed it, brought complementary strengths to this work. A veteran of C[A service since 1960, Mr. Welzenbach began research on this study in 1983, when he joined the DCI History Staff on a rotational assignment from the Directorate of Science and Technology. After tireless documentary research and extensive inter-viewing, he finished a draft manuscript of the history before returning to his directorate. fn early 1986, Gregory W. Pedlow, a new member of the DC[ History Staff, was assigned to complete the study. A Johns Hopkins University Ph.D. who has served as an Army intelligence officer and University of Nebraska professor of history, Dr. Pedlow undertook important research in several new areas, and reorganized, edited, and revised the entire manuscript before leaving CIA to be-come NATO Historian in late 1989. The final work, which has greatly benefited from both authors' contributions, is the CIA's own history of the world's first overhead reconnaissance program. +

Kenneth McDonald C[A Staff

April 1992

s~ PREFACE

When the Central Intelligence Agency came into existence in 1947, no one foresaw that, in less than a decade, it would undertake a major program of overhead reconnaissance, whose principal purpose would be to fly over the Soviet Union . Traditionally, the military services had been responsible for overhead reconnaissance, and flights deep into unfriendly territory only took place during wartime. By the early 1950s, however, the United States had an urgent and growing need for strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union and its satellite states. At great risk. US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow-penetration overflights, but these missions were paying a high price in lives lost and increased international tension. Furrhermore . many important areas of the Soviet Union lay beyond the range of existing reconnais-sance aircraft. The Air Force had therefore begun to develop a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft that would be able to conduct deep-penetration reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his civilian scientific advisers feared that the loss of such an aircraft deep in Soviet terriwry could lead to war and therefore authorized the development of new non-military aircraft, first the U-2 and later the A-12 OXCART. to be manned by civilians and operated only under cover and in the greatest secrecy. Primary responsibility for this new reconnaissance program was assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency. but the Air Force provided vital support.

The Agency's manned overhead reconnaissance program lasted 20 years. It began with President Eisenhower's authorization of the U-2 project in late 1954 and ended with the transfer of the remaining Agency U-2s to the Air Force in 1974. During this period the CIA developed a successor to the U-2, the A- 12 OXCART, but this ad-vanced aircraft saw little operational use and the program was canceled in !968 after the Air Force dep loyed a fleet of s imilar air-craft , a mil itary variant of the A- 12 called the SR-7!.

Neither of these aircraft remains secret today. A great deal of in-format ion about the U-2 and its overfl ight program became known to the publ ic a fte r I May i 960, when the Soviet Union shot down a C IA U-2 and publicly tried its pilot. Francis Gary Powers. Four yea rs

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later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence of the OXCART-type of aircraft , although only in its military YF- l2A (interceptor) and SR-71 (strategic reconnaissance) versions.

The two CfA reconnaissance aircraft have also been the subject of a number of books, beginning with David Wise's and Thomas B. Ross 's The U-2 Affair in 1962 and then Francis Gary Powers' memoirs, Operation Overflight, in 1970. Two recent books give many more details about the U-2 and OXCART aircraft : Michael Beschloss 's Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (1986) and William Burrows's Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Securiry ( 1987). Although well written and generally ac-curate, these books suffer from their authors ' lack of access to classified official documentation. By drawing upon the considerable amount of formerly classified data on the U-2 now available to the public, Beschloss has provided an accurate and insightful depiction of the U-2 program in the context of the Eisenhower administration's overall foreign policy, but his book does contain errors and omissions on some aspects of the U-2 program. Burrows's broader work suffers more from the lack of classified documemation, particularly in the OXCART/SR-71 section, which concentrates on the Air Force air-craft because little information about the Agency 's aircraft has been officially declassified and released .

Afte r the present study of the Agency 's overhead reconnaissance projects was completed. a new book on the U-2 was published in the United Kingdom. Chris Pocock's Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane is by far the most accurate unclassified account of the U-2 program. Pocock has been able to compensate for his lack of ac-cess to c lass ified documents by inte rviewing many former participants in the program, especially former pilots. Pocock is also quite familiar with ai rcraft itse lf. fo r he had worked with Jay Miller on the latter' s excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 ( 1983).

There has also been a classified officia l study of the U-2 and OXCART programs. [n 1969 the Directorate of Science and Technology published a History of the Office of Special Activities by

Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-vo!ume Top Secret Codeword study of the Agency's reconnaissance aircraft provides a wealth of technical and operational information on the two projects but does not attempt to place them in their historical context. Without examining the international situation and bureauc ratic pressures af-fecting the president and other key policymakers, however, it is impossible to understand the dec is ions that began, carried out, and ended the CIA's reconnaissance aircraft projects.

In preparing this study of CIA's overhead reconnaissance pro-gram, the authors drew on published sources, classified government documents, and interviews with key participants from the CIA, Air Force, contractors, scientific advisory commitrees. and the Eisenhower administration . The interviews were particularly impor-tant for piecing together the s!Ory of how the CIA became involved in overhead reconnaissance in the first place because Agency documen-tation on the prehistory of the U-2 project is very skerchy and there are no accurate published accounts. Research on the period of actual reconnaissance operations included the records of the Direcror of Cenrral Intelligence, the Office of Special Activities in the Directorate of Science and Technology, and the Intelligence Community Staff, along with documents from the Eisenhower Presidenrial Library in Abilene, Kansas, and additional interviews.

Both authors are grateful for the assistance they have received from many indiv iduals who played important roles in the events they recount. Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known . The assistance of Agency records management officers in the search for documents on the overhead reconnaissance program is also greatly appreciated.

To ensure that this study of the Agency's involvement in over-head reconnaissance reaches the widest possible audience, the authors have kept it at the Secret classification level. As a result, some aspects of the overhead reconnaissance program, particularl y those involving satellites and re lated interagency agreements, have had to be described in very general terms. The omission of such information is not significant for th is book, which focuses on the Agency's recon-naissance aircraft. +

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Searching for a System

THE NEED FOR HIGH-ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE

For centuries, soldiers in wartime have sought the highest ground or structure in order to get a better view of the enemy. At first it was tall trees, then church steeples and bell towers. By the time of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, ob-seryers were using hot-air balloons to get up in the sky for a better view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became possible to carry cameras into the sky to record the disposi-tion of enemy troops and emplacements. Indeed, photoreconnaissance proved so valuable during World War I that in 1938 Gen. Werner von Fritsch, Commander in Chief of the German. Army, predicted: "The nation with the best aerial reconnaissance facilities will win the next war.

