Two Sides To Every Story:In Defense of Bridgestone/Firestone

Continued from Winter (Jan. 2001)By Dirk Gibson

TX h i

he controversy over the Bridgestone/Firestonetire recall of 2000 was a focus of media and popularattention during the summer, fall and winter of 2000.The tiremaker received considerable criticism, forthe recall in general and recall-related public rela-tions in particular. As Bridgestone/Firestone andFord Motor Company squared off, in the Congres-sional hearing room and the court of public opin-ion, and traded accusations of responsibility for theseries of tread separation accidents responsible fornearly 200 deaths in the US and abroad, only onething was clear. The public and media reaction toBridgestone/Firestone's recall and communicationpolicies was one of skepticism and disfavor.

I was among the critics. I was quoted in the WallSt. Journal as saying that "Firestone violated thebasic rules of a recall, and they're doing the sametoday" (Aeppel, September 6, 2000, AlO). In a sim-ilar vein, the Detroit Free Press included my state-ment, "The situation is very simitar to the Firestone

Dirk C. Gibson

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recall of 1978, except that I don't think the publicwill be as forgiving this time" (Bodipo-Memba,November 10, 2000, 2E).

Perhaps we were a bit hasty in our judgment ofthe contemporary Bridgestone/Firestone recall. Inour on-going research into this highly publicizedpublic relations controversy, three factors haveemerged that signal the desirability of reassessingour judgment of this recall. These three variablesare: 1) The Ford causal link, 2) The Goodyear 'silentrecall,' and 3) the intercultural communicationvariable. We will conclude this essay with a series ofsix lessons to be learned from the 2000 Bridge-stone/Firestone recall.

The Causal Role of the Ford ExplorerOne of the basic elements of the Bridgestone/

Firestone public position regarding the recall wasthe refusal to accept responsibility for the tire prob-lems. The Associated Press declared that "The chiefexecutive of Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. told attor-neys during an eight-hour deposition Monday thatthe company recalled 6.5 million tires in August forsafety purposes and that the decision did not meanthe company was admitting to any product defect"(October 9, 2000, 1). One day later, the WashingtonPost similarly noted, "One month after apologizingto Congress for the circumstances surrounding therecall of 6.5 million tires, the chief executive ofBridgestone/Firestone Inc. testified yesterday thathis apology didn't mean that the tiremaker was ad-mitting to defects in the tires linked to more than100 deaths" (Grimaldi, October 10, 2000, 1).

Masatoshi Ono, in a deposition, was asked ifBridgestone/Firestone denied being at fault in thetread separation accidents. He responded, "However,there are maybe outside causes that had caused theaccidents. Then, I wouldn't say we're responsiblefor those accidents" (Grimaldi, October 10, 2000, 1).

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On December 19, Bridgestone/Firestone con-cluded its internal probe into the causes of thetread separation blowouts. "We are convinced thatthe tire separations were not entirely to blame,even though they may have been one of the causesfor the accidents in which people were hurt orkilled," declared Bridgestone CEO Yoichiro Kaizakiat a Tokyo news conference (Schaefer, December21, 2000, 5). The Associated Press decided thatKaizaki "accepted partial responsibility for tire sep-arations linked to 148 deaths in the United States/'and it explained the factors identified by theBridgestone/Firestone internal investigation ascausal factors in the accidents: "In a report pub-lished by Bridgestone/Firestone on Tuesday, it citedfour causes for the tire shreddings: the shoulder de-sign of its 15-inch ATX tires, the unique way the

Perhaps we were a bit hastyin our judgment ofthe contemporary

Bridgestone/Firestone recall.

rubber was processed at its Decatur plant, and thelower inflation pressure and the higher load limitsrecommended by Ford for its Explorer sports-utilityvehicle" (Schaefer, December 21, 2000, 5).

The 'outside cause' alluded to by Ono is the FordExplorer. New Firestone President, John Lampe,noted that "Tires will fail, and do so for a numberof reasons. In most cases, a vehicle that experiencesa tire failure can be safely brought under control.However, we have seen an alarming number ofserious accidents from rollovers of the Explorerafter a tire failure" (Keating and Mayer, October 9,2000, 3).

