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(U) DDE & NSA: An Introductory SurveyDavid A. Hatch

Cryptologic Quarterly

(V) Introduction

CU) When Dwight D. Eisenhower left the pres­idency in January 1961, his reputation alreadyhad begun to decline. The media and many histo­rians characterized the man as out of touch andmanipulated by strong-minded subordinates.

(U) Dwight D. Eisenhower

CU) The resurgence of Eisenhower's reputa­tion, however, began with Fred Greenstein's writ­ings in the 1980s on the "hidden hand" presiden­cy.l Greenstein demonstrated that Eisenhowerhad actually been an activist president, but pre­ferred to work behind the scenes, letting his cabi­net officers and other subordinates engage in thepublic policy debates, perform public actions ­and take the public heat!

CU) Parallel with this rehabilitation was therevelation of Eisenhower as active also in the fieldof intelligence. Stephen Ambrose, in Ike's Spies2

in 1981, first showed Eisenhmver as a managerand user of intelligence from World War IIthrough his presidency. A number of books, suchas Dino Brugioni's Eyeball to EyebalP in 1990,and Philip Taubman's Secret Empire4 in 2003,

emphasized Eisenhower's concern to develop awell-rounded aerial reconnaissance capability forearly warning.

CU) However, none of these recent books wasable to discuss Eisenhower's involvement withNSA or communications intelligence CCOMINT)as president. Virtually nothing on this subject hadbeen declassified from the 1950S.

CU) In fact, Eisenhower, with considerableexperience with COMINT during World War II,continued as an interested consumer of COMINTinformation during his presidency, and involvedhimself in many aspects of strengthening NSA toimprove government COMINT capabilities.

CU) This article cannot deal with all majorevents concerning NSA in the 1950S; it cannoteven treat all aspects of Eisenhower's interactionswith NSA or COMINT. However, the cases citedhere will demonstrate, I believe, that Eisenhowerwas important to the development of NSA as aninstitution in its formative years and to the healthof the nation's COMINT process.

(U) The World of the NewAdministration

CU) When the Eisenhower administration tookoffice in 1953, American officials had little solidknowledge about the sources of policy or immedi­ate goals of the USSR. Even hard facts on suchbasic matters as Red Army troop deployments athome and in Eastern Europe and development ofSoviet weaponry were scarce.

CU) In October 1953, the National SecurityCouncil adopted a basic statement on the Sovietthreat. NSC 162/1 noted a USSR armed withatomic weapons, a country that devoted one-sixth

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of its gross national product to military spend­ing.5

(U) NSC 162/1 also listed fourteen defenserecommendations; number twelve called for anintelligence system capable of analyzing hostileintentions. The system would also have to evalu­ate friendly and neutral countries to forecast any"potential foreign developments" bearing onnational security. (,

(U) Despite this, Eisenhower sought modera­tion in defense spending. He believed that fearcompounded by lack of knowledge about theadversary could lead to a garrison state, thatunchecked expenditures for national securitywould lead to economic ruin. He propoundedwhat became known as the "New Look" indefense, characterized by a sizeable reduction inconventional military forces balanced by a great­ly enhanced nuclear arsenal.

(U) Considering the Soviet threat, and y.,iththe New Look as a cornerstone ofthe administra­tion's policy, and a desire to damp down budgets,accurate and timely intelligence would be a must.

(U) Eisenhower, believing the national securi­ty staff had been organized too loosely, madeGeneral Paul T. Carroll staff secretary to facilitatepaperwork and coordinate issues across organi­zational lines. When, in September 1954, GeneralCarroll died of a heart attack, the presidentbrought in Colonel, later General, Andrew J.Goodpaster as his replacement. Goodpaster hadworked with Eisenhower at NATO in the office ofchief of stafF

(U) Eisenhower's management style was toblock out \vide issue areas, give policy direction,and then leave subordinates to handle the details.He also required his chief of staff to follow up ondetails and prompt him about areas needingattention.

(U) Goodpaster received daily and weeklyintelligence reports from CIA that includedCOMINT and reVlrrote them for the president.When Goodpaster and his staff gave intelligenceitems to the president, they sent in no more thanthirty or forty items daily, and kept them concise,that is, around five lines. The president's dailyreport would run three, or sometimes four, pages.

(U) Another principal source of the presi­dent's intelligence was the weekly NationalSecurity Council meeting, usually 10:00 everyFriday. Del Allen Dulles would often start offwith a juicy tidbit from a recent intercept, but thegroup generally followed an agenda that had beenset weeks in advance, and thus did not necessari­ly discuss current intelligence.s

(U) Goodpaster rated the president "extreme­ly competent" in analyzing the intelligencebrought to him. Eisenhower did not ask aboutsources and methods, but insisted that he receivethe "best available" intelligence. Goodpaster,assisted by the president's son John, foundEisenhower conversant with COMINT and thatthe president appreciated its value.9

(U) NSA & COMINT in the 1950S

(U) National-level intelligence activities in theUnited States began only after World War I, andmost were products of the Second World War.The community of intelligence producers andconsumers in the 1950S was still seeking the bestorganization and practices.

(U) Both the U.S. Army and Navy had sepa­rate organizations to produce COMINT (informa­tion derived from the exploitation of encryptedcommunications) before and during World WarII. Working with their British counterparts, theyproduced timely and well-detailed intelligencereports for Allied military commanders, includ­ing Eisenhower.

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(U) The postwar atmosphere of budget andpersonnel retrem:hment made difficult the main­tenance of three COMINf organizations (whenthe Air Force became a separate service, it quick­ly began to do COMINT). To consolidate effortand funding, the secretary of defense created theArmed Forces Security Agency CAFSA) in 1949.When problems became apparent in AFSA'sstructure and practices, President Harry Truman- on the basis of a study - reorganized it as theNational Security Agency in 1952.

CU) Thus, although it traced its antecedentsdirectly to organizations of the 1930s, NSA as thegovernment's central cryptologic organizationhad been in existence as such for less than a yearwhen Eisenhower took office.

CU) The Nation31 Security Act of 1947 resultedin formation of the U.S. Intelligence Board and itssubcommittee, the U.S. CommunicationsIntelligence Board CUSCIB). These committeesbrought producers and consumers of intelligencetogether to consolidate requirements and ensurethat operations were conducted in accordance"vith them.