By World War II, lenses, films, and cameras had undergone many improvements, as had the airplane, which could fly higher and faster than the primitive craft of World War L Now it was possible to use photoreconnaissance to obtain information about potential targets be-fore a bombing raid and to assess the effectiveness of the bombing afterward.

for transcontinental vuw"'" There was little to

nn,r1rn,aro1nr1v for until after World War II. when the Iron Curtain rang down and cut off most of communi-cation between the Bloc of nations and the rest of the world.

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By 1949 the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern had been effectively curtained off from the outside world, and the Soviet military carried out its planning, production, and deployment activi-ties with the utmost secrecy. All Soviet strategic capabilities-bomber forces. ballistic missiles, submarine and nuclear weap-ons plants-were concealed from outside observation. The Soviet air defense system, a prime consideration in determining US retaliatory policies, was also largely an unknown faccor.

Tight security along the Soviet Bloc borders curtailed the movement of human sources. In addition, the Soviet Union made its conventional means of communication-telephone, telegraph, and radio-telephone-more secure, thereby greatly reduc-ing the intelligence available from these sources. The stringent secu-rity measures imposed by the Communist Bloc nations effectively blunted traditional methods for gathering intelligence: secret agents using covert means to communicate intelligence, travelers to and from target areas who could be asked to keep their eyes open and re-port their observations later, wiretaps and other eavesdropping meth-ods, and postal intercepts. (ndeed. the entire panoply of intelligence tradecraft seemed ineffective against the Soviet Bloc, and no other methods were available.

Postwar Aerial Reconnaissance

Although at the end of World War [[ the United States had captured large quantities of German photos and documents on the Soviet

this material was rapidly becoming outdated. The main source of current intelligence on the Soviet Union's military installations was nt;>rrrtn;>I'U\n of prisoners of war returning from Soviet captivity. To

obtain information about Soviet scientific progress, the intelligence several programs to debrief German scientists

who had been taken to the Union after the end of the war but allowed to leave.

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Interrogation of returning Germans offered only fragmentary in-formation, and this source could nO( be expected to last much longer. As a result in the late 1940s. the US Air Force and Navy began trying to obtain aerial photography of the Soviet Union. The main Air Force effort involved Boeing RB-47 aircraft (the reconnaissance version of the B-47 jet-propelled medium bomber) equipped with cameras and electronic "ferret" equipment that enabled aircrews to detect tracking by Soviet radars. At that time the Soviet Union had not yet com-pletely ringed its borders with radars, and much of the interior also lacked radar coverage. Thus, when the RB-47s found a gap in the air-warning network, they would dart inland to take photographs of any accessible targets. These "penetration photography" tlights (called SENSINT -sensitive intelligence-missions) occurred along the northern and Pacific coasts of Russia. One RB-47 aircraft even managed to fly 450 miles inland and photograph the city of Igarka in Siberia. Such intrusions brought protests from Moscow but no Soviet military response.'

In 1950 there was a major change in Soviet policy. Air defense units became very aggressive in defending their airspace, attacking all aircraft that came near the borders of the Soviet Union. On 8 April 1950, Soviet fighters shot down a US Navy Privateer patrol aircraft over the Baltic Sea. Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, the Soviet Union extended its "severe air defense policy to the Far East In the autumn of 195 I. Soviet aircraft downed a twin-en-gine US Navy Neptune bomber near Vladivostok. An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also a victim of Soviet fighters. The United States was not the only country affected by the new aggressive Soviet air defense policy; Britain and Turkey also attacks on rheir

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The Soviet Union's air defense policy became even more aggres-sive in August 1952, when its reconnaissance aircraft began violating Japanese airspace over Hokkaido, the northernmost Japanese home island. Two months later, on 7 October 1952. Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US RB-29 flying over Hokkaido. Aerial re-connaissance of the Soviet Union and surrounding areas had become a very dangerous business.

Despite the growing risks associated with aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Bloc, senior US officials strongly believed that such missions were necessary. The lack of information about the Soviet Union, coupled with the perception that it was an aggressive nation determined to expand its borders-a perception that had been gready strengthened by the Soviet-backed North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950--increased US determination to obtain informa-tion about Soviet inentions and capabilities and thus reduce the dan-ger of being surprised by a Soviet attack.

New Approaches to Photoreconnaissance

While existing Navy and Air Force aircraft were flying their risky re-connaissance missions over the Soviet Union. the United States began planning for a more systematic and less dangerous approach using new technology. One of the leading advocates of the need for new, high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was Richard S. Leghorn, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate and employee of Eastman Kodak who had commanded the Army Air Forces' 67th Reconnaissance Group in Europe during World War II. After the war he returned to Kodak but maintained his interest in photoreconnais-sance. Leghorn strongly believed in the need for what he called pre-D-day that reconnaissance of a potential enemy before the outbreak of actual in contrast to combat reconnaissance in wartime. In papers in 1946 and

Reconnaissance Command at

that the United States needed to

the Korean war into effecc Recalled to

became the of the Air

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In Leghorn 's view, altitude was the key to success for overhead reconnaissance. Since the best Soviet interceptor at that time, the MIG-17, had to struggle to reach 45,000 feet,6 Leghorn reasoned that an aircraft that could exceed 60,000 feet would be safe from Soviet fighters . Recognizing that the fastest way to produce a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was to modify an existing aircraft, he began looking for the highest flying aircraft available in the Free World. This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber-the Canberra-built by the English Electric Company. The Canberra had made its first flight in May 1949. Its speed of 469 knots (870 ki-lometers per hour) and its service ceiling of 48,000 feet made the Canberra a natural choice for high-altitude reconnaissance work. The Royal Air Force quickly developed a reconnaissance version of the Canberra, the PR3 (the PR stood for photoreconnaissance), which be-gan flying in March 1950.7

At Leghorn's insistence, the Wright Air Development Command invited English Electric representacives to Dayton in the summer of 1951 to help find ways to make the Canberra fly even higher. By this time the Air Force had already adopted the bomber version of the Canberra, which the Glenn L. Marcin Aircraft Company was to produce under license as the B-57 medium bomb-er. Leghorn and his English Electric colleagues designed a new Canberra configuration with very long high-lift wings, new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines, a solitary pilot, and an airframe that was stressed to less than the standard military specifications. Leghorn calculated that a Canberra so equipped might reach 63,000 feet early in a long mission and as high as 67,000 feet as the declin-ing fuel supply lightened the aircraft. He believed that such a modi-fied Canberra could penetrate the Soviet Union and China for a radius of 800 miles from bases around their periphery and photo~ graph up to 85 percent of the intelligence targets in those countries.

Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not, however, cleared his idea with the Air Re earch and Development Command, whose reconnaissance

' 13,7 16 meters. To avoid giving a false impression of extremely precise measurements. original English measuring system figures in round numbers have not b

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RAF Canberra Mark-PR3


division in Baltimore; headed by Lt. CoL Joseph J. Pellegrini. had to approve all new reconnaissance aircraft designs. Pellegrini's unit reviewed Leghorn 's design and ordered extensive modifications. Accordingto Leghorn, Pellegrini was not interested in a special~ pur-pose aircraft that was only suitable for covert peacetime reconnais-sance missions, fo r he believed that all Air Force reconnaissance aircraft should be capable of operating under wartime conditions. Pellegrini therefore insisted that Leghorn 's design meet the specifica-tions for combat aircraft. which required heavily stressed airframes. armor plate, and other apparatus that made an aircraft too heavy to reach the higher altitudes necessary for safe overflights of the Soviet Bloc. The final result of Leghorn 's concept after its alteration by Peftegrini's staff was the RB-570 in 1955, whose maximum altitude



was only 64,000 feet Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952 to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.'

In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol-lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais-sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World War [L All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air Force should emphasize high-altitude phororeconnaissance.

Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft flying above 65,000 feet This assumption was based on the fact that the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup-plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584 (Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to 90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn-ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet As a result, Leghorn, Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to 65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would not be activated.

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The Air Force Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft

With interest in high-altitude reconnaissance growing. several Air Force agencies began to develop an aircraft to conduct such mis-sions. In September 1952, the Air Research and Development Command gave the Martin Aircraft Company a contract to examine the high-altitude potential of the B-57 by modifying a single aircraft to give it long, high-lift wings and the American version of the new Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engine. These were the modifications that Richard Leghorn had suggested during the previous year.'"

At about the same time, another Air Force office, the Wright Air Development Command (WADC) in Dayton, Ohio, was also examin-ing ways to achieve sustained flight at high altitudes. Working with two German aeronautical experts-Woldemar Voigt and Richard Vogt-who had come to the United States after World War II, Air Force Maj. John Seaberg advocated the development of a new aircraft that would combine the high-altitude performance of the latest turbo-jet engines with high-efficiency wings in order to reach ultrahigh alti-tudes. Seaberg, an aeronautical engineer for the Chance Vought Corporation until his recall to active duty during the Korean war, was serving as assistant chief of the New Developments Office of WADC's Bombardment Branch.

By March 1953, Seaberg had expanded his ideas for a high-alti-tude aircraft into a complete request for proposal for "an aircraft weapon system having an operational radius of I ,500 nm (nautical miles] and capable of conducting pre- and post-strike reconnaissance missions during daylight, good visibility conditions." The require-ment stated that such an aircraft must have an optimum subsonic cruise speed at altitudes of 70,000 feet or higher over the carry a of lOO to 700 of and have one.

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produce a better aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and Airplane Corporation of Maryland, study con-tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. In the L. Martin of Baltimore was asked to examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al-titude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a single-en-gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potential of 67,200 Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Model 67 (later the X-16), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 and Martin's design was a version of the B-57 called the Model

which was to cruise at 64,000 In March and other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend-ing designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell proposals. They considered Martin's version of the B-57 an interim project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more advanced concept from Bell was still being developed.

Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod-ify" the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design.

Lockheed had become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) who had

recently retired from the Air to become the assistant director Lockheed's Advanced was in the Pentagon

""'"'""'~" and an old

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Designs for the Air Force competition for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft


Lockheed also submit a design . Carter noted that the proposed aircraft would have to reach altitudes of between 65, 000 and 70,000 feet and correctly forecast, "If extreme altitude performance can be realized in a practical aircraft at speeds in the vicinity of Mach 0 .8, it should be capable of avoiding virtually all Russian defenses until about 1960 ... Carter added, "To achieve these characteristics in an aircraft which will have a reasonably useful operational life during the period before 1960 will, of course, require very strenuous efforts and extraordinary procedures. as well as nonstandard design philosophy." Some of the "nonstandard" design cnaracteristics suggested by Carter were the elimination of landing gear, the disregard of military specifications. and the use of very low load factors . Carter's memorandum closed with a warning that time was of the essence : "In order that this spe-cial aircraft can have a reasonably long and useful life. it is obvious that its development must be greatly accelerated beyond that consid-ered normal. .. 1.

Lockheed's senior official s approved Carter's proposal , and earl y in 195-f the corporation's best aircraft designer-Clarence L. (Kelly) Johnson-began working on the project, then known as the C L-282 but late r to become famous under its Air Force designator-the U-2. Already one of the world 's leading aeronautical engi neers, Kelly Johnson had many successful military and civi lian des igns to his credit. incl uding the P-38 , P-80, F- 1 04. and Constellation. Johnson qu ickly came up with a radical design based upon the fuse lage of the F- l 04 jet fi gh ter bur incorporating a high-aspect-ratio sai lp lane wing . To save we igh t and thereby increase the ai rc raft 's al -titude, Johnson decided to stress the airframe to only 2.5 units of

'' \!ilkr. Lodh.:.:J U-2 . p. t~.


