turcotte v state of maine scotus petition for certiorari plus full appendix

No. _____________

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------∞---------------------------------

Gina Turcotte

(now known as GinA)

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF MAINE

Respondent

---------------------------------∞---------------------------------

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

___________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ___________________________________________

GinA (formerly Gina Turcotte)

Petitioner

2528 WEST RIVER ROAD

SIDNEY, MAINE 04330

207-333-0628

[email protected]

Gina Turcotte v. State of Maine, Petition for Writ of Certiorari

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether Petitioner was deprived of her freedom of speech and right to be heard

under the 1st Amendment and right to due process under the 5th and 14th

Amendments caused by Secretary of State‟s failure to serve Petitioner with a

notice of driver‟s license suspension and opportunity for hearing resulting in

Respondent filing several criminal charges?

2. Whether Petitioner‟s rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

PAIMI Act were violated when her medical information was required to be

disclosed and then it was used against Petitioner to restrain and seclude

Petitioner without legal justification?

3. Whether Maine Supreme Judicial Court erred in a January 13, 2014 Order when

it acted under Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure 14(c) providing “relief” from

Appellate Rule 3(b) knowing judicial relief would affirm an invalid contract?

4. Whether Petitioner was deprived of adequate assistance of counsel?

5. Whether Petitioner was subjected to involuntary servitude to the court “by the

use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process” in violation of the 13th

Amendment?

6. Whether traffic exceptions to the 4th Amendment absent any probable cause of

criminal conduct are constitutional under the original intent of the Constitution

and principles of stare decisis?


iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The caption contains the names of all parties to the proceedings in the Maine

Supreme Judicial, Kennebec County Superior and Augusta District Courts and

Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles whose judgments are sought to be

reviewed.

There is only one Respondent in all companion cases in this petition – the

State of Maine – albeit different departments, as follows:

1. Secretary of State, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Section

2. Secretary of State, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Hearings Unit

3. Office of District Attorney, Kennebec County (as agents of the state)

4. Office of Attorney General

5. Augusta District Court

6. Kennebec County Superior Court

7. Maine Supreme Judicial Court


iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ................................................................. ii

1. Whether Petitioner was deprived of her freedom of speech and right

to be heard under the 1st Amendment and right to due process

under the 5th and 14th Amendments caused by Secretary of State‟s

failure to serve Petitioner with a notice of driver‟s license

suspension and opportunity for hearing resulting in Respondent

filing several criminal charges? .................................................................... ii

2. Whether Petitioner‟s rights under the Americans with Disabilities

Act and the PAIMI Act were violated when her medical information

was required to be disclosed and then it was used against Petitioner

to restrain and seclude Petitioner without legal justification? .................... ii

3. Whether Maine Supreme Judicial Court erred in a January 13,

2014 Order when it acted under Maine Rules of Appellate

Procedure 14(c) providing “relief” from Appellate Rule 3(b) knowing

judicial relief would affirm an invalid contract? .......................................... ii

4. Whether Petitioner was deprived of adequate assistance of counsel? ........ ii

5. Whether Petitioner was subjected to involuntary servitude to the

court “by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal

process” in violation of the 13th Amendment? ............................................... ii

6. Whether traffic exceptions to the 4th Amendment absent any

probable cause of criminal conduct are constitutional under the

original intent of the Constitution and principles of stare decisis? ............. ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ............................................................................. iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................... xiii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ............................................................. xiv


v

OPINIONS BELOW .................................................................................................... xv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................... xvi

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED .................. xvii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..................................................................................... 18

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 18

Medical Suspension............................................................................................... 23

AUGDC-CR-2011-513 ........................................................................................... 25

AUGDC-CR-2011-512 ........................................................................................... 25

AUGSC-CR-2012-286 / KEN-14-18 / KEN-14-151............................................... 29

AUGSC-CR-2012-667 ............................................................................................ 30

AUGSC-CR-2012-553 ............................................................................................ 32

AP-13-17 / KEN-13-514 ......................................................................................... 35

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .......................................................... 43

1. There are several questions of constitutional violations arising from

the legal issues in all companion cases herein tantamount to

egregious, outrageous and malicious conduct by government and

court officials during interactions with a known disabled individual

constituting a matter of great public importance....................................... 43

2. There is an unsettled area of law concerning traffic exceptions to

the 4th Amendment which allows police officers to stop walkers,

bicyclists and people in moving vehicles for civil actions which has

caused rampant official abuse of automobile exceptions triggering

several state legislatures to enact statewide prohibitions against

traffic citation quotas within police departments. ..................................... 56

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 62


vi

APPENDIX Table of Contents ....................................................................................... i

APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................. 1

Dismissal ................................................................................................................. 1

APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................. 2

Memorandum of Decision ....................................................................................... 2

APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................. 4

Objection and Imperative Judicial Notice ............................................................. 4

APPENDIX D ................................................................................................................. 6

Judicial Notice of Non-Opposition to Harold Hainke‟s Motion to

Withdraw .......................................................................................................... 6

APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................... 11

Order Regarding Motion to Withdraw ................................................................. 11

APPENDIX F ............................................................................................................... 12

Motion to Withdraw .............................................................................................. 12

APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................... 14

Order ................................................................................................................. 14

APPENDIX H ............................................................................................................... 16

Imperative Judicial Notice Violation Of Maine Code Of Judicial

Conduct........................................................................................................... 16

APPENDIX I ................................................................................................................ 19

Reply Brief for Appellant ...................................................................................... 19

APPENDIX J................................................................................................................ 25

Defendant's Rescission Of Agreement Under Deferred Disposition ................... 25

APPENDIX K ............................................................................................................... 27


vii

Defendant's 4th Motion to Dismiss ...................................................................... 27

APPENDIX L ............................................................................................................... 29

Appeal Brief for Appellant .................................................................................... 29

APPENDIX M .............................................................................................................. 42

Order ................................................................................................................. 42

APPENDIX N ............................................................................................................... 44

Dismissal ............................................................................................................... 44

APPENDIX O ............................................................................................................... 45

Agreement Of Defendant And Order Deferring Disposition ............................... 45

APPENDIX P ............................................................................................................... 47

Motion To Dismiss Count 2 Under Federal Rules Of Evidence 410(a)(2) .......... 47

APPENDIX Q ............................................................................................................... 49

Plea Offer ............................................................................................................... 49

APPENDIX R ............................................................................................................... 51

3RD Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice For Discovery And Due Process

Violations ........................................................................................................ 51

APPENDIX S ............................................................................................................... 58

Order on Rule 80C Appeal .................................................................................... 58

APPENDIX T ............................................................................................................... 64

Petitioner's Reply Brief Rule 80C ......................................................................... 64

APPENDIX U ............................................................................................................... 76

Respondent's Brief ................................................................................................ 76

APPENDIX V ............................................................................................................... 80

Rule 80C Petition Brief for Appellant .................................................................. 80


viii

APPENDIX W ............................................................................................................ 138

Order ............................................................................................................... 138

APPENDIX X ............................................................................................................. 139

Addendum to Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion

to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations ................................. 139

APPENDIX Y ............................................................................................................. 160

Defendant's 2nd Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to

Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations ..................................... 160

APPENDIX Z ............................................................................................................. 183

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and

Due Process Violations ................................................................................. 183

APPENDIX AA .......................................................................................................... 196

2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations with

Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support........................................... 196

APPENDIX BB .......................................................................................................... 208

BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES .................................................................... 208

APPENDIX CC .......................................................................................................... 210

Notice Of Violation Of Procedural Due Process ................................................. 210

APPENDIX DD .......................................................................................................... 220


APPENDIX EE .......................................................................................................... 222

Demand for Administrative Hearing for Prior Administrative (Medical)

Suspension .................................................................................................... 222

APPENDIX FF ........................................................................................................... 236


ix


APPENDIX GG .......................................................................................................... 238

Request For Administrative Hearing ................................................................. 238

APPENDIX HH .......................................................................................................... 246

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion To Reconsider ............................................ 246

APPENDIX II ............................................................................................................. 249

Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Review of

AUGDC-CR-11-512 and AUGDC-CR-11-513 .............................................. 249

APPENDIX JJ ............................................................................................................ 251

Order Summarily Dismissing Post-Conviction Petition ................................... 251

APPENDIX KK .......................................................................................................... 253

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of

Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statements of

Facts, Points and Authorities in Support .................................................... 253

APPENDIX LL ........................................................................................................... 287

Petition For Post-Conviction Review ................................................................. 287

APPENDIX MM ......................................................................................................... 289

Secretary Of State Certificate Of Suspension Apr 6 2012 ................................ 289

APPENDIX NN .......................................................................................................... 290

Narrative Of Steven J. Corbett Apr 6 2012 ....................................................... 290

APPENDIX OO .......................................................................................................... 291

Confidential Screening Sheet ............................................................................. 291

APPENDIX PP ........................................................................................................... 293

Narrative Of Christopher Guay And Christopher Shaw .................................. 293


x

APPENDIX QQ .......................................................................................................... 296

Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Aug 9 2011 ....................... 296

APPENDIX RR .......................................................................................................... 297

Judgment And Commitment July 5, 2011 ......................................................... 297

APPENDIX SS ........................................................................................................... 298

Complaint AUGDC-CR-11-512/513 .................................................................... 298

APPENDIX TT ........................................................................................................... 300

Notice Of Suspension Deletion ........................................................................... 300

APPENDIX UU .......................................................................................................... 302

Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Dec. 17, 2009 ................... 302

APPENDIX VV .......................................................................................................... 303

Medical Evaluation Request NOV. 2, 2009 ........................................................ 303

APPENDIX WW......................................................................................................... 304

Driving Record 04/02/13 ..................................................................................... 304

APPENDIX XX .......................................................................................................... 305

Petition for Review of Final Agency Action MRCivP 80C ................................. 305

APPENDIX YY .......................................................................................................... 307

Motion for Reconsideration Denied .................................................................... 307

APPENDIX ZZ ........................................................................................................... 309

Defendant‟s Motion for Reconsideration ............................................................ 309

APPENDIX AAA ........................................................................................................ 310

Motion for Reconsideration ................................................................................. 310

BLACK‟S LAW, 9TH EDITION .................................................................................. 311


xi

LEGAL MAXIMS ................................................................................................ 311

DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................... 318

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.......................................................................... 325

CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH ............................................................................ 326

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by

Automobile, 1890-1950 ................................................................................. 326

STATUTES ................................................................................................................ 328

United States Code ............................................................................................. 328

Maine Revised Statutes Annotated .................................................................... 343

Other State Statutes ........................................................................................... 363

LEGISLATION .......................................................................................................... 365

11 Georgia House Bill 7 LC 34 2781 ........................................................... 365

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 216th LEGISLATURE .......................................... 369

2015 STATE OF WYOMING 15LSO-0366 ............................................... 372

State of Arizona HOUSE BILL 2410 ................................................................. 374

WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE .............................................................. 377

Iowa Code - 2015 ................................................................................................. 379

RULES ....................................................................................................................... 380

Federal Rules of Evidence .................................................................................. 380

Maine Rules of Evidence ..................................................................................... 380

Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure ................................................................... 381

Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure .................................................................. 384

Bureau of Motor Vehicle Rules ........................................................................... 387

NEWS ARTICLES ......................................................................................................... 1

FBI Releases 2013 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and

Assaulted .......................................................................................................... 1


xii

LA police win $6M settlement over ticket quotas ................................................. 3

Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Ban Police Ticket Quotas .......................... 7

Police Union Calls For Elimination Of Traffic-Ticket Quota ................................ 9

Police quotas for traffic tickets could be outlawed by state lawmakers ............. 11

Lawmakers put skids on ticket quotas, but speed traps continue ...................... 12

Bill would toughen state ban on traffic ticket quotas ......................................... 15

Former police officer exposes Chesterfield‟s ticket quota goals .......................... 18

Sheriff Lieutenant Caught on Video Saying Officers Disciplined for Not

Writing Enough Tickets ................................................................................. 21


xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

All legal authorities cited in support of Petitioner‟s arguments exist within

the supplemental documents included in the Appendix for space-saving purposes

and to adhere to the 40 page limitation for the body of the petition.


xiv

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Gina Turcotte (now known only as GinA) respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgments of the Maine Supreme Judicial, Kennebec County

Superior and Augusta District Courts and Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles.


xv

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and Kennebec County

Superior Court are reproduced in Appendix A through Appendix AAA.


xvi

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

On December 16, 2014 the Kennebec County Superior Court entered a final Order

in this case; therefore, the jurisdiction of this Court is properly invoked under 28 U.S.

Code §1257(a).


xvii

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are reprinted in the appendix

to this brief.


18

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

INTRODUCTION

Juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique

tribuere. ―These are the precepts of the law: to live honorably, not to injure another,

to render to each person his due.‖

Jus est norma recti; et quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria. ―The law

is the rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury.‖

Maxime ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque

quod maxime omnibus probetur. ―A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest

and its authority is the most certain, and because it is most approved by all.‖

This complex petition sprouted from an arbitrary decision by Secretary of

State, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Section to suspend Petitioner‟s

driver‟s license indefinitely violating the maxim Infinitum in jure reprobatur. ―That

which is endless is condemned in law.‖ on January 5, 2010 (App. UU) claiming

Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ without giving proper notices,

without holding a hearing and having no evidence of conditions permitting a lawful

suspension which resulted in a deleterious course of unconstitutional events

provoked by a requirement that Petitioner disclose protected medical information

which was then used against her as a tool to restrain and seclude her freedom of

movement and travel. Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit. ―No guilt attaches

to a person who is compelled to obey.‖ Ex turpi contractu non oritur actio. ―No action

arises from a wrongful contract.‖

In order to adhere as much as possible to the 40-page limit for the body of

this petition, its focus will be primarily on the most important factual and legal

elements of all companion cases cited herein, their interconnected and

interdependent relationships and the violations committed thereby rather than

citing ruling case law which is already abundantly cited in Petitioner‟s

supplemental documents included in all four volumes of the Appendix totaling

almost 400 pages. Due to the highly complicated nature of the cases cited herein

Petitioner requests leniency if the document slightly exceeds 40 pages. If the court


19

cannot offer leniency with regard to page length, Petitioner requests leave for extra

time to reduce its size and re-file a 40-page petition.

Maine law regarding the “privilege” of having a “driver‟s license” to use a

private automobile on public roads and the legal consequences for failing to do so

require a closer inspection under principles of the plain meaning rule. 29-A M.R.S. §

1251(1-A) says,

Residents required to obtain license. Within 30 days of becoming a

resident of this State, a person shall apply to obtain a license in accordance

with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person

who fails to comply with the requirement of this subsection and operates a

motor vehicle on a public way or parking area commits:

A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90

days; or

B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days.

According to § 1251(1-A), applying for a “driver‟s license” is compulsory for all

Maine residents over the age of 16, which is not a privilege at all. In fact it is a legal

mandate which converts the “privilege” of having a driver‟s license into a mandatory

adhesion contract over which the public traveler in a weaker position has little

choice over the license terms.

In addition to being required by state law to apply for a driver‟s license, the

weaker member of the public is also required under Motor Vehicle Rules, Ch. 3 to

disclose all private medical information that may affect any safe operation which

can be and is then used as a weapon against the individual to restrain and seclude

that person from independently traveling in public, from autonomously performing

vital activities of daily living and self-reliantly pursuing an occupation in violation

of 42 U.S. Code §§ 10801 and 10841.

In 2005 Petitioner unwillingly obeyed Motor Vehicle Rules, Ch. 3 which

Petitioner asserts to be a violation of her 1st Amendment right not to speak about

her medical issues, a violation of her right to privacy of her medical information and

a violation of her right to not be targeted or discriminated against due to a

documented medical disability. Libertas omnibus rebus favorabilior est. ―Liberty is

more favored than all things.‖ Libertas est naturalis facultas ejus quod cuique facere


20

libet, nisi quod de jure aut vi prohibetur. ―Liberty is the natural power of doing

whatever one pleases, except what is prevented by law or force.‖

On January 5, 2010 Respondent invoked 29-A M.R.S § 2458(2)(D) claiming

Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ (App. UU) solely because

Petitioner never received nor completed a medical evaluation request in November

2009 (App. VV) and which Respondent knew was not properly served upon

Petitioner personally or through public notices as evidenced in Petitioner‟s driving

record. (App. WW) A l'impossible nul n'est tenu. ―No one is bound to do what is

impossible.‖ Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. ―There is no obligation to perform

impossible things.‖

Failure to receive a piece of paper certainly cannot equate medical

incompetence.

What if Petitioner properly filed a change of address form but a Motor

Vehicle employee didn‟t change the computer address before the notice was sent?

Would Petitioner still be deemed “incompetent to drive a motor vehicle” and

deprived of the driver‟s license?

The medical suspension for “incompetence‖ commenced without any facts in

the driving record (App. WW), no official opinions of a medical professional, no

police officer report or complaint by any party expressing reasonable concerns of

risk of unsafe operation or imminent hazard to the safety and welfare of the public.

Neminem laedit qui jure suo utitur. ―A person who exercises his own rights injures

no one.‖

Contrarily, 5 days before commencing the medical suspension, Respondent

gave Petitioner a “violation free credit” on December 31, 2009 for having no traffic

offenses or accidents during 2009 which, when combined with the credits earned in

2008 (and again in 2010 posted on March 8, 2011 upon deletion of the medical

suspension) (App. WW), defeats Respondent‟s claims that Petitioner was in any way

―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖. Probandi necessitas incumbit illi qui agit.

―The necessity of proving rests on the one who sues.‖


21

Evidently, Respondent‟s primary purpose for suspending the license was to

provoke Petitioner to disclose her address and more private medical information

both being 1st Amendment violations. Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

―Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.‖ Extortio est crimen quando quis

colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus

quod est debitum. ―Extortion is a crime when, by color of office, any person extorts

what is not due, or more than due, or before the time when it is due.‖

This unconstitutional medical suspension was the direct cause for Petitioner

being charged with numerous criminal charges and civil traffic offenses during 2011

(App. RR) and 2012 (App. A, App. N) some of which have been dismissed (AUGSC-

CR-2012-286, AUGSC-CR-2012-667) and some of which have been adjudicated

against Petitioner (App. OO) by a coerced nolo contendere‘ plea (AUGDC-CR-2011-

513) or by default. Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit. ―No guilt attaches to a

person who is compelled to obey.‖ Ex turpi contractu non oritur actio. ―No action

arises from a wrongful contract.‖

When Petitioner requested the Maine Supreme Judicial Court to review the

cogency of Secretary of State‟s unjustified medical suspension without notice (App.

L), the Maine Supreme Judicial Court rendered an unreported Memorandum of

Decision (App. B) on July 29, 2014 claiming Petitioner‟s incorrect mailing address

with Bureau of Motor Vehicles at the time of the medical suspension was just cause

for denial of Petitioner‟s appeal affirming Secretary of State‟s denial of Petitioner‟s

requests for an administrative hearing to challenge the legal justification of the

medical suspension ab initio. Actus legis nemini est damnosus. ―An act of the law

prejudices no one.‖ Actus legis nemini fadt injuriam. ―An act of the law does no one

wrong.‖

Petitioner proved by a showing in the record that there was no evidentiary

basis or legal justification for an indefinite medical suspension for incompetence ab

initio and that Petitioner was never provided required notices in 2009, 2010 or 2011

of her right to request and opportunity for a hearing.


22

Maine Supreme Judicial Court said, ―The record does not reflect any civil or

criminal charge related to that [medical] suspension, or that she was otherwise

affected by the suspension.‖ (App. B) This retort by the court is abundantly

contradicted in the record showing Petitioner was convicted of a strict liability Class

E crime after entering a coerced plea of nolo contendere‘ on July 5, 2011 for a

violation date of February 10, 2011 for Operating After Suspension under 29-A

M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A) directly resulting from two unconstitutional traffic stops on

February 10, 2011 and March 7, 2011 which revealed the existence of the medical

suspension of January 5, 2010 and which served as Petitioner‟s first knowledge of

the medical suspension. Ignorantia praesumitur ubi scientia non probatur.

―Ignorance is presumed where knowledge is not proved.‖

The record shows Secretary of State failed to invoke proper authority under

29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) to indefinitely suspend a driver‟s license for failure to comply

with a medical evaluation request. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ―The

expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.‖

This petition respectfully requests the Supreme Court to thoroughly review a

labyrinth of companion cases involving administrative, civil and criminal law all of

which interfered with Petitioner‟s rights to speak, to be heard, to have privacy of

her medical information, to be free from discrimination based on her disability, to

enjoy equal protection of the law, to enjoy her freedom of movement and right to

travel, to not be deprived of due process, to have prompt, lawful and fair hearings,

to discover and present evidence of her innocence, to confront all accusers, to have

effective assistance of counsel, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and

not be subjected to any kind of involuntary servitude by use of the law or the legal

process. Actus curiae neminem gravabit. ―An act of the court will prejudice no one.‖

Actus legis nemini est damnosus. ―An act of the law prejudices no one.‖ Actus legis

nemini fadt injuriam. ―An act of the law does no one wrong.‖

Respondent, the court and Petitioner‟s legal counsel exploited Petitioner‟s

legal ignorance and violated appellate rules by coercing Petitioner to agree to a one-


23

year deferred disposition on December 18, 2013 under 17-A M.R.S. § 1348 et seq.

(App. O) despite all parties knowing Petitioner filed a proper appeal on December 5,

2013 challenging the court‟s denial of her 3rd Motion to Dismiss. (App. R) Acta

exteriora indicant interiora secreta. ―Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden

within.‖

After Kennebec County Superior Court unfailingly refused to grant any of

Petitioner‟s five (5) motions to dismiss filed between August 27, 2012 and January

29, 2014 (App. K, P, R, AA, KK), notwithstanding any of Petitioner‟s appeals to the

Law Court, her Motion to Reconsider and her rescission of the deferred disposition

agreement for fraud (App. J), the final judgment upon which this petition is based is

the December 16, 2014 final dismissal of Count 2 (App. A) after Petitioner

successfully completed an unconstitutional and deceitfully coerced one-year

deferred disposition contract which egregiously violated Petitioner‟s rights, rules of

court and appellate procedures. Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta. ―Outward

acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.‖

Petitioner was forced to labor under involuntary servitude to the court by the

use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process from February 10, 2011

until December 16, 2014 forcing Petitioner to defend against frivolous criminal

charges directly resulting from Secretary of State‟s unconstitutional license

suspension which was commenced without legal justification, notice, hearing or due

process of law. Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur. ―The judge is condemned

when the guilty party is acquitted.‖

Medical Suspension

More than 1,900 days ago on November 2, 2009, Petitioner was unwillingly

transient due to the epidemic of substandard residential housing when State of

Maine Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles Medical Review Section sent a

Request for Medical Evaluation under 29-A MRSA § 1258(3) to ―determine the

competency of a person to operate a motor vehicle‖ to Petitioner‟s last reported


24

address requiring a routine progress report be completed about her medical

condition. (App. VV)

Respondent‟s request for a medical evaluation and other medical data serves

as prima facie evidence of Respondent‟s documented knowledge that Petitioner is a

member of a class of people with disabilities protected under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and The PAIMI Act 42 U.S. Code § 9501, § 10801 and § 10841.

United States Postal Service returned Bureau of Motor Vehicles November

10, 2009 letter (App. VV) requesting a medical evaluation as undeliverable (App.

WW), then on December 17, 2009, the Medical Review Section mailed a Notice of

Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing (App. QQ) to the same address as the

previously returned notice. This notice of suspension was also returned by the

United States Postal Service on December 29, 2009 as undeliverable. (App. WW)

The record does not show that public notices of request for medical evaluation or the

suspension and opportunity for hearing were posted to comply with due process

requirements as required by 5 MRSA § 9052(3).

Bureau of Motor Vehicles previously credited Petitioner‟s record with two

“violation free credits” for committing no traffic offenses in 2008 and 2009 which

were issued on December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009, respectively. (App. WW)

Only 5 days after the issuance of the second violation free credit, the Medical

Review Section indefinitely suspended Petitioner‟s driver‟s license on January 5,

2010 under 29-A MRSA § 2458(2)(D), failing to invoke proper authority under 29-A

M.R.S. § 1258(5), claiming Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ due

to Petitioner‟s “failure to comply with a medical evaluation request” despite having

prima facie evidence twice recorded in Petitioner‟s driving record (App. WW) that

the medical evaluation request and notice of suspension were never properly served

or received by Petitioner. The record reflects no evidence of incompetency, risk of

dangerous operation or medical opinion in support of an indefinite license

suspension.


25

Petitioner traveled safely in her private automobile until March 7, 2011 not

knowing the driver‟s license had been suspended for medical reasons.

AUGDC-CR-2011-513

On February 10, 2011 Petitioner was stopped by a police officer for a de

minimus traffic violation without probable cause of criminal conduct at which time

Petitioner was released from the scene with a traffic ticket for failure to obey a

traffic control device. (App. WW) The officer never indicated any problems with the

driver‟s license or registration paperwork.

AUGDC-CR-2011-512

On March 7, 2011 Petitioner was stopped in the same place around the same

time by the same police officer again with no probable cause of criminal conduct.

The officer expressly said he stopped Petitioner this time because after the

February 10th traffic stop1 he discovered the Medical Review Section had suspended

the license for medical reasons on January 5, 2010. The officer used Petitioner‟s

medical information to initiate a traffic stop on March 7 which violated Petitioner‟s

rights under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act and the PAIMI

Act.

The officer admitted having no other information nor did he provide required

actual notice as required by 5 M.R.S. § 9052(4), 29-A M.R.S. § 112 and 29-A M.R.S. §

2482(2) before issuing Petitioner two strict liability „criminal‟ summonses for

operating after suspension under 29-A MRSA § 2412-A(1-A), one for February 10

(AUGDC-CR-2011-513) and the other for March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512).

(App. SS)

29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A does not expressly criminalize ―operating after medical

suspension‖ nor ―failing to complete medical evaluation‖, but it does restrict failure

1 The officer said bureau of motor vehicles database was offline at the time of the February

10 stop and when he gained access at a later time the officer discover Petitioner‟s license was

suspended.


26

to pay a fine, failure to pay a license reinstatement fee or suspension for a

dishonored check as a “traffic infraction” with maximum statutory civil penalties.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. ―The expression of one thing is the exclusion of

another.‖ Exclusion of the medical suspension as a qualifying prior offense under §

2412-A(1-A) nullifies all charges ab initio.

Petitioner was not arrested and was allowed to find a licensed driver to bring

her and her car home.