A Washington Post analysis of national accidentstatistics, enhanced by comparison with detailedFlorida accident records, points an accusatory fin-ger at the Explorer: "A Washington Post analysis ofnational and Florida crash statistics shows, how-ever, that the Ford Explorer has a higher rate of tire-related accidents than other sports-utility vehicles,even when the popular SUV is equipped withGoodyear tires. The findings suggest that some-thing about the Explorer may be contributing tothe accidents, auto analysts said" (Keating andMayer, October 9, 2000, 1).

According to James Feli, former head of researchat the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-tion, the study provides "an indication that theremay be a factor with the Ford Explorer beyond thetire issue. It's a first indicator that they may have a

stability problem" (Keating and Mayer, October 9,2000, 1).

The Washington Post analysis pinpointed the Ex-plorer's culpability in rollover accidents. It foundthat "Explorer's higher fatality rate in blowout ac-cidents may be related to rollovers...the Explorerwas 13 percent more likely to roll than other com-pact SUVs, against which Ford likes to compare theExplorer's rollover record. The Explorer was 53 per-cent more likely than other compact SUVs to rollover when an equipment failure such as faultybrakes, bad tires or blowouts caused an accident"(Keating and Mayer, October 9, 2000, 1).

The Washington Post report alleged that the Ex-plorer was known by Ford to be a uniquely haz-ardous SUV, in terms of rollover tendencies:"According to a Ford document obtained by con-gressional investigators, the company's own analy-sis of rollovers after tire explosions in Venezuelafound the problem to be unique to the Explorer.'High incidence of vehicle roll over after a tire blowout or tread loss has not been detected for othervehicle brands,' the document said" (Keating andMayer, October 9, 2000, 3).

A Reuters analysis clearly summarized the mag-nitude of the Washington Posts findings: "Usingtwo different ways of measuring accident rates, theExplorer was either three or four times as likely asother SUVs to have a tire blowout contribute to anaccident, the Post said" (October 9, 2000, 2).

While Ford has steadfastly denied that the Ex-plorer has been an element in the tire problems,perhaps its corporate actions speak louder thanwords. There have been two recent recalls of theExplorer. A recall of 846,591 Explorers was an-nounced on December 2, 2000, "to replace faultyparts on the suspension system" (Pickler, December2, 2000, C4). Ten days later. Ford recalled 110,633Explorers and Mercury Mountaineers for a problemwith the speed limitation device ("Ford Recalls Too-Fast SUVs," December 12. 2000, C4).

The issue of appropriate tire pressure enters theequation, as well. Bridgestone/Firestone recom-mends that tires be inflated to 30 psi, but Ford rec-ommended inflation to only 26 psi, to improvehandling. Then, well into the recall, "While notconceding any mistakes. Ford last Friday an-nounced it was raising its recommended tire pres-sure to 30 psi" (Zagorin, October 2, 2000, 59).

The Goodyear 'Silent Recall'When the Los Angeles Times accused Goodyear of

conducting a 'silent recall,' on November 7, that wasthe best news possible for beleaguered Bridge-stone/Firestone. Attention was diverted fromBridgestone/Firestone's tire quality problems, andwas focused on Goodyear instead.

Spring 2001 19

The lead paragraph of the LA Times piece told thetale, "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. for more thanfour years has been quietly replacing thousands offailed tires fitted on vans, light trucks and sports-utility vehicles and writing checks to customers,but only for those who complain, according to tiredealers and consumers. Safety advocates and plain-tiff attorneys say the Akron, Ohio, tire maker is en-gaged in a controversial practice known as a 'silentrecall' and placing thousands of drivers and pas-sengers at risk by not declaring a full public recall"(Maharaj, November 7, 2000, 1).

The Associated Press noted the LA Times allega-tions, and Coodyear's response: "Goodyear Tire &Rubber Co. has been quietly offering free replace-ments for thousands of tires in a practice known asa 'silent recall,' the Los Angeles Times reported Tues-day. Goodyear acknowledged last month that treadseparation involving its 16-inch Load Range Elight-truck tires have been linked to 120 injuriesand 15 deaths. Company officials said a recall was-n't necessary because it found no defects in thetires" (November 7, 2000, 1).