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gravity (g's) instead of the milirary specification strength of 5.33 g's. For the power plant he selected the General Electric 173/GE-3 nonaf-terburning turbojet engine with 9,300 pounds of thrust (this was the same engine he had chosen for the F-1 04, which had been the basis for the U-2 design).'" Many of the CL-282's design features were adapted from gliders. Thus, the wings and tail were detachable. Instead of a conventional landing gear. Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib for landing-a common sailplane technique-and a jettisonable wheeled dolly for takeoff. Other fea-tures included an unpressurized cockpit and a IS-cubic-foot payload area that could accommodate 600 pounds of sensors. The CL-282's maximum altitude would be just over 70,000 feet with a 2, 000-mile range. Essemially, Kelly Johnson had designed a jet-propelled glider.''

Early in March 195-+. Kelly Johnson submitted the CL-282 de-sign to Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Schriever's Office of Development Planning. Eugene Kiefer and Bud Wienberg studied the design and recommended it to General Schriever, who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson submit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnsonpresented a full description of the CL-282 and a proposal for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon officials that included Schriever's superior. Lt. Gen. Donald L. Putt. Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, and Trevor N. Gardner. Special Assistant for Research and Development to the Secretary of the Air Force. Afterward Kelly Johnson noted that the civilian officials were very much interested in his design but the generals were not.'h

The CL-282 design was also presented to the commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. in April by Kiefer. Bud Wienberg. and Burton Klein from the Office of

11

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~RN Chapter 1 '""' 12

The Lockheed CL-282


Development Planning. According to Wienberg. General LeMay stood up halfway through the briefing. took his cigar out of his mouth, and told the briefers that, if he wanted high-altitude photographs. he would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not interested in a plane that had no wheels or guns. The general then left the room. remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time. 11

Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care-fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's choice of the unproven General Electric 173 engine. The engineers at Wright Field considered the Pratt and Whitney J57 to be the most

and the from Martin, and The absence of conventional

the Lockheed

Johnson's submission

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World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre-ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de-vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stracocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines are always better than one because, if one fails. there is a spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality. however, aviation re-cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend.'')

On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already commit-ted to the modification of the Martin B-57.::t' By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began seeking new sources of support for the aircraft.

lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA

Although the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin-ued to favor the Lockheed The most prominent proponem of the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Assistant for Research and to Air Force Harold E. Talbott Gardner had many in west coast aeronautical circles because

he had headed the

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Chapter 1 """"

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Trevor Gardner


design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant. Frederick Ayer. Jr .. and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary Talbott~

According to Norton, Gardner tried to inrerest SAC commander LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri -marily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intelligence. But General LeMay had already shown that he was not interested in an unarmed aircraft. Gardner. Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA support for the high-Hying aircraft. At that time the Agency's official involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited co advising the Air Force on the problems of launching large camera-carrying bal-loons for reconnaissance flights over hostile territory (for the details of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in the Office of Scientific Intelligence. Philip G. Strong. however. served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in-formed on developmenrs in reconnaissance aircraft.!!

Gardner, Norton. and Aycr met with Strong in the Pemagon on 12 May 1954. six days before the Wrighr Air Development Command began w evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly Johnson 's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong . After chis meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force's search for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft hme been re-ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Be/! . .. . The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a j et-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic bw can attain transonic speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of 1,400 nautical miles . ... The CL-282 can be manufacwred

'' Garrison Norton. interview by Don;~IJ E. W.:llt:nbach. tape recording. \1/ashi ngton. DC. ~J May 1983 ($): Michae l R. Bt:schloss. ,'..tuvday: Eist:rtho~>er. Khrushchev and the U-2 A;fuir (N" Strong wa.s a .:olond in tho:: :'>1arinc Corp.~ Reserve and often used th:lt titlt: even though h


mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . .. . The prototype of his plane can be produced within a year from the dare of order. Five planes could be deli vered f or operations within two years.

The Bell proposal is a more comenrionaf aircraft having nor-mal landing gear. As a result. its mar:imum altitude over target is 69.500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. -'3

Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false impression that most Air Force officials supponed the Lockheed de-sign . In reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro-cess of choosing the modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new Bell X-16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.

During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Frederick Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282 because it gave promise of tlying higher than the other designs and because at maximum altitude its smalkr radar cross section might make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials asked Philip Strong Strong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hired Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell. Jr .. about possible Agency interest in the CL-282. '"

Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be-fore he joined the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud-ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MlT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During World War ll . Bissell had managed American shipping as executi ve office r of the Combined Shipping Adj ustment Board. After the war. he served as de puty di rector of the Marsha ll Plan from 1948 unci! the end of 195 1, whe n he became a staff member of the Ford Foundation . His fi rst association with the Agency came in late 1953, when he undertook a contract of possible responses the United

'' Phil ip G. Strong, :vtemorundum for the Record. "Special Aircraft for P.:nt: tration Pholo Reconnaissance," 12 May 195-1. OSI reconls (now in OSWR). job SOR-Ol -11-1. bm I { $ ) : Karl H. Weber. The Offiu of Scientific lnte/ligena. /9-19-68, Director:ue of Science and T~chnology Historical Senes OSI-1 !C!A: DS&T. 1972). vol. I. wb A. pp. 16--17 (TS COOeWI)fd)


Chapt~ 15

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~~FORN Chapter 1 '""""' 16

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.


States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up-rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As he remarked later: " [ know I emerged from that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than human means of intelligence collection .~

Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became involved in coordination for the operation aimed at overthrowing Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz. He was. therefore very preoc-cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bisse ll said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad-vise on the macter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282. ~6

Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al-titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not mention the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. ClA and Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the overflight proposal. which the Air Force finally turned down in October 1954.17

Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over-flight of the Soviet Union, he was not enthusiastic about the CIA un-dertaking such a project. Few details about Dulles's precise attiiUde toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available , but many who knew him believe that he did not want the ClA to be-come in volved in projects that belonged to the mil itary, and the Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.

" Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kepr the Si!crers: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79 ; Beschloss, Mayday. pp. 86-89.