Petitioner contacted the Motor Vehicles Medical Review Section upon her

arrival home on March 7 and asked how to resolve the suspension. The Medical

Review Section did not tell Petitioner the suspension was for “incompetency to drive

a motor vehicle‖ under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) nor was she informed of her right

to request an administrative hearing pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9052, 29-A M.R.S. §§

112, 2482 or 2483 to challenge the base of the medical suspension. Ignorantia

excusatur non juris sed facti. ―Ignorance of fact is excused but not ignorance of law.‖

Petitioner satisfied the medical evaluation request on March 8, 2011

resulting in the medical suspension being “deleted” (App. WW) from the driving

record and the license being restored the same day without any reinstatement fees,

fines, penalties or demerit points. Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta.

―Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.‖

Also on March 8, 2011 Bureau of Motor Vehicles credited Petitioner‟s driving

record with a 3rd ―violation free credit‖ for the year ending December 31, 2010. (App.

WW)

Petitioner‟s medical evaluation showed Petitioner ended all pharmaceuticals

in 2006 and that there had been no medical risk of adverse operation in 2009 or

thereafter to justify the medical suspension for “incompetency”.

Petitioner went to the Office of District Attorney on March 8, 2011 to request

all charges be dismissed due to the medical suspension being deleted that day which

effectively nullified its effect for ensuing criminal prosecutions. The Office of

District Attorney refused to drop the charges and forced a criminal arraignment in


27

district court on July 5, 2011 on two Class E strict liability criminal charges of

operating after suspension under 29-A § MRSA 2412-A(1-A).

On July 5, 2011 Petitioner moved for a dismissal of all charges after giving

the district court judge a certified copy of the driving record printed on that day to

show no suspensions existed on February 10 and March 7, 2011. (App. WW) The

court mistakenly interpreted a June 28, 2011 license suspension for failure to pay

the fine resulting from the de minimus infraction from February 10, 2011 as the

necessary prior offense to support the criminal charges from February 10 and

March 7, 2011. Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur. ―Defendants are

rather to be favored than plaintiffs.‖ Ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis.

―The ignorance of the judge is the misfortune of the innocent.‖ Ignorare legis est lata

culpa. ―To be ignorant of the law is gross neglect of it.‖ Impius et crudelis judicandus

est qui libertat; non favet. ―A person is to be judged impious and cruel who does not

favor liberty.‖

Assistant District Attorney Steven Parker coerced Petitioner‟s plea of nolo

contendere by threatening imprisonment on both counts without benefit of counsel.

The District Attorney offered dismissal of the March 7th charge in exchange for a

guilty plea to the February 10th count of operating after suspension. Petitioner

entered a plea of nolo contendere, vis compulsiva. Acta exteriora indicant interiora

secreta. ―Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within.‖

On December 2, 2011, Petitioner was conducting personal court business at

the Augusta District Court when she was ordered into the courtroom by a judge to

explain Petitioner‟s failure to pay the fine associated with the March 7th operating

after suspension charge. Petitioner expressly claimed the charge was illegal, invalid

and charged against her in violation of her right to due process. The judge expressly

told Petitioner she had two choices: 1) pay the fine, or 2) go to jail the judge thereby

violating Actus curiae neminem gravabit. ―An act of the court will prejudice no one.‖

Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit. ―No guilt attaches to a person who

is compelled to obey.‖


28

Petitioner expressly reserved her rights and told the court she took exception

to being threatened with being kidnapped for failure to pay a fine for an action that

was not a crime and that was illegally judged against her. Petitioner expressly

declared her intention to pay the fine vis compulsiva only to stay out of jail which

she did before leaving the courthouse. Libertas omnibus rebus favorabilior est.

―Liberty is more favored than all things.‖ Quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis est,

secundum libertatem respondendum erit. ―Whenever there is an interpretation

doubtful as to liberty (or slavery), the decision must be in favor of liberty.‖

Petitioner has refused to pay any other costs or reinstatement fees related to

those charges or to restore the driver‟s license which expired December 17, 2012.

(App. WW)

Consequently, as a direct result of Respondent‟s aggressive prosecution of

AUGDC-CR-2011-513, Petitioner was forced by those legal circumstances to travel

with impunity without a „driver‟s license‟ in her private unregistered automobile

exercising her inherent right to freedom of movement and unencumbered travel in

order to attend to her activities of daily living. Neminem laedit qui jure suo utitur.

―A person who exercises his own rights injures no one.‖

Petitioner traveled safely without a driver‟s license in her private

unregistered automobile with no negative interactions with law enforcement until

February 16, 2012 when Augusta Police Officer Christopher Guay saw Petitioner‟s

unregistered private automobile parked on a public road during a roving patrol and

decided Petitioner was engaging in suspicious or criminal conduct justifying the

officer‟s attention. (App. PP)

In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur. ―All

presumptions are in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.‖

Ofc. Christopher Guay and Petitioner had had negative official contacts prior

to February 16, 2012 which were prejudicial against Petitioner causing Petitioner to

file a sworn affidavit with the Augusta Police Department in November 2011


29

swearing to the truth of a situation which was misrepresented by Ofc. Guay. (App.

Y)

Petitioner has also had many prior prejudicial interactions with other

Augusta police officers arising from civil disturbance calls placed by Petitioner

against disruptive tenants in or around her various residences. Most of those civil

calls were minimized or ignored by the police department to Petitioner‟s detriment.

(App. Y)

AUGSC-CR-2012-286 / KEN-14-18 / KEN-14-151

On February 16, 2012 Petitioner parked her private automobile in a public

parking spot at curbside on a main street while she was inside visiting a friend.

During a roving patrol, Augusta Police Ofc. Christopher Guay passed Petitioner‟s

automobile and noticed it was unregistered and instead displayed a private sign

that said “private, peaceful”, which he admitted in the police report he had seen that

type of “plate” in prior official police emails and which the officer suspected was

evidence of some sort of terroristic “sovereign citizen” activity, criminal conduct or

another reason to park his patrol car in order to constantly observe Petitioner‟s

automobile while waiting for Petitioner to return to her automobile. (App. PP)

Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertat; non favet. ―A person is to be judged

impious and cruel who does not favor liberty.‖

Once Petitioner returned and began to move her automobile over public

roads, the officer immediately followed and reported in his narrative, ―I am aware

that people who claim to be ‗sovereign citizens‘ display these types of plates.‖ For that

sole reason the officer ―called in a traffic stop, the reason for the stop, and activated

[his] blue emergency lights‖. After Petitioner stopped her car within one-tenth of a

mile after the officer first signaled for her to pull over, the officer approached and

―told Turcotte that [he] had stopped her for having a false plate attached to her

vehicle.‖ (App. PP) Ignorare legis est lata culpa. ―To be ignorant of the law is gross

neglect of it.‖ In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur. ―All

presumptions are in favor of life, liberty, and innocence.‖


30

After repeatedly explaining the law to the officers, refusing to exit her vehicle

under protections of the 4th Amendment and expressly asserting her right to travel

and be secure against unwarranted searches and seizures, Petitioner was forcibly

removed through her car window with minimal force by three officers. (App. PP)

Petitioner was arrested and booked for one count operating after suspension,

illegal attachment of plates, refusing to submit to arrest and released a few hours

later on a $300 bail bond.

AUGSC-CR-2012-667

On April 5, 2012 Petitioner was stopped by Ofc. Steven Corbett in Oakland

Maine for having no inspection sticker. (App. NN) Upon initial inquiry Petitioner

told the officer she did not have a license, registration nor insurance.

The officer repeatedly demanded Petitioner exit her vehicle which Petitioner

refused under protections of the 4th Amendment. The officer told Petitioner if she

did not exit her vehicle the officer would break her car window and she would be

forcibly removed. (App. NN)

Petitioner repeatedly refused to exit her vehicle prompting the officer to walk

to the trunk of his cruiser to retrieve a tool and then started walking back toward

Petitioner‟s car with what appeared to be a pry bar or other dangerous weapon.

Petitioner watched the officer‟s actions in her car mirrors reasonably fearing

for her safety due to the fact that she was alone in an isolated residential area with

a police officer who appeared to have a dangerous weapon who stated his intention

to break her car window to use excessive force to extract her from her car over

jagged glass for an inspection sticker violation.

In her desperate attempt to escape serious bodily injury Petitioner moved her

car and left the scene traveling to the Oakland Police Department. The officer gave

chase and called for backup which quickly gave pursuit with lights and sirens

trekking no more than half a mile to the Oakland Police Department.

Petitioner stopped two-tenths of a mile past the police station at the end of a

dead-end street in a private parking lot of a steel recycling yard. Petitioner chose to


31

surrender on private property under camera surveillance with other private people

present for her own safety and welfare.

Petitioner exited her car with both hands raised above her head showing no

resistance as the two patrol vehicles entered the parking lot. Sgt. Rick Stubbert

exited his police SUV with his gun drawn and pointed at Petitioner ordering her to

drop to the ground. (App. NN) As they approached Petitioner laying on the ground,

Sgt. Stubbert asked Ofc. Corbett what the nature of the situation was when Ofc.

Corbett said, ―Oh, it‘s a constitutional rights issue and I just violated all of hers…‖

Petitioner complied with all requests without any resistance, was handcuffed,

arrested and booked on one count violating conditions of release, operating after

suspension, improper plates, and failure to stop for an officer.

Petitioner was eventually transported to county jail and released 18 hours

later on April 6 at 12pm on a $1,500 bail bond.

At the arraignment, Petitioner requested and the court ordered court-

appointed counsel but the first two attorneys (Stephen Bourget, Lisa Whittier)

withdrew after objecting to Petitioner‟s defense strategy to retroactively challenge

the January 2010 medical suspension. Both attorneys disclaimed the validity of

Petitioner‟s strategy and refused to give any assistance in that regard.

Petitioner‟s third court-appointed counsel, Harold Hainke, Esq., was assigned

by the court on May 21, 2012 under a written contract with Petitioner as “stand-by

counsel” (App. F) only with a clear understanding by all that Petitioner was going to

direct the course of all proceedings, draft and present all motions, interview all

witnesses, speak with Respondent and the court in all matters, and would be

responsible for all trial activities before and during trial with express exception to

court rules, laws and case precedent for which Petitioner relied on Mr. Hainke‘s legal

expertise and duty of care under the 6th Amendment. Mr. Hainke also agreed in

writing that he would not communicate in any way on Petitioner‟s behalf with the

court or Respondent without Petitioner‟s inclusion and explicit permission.


32

At no time did any of Petitioner‟s three attorneys request or advise her to

request a probable cause hearing or to file a motion to suppress the evidence and

dismiss the charges. In this regard at the very least, Petitioner was denied effective

assistance of counsel ab initio in violation of the 6th Amendment which was a direct

and proximate cause of Petitioner being held in involuntary servitude to the court

for more than 1000 days in violation of the 13th Amendment.

On their way to court in June or July 2012 and after listening to Petitioner‟s

facts about the lack of proper notice of the medical suspension, Mr. Hainke boldly

told Petitioner her cases would never be dismissed in Kennebec County Superior

Court and he further said, ―GinA, you will NOT get these charges dismissed in

Superior Court. You will need to appeal your case all the way to the Supreme Court

of the United States if you want any justice.‖

Petitioner passionately chided Mr. Hainke‟s repudiation and vowed to get all

criminal charges dismissed at the superior court level with or without his help.

Mr. Hainke suggested Petitioner request post-conviction review of AUGDC-

CR-2011-513 (App. LL) and file a petition under MRCivP 80C for Review of Final

Agency Action (App. V) of Secretary of State‟s decision to medically suspend the

license for incompetence without evidentiary support.

AUGSC-CR-2012-553

On July 6, 2012, acting upon advice from Mr. Hainke, Petitioner filed a

Petition for Post-Conviction Review seeking post-conviction review of the July 5,

2011 operating after suspension conviction in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 (and dismissed

AUGDC-CR-2011-512) under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A) which were a direct result

of the January 5, 2010 medical suspension. (App. LL)

On August 27, 2012 Petitioner filed her first Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Evidence, Failure to Follow Due Process of Law and Violation of Constitutionally

Protected Rights in AUGSC-CR-2012-286. (App. KK) The court ignored Petitioner‟s

motion and never offered any opportunity to be heard on her grounds for dismissal.


33

Mr. Hainke offered no assistance in getting this motion heard nor did he urge

the court to hold a proper probable cause or suppression hearing.

On September 13, 2012 Petitioner‟s petition for post-conviction review of the

July 5, 2011 nolo contendere plea in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 was summarily

dismissed by Justice William Anderson stating, ―While coercion or duress in

securing the plea is cognizable grounds for post-conviction review, State v. Huntley,

676 A.2d 501,503 (Me. 1996), it appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner

no longer labors under any restraint or impediment that would satisfy the statute's

jurisdictional prerequisite, because she paid her fine on December 2, 2011, and she is

not currently incarcerated or subject to other restraint or impediment. See 15 M.R.S.

§ 2124 (requiring "present restraint or other specified impediment" as defined by

statute). Petitioner does not allege, and the Court cannot discern, any additional

restraint or impediment to which she is subject. The petition must therefore be

summarily dismissed.‖ (App. JJ)

On October 5, 2012 Petitioner filed Petitioner‟s Motion to Reconsider Petition

for Post-Conviction Review of AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and AUGDC-CR-2011-513 in

AUGSC-CR-2012-553. (App. II)

Petitioner also filed her Request for Discovery on the same day in AUGSC-

CR-2012-286 and AUGSC-CR-2012-667 to the District Attorney‟s office with an

extensive list of electronic evidence Petitioner was seeking to challenge probable

cause from both Augusta and Oakland police departments. (App. Y, Pg. 120a)

On October 31, 2012 Justice William Anderson denied Petitioner‟s Motion To

Reconsider Petition For Post-Conviction Review stating, ―Petitioner‘s election to pay

the fine rather than go to jail took her out of the purview of the post-conviction review

statute.‖ (App. HH) Actus curiae neminem gravabit. ―An act of the court will

prejudice no one.‖

On February 11, 2013 Petitioner and Mr. Hainke met with the newly elected

District Attorney to discuss dismissal of all charges. After hearing Petitioner‟s

defenses, the District Attorney and Mr. Hainke attempted to coerce Petitioner to


34

plead guilty to the Augusta operating after suspension and refusing to submit to

arrest charges, pay a $250 fine and perform fifty hours of community service.

Petitioner categorically rejected the plea offer and demanded a full dismissal.

On March 4, 2013 Petitioner filed her 2nd Request for Discovery reiterating

her demand to receive an extensive list of electronic and paper evidence from both

police departments which she had not received despite her first demand in 2012.

Petitioner never received several pieces of exculpatory evidence from both police

departments to challenge the officers‟ probable cause including audios and printed

transcripts of dispatch calls in the both February and April 2012 traffic stops.

Upon Petitioner‟s first opportunity to review some of Respondent‟s paper

evidence in mid-March 2013, she learned for the first time the reason for the

medical suspension was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ under 29-A MRSA §

2458(2)(D) and about her right to request an administrative hearing from Secretary

of State Bureau of Motor Vehicle Medical Review Section. Ignorantia juris sui non

praejudicat juri. ―Ignorance of one's right does not prejudice the right.‖ Ignorantia

excusatur non juris sed facti. ―Ignorance of fact is excused but not ignorance of law.‖

On March 18, 2013, acting upon this newly discovered evidence, Petitioner

sent her first Request for Administrative Hearing (App. GG) to Bureau of Motor

Vehicles Hearing Section indicating the medical suspension was commenced

―without a reasonable basis, without giving proper notices, and without following

due process.‖ Motor Vehicles responded by saying Petitioner‟s ―current suspensions‖

do not allow for an administrative hearing. (App. FF)

On March 28, 2013 Petitioner sent a Demand for Administrative Hearing for

Prior Administrative (Medical) Suspension (App. EE) again claiming the medical

suspension ―was commenced in violation of due process, without sufficient evidence

to support the suspension, and proper notices were not served prior to the effective

date of the suspension of January 5, 2010.‖ Motor Vehicles claimed the request was

untimely because the medical suspension was terminated two years prior. (App.

DD)


35

On April 8, 2013 Petitioner sent Motor Vehicles a Notice of Violation of

Procedural Due Process and a third demand for administrative hearing (App. CC) to

challenge the basis of the medical suspension giving Motor Vehicles proper notice

that they were intentionally and knowingly violating Petitioner‟s right to due

process as protected by the 5th and 14th Amendments. Motor Vehicles affirmed their

denial of the request for administrative hearing as untimely indicating it

represented final agency action which was reviewable by Superior Court under

MRCivP 80C and 5 MRSA § 11001 – 11008. (App. BB)

AP-13-17 / KEN-13-514

On April 22, 2013 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of Final Agency

Action in Kennebec County Superior Court under MRCivP 80C and 5 M.R.S. §

11001 – 11008. (App. XX)

Petitioner also filed her 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process

Violations (App. AA) and Affidavit in Support of 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery

and Due Process Violations (App. Z, X) in AUGSC-CR-2012-286 and AUGSC-CR-

2012-667.

On April 29, 2013, Ofc. Steven Corbett, the arresting officer in AUGSC-CR-

2012-667, died unexpectedly which was not known by nor disclosed to Petitioner

until the day of trial on December 18, 2013.

On May 2nd Petitioner filed Defendant‟s 2nd Affidavit in Support of

Defendant‟s 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations. (App.

Y)

Petitioner requested the court grant a stay in AUGSC-CR-2012-286 and

AUGSC-CR-2012-667 pending the outcome of the 80C petition, which the court

granted on May 28, 2013. (App. W)

On July 31, 2013 the Office of Attorney General filed the Secretary of State‟s

Response Brief in the 80C action claiming Petitioner‟s request for administrative

hearing was untimely. (App. U) Petitioner‟s Reply Brief was filed on August 14,

2013. (App. T)


36

On October 24, 2013, Kennebec County Superior Court denied Petitioner‟s

80C petition and affirmed Secretary of State‟s denial of an administrative hearing.

(App. S) which Petitioner appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court on

November 1, 2013.

On December 3, 2013 Petitioner filed her 3rd Motion to Dismiss with

Prejudice for Discovery and Due Process Violations (App. R) in AUGSC-CR-2012-

286 and AUGSC-CR-2012-667 which was heard and swiftly denied on December 5,

2013 by Justice Marden which Petitioner immediately appealed on that day and

properly notified all parties.

On December 17, 2013 Respondent offered to drop Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7

against Petitioner if Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to Count 2 operating after

suspension and pay a $250 fine. (App. Q) This plea offer was made in violation of

Appellate Rule 3(b).

Petitioner categorically rejected the plea offer and demanded a full dismissal.

On December 18, 2013 Petitioner appeared in court ready for trial when she

was informed by Respondent that all charges were dismissed except for Count 2, the

February 16, 2012 operating after suspension charge. It was at that time that

Respondent first informed Petitioner that Oakland Police Ofc. Steven Corbett had

died earlier that year and was not available to give testimony for Counts 4, 5, 6 and

7; therefore, Respondent was forced to dismiss all charges in AUGSC-CR-2012-667.

(App. O)

Respondent gave no explanation for their dismissal of Counts 1 and 3.

Respondent also notified Petitioner that they were moving to quash

Petitioner‟s witness Augusta Police Ofc. Eric DosSantos who was being called to

testify about his decision to summons Petitioner on February 10 and March 7, 2011

with two operating after suspension crimes resulting from his knowledge of the

medical suspension which goes directly to the validity of the pending criminal

charges challenging Respondent‟s capacity to move forward on Count 2 without any

supporting evidence or the foundation of Count 1, Improper Plate. Petitioner


37

explained that dismissal of Count 1 vitiates Count 2 because Count 1 allegedly gave

the officer probable cause leading to Counts 2 and 3.

Petitioner extensively explained the legal dynamics of the 2010 medical

suspension and how it triggered a series of legal events leading up to that day;

Respondent replied by offering Petitioner a one-year deferred disposition on Count 2

despite knowing Petitioner appealed the court‟s denial of her 3rd Motion to Dismiss

on December 5 which was still pending in the state supreme court.

Respondent exploited Petitioner‟s legal ignorance when Mr. Hainke failed in

his legal duty by not informing Petitioner, Respondent and the court that no trial

can occur, no plea agreement can be offered, no guilty plea can be accepted and no

entry of a deferred disposition agreement can occur pursuant to MRAppP 3(b) while

Petitioner‟s appeal was pending in the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

Despite the court‟s and Respondent‟s knowledge of Petitioner‟s pending

appeal of denial of her 3rd Motion to Dismiss filed December 5, the court used non-

disclosure to coercively persuade Petitioner to enter a conditional plea of guilty to

Count 2 under a one-year deferred disposition with agreement the Petitioner could

withdraw her guilty plea and the charge would be dismissed if Petitioner conforms

to the terms of the agreement and remains under control of the court until final

judgment on December 16, 2014. (App. O)

Interestingly, Respondent again deviated from usual course of proceedings in

deferred disposition cases by waiving all supervision fees, waiving all community

service requirements and waiving all penalties and fines against Petitioner. These

waivers leads a reasonable person to speculate about Respondent‟s motivation to

force Petitioner to labor unwillingly under judicial control and involuntary

servitude for 365 more days.

Some elements that should be considered when reviewing the deferred

disposition agreement is that Petitioner was forced to surrender to control of the

court or Respondent for 365 more days without any remedies other than a petition

to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor did Respondent include any


38

sanctions, penalties or punishments whatsoever for actions which were ultimately

based on Petitioner‟s medical condition.

Involuntary servitude is defined as the condition of one forced to labor for pay

or not for another by coercion or imprisonment. Labor is defined as work of any type,

including mental exertion and work is defined as physical and mental exertion to

attain an end such as Petitioner‟s work and labor to obtain her freedom from control

of the court.

On January 13, 2014, more than a month after Petitioner filed her December

5, 2013 appeal of the denial of her 3rd Motion to Dismiss, the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court entered a decision which said in part, ―Once Turcotte filed her notice

of appeal, the court was prohibited from taking any further action, including

accepting the guilty plea or entering the deferred disposition. M.R.App.P 3(b)”. (App.

M) Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur. ―Defendants are rather to be

favored than plaintiffs.‖

Despite the Maine Supreme Judicial Court acknowledging the trial court

lacked authority to proceed pending appeal, it misconstrued the timeline of events

on December 18, 2013 surrounding the deferred disposition negotiations and said,

―In order to effectuate the intent of the parties and the court, however, this Court will

provide relief from the rules pursuant to M.R. App. P 14(c)‖. (App. M) Impius et

crudelis judicandus est qui libertat; non favet. ―A person is to be judged impious and

cruel who does not favor liberty.‖

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court‟s suspension of the rules to validate an

unconstitutional contract leads a reasonable person to speculate about the court‟s

subtly vindictive motivations affecting the outcome of Petitioner‟s cases which

directly infringed Petitioner‟s rights to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.

On January 17, 2014 Petitioner filed her Appeal Brief (App. L) with Maine

Supreme Judicial Court regarding Kennebec County Superior Court‟s denial of

Petitioner‟s 80C petition for Review of Final Agency Action denying administrative


39

hearings by Bureau of Motor Vehicles to challenge the January 2010 medical

suspension.

State of Maine Office of Attorney General filed Secretary of State‟s Reply

Brief on January 28, 2014 again alleging Petitioner‟s request was untimely.

On January 29, 2014 Petitioner filed Defendant‟s Rescission of Agreement

Under Deferred Disposition (App. J) and her 4th Motion to Dismiss (App. K) with

Kennebec County Superior Court declaring the deferred disposition was coerced and

entered into in violation of rules of appellate procedure in willful violation of

Petitioner‟s right to substantive and procedural due process.

On February 11, 2014 Superior Court held a hearing on Petitioner‟s 4th

Motion to Dismiss and Rescission of Deferred Disposition Agreement at which time

both pleadings were denied and the invalid deferred disposition was affirmed.

Ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis. ―The ignorance of the judge is the

misfortune of the innocent.‖ Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur. ―The judge is

condemned when the guilty party is acquitted.‖

On March 10, 2014 Petitioner filed four appeals once again challenging the

superior court‟s denial of her 3rd Motion to Dismiss on December 5, 2013, her

Rescission of Deferred Disposition and 4th Motion to Dismiss, and appealing the

Superior Court‟s interpretation of the Law Court‟s January 13, 2014 Order which

said the superior court had no authority to enter the deferred disposition but yet the

Law Court affirmed the deferred disposition in violation of appellate rules.

On March 11, 2014 Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (App. YY)

with the Maine Supreme Judicial Court seeking reconsideration of the Law Court‟s

January 13, 2014 Order of Dismissal of Petitioner‟s December 5, 2013 appeal of

Justice Marden‟s denial of Petitioner‟s 3rd Motion to Dismiss.

On March 12, 2014 Petitioner filed Defendant‟s Motion for Reconsideration

and Imperative Judicial Notice Violation of Maine Code of Judicial Conduct (App.

ZZ) with Kennebec County Superior Court clearly reiterating the Law Court‟s


40

statement that ―once Turcotte filed her notice of appeal, the court was prohibited

from taking any further action…‖

On March 20, 2014 the Superior Court denied Petitioner‟s Motion for

Reconsideration (App. AAA) saying ―the Order issued 2/11/14 was based upon the

Court‘s interpretation of the Law Court‘s Order dated 1/13/14 …in which the Law

Court SUSPENDED the operation of M.R. App. P 3(b) retroactive to Dec. 5, 2013.‖

On April 15, 2014 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed Petitioner‟s

appeals as interlocutory because the deferred disposition was still pending. (App. G)

On May 4, 2014 Harold Hainke, Esq. filed a Motion to Withdraw (App. E, F)

stating in part, ―Her other cases have been dismissed pursuant to the Deferred

Disposition Agreement. While Ms. Turcotte still opposes the position of the Superior

Court in denying her request to withdraw her agreement to the Deferred Disposition

and the Law Court in denying her appeal of that decision, there are not any matters

pending which would require immediate legal consultation.‖

On May 16, 2014 Petitioner filed her Judicial Notice of Non-Opposition (App.

D) to Harold Hainke‟s Motion to Withdraw stating in part, ―On December 18, 2013,

Harold Hainke said, ‗GinA, I don‘t know how you did it but you did it! You got all

the charges dismissed!‘ Throughout this entire case history, Harold Hainke has

declared that he ‗is not my attorney‘ and has no obligation to protect my rights.