Goodyear denied the 'silent recall' accusation.The same day, CNNfn noted the Goodyear corpo-rate response, "Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ac-knowledged Tuesday it has had problems withsome of its 16-inch tires but denied a Los AngelesTimes report that it was conducting what the news-paper called a 'silent recall' (November 7, 2000, 1).

Interestingly, Goodyear had issued a somewhatvague, general defense of its 16-inch tires on Octo-ber 25, about two weeks prior to the LA Times ac-cusations. Joseph M. Gingo, Senior Vice Presidentfor Technology & Global Products Planning, as-serted that "There have been misleading media re-ports in print and on the air regarding Goodyearlight commercial tire applications, and their al-leged role in accidents across the country that haveresulted in either serious injury or fatalities" (October25, 2000, 1).

NHTSA was not swayed by Goodyear blanket re-assurances, and "the federal government opened apreliminary investigation Tuesday into Goodyearlight truck tires that have been linked to 15 deathsin accidents involving tread separation, similar tothe problem with Firestone tires being recallednationwide." According to NHTSA statistics, therehave been 37 complaints about Goodyear tire treadseparation, including 31 reported crashes involving129 injuries in addition to the deaths (Pickier,November 22, 2000, B7).

If Goodyear tires have the same problems as therecalled Firestone tires, clearly Bridgestone/Fire-stone is not uniquely culpable in any way. In fact,one can credit them with their willingness topublicly recall defective Firestone tires, whereas

Goodyear may have chosen a clandestine recallprogram resulting in suboptimal public protection.

The Intercultural Communication VariableIt might be unwise for Americans to apply West-

ern standards of judgment to Japanese public rela-tions. We run the risk of lapsing into ethnocentriccriticism, where irrelevant and culturally-inappro-priate criteria are used and negative results are vir-tually preordained. Two sets of salient interculturalcommunication variables can be identified: cul-tural differences, and public relations differences.

Japanese/American Cultural DifferencesOne basic aspect of culture used by scholars to

categorize and analyze differences involves individ-ualism vs. collectivism. For definitional purposes,individualistic societies prize the abilities andrights of individuals, while in collectivist culturesthe group is what matters most.

The Japanese culture is widely considered to beprimarily collectivist in nature. The Japanese worklong hours and spend relatively little leisure timecompared to Americans, for example. In the US, in-dividualism is a cardinal, fundamental tenet of theAmerican way of life.

Japanese/American Public Relations DifferencesI described Japanese public relations recently, in

a 1999 PRQ piece. Without repeating that analysis,but making use of parts of it for the present analy-sis, it is possible to identify four sets of differencesbetween Japanese and American public relations.These systemic idiosyncrasies may have resulted ininevitable public relations failure for a Japaneseleadership contending with a crisis in the US. Thesefour differences include; 1) Different public relationstradition, 2) Media relations differences, 3) Crisismanagement differences, and 4) Different publicrelations strategies.

Japan has a far more limited tradition of publicrelations practice than many Western nations. Be-cause of the collectivist nature of the Japanese societyand its ethnic homogeneity, public reiations as anorganizational function failed to develop as early asit did in other countries.

Media relations differs substantially betweenJapan and the US. In Japan, there are institutionscalled 'press clubs,' as fully described in the afore-mentioned PRQ article and other published ac-counts of Japanese public relations. These pressclubs serve as a means to restrict Japanese (and for-eign) media coverage of events in Japan.

American media relations, on the other hand, isalmost completely decentralized and informal.There is a variety of models of American media re-

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lations, ranging from docile, source-coopted inter-actions to adversary relationships characterized byrancor and information restriction.

Crisis public relations differs in Japan, whencompared to the American model. Although thereis a vast and not entirely consistent literature onAmerican crisis management and public relations,it is generally agreed that a relatively open com-munication style is preferable, and that it is neces-sary for the CEO or other ranking official toapologize, take responsibility, and explain things tothe satisfaction of all salient stakeholders.