" Memorandum for H. Marshall ChadwelL Assiscant Director/Scie ntific Intelligence , from Chief. Support Staff. OS I. " Rev iew of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technic::.! Collect ion Tt!ch niques," 13 M:~ y 1955 . p. 6. OS! (OSWR) records. job 80R-01424. box I (5): Richard M. Bissell. Jr .. interview by Donald E. Welunbach. ta pe recording. Fannington, Con necticut. 8 November 1984 ($) .

" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Special Assistant to the Di rector for Planning and Coordination. from Philip G. Strong. Chief. Ope rations Staff. OSI. "Overflight of Kapustin Yat." 15 Ocwber 19:54, OSI (OSWR ) records. job &OR-01424. bo~ I (TS. down-graded to S).



Moreover, high-altitude reconnaissance of the Soviet Union did not tit well into Allen Dulles's perception of the proper role of an intelli-gence agency. He tended to favor the classical form of espionage. which relied on agents rather than technology. 2"

At this point. the summer of 1954. Lockheed 's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support. Although the design had strong backers among some Air Force civilians and CIA officials, the key decisionmakers at both- Air Force and CIA remained unconvinced . To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary: prominent scientists serving on gov-ernment advisory boards.

SCIENTISTS AND OVERHEAD RECONNAISSANCE

Scientists and engineers from universities and private industry had played a major role in advising the government on technical matters during World War II. At the end of the war. most of the scientific ad-visory boards were disbanded, but within a few years the growing OCt Allen W. Dulles ten.sions of the Cold War again led government agencies to seek sci-entific advice and assistance . In 1947 the Air Force established a Scientific Advisory Board, which met periodically to discuss topics of current interest and advise the Air Force on the potential usefulness of new technologies. The following year the Office of Defense Mobilization established the Scientific Advisory Committee. but the Truman administration made little use of this new advisory body."'

The BEACON HILL Report

In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists be-cause the Strategic Air Command's requests for in formation abou t targets behind the [ron Curtain could not be fill ed. To look for new ways of conducting reconnaissance against the Soviet Bloc, the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Sta ff for Deve lopment, Maj . Gen. Gordon P. Saville. added 15 reconnaissance ex perts to an existing projec t on ai r

'' Powers. Man Who Kept the Secretr. pp. I 03-1 04: Edwin H. Land. imerv io::w by Donald E. WeiT.enbach. tape recording. Cambridge. Ma.,sachusetts. I 7 and :!0 September llJ:i-1 (TS Codeword): Robe11 Amory. Jr .. interview by Donald E. W.:lzcnbach anJ Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington . DC. 2:? Apri l 1987 (S ).

"' For more information on the Ai r Force 's use of sciApproved for Release: 2013/06/25

17

' s;&\et


defense known as Project LINCOLN, then under way at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. By the end of the year, these experts had assembled in Boston to begin their research. Their head-quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the codename for the reconnaissance project The con-sultants were called the BEACON HILL Study Group.

The study group's chairman was Kodak physicist Carl F. P. Overhage, and irs members included James G. Baker and Edward M. Purcell from Harvard; Saville Davis from the Christian Science Monitor; Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory; Peter C. Goldmark from Columbia Broadcasting System Laboratories; Edwin H. Land, founder of the Polaroid Corporation; Stewart E. Miller of Bell Laboratories; Richard S. Perkin of the Perkin-Elmer Company; and Louis N. Ridenour of Ridenour Associates, Inc. The Wright Air Development Command sent Lt. CoL Richard Leghorn to serve as its liaison officer.JO

During January and February 1952. the BEACON HILL Study Group traveled every weekend to various airbases, laboratories. and firms for briefings on the latest technology and projects. The panel members were particularly interested in new approaches to aerial re-connaissance, such as photography from high-flying aircraft and camera-carrying balloons. One of the more unusual (albeit unsuccess-ful) proposals examined by the panel was an "invisible" dirigible. This was to be a giant, almost flat-shaped airship with a blue-tinted. nonreflective coating; it would cruise at an altitude of 90,000 feet along the borders of the Soviet Union at very slow speeds while using a large lens to photograph targets of imerest. 31

After completing these at the end of February 1952. the BEACON HILL Study Group returned to MIT. where the bers the next three months mrHrrt

ProJeCt LINCOLN. HILL Problems fmelligence Reconnaissance, Massachusetts Institute Technology, !5 June 1952, pp. xi: app.

downgraded to C).


document on 15 June 1952. the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel-ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo-graphic surveillance: examined the use of passive infrared and microwave reconnaissance; and discussed the development of ad-vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda-tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:

We have reached a period i11 history when our peacetime knowl-edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten-tiall_v hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it 1virh the maximum amount of information obtainable through aerial reconnaissance. To moid political involvements. such aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from l'ehicles flying in friendly airspace, or-a decision on this point permitting-from vehicles whose performance is such that they can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of detection or interception. tJ

C~mcern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack

The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon-naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President in January I 953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc."

To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili-tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap-

to be toward a position of military parity alarming was Soviet progress in

the area of nuclear weapons. [n the late summer the Soviet Union had detonated bomb three

had

~ Chapter 19

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scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the leaders of the West Only two months before the successful hydrogen bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And. at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen-sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear weapons. led officials such as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a menace to peace and world order.

The Soviet Union's growing military strength soon became a threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United States itself. In the spring of 1953. a top secret RAND study pointed out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by Soviet long-range bombers ....

Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental United States grew after an American military auache sighted a new Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the Myasishchev-4, later designated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the turboprops of Russia's other long-range bombers. the Bison appeared to be the Soviet equivalent of the US B-52. which was only then going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel-ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft. the Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex~ perts. This new long-range jet bomber. along with the Soviet Union's

numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers. seemed to threat to the United and. in the summer of


The Air Force Intelligence Systems Panel

Even before the publication of photographs of the Bison raised fears that the Soviet bomber force might eventually surpass that of the United States, the Air Force had already established a new advisory body to look for ways to implement the main recommendation of the BEACON HILL Report-the construction of high-flying aircraft and high-acuity cameras. Created in July 1953. the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL Study Group : Land, Overhage, Donovan, and Miller. At the request of the Air Force, the CIA also participated in the panel, represented by Edward L. Allen of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) and Philip Strong of the Office of Scien tific Intelligence (OSI). lh

The chairman of the new panel was Dr. James G. Baker. a re-search associate at the Harvard College Observatory. Baker had been involved in aerial reconnaissance since 1940. when he first adv ised the Army Air Corps on ways to improve its lenses . He then es tab-li shed a fu ll-scale optical laboratory at Harvard-the Harvard University Optical Research Laboratory-to produce high-q uality

" ;\kmomndum for Rt>ben Amory. Jr .. Deputy Director. lnrclligem.:e from Edward l. Allen. Chief. Economic Research. ORR and Phi lip G. Strung. Chief, Oper

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lenses. Since the university did not wish to continue manufacturing cameras and lenses after the end of the war, the optical laboratory moved to Boston University, which agreed to sponsor the effort as long as the Air Force would fund it. Baker decided to remain at Harvard, so his assistant, Dr. Duncan E. Macdonald, became the new head of what was now called the Boston University Optical Research Laboratory (BUORL). Baker's association with the Air Force did not end with the transfer of the optical laboratory to Boston University, because he continued to design lenses to be used in photoreconnais-

n sance.

The lSP tlrst met a Boston University on 3 August 1953. To provide background on the poor state of US knowledge of the Soviet Union, Philip Strong informed the orher panel members that the best intelligence then available on the Soviet Union's interior was photog-raphy taken by the Gem1an Luftwaffe during World War [f. Since the German photography covered only the Soviet Union west of the Urals, primarily west of the Volga River. many vital regions were not included. The ISP would, therefore, have to look for ways to provide up-to-date photography of all of the Soviet Union. Several Air Force agencies then briefed the panel members on the latest developments and proposed future projects in the area of aerial reconnaissance. in-cluding new cameras. reconnaissance balloons. and even satellites. Among the Air Force reconnaissance projects discussed were multi-ple sensors for use in existing aircraft such as the RB-47, RB-52, and RB-58; Project FICON-an acronym for "fighter conversion"-for adapting a giant, I 0-engine B-36 bomber to enable it to launch and retrieve a Republic RF-84F Thunderflash reconnaissance aircraft; re-connaissance versions of the Navajo and Snark missiles: the high-alti-tude balloon program, which would be ready to go into operation by the summer of I and the search for a new reconnais-

aircrafc


The wide variety of programs discussed at the conference were all products of the Air Force's all-out effort to find a way to collect intelligence on the Communist Bloc. Some of the schemes went be-yond the existing level of technology; others, like the camera-carrying balloons, were technically feasible but involved dangerous political consequences.

British Overflight of Kapustin Yar

The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air-craft In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the Canberra bomber for high-altitude reconnaissance. This project was probably inspired by Richard Leghorn's collaboration with English Electric Company designers in 1951, when they calculated ways to increase the altitude of the Canberra. The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls-Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it long, fuel-filled wings. The range of this variant of the Canberra was now 4,300 miles, and, on 29 August !955, it achieved an altitude of 65,880 feet.N

Sometime during the first half of 1953. the RAF employed a high-altitude Canberra on a daring overflight of the Soviet Union to photograph the missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Because of ad-vanced warning from either radar or agents inside British intelli-gence, the overflight did not catch the Soviet Union by surprise. Soviet fighters damaged and nearly shot down the Canberra!" Rumors about this flight reached Washington during the summer of 1953, but official confirmation by the United Kingdom did not come until February 1954. While on a six-week tour of Europe to study aerial reconnaissance problems for the US Air Force's Scientific

James Baker was briefed by RAF offi~ cials on the Canberra of the Soviet Union. On 22 and 23

the full Board

~ Chapter 23

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24

Allen F. Donovan


Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 195-t. but could not te!l its members about the British overtl ight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this information. The panel did. however. discuss the modifications for high -altitude tlight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57."

The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282

The next Intelligence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25 May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem-ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeron:mtical Laboratory eval-uated the changes being made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft Company. Even without Martin's specifications or drawings, Donovan had been able to estimate what could be done to the B-57 by lengthening the wings and lightening the fuselage. He had determined thar alterations to the B-57 airframe would not solve the reconnais-sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any multiengine aircraft built according to military specitications. including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep-tion . To be safe, Donovan explained. penetrating aircraft would need to fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission .''

Development of such an aircraft was already under way. Donovan ccinlinued. for Phil ip Strong of the CIA had told him that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly-ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.

When he was finally able to make this trip in late summer, Donovan fou nd the plane that he and the other ISP members had been seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 195-t.. Donovan met with L. Eugene Roor. an old Ai r Force acquaimance who was now a Lockheed vice-president. and learned about the Air Force's competi -tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kell y Johnson then showed Donovan the plans for Lock heed 's unsuccessful entry. A life-long sai lplane enthusiast. Donovan immediately recognized that the

" Baker imervie" (S l.

'' Donovan intiew (SJ: Ba~cr inr.:rvicw (5 ).


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CL-282 design was essentially a jet-propelled glider capable of attain-ing the altitudes that he felt were necessary to carry out reconnais-sance of the Soviet Union successfully."'

Upon his return east on 8 August, Donovan got in touch with James Baker and suggested an urgent meeting of the Intelligence Systems Panel. Because of other commitments by the members, how-ever, the panel did not meet to hear Donovan's report until 24 September I 954 at the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. Several members. including Land and Strong. were absent. Those who did at-tend were upset to learn that the Air Force had funded a closed com-petition for a tactical reconnaissance plane without informing them. But once Donovan began describing Kelly Johnson's rejected design for a jet-powered glider, they quickly forgot their annoyance and lis-tened intently.

Donovan began by stressing that high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft had to tly above 70,000 feet to be safe from interception. Next, he set out what he considered to be the three essential re-quirements for a high-altitude spyplane: a single engine, a sailplane wing. and low structural load factors. Donovan strongly favored single-engine aircraft because they are both lighter and more reli-able than multiengine aircraft. Although a twin-engine aircraft could theoretically return to base on only one engine. Donovan explained. it could only do so at a much lower altitude, about 34,000 feet, where it was sure to be shot down.

