turning geologic data into knowledge; a summary of dam ...failure case histories pete shaffner p.g....

US Army Corps of EngineersBUILDING STRONG®

Turning Geologic Data into Knowledge; A summary of dam failure case histories

Pete Shaffner P.G.Senior Engineering Geologist

Risk Management Center

US Army Corps of Engineers

Denver, Colorado

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Reasons for this presentation include observations of a trend towards decreased quality of subsurface data essential for understanding dam foundations and performing analysis. Data is often collected without a focus on specific questions tied to performance and potential problems. This happened to some extent for each of the dam failure case histories presented. The entire dam safety community must continue to emphasize the importance of the geologic evaluation process and the key products (especially essential drawings) to the next generation. Dam foundation evaluation experience may be harder to come by due to fewer new construction projects and mentoring is our obligation, especially with the large pending turnover in the Dam Safety community. The risk assessment process provides focus on specific issues and an opportunity to improve the foundation evaluation process and drawings by bringing together diverse teams.

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Purpose of this Presentation:

To emphasize why studying case histories is critical and demonstrate that data by itself does not solve problems or prevent failures

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To emphasize to the next generation of Dam Safety professionals that there is much homework to be done and knowledge to be transferred by studying and understanding many different dam failures from the last century

REFERENCES PROVIDED

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Presentation Notes

(Photos by Pete Shaffner)

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One of the most important questions we can ask ourselves when collecting or portraying geologic information is “SO WHAT?”

The Sniff Test:

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Asking “so what” in regards to the various data collection is a useful way to focus our efforts on the data that is most valuable for answering specific dam safety questions. How does the data improve our understanding of the most important foundation conditions? How will the instrumentation help us detect failure initiation or progression specifically?

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Many dam foundation problems are not from a lack of information but

from a LACK OF IMAGINATION

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Some Case Histories of Dam Failures and Incidents that Must be Studied and Understood

(Each deserving several hours discussion)

• Saint Francis Dam Failure• Malpasset Dam Failure • Vaiont Dam Failure• Teton Dam Failure• Fontenelle Dam Incident• Bayless Dam (Austin) Failure• Camara Dam Failure• Baldwin Hills Dam Failure• Quail Creek Dike Failure

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Many of these failure case histories had:

Geologic data was collected and reported, but was NOT understood in terms of potential failure modes Experienced the limits of current state

of knowledge in engineering or geology Inadequate geologic exploration Lack of engineering knowledge by a

geologist

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Why Geologic Data Alone is Not Enough by Itself

Data must be synthesized Data must be understood in terms of the

dam’s vulnerabilities (Failure Modes) The significance of the information must be

clearly communicated (Dam Safety Case) Geologists must take responsibility for

understanding and portraying uncertainty Communications can require assertiveness

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Presentation Notes

Must emphasize over and over that asking the correct QUESTIONS before collecting or assembling data is extremely important to provide correct focus to all activities. Without this focus on the most important questions, data collection is more expensive, and often does not provide as much reduction of uncertainty. Tying data collection directly to the specific branch in the risk tree where uncertainty is high has been very effective. We are seeing foundation stability and deformation analysis performed without a good understanding of the foundation material properties, geology and continuity. There is a sad tendency to over-analyze before the geologic environment is properly understood. This lack of focus can lead to very poor major decisions and has led to dam failure in many cases.

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St. Francis Dam• Failure midnight March 12, 1928• 450 lives lost• Left abutment sliding initiated failure• Re-analyzed by J. David Rogers and Karl F. Hasselmann• Geology was evaluated and believed adequate• Paleo landslides were completely missed

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St. Francis Dam 1928

Re-evaluation by David Rogers 1992

Two of the world's leading geologists at the time, John C. Branner of Stanford University and Carl E. Grunsky, found NO major problems with the foundation.

After failure Bailey Willis recognized paleo landslides.

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Presentation Notes

Geology was mapped, smart people involved, didn’t understand the failure mode Professor Bailey Willis, visited the site after the failure and recognized the paleo landslides along the left abutment Geology was mapped, but didn’t understand the failure mode and many people died due to misjudging the geologic setting. The magnitude of the consequences were not considered. Geologic uncertainty was not accounted for in the design. Having the data does not prevent failure. Understanding the information and acting upon it is the solution. Most failures are due to a lack of imagination, not a lack of data. Every major dam failure can be shown to have collected a large amount of information and very qualified people have usually been involved in the design and construction. Geologists and engineers were arguing about whether an enormous paleo slide might be present, some thought there was evidence to support this. Drilling did not recover the slide plane (not a big surprise).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Branner�



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No Drains on abutment

Old slide in schist not accounted for

From Rogers, 1992: 64 years later

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No drainage was considered during this era and it is very likely that increased water pressure in the foliated schist abutment contributed to this failure. Drainage was being discussed by engineers of this era, including Terzaghi, Lane, Harza and others, but many of those discussions revolved around masonry dams on soil foundations.

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DESIGN DEFICIENCIES #1 (from David Rogers) •The dam unknowingly built against paleolandslide •Hydraulic uplift ignored in the design, leading to a lower factor of safety than designers realized •Hydraulic uplift not relieved on sloping abutments ( a common problem until 1960s) •Insufficient depth of seepage cutoff wall •Cement heat of hydration effects ignored •Low strength laitance layer between concrete placement lifts •Aggregate separation through trough placement

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Understanding these abundant paleo slides would have been very important during design

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The simple inclusion of a geologist on a project, will not, in of itself, insulate such projects from disaster. -David Rogers

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Additionally, the collection of geologic data will not necessarily prevent disaster. Geologic information needs to be turned into knowledge by a team that understands potential failure modes and the dam’s vulnerabilities.