Despite Harold Hainke repeatedly denying any attorney-client status, he has

repeatedly sent and accepted written communications from the court and knowingly

communicated with the court, Joelle Pratt and other parties about this case expressly

failing in all his legal duties. Harold Hainke‘s legal role has been de minimus

having had no impact on the current ‗dismissed‘ status…‖

On June 2, 2014 Petitioner filed an Objection and Imperative Judicial Notice

(App. C) making known her opposition to Mr. Hainke being paid for any legal

services due to his breach of contract, attempt to coerce Petitioner into guilty pleas

and his claim that he was not required to protect Petitioner‟s rights during the

proceedings.


41

On July 29, 2014 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court issued a Memorandum

of Decision (App. B) affirming Superior Court‟s upholding the Secretary of State‟s

denial of Petitioner‟s request for administrative hearing on the medical suspension.

Finally, on December 16, 2014, 1406 days after the first criminal charge was

filed in Augusta District Court in AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513, Petitioner appeared in

Kennebec County Superior Court where Count 2 of AUGSC-CR-2012-286 was

dismissed (App. A) and all conditions were released.

However, Petitioner now needs to act under MRCivP Rule 60(b) and

retroactively challenge the unlawful conviction in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 (App. RR)

for the coerced nolo contendere‘ plea (App. OO) on July 5, 2011 which directly

resulted from the 2010 medical suspension. The conviction of AUGDC-CR-2011-513

rebuts Maine Supreme Judicial Court‟s contention that ―The record does not reflect

any civil or criminal charge related to that [medical] suspension, or that she was

otherwise affected by the suspension.‖

There can be no question Petitioner exhausted all remedies within the Maine

state court system and with Secretary of State in her attempt to receive a proper

hearing on the medical suspension which triggered these course of events leading to

nine criminal charges plus various civil violations.

Notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of Secretary of State‟s actions, there

was never any suspicion of nor actual criminal conduct in any of Petitioner‟s actions

which would have given Respondent justification for filing any criminal charges.

All charges referenced herein directly resulted from the unconstitutional

medical suspension which was basically an administrative error by Secretary of

State which grew into a multitude of violations of Petitioner‟s rights as protected by

the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the PAIMI Act, Civil Rights

Act and others.

Most importantly, Petitioner is a lifetime resident of Augusta Maine and not

known as a violent or dangerous individual in any way and does not have any kind

of history which would justify any aggressive actions against her by police.


42

However, Petitioner is well known to law enforcement for her civil outspokenness

from prior interactions and her complaints of disturbances by other tenants at her

various previous residences.

It was during those civil interactions and patrolling Petitioner‟s neighborhood

that various Augusta police officers first took notice of the “peaceful, private” sign on

her private automobile which was always parked immediately adjacent to a main

road which police heavily patrol notwithstanding the numerous civil calls at

Petitioner‟s property.

Petitioner asserts that the traffic violation “automobile exceptions” to the 4th

Amendment, the licensing requirements under 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(1-A), and

mandatory registration of private property under 29-A M.R.S. § 351 was the

triggering factor which gave the officers assumed authority to follow, seize and

arrest Petitioner absent any evidence, facts, suspicion or belief of criminal conduct

simply because she did not have proper licensing papers or registration plates and

which allegedly gave Respondent authority to file several criminal charges against

her.

Petitioner asserts and provides evidence herein in the form of recently

passed legislation, newspaper articles, press releases and other public information

sources as shown in the Appendix Pgs. 342a-391a that automobile exceptions to the

4th Amendment have caused an evolving endemic of official abuse of the traffic

violation exceptions by police departments as well as the courts which have

prompted no less than seven (7) states to propose or enact statewide legislation

outlawing traffic citation quota systems within all police departments.

Petitioner asserts that if the original intent of the Constitution and stare

decisis et non quieta movere had been carefully honored by the Supreme Court when

applying 4th Amendment principles to all prior rulings involving de minimus traffic

violations and maintaining prohibition of all stops, searches, and seizures absent

reasonable suspicion or probable cause based on specific and articulable facts that

criminal conduct is afoot, none of the criminal charges would have been filed


43

against Petitioner and she would not have been held in conditions of involuntary

servitude to the court for more than 1000 days for frivolous criminal charges by use

or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

1. There are multiple questions of constitutional violations arising from the legal

issues in all companion cases herein tantamount to egregious, outrageous and

malicious conduct by government and court officials during interactions with a

known disabled individual constituting a matter of great public importance.

A. Petitioner was deprived of her freedom of speech and right to be

heard under the 1st Amendment, her right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures under the 4th Amendment,

her right to not incriminate herself under the 5th Amendment and

her right to due process under the 5th and 14th Amendments

caused by Secretary of State’s failure to serve Petitioner with a

notice of driver’s license suspension and opportunity for hearing

resulting in Respondent accusing Petitioner of numerous

criminal charges.

Petitioner was deprived of multiple rights and protections under the

Constitution and other federal authorities such as the Americans with Disabilities

Act and the PAIMI Act beginning with deprivation of her right to not speak about

private medical information in 2005 when she was compelled by Secretary of State

Motor Vehicle Rules, Ch. 3 to disclose the existence, nature, severity, and treatment

of her medical condition. 42 U.S. Code § 9501, § 10801(b) and § 10841(1)(A).

Petitioner was unable to maintain a stable mailing address with Secretary of

State nor a stable residence due to the unavailability of safe low-income disabled

housing; even when Petitioner submitted proper change of address forms with

USPS and Secretary of State there was always a high likelihood of postal delay due

to forwarding procedures or human error, therefore, Petitioner‟s attempts to comply

with 29-A M.R.S. § 1407 which requires ―that person shall, within 30 days, notify

the Secretary of State, in writing or by other means approved by the Secretary of

State, of the old and new addresses‖ was a futile effort because Petitioner was


44

sometimes required to reluctantly move every 7-21 days. Impossibilium nulla

obligatio est. ―There is no obligation to perform impossible things.‖

Furthermore, Petitioner experienced numerous times when government

employees failed to perform their official duties resulting in various deleterious

events over which Petitioner was powerless. One such instance was in July 2012

when Kennebec County Superior Court staff failed to fax court documents to the

Waterville Maine District Court requiring the record for the April 2012 arrest be

sent to superior court for a trial by jury which resulted in Petitioner‟s failure to

appear in Waterville District Court in July 2012 because she was told the case was

being sent to superior court resulting in a bench warrant being issued by the

Waterville court for Petitioner‟s immediate arrest.

This bench warrant was active for 10 days and was erroneously issued

because court employees failed to perform a basic vital function of their duties

which would have effectively transferred the Waterville case to the Kennebec

County Superior Court and nullified Petitioner‟s need to appear in Waterville court.

Mr. Hainke was first notified of the bench warrant in late July and promptly

communicated that information to Petitioner at which time they discussed the

events that could have caused the warrant to issue and Mr. Hainke explaining the

actions he was going to take to resolve the mistake.

In early August 2012 Mr. Hainke reviewed the Kennebec County Superior

Court case files for AUGSC-CR-2012-286 and AUGSC-CR-2012-667 at which time

he discovered a July 2012 court order for the delivery of the case from Waterville

District Court to Kennebec County Superior Court which had never been faxed or

otherwise delivered to the Waterville District Court. Mr. Hainke was able to nullify

the bench warrant with the proper delivery of the court order and notified

Petitioner that she was no longer in danger of being arrested. Errors such as these

are dangerous to liberty and wholly unacceptable.

Resulting directly from Petitioner being compelled to disclose medical

information under M.V.R. Ch. 3 and Petitioner necessarily exercising her freedom of


45

movement due to safe housing issues, the Medical Review Section further violated

Petitioner‟s rights by failing to use an alternative reasonable means of notice by

posting public notices as required by 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) to notify Petitioner of her

need to update her address or to contact Bureau of Motor Vehicles immediately.

Medical Review Section failing to notify Petitioner of her need to update her

address and to complete a medical evaluation violated the protections of the PAIMI

Act which require services must be in a setting and under conditions that—(i) are

the most supportive of such person‘s personal liberty; and (ii) restrict such liberty

only to the extent necessary consistent with such person‘s treatment needs, applicable

requirements of law, and applicable judicial orders.

Bureau of Motor Vehicles violated Petitioner‟s right against unreasonable

seizure of her property when they suspended the driver‟s license on January 5, 2010

citing 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) claiming Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a

motor vehicle‖ solely because she did not receive or comply with the request for

medical evaluation. A l'impossible nul n'est tenu. ―No one is bound to do what is

impossible.‖ Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. ―There is no obligation to perform

impossible things.‖

This deprivation resulted directly from her protected medical condition.

On February 10 and March 7, 2011 Petitioner was deprived of her right to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures and her right to not incriminate

herself when Petitioner was stopped in her registered, inspected, and insured

automobile twice by the same officer both times having no suspicion or probable

cause of criminal conduct with the second stop directly resulting from a protected

medical condition and the first from a de minimus violation of a traffic control

device.

On March 7 and 8, 2011 Petitioner was deprived of due process and her

freedom to speak when she was not informed of the nature of the charges prompting

the medical suspension ab initio nor was she informed of her right to request a

hearing to give evidence of her innocence of the charge that she was “incompetent to


46

drive a motor vehicle” under § 2458(2)(D) and then again on December 2, 2011 when

the court forced Petitioner to speak with the judge and pay a court fine related to

AUGDC-CR-2011-513 under threat of imprisonment.

Resulting from the unconstitutional actions previously described, Petitioner

was necessarily forced to travel with impunity without a valid driver‟s license which

again resulted in her unconstitutional detainment and arrest on February 16, 2012

resulting directly from exercising her freedom of speech by placing a sign on her

private automobile instead of a “valid registration plate” issued by the Bureau of

Motor Vehicles. The words on her private sign were the “probable cause” used by

the officer to justify the arrest, the ensuing criminal charges and other civil

violations. Once she was stopped on February 16, 2012 for exercising her freedom of

speech she was then threatened with arrest and was coerced to incriminate herself

in violation of the 5th Amendment when she was forced to provide her name and

other identifying information which led to police to look at her driving record which

led to several frivolous criminal charges.

On April 5, 2012 Petitioner was stopped for the innocent action of not having

a sticker with certain words (inspection sticker) upon her private automobile, being

another violation of the 1st Amendment to not speak, which was used as probable

cause by the police officer to threaten excessive force to break her car window to

effect a violent and aggressive arrest. After Petitioner left the scene in fear and

preservation of her safety, Petitioner was chased by two police officers causing her

to surrender only under public surveillance to ensure her personal safety, at which

time she was threatened with violence by firearm and then falsely imprisoned for 18

hours during which time she was deprived of her right to make a phone call to

secure her prompt release.

Petitioner‟s right to due process and effective assistance of counsel was also

violated by all three court-appointed attorneys in early 2012 by their failure to

request a probable cause hearing or to assist Petitioner in securing a probable cause

hearing in 2012. Their failure to request a routine probable cause hearing was an


47

egregious dereliction of their legal duty to provide Petitioner with adequate legal

counsel which directly and proximately caused Petitioner‟s involuntary servitude to

the court for more than 1000 days.

Petitioner‟s third attorney, Harold Hainke, Esq. repeatedly told Petitioner

she would not get the charges dismissed at the superior court level and would need

to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States if she wanted any justice. Mr.

Hainke also repeatedly disclaimed that he was Petitioner‟s attorney and that he

had no legal duty to protect Petitioner‟s rights. Petitioner interpreted these denials

by Mr. Hainke as prima facie evidence of Mr. Hainke‟s unwillingness to provide

effective assistance of counsel to get all the charges dismissed as Petitioner was able

to do in December 2013 and 2014 through her own diligent work and tenacity.

Beginning in August 2012 Petitioner filed her first legally precise and well-

supported motion to dismiss for violation of her rights secured by the Constitution.

The court wholly ignored this motion effectively prohibiting Petitioner from

speaking, being heard or enjoying due process and equal protection of the law in

violation of the 1st and 5th Amendments, inter alia. Petitioner wholly believes if Mr.

Hainke had submitted the motion as his own legal work under the traditional

attorney/client scheme, the motion to dismiss would have been heard in short time

and would have been given its due consideration including a full dismissal of all the

charges.

In October 2012 Petitioner requested to receive several pieces of exculpatory

evidence, both written and electronic, for both the February and April 2012 traffic

stops. Most of the requested evidence was withheld with no explicit reason for its

exclusion violating Petitioner‟s right to due process and equal protection of the law.

In February 2013 Petitioner was again deprived of effective assistance of

counsel during a meeting with the District Attorney when Mr. Hainke attempted to

coerce Petitioner to plead guilty to the February operating after suspension and

refusing to submit to arrest charges, pay a $250 fine and perform 50 hours of

community service despite his knowledge of Petitioner‟s innocence nunc pro tunc.


48

After making her second request for discovery in early 2013 and finally

receiving some paper evidence from Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Petitioner wrote 3

letters to the Hearing Unit on March 18, March 28 and April 8, 2013, requesting

she be given an administrative hearing so she could challenge the basis of the

January 5, 2010 medical suspension as statutorily required before any license

suspension can occur. Petitioner amply explained that she had exceptional reasons

for not requesting a hearing within the required 10 days because she was transient

and did not receive the 2009 medical evaluation request or notice of suspension.

All of Petitioner‟s requests for an administrative hearing were denied as

untimely which thereby violated Petitioner‟s freedom of speech in post-termination

procedures, right to due process and equal protection of the law, as well as

Petitioner‟s rights under 42 U.S. Code § 10801 and § 10841.

Petitioner‟s 1st and 2nd Motions to Dismiss were ignored which violated

Petitioner‟s freedom of speech and right to due process with Mr. Hainke failing in

his 6th Amendment legal duty to assist Petitioner with presenting her defense by

intervening with the court to get proper dismissal or suppression hearings

immediately scheduled.

Directly resulting from the court‟s refusal to hear or grant Petitioner‟s 1st and

2nd motions to dismiss, Petitioner was forced to file a Petition for Review of Final

Agency Action pursuant to MRCivP 80C to challenge the validity of the medical

suspension nunc pro tunc. This unnecessary delay, finally and wrongly resulting in

denial of the 80C petition on October 24, 2013 by Kennebec County Superior Court,

further violated Petitioner‟s rights to equal protection of the law which caused

continuation of the criminal cases and her condition of involuntary servitude to the

court.

On December 3, 2013 Petitioner filed her 3rd Motion to Dismiss again citing a

multitude of constitutional violations of due process, equal protection, right to be

heard and right to speak, inter alia, which was heard and denied on December 5,

2013 by superior court Judge Marden which Petitioner immediately appealed to the


49

law court and notified her legal counsel, superior court and Respondent of the

appeal. Respondent again attempted to coerce Petitioner to plead guilty to a

criminal charge of operating after suspension against Petitioner‟s right to due

process when an appeal has been properly docketed. Petitioner again categorically

rejected all plea offers and demanded a full dismissal of all charges.

Petitioner reluctantly appeared at superior court on December 18, 2013 ready

for her trial by jury and demanded to receive all exculpatory evidence as previously

requested which was again denied by Respondent again in violation of Petitioner‟s

right to due process, inter alia. Respondent also informed Petitioner that the

arresting officer for the April 2012 arrest had died in April 2013 and was not

available to testify as to Counts 4, 5, 6 and 7 and therefore those charges were

immediately dismissed. Respondent knowingly withholding information about the

availability of material witnesses is a grave violation of court rules and

Constitutional protections. If Respondent had disclosed this information about Ofc.

Corbett‟s death as soon as they received it in 2013, Petitioner would not have been

held in unnecessary conditions of involuntary servitude to the court for Counts 4, 5,

6 and 7 until December 18, 2013.

Mr. Hainke again failed miserably in his legal duty to inform Petitioner of

Rule 3(b) during an extensive off-the-record conversation about the medical

suspension and the course of events thereafter with Mr. Hainke and Respondent

prior to trial on December 18. Respondent knowingly violated appellate Rule 3(b) by

strong-arming Petitioner to enter a conditional plea of guilty to Count 2 under a

deferred disposition agreement for one year subjecting Petitioner to other legal

conditions and restrictions under court control.

Petitioner was not offered any meaningful or lawful choices; her only option

was to accept the illegal deferred disposition or go to trial with minimal exculpatory

evidence.

Despite the Maine supreme court acknowledging legal prohibition of the

deferred disposition, it violated Petitioner‟s rights even further by providing relief


50

from the rules pursuant to M.R.App.P 14(c) in favor of Respondent which effectively

affirmed the illegal deferred disposition contract further subjecting Petitioner to the

court‟s authority.

Constitutional due process requires Petitioner to receive actual notice which

―…requires satisfying all elements of notice pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3)

which must state,

A. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the

proceeding is being conducted;

B. A reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule

provisions involved;

C. A short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the

proceeding and of the matters asserted;

D. A statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within

which a hearing may be requested;

E. A statement of the manner and time within which evidence and

argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a

hearing has been set; and

F. When a hearing has been set, a statement of the manner and time

within which applications for intervention under section 9054 may be filed.

There are no facts in the record to support Appellee's claim that Ofc.

Eric DosSantos provided all elements of actual notice under § 9052(3) above.

Thus, Secretary of State violated constitutional due process which Appellant

has undeniably proven by the facts and evidence in this case.‖ (See App. I, Pg.

18a)

Finally, after serving 1807 days of involuntary servitude to the court from

January 5, 2010 until December 16, 2014, Respondent dismissed Count 2 and the

court released all bail bonds and restrictions freeing Petitioner from her legal

chains; however, Petitioner‟s driver‟s license expired on December 17, 2012 while

still suspended.

Despite Petitioner‟s meticulous legal efforts to defend herself from baseless

criminal charges, both the court and Respondent refused to read the timeline of

evidence or to follow all pertinent laws and rules of procedure subjecting Petitioner

to legal control of the court or Respondent from January 5, 2010 until the present

day.


51

In consideration of the obvious bias recorded by Maine courts against

Petitioner, the Supreme Court of the United States is the only venue where

Petitioner will have any fair chance of receiving a lawful and constitutional

adjudication on the legality of the medical suspension, the subsequent civil and

criminal charges and multitude of appeals which unnecessarily followed.

However, notwithstanding the unconstitutionality of Secretary of State‟s

actions to suspend the driver‟s license for a protected medical condition, the

Augusta and Oakland Police Departments and the Office of District Attorney would

have had no authority to become involved in this civil administrative situation be it

not for the traffic exceptions to the 4th Amendment instituted by Carroll v. United

States, Terry v. Ohio, Heien v. North Carolina and other similar Supreme Court

decisions which have criminalized civil actions.

If „traffic exceptions‟ to the 4th Amendment did not exist, Petitioner would not

have been stopped or arrested because she never exhibited any suspicious or

criminal behavior constituting probable cause to justify any type of traffic stop.

B. Whether Petitioner’s rights under the Americans with Disabilities

Act and the PAIMI Act were violated when her medical

information was required to be disclosed and then it was used

against Petitioner to restrain and seclude Petitioner without legal

justification.

The record is crystal clear that all civil and criminal charges lodged against

Petitioner beginning in February 2011 were the direct result of Petitioner‟s medical

condition and which the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was required to treat with extra

care under 42 U.S. Code § § 10801 and 10841 in ways that ―are the most supportive

of such person‘s personal liberty‖ restricted ―only to the extent necessary consistent

with such person‘s treatment needs, applicable requirements of law, and applicable

judicial orders…‖

The record shows no “order of a responsible mental health professional‖

documenting sufficient facts to support indefinite suspension of the driver‟s license

for incompetence. Bureau of Motor Vehicles violated Petitioner‟s ―right to freedom

from restraint or seclusion‖ by suspending the license despite the ―violation free


52

credits‖ rewarding her safe and legal traveling habits. The record also shows a

contradictory and illogical suspension on January 5, 2010 under § 2458(2)(D)

claiming Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ simply because she

did not receive or comply with the medical evaluation request which the record

clearly shows was returned to Respondent by the USPS. (See 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3))

Respondent‟s actions put Petitioner‟s life in grave legal jeopardy which

effectively ―restrained and secluded‖ Petitioner by prohibiting her freedom of

movement and her right to travel independently by automobile as a direct result of

Petitioner complying with Motor Vehicle Rules, Ch. 3 and disclosing the existence of

her medical condition which was then used as a legal weapon against her.

As abundantly shown in the record, Respondent‟s actions leaves a reasonable

person to wonder about Respondent‟s motivations for committing the many legal

offenses against Petitioner as a direct result of Petitioner‟s known medical

disabilities. There are very few conclusions anyone can come to after reading this

petition and multitude of legal documents in the Appendix.

C. Whether Maine Supreme Judicial Court erred in a January 13,

2014 Order when it acted under Maine Rules of Appellate

Procedure 14(c) providing “relief” from Appellate Rule 3(b)

knowing judicial relief would affirm an invalid contract.

After almost two years of legal maneuvering to get seven bogus criminal

charges dismissed, Petitioner successfully defeated six charges in December 2013,

but Petitioner‟s right to equal protection of the law inter alia was again violated by

Maine supreme court when it used abusive discretion in its judicial capacity and

affirmed an invalid deferred disposition contract after ―providing relief‖ from

appellate Rule 3(b) pursuant to Rule 14(c) sua sponte ―in order to effectuate the

intent of the parties‖.

Maine Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A) A Judge Shall Avoid

Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All of the Judge’s

Activities requires, ―A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at

all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and


53

impartiality of the judiciary.‖ Maine Supreme Court‟s suspension of appellate rules

pursuant to Rule 14(c) to avoid appellate Rule 3(b) which affirmed a fraudulent

contract which enslaved Petitioner for 365 days to the court certainly does not

―promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary‖.

Canon 3(A)(5) A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office

Impartially and Diligently. ―A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or

prejudice. A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or

conduct manifest bias or prejudice…‖ The Maine Supreme Court‟s actions under

14(c) were clearly biased in favor of Respondent in consideration of the court‟s own

legal declaration that Respondent was expressly prohibited by Rule 3(b) from

coercing and accepting Petitioner‟s guilty plea but yet the Maine supreme court

affirmed the fraudulent contract nonetheless certainly revealing its bias and

prejudice.

D. Petitioner was deprived of adequate assistance of counsel.

There is no question that Petitioner‟s nolo contendere‘ plea in AUGDC-CR-

2011-513 was coerced by a threat of false imprisonment on both AUGDC-CR-2011-

512 and 513 without assistance of legal counsel in violation of 5th and 6th

Amendments and Maine law.

When Petitioner was assigned and contacted by her first two court-appointed

attorneys, Stephen Bourget and Lisa Whittier, she was told she could not legally

collaterally attack the medical suspension and that the attorneys would not aid in

her defense strategy. Neither attorney filed a request with the court on Petitioner‟s

behalf for a probable cause hearing, a motion to dismiss nor a motion to suppress.

Petitioner and Harold Hainke first spoke in late May 2012 signing a written

contract on June 5, 2012 expressly authorizing Petitioner to ―act as her own attorney

and have all the duties and responsibilities of an attorney…‖ stating Petitioner

―wanted an attorney to be available to advise her as to court procedures and render

other legal advice…‖


54

Mr. Hainke repeatedly denied the likelihood of Petitioner getting a full

dismissal in superior court which was a red flag for Petitioner that Mr. Hainke was

not going to be of any benefit in presenting Petitioner‟s constitutional defenses to

the court. As Petitioner suspected, Mr. Hainke tried to coax her into unfair plea

agreements which would have resulted in criminal convictions, permanent damage

to her public reputation, extensive and permanent mental, physical and financial

damage.

At the time Respondent offered the deferred disposition all parties were fully

aware that all charges were the direct result of a protected medical condition.

After Petitioner successfully defeated six of the seven criminal charges,

Respondent swore not to seek jail time for any violation of the deferred disposition

so Mr. Hainke filed a motion to withdraw as legal counsel claiming he could no

longer work with Petitioner because Petitioner had threatened him with a federal

lawsuit for breach of contract inter alia which created a conflict for Mr. Hainke in

his ability to further represent Petitioner.

Mr. Hainke‟s dereliction of legal duty under the 6th Amendment prior to his

legal withdrawal directly caused Petitioner‟s involuntary servitude to the court for

more than 1000 days which incited Petitioner‟s pledge to file a federal lawsuit

against him.

This court decided Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984) and said,

―the Court has recognized that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective

assistance of counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970).

Government violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain

ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct

the defense. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976) (bar on attorney-

client consultation during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U. S. 853

(1975) (bar on summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U. S. 605, 612-

613 (1972) (requirement that defendant be first defense witness); Ferguson v.

Georgia, 365 U. S. 570, 593-596 (1961) (bar on direct examination of defendant).


55

Counsel, however, can also deprive a defendant of the right to effective assistance,

simply by failing to render "adequate legal assistance," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S.,

at 344. Id., at 345-350 (actual conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's

performance renders assistance ineffective).‖

If Mr. Hainke had provided ―adequate legal assistance‖, there is a very high

probability that all charges would have been dismissed in early/mid 2012.

E. Whether Petitioner was subjected to involuntary servitude to the

court “by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal

process” in violation of the 13th Amendment.

It is absolutely clear that every official action performed in this petition was

the direct result of the mandatory driver‟s license being arbitrarily suspended on

January 5, 2010 for medical reasons simply because Petitioner was without a stable

residence where she could easily receive postal mail without interruption. There

also can be no question that the Medical Review Section made a unilateral,

arbitrary and uninformed decision to suspend the driver‟s license under §

2458(2)(D) claiming Petitioner was ―incompetent to drive a motor vehicle‖ without

any professional supporting opinions simply because she was never informed of her

need to complete a medical evaluation request.

It must also be clear that Petitioner had no meaningful choices or any other

lawful remedies to resolve the medical suspension or subsequent criminal charges.

Her only option was to surrender vis compulsiva to the legal control and demands of

Secretary of State and the courts during the adjudication of all these matters.

Involuntary servitude is defined as the condition of one forced to labor for pay

or not for another by coercion or imprisonment, labor is defined as work of any type,

including mental exertion and work is defined as physical and mental exertion to

attain an end. There can be no question Petitioner labored under the courts‟ control

for the courts‟ purposes without pay with great mental exertion to attain a

dismissal of frivolous criminal charges which were filed directly resulting from a

violation of Petitioner‟s right to privacy of her medical information.


56

It must also be clear that Petitioner had no options other than to submit to

the control of the Secretary of State, the courts and Respondent while they

prosecuted these claims. In effect, the State of Maine caused all violations herein.

2. There is an unsettled area of law concerning traffic exceptions to the 4th

Amendment which allows police officers to stop walkers, bicyclists and people in

moving vehicles for civil actions which has caused rampant official abuse of

automobile exceptions triggering several state legislatures to enact statewide

prohibitions against traffic citation quotas within police departments.