The second of Donovan's essential factors, a sailplane wing (in technical terms a high-aspect-ratio, low-induced-drag wing), was needed to take maximum advantage of the reduced thrust of a en-

operating in the rarefied of extreme altitude. Because of the thinness of the atmosphere above 70,000 esti-mated that the power curve of a would fall off to about 6

25

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......

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wingroot areas to withstand the high speeds and sharp turns man-dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail-plane wing.

In short, it was possible to achieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000 feet, but only by making certain that all parts of the aeronautical equation were in balance: thrust, lift, and weight. The only plane meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the CL-282 did not have to meet the specifications of a combat aircraft because it could fty safely above Soviet fighters .....

Donovan's arguments convinced the Intelligence Systems Panel of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the Air Force. which had already rejected the CL-282. Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954--the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back-ers were all connected with the Air Force. They could not offer funds to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 concept because the Air Force was already committed to the Martin RB-57 and the Bell X-16. Additional support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282 project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on high-level advisory committees.

The Technological Capabilities Panel

The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned over the capability of the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on the United States. m Trevor Gardner had become alarmed

a RAND Corporation study that a surprise attack narr"u 85 of the SAC bomber Gardner then met

California Institute


Gardner. the committee members decided to approach President Eisenhower on the matter. On 27 March 1954. the President told them about the discovery of the Soviet Bison bombers and hi s concem that these new aircraft might be used in a surprise attack on the United States. Stress ing the high priority he gave to reducing the risk of mili-tary surprise, the President asked the comminee to advise him on this problem.H

The President's request led Chairman DuBridge to ask one of the most prominem members. MIT President James R. Killian, Jr .. to meet with other Science Advisory Committee members in the Boston area to discuss the feasibility of a comprehensive sciemitic assess-ment of the nation's defenses . At their meeting at MIT on 15 April 1954. the group called for the recruitment of such a task force if the President endorsed the concept.

On 26 July 1954. President Eisenhower aurhorized Killian to re-cruit and lead a panel of experts to study "'the country's technologi-cal capabilities to meet some of its current problems ." Killian quickly set up shop in offices located in the Old Executive Oftice B.u.ilding and organized 42 of the nation's leading scientists into three special project groups investigating US offensive. defensive. and intelligence capabilites. with an additional communications working group (see chart. page 28). The Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) groups began meeting on 13 September 1954. For the next 20 weeks, the members of the various panels met on 307 sepa-rate occasions for briefings. field trips. conferences. and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish-ments. After receiving the most up-to-date information available on the nation s defense and intelligence programs. the panel members began drafting the ir report to the National Security Council."'

Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Techno logical Capabilities Panel report was ready, one of the three working groups took actions that would have a major impact on the US reconnaissance program. Project Three had

" Besch loss. Mavda ;.. pp. 73-7-1-: Technological Capabilities Pand of the Scit!nce Advisory Commiltce. Mt'etin

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Executive Staff

David Z. Beckler, ODM Lt. Col. V. T. Ford, USAF

Administrative Staff

William Brazeal M. Comerford C. Klett L. Wiesner E. Hockett D.Le~wis K. Welchold

I Project 1

M. G. Holloway, Dir. E. P. Aurand R. L. Belzer S.C. Hight R. Mettler E. H. Plesset W. Stratton J. West C. Zimmerman R Horton

Consultant for Personnel

H. D. Chittim


Technological Capabilities Panel

I The President of the United States j -

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

Technological Capabilities r--- Panel of the Science

Advisory Committee

Military Advisory _Committee

Steering Committee

J. R. Killian, Jr., Director J. B. Fisk, Deputy Director L. A. DuBridge J.P. Baxter M. G. Holloway J. H. Doolittle L. J. Haworth E. H. Land R. C. Sprague, Consultant

l Project 2

L. J. Haworth, Dir. E. Barlow D. Dustin R. Emberson A. G. Hill B. McMillan R. Rollefson H. Scoville, Jr. M.A. Tuve R Gilruth

Morton Mouzon

I

Project 3

E. H. Land, Dir. J. G. Baker J.Kennedy A. Latham, Jr. E. Purcell J. W. Tukey

Lt. Gen. L. L. Lemnitzer, USA RAdm. H. D. Felt, USN Brig. Gen. B. K. Holloway, USAF"

Maj. Gen. H. McK. Roper a Constitute military consultant

group.

I Communications Working Group

J. B. Wiesner, Chmn. G. W.Gilman H. T. Friis W. H. Radford

Subcommittee


the task of investigating the nation's intelligence capabilities. Its chairman was Edwin H. (Din) Land . the inventor of the polarizing fil-ter and the instant camera. When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had ro make a major decision about his career. At the time, the 45-yearold millionaire was on a leave of absence from Polaroid and was living in Hollywood, advising Alfred Hitchcock on the technological aspects of making three-dimensional movies. Land decided to give up his interest in cinema's third dimension and return east to Polaroid and the panel appointment:7

Land 's Project Three was the smallest of the three Technological Capabilities Panel projects , for he preferred what he called taxicab committees"--committees small enough to fit into a single taxicab. The Project Three commitree consisted of Land; James Baker and Edward Purcell of Harvard; chemist Joseph W. Kennedy of Washington University, St. Louis; mathematician John W. Tukey of Princeton University and Bell Telephone Laboratories; and Allen Latham, Jr.. of Arthur D. Little. Inc., an engineer and fonner treasurer of the Polaroid Corporation: Edwin H. Land

[n mid-August 1954. Land and Baker went to Washington to ar-range for the various intelligence organizations to brief the Project Three study group. As the briefings progressed, the panel members became more and more distressed at the poor state of the nation 's in-telligence resources. Land later noted. "We would go in and interview generals and admirals in charge of intelligence and come away wor ried. Here we were, five or six young men. asking questions that these high-ranking officers couldn't answer." Land added that the Projec t Three members were also not overly impressed with the Central [ II . 'I nte 1gence Agency.

Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 ai rcraft soon after he arrived in Washington . Philip Strong showed him Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing of the plane and told him that the Air Force had rejected it. Although Land had heard Allen Donovan

" James R. Kill ian, Jr . interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Cambridge. ,\lassachusc:us. ~November 198-1 (S); Land inte rview

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brietly mention a Lockheed design for a high-tlying aircraft ar the 24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same. As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however, he telephoned Baker to say. "Jim. I think I have the plane you are after." '"

A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members. they all be-came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker had heard Allen Donovan's brief mention of the Lockheed design in May. he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24 September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing. Baker began designing a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 5 '

At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard Bissell. who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais-sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un-clear to him why he had even been contacted.'~ Bissell's outstanding academic credentials. his acquaintanceship with James Killian through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access to ocr Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel members to consider him the best CIA point of contact.

Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282 project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954, Bissell had E. a young Air Force officer on his


attention to a section of the report about a "stripped or specialized aircraft" called the Lockheed CL-282.~"

By September 1954. Land's Project Three study group had be-come very much interested in the Lockheed CL-282 design. Their in-terest grew even stronger when James Baker told them of Allen Donovan's strong case for the CL-282 at the 24-25 September meeting of the ISP. It is not possible to determine exactly when the Land com-mittee decided to back the CL-282; in fact. there may never have been a formal decision as such. In view of Land's impulsive nature, he probably seized upon the CL-282 design as being a workable concept and immediately began developing it into a complete reconnaissance system.

During September and October the Project Three study group met frequemly to discuss the Lockheed design and the reconnaissance equipment it would carry. Meetings were small, generally with fewer than 10 participants; Garrison Norton was often the only government official in attendance. At times outside experts joined in the proceed-ings. When the discussion turned to cameras and film, Land invited Dr. Henry Yutzy, Eastman Kodak's film expert, and Richard S. Perkin, President of the Perkin-Elmer Company, to participate. For discussions on the J57 engine, the panel members asked Perry W. Pratt, Pratt and Whitney's chief engineer, to attend. Kelly Johnson also met with the panel to review plans for the CL-282 system.5'"

By the end of October, the Project Three meetings had covered every aspect of the Lockheed design. The CL-282 was to be more than an airplane with a camera, it was to be an integrated intelli-gence-collection system that the Project Three members were confi-dent could find and photograph the Soviet Union's Bison bomber fleet and. resolve the "bomber lt was

the Lockheed aircraft that had captured the Land fan-was seen as the for a whole new

4

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camera with tremendously improved resolution and film capacity, and the Eastman Kodak company was working on new thin, lightweight film. 15

By October 1954. the Project Three study group had drafted a complete program for an overhead reconnaissance effort based on the CL-282 aircraft. The one remaining question was who would conduct the overtlights. The committee's members, particularly Land. were not in favor of the Air Force conducting such missions in peacetime. Firmly believing that military overflights in armed aircraft could pro-voke a war, they argued for civilian overflights in unarmed, unmarked aircraft. In their view, the organization most suited for this mission was the Central Intelligence Agency. 5'

In late Occober 1954, the Project Three panel discussed the CL-282 system concept with DCI Allen Dulles and the Secretary of the Air Force's Special Assistant for Research and Development. Trevor Gardner. Dulles was reluctant to have the CIA undertake the project. He did not like to involve the CIA with military projects, even ones that the military had rejected, like the CL-282. Furthermore. the DCI strongly believed that the Agency's mission lay in the use of hu man operatives and secret communications. the classic forms of intel-ligence gathering. Land came away from this meeting with the impression that Dulles somehow thought overflights were not fair play. Project Three committee members were nevertheless convinced that technology. particularly in the form of the CL-282 and the new camera designs, would solve the nation's intelligence problems.P

A Meeting With the President

Allen Dulles's reluctance to involve the CIA in the CL-282 project did not stop the Project Three committee from its aims because it was able to go over Dulles's head and appeal to the President

in the BEACON HILL and the


to do so because the Land committee was part of a panel commis-sioned by President Eisenhower to examine the nation's intelligence community and recommend changes. The committee thus had a direct line to the White House through James Killian's contacts there.

Early in November 1954, Land and Killian met with President Eisenhower to discuss high-altitude reconnaissance. Killian's mem-oirs comain an account of this crucial meeting:

Land described the [CL-282] system using an unarmed plane and recommended that its development be undertaken. After listening to our proposal and asking many hard questions, Eisenhower ap proved the development of the system, but he stipulated that it should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by rivalries among the services.S8

The scientists from the advisory committees and the President were thus in agreement that the new reconnaissance program should be controlled by the CIA. not the military.

ClA and Air Force Agreement on the CL-282

Meanwhile Edwin Land and his Project Three colleagues were work-ing to convince Allen Dulles that the CIA should run the proposed overflight program. On 5 November Land wrote to the DCI strongly urging that the CIA undertake the CL-282 project:

Here is the brief report from our panel telling why we think overflight is urgent and presently feasible. I [Land] am not sure that we have made it clear that we feel there are many reasons why this activity is appropriate for CIA, always with Air Force assistance. We told you that this seems to us the kind of action and technique that is right the contemporary version of CIA: a modem and scientific way an that is

ed to be to its uu""x

starU'

33

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The letter had two attachments: a two-page summary of a com-plete operational plan for organizing, building, and deploying the CL-282 within a period of 20 months at a cost of S22 million and a three-page memorandum, entitled "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence."

Aware of Dulles's preference for classical intelligence work, the Project Three memorandum stressed the superiority of the CL-282 program over traditional espionage methods:

We believe that these planes can go where we need to have them go efficiently and safely, and that no amount of fragmentary and indirect intelligence can be pieced together to be equivalent to such positive information as can thus be provided. 60

The Land committee memorandum also stressed the need for the CIA to undertake such reconnaissance missions rather than the Air Force, noting that "For the present it seems rather dangerous for one of our military arms to engage directly in extensive overflight." The committee members also listed the advantages of using the CL-282 rather than an Air Force aircraft:

The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of present Russian interceptors and high enough to have a good chance of avoiding detection. The plane itself is so light ( 15,000 pounds), so obviously unarmed and devoid of military usefulness, that it would minimize affront to the Russians even 1j through some remote mischance it were detected and identi-fied.6'

One additional advantage of the Lockheed design over the Air Force's proposed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft was a faster completion time. Kelly Johnson had promised the Land committee t

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