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What would geologists do today that was not done at St. Francis Dam in the 1920’s?• Use aerial photographs to specifically map scarps and search for paleo landslides at the dam and reservoir• Look specifically for daylighting planes in the foundation that could result in failures (map downstream abutments!)• Define rock lithology and structure in terms of the dam’s vulnerabilities and potential failure modes• Perform more detailed investigations specifically targeting potential weaknesses• Design for geologic uncertainty tied to potential failure modes and past case histories!

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Camara Dam Failure: 2004

Failures still happen!!!

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Analyses and design can still happen in a vacuum, completely ignorant of past problems and failure modes and design standards. This dam was not keyed into the foundation and the open and weak foliation planes parallel to abutment were obvious during construction. We are doomed to repeat the past if we don’t learn from it. How can designers today not be familiar with this failure mode that killed hundreds of people at St Francis Dam? The owner over-ruled the designers wishes to stop the reservoir filling when major seepage occurred on the left abutment.

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Malpasset Dam• Designed by Dr. Andre Coyne, the world’s foremost expert in arch dam engineering• Geologists mapped the local area when a gravity dam was considered• The design was switched to an arch dam• A large rock wedge slid along a shear zone in the left abutment upon first filling in 1959• 421 people were killed• Pierre Londe spent 8 years studying the failure

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Malpasset Dam 1959

421 deathsVery important engineering and geology lessons, but it took at least 15 years for some dam building organizations to understand this failure mode and design for it.

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Geologic foundation mapping was performed and data were available. The geologists mapping this foundation may not have even known the design was changed from a gravity dam to an arch dam after the foundation was mapped. This failure mode became a major consideration for arch dams after this failure, but it took decades for these changes to take place in some organizations. Arch dams were still being constructed in the 60”s and 70’s without any consideration for the vulnerability associated with removable foundation rock blocks. How can we be so slow to learn? Are we any better today and learning from mistakes made on other projects? National organizations like AEG are very important to create a forum for discussion of successes and failures.

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Malpasset Dam

• Failure was caused by hydraulic uplift of a large rock wedge lying beneath the dam’s left abutment

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The Malpasset arch dam in France failed on its initial filling in 1959 • Dr. Pierre Londe spent 8 years unraveling the failure mechanism • It was caused by hydraulic uplift of a large rock wedge lying beneath the dam’s left abutment

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Left Abutment Section as depicted by Pierre Londe

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There were some arguments regarding the possibility that permeability was reduced due to the loading, but these were later discounted. This failure mode stresses the importance of studying and mapping the downstream abutment in order to identify any potential sliding planes that daylight. Note in this cross section that the “crushed seam” and the release plane would not be easily identified in the foundation excavation.

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• There were no plan, sections or borehole logs included in any reports• The geologic language was likely NOT understood by design engineers• Prof. Corroy obviously had no understanding of engineering• He was investigating a dam site without knowing the type of dam being considered• No discussion of forces, direction of forces, angles, stresses, deformation, etc.• Even during the subsequent inquiry into the failure the comments by the geologists indicate a complete lack of understanding of the engineering aspects

Five Geologic Reports were developed by Professor Corroy, Univ. of Marsailles - 2 reports prior to construction and 3 reports during construction

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Geologic Lessons Learned from Malpasset Dam Failure

• Geology must not be treated as a separate and independent science, it must be integrated into answering the important engineering questions• Collecting geologic data without consideration of the most important engineering questions is not productive or very useful• Understanding a structure’s vulnerabilities (potential failure modes) is key to focusing data collection and exploration priorities (was this was a “new” failure mode or unlearned lesson (St Francis)??)• Geologists need to avoid using language that is not universally understood by non-scientists, and learn to write simply and concisely• It is usually impossible to investigate, understand and communicate foundation conditions without detailed geologic sections and plan maps

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Geologic Lessons Learned from Malpasset Dam Failure

• Uplift forces acting on the foundation block were not understood or accounted for (“new” vulnerability?).• The geometry of the “system” was not understood or analyzed• Today we would incorporate grouting upstream and drainage downstream• Geologic mapping of the foundation and downstream abutments to define the geologic discontinuities and potential sliding blocks is essential• Some of these lessons were not incorporated into the investigations, design and construction of concrete dams for over a decade• Some of these lessons are still being ignored today

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Here is an example of a mapped downstream abutment that identified a removable block 50 years after construction. The lessons from Malpasset Dam were not learned by Reclamation until after this dam was built. The geologists and engineers working at Auburn dam in the early 1970’s discussed the foundation blocks and specifically looked for them. This type of mapping is most easily done today using ground based photogrammetry with tools such as AdamTechnology or SiroVision or 3G.

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This sequence of drawings shows typical foundation mapping that is very difficult to use and decipher many years later. Today, knowing the failure modes, we need to specifically identify base and side planes forming potential blocks and highlight them on our maps.

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Very detailed foundation map could be much more useful if specific failure modes (removable foundation blocks) where searched for and identified when mapping. Often it may be what lies directly below the mapped surface that is the most concern, making the mapping of the daylighting downstream features critical.

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This is the full sized drawing

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Useful mapping, but deciphering this data 50 years later is difficult in terms of finding base planes and side planes for potential foundation blocks. It is important for geologists to be focused on the potential failure modes and to specifically address the data in terms of these. There have been several cases where geologists mapped to this detail, but completely missed an underlying seam of great importance.

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Can you find the removable blocks on this map? It can take days and weeks if it was not considered when mapping.

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This is not very helpful in its original form

Dam Foundation Map

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This is an example of having an incredible amount of information, but nobody really took the time during construction to understand the significance of all the information, to “extract” the most important key features, to understand potential failure modes, and to identify removable foundation blocks. To do it later is much more difficult and extremely limited.

