tussie and tuozzo

8/6/2019 Tussie and Tuozzo

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Opportunities and Constraintsfor Civil Society Participation inMultilateral Lending Operations:

Lessons from Latin America......

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Diana Tussie and Maria Fernanda TuozzoAt the dawn of a new century, the international system is witnessingincreasing intervention by nongovernmental actors in national and globalpolicy processes. The expanding activism of domestic and internationalcivic actors in Latin America signals the beginning of a new phase of politics in the region. Democratization and liberalization in the developingworld have spurred the rediscovery of civil society and its capacity to provide services that were previously supplied by the state. Parallel to thiscourse of events, and partly as a result of these changes, the World Bankand the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) have taken up a refonnagenda that has furthered civil society consultation and participation. Theiroperations now increasingly include the application of mechanisms toinvolve NGOs and grassroots organizations. This is a welcome development since it engenders more legitimate and sustainable policy processes,yet at the same time it challenges the standard Bank tendency to design orimplement policies in a top-down fashion. The involvement of civil societyorganizations in matters of public policy has become a source of tension forboth governments and the multilateral development banks (MDBs).

This scenario is reshaping the boundaries of domestic and internationalpolitics, realigning the actors involved, and stimulating the emergence ofnew coalitions. New cleavages now cut across Latin America, characterizedby rising internal inequalities instead of the traditional international-domestic divide. On one hand, Latin American governments, businesses, bureaucracies , and the international financial institutions have rallied together tosupport neoliberal economic refonns. On the other, civil society organizations are increasingly sharing their concerns and strategies with international networks. In this chapter we aim to explore the extent to which the par


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ticipatory refonns of the MDBs have affected the relationship between governments and civil society in Latin America. We analyze the opportunitiesand constraints that these changes provide for civil society participation insecond generation refonns , and we look at if and how participatory practices have influenced the nature of policy processes in the region. Weattempt to answer the question , Is participation, however weak, alteringthese processes and the wider relationship between governments and civilsociety in order to consolidate more democratic patterns of decisionmaking?The analysis is divided into three sections and draws from five countrystudies in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico , and Peru.The first section explores the evolving nature of the relationships betweenMDBs and governments and describes the background against whichrefonns have been implemented. The second part of the chapter analyzesparticipatory practices in the MDBs as well as their most important results.The third section studies the impact of these refonns on the relationshipsamong governments, MDBs, and civil society in the region, highlightingboth positive and negative effects and analyzing the opportunities and constraints they generate for new and traditional social actors.

MOBs and Governments: A Changing RelationshipThe presence of the World Bank and the Inter-American DevelopmentBank in Latin America has expanded over the last ten years, and their roleshave changed substantially. The volume of lending is no longer the sole oreven most important determinant of their relevance (Culpeper 1997).Financial flows from the MDBs have increased , but so have policy recommendations that have greatly influenced the nature of the policy processesundertaken in the region. The MDBs have become key trendsetters, notonly in the area of macroeconomic policy but in health, education, labormarket refonns, and governance, that is, in the so-called second generationrefonns.Since new loans are directed at modifying health, education , and judicial systems, the refonns that go with them touch on values and traditionsthat are deeply entrenched in each society. Despite the intrusiveness ofthese new refonns , the recommendations of the MDBs seem to convergewith the policies of borrowing countries. For governments, this has presented new challenges at the domestic level where support was needed toenforce policy changes . "Economic diplomacy" was used to persuade business groups to buy into the need to transfonn the economy. By the early1990s, the refonns were strongly supported by technocratic elites and business groups but were rejected to the same extent by large sectors of civil

Opportunities and Constraints 107

society and opposition parties . The political opposition has repeatedly criticized the damaging effects of structural adjus tment programs (SAPs) on thepoorest and most vulnerable groups and has cautioned against the impact ofwidening inequality. Growing levels of poverty, inequality, and exclusionhave obliged governments to implement compensatory policies (such associal safety nets) to make the economic model politically sustainable. Aspart of these programs, MDBs and governments are increasing the volumeof social and poverty alleviation programs and promoting cooperation withcivil society organizations to provide social services. This is the context inwhich new mandates of transparency, participation, and accountability havebeen introduced into the lending strategies of the MDBs, gradually changing the nature of their operations in the region.