F. Traffic exceptions to the 4th Amendment absent any probable

cause of criminal conduct are unconstitutional under the original

intent of the Constitution and principles of stare decisis.

Ruling case law on constitutional protections when traveling by automobile

on public roads shows a progressive erosion and relaxation of historic prohibitions

against warrantless and unreasonable searches and seizures in favor of the state‟s

claim that its interests in officer and public safety are paramount to the privacy

interests and constitutional protections of citizens. “Prior to the nineteenth century,

courts generally held the public roadways were open to all users without regard to

the travelers' methods or means of transport. Licenses or other indicia of

governmental permission were thought unnecessary or even violative of

constitutional rights. [City of Chicago v. Banker, 112 Ill. App. 94 (1904); City of

Chicago v. Collins, 51 N.E. 907 (Ill. 1898); Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (Kan.

1890)] But widespread disdain and fear of the automobile led twentieth century

policymakers to push aside these long-standing constitutional barriers in order to

regulate motorized driving. This new regulatory [*247] approach was justified on

the grounds that motor vehicles were too dangerous to operate unlicensed and that

traffic injuries were increasingly on the rise. [See Dr. Roots, CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW]

The 4th Amendment traffic exceptions have been the cause for wild official

abuse for the sole purpose of increasing local tax revenue through the payment of


57

traffic tickets, as evidenced in the following legislation, press release and

newspaper articles as found in the Appendix beginning on page 306a:

LEGISLATION

11 Georgia House Bill 7 LC 34 2781, "Right to Travel Act."

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 216th LEGISLATURE, “AN ACT concerning

quotas for arrests and citations and amending P.L.2000, c.164.‖

2015 STATE OF WYOMING 15LSO-0366, HOUSE BILL NO. HB0125,

“Law enforcement citation quotas-prohibition.‖

State of Arizona HOUSE BILL 2410

WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE, “349.025 Quotas relating to the

enforcement of traffic regulations prohibited.‖

Iowa Code – 2015, Title VIII – Transportation, Chapter 321 Motor Vehicles

And Law Of The Road, 321.492A QUOTAS ON CITATIONS PROHIBITED.

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND PRESS RELEASES

LA police win $6M settlement over ticket quotas

Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Ban Police Ticket Quotas

Police Union Calls For Elimination Of Traffic-Ticket Quota

Police quotas for traffic tickets could be outlawed by state lawmakers

Lawmakers put skids on ticket quotas, but speed traps continue

Bill would toughen state ban on traffic ticket quotas

Former police officer exposes Chesterfield‘s ticket quota goals

Sheriff Lieutenant Caught on Video Saying Officers Disciplined for Not

Writing Enough Tickets

Police departments nationwide rely upon the Supreme Court‟s automobile

exceptions to establish policies about roving patrols and other types of police

conduct whereby the people are now subject to virtually random and unprovoked

searches and seizures under the pretext of conducting a “brief investigatory stop” to

check licensing and registration compliance which now serves as the officers‟

“probable cause” without suspicion of criminal conduct to stop innocent travelers

http://www.lris.com/2014/10/10/police-union-calls-elimination-traffic-ticket-quota/


58

These stops may now result from an officer‟s “reasonably mistaken belief” of a traffic

violation as this court overwhelmingly decided in Heien v. North Carolina 574 U. S.

__ (2014). Justice Sotomayor was the sole dissenter fearing official abuse by police,

as we do now have in this country. ―Departing from this tradition means further

eroding the Fourth Amendment's protection of civil liberties in a context where that

protection has already been worn down. Traffic stops like those at issue here can be

"annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating." Terry, 392 U.S., at 25, 88 S.Ct.

1868; see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660

(1979).‖

Since police officers are purportedly no longer required to show specific and

articulable facts supporting probable cause of criminal conduct due to traffic

exceptions to the 4th Amendment, several police departments now order routine

issuance of traffic citations for the specific purpose of increasing local tax revenue

through payment of traffic citations. This taxation scheme is now being justified by

claiming the state‟s interests ―in public and police officers‘ safety‖ by conducting a

“brief investigatory stop” outweigh the public‟s constitutional rights of privacy and

freedom of enfettered travel.

Some police departments are justifying traffic citation quota systems by

calling them a benchmarking tool for measuring individual patrol officers‟ eligibility

for promotions and overtime based on their performance evidenced by the number

of traffic tickets and arrests they make. Some police officers who refuse to comply

with quota mandates are being harassed, disciplined and even terminated for poor

performance and insubordination. This petition will show that some of those lawful

officers have sued their departments for enforcement of illegal traffic citation quotas

and have been compensated for harassment which resulted from the officers‟ refusal

to enforce those illegal policies.

As this court indicated in Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 (1886), ―the

‗unreasonable searches and seizures‘ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are

almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against


59

himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and

compelling a man ‗in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,‘ which is

condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an

‗unreasonable search and seizure‘ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and

papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling

him to be a witness against himself.‖

―Nineteenth century Americans would scarcely recognize the immense quilt of

laws which govern highway travel today. With the exception of the Civil War,

nothing before or since has so fundamentally altered America's scheme of rights and

freedoms as that of the laws now governing highway travel. Today, the vast majority

of Americans voluntarily submit to a variety of registration, identification, and

licensing schemes in order to travel by automobile. Today's laws once would have

been viewed as unconstitutional. The hand of the State now extends over aspects of

travel in ways which would have been impossible according to common law

precedents familiar to earlier Americans.‖ CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned

Right: The Right to Travel by Automobile, 1890-1950, Dr. Roger Isaac Roots, J.D.,

Ph.D., 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 245

Ruling case law restated in 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 328, Pg. 1132

clearly indicates, ―… the words ‗life, liberty, and property‘ as used in Constitutions

are representative terms and are intended to cover every right to which a member of

the body politic is entitled under the law. These terms include the right of self-

defense, freedom of speech, religious and political freedom, exemption from arbitrary

arrests, the right freely to buy and sell as others may, the right to labor, to contract,

to terminate contracts, to acquire property, and the right to all our liberties, personal

civil, and political – in short, all that makes life worth living.‖

―It is often specifically provided in the Bill of Rights contained in a state

Constitution that the sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect

the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property. The Constitution was


60

intended, and its very purpose was, to prevent experimentation with the fundamental

rights of the individual.‖ Id.

A walker, an equestrian, or bicyclist in no way needs a “driver‟s license” to

travel over public roads nor is it acceptable practice for police officers to issue traffic

tickets to people traveling by non-motorized means of travel. Moreover, it is simply

unlawful for a police officer to perform a “brief investigatory stop” on a walker,

bicyclist, or equestrian to inquire about their license to travel absent reasonable

suspicion or probable cause of criminal conduct nor would the traveler be required

to comply with the officer‟s demand under the protections of the 4th and 5th

Amendments.

According to Pew Research Center, as far back as the 1970‟s, public surveys

show Americans have historically and overwhelmingly considered the automobile as

fundamental to their safety, health, welfare, life, liberty and pursuit of happiness,

regardless of socioeconomic status. Use of the automobile is more widespread within

certain geographic areas of the country which are too cold, mountainous, or vast to

travel by foot or by other non-motorized means of travel and, contrarily, there are

some metropolitan areas where automobile ownership is not as widespread due to

snug living spaces and high costs of using, storing and insuring the vehicles, such as

in New York City where 2013 census data shows 8,405,837 residents lived in New

York City with only 223,089 automobiles registered for private operation on public

roads. In contrast, 2013 census data for the state of Maine shows a state population

of 1,328,702 people (at least 20% being children under the age of 16) who have

registered 1,001,750 automobiles for private use on public roads.

Notwithstanding the convenience and speed by which one can travel by

automobile, according to the Pew Research Center, eighty-six percent (86%) of

Americans consider automobile travel to be an absolute necessity of life in most

parts of the United States, ―As has been the case since the question was first asked in

the 1970s, an overwhelmingly number of Americans consider a car a necessity in life.

Fully 86% say a car is a necessity, compared with just 14% who say a car is a luxury


61

you could live without. In fact, asked to describe a list of 12 everyday consumer

products as luxuries or necessities, more Americans describe a car as a necessity than

any other item. This was also the case in Pew Research surveys conducted in 2009

and 2006, as well as in surveys conducted by Roper in the 1980s and 1970s.‖ A Car

is a Necessity as found here: http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/a-car-is-a-

necessity/

Petitioner urges the Supreme Court to review with great care the damage to

the fabric of our 4th Amendment protections as a result of the traffic exceptions and

how people are now prohibited from freely traveling in private automobiles without

surrendering to the statutory mandate under 29-A M.R.S. §§ 351 and 1251 to apply

for, obtain and maintain a driver‟s license and registration under threat of arrest,

imprisonment and coercion by use of the legal process.

―It has been said that the rights to life, liberty, property, and the equal

protection of the law are so related that the deprivation of any one of those separate

and independent rights may lessen or extinguish the value of the other three. The

14th Amendment recognizes liberty and property as coexistent and debars the states

from any unwarranted interference with either." 11 Am Jur, Constitutional Law §

328, Pg. 1132

http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/a-car-is-a-necessity/

http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/a-car-is-a-necessity/


62

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of certiorari should be

granted.

March 16, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

GinA (f/k/a GINA TURCOTTE)

Petitioner

2528 West River Road

Sidney, Maine 04330

(207) 333-0628

[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

No. _____________

IN THE Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------∞---------------------------------

Gina Turcotte (now known as GinA)

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF MAINE Respondent

---------------------------------∞---------------------------------



___________________________________________

APPENDIX, VOLUME I ___________________________________________

GinA (formerly Gina Turcotte) Petitioner 2528 WEST RIVER ROAD SIDNEY, MAINE 04330 207-333-0628 [email protected]

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix i

Table of Contents Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................. 1

Dismissal ................................................................................................................. 1

APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................. 2

Memorandum of Decision ....................................................................................... 2

APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................. 4

Objection and Imperative Judicial Notice ............................................................. 4

APPENDIX D ................................................................................................................. 6

Judicial Notice of Non-Opposition to Harold Hainke’s Motion to Withdraw .......................................................................................................... 6

APPENDIX E ............................................................................................................... 10

Order Regarding Motion to Withdraw ................................................................. 10

APPENDIX F ............................................................................................................... 11

Motion to Withdraw .............................................................................................. 11

APPENDIX G ............................................................................................................... 12

Order 12

APPENDIX H ............................................................................................................... 13

Imperative Judicial Notice Violation Of Maine Code Of Judicial Conduct........................................................................................................... 13

APPENDIX I ................................................................................................................ 15

Reply Brief for Appellant ...................................................................................... 15

APPENDIX J................................................................................................................ 20

Defendant's Rescission Of Agreement Under Deferred Disposition ................... 20

APPENDIX K ............................................................................................................... 22

Defendant's 4th Motion to Dismiss ...................................................................... 22

APPENDIX L ............................................................................................................... 23

Appeal Brief for Appellant .................................................................................... 23

APPENDIX M .............................................................................................................. 35

Order 35

APPENDIX N ............................................................................................................... 36

Dismissal ............................................................................................................... 36

APPENDIX O ............................................................................................................... 37

Agreement Of Defendant And Order Deferring Disposition ............................... 37

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix ii

APPENDIX P ............................................................................................................... 39

Motion To Dismiss Count 2 Under Federal Rules Of Evidence 410(a)(2) .......... 39

APPENDIX Q ............................................................................................................... 41

Plea Offer ............................................................................................................... 41

APPENDIX R ............................................................................................................... 42

3RD Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice For Discovery And Due Process Violations ........................................................................................................ 42

APPENDIX S ............................................................................................................... 46

Order on Rule 80C Appeal .................................................................................... 46

APPENDIX T ............................................................................................................... 50

Petitioner's Reply Brief Rule 80C ......................................................................... 50

APPENDIX U ............................................................................................................... 58

Respondent's Brief ................................................................................................ 58

APPENDIX V ............................................................................................................... 62

Rule 80C Petition Brief for Appellant .................................................................. 62

APPENDIX W ............................................................................................................ 103

Order 103

APPENDIX X ............................................................................................................. 104

Addendum to Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations ................................. 104

APPENDIX Y ............................................................................................................. 118

Defendant's 2nd Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations ..................................... 118

APPENDIX Z ............................................................................................................. 133

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations ................................................................................. 133

APPENDIX AA .......................................................................................................... 142

2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support........................................... 142

APPENDIX BB .......................................................................................................... 150


APPENDIX CC .......................................................................................................... 151

Notice Of Violation Of Procedural Due Process ................................................. 151

APPENDIX DD .......................................................................................................... 158

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix iii


APPENDIX EE .......................................................................................................... 159

Demand for Administrative Hearing for Prior Administrative (Medical) Suspension .................................................................................................... 159

APPENDIX FF ........................................................................................................... 168


APPENDIX GG .......................................................................................................... 169

Request For Administrative Hearing ................................................................. 169

APPENDIX HH .......................................................................................................... 174

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion To Reconsider ............................................ 174

APPENDIX II ............................................................................................................. 176

Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Review of AUGDC-CR-11-512 and AUGDC-CR-11-513 .............................................. 176

APPENDIX JJ ............................................................................................................ 177

Order Summarily Dismissing Post-Conviction Petition ................................... 177

APPENDIX KK .......................................................................................................... 179

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statements of Facts, Points and Authorities in Support .................................................... 179

APPENDIX LL ........................................................................................................... 202

Petition For Post-Conviction Review ................................................................. 202

APPENDIX MM ......................................................................................................... 206

Secretary Of State Certificate Of Suspension Apr 6 2012 ................................ 206

APPENDIX NN .......................................................................................................... 207

Narrative Of Steven J. Corbett Apr 6 2012 ....................................................... 207

APPENDIX OO .......................................................................................................... 210

Confidential Screening Sheet ............................................................................. 210

APPENDIX PP ........................................................................................................... 211

Narrative Of Christopher Guay And Christopher Shaw .................................. 211

APPENDIX QQ .......................................................................................................... 214

Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Aug 9 2011 ....................... 214

APPENDIX RR .......................................................................................................... 215

Judgment And Commitment July 5, 2011 ......................................................... 215

APPENDIX SS ........................................................................................................... 216

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix iv

Complaint AUGDC-CR-11-512/513 .................................................................... 216

APPENDIX TT ........................................................................................................... 218

Notice Of Suspension Deletion ........................................................................... 218

APPENDIX UU .......................................................................................................... 219

Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Dec. 17, 2009 ................... 219

APPENDIX VV .......................................................................................................... 220

Medical Evaluation Request NOV. 2, 2009 ........................................................ 220

APPENDIX WW......................................................................................................... 221

Driving Record 04/02/13 ..................................................................................... 221

APPENDIX XX .......................................................................................................... 225

Petition for Review of Final Agency Action MRCivP 80C ................................. 225

APPENDIX YY .......................................................................................................... 240

Motion for Reconsideration Denied .................................................................... 240

APPENDIX ZZ ........................................................................................................... 241

Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration ............................................................ 241

APPENDIX AAA ........................................................................................................ 244

Motion for Reconsideration ................................................................................. 244

BLACK’S LAW, 9TH EDITION .................................................................................. 251

LEGAL MAXIMS ................................................................................................ 251

DEFINITIONS .................................................................................................... 257

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.......................................................................... 262

CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH ............................................................................ 263

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by Automobile, 1890-1950 ................................................................................. 263

STATUTES ................................................................................................................ 284

United States Code ............................................................................................. 284

Maine Revised Statutes Annotated .................................................................... 294

Other State Statutes ........................................................................................... 307

LEGISLATION .......................................................................................................... 309

11 Georgia House Bill 7 LC 34 2781 ........................................................... 309

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 216th LEGISLATURE .......................................... 311

2015 STATE OF WYOMING 15LSO-0366 ............................................... 313

State of Arizona HOUSE BILL 2410 ................................................................. 314

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix v

WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE .............................................................. 316

Iowa Code - 2015 ................................................................................................. 317

RULES ....................................................................................................................... 318

Federal Rules of Evidence .................................................................................. 318

Maine Rules of Evidence ..................................................................................... 318

Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure ................................................................... 318

Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure .................................................................. 320

Bureau of Motor Vehicle Rules ........................................................................... 322

NEWS ARTICLES ..................................................................................................... 341

FBI Releases 2013 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted ...................................................................................................... 341

LA police win $6M settlement over ticket quotas ............................................. 343

Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Ban Police Ticket Quotas ...................... 346

Police Union Calls For Elimination Of Traffic-Ticket Quota ............................ 347

Police quotas for traffic tickets could be outlawed by state lawmakers ........... 349

Lawmakers put skids on ticket quotas, but speed traps continue .................... 350

Bill would toughen state ban on traffic ticket quotas ....................................... 352

Former police officer exposes Chesterfield’s ticket quota goals ........................ 354

Sheriff Lieutenant Caught on Video Saying Officers Disciplined for Not Writing Enough Tickets ............................................................................... 356

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix vi

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 5 ................................................................... 107 Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A ......................................................... 85, 206 United States Constitution, Amendment I ............................................................... 285 United States Constitution, Amendment IIVX ........................................................ 285 United States Constitution, Amendment V .............................................................. 285 United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2 .................................................... 285 United States Constitution, Article VI ..................................................................... 285

STATUTES 11 M.R.S. § 1-1304 ....................................................................................................... 20 15 M.R.S. § § 2121-2132 .................................................................................... 174, 177 15 M.R.S. § 2124 ................................................................................................ 174, 177 15 M.R.S. § 2124(3)(A) ............................................................................................... 175 17 M.R.S. § 2931 .................................................................................. 98, 109, 111, 190 17-A M.R.S. § 12 ................................................................................................ 183, 185 17-A M.R.S. § 1348 .............................................................................................. 37, 297 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A ..................................................................................... 12, 35, 297 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-C ............................................................................................. 12, 35 17-A M.R.S. § 2 .......................................................................................................... 180 17-A M.R.S. § 2(19) .............................................................................................. 97, 189 17-A M.R.S. § 2(20) .............................................................................................. 98, 189 17-A M.R.S. § 751-A ........................................................................................... 183, 184 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B ........................................................................................... 183, 184 18 U.S. Code § 1589 ................................................................................................... 284 18 U.S. Code § 31(a) (10) ....................................................................... 53, 78, 186, 284 18 U.S. Code § 31(a) (6) ......................................................................... 53, 78, 186, 284 23 U.S. Code § 154(a) ................................................................................................. 285 23 U.S. Code § 159(c) ................................................................................................. 285 29-A M.R.S. § 101(42) .......................................................................................... 79, 186 29-A M.R.S. § 101(50) .......................................................................................... 79, 186 29-A M.R.S. § 101(59) .......................................................................................... 79, 186 29-A M.R.S. § 101(75) .......................................................................................... 79, 186 29-A M.R.S. § 101(91) .......................................................................................... 79, 186 29-A M.R.S. § 103 ...................................................................................................... 298 29-A M.R.S. § 104 ...................................................................................................... 298 29-A M.R.S. § 105 ...................................................................................................... 298 29-A M.R.S. § 112 ...................................................................................... 162, 170, 299 29-A M.R.S. § 113 ...................................................................................................... 299 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 ......................................... 51, 53, 54, 55, 64, 77, 85, 93, 97, 99, 300 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(1) .................................................................................................. 85

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix vii

29-A M.R.S. § 1251(4) .................................................................................................. 53 29-A M.R.S. § 1253 .................................................................................................... 301 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) ............................................................................................ 53, 79 29-A M.R.S. § 1258 .............................................................................................. 32, 302 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(3) ............................................................................................ 46, 58 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4) .................................................................................................. 30 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4)(A) ................................................................................... 152, 160 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) ................................................................................ 17, 18, 25, 32 29-A M.R.S. § 1407 .................................................................................................... 303 29-A M.R.S. § 2104(1-A) ............................................................................................ 184 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A ................ 53, 91, 92, 136, 152, 162, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 303 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) ...........................27, 93, 99, 101, 134, 137, 138, 139, 152 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(8) ............................................................................................ 177 29-A M.R.S. § 2458 .................................................................................................... 305 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) ... 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 50, 54, 84, 87, 92, 93,

94, 99, 100, 133, 134, 152, 159, 160, 161, 169, 170 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(4) ...................................................................................... 17, 25, 32 29-A M.R.S. § 2482 ................................... 27, 48, 49, 55, 59, 64, 87, 136, 162, 187, 306 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(1) ............................................................................................ 59, 87 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3) .................................................................................... 16, 55, 136 29-A M.R.S. § 2483 ............................................................................................ 165, 307 29-A M.R.S. § 2483(1) ............................................................................................ 47, 59 29-A M.R.S. § 256 ...................................................................................................... 299 29-A M.R.S. § 351 ...................................................................... 186, 189, 190, 191, 299 29-A M.R.S. § 451(4) .................................................................................................. 184 42 U.S. Code § 10841 ................................................................................................. 289 42 U.S. Code § 1985 ................................................................................................... 285 42 U.S. Code § 1986 ................................................................................................... 286 42 U.S. Code § 9501 ................................................................................................... 289 49 U.S. Code § 30301 ................................................................................................. 293 5 CFR § 2635.101 ....................................................................................................... 180 5 M.R.S. § 10001 ................................................................................ 152, 164, 171, 296 5 M.R.S. § 10003 .............................................................. 30, 64, 87, 153, 164, 171, 296 5 M.R.S. § 10003(1) ...................................................................................................... 87 5 M.R.S. § 10004 ................................................................................ 153, 164, 172, 296 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) ............. 16, 18, 25, 26, 30, 32, 84, 87, 92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 133, 134 5 M.R.S. § 11001 .................................................................................................. 28, 150 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C) ................................................................................................. 49 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(4)-(6) ....................................................................................... 16 5 M.R.S. § 5 ................................................................................................................ 179 5 M.R.S. § 8001 .......................................................................................................... 139 5 M.R.S. § 9051-9064 ................................................................................................. 169 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) .......................................................................................... 17, 18, 173 5 M.R.S. § 9053 ........................................................................................ 47, 48, 59, 295

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix viii

5 M.R.S. § 9056 .................................................................................................... 55, 296 N.Y. VAT. LAW § 155 ................................................................................................ 307

REGULATIONS

Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 ............................................. 59, 87, 325 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 ........................................... 59, 87, 325

RULES

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 410 ................................................................... 44, 341 M.R.App.P. 14(c) .................................................................................................. 39, 344 M.R.App.P. 3(b) .................................................................................. 22, 23, 24, 39, 344 M.R.Civ. P. 80C ............................................................................................................ 52 M.R.Civ.P. 76H(a) ........................................................................................................ 22 M.R.Crim.P 48(a) ..................................................................................................... 1, 41 M.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(3) ............................................................ 50, 131, 133, 143, 152, 155 M.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(5) .................................................................................................... 50 M.R.Crim.P. 16(d) .................................................................................................. 47, 50 M.R.Crim.P. Rule 16 .............................................................................................. 47, 50 M.R.Crim.P.11 (a)(2) .............................................................................................. 13, 39 Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure ......................................................................... 343 Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure .......................................................................... 341 Maine Rules of Evidence ........................................................................................... 341

OTHER AUTHORITIES

2 Wigmore On Evidence§ 291, At 228 ....................................................................... 158 Addendum To Defendant's Affidavit In Support Of Defendant's 2nd Motion To

Dismiss For Discovery And Due Process Violations ............................................. 115 Agreement Of Defendant And Order Deferring Disposition ..................................... 42 Appeal Brief For Appellant ......................................................................................... 26 Complaint Augdc-Cr-11-512/513 ............................................................................... 231 Confidential Screening Sheet .................................................................................... 225 Defendant's 2nd Affidavit In Support Of Defendant's 2nd Motion To Dismiss For

Discovery And Due Process Violations .................................................................. 130 Defendant's Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Dismiss For Discovery And Due

Process Violations .................................................................................................. 145 Demand For Administrative Hearing For Prior Administrative (Medical)

Suspension .............................................................................................................. 174 Driving Record 04/02/13 ............................................................................................ 236 Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 ........................................................... 106, 196 Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 575 (2d Ed. 1961) ................................................ 76

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix ix

Medical Evaluation Request Nov. 2, 2009 ................................................................ 235 Narrative Of Christopher Guay And Christopher Shaw ......................................... 226 Notice Of Suspension And Opportunity For Hearing Dec. 17, 2009 ....................... 234 Notice Of Suspension Deletion .................................................................................. 233 Notice Of Violation Of Procedural Due Process ....................................................... 165 Petitioner's Reply Brief Rule 80c ................................................................................ 56 Request For Administrative Hearing ....................................................................... 184 Respondent's Brief ....................................................................................................... 65 Rule 80c Petition Brief For Appellant ........................................................................ 69 The Orphaned Right, Dr. Roots .................................................................................. 86

ORDERS

Dismissal .................................................................................................................. 1, 41 Judgment And Commitment July 5, 2011 ................................................................ 235 Memorandum Of Decision ............................................................................................. 2 October 24, 2013 Order................................................................................................ 17 Order ........................................................................................................ 13, 39, 43, 114 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion To Reconsider ................................................... 189 Order On Rule 80c Appeal ........................................................................................... 52 Order Regarding Motion To Withdraw ....................................................................... 10 Order Summarily Dismissing Post-Conviction Petition .......................................... 193

MOTIONS

2nd Motion To Dismiss For Discovery And Due Process Violations With Incorporated Memorandum Of Law In Support ................................................... 155

3rd Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice For Discovery And Due Process Violations 47 Defendant's 4th Motion To Dismiss ............................................................................ 24 Motion To Dismiss Count 2 Under Federal Rules Of Evidence 410(A)(2) ................ 44 Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Standing; Failure To Follow Due Process Of Law;

Violation Of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statements Of Facts, Points And Authorities In Support ........................................................................................... 195

Motion To Withdraw .................................................................................................... 11 Petition For Post-Conviction Review ........................................................................ 221 Petitioner's Motion To Reconsider Petition For Post-Conviction Review Of AUGDC-

CR-11-512 and AUGDC-CR-11-513 ....................................................................... 191

DEFINITIONS

absolute right ............................................................................................................... 77 administration ............................................................................................................. 74 apparatus ..................................................................................................................... 74