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Vaoint Dam(Also spelled “Vajont”)

Northern Italy

• Enormous landslide into reservoir in 1963• Dam 860 ft tall (328 ft wave over dam!)• Dam survives, 2600 lives lost by overtopping• Sliding was being monitored closely up to failure• Creep measured as 40 inches per day before failure• Designers ignored seriousness of slide• Local residents were nervous, could feel ground shakes from displacements• Failure blamed on geologists and engineers

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Landslide Scarp

Landslide Mass

First Filled 1959

1963 landslide killed 2,600 people

Vaoint Dam

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The dam itself and the foundation was not the issue

The enormous consequences associated with a massive landslide into the reservoir were not accounted for.

Politics played a major role in operating the dam with known sliding issues.

This was a failure of the imagination.

265 m high(869 ft.)

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Why case histories are critical Many smart engineers and geologists, didn’t understand the failure mode until it was too late Prior to the landslide that caused the over-topping flood, the creep had been 0.4 inches per week. During September this creep reached 10.0 inches per day until finally, the day before the landslide, the creep was measured at 40.0 inches (1 metre)

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Enormous landslide scarp in limestone on left side of Vaoint Reservoir.

Volume estimated to be 340 million cu. yds

Resulted in a wave approximately 328 feet tall overtopping the dam.

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Before Slide

After Slide

Vaoint Landslide

View of left bank, looking downstreamAll limestone

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300 million C.Y slide moved at 70 mph: Oct 9, 1963

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Langarone Italy

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1963; 2600 people killed

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Presenter

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Much instrumentation Measured movement carefully Knew the slide was moving Ignored the warning signs until it was too late Arrogance and ignorance

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• Geologic work and slope stability first studied in 1928• Eminent university professor was expert in dolomites• 1959 Refraction survey concluded a slide plane did not exist• 1960 team of geologists reported evidence of a major ancient landslide on the left bank, noting a remnant mass and a mylonite zone • Geologists considered a large slide mass a possibility• Three boreholes were drilled and the slide plane was not recovered• Assumed the slide if it existed was “stable”• October 1960 noted accelerated slope movements and large scarp• Failed in 1963

Vaiont Landslide Summary Facts

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Vaiont Landslide Summary Facts• pre-existing gullies and saddles defined the ancient slide mass on topo maps and aerial photos, but the aerial photos were likely not used• By 1963 it was obvious that a large landslide was moving. The toe had stopped moving and was “locked” but the upper mass continued to move• No individual or group had the political willpower to stop the project•At the time of failure, a drainage tunnel was being constructed and the reservoir was restricted – the slide was a known “concern”.• Like many other failures, the design of Vaoint Dam failed to account for the geologic uncertainties• There was no independent review with authority to take serious and drastic action to protect the public.

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What would geologists do today that was not done at Vaoint Dam in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s?

• In steep terrain, look specifically for potential sliding in the reservoir and evaluate the hazard using maps and aerial photographs• Capitalize on the Vaiont Failure to help focus attention on the need for robust geological investigations beyond the dam footprint.• Pay more attention to instrumentation thresholds and establish “triggers” for emergency actions• Be more involved in design decisions and account for geologic uncertainty in the design• Communications can require assertiveness, some battles are worth fighting.

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Teton Dam

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• June 4th, 1976: 11 people killed• Only 20 gpm at 8 a.m. and 2 CFS at 9 a.m.• 15 CFS at 10:30 a.m.• Sinkhole at 11:30 a.m.• Breach at 11:55 a.m.• Intensely jointed volcanic rock known • Untreated rock discontinuities with high gradients• Very steep and deep cutoff trench• No grouting of rock above bottom of trench• Rock was mapped and joint intensity known• Significance of information not understood

Teton Dam Failure 1976

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Presenter

Presentation Notes

Note very steep and fractured side slopes in cutoff trench. Grouting performed in the bottom of this trench did not treat any of this material shown in the sidewalls. Arching within the embankment due to these large, steep excavation slopes was believed to be a major contributor to the failure mechanism. Gradients across the trench and grout curtain were very high. Groundwater was very deep and far below the bottom of the excavation.

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About 10:45 am

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Construction completed by USBR in 1975 On the Teton River in eastern Idaho Intensely jointed rock. Seepage control consisted of 70-foot deep, narrow, trenches and by a deep single-line grout curtain in the center of the core contact. Also, concrete slurry was gravity fed into open bedrock joints upstream and downstream of the cutoff trench, but was inexplicably discontinued above a level 120 feet below the dam crest. Dam engineers had limited authorization to visit the site during construction, which could otherwise have allowed them the opportunity to require continuation of the joint plugging, or to reconsider the inadequacy of compacting erodible fill core material against open and jointed rock. On June 5, around 7 am several small seeps were observed at the downstream to about 1/3 up the right abutment contact. By 7:30 am, the flows were muddy and about 25 cfs. By 10:30 am the muddy leakage had progressed up the abutment about 2/3 of the dam height. Warnings were issued downstream Shortly, a whirlpool was seen in the reservoir. By 11:30 am, a large hole had been washed out of the downstream face. In the next 30 minutes, due to violent discharges and caving, the erosion hole neared the crest. At 11;55 am, the crest was breached, the breach expanded rapidly through the full height of the dam. By 6:00 pm, the reservoir was nearly empty of 250,000 acre feet Flooding downstream inundated Rexburg and Sugar City, among

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10:45

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Flow Increasing, Dozers Sent to Fill Hole at Elevation 5200 about 10:45 am

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Dozers Lost In Hole About 11:20 am

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About 11:25 am, June 5, 1976

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11:55 a.m.

Less than 4 hours from 20 gpm detected seepage to total breach

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Crest breaching at 11:55 am

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Only FOUR hours to get from 20 gpm to breach

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The designers failed to understand and incorporate actual geologic information into the design and geologists failed to present any strong resistance against the misinterpretation of this data.