What Role for Civil Society Participation in the MOBs?Civil society engagement with the MDBs is an important component of therefonns these institutions are undergoing in order to become more transparent, participatory, and accountable . These refonns have been introduced asa result of lobbying by Northern civil society organizations and the weakperfonnance of their respective portfolios (Nelson 1997 and 2000).2 Publicinfonnation offices and web sites have been set up to provide data in compliance with disclosure policies . Participatory mechanisms have been partially introduced into bank lending portfolios, and accountability is increasingly enforced through the creation of mechanisms such as the World BankInspection Panel and the Independent Investigation Mechanism in the IDB.

This internal refonn agenda has furthered civil society intervention inMDB operations by introducing participatory mechanisms into the designand implementation of projects. Participation improves delivery but alsostrengthens monitoring and transparency. I f participatory mechanisms canbe introduced into decisionmaking processes, a new model of public policyfonnulation and implementation could emerge. Hence , participatory mechanisms provide a window for civil society involvement in decisionmaking.However, civil society participation is not always seen as desirable. At thevery least, the record is uneven. Involvement is highly restricted, both intern1S of the circumstances in which participation is applied and in tenns ofwho is invited to participate. The MDBs' main areas of action in a countryinvolve two different levels of decisionmaking. Strategic decisions arerelated to the general plans and policies of the MDB s, while operationaldecisions are related to their programs and projects.

Strategic decisions are translated into the country assistance strategy(CAS) in the World Bank and the country programming paper in the IDB.These documents constitute the lending strategies that MDBs fonnulate for


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a country for a certain period of time, and they set out the relevant budgetary implications. They include repOlts on the economic and political performance of the country, a risk investment analysis , and an assessment ofthe priority lending areas set by each MDB . The documents are discussedwidely with governments but are ultimately drawn up by the multilateralinstitutions. The IDB considers the country programming paper an internaldocument , and therefore no consultation is deemed necessary. The WorldBank used to follow a similar approach with the CAS but has recentlychanged its policy to include limited civil society participation, tested in afew countries in Latin America to assess the impact of this innovation.

At the operational level, a distinction can be made between re form oradjustm ent programs and compensatory programs. The first category ismainly directed at sectoral reforms and at modifying regulations and publicsector management; the second is largely focused on social assistance.Patterns of civil society involvement depend on the character of the loan inquestion. MDB portfolios reveal that participation becomes more and morerestricted as one moves from operations to decisionmaking. Neither theWorld Bank nor the Inter-American Development Bank have binding commitments for the application of participatory mechanisms. The officialreports on good practices include only the quality of recommendations(World Bank 1998). Consultation is obligatory only in certain areas wherevisible negative impacts on affected groups must be avoided, such as in theresettlement of communities and indigenous peoples. 3 In all other areas,participation is introduced in a selective and ad hoc fashion, and MDBsintroduce different degrees of participation at different levels of policyimplementation and decisionmaking. As Table 8.1 shows, the application ofparticipatory mechanisms is concentrated in operational decisionmakingwhere compensatory programs prevail, in contrast to a lack of participationin general strategies such as the CAS .

In most Latin American countries, decisionmaking in general strategiesis restricted to the government and the MDBs , though the World Bank hasshown more flexibility. The Brazilian experience provides a particularlyinteresting case. Even though the Brazilian government and the MDBs didnot support the opening of the CAS and the country programming paper,both of these general strategies became public. Civil society organizations(acting through a network that monitors MDB operations) were successfulin pushing through the publication of the strategy documents as a result ofjoint action with the Brazilian Congress-the first time that these two setsof actors had collaborated in challenging the restricted nature of the negotiations between the executive branch of government and the MDBs.4 Thisexperience contrasts distinctly from the involvement of civil society inother participatory experiences in the region.