CUITF6U8t NSA, subordinate to theDepartment of Defense, was responsible fornational-level or strategic COl\UNT, while eachmilitary service had an organic cryptologic agencyto provide tactical support. In addition, theseService Cryptologic Agencies conducted someintercept and intermediate-level processing tasksfor NSA.

0":5//8+) It was estimated in the mid-1950sthat these cryptologic services intercepted inexcess of five million messages per month, andforwarded most of it - about one ton of paper perday - to the D.C. locations of NSA.

~ NSA was also responsible for nationalcommunications security CCOl\1SEC), i.e., estab­lishing COMSEC doctrine and policy, and procur­ing COMSEC materials.

ffS+ NSA itself had a personnel strength ofjust over 10,000 employees, of whom about two­thirds were civilians. In addition to those at NSA,the Army Security Agency and Air Force SecurityService each had over 15,000 people, and theNaval Security Group had about 3,300.

~ A constant theme in both internal andexternal evaluations of NSA was the difficulty inhiring a civilian workforce and retaining careermilitary in the cryptologic services. The constantturnover not only was a security problem but alsoimperiled the continuity of COMINf operations.

CUI j'"fOU,» Although admitting it was diffi­cult to compute the total cost of the U.S. COMINfeffort, a presidential commission in the mid­1950S estimated that the annual expenditure was"in the neighborhood of $500,000,000."10

CU) The first director of NSA CDIRNSA) wasMajor General (later Lieutenant General) RalphCanine, USA. Although not a professional intelli­gence officer, Canine quickly learned the essen­tials of cryptologic management, and workedhard to build a more effective organization. In1956 Canine retired and was replaced as DIRNSAby Lieutenant General John Samford, USAF.

CU/ /fflU~ The post of deputy at NSA was aproblem in the early years. Initially, NSA hadthree military vice-directors, each responsible forone particular aspect of cryptologic operations.After the Pentagon urged selection of a deputydirector from outside, two different civilians hadbeen tried, but were found unsatisfactory. WhenPentagon officials again proposed bringing in anoutsider, General Samford asked for promotionfrom within. Referring to the arcane nature ofcryptology, he argued that an outsider would haveto survive "artificial stimulus, frustration, con­flict, disillusionment, and rationalization" beforebecoming effective. tt

CUI /F'ISU9j. This led to the appointment ofDr. Louis Tordella in 1958. "Dr. T" had been in

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charge of a major Navy collection station duringWorld War II; postwar, as a civilian with NSA'spredecessors, he had had an important role indeveloping early computers for cryptologic tasks.

CU/~WhenDr. Tordella was nominat­ed for the post, Department of Defense seniorofficials suggested the appointment be for fouryears.12 In actuality, Dr. Tordella became thelongest-serving deputy director at NSA, holdingthe post until his retirement in 1974.

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(U) Dr. Louis Tordella

(T5//81) William Jackson, a former directorof CIA who consulted on intelligence matters forthe president. advocated elevation of responsibil­ity for NSA within the Defense Department. Thesecretary of defense had given responsibility to adeputy, who, in turn, had delegated it to the assis­tant for special operations. Jackson wantedresponsibility placed where it had originally beenenvisioned when NSA \-vas formed, at the assis­tant secretarv level. 1;l While this idea surfacedagain, more than once over the decades, it hasnever been implemented.

(D) Studying and Reorganizing

(U) Hoover Commission

CU) During the campaign of 1952, theRepublicans had charged the previous twoadministrations 'with inefficiency, even outrightcorruption. Therefore, in 1954 Eisenhower com­missioned former president Herbert Hoover tostudy U.S. government organization and makerecommendations for more efficient operations.This included examination of the intelligenceagenCIes.

CD) Hoover delegated study of the intelligencecommunity to a subcommittee under retiredArmy General Mark W. Clark.

CD) The study encompassed extensive inter­viewing - over 200 individuals - as well as visitsto sites around the country. The report from theHoover Commission was sent to the White Houseon May 25, 1955, with a top secret appendix onNSA, communications intelligence, and commu­nications security.14

-(T8//~4The Hoover Commission found NSA"basically well conceived, well organized, and effi­ciently operated," and that it did excellent work.

~ U.S. communications security wasadjudged good, although the Commission felt toomany messages were transmitted in plain text,giving away a great deal of information to foreigngovernments.

~The Commission found that 30,000

Americans were cleared for COMINT. The vastmajority were producers, with recipients num­bering only 4,687. The commission felt that thislarge a number, combined with a high turnoverrate for military personnel involved in produc­tion, represented a "constant danger" to the secu­rity of COMINT.

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(~) The Hoover Commission recom­mended that USCIB improve its guidance to NSA,ensuring more realism and clarity. At the sametime, NSA needed to make greater efforts in pro­duction. In fact, expenditures equivalent to thoseof the Manhattan Project were needed "at once.,,15

(T&) Another major recommendation advisedthe administration to consider combiningCOl\IINT and electronic intelligence (ELINT) inone organization. We ""ill return to this.

gS//Sf) Given an opportunity to respond tothe provisions of the Hoover report, USCIB, theDepartment of Defense, and NSA essentiallyrejected them. They first denied the idea thatCOMINT production had suffered because ofUSCIB's guidanct' practices, but, conversely,noted that USCIB was already implementingchanged requirements and guidance proceduresfor COMINT.16

("f8;'/Si) The Department of Defense expand­ed on the call for Manhattan Project-sized expen­ditures. The limitation on improvement to crypt­analysis was not funding, DoD stated, but a short­age of qualified personnel. Having said this, theDepartment noted it had authorized DIRNSA tobring in the "best possible analytic brains" fromoutside NSA to help attack the problem.17

~he three respondents agreed that it 'wasdesirable to seek ways to achieve a higher level ofcommunications security. However, they notedthat NSA and the military services kept this prob­lem under review "at all times.,,18

(U/~) The Hoover Commission result­ed in no direct institutional or proceduralchanges at NSA It did, however, start adminis­tration and NSA officials thinking about neces­sary changes; in a sense, it prepared the way foracceptance of change in the future.

