turkey and the united states under barack obama: yes they can

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Analysis ANKARA — As people across the globe celebrated last week’s election o Barack Obama, America’ s rst Ar ican-Ameri- can president, locals in a remote village in southeastern Turkey slaughtered 44 sheep to register their joy. “Obama will usher in peace, unite the world, ” they declared beore smearing sacricial blood on an image o Obama in keep- ing with an age old rite to ward o evil spirits. In T urkey’s capital city o An- kara, though, the mood was rather more subdued as Turkish leaders pondered the meaning o America’s new president or their country. Strategically wedged between Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, Turkey is a key actor in the biggest oreign policy challenges acing the new U.S. administration: the wars in Iraq and Aghanistan, Iran’s nuclear am- bitions, and a newly belligerent Russia. T urkey’s interests have not always con- verged with those o the United States. This was never more evident than when the Turkish Parliament reused to let U.S. troops use T urkey as a launch- ing pad to open a second ront against Saddam Hussein in March 2003. The rebuttal unleashed a cycle o mutual hostility and recrimination that is only  just beginning to ease. Y et nothing alarms Turks quite as much as the prospect that Obama will ulll his campaign promise to recognize the mass slaughter o the Ottoman Armenians in 1915 as genocide. While acknowledging the ground-breaking nature o the U.S. presidential election, it is rom this narrow prism that many T urks tend to weigh the pros and cons o President-elect Barack Obama. Will Obama stick to his promise to Armenian-American constituents and wreck Turkish-American relations or good or, as in the past, will America’s reliance on Turkey’s military coopera- tion win the day? And what o the Iraqi Kurds? W ill a Democratic president be more amenable to their irredentist im- pulses? Obama’s oreign policy vision suggests that T urkish ears are over- blown, and that there exists a window o opportunity or reinorcing strategic partnership with the United States in ways that can positively impact the region provided leaders on both sides show pluck and imagination and avoid the pitalls that line the way. Rather than ocus on parochial phobias, Turkey should recognize the opening that the Obama administration presents. Ater eight years o Bush policies that have alienated Turks across the political spectrum, there is now leadership in Washington that likely will share T urkey’s multilateralist approach to oreign policy headaches in its backyard and beyond. Turkey and the United States under Barack Obama: Yes They Can  by Amberin Zaman* * Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent of The Economist and writes a weekly column for the Turkish daily Taraf . The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Washington, DCBerlin Bratislava Paris Brussels BelgraDe  ankara BuCharest  www.gmfus.org  Offices Summary: Strategically wedged between Europe, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, Turkey is a key actor in the biggest foreign policy challenges facing the new U.S. administration: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and a newly belligerent Russia. As the world celebrates the recent election of Barack Obama, politicians in Ankara ponder what  this will mean for their country. Obama’s foreign policy vision suggests that Turkish fears are overblown, and that there exists a window of opportunity for reinforc- ing a strategic partnership with the United States in ways that can positively impact the region, if leaders on both sides show some imagination and avoid pitfalls that line the way.

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8/8/2019 Turkey and the United States under Barack Obama: Yes They Can

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkey-and-the-united-states-under-barack-obama-yes-they-can 1/3

Analysis

ANKARA — As people across the globecelebrated last week’s election o Barack

Obama, America’s rst Arican-Ameri-can president, locals in a remote villagein southeastern Turkey slaughtered 44sheep to register their joy. “Obama willusher in peace, unite the world,” they declared beore smearing sacricialblood on an image o Obama in keep-ing with an age old rite to ward o evilspirits. In Turkey’s capital city o An-kara, though, the mood was rather moresubdued as Turkish leaders ponderedthe meaning o America’s new president

or their country. Strategically wedgedbetween Europe, the Caucasus, and theMiddle East, Turkey is a key actor in thebiggest oreign policy challenges acingthe new U.S. administration: the wars inIraq and Aghanistan, Iran’s nuclear am-bitions, and a newly belligerent Russia.

Turkey’s interests have not always con-verged with those o the United States.This was never more evident than whenthe Turkish Parliament reused to letU.S. troops use Turkey as a launch-ing pad to open a second ront againstSaddam Hussein in March 2003. Therebuttal unleashed a cycle o mutualhostility and recrimination that is only 

 just beginning to ease.

Yet nothing alarms Turks quite as muchas the prospect that Obama will ulllhis campaign promise to recognize

the mass slaughter o the OttomanArmenians in 1915 as genocide. While

acknowledging the ground-breakingnature o the U.S. presidential election,it is rom this narrow prism that many Turks tend to weigh the pros and conso President-elect Barack Obama.

Will Obama stick to his promise toArmenian-American constituents andwreck Turkish-American relations orgood or, as in the past, will America’sreliance on Turkey’s military coopera-tion win the day? And what o the Iraqi

Kurds? Will a Democratic president bemore amenable to their irredentist im-pulses? Obama’s oreign policy visionsuggests that Turkish ears are over-blown, and that there exists a windowo opportunity or reinorcing strategicpartnership with the United States inways that can positively impact theregion provided leaders on both sidesshow pluck and imagination and avoidthe pitalls that line the way. Ratherthan ocus on parochial phobias, Turkey should recognize the opening that theObama administration presents. Atereight years o Bush policies that havealienated Turks across the politicalspectrum, there is now leadershipin Washington that likely will shareTurkey’s multilateralist approach tooreign policy headaches in its backyardand beyond.