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix x

christianity ................................................................................................................... 74 church ........................................................................................................................... 74 conscience ..................................................................................................................... 74 constitution .................................................................................................................. 74 corpus ........................................................................................................................... 75 deed poll ....................................................................................................................... 75 DEFINITIONS ............................................................................................................. 74 doctrine ......................................................................................................................... 75 driver ...................................................................................................................... 57, 75 driver's license ............................................................................................................. 75 driving .......................................................................................................................... 75 ecclesiastical ................................................................................................................. 75 fee simple ..................................................................................................................... 75 freehold ......................................................................................................................... 75 incompetency ................................................................................................................ 35 Indefeasible .................................................................................................................. 75 Independent ................................................................................................................. 75 Institution .................................................................................................................... 75 justice ........................................................................................................................... 75 knowingly ..................................................................................................................... 74 liberty ........................................................................................................................... 75 license ............................................................................................................. 76, 86, 198 motor vehicle .............................................................................................. 59, 60, 86, 87 natural liberty .............................................................................................................. 75 operate .......................................................................................................................... 76 organization ....................................................................................................... 105, 197 owner .................................................................................................................... 87, 194 person ................................................................................................................. 106, 197 private morality ........................................................................................................... 76 privilege ........................................................................................................................ 76 public ............................................................................................................................ 76 public servant ............................................................................................................. 188 public way ............................................................................................................ 87, 194 punishment .................................................................................................................. 76 punitive ........................................................................................................................ 76 religion ......................................................................................................................... 76 religious liberty ............................................................................................................ 76 remedial ....................................................................................................................... 77 secta .............................................................................................................................. 77 secular .......................................................................................................................... 77 sentiment ..................................................................................................................... 77 spiritual ........................................................................................................................ 77 street or highway ................................................................................................. 87, 194 used for commercial purposes ..................................................................................... 59

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix xi

vehicle ................................................................................................................... 87, 194

CASES

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 ............ 92, 211 Amdstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920) ................................................... 127 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500 ............................................................... 28 Arizona v. Youngblood, 448 U.S. 51 .................................................................. 161, 162 Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147 ..................................................... 35, 73 AUG-CR-2012-667 ..............................................141, 150, 154, 155, 158, 163, 166, 190 AUGDC-CR-2011-512 ............................. 20, 29, 30, 31, 38, 60, 102, 112, 148, 151, 189 AUGDC-CR-2011-513 . 20, 29, 30, 31, 38, 44, 60, 62, 102, 148, 149, 153, 154, 158, 189 AUGSC-CR-2012-286 .... 20, 29, 31, 38, 63, 64, 102, 103, 105, 112, 141, 144, 150, 152,

154, 155, 158, 163, 190 Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023,1025 ........................................... 76, 86 Beck v. Ohio, 379 US 89 ............................................................................................ 212 Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958 ........................ 91, 210 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 ......................................................................... 126 Bischoff v. Maine State Ret. Sys., 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995) .............................. 53 Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 – 1908.............................................................. 89, 208 Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886 ............................... 89, 207 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ........................................................................ 159, 160 Brown v. Texas, 443 U S. 47...................................................................... 201, 213, 215 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 .............................................................. 160, 161 Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959.......... 109, 219 Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241, Me Supreme Judicial Court 2012 ...... 35 Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 ....................................................................... 212 City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 – 1898 .................................................... 89, 208 City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 – 1948 ........................................... 89, 210 Clark v. Hancock Cnty. Comm'rs, 2014 ME 33 ............................................................ 3 Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48 ....................... 34, 35, 71, 72 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958 ............................................. 91, 210 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547; 562 (1892) ................................................ 127 CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226 ................................................. 34 Davis. v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 .................................................................. 213, 214 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 ............................................................................... 214 Delaware v. Prouse, at 440 U. S. 661 ........................................................................ 126 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 .................................................................. 162 Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206 ..................................................................... 212 Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233.................................................................................... 73 Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62 .................. 34, 35, 71, 72, 73 Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 489 (1944) .............................................. 127 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 ...................................................... 90, 208 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824 ............................................ 86, 207

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix xii

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 ....................................................................... 159 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479.......................................................................... 58 Gulick v. Bd. Of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Me. 1982) ................................. 53 Haines v. Kerner 404 US 519 ...................................................................................... 28 Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333 ......................................................................... 109 Henry v. United States, 361 US 98 ........................................................................... 212 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 ........................................................... 126 Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 ........................................................................ 212 KEN-13-514.................................................................................................................. 26 KEN-14-18 ............................................................................................................. 23, 24 Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231 ...................................................................... 161 Kronisch v. United States, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1998 156 Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995) ......................................................... 159 Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S. CT. 316, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) ........................................... 126 Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149 ................. 35, 73 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 .......................................................................... 162 Maines v. Secretary of State 493 A.2d 326 ........................................................... 63, 67 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 .................................................................... 58 Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d 802, 803 (Me.1991) ............................ 73 Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 ................................................................. 58, 207 Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895 .................................... 89 McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50 ........................................................ 34, 35, 72, 73 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 ....................................................................... 162 McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 1998 ME 177 ......... 17 Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16 .............................................. 73, 74 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 ........................................................................ 75, 281 Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956 .... 91, 210 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966 ................................... 93, 211 Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 .................................................................................. 161 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943 .......................... 91, 209 Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 ................................................................................................... 74 Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st

Cir.1982) ................................................................................................................. 156 Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02 ............................................................. 34 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886 ........................... 88, 207 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 ................................................................. 217 Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649 .............................................................. 94, 95 Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849):630 .......................................................... 126 Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237 ............................................................................ 89, 210 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 ................................................................ 159, 160 People v. Horton, 14 Cal. App. 3d 930- Cal: Court of Appeal, 5th Appellate Dist.

1971 ......................................................................................................................... 212 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889 ................................................ 89, 207, 208 Rangeley Crossroads Coal. v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 2008 ME 115 ............ 53

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix xiii

Rauter v. U.S., 871 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1989) .................................................... 162 Rios v. United States, 364 US 253 ............................................................................ 212 Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ................................................ 107, 126, 198 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 US 147 ........................................... 126, 212 Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944 ..................................... 89, 210 Smith v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 2008 ME 8 ................................................................... 3 State v. Cloukey, 486 A. 2d 143- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1985 ....................... 214 State v. Daniel Whitney, 2012 ME 105- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012 ........... 218 State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975) ........................................................ 95 State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170 .................................................................................... 216 State v. Harris, 1999 ME 80 ........................................................................................ 73 State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d 501, 503 (Me. 1996) ................................................... 13, 39 State v. Kovtuschenko, 521 A.2d 718, 719 (Me. 1987) ............................................... 54 State v. Patterson, 868 A. 2d 188- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2005 .................... 216 State v. Ronald A. LaPlante, 26 A. 3d 337- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2011 ..... 216,

218 State v. Rowe, 453 A.2d 134, 136 (Me. 1982) ............................................................ 121 State v. Tayman, 2008 ME 177 ................................................................................... 54 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 ................................................................... 162 Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995) ........................................................ 73 Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217 ..................................................................................... 209 Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 ..................................................................... 211, 213, 214, 215 Thacker v. Konover Dev. Corp., 2003 ME 30 ............................................................. 53 Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 ........................................................................ 90, 208 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 ............................................................. 212 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 ......................................................... 159, 160, 162 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 .............................................................. 160, 162 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873 ....................................... 125, 213, 215 United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 .............................................................. 125, 215 United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581 .......................................................................... 212 United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966 .............................. 92, 210 United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir.1989) .......... 215 United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94,97 (1st Cir. 1997) .............................. 160, 161 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 US 544 ....................................................... 214, 216 United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136 .............................................................. 210 United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir.1989) .............. 215 United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir.1989) ................................. 125 United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392 ..................................................................... 125 United States v. Sokolow, 490 US 1 .................................................................. 214, 215 United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir.1988) .................................... 125 United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 .................................................. 159 US v. Salinas, 940 F. 2d 392- Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 1991 .......................... 215 Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 ........................................................................ 161

GinA v. State of Maine, Appendix 1a

APPENDIX A STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Dismissal (M.R.Crim.P 48(a))

Pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure the District Attorney for Prosecutorial District 4 hereby dismisses the indictment, information, complaint or Count(s) 2 thereof against the defendant for the following reasons: 8. Other: Completed deferred disposition Date: 12/16/14 Asst. District Attorney Joelle Pratt


APPENDIX B MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Reporter of Decisions Decision No. Mem 14-103

Docket No. Ken-13-514

GINA L. TURCOTTE v.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Submitted on Briefs July 1, 2014 Decided July 29, 2014

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, and GORMAN, JJ.

Memorandum of Decision

Gina L. Turcotte appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J.) affirming the Secretary of State's denial of her petition for review as untimely. Turcotte's license was suspended by the Secretary of State, effective January 5, 2010, when Turcotte failed to respond to a notice of suspension related to a medical condition. Turcotte argues that she did not receive the suspension notice in the mail because she had not updated her address and that she, therefore, has a continuing right to be heard. In 2011, Turcotte was stopped by a police officer and informed of the suspension. The following day, she provided medical documentation to the Secretary of State, and her license was immediately reinstated. The record does not reflect any civil or criminal charge related to that suspension, or that she was otherwise affected by the suspension. In March of 2013, more than two years after she personally learned of the suspension, Turcotte requested an administrative hearing to challenge the January 2010 suspension. The Secretary of State determined that the request was untimely, the Superior Court affirmed that determination, and we affirm the determination as well.1

The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Gina Turcotte, pro se appellant Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Donald W. Macomber, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Secretary of State Kennebec County Superior Court docket number AP-2013-17


1 Moreover, the issue presented here could be regarded as moot because, within twenty-four hours of Turcotte's report that her license was improperly suspended, the Secretary remedied the situation by restoring Turcotte's license and deleting from her record the failure to comply with the Secretary's request for medical documentation. See Clark v. Hancock Cnty. Comm'rs, 2014 ME 33, ~ 11, 87 A.3d 712; see also Smith v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 2008 ME 8, ~ 8, 940 A.2d 1079 (recognizing three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, none of which are applicable here).


APPENDIX C STATE OF MAINE

KENNEBEC, ss DOCKET NO. AUGSC-CR-2012-286 STATE OF MAINE * PLAINTIFF * v * GINA TURCOTTE * DEFENDANT *

Objection and Imperative Judicial Notice

NOW COMES GINA TURCOTTE, sui juris, all rights expressly and irrevocably reserved, incorporates DEFENDANT’s Notice of Non-Opposition filed on May 16, 2014 as if set forth fully herein, and gives this court imperative judicial notice that DEFENDANT OBJECTS to HAROLD HAINKE receiving payment for any legal services rendered for this case, for the following reasons:

1. In June 2012, Harold Hainke clearly expressed his disbelief in DEFENDANT’s legal strategy by stating, “GinA, you will NOT get these charges dismissed in Superior Court. You will need to appeal your case all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States if you want any justice.”

2. On December 18, 2013, Harold Hainke said, “GinA, I don’t know how you did it but you did it! You got all the charges dismissed!”

3. Throughout this entire case history, Harold Hainke has declared that he “is not my attorney” and has no obligation to protect my rights.

4. Despite Harold Hainke repeatedly denying any attorney-client status, he has repeatedly sent and accepted written communications and knowingly communicated with the court, Joelle Pratt and other parties about this case expressly failing in all his legal duties.

5. Harold Hainke’s legal role has been de minimus having had no impact on the current “dismissed” status.

6. Harold Hainke has used a frivolous excuse to attempt to withdraw from this case since nothing more will happen until December 16, 2014.

7. DEFENDANT does not need Harold Hainke’s deleterious inept counsel.

8. DEFENDANT understands all attorneys who represent indigent defendants are required to wait until the close of the case before they are allowed to submit their vouchers for payment.

9. DEFENDANT’s case will not be closed by this court until December 17, 2014.

10. DEFENDANT believes Harold Hainke submitted his motion to withdraw as an attempt to expedite his receipt of payment for the


insignificant work he claims to have done prior to this case being closed.

11. DEFENDANT gives judicial notice to this court that Harold Hainke purposely violated a private contract, nunc pro tunc, and has waived his right to receive any payment as a result of his violation of DEFENDANT’s legal contract.

WHEREFORE, DEFENDANT hereby OBJECTS to HAROLD HAINKE

receiving any payment for any legal services allegedly provided to DEFENDANT.

Signed in Augusta, Maine on this 2nd day of June, 2014. In Peace, GINA TURCOTTE 32 COURT ST APT 1 AUGUSTA, MAINE


APPENDIX D STATE OF MAINE

KENNEBEC, ss DOCKET NO. AUGSC-CR-2012-286 STATE OF MAINE * PLAINTIFF * v * GINA TURCOTTE * DEFENDANT * Judicial Notice of Non-Opposition to Harold Hainke’s Motion to Withdraw

NOW COMES GINA TURCOTTE, sui juris, all rights expressly and

irrevocably reserved, and gives this court judicial notice that DEFENDANT does not oppose HAROLD HAINKE’s Motion to Withdraw as a privately contracted, state-paid ‘stand-by legal counsel’, for the following reasons:

1. Harold Hainke has alleged and is presumed to be a practiced attorney having full knowledge and understanding of court, evidentiary, and appellate rules which he was contracted to convey to DEFENDANT to ensure a lawful trial.

2. Harold Hainke has proven himself to be legally incompetent, nunc pro tunc.

3. Harold Hainke has refused to participate in DEFENDANT’s constitutionally lawful strategy which secured full dismissals of seven illegal criminal charges.

4. Harold Hainke clearly expressed his disbelief in DEFENDANT’s legal strategy in June 2012 by stating, “GinA, you will NOT get these charges dismissed in Superior Court. You will need to appeal your case all the way to the Supreme Court of the United States if you want any justice.”

5. Harold Hainke has repeatedly, knowingly and willfully breached a carefully constructed Legal Services Agreement (contract), as follows:

a. Paragraph 2 states, “Ms. Turcotte…did not want an attorney to act on her behalf, but wanted an attorney to be available to advise her as to court procedures and render other legal advice. This arrangement is referred to as ‘stand-by counsel’.”

b. Paragraph 3 states, “Gina L. Turcotte will act as her own attorney and have all the duties and responsibilities of an attorney…including communicating with the Court, the District Attorney and any other persons,…making objections to the District Attorney’s presentation of evidence and responding to the District Attorney’s objections to her presentation of evidence…She will make all the decisions concerning her case, including the legal strategy to pursue.”


c. Paragraph 4 states, “Mr. Hainke will not have the traditional responsibilities concerning the allocation of authority between Attorney and Client and the scope of his representation will be limited to the duties of stand-by counsel…Mr. Hainke shall assist Ms. Turcotte with the presentation of her case and be available to render legal advice upon her request.”

d. Paragraph 5 states, which was deliberately included by DEFENDANT, “Therefore, Mr. Hainke will not communicate with any party in this matter unless Gina L. Turcotte is present and has expressly given Mr. Hainke authority to offer counsel.”

e. The Legal Services Agreement does not give Harold Hainke any right to receive nor to submit any official legal documentation to or from the court or any other party on DEFENDANT’s behalf.

f. The Legal Services Agreement ends with a proclamation, “WE HAVE EACH READ THE ABOVE AGREEMENT BEFORE SIGNING IT”.

g. Both Harold Hainke, Esq. and Gina L. Turcotte personally signed the Legal Services Agreement in each other’s presence after discussing and agreeing on its explicit terms on June 5, 2012.

h. During a meeting in February 2013 between DEFENDANT and District Attorney Maeghan Maloney, Harold Hainke tried coercing DEFENDANT into pleading guilty to two bogus criminal charges despite evidence of her innocence and the State’s persistent violations of due process.

i. The end result of that plea agreement was a conviction for “Refusal to Submit to Arrest” despite being charged without legal or factual merits.

j. During a motion hearing before Judge Marden on December 4, 2013, DEFENDANT demanded a dismissal of all charges for the State’s utter contempt for and violation of due process, the rules of court procedure, rules of exculpatory evidence, and basic maxims of constitutional law.

k. Judge Marden denied DEFENDANT’s 3rd Motion to Dismiss setting trial by jury for December 18, 2013 without any supporting evidence.

l. DEFENDANT properly and immediately appealed Judge Marden’s illegal decision to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and gave proper written notice to this court, Joelle Pratt and Harold Hainke of the appeal.

m. This record shows the court, Joelle Pratt and Harold Hainke all had proper notice that a proper appeal was filed on December 5, 2013.


n. MRAppP Rule 3(b) unambiguously states, “The trial court shall take no further action pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court…”

o. During an off-the-record informal conversation with Harold Hainke on December 18, 2013 prior to trial, Joelle Pratt withdrew Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 due to lack of credible witnesses and supporting evidence.

p. Joelle Pratt further corroborated the absurdity of Count 2 by offering to dismiss that charge on December 17, 2014 if DEFENDANT plead guilty to Count 2 on that day, December 18, 2013 under deferred disposition.

q. Joelle Pratt is liable for violating DEFENDANT’s due process rights.

r. On December 18, 2013, DEFENDANT expressly restated her innocence on the record declaring several constitutional and due process abuses.

s. Harold Hainke knowingly and willfully conspired with Michaela Murphy and Joelle Pratt to violate the Maine Constitution and court rules by accepting a guilty plea from DEFENDANT while an appeal was pending.

t. DEFENDANT innocently agreed vis compulsiva to plead guilty under deferred disposition unaware Michaela Murphy, Joelle Pratt and Harold Hainke had conspired to violate court rules to wrongly oppress her.

u. DEFENDANT has always fully intended to use the December 18, 2013 recorded hearing as prima facie evidence of fraud and corruption.

v. DEFENDANT’s innocence was reaffirmed on December 18, 2013 when Joelle Pratt and this court ordered dismissal of Count 2 on December 17, 2014 without further taxing or penalizing DEFENDANT.

w. On December 18, 2013, Harold Hainke said, “GinA, I don’t know how you did it but you did it! You got all the charges dismissed!”

x. Throughout this entire case history, Harold Hainke has declared that he “is not my attorney” and has no obligation to protect my rights.

y. Despite Harold Hainke repeatedly denying any attorney-client status, he has repeatedly sent and accepted written communications from the court and knowingly communicated with the court, Joelle Pratt and other parties about this case expressly failing in all his legal duties.

z. Harold Hainke’s legal role has been de minimus having had no impact on the current “dismissed” status.


6. Harold Hainke has stated, “Being threatened by Ms. Turcotte makes it unreasonably difficult for me to continue to be available to consult with her.”

7. DEFENDANT disclaims making threats to anyone reaffirming and reiterating her intention to pursue all proper remedies for all constitutional violations.

8. The allegations cited above are not all-inclusive and are subject to change.

WHEREFORE, DEFENDANT hereby nullifies her contract with Harold

Hainke, nunc pro tunc, and releases him from all future legal duties to DEFENDANT as written in their Legal Services Agreement.

FURTHERMORE, DEFENDANT expressly prohibits Harold Hainke from having any further discussions about this case with this court, the PLAINTIFF, Joelle Pratt and any other party.

Signed in Augusta, Maine on this 16th day of May, 2014.

In Peace, GINA TURCOTTE 32 COURT ST APT 1 AUGUSTA, MAINE

The attached document was served upon all parties by hand delivering a

copy to the court, the District Attorney’s office and Harold Hainke’s office in Augusta on this day.

Signed in Augusta, Maine on this 16th day of May, 2014.

In Peace, GINA TURCOTTE 32 COURT ST APT 1 AUGUSTA, MAINE


APPENDIX E State of Maine Superior Court Kennebec, ss Criminal Action Doc. No. CR-12-286 State of Maine v. Gina Turcotte, Defendant

Order Regarding Motion to Withdraw After review of Harold J. Hainke’s Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Advisor for the above named Defendant, the Court hereby grants the withdrawal of Counsel and because the State is not seeking jail at the end of the deferred disposition, Ms. Turcotte is no longer entitled to an attorney or attorney advisor at State expense. Ms. Turcotte, as all defendants, has the right to hire an attorney to assist her. Dated: _________ ____________________________________ Justice, Superior Court


APPENDIX F State of Maine Superior Court Kennebec, ss Criminal Action Doc. No. CR-12-286 State of Maine v. Gina Turcotte, Defendant

Motion to Withdraw NOW COMES, Harold J. Hainke, Esq., Attorney Advisor for the above named Defendant and Respectfully Requests that this Honorable Court grant his withdrawal from his role in this case. The undersigned was appointed in this case on May 21, 2012, after two other attorneys had been fired by Ms. Turcotte. Ms. Turcotte is on a Deferred disposition and does not have any matters pending in the Superior Court. Her other cases have been dismissed pursuant to the Deferred Disposition Agreement. While Ms. Turcotte still opposes the position of the Superior Court in denying her request to withdraw her agreement to the Deferred Disposition and the Law Court in denying her appeal of that decision, there are not any matters pending which would require immediate legal consultation. Therefore, withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client. [M. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(b)(1)]. A lawyer may withdraw from representation when the representation has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client. [M. R. Prof. Conduct 1.16(6)]. In this case, Ms. Turcotte wrote in an email message that she would sue the undersigned in Federal Court if certain actions were not taken. Being threatened by Ms. Turcotte makes it unreasonably difficult for me to continue to be available to consult with her. Further, it may be that even if Ms. Turcotte were to get the bad result on her Deferred Disposition, that the Office of the District Attorney may not request jail and therefore Ms. Turcotte may not be eligible for legal advice at state expense. Therefore, the undersigned respectfully requests that withdrawal be granted. Dated: May 4, 2014 _______________________________ Harold J. Hainke, Esq. The attached document was served upon the parties listed below by placing a photocopy of the document in the U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid with the addresses listed below: Gina L. Turcotte 32 Court St. Apt. 1 Augusta ME 04330

Joelle S. Pratt, Esq. Office of the District Attorney 95 State Street Augusta ME 04330

Dated: May 4, 2014 _________________________ Harold J. Hainke, Esq.


APPENDIX G STATE OF MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Sitting as the Law Court Docket No. Ken-14-151

State of Maine v. Gina Lynn Turcotte

Order On March 10, 2014, Gina Lynn Turcotte filed three notices of appeal from two

orders of the Superior Court: one entered on December 5, 2013, denying her motion to dismiss the charges against her, and one entered on February 21, 2014, denying another motion to dismiss and a motion to rescind the deferred-disposition agreement. On December 18, 2013, Turcotte entered a guilty plea on one of the seven counts against her, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The court entered a deferred disposition the same day.

As this Court explained in dismissing Turcotte's last appeal from the same

matter, Law Court docket number Ken-14-18, because the judgment of conviction has not yet been entered, 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A (2013), Turcotte's appeal is interlocutory. In addition, except for conditional guilty pleas, M.R.Crim.P.11 (a)(2), there is no right to a direct appeal from a guilty plea in a criminal case except for claims that the court lacked jurisdiction or the punishment was illegal or cruel or unusual. State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d 501, 503 (Me. 1996). Furthermore, Turcotte, by agreeing to the deferred disposition, is precluded from attacking it, unless she is found to have violated it and is later sentenced for the underlying crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-C (2013).

It is therefore ORDERED that Turcotte's appeal is DISMISSED as interlocutory. Dated: April 15, 2014 For the Court, Associate Justice


APPENDIX H STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant Imperative Judicial Notice Violation Of Maine Code Of Judicial Conduct

NOW COMES DEFENDANT, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, who gives Imperative Judicial Notice to Judge Michaela Murphy and the court that egregious violations to court rules have been knowingly committed by Judge Michaela Murphy causing grave injury to this court's appearance of impartiality in violation of Canons 1, 2 and 3 of the Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, to the integrity of the court, and to the fairness of our judicial process.

Judge Murphy's actions have perpetuated and are continuing to cause permanent injury to DEFENDANT's life, liberty and pursuit of happiness as protected and guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and Maine Constitution of 1820.

This court knows and the record clearly reflects this frivolous action commenced in February 2012 resulting from a de minimus infraction and unproven allegations of medical incompetency which is being reviewed by the Law Court under KEN-13-514.

This court knows there is a high probability of due process violations by DMV.

This court knows PLAINTIFF failed to provide exculpatory evidence to DEFENDANT as required by court rules.

This court knows DEFENDANT filed an interlocutory appeal under KEN-14-18 on December 5, 2013 challenging J. Marden's denial of DEFENDANT's 3rd Motion to Dismiss.

This court knows MRAppP 3(b) says "The trial court shall take no further action pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court."

This court knows it was prohibited from accepting any guilty plea or entering any deferred disposition agreement (contract) with DEFENDANT.

This court knows all contracts are governed by Title 11 which requires absolute disclosure and good faith from all parties, nunc pro tunc.

This court knows PLAINTIFF dismissed Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and fraudulently solicited a deferred disposition contract for Count 2 on December 18, 2013.

This court knows PLAINTIFF had no authority to offer such an agreement.


This court knows it was prohibited by MRAppP 3(b) from taking any further action until the law court made its determination on DEFENDANT's December 5th appeal.

DEFENDANT's agreement to the deferred disposition was solicited fraudulently.

This court's actions are equivalent to fraudulent nondisclosure. This Imperative Judicial Notice is given on this date in Augusta, Maine.

Dated: March 12, 2014 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This document was delivered by hand upon the District Attorney at the Office of the District Attorney at 95 State Street Augusta, Maine on this day. Dated: March 12, 2014 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX I

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT SITTING AS THE LAW COURT

KEN-13-514

GINA TURCOTTE

APPELLANT v.

SECRETARY OF STATE APPELLEE

Reply Brief for Appellant

Gina Turcotte APPELLANT

32 Court St, Apt 1 Augusta, Maine

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................2 STANDARD OF REVIEW ............................................................................................3 REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ..............................................................................3 1. APPELLEE FAILED TO PROVE THAT FAILURE TO FILE A MEDICAL EVALUATION EQUALS INCOMPETENCE TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE. CONCLUSION ...............................................................................................................8 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .....................................................................................11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CONSTITUTION United States Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses Maine Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses CASES McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 1998 ME 177 STATUTES 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) 5 M.R.S. § 10003 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(4)-(6) 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5)


29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(4) 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3)

STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may only reverse or modify an administrative agency's decision if

it is based upon "bias or error of law", is "unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record", is "arbitrary and capricious", or involves an "abuse of discretion" by the agency. 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C)(4)-(6). According to the Law Court, the power to review decisions of the Secretary of State is confined to an examination of "whether the Commission correctly applied the law and whether its fact findings are supported by any competent evidence." McPherson Timberlands, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n, 1998 ME 177, ~ 6,714 A.2d 818, 820.

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

1. APPELLEE FAILED TO PROVE THAT FAILURE TO FILE A MEDICAL EVALUATION EQUALS INCOMPETENCE TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE.

The Secretary of State repeatedly indicates they "mailed a notice of suspension and opportunity for hearing to the last known address" but they fail to disclose that both of those notices were returned to them by the USPS thereby nullifying any claims that actual notice of the medical evaluation request or notice of suspension were successfully served.