(U) Killian Panel

(U) After a White House conference in March1954, Eisenhower asked the Office of DefenseMobilization (ODM) to study the nation's readi­ness to defend against a surprise nuclear attackfrom the Soviet Union. In turn, the chairman ofODM's Science Advisory Committee suggestedthat Dr. James R. Killian, president of theMassachusetts Institute of Technology, conductan initial study on this.

(U) President Eisenhower (left) and Dr. JamesKillian (right)

(D) After further meetings, Killian and ODMsuggested creating a special task force to studydefense, striking power, and intelligence.Eisenhower thereupon asked Killian to takecharge, stud}ing American "technical capabilitiesto meet some of its current problems."

(U) Killian's panel had a subcommittee onintelligence, chaired by Edwin Land, of Polaroidfame, and included prominent figures from uni­versities and private industry. Killian was indoc­trinated for COMINT by the CIA in August1954:9 Nine members of the group, includingKillian and Land, visited NSA for orientation on

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October 13, 1954,20 beginning five months ofstudy.

(V) Although its actual title was "Meeting theThreat of Surprise Attack," the final report wasknown throughout the intelligence community asthe "Killian Report," the "TCP [for TechnicalCapabilities Panel] Report," or the "SurpriseAttack Report.,,21

(U) When Killian published his own accountofthese years, he discussed at length the portionsof the TCP Report that dealt with continentaldefense, missile programs, and aircraft recon­naissance. However, he noted that "[a]t the timeof this writing, only part of the report has beendeclassified (a restriction of which I approve)."22

(V) Four of the TCP Report's five sectionsdealt with continental defenses and the effect oftechnology on the military. The first section, how­ever, read:

Increasing our capacity to get morepositive intelligence about theenemy's intentions and capabilitiesand thus to obtain, before it islaunched, adequate foreknowledgeofa planned surprise attack.23

(V) The intelligence study said the V nitedStates "must find ways to increase the number ofhard facts on which our intelligence estimates arebased," The V.S. should have the "best-informedgovernment in the world," it read, not only fordefense, but also to help resolve the debatesbetween "contending views and fantasies" thatappear in the democratic process.24 This meantincreased COMINT efforts.

(~) Since the TCP's task was to examineintelligence as a tool to provide warning of aSoviet surprise attack, it paid less attention tocommunications security. However, it did com­ment on communications, since a communica­tions failure due to malfunctions or jamming in a

crisis would negate any COMINT warning capa­bilities.

~ NSA's communications group, inresponse, considered the assumption the Sovietswould undertake wide-scale jamming "not neces­sarily sound." NSA, on the other hand, did sup­port the TCP call for research and upgrading ofcommunications.25

("rS1. When the TCP study expressed concernabout the number of persons with access toCOMINT, VSCIB responded that the number ofpersons cleared for COMINT was under constantreview. VSCIB also said that all member agencieswere enjoined to keep the need-to-know principlea priority.26

(V) In later years, recalling the TCP, Killianexpressed a belief that its worth went beyond anypractical recommendations it had made. Hebelieved the panel had helped restore trustbetween scientists and the government. He alsonoted that Eisenhower was pleased that, unlikeother panels, there were no leaks from the TCp,27

(V) The Killian panel gave Eisenhower confi­dence in its chairman, and put Killian in a posi­tion to make further recommendations. Dr.Killian became an influential figure in furtherstudies ofthe intelligence community. In fact, thenext step, initiated by Dr. Killian, had far-reach­ing effects on NSA.

(U) Baker Panel

(V) When Killian, by then Eisenhower's sci­ence advisor, presented a report to the NSC inJanuary 1957, the president discussed the needfor survivability of intelligence organizations incase of war, and the need to save money. As dis­cussions progressed, Eisenhower agreed with arecommendation to seek ways to save money bykeeping NSA's costs from going up. TreasurySecretary Humphrey said he was "numb" at therate at which COMINT expenditures were

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increasing. DCI Allen Dulles interjected that"great value" was received from NSA activities.When Defense Secretary Wilson questionedDulles's assertion, Eisenhower sided ,\lith Dulles.

CU) Killian contemplated a group of about fif­teen scientists to study COMINT, probably forfour to six months. Eisenhower agreed andexpressed the hope that the group would adviseNSA how to remain productive in COMINT.28

-ffS//~ItAs a result of these recommenda­tions from Killian, Eisenhower appointed a spe­cial panel under Dr. William O. Baker of BellTelephone Laboratories to study the state ofcryptanalytic proficiency. For administrative pur­poses the panel members "vere consultants to theOffice of Defense Mobilization, although theDepartment of Defense - NSA's parent organiza­tion - footed the bill.29

(U) Dr. William O. Baker

CD) Baker had received his Ph.D. fromPrinceton University, and joined BellLaboratories in 1939. He had served as Bell's vicepresident of chemical and metallurgical researchfrom 1951 to 1954, and would serve as vice presi­dent of research from 1955 to 1980.30

(TS//SI) Over a period of months the panelstudied all phases of COl\lINT production fromthe general to the specific; most members had

had no prior concepts of the specifics of cryptog­raphy or cryptanalysis. Panel members met \\lithsenior and mid-level supervisors at NSA to dis­cuss cryptanalysis and other topics, such asELINT.31

Cf~//~I) Dr. Baker summarized his findingsin front of the president, members of the NSC,and other officials, including the DIRNSA,General Samford, on February 10, 1958. Heargued that the cryptographer had won over thecryptanalyst, and this situation was likely to con­tinue. Nevertheless, Dr. Baker said, "there is nodoubt that NSA has paid its way."

ETS//SI) Baker first stated it would be neces­sary to reevaluate government COMINT activitiesand separate cryptologic research from actualexploitation of enemy communications. Second,Baker recommended, the government shouldestablish a separate organization on the model ofa university department to undertake fundamen­tal research in mathematics and cryptanalysis.

("t'S/lSI) Discussing this, Eisenhower said hisunderstanding was that a research organizationmeant hiring experts who "wouldn't have to doanything but think." He asked whether theresearch organization would be over NSA or sub­ordinate to it. Baker replied that the panel envis­aged the institute as tied to NSA and able to uti­lize its facilities, but not superior to it.

~ Next, Baker claimed there was v,ideacceptance of the concept of putting ELINT andCOMINT together in one organization. DCI AllenDulles agreed that this should be done, butUndersecretary of Defense Donald Quarlesreminded the group that many military com­manders depended on ELINT for enemy order ofbattle information. He urged a six-month delaybefore taking any action.