At the end of 1996 the World Bank started a consultation process for

Opportunities and Constraints Table 8.1 Mechanisms for Civil Society Participation in MOBs

Degree and Nature ofActors Involved ParticipationWorld Bank IDB World Bank IDB

Strategicdecisionmaking: Chiefly MDBsand OnJy limitedconsultation Noconsultationgovernments was conducted with civil(executive) with selected society was

NGOsand carried out.Generalstrategies The World Bankhas carried out The IDB andgovernments other grassrootsorganizations.a few pilot (executive)"participatory " Civil societyexperiences in has had nothe drafting of involvementthe country in decision-assistance making .strategy (CAS )where selectedNGOs (peasantorganizations.

indigenou speoples) wereinvited topart ic ipate.

Operationaldecision-making:Reform/ Governments Governments Consultation Consultationadjustment and MDBs and MDBs with civil with civilprograms society is society isalmost almostnonexistent nonexistentCompensatory Governments, Governments, Participation Participationprograms MDBs. primary MDBs, primary was mainly was mainlystakeholders, stakeholders, focused on the focused on theand technical and technical diagnosis of diagnosis ofNGOs NGOs needs and needs andimplementation implementa

of projects. tion ofprojects.

the formulation of a new CAS in Peru. The Peruvian government consentedto this process but declined to participate . Consultation workshops weredecentralized and involved NGOs, indigenous organizations, peasantorganizations , the Association of Municipalities of Peru , and other urbansocial associations dedicated to the distribution of food to the poor.


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However, publication of the CAS continues to depend on the political deci sions of the national government, and the contents of the final documentwere never released . It is therefore not possible to verify the extent towhich the concerns of civil society were taken into account (Campod6nico1999).

In Colombia, also in 1996, the World Bank promoted civil society participation in the design of the CAS for the first time. During this processthe CAS went through three reviews (within the Bank, by the Colombiangovernment , a nd by civil society). Of the 140 people invited to attend thecivil society workshop , 60 attended, including representatives from NOOs ,academia, the private sector, and the church, but not from trade unions .Even though the contribution of civil society was valued , and the documentwas later published and translated into Spanish, it was clear that the WorldBank and the government would continue to be the most important actorsin the formulation of the document (Ahumada 1999).

In Argentina for example, an ex post debate was conducted on thecountry assistance strategy approved for the 1997-1999 period, so amendments were foreclosed. Moreover, only the parts of the document (containing references to social assistance funding) were made available for debate .

In adjustment programs the pattern is the same: Policies and reformsare oriented to improve the efficiency of services , reduce the role of thestate, and decentralize provision, but they rarely involve active participation by stakeholders . Consultation with civil society organizations is limited to surveys of client preferences and satisfaction with services . As severalcases in Latin America have shown (especially Argentina , Brazil ,Colombia, and Mexico), civil society groups whose interests are endangered by the reforms are usually excluded.s In cases such as health sectorreform, workers' organizations and trade unions constitute the civil societygroups most affected. Though not invited to participate, many of theseorganizations have successfully mobilized resources and influence to forcegovernments to modify the content of the reforms.