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• The jointing in the bedrock was known and measured• The geology of the site was well-defined and explored• Geologic plan and profile drawings were developed• A robust exploration program was performedBUT•Communications between designers, construction forces, and geologists were very poor• The VULNERABILITY of the dam to seepage and erosion was not understood (silty embankment on open joints)• The designers learned nothing from the major seepage incident at Fontenelle dam a decade earlier - it was not published or discussed• The schedule and budget pressures were enormous to make NO CHANGES during construction•This was a failure of the dam community to learn from past experiences

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• The existence of geologic reports, logs, maps, cross sections and other data did not result in a robust design or prevent failure.• The potential problems were not imagined or understood by geologists or engineers.• Geologists need to do more than collect data!• Everyone needs to assure they understand the geology related to the dam’s vulnerabilities (potential failure modes)• Geologic data must be collected with specific questions and potential failure modes in mind• The design must never be considered complete until the foundation is exposed, inspected, understood and approved• Past incidences and failures MUST be shared, publishded, studied and understood and applied to current designs.• There is no place for HUBRIS in dam design

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others 11 people were killed. Property damage was in excess of a half billion dollars.

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The Auburn dam Plexiglas model is an example of the high quality engineering geology and attention to detail required to adequately understand and analyze a concrete dam foundation. It is remarkable that this highly functional, extremely focused team of geologists, geotechnical engineers and structural engineers worked together for years to understand this foundation. This happened during the very same time that dysfunctional teams in the same organization were designing and constructing Teton Dam. This pocket of excellence within the organization is an example of what a few smart, focused individuals with strong personalities can do when they truly understand the significance of the foundation geology modeling. It did not require a directive or a policy for this team to succeed. It required dedication to excellence. At Auburn, basic volcanic rock was interspersed with faults and shear, most of which had continuous seams of gouge that varied from paper thin to several feet in thickness, and with other rock anomalies each with individual deformation moduli. The resulting anisotropy required a definitive analyses to obtain the existing foundation modulus, and then a determination of which and how much of the geologic discontinuities need to be treated to obtain acceptable deformation moduli throughout the foundation. This team was a learning machine, with everyone learning from each other. Mentoring occurred constantly in all directions.

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Geologists and engineers worked together daily to incorporate all new information from drilling as it was obtained in order to guide the exploration and the design. Everyone on the team was learning from everyone else in an intense cross-mentoring environment. At the same time this excellent collaboration was occurring between geologists and geotechnical engineers and structural engineers, the Teton Dam was being designed by the same organization with very poor coordination and collaboration between scientists and engineers. This is an interesting observation of two different cultures existing simultaneously within one organization. It also emphasizes excellence can be obtained with just a handful of experienced individuals with strong personalities and a clearly defined vision. �The excellence experienced on the concrete dam side of the organization was driven by 3 or 4 very experienced people who understood the value this inter-dependency collaboration and insisted everyone understand the design goals and geologic conditions influencing major design decisions.

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The Auburn Dam Geologic Exploration Philosophy

• Integrated team of geologists, engineers and technicians• Real Time updating of plans, sections and 3D physical model• Principal leadership by experienced individual versed in understanding failure mode case histories and analytical requirements: Guru teacher concept• Geology collected, analyzed, synthesized and used for ongoing engineering analyses rapidly on site• Mentoring and teaching was a critical aspect of all work, complete with site-specific training manuals explaining how and why things are done

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Engineering Geology involves

high level detective work

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Presenter

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Quality Engineering Geology work is very similar to detective work: it includes sorting clues, tracking down information, solving problems and building a case. It is NOT about merely collecting data for someone else to figure out and use. The detective work needs to be focused on solving the correct problems and confidence and uncertainty must be considered and included in building the case.

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Fontenelle Dam Incident: 1965

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Factors helping prevent total failure Luck High clay content of dam materials resisted erosion Volume of seepage limited by the size of the open joints in bedrock Outlet works capacity is about 18,000 CFS, allowed faster drawdown

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“FONTENELLE DAM, RIRIE DAM, AND TETON DAM – AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE ON DECISION-MAKING”

Interviews Conducted by Snorteland, Shaffner and Paul

2009 ASDSO proceedings

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This is a very important paper since it compares three dams built by two organizations and discusses why the organizational culture was a problem. We have these same problems today on some projects with schedules and budgets driving decisions rather than quality. Understanding how these organizational problems can lead to public safety problems is very important for us all to know.

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Fontenelle Dam Incident(1965 – 10 years before Teton)

Open bedrock fractures with high water flow connected to reservoir

Discontinuities known but dam vulnerability not understood Failure mode was not imagined Large outlet works prevented failure Incident was not published or shared resulting in no

learning and leading to Teton failure Better communication of this incident with the dam safety

community may have saves lives!

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Leakage at Fontenelle in 1965

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Fontenelle near-failure: First Filling in 1965

Saved only by a large outlet works

See detailed notes on slides

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In the summer of 1964, the reservoir filled for the first time, water was about 50 feet deep and a 6 CFS seep occurred about 2000 feet downstream. Filling was stopped and seepage evaluated, it was not considered dangerous. As filling continued, seepage increased. More seepage was seen on the right abutment near the spillway and on the left abutment about 3000 feet downstream. In the summer of 1965 runoff was unusually high and the reservoir rose to within 2 feet of maximum. Seepage was estimated at 70 CFS. On September 3, 1965, a wet spot on the dam was noticed. By mid afternoon water was flowing and erosion was starting, by evening flow was 5 cfs from the dam. By the next morning on September 4th, flow was about 21 CFS and over 10,000 CY of material had been removed from the dam. The Outlet works stilling basin was coffer dammed for repairs, this was removed to lower the reservoir. By the morning of September 5th, the volume of flow had not increased, dumping rock into the hole appeared to have slowed erosion, but it force the water higher which produced caving higher up. It was assumed that flow was through rock because flow was not increasing as erosion increased. On September 6th an area on the crest about 20 feet in diameter dropped 30 feed suddenly. Bedrock was exposed, and water was seen issuing from joints, the reservoir was 13 feet above the base of the cavity. Heavy rock was dumped into the hole, reservoir continued to drop 4 ft. per day

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Piping Erosion Conduit9-9-65

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Instability led to progressive sloughing of the embankment. This case study was never published until 2009 (Snorteland, Shaffner and Paul, ASDSO).