Judge Murphy of Kennebec County Superior Court improperly concluded in the October 24, 2013 Order that "actual notice was given to Turcotte by a law enforcement officer, who during a traffic stop, personally informed Turcotte that her driver's license had been suspended" although having no evidence that Ofc. DosSantos informed Appellant of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the proceeding would be conducted, a reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule provisions involved, a short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the proceeding and of the matters asserted, a statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within which a hearing may be requested, a statement of the manner and time within which evidence and argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a hearing had been set, and when a hearing had been set, a statement of the manner and time within which applications for intervention under section 9054 may be filed.

The Superior Court's determination that actual notice was properly served is a reversible error which rises to the level of a question of law which is reviewable by a federal court of appeals.

29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3) indisputably specifies, "The notice is deemed received 3 days after mailing, unless returned by postal authorities."

The Secretary of State is empowered to take unilateral administrative action without a hearing when there are concerns about public health or safety and as long as that suspension does not continue for more than 30 days pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3), "The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a


significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days."

There is no evidence whatsoever that "The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action..." in 2009 and 2010.

When the Secretary of State received and logged both USPS returned mail items they did not try to fulfill actual notice requirements by placing a public notice pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3), "Notice to the public shall be given: A. By publication, at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state affected; B. By publication in any other trade, industry, professional or interest group publication which the agency deems effective in reaching persons who would be entitled to intervene as of right under section 9054, subsection 1; and C. In any other manner deemed appropriate by the agency."

The Secretary of State took no further steps to ensure their compliance with constitutional due process requirements pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(4) which very clearly indicates only three (3) exceptions to the notice requirement, "Upon suspending or revoking a...license...pursuant to subsection 2, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of opportunity for hearing as provided in section 2483, except when: A. The suspension...rests solely upon a conviction in court of an offense that by statute is expressly made grounds for that suspension or revocation; B. The basis of the Secretary of State's action is a condition of bail or conditional release pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph Q; or C. The suspension or revocation is required by federal statute or regulation."

Appellant had no convictions in 2008, 2009 or 2010 that were statutory grounds for any suspension, nor were there any bail conditions or legal applicability of any federal statute or regulation to substantiate any action without proper hearing and evidentiary findings of fact as supported by evidence in the record.

Furthermore, the Secretary of State cannot claim they acted upon a report of adverse or negligent operation, a report by a law enforcement officer, nor upon the advice of the Medical Advisory Board because no evidence of those events exist.

As a matter of record, Secretary of State issued a violation free credit on December 31, 2008 for year 2008, another on December 31, 2009 for year 2009 and a third credit on March 8, 2011 for the year 2010 which clearly supports Appellant's rebuttal of Secretary of State's allegation of incompetence to drive a motor vehicle which is the crux of this instant case regardless of Appellee's successful service of any required actual notice.

Appellee states in their brief on page 2, ¶2, "On January 5, 2010, the indefinite suspension went into effect because Turcotte did not submit the requested evaluation form." which should have been, but was not, based on 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5), "The license of a person under review who refuses to submit to an examination or to provide information as requested by the Secretary of State


pursuant to this subchapter may be suspended until the individual complies with the request."

Initially, in the January 5th letter, the Secretary of State indicates that "failure to file a medical evaluation request" will result in indefinite suspension for "incompetence to drive a motor vehicle" pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) even though they could have properly applied 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) or 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) instead.

In fact, the Secretary of State has made no mention whatsoever of 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) in support of their indefinite suspension for failure to comply with the medical evaluation request; instead, Secretary of State has claimed but utterly failed to provide evidence of incompetence to drive a motor vehicle under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D).

If Secretary of State wanted Appellant to have actual notice of the request for medical evaluation, they should have fully complied with 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) and posted public notices in local publications expecting Appellant or someone who knows Appellant would see the public notice and whereby Appellant could have, and would have, promptly complied with the request for medical evaluation without the need for an arbitrary and abusive suspension. This public notice could have also served as Appellee's irrefutable proof of due process because they would now be able to go into the newspaper archives to show overwhelming proof of public notice publication satisfying all elements of notice pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) which must state,

A. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the proceeding is being conducted; B. A reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule provisions involved; C. A short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the proceeding and of the matters asserted; D. A statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within which a hearing may be requested; E. A statement of the manner and time within which evidence and argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a hearing has been set; and F. When a hearing has been set, a statement of the manner and time within which applications for intervention under section 9054 may be filed. There are no facts in the record to support Appellee's claim that Ofc. Eric

DosSantos provided all elements of actual notice under § 9052(3) above. Thus, Secretary of State violated constitutional due process which Appellant has undeniably proven by the facts and evidence in this case.

Again, the Superior Court's determination that actual notice was properly served is a reversible error which rises to the level of a question of law which is reviewable by a federal court of appeals.

Presuming theoretically that Appellant received the 2010 suspension letter and immediately requested an administrative hearing within the rules, there is no


evidence to support allegations of incompetence regardless if Appellant received or complied with any request for any medical evaluation.

Despite Appellant's failure to receive or comply with a medical evaluation request, Secretary of State never had authority or substantial evidence under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) to suspend Appellant's license for any reason.

Secretary of State's application of 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) was arbitrary, capricious and based upon bias or error of law, was a clear abuse of discretion, and was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record.

CONCLUSION The question before this court is not just whether actual notice was properly

served although that is definitively one of the elements heavily impacting the merits of this case; the question at the heart of this appeal is if substantial evidence exists to support a finding of incompetence to drive a motor vehicle under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) as alleged by Secretary of State in the 2010 notice of suspension.

The end result of any administrative hearing, past or present, will be a full nullification of the administrative medical suspension based on the lack of evidence to support any allegation of incompetence.

For the foregoing reasons together with those reasons the law court finds pertinent and persuasive, Appellant respectfully moves the court to find that actual notice requirements were not met, immediately reverse the January 5, 2010 decision by Secretary of State to suspend the license under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) for 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle', void all companion cases which resulted directly or indirectly from this medical suspension (docketed under AUGDC-CR-2011-512, AUGDC-CR-2011-513, AUGSC-CR-2012-286, including unidentified Violations Bureau summonses).

If the law court remands this action back to Secretary of State for proper hearing, the final outcome will be a full nullification of the medical suspension as well as all companion cases resulting directly or indirectly from the 2010 medical suspension so Appellant moves the law court to take the appropriate action now nullifying the medical suspension and all corresponding violations, and issuing an order for a complete refund and forgiveness of all fines and reinstatement fees resulting from this and the companion cases cited herein.

If the law court decides actual notice was provided as required by law, and that "failure to file a medical evaluation" rises to the level of being "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle", Appellant needs findings of fact supporting the Appellee's claim that Ofc. DosSantos provided all elements of actual notice as well as specifying the factual elements which caused Appellant to become "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle".

Dated in Augusta Maine this 5th day of February 2014. In Peace, GINA TURCOTTE 32 COURT ST, APT 1 AUGUSTA, MAINE


APPENDIX J STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Defendant's Rescission Of Agreement Under Deferred Disposition NOW COMES DEFENDANT, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and rescinds her agreement under deferred disposition for fraudulent nondisclosure, as described below: 1) Defendant has always maintained her absolute innocence nunc pro tunc. 2) Defendant's 3rd Motion to Dismiss was improperly denied on December 5, 2013. 3) Defendant filed a notice of appeal from that order on that day under KEN-14-

18. 4) Defendant properly and immediately informed Plaintiff of such appeal. 5) Pursuant to M.R.App.P. 3(b), "The trial court shall take no further action

pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court." 6) Pursuant to M.R.App.P. 3(b) Plaintiff was prohibited from entering a deferred

disposition agreement with or accepting a guilty plea from Defendant. 7) M.R.App.P. 3(b) required all trial activities to be suspended. 8) Defendant communicated with Plaintiff via email on December 17, 2013,

through counsel Hank Hainke, unsuccessfully compelling Plaintiff to dismiss all charges.

9) Defendant was present in court and prepared for trial on December 18, 2013. 10) Plaintiff announced their willful dismissal of six of the seven pending charges. 11) Plaintiff and Defendant discussed pertinent facts off the record in the courtroom

on December 18, 2013 while waiting for the judge and jury to be seated. 12) Defendant exercised her rights under M.R.Civ.P. 76H(a) to record the entire

exchange. 13) Plaintiff offered dismissal of Count 2 under a one-year deferred disposition. 14) 11 M.R.S. § 1-1304. Obligation of Good Faith, stipulates "Every contract or duty

within the Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement."

15) Defendant reserved her right to withdraw any guilty plea at any time. 16) Defendant's innocence was proven by Plaintiffs offer of deferred disposition of

Count 2 and outright dismissal of Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.


17) The law court appeal was denied on January 13, 2014 because Defendant unwittingly accepted Plaintiffs illicit deferred disposition contract.

18) The law court stated in KEN-14-18, "Once Turcotte filed her notice of appeal, the court was prohibited from taking any further action, including accepting the guilty plea or entering the deferred disposition. M.R.App.P. 3(b)"

19) The law court wrongly assumed "the intent of the parties" at the time Defendant entered the deferred disposition contract.

20) Defendant always asserted her intent to have all charges dismissed nunc pro tunc.

21) Plaintiff did not act in good faith when offering a deferred disposition. 22) Plaintiff was prohibited from signing any agreement with Defendant. 23) Plaintiff and Defendant are both required to know and obey all rules of court. 24) Superior Court violated M.R.App.P. 3(b) by accepting the deferred disposition. 25) Plaintiffs actions are equivalent to fraudulent nondisclosure. 26) Plaintiff has blatantly violated Defendant's due process rights nunc pro tunc. 27) Plaintiffs actions justify dismissal of all charges with disciplinary sanctions. 28) Plaintiffs actions justify redemption and remedial compensation for Defendant. WHEREFORE, Defendant RESCINDS the agreement under deferred disposition for fraudulent nondisclosure nunc pro tunc and demands redemption and damages. Dated: January 29, 2014 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX K STATE OF MAINE


Defendant's 4th Motion to Dismiss NOW COMES DEFENDANT, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and moves this court to dismiss all charges with prejudice for the following reasons: 1) Defendant has always maintained her absolute innocence nunc pro tunc. 2) Plaintiff has never had sufficient evidence to prove Defendant's guilt. 3) Plaintiff has repeatedly violated Defendant's right to a speedy trial, to receive

all exculpatory evidence, right to due process, inter alia. 4) Defendant's 3rd Motion to Dismiss was improperly denied on December 5, 2013; 5) Defendant filed a notice of appeal from that order on that day under KEN-14-

18. 6) Defendant properly and immediately informed Plaintiff of KEN-14-18. 7) Pursuant to M.R.App.P. 3(b), "The trial court shall take no further action

pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court." 8) M.R.App.P. 3(b) required all trial activities to be suspended thus prohibiting a

deferred disposition agreement or accepting any guilty plea from Defendant. 9) Defendant was present in court and prepared for trial on December 18, 2013

(which was also prohibited by M.R.App.P 3(b)) when Plaintiff announced their willful dismissal of Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

10) Plaintiff illicitly offered dismissal of Count 2 under a one-year deferred disposition.

11) M.R.App.P. 3(b) prohibits Plaintiff from moving forward with any trial activities and offering any agreement to Defendant therefore Plaintiff did not act in good faith when offering a deferred disposition.

12) Defendant's agreement to the deferred disposition was solicited fraudulently by Plaintiff and is in fact null and void nunc pro tunc.

13) Plaintiffs actions are equivalent to fraudulent nondisclosure justifying disciplinary sanctions with dismissal of all charges plus remedial compensation for Defendant.

WHEREFORE, Defendant demands dismissal of all charges plus remedial compensation. Dated: January 29, 2014 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX L

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT SITTING AS THE LAW COURT

KEN-13-514

GINA TURCOTTE

APPELLANT v.

SECRETARY OF STATE APPELLEE

Appeal Brief for Appellant

Gina Turcotte APPELLANT

41 Lambert Avenue Augusta, Maine

Table of Contents

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................ iii PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................... 1 NOTICE OF COMPANION CASES ............................................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................. 2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY ............................................................................................2 ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ......................................................................... 9 1. WHETHER FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION RISES TO 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE. 2. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE. 3. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD. 4. WHETHER OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.


5. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...................................................................................... 9 STANDARD OF REVIEW .......................................................................................... 11 ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................ 12 1. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED 'FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION' IS THE EQUIVALENT OF 'INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE'. 2. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE. 3. SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD. 4. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011. 5. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................ 17 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES DICTIONARY Black’s Law Dictionary, 1st Edition CONSTITUTION United States Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses Maine Constitution, All Pertinent Due Process Clauses CASES Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500, Supreme Court 1964 Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157 Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241, Me Supreme Judicial Court 2012 Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271 CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, ¶ 6, 703 A.2d 1258, 1261 Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 Haines v. Kerner 404 US 519


Liberty Ins. Underwr. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94 McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896 A.2d 933 Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02 STATUTES 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) 29-A M.R.S. § 1258 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4) 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(4) 5 M.R.S. § 10003 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) 29-A M.R.S. § 2482 MAINE MOTOR VEHICLE RULES 29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 2 29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 3

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT Appellant's case is heavily laden with constitutional violations by Appellee

"that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties" Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US 500, Supreme Court 1964.

Appellant is not a licensed nor a practiced attorney and has no formal legal education or training. Appellant has a long and diverse administrative work history involving proper application of various laws but has a very limited knowledge of court rules, procedures and appellate process.

Hence, Appellant asks the law court to honor United States Supreme Court's precedent in Haines v. Kerner 404 US 519, which stipulates, "the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and excuse Appellant's minor technical errors as harmless errors having no influence on the merits or outcome of this case.

Appellant has expressly reserved and continues to expressly reserve all of her natural and common law rights as protected and guaranteed by the federal and Maine Constitutions, on and for the record, nunc pro tunc. Appellant also expressly reserves her right to amend without leave of court.

NOTICE OF COMPANION CASES There are three (3) companion cases to this instant case, not including

Violations Bureau companion cases, which are docketed under: AUGDC-CR-2011-512 AUGDC-CR-2011-513 AUGSC-CR-2012-286

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellant became transient in September 2007 after a micro-burst tornado

seriously damaged her rented home in Windsor, Maine which consequently caused


her residency to become stopgap and unstable for several years. Appellant has since lived in a few dozen different places with some lasting only a few days.

Consequently, Appellant was unable to keep a current mailing address consistently on file with Appellee which prevented mail from being delivered to Appellant which caused Appellant to unknowingly fail to fulfill a request for medical evaluation in November 2009.

The record shows two medical notices were returned as undeliverable on November 10 and December 29, 2009 by the United States Postal Service.

Appellee issued Appellant a violation free credit on December 31, 2009. The record shows Appellee did not post pertinent public notices in their

attempt to contact Appellant and follow due process, nor were public notices issued of a potential 'health or safety hazard' caused by Appellant’s alleged 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle'.

In fact, no actual notices were served on Appellant at all. Despite the record clearly showing Appellant had not received nor been

served with the required actual notices, Appellee ignored and violated constitutional and procedural due process and suspended the license on January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) without holding a preliminary hearing, without receiving any reports of adverse operation, without having clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency, without having clear and sufficient evidence of a health or safety hazard, and without any advice of the Medical Advisory Board or any other competent medical professional.

Appellee maintained the administrative medical suspension for 397 days beyond the statutory limitations imposed by 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) Action without Hearing.

On February 10, 2011, Augusta Police Ofc. DosSantos initiated a traffic stop without probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, which resulted in Appellant being released from the scene after being issued a Violation Summons and Complaint for failure to obey a traffic control device. Ofc. DosSantos did not indicate in any way that license #1491178 was suspended or revoked. (AUGDC-CR-2011-512) (VB#2576761)

On March 7, 2011, Augusta Police Ofc. DosSantos, without probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, and with full knowledge the license was suspended for medical reasons, initiated a traffic stop and twice asked Appellant if her license was suspended which Appellant twice denied; this communication served as Appellant’s first actual notice of the medical suspension only. (AUGDC-CR-2011-513)

Ofc. DosSantos asked Appellant if she knew any reason the medical unit would have to suspend the license. Appellant denied any knowledge insisting the license should be active.

Ofc. DosSantos told Appellant he had no knowledge of the basis for the medical suspension, the statutory authority for the suspension, nor did he inform Appellant that she had a right to request an administrative hearing.


Ofc. DosSantos did not fulfill the requirements of actual notice under 29-A M.R.S. § 2482 or Motor Vehicle Rules 29-250, Ch. 2, Section 2 Notice of Opportunity for Hearing during the March 7, 2011 traffic stop.

Ofc. DosSantos issued two (2) Uniform Summons And Complaints under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) for February 10 and March 7, 2011. (AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513)

Appellant called the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle upon her arrival home on March 7, 2011.

Appellant contacted her physician on March 8, 2011 fulfilling Appellee’s request for a medical evaluation with a signed declaration by Appellant’s physician that Appellant was not using any medication at the time of the 2010 suspension, nor currently. (Physician's Report, March 8, 2011)

In fact, Appellant ceased taking all pharmaceuticals in 2006. Appellant never received any type of verbal or written notice prior to March

2013 that she was entitled to an administrative hearing or the license had been suspended pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) for incompetency.

The record shows no adverse report of unsafe operation nor the advice of the Medical Advisory Board supporting any type of suspension.

Appellee deleted the medical suspension on March 8, 2011. (Dr. Record 1491178, 4/06/12 09:45:18, Page 3)

Appellee issued a “violation free credit” to Appellant on March 8, 2011 for the calendar year 2010. (Dr. Record 1491178, 4/06/12 09:45:18, Page 3)

On March 8, 2011 Appellant went to the District Attorney’s office to ask for a dismissal of AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and AUGDC-CR-2011-513, which the District Attorney explicitly rejected.

On July 5, 2011, Appellant appeared at her bench trial for AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and AUGDC-CR-2011-513 and submitted a certified public copy of driving record #1491178 to the district court judge showing no suspension existed on February 10 or March 7, 2011, which the court rejected.

Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere vis compulsiva on July 5, 2011 to AUGDC-CR-2011-513.

AUGDC-CR-2011-512 was dismissed. Appellant repeatedly expressed to the court that she had not received actual

knowledge or notice of any suspension until March 7, 2011 and that all charges must be dismissed for Appellee’s failure to comply with actual notice requirements under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A).

Appellant was not represented by nor did she waive her right to counsel in criminal prosecutions of AUGDC-CR-2011-512 and 513.

Appellant did not have actual notice of the specific statutory authority of the medical suspension until March 2013 thereby being unaware of her right to request an administrative hearing to challenge the suspension nunc pro tunc.

In March 2013, Appellant discovered the statutory authority of the medical suspension while reviewing evidence for AUGSC-CR-2012-286.


On March 18, 2013, Appellant sent her first request for administrative hearing to Appellee.

Assistant Director Susan Cole rejected Appellant's request on March 20, 2013 stating Appellant’s “current suspensions” did not allow for an administrative hearing.

On March 28, 2013, Appellant sent her second demand for an administrative hearing claiming the medical suspension was commenced improperly, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, without required notices and in violation of due process, which was sent directly to Robert O’Connell, Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings.

On April 2, 2013, Mr. O’Connell denied Appellant’s demand for an administrative hearing specifying, “Your request for an administrative hearing on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely.”

On April 8, 2013, Appellant sent a third demand for an administrative hearing and notice of violation of procedural due process to Appellee again demanding an administrative hearing and the opportunity to review the evidence which supported Appellee’s decision to suspend the license without notice or opportunity for preliminary hearing.

On April 10, 2013, Mr. O’Connell again denied Appellant’s demand for administrative hearing specifying, “I am in receipt of your correspondence of April 8, 2013 in response to my letter of April 2, 2013 to you denying your request for an administrative hearing. As I advised you in that letter, my decision represents final agency action in this matter. You may seek judicial review of this final agency action pursuant to the provisions of 5 M.R.S. § 11001-11008.”

At no time has Appellee disputed or contested any facts in the record. On April 22, 2013 Appellant filed a Rule 80C Petition and Application and

Affidavit to Proceed without Payment of Fees which was ordered on April 25, 2013 by Judge Murphy.

On May 24, 2013 Appellant filed an Affidavit and Request for Default Judgment for Appellee's failure to file the Certified Record on time.

On May 28, 2013 Appellee filed the Certified Record with the court. On May 29, 2013 a Notice and Briefing Schedule was mailed to both parties. On May 31, 2013, Appellee filed Respondent's Motion to Enlarge Time to File

Record Nunc Pro Tunc. On June 27, 2013, J. Nivison ordered Appellee's Motion to Enlarge Time to

File Record Nunc Pro Tunc. On July 6, 2013, Appellant filed a Motion to Enlarge Time to File Brief. On July 12, 2013 J. Murphy ordered Appellant's Motion to Enlarge Time to

File Brief setting the deadline to file the brief for July 15, 2013. On July 15, 2013, Appellant filed the Rule 80C Brief with the court. On July 31, 2013, Appellee filed Brief of Respondent with the court

accompanied by a letter stating in the event the Petitioner requests oral argument, Respondent waives its right to be present for the argument.


On August 14, 2013, Appellant filed Petitioner's Reply Brief. On September 18, 2013, Appellant filed a letter with superior court

requesting that oral arguments be scheduled. On September 21, 2013, superior court scheduled oral arguments for October

9, 2013 at 11:00am. On October 9, 2013, oral argument was held with J. Murphy presiding,

Appellant was present and prepared but Appellee was absent as noted. J. Murphy took Appellant's argument under advisement. Tape 1767, Index 6245-7380.

On October 24, 2013, J. Murphy affirmed Appellee's decision of April 2, 2013 indicating, "actual notice was given to Turcotte by a law enforcement officer, who during a traffic stop, personally informed Turcotte that her driver's license had been suspended... Turcotte's request for an administrative hearing to challenge the January 5, 2010 suspension was untimely...."

On November 1, 2013, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and Application and Affidavit to Proceed without Payment of Fees which was ordered on November 6, 2013 by J. Murphy.

Appellant's appeal was docketed by the law court on November 15, 2013.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. WHETHER FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION RISES TO 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE. 2. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE. 3. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD. 4. WHETHER OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011. 5. WHETHER SECRETARY OF STATE ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Suspending any license without providing required notices, hearings and

following procedural due process is a violation of the Maine Constitution. Appellee improperly determined that 'failure to file a medical evaluation' was

equivalent to 'incompetent to drive a motor vehicle' and then abusively and capriciously suspended license #1491178 under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) on January 5, 2010 because Appellant did not receive, was not aware of and did not


comply with a request for medical evaluation in November and December 2009. Both notices were returned to Appellee by the USPS effectively nullifying any notice Appellee attempted to serve. There is no evidence Appellee posted public notices as required by 5 M.R.S. § 10003.

The record shows no evidence of adverse or unsafe operation, no recommendation by the Medical Advisory Board in support of indefinite suspension for incompetence, no evidence whatsoever of incompetence and no proof that all elements of actual notice of suspension were provided to Appellant prior to March 2013.

Appellee improperly denied Appellant's request for administrative hearing as untimely because Appellee incorrectly claims that actual notice was given to Appellant by Ofc. DosSantos on March 7, 2011 during a traffic stop.

Appellee's erroneous claim that Ofc. DosSantos provided Appellant with all required elements of 'actual notice' on March 7, 2011 is unsubstantiated and wholly false.

The Maine Legislature has established clear rules indicating form, content and delivery of suspension notices which mandate strict compliance with all elements of actual notice and which must be supported by evidentiary proof of the alleged actual notice.

"The statutory authority for suspension of a driver's license by the Secretary of State in this case is set forth in section 2458(2)(D) which authorizes the suspension if the licensed driver 'is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle.' Although this is a decision of the Secretary of State or his designee, the Secretary does have available the assistance of his Medical Advisory Board which may, at the Secretary's request, interview drivers whose competency is in question. 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4)." Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02

However, 5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right To Hearing stipulates, "an agency may not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, nor may it refuse to renew any license unless it has afforded the licensee either an opportunity for an agency hearing in conformity with subchapter IV or an opportunity for a hearing in the District Court. In any such proceeding determined by the agency to involve a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV.

When Appellee suspends a license pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) without providing a hearing or making evidentiary findings, Appellee must adhere to 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) Action Without Hearing, "Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days."

Clearly and convincingly, the record does not contain "competent and substantial evidence which supports the results reached by the agency." CWCO, Inc.


v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, ¶ 6, 703 A.2d 1258, 1261. "The remaining issue is whether there were findings not supported by the evidence. Again, the issue is not whether the court would have the same decision based upon the evidence, but rather whether there was any evidence of record to support the agency's findings." Norris Perry v. Secretary of State, AP-00-02

STANDARD OF REVIEW "Because the Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we

directly review the Secretary of State's decision." McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896 A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results," Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers interpretations ... that do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is ambiguous." Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94. "A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations." Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411." Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241, Me Supreme Judicial Court 2012.

ARGUMENT 1. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED 'FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION' IS THE EQUIVALENT OF 'INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE'.

Appellant has been unable to locate any case law on point but Black’s Law Dictionary, 1st Edition, defines “incompetency” as “lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty.”

The record does not show any evidence of adverse or dangerous operation, lack of ability, lack of legal qualification, or lack of fitness by Appellant to support any claim of incompetency. Additionally, the record shows Appellant was issued three consecutive years violation free credits for 2008, 2009 and 2010 indicating Appellant had committed no violations and was able, legally qualified and fit to receive those violation free credits.

Appellant did not receive actual notice of the request for medical evaluation nor did Appellee post required public notices thereby preventing Appellant from complying with its terms; however, even if Appellant had actual notice but still had not complied with the medical evaluation request, there is no evidence in the record to substantiate a license suspension for "incompetency to drive a motor vehicle".


2. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED APPELLANT WAS INCOMPETENT TO DRIVE A MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT SUPPORTING EVIDENCE.

Nowhere in the record does Appellee claim to exercise any power under 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(5) to suspend the license indefinitely for Appellant's failure to submit to a medical evaluation. Instead, Appellee claimed authority under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) despite lack of any "showing by the Secretary of State's records or other sufficient evidence" that Appellant was "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle". Appellee claims no other authoritative statutes in the December 17, 2009 suspension letter to support the January 5, 2010 suspension.

Upon Appellee deciding to suspend the license for incompetence under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) simply because Appellant failed to comply with a medical evaluation request, Appellee knowingly and willfully failed to consult the Medical Advisory Board under 29-A M.R.S. § 1258 to determine if Appellant's continued operation created any potential hazard to the public.

Appellee suspended the license under the statutory authority of 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) citing incompetence; therefore, it is reasonable that Appellee was also invoking 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) Action without Hearing because of the alleged potential danger allegedly caused by Appellant’s continued operation.