This is not the norm in Japan, where a less ag-gressive media does not force organizational re-sponses. The Bridgestone/Firestone corporate recallpublic stance typified the non-confrontational,subtle, low-key Japanese: "Bridgestone's overallstrategy seems to be a dogged one of hunkeringdown and waiting for the cloud to blow over. Such

Crisis public relationsdiffers in Japan,

when compared tothe American model.

behavior is the norm in Japan, where few managersare comfortable dealing with the press and in-vestors" (Kunii and Foust, September 18, 2000, 43).

Eisenberg also noted the differences betweenAmerican and Japanese crisis management theoryand practice, as manifested in the Bridgestone/Fire-stone recall, "For effective crisis management,swift, decisive action, not to mention an appropri-ate level of contrition, is the name of the gametoday. Firestone has seemed slow and unrespon-sive, a legacy, perhaps, of its insular parent com-pany in Japan, where consumers have few rightsand product liability lawsuits hardly exist" (Septem-ber 18, 2000, 39).

A Wall St. loumal investigation of the Bridge-stone/Firestone recall revealed this conclusion: "In-deed, another reason for the silence at Bridgestoneheadquarters is that the company is feeling no pub-lic pressure in Japan over the recall. The Japanesepress has shown scant interest in the story, as therehave been no reports of Japanese dying in acci-dents, and the scope of the recall here was tiny"(Zaun and Dvorak, September 5, 2000, A16).

"The Japanese don't understand the value of PR,"a US executive was quoted by Kunii and Foust assaying (September 18, 2000, 43). That might be abit ethnocentric; what is true is that the Bridge-stone/Firestone recall crisis public relations seems

to be in line with Japanese public relations and cul-tural norms, not those of Americans engaged incriticism of the Japanese firm's behavior.

A fourth, and final, major difference in Japaneseand American public relations can be identified:basic public relations strategy differs considerably.In the US, basic public relations strategy calls forsymbolic organizational responses to recalls andother crises. This symbolic response is frequentlyrhetorical in nature, and it inevitably uses commu-nication to advance its interests.

In Japan, 'laying low' is considered an honorable,face-saving, nonconfrontational solution to publiccontroversy. As Eisenberg explained, "ParentBridgestone's CEO Yoichiro Kaizaki, who gained atough-guy reputation in shaping the company'sAmerican strategy, has been all but invisible. Hemay be practicing what the Japanese call fugenjikko- no words, only actions - but silence is deafeninghere" (September 18, 2000, 39).

The Wall St lournal study of the Bridgestone/Fire-stone recall suggested, "In Japan, Bridgestone hassaid little about the matter. It has held just onenews conference on the recall, on the day after itwas announced. Otherwise, the company has con-fined its remarks to terse written statements" (Zaunand Dvorak, September 5, 2000, A16).

Lessons to Be Learned From the2000 Bridgestone/Firestone Recall

There are six fundamental lessons we might gleanfrom the unfortunate experience of Bridgestone/Firestone, during the 2000 recall of 6.5 milliontires. These six lessons include: 1) Be aware of in-tercultural variables, 2) American recalls require ag-gressive media relations, 3) The US recall regulatorysystems require open communication, 4) Proactivepublic relations is necessary, 5) Rapid media andpublic judgment requires recall 'first strike' tactics,and 6) A variety of perspectives is usually available.

Be Aware of Intercultural VariablesIt is vital, in international and/or intercultural

interactions, that all parties dispense with ethno-centric normative preconceptions and remain cog-nizant of potential intercultural misunderstandings.It is only human for us to perceive reality and in-teract with others from our own background, butthat background should not limit our understand-ing of others or our interactions with them.

Aggressive Media Relations Is NecessaryIn the US, where an aggressive media will ferret

out any covered-up angle of a recall, it is necessaryto take the initiative and use aggressive media rela-tions tactics. This may disarm, and will certainly

Spring 2001 21

defuse, media criticism of the recalled if the recalleris perceived as proactive and open.