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This erosion incident several months earlier was labeled as a “slope stability failure” and backfilled with more permeable material.

There were two of these “incidents” prior to the main problem, but engineers failed to comprehend the seriousness of the problem

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There were actually 3 separate incidents of seepage and stability problems adjacent to the spillway. The significance of the problem was grossly underestimated.

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If the Fontenelle Dam incident was understood by engineers and geologists working on the design and construction of Teton Dam 10 years later, it may have prevented a catastrophe and saved lives.

Dam Safety Case Histories must be widely shared and studied!!!

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Mapping must single out and highlight specific features important to

specific potential failure modes

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Baldwin Hills DamCalifornia

• Completed in 1951, Failed in 1963• 5 fatalities, 1000 homes damaged• Over 11 million in property damage• Reservoir had earth lining sandwiched between asphaltic membranes and poor monitoring of drain• Several minor, steeply dipping faults were mapped as passing through the reservoir• Differential settlement likely from oil wells or fault consolidation• Failed to account for geologic conditions

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Baldwin Hills DamCalifornia

Aseismic Movementof Fault

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Constructed between 1947 and 1951 in Los Angeles Built in a ravine, it was a continuous homogeneous compacted embankment 232 feet high. The reservoir floor was a compacted earth lining sandwiched between asphaltic membranes. An underdrain system collected seepage passing through the lining. During construction several minor, steeply dipping faults were mapped as passing through the reservoir. The dam failed on Dec 14, 1963, Heavy water flow was noted from the underdrain system at 11:45 am An attempt to lower the reservoir was made, but 24 hours would be required. By 1:00 pm seepage increased greatly and a crack was noted in the lining on the upstream face Evacuation was initiated Sandbags were used unsuccessfully to seal the crack. The dam was breached at 3:30 pm and the reservoir was empty by 5:00 pm. 5 people were killed, 1000 homes were damaged. Over 11 million in property damage No earthquake involved. Theory 1: Aseismic movement of fault from pumping of petroleum from deep formations disrupted asphalt liner and drain system. Theory 2: Differential settlement due to fractured and loosened fault zone material (Another dam in Iceland had similar thing happen with no catastrophic release)

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Note Population at risk: Evacuation saved many lives

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Note Oil Field

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Camara DamBrazilJune 4, 2004

Information from personal correspondce, Milton Kanji to Robin Fell

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Where were the geologists?

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Smooth foliation surfaces left untreated in the foundation of Camara Dam led to a foundation failure upon first filling. These planes were not recognized as a failure mode. The understanding of the foundation was obviously inadequate.

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Two days after first filling and failure

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During reservoir filling the dam showed several abnormalities as: artesian conditions and dirty water in some drain holes, leakage through the concrete and to the gallery, inundation of the gallery by clogging of the drain holes, leakage at the left abutment, etc.). The designer recommended emptying the reservoir several times. The state authority did not empty it, (mainly for political reasons as the cities around were in demand for the water). No personal were maintained at the site. The reservoir was about 3/4 full, it failed.

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View of left abutment from downstream

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The failure occurred at the foundation of the left abutment, through a continuous infilled plane of the micaceous silty clay (that same one that was thought during construction to extend only 3m inside the abutment). It was a great geological interpretation mistake.

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View along crest showing failed bridge and continuous infilled fracture plane at left abutment

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Austin Dam(Bayless Paper

Mill)

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• The direct evidence of foundation sliding was ultimately ignored by the owner.• The risk of failure was either not understood or ignored.• Weak shale layers were not accounted for in the design.• Foundation sliding and the need for drainage were not completely understood in this era

Bayless Dam, Austin Pennsylvania

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Austin Dam-50 ft

high

January 17, 1910

Built and operated by Bayless Pulp & Paper Co.

Failed in 1911

On January 17, 1910 a bulge appeared on the crest of the dam. Measurements indicated the dam had moved downstream on its foundation. The dam was taken out of service. A consultant review recommendation to strengthen the dam was ignored.

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Although most concrete dams have performed extremely well, there have been a few notable exceptions. A study of these failures is important to avoid repeating the same mistakes. Bayless Dam was a gravity dam constructed by the Bayless Pulp and Paper Co. in the early 1900's. The dam and reservoir were of a fairly modest size, with the dam constructed to a height of 13 m. On January 17, 1910 a bulge appeared on the crest of the dam. Measurements indicated the dam had moved downstream on its foundation. The dam was taken out of service. A consultant review resulted in a recommendation to strengthen the dam. This recommendation was ignored, and the dam was put back into service. On September 30, 1911 with water going over the spillway, the dam collapsed suddenly. A review of the failure indicated that the foundation of the dam was too weak to accept the loads from the dam, and the dam failed by sliding on weak shale layers in the rock foundation.

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Austin Pennsylvaniaafter Bayless Dam Failure

78 fatalities

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Bayless Dam Failure: September 30, 1911The dam collapsed suddenly. A review of the failure indicated that the dam failed by sliding on weak shale layers in the rock foundation.

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Sophisticated calculation is too often substituted for painstaking subsurface investigation…….

