two objections to non- cognitivism michael lacewing [email protected]

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Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy .co.uk

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Page 1: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Two objections to non-cognitivism

Michael [email protected].

uk

Page 2: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism

• What are we doing when we make moral judgments?

• Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’– Aim to describe how the world is– Can be true or false– Express beliefs that the claim is true

• Non-cognitivism: moral judgments– Do not aim to describe the world– Cannot be true or false– Express attitudes towards the world

Page 3: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

The authority of morality

• If there is no objective moral truth, then does ‘anything go’? What is the authority of morality?– If morality is subjective, then is it anything

more than a matter of taste?• Reply: this is a misunderstanding

– Living as though there are no moral values is itself a kind of choice, an immoral one

– Non-cognitivism does not entail that we should stop having moral feelings!

Page 4: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Condemning immorality

• But can we justify interfering with others’ behaviour because their actions interfere with our feelings?

• Reply: our feelings isn’t the reason we interfere, the cruelty (or whatever) is

• But taking cruelty as a reason to interfere is itself subjective

Page 5: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Moral progress

• If there is no moral reality, then our moral beliefs or feelings cannot become better or worse.– They may have changed, but change

is not progress if there is no truth.• Reply: people’s views can change

for the better in non-moral ways, e.g. become more informed or rational (consistent or coherent).

Page 6: Two objections to non- cognitivism Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

Moral progress

• Reply 2: people’s views can become better in moral ways:– If we disapprove of past moral codes

and approve of our own moral code, then we will say that we have made moral progress.

• Moral progress is relative to a particular point of view – but this is just the usual problem of moral disagreement.