By contrast, compensatory programs usually include civil society participation. These projects are essentially social assistance loans directed atalleviating the most pressing needs of vulnerable groups. Both the IDB andthe World Bank have directed an increasing volume of their portfolios tosocial assistance programs. For example, Program a Materno Infantil (inArgentina) combines policy-based lending and social assistance , but civilsociety involvement takes place only in the compensatory portion of theloans. Other social assistance loans such as the Fondo Participativo deInversi6n Social (in Argentina), Social Development Fund (FOCONDES,in Peru), and the Facilidad de Financiamiento para Pequefios Proyectospara Orupos Marginados (in Mexico) also illustrate the effective and systematic application of participatory mechanisms, though the degree and

Opportunities and Constraints I I I

intensity of participation may differ from one to another. Even in compensatory loans, participation is present only in certain phases of the projectcycle. Diagnosis and identification usually involve major consultation withprimary stakeholders and NOOs. The design of the project, however, isusually left in the hands of the MDBs and governments who decide andnegotiate the details of the loan.

These experiences show that participatory mechanisms are not implemented in key aspects of MDB portfolios. The disparity in implementingparticipatory mechanisms is strongly related to the political context ofloans. The World Bank fosters the involvement and participation of citizensand NOOs when it considers it appropriate and likely to be approved bygovernment (World Bank 1991). Oiven that new areas of intervention bythe MDBs are increasingly linked to the reform programs of governments,participation is not usually welcome. Reforms are generally approved bythe executive branch of government through decrees, to avoid resistance incongresses and opposition by civil society. MDBs rarely object to theseprocedures , given that most negotiations between MDBs and governmentshave traditionally been settled directly with the respective executivebranches, affording a degree of discretion valued by both sides.

The commitments of the MDBs to participation and transparency areconstrained not only by the character and cycle of the loan concerned butalso by the pivotal role that macroeconomic priorities occupy in their portfolios. Participation and accountability seem to wane when economic crisesemerge. Both the Mexican crisis of 1995 and the Brazilian monetary deval uation of 1999 proved that macroeconomic goals remain the primary concern of MDBs in the region. In many country strategies, commitments weremodified without any consultation in order to prioritize support for balanceof payments over social programs or governance . This was the case inArgentina, Brazil, and Peru, where commitments already undertaken werecanceled or rescheduled to meet the economic urgencies unleashed by theeffects of the crisis.

Another set of impediments to full implementation of participatorymechanisms lies in the fact that operational changes are mostly applied inregional and country offices, where NOO pressure on MDBs is generallyweaker. Thus, the implementation of these mechanisms is very uneven anddepends on factors such as staff commitment to participatory practices , andon the capabilities of local civil society organizations to lobby and influence the policies and operations of the banks. In short, several factors havecontributed to the fragmented implementation of participatory practices inthe region. The selective application of participatory mechanisms limitsany possible spillover effects in other areas and at other levels of decisionmaking. This tends to create pockets of participation that are not easilyreplicated elsewhere.6 However, as the MDBs become more active domes


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tic actors in all spheres of politics, observers may see a new pattern ofinteraction emerging among MOBs, governments, and civil society.

MOBs, Governments, and Civil Society: Ne w Patterns of Interaction

The involvement of MDBs in new areas of policy-based lending, as well astheir increasing engagement with civil society, has created new tensions intheir operations. The nature of second-generation reforms requires thatthose affected be involved in design and implementation in order toimprove results and make the reforms more legitimate and sustainable.However, the inclusion of civil society challenges the authority traditionally exercised by the MOBs, since these groups generally resist modelsimposed from above and demand a greater degree of control over the management of resources and the direction of development. This tension fostersan ambiguous strategy toward participation, characterized by the discretionary application of these mechanisms and the discretionary selection ofthe organizations invited to participate. MOBs show a tendency to fragmentthe dialogue, and to take NGOs as a proxy for civil society (Nelson 2000).The World Bank handbook on NGO law, the Bank's annual reports onNGO operational collaboration, and maintenance of a joint NGO-WorldBank Committee suggest the privileged standing given to these organizations (Nelson 2000). Other forms of collective action with a long-standingpresence in the region-such as trade unions and public interest groupsare usually excluded. This raises questions of legitimacy and representation.