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Geology, the foundation of engineering

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Am I preaching to the choir? Need to continual discuss and show examples of excellent foundation drawings Continually emphasize that geologists need to be working with geotechnical engineers on a daily basis Without collaboration we lose the ability to mentor on each project and eventually we lose critical skills in the organization

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“Over the years it became increasingly apparent to me that the difference between success and failure resided not in the quality or quantity of theoretical studies, but in the success with which the fundamental properties of the geological materials had been evaluated originally or could be determined as a result of field observations during and even after construction.” -Ralph Peck

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“Sophisticated calculation is too often substituted for painstaking subsurface investigation. The ease or the fascination of carrying out calculations taking into account complex loadings, geometrics, and soil conditions leads many of us to believe that realistic results will somehow emerge even if vital subsurface characteristics are undetected, ignored, or oversimplified. Unwarranted comfort is often taken in the delusion that a range of assumed values, possibly all of which overlook a vital feature, guarantees that the correct result will be bracketed by the calculated ones. Not only does this practice lead to erroneous conclusions in specific instances, but it breeds a distaste for the painstaking field work that may be required to disclose and evaluate those subsurface features that will determine safety and performance” –Ralph Peck

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ReferencesAustin Dam

Greene, B. H., and Christ, C. A., 1998, Mistakes of Man; The Austin Dam Disaster of 1911: Pennsylvania Geology, Vol. 29, No. 2-3, pp. 7-14.

Martt, D. F., Shakoor, A., and Greene, B. H., 2005, Austin Dam, Pennsylvania; The Sliding Failure of a Concrete Gravity Dam: Environmental and Engineering Geoscience, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 61-72.

Taylor, T. U., 1900, The Austin Dam: U. S. Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper W-0040, 52 p.

Baldwin Hills Dam

Flagg, C. G., 1979, Geological Causes of Dam Incidents: Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, No. 20, pp. 196-201.

Jansen, R. B., 1987, A Review of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 7-81.

Leps, T. M., 1987a, Failure of Baldwin Hills Reservoir, 1963; Interpretaton of Step-By-Step Failure Sequence; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 83-88.

Leps, T. M., 1987b, The Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure in Retrospect; Discussion Modified; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 89-92.

Leps, T. M., 1987c, Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Discussion Modified; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 93-95.

Leps, T. M., 1987d, Failure of Baldwin Hills Reservoir; Invited Discusser's Responses to Prepared Questions; Dam Failures. Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 97-102.

Leps, T. M., 1987e, Ground Subsidence Analysis Prior to the Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 143-154.

Leps, T. M., and Jansen, R. B., 1988, Lessons from Notable Events; The Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure. In R. B. Jansen (Ed.), Advanced Dam Engineering for Design, Construction, and Rehabilitation: Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, United States, pp. 8-16.

Muhunthan, B., and Schofield, A. N., 2000, Liquefaction and Dam Failures: Geotechnical Special Publication No. 101, pp. 266-280.

Scott, R. F., 1987a, Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure in Review; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 103-125.

Scott, R. F., 1987b, The Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 155-159.

Stapledon, D. H., and Gordon, F. R., 1976, Geological Hazards and Water Storage; Symposium 113, Geological Hazards and the Environment: Bulletin Engineering Geology and the Environment, No. 14, pp. 249-262.

Wilson, S. D., 1987a, A Discussion of the Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 127-141.

Wilson, S. D., 1987b, The Baldwin Hills Reservoir Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 161-166.

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ReferencesFontenelle Dam

Murray, B. C., and Browning, S. E., 1984, Unique Monitoring of Possible Recurring Foundation Problems at Fontenelle Dam; Safety of Dams; in Proeceedings, International Conference on Safety of Dams, Coimbra, Portugal: A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam, Netherlands, pp. 227-234.

Bureau of Reclamation Experience in Stabilizing Embankment of Fontenelle Earth Dam, B.P. Bellport, Ninth International Congress on Large Dams, Istanbul, Turkey, September 4-8, 1967.

Design Considerations for Dam Embankment, Fontenelle Dam, Seedskadee Project, Wyoming, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver, Colorado, May 1961.

Snorteland, N.J, Shaffner, P.T, and Paul, D, 2009, ASDSO

Malpasset Dam

Boyer, D. D., and Ferguson, K. A., 2000, Important Factors to Consider in Properly Evaluating the Stability of Rock Slopes: Geotechnical Special Publication No. 101, pp. 58-71.

Fishman, Y. A., 2008, Features of Shear Failure of Brittle Materials and Concrete Structures on Rock Foundations: International Journal of Rock Mechanics and Mining Sciences, Vol. 45, No. 6, pp. 976-992.


Goodman, R. E., and Powell, C., 2003, Investigations of Blocks in Foundations and Abutments of Concrete Dams: Journal of Geotechnical and Geoenvironmental Engineering, Vol. 129, No. 2, pp. 105-116.

Habib, P., 1987, The Malpasset Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 331-338.

James, L. B., 1988, Lessons from Notable Events; The Failure of Malpasset Dam; In Jansen, R. B., Ed., Advanced Dam Engineering for Design, Construction, and Rehabilitation: Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, United States, pp. 17-27.

Londe, P., 1973, Analysis of the Stability of Rock Slopes: The Quarterly Journal of Engineering Geology, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 93-124.

Londe, P., 1987, The Malpasset Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 295-329.

Marliave, E. C., 1960, Foundation Failure at Malpasset Dam near Frejus, France: Geological Society of America Bulletin, Vol. 71, No. 12, pp. 2066-2067.

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References(Malpasset Dam continuted…)

Post, G., and Bonazzi, D., 1987a, Latest Thinking on the Malpasset Accident; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 339-353.

Post, G., and Bonazzi, D., 1987b, Malpasset Dam; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 395-398.

Serafim, J. L., 1987, Malpasset Dam Discussion; Remembrances of Failures of Dams; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 355-366.


Wittke, W., 1987, Malpasset Dam; Dam Failures. Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 399-400.

Wittke, W., and Leonards, G. A., 1987a, Modified Hypothesis for Failure of Malpasset Dam; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 367-394.

Wittke, W., and Leonards, G. A., 1987, Modified Hypothesis for Failure of the Malpasset dam; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 407-421.