If the law court finds that Appellant's failure to receive or comply with the request for a medical evaluation rises to the level of incompetence to drive a motor vehicle, the law court must specifically define the phrase 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle' and explicitly identify the evidence in the record which supports the determination of 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle'. 3. SECRETARY OF STATE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS BY SUSPENDING THE LICENSE WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY OR CONSULTATION WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

The record shows no sufficient facts or evidence to substantiate or support Appellee's decision to suspend the license for incompetence under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) without consulting the Medical Advisory Board. 4. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT DETERMINED OFC. DOSSANTOS NOTIFIED APPELLANT OF ALL REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF 'ACTUAL NOTICE' ON MARCH 7, 2011.

The final outcome of this case hinges upon the law court's decision if Appellant received 'actual notice' of the December 2009 Notice of Suspension for Failure to File Medical Evaluation as required by statute and motor vehicle rules. Appellee falsely alleges that 'actual notice' was given to Appellant verbally on March 7, 2011 by Ofc. DosSantos of the Augusta Police Department during a traffic stop.

There is no evidence in the record to support Appellee's claim that Ofc. DosSantos satisfied requirements of actual notice by informing Appellant of all elements subject to the provisions of 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(4). 29-250, Ch. 2 Motor Vehicle Rules clearly state for Administrative Hearings, subsection 2, Secretary of State upon suspending or revoking a person’s


license...shall notify that person that the person has a right to and may request a hearing. The notice must state:

1. The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation; 2. The effective date of the suspension or revocation; 3. The procedure for requesting a hearing; and 4. The date by which that request for hearing must be made. There is no evidence in the record to substantiate the claim that Ofc.

DosSantos knew or informed Appellant of the reason or statutory grounds for the suspension, the procedure for requesting a hearing, or the date by which the request for hearing must be made. The only knowledge Ofc. DosSantos claimed to have or delivered to Appellant was the license was suspended by the medical unit on January 5, 2010. 5. SECRETARY OF STATE COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING IN MARCH AND APRIL 2013.

29-250 Motor Vehicle Rules Section 3 requires, "If a request is made after the ten day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension..., the Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and grant the hearing request, except a stay may not be granted."

Superior Court indicated in their October decision that the waiver applies only "if Petitioner can prove she did not have 'actual' notice of the suspension. But these are not the facts of this case. On March 7, 2011, an actual notice was given to Turcotte by a law enforcement officer, who during the traffic stop, personally informed Turcotte that her driver's license had been suspended."

There are no facts in the record to substantiate Appellee's claim that actual notice was properly given to Appellant by Ofc. DosSantos on March 7, 2011. Appellant maintains Ofc. DosSantos confessed to having no knowledge by which he was competent to provide actual notice of all elements as required by law. The only element of actual notice Ofc. DosSantos provided was that the license had been suspended by the medical unit on January 5, 2010.

There is no evidence in the record that Appellant was given verbal or written notice by the medical unit on March 7 or 8, 2011 of the statutory authority for the medical suspension or of Appellant's right to request an administrative hearing to challenge the evidence and basis for the suspension.

Appellee cannot substantiate by evidence in the record that Appellant received actual notice prior to March 2013 of the statutory authority for the medical suspension under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D).

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons together with those reasons the law court finds

pertinent and persuasive, Appellant respectfully moves the court to find that actual notice requirements were not met, immediately reverse the January 5, 2010 decision by Secretary of State to suspend the license under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) for 'incompetence to drive a motor vehicle', void all companion cases which resulted


directly or indirectly from this medical suspension (docketed under AUGDC-CR-2011-512, AUGDC-CR-2011-513, AUGSC-CR-2012-286, including unidentified Violations Bureau summonses).

If the law court remands this action back to Secretary of State for proper hearing, the final outcome will be a full nullification of the medical suspension as well as all companion cases resulting directly or indirectly from the 2010 medical suspension so Appellant moves the law court to take the appropriate action now nullifying the medical suspension and all corresponding violations, and issuing an order for a complete refund and forgiveness of all fines and reinstatement fees resulting from this and the companion cases cited herein.

If the law court decides actual notice was provided as required by law, and that "failure to file a medical evaluation" rises to the level of being "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle", Appellant needs full definitive opinions specifying the elements which caused Appellant to become "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" and the facts and evidence supporting those opinions.

Dated in Augusta Maine this 17th day of January 2014. In Peace, GINA TURCOTTE 41 LAMBERT AVENUE AUGUSTA, MAINE


APPENDIX M STATE OF MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Sitting as the Law Court Docket No. Ken-14-18

State of Maine v. Gina Lynn Turcotte

Order On December 5, 2013, Gina Lynn Turcotte filed a notice of appeal from an

order of the Superior Court, entered the same day, denying her motion to dismiss the charges against her. On December 18, 2013, Turcotte entered a guilty plea on one of the seven counts against her, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The court entered a deferred disposition the same day.

Because the judgment of conviction has not yet been entered, 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A (2013), Turcotte's appeal is interlocutory. In addition, except for conditional guilty pleas, M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), there is no right to a direct appeal from a guilty plea in a criminal case except for claims that the court lacked jurisdiction or the punishment was illegal or cruel or unusual. State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d 501, 503 (Me. 1996). Furthermore, Turcotte, by agreeing to the deferred disposition, is precluded from attacking it. 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-C (2013).

Once Turcotte filed her notice of appeal, the court was prohibited from taking

any further action, including accepting the guilty plea or entering the deferred disposition. M.R.App.P. 3(b). In order to effectuate the intent of the parties and the court, however, this Court will provide relief from the rules pursuant to M.R.App.P. 14(c).

It is therefore ORDERED as follows: 1. The provisions of M.R.App.P. 3(b) are suspended retroactive to

December 5, 2013, to the extent necessary to make all actions taken by the Superior Court after Turcotte filed her notice of appeal are valid.

2. Turcotte's appeal is DISMISSED as interlocutory. Dated: January 13 , 2014 For the Court, Associate Justice


APPENDIX N

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 and 667 (merged) STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Dismissal (M.R.Crim.P 48(a))

Pursuant to Rule 48(a) of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure the District Attorney for Prosecutorial District 4 hereby dismisses the indictment, information, complaint or count(s) 1, 3-7 thereof against the defendant for the following reasons:

1.) The Defendant has plead to other charges. (Count 2) 8.) Other.

Date: 12/18/13 Asst. District Attorney Joelle Pratt


APPENDIX O

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Agreement Of Defendant And Order Deferring Disposition Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1348 et seq., I am the above-named defendant, I have entered a plea of guilty, and I agree to: 1. Appear in the court on the date and time I am notified to appear. 2. Refrain from all criminal conduct and violation of federal, state, and local

criminal laws. 3. Identify myself as being on deferred disposition if arrested or questioned by law

enforcement and notify the District Attorney's Office in writing of any contact with law enforcement within 96 hours of that contact.

4. Advise the court named above of any change in my address or telephone number within 24 hours of the change.

5. Comply with all conditions of the attached Conditions of Release. 6. Pay an administrative supervision fee of $0.00 per month. 7. Other: No violations of Title 29-A (M.R.S.). I UNDERSTAND THAT IF I VIOLATE ANY OF THE ABOVE REQUIREMENTS, I AM SUBJECT TO ARREST AND DETENTION, I CAN BE REQUIRED TO MEET DIFFERENT OR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF DEFERRED DISPOSITION, AND I CAN BE TERMINATED FROM DEFERRED DISPOSITION AND SENTENCED IMMEDIATELY. By signing here, I acknowledge that I understand the provisions of this order, I have received a copy of this order, I agree to comply with the above requirements, and I agree to have sentencing deferred to a later date. Date: December 18, 2013 Gina L. Turcotte

Defendant As counsel for the defendant, I have explained to the defendant this procedure and agreement. I believe the defendant fully understands the meaning of this


agreement and has the mental capacity to intelligently, intentionally, and knowingly enter into this agreement. Date: December 18, 2013 Hank Hainke, Esq.

ORDER Based upon the above, the defendant's plea of guilty is accepted and sentencing is deferred until a final disposition hearing (for 12 months to a date to be scheduled by the clerk) (to date: December 16, 2014) Date: December 18, 2013 Judge Michaela Murphy


APPENDIX P STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Motion To Dismiss Count 2 Under Federal Rules Of Evidence 410(a)(2)

NOW COMES DEFENDANT and moves this court to dismiss with prejudice Count 2 Operating While License Suspended or Revoked, Prior under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 410(a)(2) because the prior conviction under AUGDC-CR-2011-513 was the result of an involuntary nolo contendere plea by Defendant on July 5, 2011 as evidenced by "PRIOR OAS conviction AUGDC-CR-11-513, July 5, 2011- fine imposed was $250." and "07/11 OAS Nolo FINE" on the "Confidential Screening Sheet" dated 4/6/2012 9:23:00AM by former A.D.A. DAVID W. JACKSON and hereby attached to this motion. Defendant's nolo contendere plea on July 5, 2011 was the direct result of threat, duress and coercion by former A.D.A. STEVEN PARKER in violation of due process.

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 410 clearly limits admissibility of prior

convictions in all civil and criminal cases as follows: Rule 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements (a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence _of the following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: (1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (2) a nolo contendere plea; (3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4):

(1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together; or


(2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.

DEFENDANT affirms neither of the exceptions are applicable in this case. WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this Court to dismiss Count 2 with prejudice under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 410, immediately release Defendant from all bail conditions, and grant such further relief as justice so requires. Dated: December 18, 2013 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX Q Hainke & Tash

Attorneys-at-Law

P O Box 192 Whitefield ME 04353

Harold J. Hainke, Esq. Tel 207-549-7704 Sherry Tash, Esq. Fax 855-877-3737 [email protected] December 17, 2013 Hand Delivered on 12-18-13 Gina L. Turcotte 41 Lambert Ave. Augusta ME 04330 Subject:

Plea Offer Dear Gina: As we have spoken about on previous occasions, you are charged with Operating After Suspension a Class E crime, refusing to Submit to Arrest, a Class D crime and Attaching False Plates, a Class E Crime. A Class D crime is punishable by up to a year in jail and a $2000 fine. A Class E crime is punishable by up to 6 months in jail and a $1000 fine. Therefore you could be sentenced to 2 years in jail and fined $3000 if you are found guilty. The District Attorney has offered to dismiss all charges except Operating After Suspension and offers a $250 fine. I recommend that you accept this offer. Cordially, Harold J. Hainke, Esq.


APPENDIX R STATE OF MAINE


3RD Motion To Dismiss With Prejudice For Discovery And Due Process Violations

Defendant restates and fully incorporates as if fully set forth herein, Defendant's August 27, 2012 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statements of Facts, Points and Authorities in Support and Defendant's May 7, 2013 2nd Motion To Dismiss For Discovery And Due Process Violations With Incorporated Memorandum Of Law In Support. Defendant, Gina Lynn Turcotte, retaining all her rights and remedies, moves this court to dismiss all charges with prejudice, pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 16(d), as follows: 1. Defendant is charged with:

Count 1: Refusing to Submit to Arrest or Detention, Physical Force Count 2: Operating While License Suspended or Revoked, Prior Count 3: Permit Attachment of False Plates Count 4: Violating Condition of Release Count 5: Operating While License Suspended or Revoked, Prior Count 6: Attaching False Plates Count 7: Failure to Stop for an Officer

2. This case is now on the December 2013 trial list, almost two (2) years after these charges were first filed, and despite numerous requests and the Plaintiff’s legal responsibility under M.R.Crim.P. Rule 16 to provide prompt discovery of ALL exculpatory evidence, Defendant still has not received critical discovery, as follows: a. All dispatch audio between Officer Guay, Officer Harris, Sergeant

Shaw and Augusta Police Dispatch on February 16, 2012.


b. All dispatch written transcripts between Officer Guay, Officer Harris, Sergeant Shaw and Augusta Police Dispatch on February 16, 2012.

c. All dispatch audio between Officer Corbett, Captain Stubbert and Oakland Police Dispatch on April 5, 2012.

d. All dispatch written transcripts between Officer Corbett, Captain

Stubbert and Oakland Police Dispatch on April 5, 2012. e. All dashcam audio and video recordings taken from Officer Guay's

cruiser on February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. f All dashcam audio and video recordings taken from Officer Harris'

cruiser on February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. g. All dashcam audio and video recordings taken from Sergeant Shaw's

cruiser on February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. h. All dashcam audio and video recordings taken from Officer Corbett's

cruiser on April 5, 2012, 2:30pm. i.. All dashcam audio and video recordings taken from Captain Stubbert's

SUV on April 5, 2012, 2:30pm. j. All audio recordings from Officer Guay's handheld mp3 recorder on

February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. k. All audio recordings from Officer Harris' handheld mp3 recorder on

February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. l. All audio recordings from Sergeant Shaw's handheld mp3 recorder on

February 16, 2012, 2:30pm. m. All audio recordings from Officer Corbett's handheld mp3 recorder. n. All audio recordings from Captain Stubbert's handheld mp3 recorder. o. All booking audio and video from Oakland Police Department on April

5, 2012. p. All booking and surveillance audio and video from Kennebec County

jail from April 5, 2012 at/around 3pm through April 6, 2012, 12:00pm.


q. All internal email messages, written literature, documentation and official training materials from both Augusta and Oakland Police Departments regarding “sovereign citizens" (a misnomer).

r. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police

departments regarding collection and retention of investigatory records, notes, electronic recordings, and other related documents or tangible objects.

s. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police departments regarding engaging pursuit.

t. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police departments regarding initiating traffic stops for alleged minor violations.

u. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police departments regarding arrest and detention resulting from traffic stops.

v. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police

departments regarding communicating and interacting with those suspects the police officer may consider to be a “sovereign citizen”.

w. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police

departments regarding use of physical force. x. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police

departments regarding use of firearms. y. All standard operating procedures and policies for both police

departments regarding disciplinary procedures and sanctions for internal violation of laws, rules or procedures by law enforcement officers.

. z. YES or NO?? Did each of the officers perform mandatory in-car camera

pre- pursuit vehicle checks required by Maine Criminal Justice Academy Pursuit and Response" training manual? If NO, specify reasons.

aa. YES or NO?? Do activating blue police lights automatically activate

the in-car camera system? If NO, specify reasons. bb. YES or NO?? Was the in-car camera properly recording at the time of

pursuit? If NO, specify reasons. cc. YES or NO?? Did each of the officers initiate audio recording before the

initial traffic stop or subsequent pursuit? If NO, specify reasons.


dd. YES or NO?? Does a 2-car pursuit warrant the use of in-car camera systems? If NO, specify reasons.

ee. YES or NO?? Does drawing a firearm on a suspect mandate video/

audio evidence? If NO, specify reasons.

ff YES or NO?? Did any of the officers consider Defendant to be a “sovereign citizen” at any time prior to, during, or after the traffic stop, arrest and detention? If YES, why?

gg. PROVIDE DETAILED ANSWER: Why has the Oakland Police Department failed to deliver booking audio and video if the Oakland Police arrest report claims the entire booking process was recorded?

3. Plaintiff has not refuted the existence of any of the aforementioned evidence. 4. Plaintiff has absolutely no legitimate reason for withholding exculpatory evidence. 5. Plaintiff has knowingly violated M.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(3) by failing to provide full discovery within 10 days of arraignment for a Class D and Class E crime, as charged. 6. Plaintiff has knowingly violated M.R.Crim.P. 16(b)(5) by failing to provide full discovery for all cases charging a Class D and Class E crime within 10 days of the request. 7. Plaintiff has knowingly violated the constitution and Defendant's right to receive a speedy trial by failing to provide exculpatory evidence as required under M.R.Crim.P. 16. WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this Court to dismiss all pending charges with prejudice for the State's violation of its discovery obligation pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 16(d) and their denial of Defendant's due process rights, immediately release Defendant from all bail conditions, refund Defendant's bail bond of $300, and grant such further relief as justice so requires. Dated: December 3, 2013 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX S STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NO. AP-13-17 GINA TURCOTTE, Petitioner v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Respondent

Order on Rule 80C Appeal Before the Court is Petitioner Gina Turcotte's ("Turcotte") Petition filed

pursuant to M.R.Civ. P. 80C challenging a decision of Respondent, Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles' ("BMV'), dated April 2, 2013. BMV's April 2, 2013 decision denied Petitioner's March 18, 2013 request for an administrative hearing on the January 5, 2010 suspension of her driver's license for failure to timely file a driver medical evaluation form with the BMV. Petitioner argues that the BMV' s decision should be reversed because she was not properly noticed of the suspension.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 7, 2005, BMV received a driver medical evaluation form regarding Turcotte's diagnosis of Psychiatric Disorders. (R. T. 3.) On November 12, 2009, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(3) & 29-250 C.M.R. ch. 3, BMV requested Turcotte to submit a progress report on her condition by January 5, 2010 and mailed a driver medical evaluation form to the last known address she had provided to BMV.1 (R. T. 3 .) On December 27, 2009, BMV mailed a notice of suspension and opportunity for hearing, again to the last known address Turcotte had provided. (R. T. 3.) The notice warned Turcotte that her license would be suspended effective January 5, 2010 if she failed to submit the requested driver medical evaluation form. (R. T. 3.) The notice also informed her that that she had the right to request an administrative hearing prior to January 15, 2010. (R. T. 3.)

On January 5, 2010, the indefinite suspension went into effect because Turcotte did not submit the requested evaluation form. (R. T. 3 .) Turcotte also failed to request an administrative hearing by the January 15, 2010. (Br. of Resp. 2.) On March 7, 2011, during a traffic stop, a law enforcement officer personally informed Turcotte that her license was under suspension. (R. T. 3.) On March 8, 2011, Turcotte submitted a completed driver medical evaluation form to BMV. (R. T. 3.) That same date, BMV restored Turcotte 's driving privileges. (R. T. 3.)

On March 18, 2013, more than two years after BMV restored her driving privileges, Turcotte requested an administrative hearing to challenge the January


5, 2010 suspension. (R. T. 3.) After an exchange of correspondence between Turcotte and BMV, on April 2, 2013, Robert E. O' Connell, Jr. , Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings at BMV, sent a letter to Turcotte denying the request for hearing as untimely. (R. T. 3.) Mr. O'Connell 's letter also informed Turcotte that his letter was considered final agency action. (R. T. 3 .) On April 22, 2013, Turcotte filed her Petition seeking review of the April 2, 2013 decision denying her request for an administrative hearing.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court must affirm agency decisions unless it finds an abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence from the record.2 Thacker v. Konover Dev. Corp., 2003 ME 30, ¶14, 818 A.2d 1013 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that "no competent evidence supports the [agency's] decision and that the record compels a contrary conclusion." Bischoff v. Maine State Ret. Sys., 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995) (citation omitted). "Judges may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency merely because the evidence could give rise to more than one result." Gulick v. Bd. Of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Me. 1982) (citation omitted). Rather, the court will defer to administrative conclusions when based on evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (citation and quotation omitted).

In doing so, the court must give great deference to an agency's construction of a statute it is charged with administering. Rangeley Crossroads Coal. v. Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 2008 ME 115, ¶10, 955 A.2d 223. Likewise, the court must accept the agency's interpretation of its own internal rules and regulations "unless the rules or regulations plainly compel a contrary result." Id.

DISCUSSION

Under 5 M.R.S. § 9053, an agency may "[p]lace on any party the responsibility of requesting a hearing if the agency notifies him in writing of his right to a hearing, and of his responsibility to request the hearing" and "[m]ake informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by default, provided that notice has been given that failure to take required action may result in default." 5 M.R.S. § 9053. Section 2983, which outlines administrative procedures for suspension of a driver's license, requires that a request for hearing "be made within 10 days from the effective date of the suspension." 29-A M.R.S. § 2483(1).

Petitioner argues that she was unable to make a timely request for a hearing because she had not been given proper notice advising her of the suspension and the right to a hearing. Section 3 of the Department of the Secretary of State Rules for Administrative Hearings provides as follows:


If a request is made after the ten day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension or due to factors of phys1cal incapacity, the Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and grant the hearing request.

29-250 C.M.R. Ch. 2, § 3.

To satisfy 5 M.R.S. § 9053(1) and in compliance with 29-A M.R.S. § 24823 on December 27, 2009, BMV mailed a notice of suspension, which informed Turcotte that her right to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended on January 5, 2010 and that she had a right to an administrative hearing. The notice was sent to Turcotte's last known address, the address she had provided to DMV. See State v. Kovtuschenko, 521 A.2d 718, 719 (Me. 1987) ("[M]ail addressed to a licensee at the address he himself supplied is reasonably calculated to reach him and apprise him of the Secretary's action."); see also State v. Tayman, 2008 ME 177, ¶7, 960 A.2d 1151 ("[P]roof of mailing of notice, rather than of actual receipt, satisfied both statutory and due process requirements.").

Petitioner purports that because she had become "transient" in September 2007, she did not receive the December 27, 2009 correspondence and therefore, did not have "actual" notice of the suspension. Section 3 of 29-250 C.M.R. Ch. 2 indeed requires the Secretary of State to waive the ten-day period of limitation and reopen the matter, if Petitioner can prove she did not have "actual" notice of the suspension. But these are not the facts of this case. On March 7, 2011, an actual notice was given to Turcotte by a law enforcement officer, who during a traffic stop; personally informed Turcotte that her driver's license had been suspended .Petitioner did not make her request for a hearing until more than ·two years from receiving the March 7, 2011 "actual" notice of the suspension. For the foregoing reasons, Turcotte's request for an administrative hearing to challenge the January 5, 2010 suspension was untimely.

Moreover, even if this Court were to find that Turcotte's request for a hearing was made within the time period permitted by 29-250 C.M.R. Ch. 2, § 3, her request is now moot because on March 8, 2011, her driving privileges were fully restored. See Pelkey v. State, No. CIV A AP-99-59, 2000 WL 33675710, at *2 (Me. Super. Aug. 21, 2000) ("The concept of mootness is based on the principle that courts should decline to decide issues which by virtue of valid and recognizable supervening circumstances have lost their controversial vitality .") (quotations omitted).

The entry will be: The decision of the Secretary of State dated April 2, 2013 is AFFIRMED.


DATE: 10/24/13 Michaela Murphy, Superior Court Justice 1The Functional Ability Profile for Psychiatric Disorders Level 3(a) calls for an internal review every 4 years. BMV Medical Rules, Rule 29-250, Ch. 3. 2Under the statutory iteration, the Superior Court may only reverse or modify an administrative decision if it is: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; (4) Affected by bias or error of law; (5) Unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion. 5 M.R.S. § 11007(4)(C). 329-A M.R.S. § 2482 in relevant part provides as follows: Upon determining that a person is subject to license suspension or revocation, the Secretary of State shall immediately notify the person, in writing, of the license suspension or revocation. The notice must be sent to the last name and address provided under section 1407. The notice must clearly state: the reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation; the effective date of the suspension or revocation.


APPENDIX T

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AP-13-17 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Petitioner v. STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Respondent

Petitioner's Reply Brief Rule 80C This matter is under review by this court because Respondent claimed on

January 5, 2010 that Petitioner was "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" based on the exclusive fact that Petitioner did not receive nor promptly complete the Medical Evaluation Request because of her homeless and transient status; the record shows that Petitioner was safe, competent and law-abiding during the time in question.

Respondent has legally acquiesced to all facts as stated by Petitioner through their refusal to object with any factual authoritarian rebuttals.

Respondent suspended driver's license #1491178 pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) without a shred of evidence of any kind of incompetency, no notice to Petitioner, no input from any medical professional or medical advisory board, no public input nor any preliminary hearing as required by the constitutions.

The January 5, 2010 medical suspension was illegal, capricious and punitive. Petitioner gives judicial notice to this court that Respondent's Response Brief

dated July 31, 2013 was received by Petitioner on July 31, 2013 as delivered by the United States Postal Service in an envelope postmarked July 30, 2013 causing Petitioner to speculate as to the reason why Respondent would allow such a patent error to occur in a delicate proceeding which is based on explicit dates, evidence, facts, law and procedure. How did Respondent mail the brief before it was created??

Petitioner speculates that Respondent is so comfortable with their relationship with this court that they no longer feel the need to be meticulous and precise in drafting and creating a legal paper with basic truthful data. If a criminal attorney-at law with more than three decades in the legal industry allows a document to be irresponsibly misdated and then filed as a document of truth, how can any court heed any of their evidence as unadulterated?

This case is based on precise dates and many facts related to those dates. If Respondent cannot take the care needed to place the correct date on a historical legal document, how can this court trust that they took any care to ensure their facts, evidence, law and procedure are not prejudicially flawed and biased?


This court will notice that the record and argument filed by Respondent are wrought with error, contradictions and inconsistencies which Petitioner will amply clarify in this reply brief.

Respondent relies on Maine Revised Statutes, Motor Vehicle Rules, rules of civil procedure and judicial precedent to justify their actions; however, all relevant state and federal rules, laws and precedent must apply as they are written, not just a select few which serve their unethical, unconstitutional, and capricious motivations.

The court will see that Petitioner has had clean hands nunc pro tunc. This court's decision must be made de novo upon the basis of truth, facts,

evidence, law and procedure in reviewing the agency's decision directly for abuse of discretion, errors of law or findings not supported by the evidence and if the record contains competent and substantial evidence to support the agency's conclusions.

Based upon the evidence in this record, strictly construed under the plain meaning rule, this court must find that Respondent's actions were then, and are now, based on willful non-disclosure, omission of facts, and fraud nunc pro tunc about issuing the 'driver's license' in February 1989 and that they do not now nor have they ever had sufficient evidence to justify any suspension for incompetency.

Additionally, after thoroughly reviewing and comparing federal and state laws and Supreme Court decisions, there is a palpable conflict about the “driver's license” being a statutory mandate for all persons rather than an alleged revocable privilege.

Petitioner has proven beyond any doubt that a “driver's license” is not a privilege and is in fact mandated by 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq. which gives Respondent power to mandate a “driver's license” for all private noncommercial traveling in automobiles in violation of federal and Maine constitutions and supreme court decisions.

The purpose of constitutions is to articulate restraints placed upon activities of governmental bodies in their attempted control and governance of private liberties which are loosely defined by the United States Supreme Court as not being confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint but also includes liberties which extend to the full range of conduct an individual is free to pursue, and which cannot be restricted except for a proper governmental objective not based upon fraudulent nondisclosure.