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(TS//SI) Eisenhower approved promptimplementation of proposed presidential actionsgenerated by the Baker Report.32

(T~//~I) NSA cryptanalysts found Baker'sevaluation of their activities too pessimistic. Theylet it be known that they considered a proposal toseparate basic research from production danger­ous. NSA argued that the two supported eachother, and when separated "both suffer."33

fFSffSI) The Baker Panel's report began aprocess of change to NSA's organization. As ithappened, despite the president's approval ofimmediate implementation, the change did notoccur exactly as the panel recommended.

(U) Cryptology

.f+B//~ Despite its initial reservations, NSAeventually warmed to the Baker Panel recom­mendations for a cryptologic think tank. This wasparticularly so after the idea evolved, when it nolonger meant dismantling NSA but creating agroup to supplement the Agency's activities.

(1'~//SIt The director of NSA, GeneralSamford, with DoD approval eventually, selectedthe Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) inPrinceton, New Jersey, where an existing DoDcontract could be used.34

CU) When the IDA Board of Trustees met inlate 1957, NSA deputy director Dr. HowardEngstrom presented them with a proposal to dodirected research on behalf of the Agency.Subsequently, after "considerable discussion,"centering on the need for more detailed proposalson specific projects and whether commitments toNSA would interfere with other obligations, IDAaccepted.35

(T8jf80 IDA accepted in June,36 and theNSA-IDA contract began in October 1958.37

ffSjjSI) IDA in fact made some significantcontributions to cryptanalysis, communicationssecurity, and computer development. Lookingback at it, long-time NSA deputy director Dr.Louis W. Tordella, in an interview after his retire­ment, commented that IDA "has paid for itselfseveral times over."38

(U) PBCFIA

CUIffOUO) The President's Board ofConsultants on Foreign Intelligence Activitieswas established by executive order on February 6,1956. Its members were to be knowledgeable peo­ple from outside the government and were toserve without compensation.39 In a "more explic­it" letter to the board, Eisenhower told them theirresponsibility was to review all foreign intelli­gence activities, not just those of CIA. The boardwas to report on "over-all progress," training,security, research, funding, and effectiveness andgeneral competence in carrying out assignedtasks.40

-(8//51) The Board met eighteen times overthe next five years to consider numerous ques­tions of intelligence doctrine and practice. Overthis time, it followed up important issues relatingto COMINT, ELINT, and NSA.

CU) In late February 1958, at the chairman'srequest, Eisenhower replaced Killian withGeneral John Hull. Killian had asked to berelieved as chairman because of the burden of hisduties as special assistant for science and tech­nology, but would continue as a member of theboard.41 Eisenhower had known Hull as an excel­lent planning officer in the Pentagon and atNATO.

tTS//SB PBCFIA's first concern was gettingwarning of a possible enemy attack; the problemwas to redesign the government communicationsto get critical information to the president in a

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timely way. The existing network was cumber-some, with delays in processing and priorities.42

l1SJlfflThe Hull Committee's reviews, pro­posals, and follow-ups accelerated changes tomany facets of NSA's organization and mission,

I particularly communications and ELINT.

(U) Communications

(D) As on-going discussions determined reor­ganizations and support for the intelligence com­munity, the administration realized that commu­nications support was critical to support the otherfields.

(D) At a meeting with the president inOctober 1957, Dr. Killian, then still chairman ofPBCFIA, restated the board's first recommenda­tion about better communications for early warn­ing of a Soviet attack. His group had found delaysand "extraordinary blockages" in the communica­tions channels, both in reporting from the fieldand in successive stops in the Washington report­ing chain.

CD) Eisenhower asked if this problem weredue to duplication of effort. Killian told him thatit was due to system overload and a lack of effec­tive ways to prioritize messages.43 The presidentdirected formation of a committee under the NSCto study crisis communications.

C'fS//S~ The resultant NSC Committeedefined critical information as that requiring theimmediate attention of the president.44

(TS//SI) The committee noted that commu­nications to support COMINT activities had capa­bilities that met the president's requirement forrapid communications. This was because theCOMINT;;ystem had to be ready to respond to acrisis at any time and its communications systemhad operated continuously since the war.45 Thus,the new presidential system came to be assigned

to the secretary of defense, who would furtherdelegate its management to NSA.

r'fS/lSB- The National Security Council tookup Draft NSCID #7, "Critical IntelligenceCommunications," at its meeting of August 27,1958. DCI Allen Dulles said there was little pur­pose in developing intelligence collection until itsproduct could be sent back to Washington rapid­ly. Dulles said that critical intelligence shouldreach Washington within ten minutes; he dubbedthis communication network the "CRITIC sys­tem."

ETS//Sn Dr. Louis Tordella, deputy directorof NSA, briefed the NSA proposal for the CRITICsystem. He explained that it would include fullautomation of the existing COMINT communica­tions system, and critical information would have"overriding priority." Tordella expected the sys­tem would be completed in the FY 1962-65 peri­od, and would require funding of $29 million inaddition to the $16 million already expended.46

efSjjSI) Eisenhower asked no technical ques­tions about the briefing. Tordella rememberedthe decision went quickly thereafter - a matter ofEisenhower asking, "Can we do it?" With an affir­mative answer by the deputy secretary ofdefense,the president responded, "Let's do it."47

~As the government moved to implementthe presidential decision, Dr. Baker, on May 1,

1959, worried that the work on communicationssystems, including CRITICOMM, was "superfi­cially impressive," but really was fragmented andunlikely to result in the integrated system neces­sary.48

ETS//~I) The PBCFIA, in a report to the pres­ident, also had "misgivings" about the CRITI­COMM effort. Although improvements had beenmade in message handling and from the field, theboard felt that would be impossible to completethe system by the target date of October 1961.The board recommended a thorough review of

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the system, followed by a reorganization of it, andmore frequent system tests.49

(T511~) The CRITIC system began initiallimited operations on July 21, 1959. Substantialtime savings for crisis messages were achieved:average time for messages was one and a halfhours, compared with an average of nine and onehalf hours, as measured two years earlier. Amajority of messages were received in less thanan hour.50

~ A report of November 1959 listed theestablishment of traffic control points around theglobe, as well as significant upgrades to equip­ment. Occasionally, message time approachedeleven minutes from origin to Washington, butmost still required twenty-four to twenty-nineminutes.51

~ The desired improvements in time werenot achieved until the early 1960s, during theKennedy administration.