Turkey and the United States under

Barack Obama: Yes They Can 

by Amberin Zaman*

*

Amberin Zaman is the Turkey correspondent of The Economist

and writes a weekly column for the Turkish dailyTaraf 

. The viewsexpressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German Marshall Fund of the United

States (GMF). 

Washington, DC•Berlin •Bratislava • Paris 

Brussels • BelgraDe • ankara • BuCharest 

 www.gmfus.org

  O f f i c e s

Summary: Strategically wedged

between Europe, the Caucasus,

and the Middle East, Turkey is a

key actor in the biggest foreign

policy challenges facing the new

U.S. administration: the wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran’snuclear ambitions, and a newly

belligerent Russia.

As the world celebrates the

recent election of Barack Obama,

politicians in Ankara ponder what

 this will mean for their country.

Obama’s foreign policy vision

suggests that Turkish fears are

overblown, and that there exists a

window of opportunity for reinforc-

ing a strategic partnership with the

United States in ways that can

positively impact the region, if 

leaders on both sides show some

imagination and avoid pitfalls that

line the way.

8/8/2019 Turkey and the United States under Barack Obama: Yes They Can

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkey-and-the-united-states-under-barack-obama-yes-they-can 2/3

8/8/2019 Turkey and the United States under Barack Obama: Yes They Can

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/turkey-and-the-united-states-under-barack-obama-yes-they-can 3/3

The Kurdish conundrum

One o the biggest reasons why Turks continue to dislikeAmerica (not Americans) in large numbers1 is because they believe that the United States is surreptitiously working to es-tablish an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq that willeventually comprise at chunks o southeastern Turkey. The“proo,” their argument runs, lies in the reusal by the UnitedStates to take military action against some 5,000 rebels o theseparatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) based in northernIraq. The suspicions persist even though the United States hasbeen providing the Turkish army with real time intelligence onthe PKK since November 2007, and has been allowing Turkish

ghter jets to strike PKK bases across the border.

It hasn’t helped that the PKK is mounting increasingly audacious attacks, killing an ever-growing number o Turk-ish soldiers each time. It would help or the new administra-tion to call very publicly on the Iraqi Kurds to do more toprevent the PKK rom moving so reely in areas under theircontrol. At the same time, the notion that withdrawal romIraq means abandoning the Iraqi Kurds should be rmly dispelled. Ankara’s recent overtures to the president o theKurdish regional government, Massoud Barzani, should beencouraged, as should his eorts to peaceully disarm the

PKK. Yet, America’s intentions will remain in question solong as it sits on the ence on a purportedly new separatistKurdish group, the Party or Free Lie in Kurdistan (Pejak),that is ghting or Kurdish autonomy inside Iran. It is anopen secret that Pejak and the PKK are one and the same.Yet the U.S. Department o State does not label Pejak aterrorist group as it does the PKK. Not surprisingly, Iran (acountry that in the past used to arm and shelter the PKKin an eort to undermine Turkey) is now helping Turkey hunt them down. The Obama administration would gainmuch sympathy in Turkey i it were to call Pejak by its realname—terrorists—and rouse the mettle to condemn theirmischie in Iran. Talk o U.S. double standards would sub-side, Turkish-Iranian military cooperation would be nippedin the bud, and Iran would have one less reason to believethe United States is committed to overthrowing its regime.

Human rights

The conventional wisdom in Ankara has long held that theRepublicans are better or Turkey. They best appreciateTurkey’s strategic value and are less bothered about its patchy 

human rights record than the Democrats. Obama should do

nothing to disabuse Turkey o this notion. Torture and otherviolations are on the rise. The government seems to have lostall interest in reorms tailored to win EU membership. And de-spite earlier promises to do more or the country’s estimated 14million ethnic Kurds, Prime Minister Erdoğan has done littleto improve their lot, and seems increasingly inclined to take hiscue rom the generals. Kurds continue to be punished or usingtheir mother tongue and giving their children Kurdish names.Long-promised economic development schemes have ailedto materialize. All o this has provided the PKK with a steady stream o recruits. For many Kurds, Obama’s victory oeredhope that they too might break ree rom second-class status

some day. Unsurprisingly, the villagers who slaughtered sheepto celebrate his success were Kurds.

Conclusion

The election o Barack Obama has provoked hope andexcitement across the world and the overwhelming majority o Turks share those eelings. The opportunity to turn a reshpage in Turkish-American relations has never been better.The onus is on leaders in Turkey and the United States to riseabove their parochial interests and ensure that this historicmoment is seized.

 

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Analysis

 

Amberin Zaman, Correspondent, The Economist 

Amberin Zaman has been the Turkey correspondent or The Economist  

and writes a weekly column or the Turkish daily Taraf .

About GMF The German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a

nonpartisan American public policy and grantmaking institution

dedicated to promoting greater cooperation and understanding

between North America and Europe. GMF does this by supporting

individuals and institutions working on transatlantic issues, by convening leaders to discuss the most pressing transatlantic themes,

and by examining ways in which transatlantic cooperation can

address a variety o global policy challenges. In addition, GMF

supports a number o initiatives to strengthen democracies. In

addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has seven

oces in Europe: Berlin, Bratislava, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara,

and Bucharest.

1 See http://www.transatlantictrends.org