NGOs appeal to the MOBs because they are attracted by the featuresthat characterize such organizations-the way in which this particular manner of organizing collective action replicates self-regulation, individualism,and voluntarism-all principles embedded in the free-market system.However, it is highly problematic to privilege this kind of social organization in Latin America, where for historical reasons the culture of individualism, freedom of association, and entrepeneurship has always been weak(Pearce 1998). The MOBs' interest in domestic laws that foster the formation of new NGOs can be seen as a contribution to reconfiguring state-society relations, but this model of organization is alien to the political cultureof the region. The World Bank works with a notion of civil society that ismore akin to the Anglo-Saxon experience than that prevailing in LatinAmerica for centuries, a view that puts individual interest ahead of notionsof the public good or collective rights. In this view, civil society is comprised of different individuals banding together with specific shared interests, often to avoid encroachment by the state. The lOB is developing a


more timid bu t less antis tate concep t of civil society in which governmentsremain at the core of its strategies.

The different governance structures and corporate cultures of eachMOB shape their pursuit of the participatory paradigm (Casaburi andTussie 1997). Therefore, relations with civil society organizations evolve indifferent ways. The World Bank actively promotes the strengthening andparticipation of civil society, assuming that increasing civil society involvement and the demands that citizens make will, over time, improve the quality of governance. In contrast, the lOB concentrates on relationships withcivil society from the government's perspective, addressing civil societyinvolvement as part of the agenda of state modernization'? While the WorldBank sidesteps governments by establishing a more direct relationship withcivil society and building a constituency of its own, the IDB responds firstand foremost to its member states. These differences flow through MOBstrategies and policies, but at the project level the results are quite similar.

Civil society organizations, and particularly NGOs, have also modifiedtheir strategies in response to MOB reforms. Although widespread knowledge of new practices is confined to a small number of organizations,changes in the attitude of NGOs are widespread. One general shift in theregion has been to use the reforms as a means to influence or oppose government policies. The reforms offer a platform that civil society can use toits advantage. Effectiveness and impact, however, depend on the politics ofthe context and the capacity of government to resist, ignore, or coopt theseinitiatives. Perhaps the most salient case here is Mexico, where civil society organizations have used MOB projects to claim their right to participatein politics. Together with the Mexican Congress they have used the newmandates as an instrument to force a more general opening in the policiesof government (Fernandez and Adelson 2000). Even though these strategiesare still incipient and alliances have not yet coalesced, room for maneuveris slowly being expanded.

Another example comes from ProHuerta, a social and microfinanceprogram in Argentina. The Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS),an NGO active on human rights issues, has used the World Bank'sInspection Panel to partially block the Argentine government's attempt toarbitrarily dispose of funds committed to social objectives throughProHuerta.8 CELS filed a claim through the Inspection Panel and exertedenough pressure to force the government to reverse its decision. At thesame time, it also forced the World Bank to stand by its agreement andguarantee delivery of the allotted funds. This proved to be a landmark case,since the Inspection Panel had not dealt with social funds before. The claimby CELS could also set a precedent in that it widens the range of issuesreviewed by the panel and provides new avenues of action for civil societydemands. Originally, the Inspection Panel was created to provide greater


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transparency and accountability in World Bank operations as well as to protect those harmed by projects. However, through the claim processlaunched around PRO HUERTA, CELS was able to turn passive projectbeneficiaries into an active social group. Furthermore, the CELS claim hasturned loan contracts and conditionalities into instruments that can be usedto activate demands and empower previously silent voices.

New mechanisms for civil society involvement bring significantopportunities, but the risks that go with them must also be evaluated.Indirect pressure is an expedient that may further weaken the internal structures of accountability that have long been eroded in the region as a resultof long periods of dictatorship. Civil society groups must maintain a delicate balance between external and internal strategies to enforce accountability in government. The danger of focusing overmuch on MDB mechanisms to the detriment of domestic avenues for participation is real andmust be addressed. Brazil may be an exception to this problem. Here, civilsociety networks have made strenuous efforts to combine forces, not onlywith trade unions and grassroots movements but also with political parties,to monitor and control the executive's dealings with the international financial institutions. A key feature of this relationship has been the active roleplayed by the Brazilian Congress, which is absent from the scene in almostall other countries in the region. The endeavors of Brazilian groups to redirect demands to the domestic political level in order to make governmentsresponsible for their actions offer important lessons for the future (Vianna2000).