(U) Computers

(7'5//SI) An advisory group of scientistsformed by NSA to study its own operations tookcomputer development as a primary interest. Atan October 1954 briefing by NSA staff, membersasked about technical aspects of collection andcryptanalysis. Among the questions was "whatare things you dream about but do not dare hopefor?" Dr. Howard Eachus, replied "more speed insmaller boxes."52 This led to an active program todevelop advanced computers.

(~ An effort to develop a powerful general­purpose computer eventually became known asProject FREEHAND. Associated with it wasProject LIGHTNING, an effort to increase com­puter speed 1,000 times.

11SIIBi-) Project FREEHAND was approvedat the DoD level in early October 1956. DeputySecretary Reuben Robertson informed DIRNSA

Ralph Canine that NSA was authorized to spendan extra $5 million per year for five years todevelop a high-speed computer. Thereafter,FREEHAND was to become a regular NSA budg­et item. However, Robertson disapproved anybudget increase for the overall NSA effort.53

(TS//SI) Projects FREEHAND and LIGHT­NING were briefed to the president in January1957. Eisenhower agreed with the concept ofincreasing computer speed for cryptology andauthorized use of his name in connection withrecruiting for the projects.54

~With DoD funding in late 1956, and thenpresidential support, NSA and its science advi­sors took up Projects FREEHAND and LIGHT­NING. They sought new ideas from commercialconsultants and various universities that weredoing related work.55

t'fs//g~ The magnitude of computer devel­opment sought was considered audacious bymany scientists. Even Dr. Killian thought theproposed leap in computing power "infeasible."56

The only point of agreement among thoseinvolved was the desirability of pushing technolo­gy to the limit. In fact, with no agreement on asingle best path, general research progressed onseveral divergent computer technologies, abettedby at least six corporations under contract andtwo universities.

l:slA LIGHTNING test machine was not con­structed until 1962; in practical terms, the projectresulted in HARVEST, NSA's first general-pur­pose high-speed computer system. Beyond this,NSA proudly pointed to the fact that researchresults in this area had been shared with othergovernment agencies, academia, and commercialfirms, driving the high-speed computing revolu­tion.57

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(U)ELINT

.fI(!) EUNT (electronic intelligence) is infor­mation derived from electronic signals that donot contain speech. As an intelligence discipline ithas two aspects: the study ofthe characteristics ofsignal emitters such as radars or beacons, and thelocation of specific emitters. Because specificemitters are associated with specific weapons,EUNT thus provides accurate order-of-battledata.

~Among the problems was the relation­ship of COMINT producers to EUNT production;in many ways, organization and production activ­ities overlapped. Both COMINT and EUNT wereperformed by the individual services with similartechnologies. Both resulted in informationrequired by both services, but each was processedand reported by different organizations.

(D) The services understandably hoped topreserve their control over an asset vital to theirwar-fighting capabilities. Split responsibility inproduction and reporting, however, frequentlymeant wasteful duplication of effort, and, worse,carried with it the risk that commanders in com­bat would not get data as quickly as needed or notget it at all.

~ The first major study of the intelligencecommunity, the Clark subcommittee of theHoover Commission, examined EUNT alongwith other sources of intelligence. It found affini­ties between EUNT and COMINT because ofsimilarities of intercept operations, and becauseeach helped in interpreting the other.

~ The Hoover Commission had favoredgiving most responsibility for Eum to NSA.58

NSA would have control of analysis, as well asresponsibility for "guidance and coordination" of,collection and dissemination. Tactical EUNTwould remain with local commanders.59 This rec­ommendation was not implemented, and the

problem came up again with the other studies ofthe intelligence community.

tTs//~) Although the report of the BakerPanel concentrated on COMINT, it made a clearstatement about EUNT: "We recommend thatresponsibility for and control of EUNT process­ing and analysis be assigned to the NationalSecurity Agency.,,60

'tTS1-A special EUNT task force, chaired byPhilip G. Strong of CIA, responding to a presiden­tial directive of February 1958, concluded that itwas "essential" to have a single operational andtechnical authority for EUNT.61 USCIB approvedthe task force's conclusions in mid-August 1958and sent them to the president. They proposedmaking the secretary of defense executive agentfor EUNT; he, in turn, would assign NSA anEUNT mission equivalent to its existingCOMINT responsibilities.62

~ The assignment of EUNT analysis toNSA under this presidential decision producedmixed results and reactions.

(UI jtl'OU~ At an NSC conference onDecember 16, 1958, General John Hull pointedout that the decision had improved coordination.He emphasized, however, that NSA needed "max­imum support" from 000. Eisenhower agreedwith this, and noted that the arrangements werecorrect.63 This sentiment was repeated at an NSCmeeting in mid-January 1959. Eisenhower saidhe fully endorsed NSA's COMINT-EUNTefforts.64

tTS//Stj In a review of COMINT and EUNTat the end of August 1960, just six months beforethe Eisenhower administration was to leaveoffice, DCI Allen Dulles noted that improvementshad been made and were continuing. The DCI'sreport concluded "COMINT, and to a lesserextent EUNT, continue to provide one ofour best

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potentials for early warning" against a surpriseattack.65

(U) Allen Dulles

fFS//eI} The PBCFIA disagreed. In two sum­mary reports near the end of the Eisenhoweradministration, the Board, although notingprogress in coordinating COMINT and ELINTunder NSA, felt it had been too slow. The directorof NSA was not exercising positive control butdeferring frequently to the individual services.The Board recommended that DoD promotegreater continuity in the term of office of thedirector of NSA, that tactical control of ELINT begiven from the services to NSA, and thatCOMINT and ELINT planning be done at theDSIB level.

CD17FOU&j Eisenhower issued no instruc­tions about the problem, but directed that a copyof this report be given to incoming president JohnKennedy, and this was done.66

CD/ /reu91 NSA's assumption of responsibil­ity for some aspects of ELINT, by the way, result­ed in a new term to describe one of the Agency'sprincipal missions. Since communications intelli­gence dealt with messages that contained speech,it did not encompass electronic intelligence,which dealt vvith non-speech signals. Thus, the

term signals intelligence CSIGINT) was coined todescribe a mission that included both.