US Regulatory SystemsRequire Open Communication

Federal regulatory agencies with recall jurisdic-tion, like NHTSA, the Consumer Product SafetyCommission, the Food and Drug Administration,and others, specify recalling firms' communicationresponsibilities. Regulations specify communica-tion tactics and messages, and even suggest appro-priate communication media. The bottom line -recallers must be specific about dangers posed byproducts, and must communicate those dangerseffectively to salient publics.

Proactive Public Relations is NecessaryLimited research specifically on recalls supports

extensive research on mass communication in gen-eral - it is easier to maintain a pre-existing image inthe event of a recall than it is to create a favorableimage during a recall event. A company cannotwait until a recall strikes, then conduct the recallwhile simultaneously trying to create favorablemedia relations and general public relations. Thatis 'old-school PR,' and it does not work anymore.

Rapid Public/Media JudgmentRequires 'First Strike' Tactics

People tend to make up their minds early, in theproverbial rush to judgment, and the media catersto this inclination towards rapidity through pre-mature speculation and the industry-wide coveted'scoop' over the competition. To take advantage ofthis human and journalistic tendency, recailersshould not wait for news developments, but shouldactively seek to fashion that media agenda throughinformation dissemination. (S)he who hesitates istruly lost.

A Variety of Perspectives is AvailableReality is complex. There are almost always sev-

eral competing explanations of reality, based ondifferences in perceptions, perceived stake, framesof reference, and other personal and interpersonalfactors. The public relations representative, work-ing within a recaller's approved boundaries, mustselect public positions based on his/her assessmentof the situational variables.

Numbers often prove useful. Plaintiff's attorneysare fond of the number 148, the estimated numberof American deaths linked to the recalled Firestonetires. Other important numbers purportedlydemonstrate a disproportionate number of acci-dents involving Firestone tires.

Numbers can defend Bridgestone/Firestone, too.For instance. Harper's Index recently noted that the"Percentage of Americans killed by faulty auto partsin the 1990s who were killed by Firestone tires: 0.1"(November, 2000, 13).

Another quantitative perspective further dimin-ishes the role of tires in the current Firestone tiresafety fracas. According to the Washington Poststudy, "In the national data. The Post identified2,042 fatal SUV accidents from those model years,including 377 Explorers that could be tracked totheir manufacturing plant by the VIN. There were53 tire-related accidents. In the Florida data. ThePost identified 25,617 SUV accidents from thosemodel years, including 6,009 Explorers linked totheir manufacturing plant. There were 83 tire-related accidents" (Keating, October 9, 2000, 1). Inother words, there is a large number of SUV acci-dents, but relatively few involve the Ford Explorer,and very few of the accidents involve tire failures.

ConclusionWas the Bridgestone/Firestone recall of 2000 a

public relations debacle, as many have contended?Or, was it a pragmatic series of management deci-sions predicated on differing ideas of what was bestfor the company, and heavily influenced by collec-tivist values and intercultural variables?

If it turns out that the Firestone tires in questionwere inherently fine, but that their use on Explor-ers caused most of the rollover fatalities, will we re-member that Bridgestone/Firestone executivesstaunchly refused to take responsibility? If a con-fluence of factors, including hot and humidweather, underinflation, use on vehicles with un-stable aerodynamics, and a tire design defect, com-bined to cause the accidents, how shall weapportion blame and assign legal responsibility?Or, are these complex sets of causes too demandingfor a sound-bite seeking, issue-simplifying, 'story'-driven media to understand and communicate?Only time will tell. PR9References available on request to PRQ,Dirk C. Gibson, Ph.D. is an associate professor in theDepartment of Communication and Journalism at theUniversity of New Mexico, in addition to product recall, hismain research interests include Hispanic advertising,Japanese public relations, litigation public relations, publicrelations education, and public information. He was invited bythe Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1998 to makea presentation to the CPSC National Forum on ImprovingRecall Effectiveness, and he recently completed a two-vol-ume, 460-page report on the U. S. Department of Agriculturerecall policies, performed at that agency's request. Thoseinterested in teaming more atx}ut these recall researchactivities are invited to examine the website of The ProductRecall Research Group, at www.unm.edu/dirkcgib.

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