Quail Creek Dike

Gourley, C., 1992, Geological Aspects of the Quail Creek Dike Failure; Engineering and Environmental Geology of Southwestern Utah: Utah Geological Association Publication, Vol. 21, pp. 17-38.

Johnson, K. S., 2008, Gypsum-Karst Problems in Constructing Dams in the USA: Environmental Geology, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 945-950.

O'Neill, A. L., and Gourley, C., 1991, Geologic Perspectives and Cause of the Quail Creek Dike Failure: Bulletin of the Association of Engineering Geologists, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 127-145.

Payton, C. C., Hansen, M. N., 2003, Gypsum Karst in Southwestern Utah; Failure and Reconstruction of Quail Creek Dike; in Johnson K. S., Neal J. T., Eds., Evaporite karst and Engineering/Environmental Problems in the United States: Oklahoma Geological Survey Circular 109, pp. 293-303.

Payton, C. C., 1992, Geotechnical Investigation and Foundation Design for the Reconstruction of Quail Creek Dike; Engineering and Environmental Geology of Southwestern Utah: Utah Geological Association Publication 21, pp. 39-51.

Picard, M. D., 1993, The Fall of Quail Creek Dike: Journal of Geological Education, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp.52-56.

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ReferencesSaint Francis Dam

Boyer, D. D., and Ferguson, K. A., 2000, Important Factors to Consider in Properly Evaluating the Stability of Rock Slopes: Geotechnical Special Publication No. 101, pp. 58-71.

Clements, T., 1966, Saint Francis Dam Failure of 1928; Engineering Geology in Southern California: Association of Engineering Geologists, Southern California Section, Glendale, California.

Fife D. L., Eagen J. T. and Hollon C. E., 1978, Failure of the St. Francis Dam; San Francisquito Canyon Near Saugus: Association of Engineering Geologists, Southern California Section, Glendale, California, 41p.

Hill, L. C., 1929, Essential Facts Concerning the Failure of the Saint Francis Dam California; report of committee: Proceedings of the American Society of Civil Engineers, Vol. 55, No. 8, 2147-2163.

Jansen, R. B., 1988, Lessons from Notable Events; The St. Francis Dam Failure; in Jansen, R. B., Ed., Advanced Dam Engineering for Design, Construction, and Rehabilitation: Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, United States, pp. 28-34.

Longwell, C. R., 1928, Lessons from the Saint Francis Dam, California: Fort Hays Studies, New Series, Science Series, Vol. 67, pp. 36-37.

Louderback, G. D., 1928, The Geology of the Saint Francis Dam Site: American Society of Civil Engineers, San Francisco Section, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 9-10.

Outland, C. F., 1977, Man-Made Disaster; The Story of St. Francis Dam; Its Place in Southern California's Water System, Its Failure and the Tragedy in the Santa Clara River Valley, March 12 and 13, 1928: Arthur H. Clark Co., Glendale, CA, United States, 275 p.

Petroski, H., 2003, St. Francis Dam: American Scientist, Vol. 91, No. 2, pp. 114-118.

Ransome, F. L., 1928, Geology of the Saint Francis Dam Site: Economic Geology, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 553-563.

Rogers, J. D., 1992, Reassessment of St. Francis Dam Failure; Engineering Geology Practice in Southern California: Association of Engineering Geologists Special Publication 4, pp. 639-666.

Rogers, J.D., 2006, Lessons Learned from the St. Francis Dam Failure: Geo-Strata, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 14-17.


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ReferencesTeton Dam

Aberle, P. P., 1976, Pressure Grouting Foundation on Teton Dam Rock Engineering for Foundations and Slopes; in Proceedings, Rock Engineering for Foundations and Slopes, Boulder, Colorado, Vol. 1: American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, United States, pp. 245-263.

Arthur, H. G., 1977, Teton Dam Failure; in Proceedings, The Evaluation of Dam Safety, Pacific Grove, California: American Society of Civil Engineers, New York, NY, UnitedStates, pp. 61-68.

Boffey, P. M., 1976, Teton Dam Collapse; Was it a Predictable Disaster?: Science, Vol. 193, No. 4247, pp. 30-32.

Fecker, E., 1980, The Influence of Jointing on Failure of Teton Dam; A Review and Commentary: Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, No. 21, pp. 232-238.


Fucik, E. M., 1987, The Teton Dam Failure; A Discussion; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 207-215.

Hilf, J. W., 1987, The Wet Seam and The Teton Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 265-281.

Leonards, G. A., and Davidson, L. W., 1984, Reconsideration of Failure Initiating Mechanisms for Teton Dam; in Proceedings, International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering, St. Louis, MO, Vol. 3: University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO, United States, pp. 1103-1113.

Leps, T. M., 1987, Failure of Teton Dam, 1976; Invited Discusser's Responses to Prepared Questions; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 217-220.

Leps, T. M., 1988, Lessons From Notable Events; Failure of Teton Dam; in Jansen R. B., Ed., Advanced Dam Engineering for Design, Construction, and Rehabilitation: Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, United States, pp. 34-41.

Muhunthan, B., and Schofield, A. N., 2000, Liquefaction and Dam Failures; Slope Stability 2000: Geotechnical Special Publication No. 101, pp. 266-280.

Muthunthan, B., and Pillai, S., 2008, Teton dam, USA; Uncovering the Crucial Aspect of its Failure; Learning from Failures; in Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers: Civil Engineering, Vol. 161, Special issue 2, pp. 35-40.

Penman, A. D. M., 2005, Dams Designed to Fail: International Journal on Hydropower and Dams, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 148-155.

Penman, A. D. M., 1987a, Teton Investigation; A Review of Existing Findings; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 221-237.

Penman, A. D. M., 1987b, The Teton Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 257-259.

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References(Teton Dam continued…)

erry, E. B., 1991, The Teton Dam Failure; Problems with the Use of Loess Material in Earth Dam Structures; Discussion Modified: Engineering Geology, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 205-206.