(U) Observations

CD) There are no startling revelations aboutPresident Dwight D. Eisenhower in his relation­ship with NSA or his fostering of communicationsintelligence. Eisenhower was the consummatestaff chief, one who had mastered the art of dele­gation for research and action. Thus, we find fewdirect fingerprints from him on intelligencedevelopments.

ClJ) Yet, it is clear from the record that heunderstood COMINT, had knowledge of NSAoperations, and acted in positive ways to improveboth.

CD) Eisenhower had greater involvement withthe burgeoning reconnaissance programsbecause these were essentially new activities, and,moreover, programs that had the potential forcausing an international incident. With NSA andCOMINT, it was not a matter of creation;Eisenhower was dealing with institutions, struc­tures, and processes already in existence thatneeded reforming.

CD) The principal tool for his actions in regardto COMINT and NSA was a chain of panels thatstudied the important intelligence issues.Eisenhower initiated many of their studies, con­sidered their recommendations, and took appro­priate actions based on them. Not infrequently,the actions taken were the commissioning ofadditional panels for further study.

CD) Eisenhower put first-rate minds from thegovernment or academia on the panels to studythe intelligence community and NSA. Theirinvolvement attracted other top people to thepanels and ensured that NSA and its componentdisciplines would get the best analyses possible.

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...(U) In many cases, such as the CRITIC com-

munications system and ELINf, the results werenot apparent during his administration. Changewas slow for a variety of reasons. In the case ofEUNT, for example, the military services hadsound reasons for objecting to structural changesto an intelligence source and opposed them. TheCRITIC system moved steadily toward imple­mentation, but the technical challenges weregreat, and the physical challenges of emplacingthe system on a global basis were daunting.

(U/freYO.) Change did come, however. Themajor areas in which he fostered change werethose that most affected NSA's intelligence mis­sion - cryptanalytic research, communicationsimprovement, computing power, and ELINf ­would not have happened naturally; theyrequired Eisenhower's concern and intervention.

(U) The changes Eisenhower initiated, even ifnot fully realized during his time, had profoundimpact in keeping NSA ahead of the technologicalcurve, and ensuring that SIGINf would be avail­able to help keep the American people secure inthe decades to come.

(D) Notes

1. (U) Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-HandPresidency: Eisenhower as Leader CNew York: BasicBooks, 1982).

2. CD) Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies:Eisenhower and the Intelligence Establishment CNewYork: Doubleday & Co., 1981).

3. CD) Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: theInside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York:Random House, 1990).

4. CU) Philip Taubman, Secret Empire:Eisenhower, the CIA, and the Hidden Story ofAmerica's Space Espionage CNew York: Simon &Schuster, 2003).

5. CD) "Note by the Executive Secretary to theNational Security Council on Basic National SecurityPolicy," Washington, October 30,1953, marked "TOPSECRET," in Lisle A. Rose & Neal H. Peterson, editors,Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,Volume II: National Security Affairs, part 1(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984),577­78.

6. CU) "Statement of Policy," 582.7. CD) New York Times Oral History Program,

Eisenhower Administration Project, interview ofGeneral Andrew J. Goodpaster by Ed Edwin, 25 April1967, interview no. 1,9,13,24,31.

8. CD)Richard Kovar, "An Interview withRichard Lehman," www.cia.gov/csi/studies/sum­meTOD/ art05.html.

9. CD) Hatch telephone interview with GeneralGoodpaster; Goodpaster interview by Edwin.

10. CD) Task Force on Intelligence Activities of theCommission on Organization of the Executive Branchof the Government, "Report on Intelligence Activitiesin the Federal Government," hereafter, "Report onIntelligence Activities," Appendix I, 11. Center forCryptologic History Series File, VI.C.1.8.

11. CD) LtGen John A. Samford, Director, NSA, let­ter to General G. B. Erskine, 10 July 1958. NSA ARCACC #26030 CB0L48.

12. CD) G. B. Erskine, Memorandum for DeputySecretary Quarles, "Director of National Security

Page 13

Agency," h July 1958. NSA ARC ACC #26030CB048.

13. (U) William H. Jackson, Special Assistant tothe President, Memorandum for Sherman Adams,Assistant to the President, "Weekly Report of WilliamH. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President," 28July 1956. Eisenhower Presidential Library, SubjectSeries, White House Subseries, Box 1-7, file: Jackson,William H. (3); William H. Jackson, Special Assistantto the President, Memorandum for Sherman Adams,the Assistant to the President, "Reorganization of theNational Security Agency," 1August 1956. EisenhowerPresidential Library, Subject Series, White HouseSubseries, box: 6, file: Jackson, William H.

14. (U) George F. Howe, "The Clark Report,"unpublished manuscript, Center for CryptologicHistory Series File, VII. 1.9.

15. (U) "Report on Intelligence Activities,"Appendix I, 20-24, 27, 36, 46-49.

16. (D) Untitled, undated response to the "Reporton Intelligence Activities," 1-2. CCH Series FileXVI.D.1.2.

17. (U) Untitled, undated response to the "Reporton Intelligence Activities," 3.

18. (U) Untitled, undated response to the "Reporton Intelligence Activities," 3.

19. (U) LCDR P. J. Karl, USN, Memorandum forMr. Hugh S. Erskine, "The President's ScienceAdvisory Committee," 9 March 1955. NSA ARC ACC#20659 CBJG 16.

20. (D) William F. Friedman, Special Assistant,memorandum for the Chief of Staff, "Visit to NSA byMembers of the Special Subcommittee of the ScientificAdvisory Committee," 6 October 1954. NSA ARC ACC#28690, CBTKs7.

21. (U) James R Killian, Jr., SPU1NIK, SCIEN­TISTS, AND EISENHOWER: A Memoir of the FirstSpecial Assistant to the President for Science andTechnology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MITPress, 1977), 64-70.

22. (D) Killian, SPUTNIK, 70.23. (D) Killian, SPUTNIK, 71.24· (D) Killian, SPUTNIK, 79-80.25. (U) John A. Skinner, A/Chief,

Communications, "Analysis of TechnologicalCapabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee

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Tap 8Ee~E"j)'eOMINT/nc I

as it Pertains to NSA Communications," enclosure inPowers, DF, "Report by the Technological CapabilitiesPanel," 7 June 1955. NSA ARC ACQ #30235.