The slow transformation of the MDBs poses additional risks .Underpinning the new approach to civil society is the assumption withingovernments and MDBs that NGOs should be vehicles for channelingincreasing volumes of foreign aid. This view perceives NGOs as agenciesthat can alleviate the effects of economic adjustment on vulnerable groupsand contribute to implementing postadjustment recovery policies in orderto reduce poverty, develop human resources, and protect the environment.The danger is that this conception not only reduces state responsibilitiesdrastically but also bestows a predetermined role on NGOs in policy development. The role of NGOs as contractors to official programs has grownsignificantly in the last few years in Latin America, carrying real risks thatNGOs might become the implementers of donor policies (Smillie 1995;Hulme and Edwards 1997). The arbitrary use of funds, especially by localgovernments, has produced a wave of new NGOs and in some cases hasfostered new patterns of old practices of patronage (Tussie 1997). Thereliance of Latin American NGOs on government agendas and resourcescan also be extended to Northern donors. As Pearce (1997: 261) points out,dependence on external funding often results in organizations becoming

Opportunities and Constraints 1IS

"accountable to their funders rather than beneficiaries, reflecting their fun der's agenda rather than setting their own. " This is especially true in LatinAmerica where NGOs face severe funding difficulties, stringent budgetcuts, and weaknesses in human resources. In situations of high financialvulnerability like this, funding can influence not only the issues addressedby NGOs but also the precedence given to local and regional priorities.

High levels of dependency do not stem solely from funding issues. Theinfluence exercised by transnational NGO coalitions as a result of greatercommunication and networking resources is also important. NorthernNGOs (especially those based in Washington, D .C .) have considerableinfluence on civil society in Latin America. Many benefits have come fromthis interaction- international alliances have allowed Southern NGOs togain more resources, expertise, and information about multilateral institutions as well as greater knowledge of their operations. They have alsoenabled joint action and advocacy, as in the IDB-funded highway project inBelize wherein local civil society groups, working with Washington-basedNGOs, were able to the remove the project from the World Bank's pipeline,gaining valuable time to renegotiate the conditions of the loan (Nelson2000). However, NGO coalitions also tend to reproduce the hegemony ofthe global North. Northern NGOs often steer the direction of the coalition,partly because they control the management of resources but also becausethey have more influence over the definition of the campaign s goals andagenda (Vi anna 2000).

As Mansbach and Vasquez (1980: 97) have pointed out , "Access to asystem requires understanding the rules of the game, a willingness to follow the rules and the skills to do so-assets that can only be acquired withexperience." Unfortunately, exposure to such rules is limited to a smallnumber of civil society organizations in Latin America. History and problems of resources hinder the ability of civic groups to lobby the MDBs, butthey are learning quickly, sometimes seduced by the high political andfinancial payoffs that may come from taking part in reforms. The limitedability of Latin American organizations to influence the MDBs stems froma range of factors:

Local civil society is mostly unaware of new mechanisms that foster the transformation of MDB operations in borrower countries; Local civil society organizations rarely engage in lobbying activi ties toward the international financial institutions, due to the lack of ownership of MDB activities in society; and Civil society organizations that do engage in these activities are, in most cases, too weak in terms of leverage and economic and human resources to accomplish significant results .


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The one exception to this generalization seems to be the Brazilian network,made up of NOOs, trade unions, and grassroots movements. This networkhas been able not only to establish a monitoring system for the activities ofthe MDBs in the country but also to permeate congressional circles in taking forward the results (Vianna 2000).