Rogers, C. D. F., Dijkstra, T. A., Smally, I. J., and Sowers, G. F., 1994, Human Factors in Civil and Geotechnical Engineering Failures; Discussion and Closure: Journal of Geotechnical Engineering, Vol. 120, No. 8, pp. 1446-1449.

Sasiharan, N., Muhunthan, B., and Pillai, V., 2006, Failure Report: International Water Power and Dam Construction, Vol. 58, No. 9, pp. 28-33.

Schuster, R. L., 1980, Discussion of "Geological Causes of Dam Incidents" by Flagg, C. G.: Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, No. 21, pp. 231-232.

Seed, H. B., and Duncan, J. M., 1982, The Teton Dam Failure; A Retrospective Review; in Proceedings of the tenth international conference on soil mechanics and foundation engineering: A.A. Balkema, Rotterdam-Boston, pp. 219-238.

Seed, H. B., and Duncan, J. M., 1987, The Failure of Teton Dam; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 173-205.

Sherard, J. L., 1987, Lessons from the Teton Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 239-256.

Sherard, J. L., 1987, Teton Dam Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 283-293.

Smalley, I. J., and Dijkstra, T. A., 1991, The Teton Dam (Idaho, U.S.A.) Failure; Problems with the Use of Loess Material in Earth Dam Structures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 197-203.

Smalley, I., 1992, The Teton Dam; Rhyolite Foundation + Loess Core = Disaster: Geology Today, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 19-22.

Teton Dam Failure Review Group, 1977, Failure of Teton Dam; a Report of Findings by United States Department of the Interior: U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 745 p.

Teton Dam Failure Review Group, 1980, Failure of Teton Dam; Final Report: U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 800 p.

U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operation, 1976, Teton Dam Disaster; Thirtieth Report Modified: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 37 p.

U. S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Conservation, Energy, and Natural Resource, 1976, Teton Dam Disaster: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 678 p.

U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development, 1977, Oversight; Teton Dam Disaster: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 315 p.

U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development, 1977, Teton Dam Failure: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 96 p.

U. S. Congress, Senate Subcommittee on Energy Research and Water Resources, 1976, Teton Dam: U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., United States, 69 p.

Williams, R. P., 1978, Effects of the Teton Dam Failure: U. S. Geological Survey Professional Paper P1100, 211 p.

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ReferencesVaiont (or Vajont) Dam

Belloni, L. G., and Stefani, R., 1987, The Vajont Slide; Instrumentation, Past Experience and the Modern Approach; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 445-474.

Chowdhury, R. N., 1987, Aspects of the Vajont Slide; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 533-540.


Hendron, A. J. and Patton, F.D., 1985, The Vajont Slide, a Geotechnical Analysis Based on New Geologic Observations of the Failure Surface: Technical Report GL-85-5, Department of the Army, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C., two volumes.

Hendron, A. J.,Jr, and Patton, F. D., 1987, The Vaiont Slide; a Geotechnical Analysis Based on New Geologic Observations of the Failure Surface; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 475-491.

Jaeger, C., 1970, Engineering and Rock Mechanics, Part One: Water Power, Vol. 22, No. 5-6, pp. 203-209.

Kaliser, B. N., 1969, Slips Showing: Utah Geological and Mineralogical Survey Quarterly Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 3.

Kiersch, G. A., 1976, The Vaiont Reservoir Disaster; in Tank R. W., Ed., Focus on Environmental Geology; a Collection of Case Histories and Readings from Original Sources: Oxford University Press, London, United Kingdom, pp. 132-143.

Kiersch, G. A., 1988, Lessons from Notable Events; Vaiont Reservoir Disaster; in Jansen, R. B., Ed., Advanced Dam Engineering for Design, Construction, and Rehabilitation: Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, NY, United States, pp. 41-53.

Lo, K. Y., Lee, C. F., and Gelinas, P., 1972, Alternative Interpretation of the Vaiont Slide; Stability of Rock Slopes: Proceedings - Symposium on Rock Mechanics, Vol. 13, pp. 595-617.

Earth System Sciences, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 865-873. Mantovani, F., and Vita-Finzi, C., 2003, Neotectonics of the Vajont Dam Site; Studies on Large Volume Landslides: Geomorphology, Vol. 54, No. 1-2, pp. 33-37.

Mueller-Salzburg, L., 1987a, The Vajont Catastrophe; a Personal Review; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 423-444.

Mueller-Salzburg, L., 1987b, The Vajont Slide; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 513-523.

Nonveiller, E., 1987, The Vajont Reservoir Slope Failure; Dam Failures: Engineering Geology, Vol. 24, No. 1-4, pp. 493-512.

Petley, D. N., and Petley, D. J., 2006, On the Initiation of Large Rockslides; Perspectives from a New Analysis of the Vaiont Movement Record; Landslides from Massive Rock Slope Failure: NATO Science Series IV, Earth and Environmental Sciences, Vol. 49, pp. 77-84.

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References(Vaiont Dam continued…)

Stamatopoulos, C., and Aneroussis, S., 2006, Back Analysis of the Vaiont Slide Using a Multi-Block Sliding Model; Monitoring, Simulation, Prevention and Remediation of Dense and Debris Flows: WIT Transactions on Ecology and the Environment, Vol. 90, pp. 261-269.

Semenza, E., and Ghirotti, M., 2000, History of the 1963 Vaiont Slide; The Importance of Geological Factors: Bulletin of Engineering Geology and the Environment, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 87-97.


Superchi, L., Floris, M., Ghirotti, M., Genevois, R., Jaboyedoff, M., and Stead, D., 2010, Technical note: Implementation of a Geodatabase of Published and Unpublished Data on the Catastrophic Vaiont Landslide: Natural Hazards and

turning geologic data into knowledge; a summary of dam ...failure case histories pete shaffner p.g....

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