26. (U) No author, n.d., "Interim Statement forKillian Board." NSA ARC, ACQ #2944.

27. (U) Columbia University, Oral HistoryCollection, Part VI, "Killian, James P., Jr.," 29, 36.

28. (U) Memorandum, "Discussion at the SpecialMeeting in the President's Office on Thursday,January 17,1957. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

29. (U) Gordon Gray, director, ODM, letter toDonald H. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 10June 1957. NSA ARC ACC#34106 CBLG36; G. B.Erskine, Assistant to the President (SpecialOperations), Memorandum for the ExecutiveSecretary, NSC, "Report to the President by thePresident's Board of Consultants on ForeignIntelligence Activities, dated December 20, 1956," 26April 1957. CCH SERIES FILE XVI.D.1.2.

30. (U) "The Bell Laboratory Cronies: TheWilliam O. Baker Page," http://ourworld/com­puserv.com/homepages/CarolASThompson/Baker.html. Other Baker Panel members included 1. W.Alvarez of the University of California, H. W. Bode andJ. R Pierce ofBell Labs, R. 1. Garwin and N. Rochesterof IBM, D. A. Huffman of MIT, J. W. Milnor ofPrinceton University, O. Selfridge of LincolnLaboratories at MIT, A. M. Gleason of HarvardUniversity (part-time), and J. W. Tukey of Bell Labs asa consultant.

31. (U) James S. Lay, Executive Secretary, memo­randum for the Secretary of Defense and Director,Office of Defense Mobilization, "Report to thePresident by the President's Board of Consultants onForeign Intelligence Activities, dated December 20,1956," 19 April 1957. NSAARC, ACC: 46033; James S.Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, Memorandum for theDirector of Central Intelligence, "RecommendationNO.4 - Report of the President's Board of Consultantson Foreign Intelligence Activities dated October 24,1957, 28 October 1957. NSA ARC, ACC #46033;Gordon Gray, Memorandum for James S. Lay, Jr.,Executive Secretary, NSC, "Study of Soviet High­Grade Ciphers," 25 April 1957. EisenhowerPresidential Library, NSC Series, Subject Subseries,box: 7, file: President's Board - 1st Report (8);

.ep SE6REli'leeMINlh,*1

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~

.,hen L. David, ADVA, Memorandum for theCl.-otor, NSA, "The Baker Committee," 16 September

~7. NSA ARC ACC#34106 CBLG36; Howard C.=-low, Memorandum to Mr. Austin, "Parallel," 4;bruary 1957. NSA ARC ACC #34106 CBLG36.

32. (U) J. Patrick Coyne, Memorandum re~eetingHeld in the President's Office from 10:30 a.m.

_ ~I 11:30 a.m., February 10, 1958, "The Baker Report'Recommendation No 8-a of the Report of the

~ident's Board of Consultants on Foreignintelligence Activities, dated December 20, 1956, 10February 1958. CCH Series File, XVI.D.1.2.

33. (U) Unsigned Memorandum for the ExecutiveSecretary, USCIB, "comments on the Baker Study,"With ink notation "Dr. Engstrom's," n.d.; Untitledresponse signed by Arthur J. Levenson, Chief, ADVA;Memorandum "General Comments on the BakerCommittee Report," signed by initials FCA. NSA ARCACC #31003 CBOE53.

24. (U) John A. Samford, Director, NSA,Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense,"NSA Research Institute," 21 February 1958. NSAARC, ACC #34285; G. B. Erskine, Assistant to theSecretary of Defense (Special Operations),Memorandum for the Director, National SecurityAgency, "NSA Research Institute," 4 March 1958. NSAARC, ACC #34285; John A. Samford, Director, NSA,Memorandum for General Erskine, "NSA ResearchInstitute," 6 March 1958. NSA ARC, ACC #34285; G.B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of defense(Special Operations), Memorandum for the Director,National Security Agency, "Baker PanelRecommendation on Research Institute for SovietHigh-Level Problem," 13 March 1958. NSA ARC ACC#34106 CBLG36 H01-01l1-7; John A. Samford,Director, NSA, Memorandum for the Secretary ofdefense, "NSA Research Institute," 4 April 1958. NSAARC, ACC #34285.

35. (U) "Institute for Defense Analyses, SpecialMeeting of the Board of Trustees, October 31, 1957."Eisenhower Presidential Library, White House Office,Office of the .special Assistant for Science andTechnology (James R. Killian and George B.

Kistiakowsky): Records 1957-61, box: 11, file: Institutefor Defense Analyses [December 1959].

36. (U) Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary ofDefense, letter to Major General James McCormack,Jr., USAF (Ret), President, Institute for DefenseAnalyses, 24 April 1958. NSA ARC, ACC # 34285; H.T. Engstrom, [Deputy]Director, NSA, letter to MajorGeneral James McCormack, Jr., USAF (Ret),President, Institute for Defense Analyses, 17 June1958. NSA ARC, ACC #34285.

37. (U) A. G. Hill, Memorandum for File, 12September 1958. NSA ARC ACC #26030 CBOW8.

38. (U) Oral History, Dr. Louis W. Tordella, inter­viewed by Robert W. Farley, 28 July 1990, OH-08-90,Center for Cryptologic History, 90.

39. (D) Press release and Executive Order"Establishing the President's Board of Consultants onForeign Intelligence Activities," 6 February 1956. NSAARC ACC #34187 CBPD47; Colonel A. J. Goodpaster,"Memorandum of Conference with the President, 20December 1956 - 3:00 PM," 20 December 1956. CCHSeries File, XVI.D.1.2.

40. (U) BG John F. Cassidy, Staff Director, "ThePresident's Board of Consultants on ForeignIntelligence Activities," 13 January 1956. NSA ARCACC #34187 CBPD47.

41. (D) BG John F. Cassidy, Staff Director, PBC­FlA, Memorandum for Captain E. W. Knepper, USN,Chief of Staff, Production, NSA, 7 March 1958. NSAARC ACC #34187 CBPD47.

42. (D) President's Board of Consultants onForeign Intelligence Activities, Report for thePresident, "Recommendations of the PBCFIA," 24October 1957. Eisenhower Presidential Library, NSCSeries, Subject Subseries, box: 7, file: President'sBoard - 2nd Rpt (1).