Participation: Window Dressing orWindow of Opportunity? Increased participation and transparency in lending operations haveundoubtedly modified the relationships among MDBs, governments, andcivil society in Latin America, but the impact of these changes on democratization remains uncertain. Our analysis of the World Bank and the IDBshows that there is still a wide gap between rhetoric and operational realities. Participatory practices are implemented very irregularly in pockets ofparticipation at the microlevel, but these are rarely replicated at significantlevels of decisionmaking. Thus far, participatory mechanisms have beenused to legitimize top-down policy processes rather than to innovate in keyareas of decisionmaking.Nevertheless, operational reforms in the MDBs are gradually helpingto reshape the political landscape. Significant opportunities are beingoffered to some civil society organizations (especially NOOs) but not toothers such as trade unions and economic interest groups. NOOs can contribute to enhancing transparency and accountability in government, butthere are clear limits to their impact since NOOs often create vertical linkswith governments and the MDBs at the expense of horizontal links acrosscivil society. In this sense, there is a danger that opportunities for participation will be little more than window dressing, making it imperative thatcivil society organizations adjust their strategies toward the MDBs. Thesegroups must expand the space they have been given to open up negotiationsbetween governments and creditors, and they must democratize decisionmaking where it matters most.

NotesThe authors gratefully acknowledge generous and insightful comments fromGabriel Casaburi and Maria Pia Riggirozzi.1. These case studies were developed under the FLACSO/Argentina coordinated project Strengthening the Role of Civil Society in Global and LocalGovernance: The Looming Refonn Agenda of Multilateral Development Banks,directed by Diana Tussie. Case study authors are Argentina, Carlos H. Acuna andM. Fernanda Tuozzo; Brazil, Aurelio Vianna; Colombia, Consue10 Ahumada;


Mexico, Manuel Fernandez Villegas and Naomi Adelson; Peru, HumbertoCampod6nico.2. Two internal reviews, the Wapenhans Report (World Bank 1993) and theTapoma Report (lOB 1993) revealed the difficulties in program implementation andhigh failure rates in MOB portfolios.3. Bind ing mandates on participati on in the World Bank are Environment(Operational Directive 400 Annex A), Indigenous Peoples (Operational Directive4.20), and Resettlement (Operational Directive 4.15). The lOB does not have opera

tional directives as such but it requires civil society consultation in the followinginstances: environment projects of high risk (category IV) and resettlement ofaffected communities. The normative framework that sustains the participatorypolicies in the IDB rests primarily on four pillars that can be found in working documents presented at the Forum on Social Refonn and Poverty, 1993 (Washington,D.C.); in the IDB meeting, the Eighth Replenishment of Resources, 1993, whichprovided the initial framework for the agenda for modernization of the state andstrengthening of civil society; and lastly in lOB, Department of Policies andStrategic Planning, Modernization of the State and Strengthening of Civil Society(1997).

4. The Brazilian constitutional refonn in 1988 enabled Congress to approve ordisapprove foreign loans and granted congresspersons the power to ask the executive for the MOBs ' strategic documents (Vi anna 2000). On the process of the publication of the CAS, see Vi anna 1998.5. For further information see Acuna and Tuozzo 2000; Fernandez andAdelron 2000; and Ahumada 1999.6. This draws from the conclusions of the project Strengthening the Role ofCivil Society in Global and Local Governance: The Looming Refonn Agenda ofMultilateral Development Banks (2000).

7. For further infonnation on the lOB's engagement with civil society throughthe agenda of state modernization, see "Summary Report of the Conference onStrengthening Civil Society," 12 September 1994 (Washington, D.C.).8. The Inspection Panel was created in 1994 to provide a more independentinvestigation mechanism to monitor the appropriate application of the World Bank'sPolicies and Directives and to recommend that the executive board-if violationshad been committed-give the proper compensation to those who had been damaged.

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