43. (D) A. J. Goodpaster, "Memorandum ofConference with the President, October 24, 1957, 8:30a.m.," 28 October 1957. Eisenhower PresidentialLibrary, White House Office, Office of the StaffSecretary, Alphabetical Subseries, box no. 6, file:board of Consultants [on Foreign IntelligenceActivities] (5).

44. (U) William A. Tidwell, Chairman, Ad HocCommittee, Memorandum for the Chairman,Intelligence Advisory Committee, "Report of the AdHoc Committee on Communications," 29 April 1958.Eisenhower Presidential Library, Subject Series,

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~

Alphabetical Subseries, box: 14-15, file: Preparationfor Intelligence Communications Test and Exercise.

45. (U) "Annex D, Points of Origin for CriticalIntelligence," SC 02305/58. Eisenhower PresidentialLibrary, Staff Secretary, Subject - Alpha, box: 15.

46. (U) Memorandum of the 378th NSA meeting,38 August 1958; Captain Arthur Enderlin, USN, Chief,Office of Telecommunications, Memorandum for theRecord, "NSCID #7, Action on the 'CRITICOMM'Plan," and insert "The CRITICOMM Plan," 27 August1958. NSA ARC ACC#10149 CBND73.

47. CU) Oral History, Dr. Louis Tordella, inter­viewed by Robert Farley, 28 July 1990, OH-08-90,Center for Cryptologic History, 22, 66.

48. (U) W. O. Baker, MEMORANDUM FOR DR. J.R. KILLIAN, JR., "Coordination of MilitaryCommunications Development with ParticularReference to the CRITICOMM System," 1 May 1959.Eisenhower Presidential Library, Subject Series,Alphabetical Subseries, box: 14-15, me: Preparationfor Intelligence Communications Test and Exercise.

49. (D) John E. Hull, Chairman, PBCFIA, Reportto the President, 12 August 1959. CCH SERIES FILE,XVI.D.1.2.

50. CU) Draft Memorandum For the President,"Transmission of Critical Intelligence," 19 January1959. Enclosure in Assistant Director, CurrentIntelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, MEMO­RANDUM FOR General Andrew J. Goodpaster,"Transmission of Critical Intelligence," 19 January1959. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

51. (U) Admiral Dorsey, "CRITICOMM Briefingfor The President's Board of Advisors on ForeignIntelligence Activities," 19 November 1959. NSA ARCACC# 43510.

52. CD) Capt. I. T. Mcdonald, USAF, Memorandumfor the Record, Memo Routing, 18 October 1954. NSAARC ACC #21479 CBJH52.

53. (U) Reuben B. Robertson, Jr., DeputySecretary of Defense, Memorandum for the Director,National Security Agency, "Project FREEHAND," 1October 1956. NSA ARC ACC #23666 CBOG51.

.. 54. (U) LTG John A. Samford, DIRNSA,Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense(Comptroller), "Project LIGHTNING," Serial: N2145,3 April 1957. NSA ARC ACC #34105 CBLG36.

55. CU) Minutes of the NSA Scientific AdvisoryBoard Meeting Held on 8 October 1956. NSA ARCACC #26093 CBOL56; Minutes of the NSA ScientificAdvisory Board Meeting Held on 9 October 1956. NSAARC ACC #28690 CBTKs7.

56. CU) Second Quarterly Briefing of the DeputySecretary of Defense, Presentation by General Erskine,1030, 2 August 1956. NSA ARC ACC #26097,CBNC62.

57. (U) NSA, "Progress in Management: ReportNo. 12, UGHTNING," November 1964, 1-9. NSA ARCACC #22251 CBJL73.

58. CU) "Report on Intelligence Activities,"Appendix I, 41-45.

59. CU) "Report on Intelligence Activities,"Appendix I, 48-49.

60. CU) Captain Allyn Cole, Jr., USN,Memorandum for the members of USCIB,"Presidential Action on Baker Panel Report," enclo­sure "Digest of Report," 13 February 1958. NSA ARCACC #44403N.

61. CU) Philip G. Strong, chairman, ELINT TaskForce, Memorandum for Chairman, USCIB, "Reportof the USCIB EUNT Task Force," 9 June 1958. NSAARC ACC #36348 CBNAI6.

62. CU) Colonel W. Shepard, USAF, Chief, Plansand Control Group in Production, disposition Form,"Recent USCIB Developments," PROD-042/S-4639,21 August 1958. NSA ARC ACC #35271 CBPD54.

63. CU) John S. D. Eisenhower, "Memorandum ofConference with the President, December 16, 1958 ­9:00 AM," 22 December 1958. CCH Series FileXVI.D.1.2.

64. (U) Memorandum, "Discussion at the SpecialMeeting held in the Cabinet Room of the White Housefollowing the 393rd NSC Meeting, Thursday, January15, 1959," 19 January 1959. Eisenhower PresidentialLibrary, Box 7.

65. (U) "Developments and Trends in theCOMINT and ELINT Fields during Fiscal Year 1960,"Annex to USIB-D-3.2/1O, 30 August 1960, enclosureto Allen Dulles, Director, CIA, Memorandum for theExecutive secretary National Security Council, "Reporton 'Developments and Trends in the COMINT andELINT Fields During Fiscal Year 1960,'" 31 August1960. Eisenhower Presidential Library.

t

•.

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:~. CD) John E. Hull, chairman, PBCFIA, report topresident, 24 May 1960. CCH SERIES FILE,0.1.2; John E. Hull, chairman, PBCFIA, report topresident,s January 1961. CCH SERIES FILE,-D.1.2. A handwritten marginal note states that theJIt was handed to President Kennedy as per;-lhower's instructions.

Cryptologic Quarterly

(UlIF'OtJ6.) Dr. Hatch is currently Technical Director of the Center for CryptologicHistory (CCH) and is also the NSA Historian. He has worked in the CCH since 1990.From October 1988 to February 1990, he was a Legislative Staff Officer in theNSA Legislative Affairs Office. Previously, Dr. Hatch served as a CongressionalFellow. He earned a B.A. degree in East Asian languages and literature and anM.A. in East Asian studies, both from Indiana University at Bloomington. Dr. Hatchholds a Ph.D. in international relations from American University.

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