Petitioner has proven that the Maine legislature acknowledged the imperative differentiation between an “operator's license” and a “driver's license” by their repeal of Title 29, Ch. 7 OPERATOR'S LICENSE and replacing it with Title 29-A, Ch. 11 DRIVER’S LICENSE. The obvious difference lies in the plain meaning between an ‘operator’ and a ‘driver’ as defined by Black's and Bouvier's Law and Merriam Webster dictionaries. A driver earns a fare, fee or compensation for their exercising control over the motor vehicle, whereas an operator does not and which is private and cannot be licensed, infringed or regulated in any way.


The Maine legislature acknowledged by their actions that licensing of a private operator for non-commercial activities would be violating judicial precedents, both federal and state constitutions and many laws of this state.

Petitioner has proven that Respondent's fraudulently issuing a 'driver's license' in February 1989, and then the arbitrary suspension of the driver's license was in utter contempt for basic standards of honest and ethical behavior, all basic codes of professional conduct, Maine Administrative Procedures Act, Maine Statutes, Maine Motor Vehicle Rules and long-standing imperative judicial precedents.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479, "has held that the Fourteenth Amendment absorbs and applies to the States those specifics of the first eight amendments which express fundamental personal rights. The language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments.

The Ninth Amendment reads, 'The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ‘The Amendment is almost entirely the work of James Madison. It was introduced in Congress by him and passed the House and Senate with little or no debate and virtually no change in language. It was proffered to quiet expressed fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that others were protected."

These statements of Madison and Story make clear that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people.

While this Court has had little occasion to interpret the Ninth Amendment, "[i]t cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174. In interpreting the Constitution, 'real effect should be given to all the words it uses.' Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 151. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution may be regarded by some as a recent discovery and may be forgotten by others, but since 1 791 it has been a basic part of the Constitution which we are swam to uphold."

This court and all courts "are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted ... " Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 Respondent arbitrarily suspending the license for the purpose of compelling Petitioner to update her mailing address and to comply with a medical examination under duress, which was not provoked by a report of adverse or dangerous operation, did in fact violate Petitioner's right to due process, equal protection, freedom to not speak, freedom to maintain medical privacy, freedom of non-compliance to any religion, government body, group or sect, freedom from unwarranted searches and seizures, freedom to use private property on public highways, freedom of movement, freedom to travel, freedom from self-incrimination,


freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, freedom from wrongful imprisonment, excessive bail and penalties, and freedom from double jeopardy, inter alia.

If Respondent wants to erroneously apply the statutes to Petitioner, then Petitioner gives this court imperative judicial notice that Respondent is constrained by 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) which requires, "The State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat.1748 and regulations adopted under those Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take precedence ...”

Through enactment of 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(4) "Number limited. A person may not have more than one valid license, unless authorized by the Secretary of State. A person may not have more than one commercial license."

Respondent fully acknowledges all obligations under 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) by implementation of certain restrictions on the number of licenses which can be issued to any person as required by Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, inter alia.

Respondent's codified deference to federal statutes through enactment of 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) force their compliance with United States Code as well as all other federal rules and regulations.

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, § 31(6) defines “motor vehicle” as "every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo."

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, § 31(10) defines "used for commercial purposes" as "the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit."

29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) requires this court to defer to 18 USC § 31(6) for definition of a 'motor vehicle', then it must scrutinize the constitutionality of 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq. and 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A inter alia.

29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A claims that 'operating a motor vehicle' without a proper 'driver's license' is a 'crime' therefore the definition of a 'motor vehicle' must be defined by United States Criminal Code in adherence to 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2).

This court must scrutinize 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A because Petitioner was prosecuted of a "strict liability crime" on July 5, 2011 under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-Aunder dockets AUGDC-CR-2011-00512 (dismissed) and AUGDC-CR-2011-00513 (coerced plea agreement) as a direct result of the medical suspension initiated on January 5, 2010 for being "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" although the suspension notice claimed the suspension was for "failure to file a medical evaluation request' which is not the same thing as being "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" .


Notwithstanding other legal determinations, if this court finds that 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq. is unconstitutional or is in any way unenforceable, then this court must instantly grant Petitioner's appeal and order reversal of the January 5, 2010 suspension and all events relative to that suspension.

If this court finds that 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq. passes constitutional muster, then it must apply all federal and state statutes equally and fairly upon all parties.

Respondent claims "BMV mailed a notice of suspension to Turcotte's last known address" but fails to admit their own evidence which proves the notice was returned twice by the United States Postal Service, once on November 10, 2009 and once on December 29, 2009, and which were never successfully delivered as shown in Tab 3 "BMV Review Requested 4/02/13" and "BMV Review Requested 3/30/13".

The record shows no evidence of any type of public notice of a potentially dangerous "incompetent driver", nor any invitation for public input or comments.

The record shows no evidence of the Secretary of State engaging in any kind of consultation with any type of medical professional to support and justify the claimed authority under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), inter alia.

Secretary of State is not a medical professional and is therefore incompetent to independently scrutinize and determine any individual's medical competency.

The record shows no evidence of adverse or dangerous operation. The record shows no evidence of unsafe chemical dependency or impairment. The record shows no evidence of any accidents, traffic infractions or crimes

committed by Petitioner from mid-2007 through February 2011. The record shows three (3) years consecutive 'violation free' credits for years

2008, 2009 and 2010 in Tab 3 "BMV Review Requested 4/02/13" and "BMV Review Requested 3/30/13".

The record shows no evidence of incompetency to support BMV's claim of authority to suspend the license under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), inter alia.

There is no civil or criminal Maine Statute titled, "SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL EVALUATION REQUEST".

Legal incompetency does not arise from failure to receive and comply with a medical evaluation request.

Legal incompetency to drive a motor vehicle does not arise from a homeless and transient status.

Respondent cannot discriminate against and target Petitioner simply because Petitioner did not have a stable permanent mailing address. Petitioner had no knowledge of the medical evaluation request or suspension

prior to March 7, 20 11. Petitioner did not know on or before March 7, 2011 the basis of suspension. Petitioner submitted a completed medical evaluation request on March 8,

2011 showing no medications and no risk of dangerous operation. Petitioner required removal of the medical restriction on March 8, 2011. Petitioner was not told that the medical restriction was not removed.


Petitioner was not told that she had a right to challenge the suspension. Respondent cannot prove that Petitioner had any knowledge of her right to

request a hearing on March 8, 2011. Respondent cannot prove that Petitioner had any knowledge of her right to

request a hearing prior to April 2013. Respondent has not proven successful delivery of the legal notice, as required

under 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3). Petitioner was never given the occasion to challenge the medical suspension. Respondent cannot violate Petitioner's statutory right to receive proper notice

and then deprive her of an opportunity for a lawful hearing under 5 M.R.S. § 9056. Respondent restored license #1491178 without reinstatement fees or any

other penalties whereby indicating that the 'medical suspension is not any type of crime.

Respondent issued a 'violation free' credit on March 8, 2011 for year 2010. Respondent and BMV employees are incompetent to make accurate basic

entries, corrections and maintenance of records as evidenced in Tab 2 and Tab 3 of Respondent's evidence, which is explained further in Petitioner's Brief, Pgs. 39- 42.

There is absolutely no evidence that Petitioner is incompetent. There is absolutely no evidence that Petitioner is a driver. There is absolutely no evidence that Petitioner drives a motor vehicle as

defined pursuant to 18 USC § 31(6). Respondent has utterly failed to prove with sufficient and clear evidence that

Petitioner was "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" as defined herein. Petitioner has evidently proven that the 'driver's license' is statutorily

mandated under 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq. for every resident and nonresident over the age of 16 which patently interferes with ownership, use and enjoyment of private property.

29-A M.R.S. § 1251 et seq converted into a crime the exercising of natural rights of ownership and enjoyment of private property and freedom of movement and travel.

Petitioner was improperly and criminally prosecuted in 2011 for owning private property, using and enjoying that private property on public streets while not having a proper 'driver's license' although not engaged in compensated commercial activities.

Respondent arrogantly claims that Petitioner "did not attempt to challenge the suspension, nor did she request a hearing. Rather, she immediately complied with BMV's request by submitting a driver medical evaluation form ... "

Respondent fails to admit that Petitioner had no other choice but to comply. Respondent cannot prove that Petitioner was informed by BMV on March 8,

20 11 that the license was suspended for "incompetency”. Petitioner never received a copy of 2010 suspension notice as requested from

BMV Medical Unit on March 8, 2011. Petitioner required the removal of all medical restrictions on March 8, 2011

but were never removed by BMV Medical Unit employees.


Petitioner made a second demand for removal of all medical restrictions several months later but which still have not been removed by BMV.

Petitioner affirms and testifies that she has not used any pharmaceutical medications since August 2006 as evidenced in her private medical records.

Petitioner has never posed any type of danger to the safety of the public through any type of reckless, incompetent or chemically-afflicted operation.

After Petitioner was advised in June-July 2012 by court-appointed stand by counsel, Harold Hainke, to file for post-conviction review of AUGDC-CR-2011-513 of July 5, 2011, Petitioner properly challenged the criminal conviction by requesting a timely post-conviction review on July 6, 2012 which was reviewed and denied in September 2012 and then Petitioner submitted reconsideration for post-conviction review which was denied in November 2012.

Petitioner's grounds for requesting post-conviction review was that the medical suspension was not proper legal grounds for pursuing criminal charges in that the medical suspension was effectively “deleted” from the driving record on March 8, 2011 and is null and void. The deletion is proven in Respondent's evidence under Tab 3 "BMV Review Requested 3/30 /13" and Petitioner's Brief, Pg. 41.

BMV's deletion of the medical suspension nullified all effects of that suspension nunc pro tunc.

Maines v. Secretary of State 493 A.2d 326 did not dispute the facts of that case. The Plaintiffs in that case were convicted of a dangerous criminal offense of operating under the influence of alcohol or drugs and did not challenge the merits of the case, statutory authority or successful delivery of any notice nor did they dispute having actual knowledge of their right to a hearing.

Those Plaintiffs had no appearance of clean hands. Petitioner's Brief and this Reply Brief abundantly clarified how BMV

exceeded their statutory powers and proceeded in a manner unauthorized by law which was the direct cause for Petitioner having to defend against four (4) collateral companion criminal cases all of which were the catalyst for this 80C review.

Res judicata does not apply to this action because Petitioner has clean hands, and is properly collaterally attacking BMV's action as allowed by Maines v. Secretary of State, “[I]f a public agency exceeds its statutory powers or ... proceeds in a manner unauthorized by law, its orders, decrees and judgments may be attacked collaterally as null and void,".

Petitioner has been trying to get a proper review of the medical suspension since first knowledge of BMV's allegation of "incompetency” while reviewing evidence for AUGDC-CR-2012-00286 in April 2013. The State has been sluggish to submit their full evidence in that criminal case which directly delayed this 80C request.

Petitioner never received proper notice of BMV's alleged statutory authority. Petitioner never received proper notice of her right to be heard. Petitioner attempted to exhaust her administrative remedies with BMV prior

to filing this 80C review. Petitioner never received evidence of claimed incompetency because said


evidence does not exist which therefore entirely nullifies the merits of BMV's claims.

Regardless if Petitioner changed her mailing address every week, being legally homeless or transient is not the same as being "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" which BMV used to arbitrarily suspend the license without basis in fact or law.

CONCLUSION Petitioner has proven by an abundance of unrebutted facts, evidence, law and

procedure that BMV has engaged in fraudulent; deceptive and unfair business practices in that they knowingly fail to provide full disclosure upon an application for a 'driver's license", they mandate noncommercial operators of private property to request a needless 'driver's license' and then they arbitrarily suspend that license without any expert consultation, facts, evidence or proper legal authority.

Petitioner moves this court to grant the Rule 80C appeal, enter declaratory and injunctive relief in Petitioner's favor, reverse and nullify the January 5, 2010 medical suspension, reverse and nullify all companion open and closed cases related to the medical suspension, refund all monies paid in all companion cases, release all bonds and conditions of release for AUGSC-CR-2012-286, nullify all fines, penalties and reinstatement fees pending on driving record # 1491178, cancel # 1491178 ME for nondisclosure and fraud, order Respondent to flag # 1491178 ME with "DO NOT STOP" on the National Driver Register, and order compensatory damages and other legal and equitable relief as this court deems just, fair and appropriate. DATED: August 14, 2013 GINA TURCOTTE


APPENDIX U STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION

DOCKET NO. AP-13-17 GINA TURCOTTE, Petitioner v. SECRETARY OF STATE, Respondent

Respondent's Brief

INTRODUCTION On April 24, 2013, Petitioner Gina Turcotte ("Turcotte") filed the pending

Rule 80C appeal to challenge the Respondent Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles’ ("BMV") April 2, 2013 denial of Turcotte's March 18, 2013 request for an administrative hearing to challenge a January 5, 2010 suspension of Turcotte's license, which had been imposed for failing to timely submit a driver medical evaluation form. Petitioner Turcotte submitted her brief in support of the appeal on July 15, 2013. BMV submits this brief in reply to Turcotte's brief.

BACKGROUND 1. On September 7, 2005, BMV received a driver medical evaluation form

regarding Turcotte's diagnosis of Psychiatric Disorders. (Tab 3, 11/12/ 09 letter of Patty Morneault).

2. On November 12, 2009, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(3) & Rule 29-250, Chapter 3, BMV requested Turcotte to submit a progress report on her condition by January 5, 2010 and mailed a driver medical evaluation form to the last known address she had provided to BMV.1 (Tab 3, 11/12/09 letter of Patty Morneault).

3. On December 27, 2009, BMV mailed a notice of suspension and opportunity for hearing to the last known address that Turcotte had provided to BMV. (Tab 3, 12/27/09 Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing). The notice warned her that her license would be suspended effective January 5, 2010 if she failed to submit the requested driver medical evaluation form. The notice also informed her that she had the right to request an administrative hearing prior to January 15, 2010.

4. On January 5, 2010, the indefinite suspension went into effect because Turcotte did not submit the requested evaluation form. (Tab 3, 4/2/13 Review Requested). Turcotte also did not request an administrative hearing by January 15, 2010.

5. On March 7, 2011, a law enforcement officer personally informed Turcotte that her license was under suspension during a traffic stop. (Tab 3, 3/28/13 letter of Gina Turcotte).


6. On March 8, 2011, Turcotte submitted a completed driver medical evaluation form to BMV. (Tab 3, 3/8111 Driver Medical Evaluation Form). That same date, BMV restored Turcotte's driving privileges. (Tab 3, 3/8/ 11 letter of Charles Summers, Secretary of State).

7. On March 18, 2013, more than two years after BMV restored her driving privileges, Turcotte requested an administrative hearing to challenge the January 5, 2010 suspension. (Tab 3, 3/18/13 letter of Gina Turcotte).

8. After an exchange of correspondence between Turcotte and BMV, on April 2, 2013, Robert E. O'Connell, Jr., Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings at BMV sent a letter to Turcotte denying the request for hearing as untimely. (Tab 3, 4/2/13 letter of Robert E. O'Connell, Jr.). Mr. O'Connell also informed Turcotte that his letter was considered final agency action.

ARGUMENT Pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9053(1), an agency may "[p]lace on any party the

responsibility of requesting a hearing if the agency notifies him in writing of his right to a hearing, and of his responsibility to request the hearing." Pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2483(1), a request for hearing must be made within 10 days from the effective date of the suspension." Pursuant to Rule 29-250 Chapter 2, Rules for Administrative Hearings, Section 3, "after a notice of suspension or revocation and opportunity for hearing has been sent or delivered to a person, that person has ten days from the effective date of the suspension or revocation to request in writing a hearing."

On December 27, 2009, BMV mailed a notice of suspension to Turcotte's last known address, which informed her that her right to operate would be suspended on January 5, 2010 if she did not submit the requested driver medical evaluation form. The notice also informed her that she had until January 15, 2010 to request a hearing to challenge the suspension. She did not submit the form, nor did she request a hearing.

Turcotte claims this is because she never received the notice of suspension. Title 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(1), however, only required BMV to send the notice to the last address she provided pursuant to section 1407, which requires a licensee to inform the Secretary of State within 30 days of any change in address. Turcotte admits that she did not do so. Petitioner's Brief, page 53.

Regardless of whether she received notice of the suspension in the mail in 2010, Turcotte admits she received actual notice of the suspension in March 2011 when she was stopped by a law enforcement officer. (Tab 3, 3/28/13 letter of Gina Turcotte). Even then Turcotte did not attempt to challenge the suspension, nor did she request a hearing. Rather, she immediately complied with BMV' s request by submitting a driver medical evaluation form, and BMV in turn restored her driving privileges.

Her 2013 request for hearing, received more than two years after the deadline for such a request, was untimely. Therefore, BMV did not commit an error of law in denying Turcotte's belated request. Maines v. Secretary of State, 493 A.2d 326, (Me. 1985)(upholding summary judgment in favor of Secretary of State based


on res judicata in declaratory judgment action because plaintiffs failed to timely request administrative hearing to challenge license suspension).

CONCLUSION The Respondent respectfully requests the Court to affirm BMV's decision to

deny Petitioner's belated request for an administrative hearing and deny her Rule 80C appeal. Dated: July 31, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

DONALD W. MACOMBER Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division Maine Bar No. 6883 Six State House Station Augusta, ME 04333-0006 (207) 626-8507

No. _____________


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------


Petitioner

v.


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------



___________________________________________

APPENDIX, VOLUME II ___________________________________________



APPENDIX V

KENNEBEC COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT Docket No. AP-13-17

GINA TURCOTTE

Petitioner/APPELLANT v.

SECRETARY OF STATE Respondent/APPELLEE

Rule 80C Petition Brief for Appellant DUE AND SUBMITTED ON JULY 15, 2013

Gina Turcotte

Petitioner/APPELLANT 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1

Augusta, Maine TABLE OF CONTENTS I. TABLE OF CONTENTS II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES III. STANDARD OF REVIEW IV. PLAIN MEANING RULE V. DEFINITIONS VI. DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER VII. IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE VIII. INTRODUCTION IX. STATEMENTS OF THE ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED X. FACTUAL BACKGROUND XI. ARGUMENT XII. RELIEF REQUESTED XIII. CONCLUSION


II. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES DIAGRAM OF NATURAL ORDER Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed; Certificate of Live Birth; Writ of Mandamus and Replevin BLACK’S LAW, 4th and 9th Bouvier’s Law, 6th MERRIAM WEBSTER CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by Automobile, 1890-1950, Dr. Roger Isaac Roots, J.D., Ph.D., Oklahoma City University Law Review, Summer, 2005, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 245 Maine Constitution, Article 1:

Section 1. Natural rights. Section 2. Power inherent in people. Section 3. Religious freedom; sects equal. Section 4. Freedom of speech. Section 5. Unreasonable searches prohibited. Section 6. Rights of persons accused. Section 6-A. Discrimination against persons prohibited. Section 8. No double jeopardy. Section 9. Excessive bail, cruel or unusual punishments prohibited. Section 19. Right of redress for injuries.

Plain Meaning Rule State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999 Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2000 In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007 Motor Vehicles Rules 29-250 SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 1: Rules for Administrative Suspension Relating to Demerit Point Accumulation, Convictions and Adjudications Chapter 2: Rules for Administrative Hearings Chapter 3: Physical, Emotional and Mental Competence to Operate a Motor Vehicle Chapter 13: Rules Governing Driver License Restriction Maine Rules of Civil Procedure RULE 80C


Maine Statutes 5 M.R.S. § 9052. Notice 5 M.R.S. § 9056. Opportunity To Be Heard 5 M.R.S. § 9059. Record 5 M.R.S. § 10001. Adjudicatory Proceedings 5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right To Hearing 5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action Without Hearing 5 M.R.S. § 11001. Right To Review 5 M.R.S. § 11005. Responsive Pleading; Filing Of The Record 5 M.R.S. § 11006. Power Of Court To Correct Or Modify Record 5 M.R.S. § 11007. Manner And Scope Of Review 29-A M.R.S. § 112. Notice Of Hearing 29-A M.R.S. § 1258. Medical Advisory Board 29-A M.R.S. § 1251. License Required 29-A M.R.S. § 1309. Reexamination Of Incompetent Or Unqualified Operators 29-A M.R.S. § 1407. Change Of Location Or Status 29-A M.R.S. § 2458. Suspension or revocation of license 29-A M.R.S. § 2482. Notice of suspension or revocation of license 29-A M.R.S. § 2485. Decision; Appeal Maine Cases Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975) Fickett v. Maine KEN-AP-02-57 Melanson v Secretary of State 2004 ME 127 DiPietro v. Secretary of State, 802 A. 2d 399 - Me: Supreme Judicial State v. Savard, 659 A. 2d 1265 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1995 Centamore v. Dep't of Human Services, 664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995) CWCO, Inc. v. Sup't of Insurance, 1997 NrE 226, ¶6, 703 A.2d 125S, 1261 Imagineering v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991) Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969) State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975) Carrier v. Secretary of State, 60 A. 3d 1241 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012 McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, 896 A.2d 933 Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, 55 A.3d 411 Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, 896 A.2d 271 Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, 838 A.2d 1157 Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149 957 A.2d 94 Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm


United States Code Title 18, 31(6) Title 18, 31(10) United States Cases Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886 Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886 Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895 Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944 Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946) City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 – 1948 Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889 City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 – 1898 Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 – 1908 Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926 Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943 Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953 Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956 Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958 Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959 United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966 Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966

STANDARD OF REVIEW At this stage of appeal, the standard of review is de novo, “Because the

Superior Court acted as an intermediate appellate court, we directly review the Secretary of State's decision.” McGee v. Sec'y of State, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 5, 896 A.2d 933. We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo. Id. We first look to the plain meaning of the statute, interpreting its language "to avoid absurd, illogical or inconsistent results," Estate of Joyce v. Commercial Welding Co., 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411 (quotation marks omitted), and attempting to give all of its words meaning, Cobb v. Bd. of Counseling Prof'ls Licensure, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 11, 896 A.2d 271. When a statute is unambiguous, we interpret the statute directly, without applying the rule of statutory construction that "prefers interpretations… that do not raise constitutional problems," McGee, 2006 ME 50, ¶ 18, 896 A.2d 933, and without examining legislative history, Ashe v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 2003 ME 147, ¶ 7, 838 A.2d 1157, or the agency's interpretation, Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271. "We look to legislative history and other extraneous aids in interpretation of a statute only when we have determined that the statute is


ambiguous." Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Estate of Faulkner, 2008 ME 149, ¶ 15, 957 A.2d 94. "A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations." Estate of Joyce, 2012 ME 62, ¶ 12, 55 A.3d 411. [emphasis added]

PLAIN MEANING RULE PETITIONER incorporates the plain meaning rule and consistently applies it

throughout this entire action, as clearly and expressly standardized by Maine Supreme Judicial Court in:

State v. Harris, 730 A. 2d 1249 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1999, “The sole issue before us is one of statutory construction. "Statutory interpretation is a matter of law, and we review the trial court's decision de novo." Estate of Jacobs, 1998 ME 233, ¶ 4, 719 A.2d 523, 524 (italics added). "If the meaning of the language is plain, we must interpret the statute to mean exactly what it says." [5] Marsella v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 585 A.2d 802, 803 (Me.1991) (quotations omitted). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no occasion for resort to rules of statutory interpretation to seek or impose another meaning." Marsella, 585 A.2d at 803 (quotations omitted). "[N]othing in a statute may be treated as surplusage if a reasonable construction applying meaning and force is otherwise possible." Struck v. Hackett, 668 A.2d 411, 417 (Me.1995) (quotations omitted)."

Merril v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 745 A.2d 378 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court (2000), “The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction. See State v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, ¶ 13, 730 A.2d 1249, 1251”

In the Matter of Nadeau, 2007 ME 21 - Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2007, “Because the word "knowingly" is defined in the Code and because its definition is plain and unambiguous, we are not free retroactively to give the word a different meaning. "Knowingly" is defined in the Code of Judicial Conduct as "denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question." M. Code of Jud. Conduct II(3)(J). ... See generally, Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 2000 ME 16, ¶ 11, 745 A.2d 378, 384 ("The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is the plain meaning rule. When statutory language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to any other rules of statutory construction.").”

DEFINITIONS PETITIONER gives judicial notice that the following definitions are

incorporated as defined herein: 1. administration. The management or performance of the executive duties of

a government, institution, or business. 2. apparatus. See MACHINE. A device or apparatus consisting of fixed and

moving parts that work together to perform some function.


3. christianity. The religion established by Jesus Christ. Christianity has been judicially declared to be a part of the common law of Pennsylvania.

4. church. In a moral or spiritual sense this word signifies a society of persons who profess the Christian religion; and in a physical or material sense, the place where such persons assemble. The term church is nomen collectivum; it comprehends the chancel, aisles, and body of the church.

5. conscience. The moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one's own judgment and actions. In law, the moral rule that requires justice and honest dealings between people.

6. constitution. The fundamental and organic law of a nation or state that establishes the institutions and apparatus of government, defines the scope of governmental sovereign powers, and guarantees individual civil rights and civil liberties. The written instrument embodying this fundamental law, together with any formal amendments. In British constitutional law, the constitution is a collection of historical documents, statutes, decrees, conventions, traditions, and royal prerogatives. Documents and statutes include Magna Carta (1215), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the European Communities Act (1972). The implied parts of a written constitution, encompassing the rights, freedoms, and processes considered to be essential, but not explicitly defined in the written document.

7. corpus. [Latin "body"] The property for which a trustee is responsible; the trust principal. Also termed res; trust estate; trust fund; trust property; trust res; trust.

8. deed poll. A deed made by and binding on only one party, or on two or more parties having similar interests.

9. doctrine. A principle, esp. a legal principle, that is widely adhered to. 10. DRIVER. (Bouvier’s 6th) One employed in conducting a coach, carriage,

wagon, or other vehicle, with horses, mules, or other animals. 11. driver. A person who steers and propels a vehicle. 12. driver's license. The state-issued certificate authorizing a person to

operate a motor vehicle. 13. driving. The act of directing the course of something. 14. ecclesiastical. Of or relating to the church. 15. fee simple. An interest in land that, being the broadest property interest

allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs; esp., a fee simple absolute.

16. freehold. An estate in land held in fee simple; any real-property interest that is or may become possessory.

17. Indefeasible: (Of a claim or right) not vulnerable to being defeated, revoked, or lost.

18. Independent. Not subject to the control or influence of another. 2. Not associated with another (often larger) entity 3. Not dependent or contingent on something else.

19. Institution. An elementary rule, principle, or practice. 20. justice. The fair and proper administration of laws.


21. liberty. Freedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, esp. by a government. A right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by prescription or by grant; the absence of a legal duty imposed on a person. "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 (1923).

22. natural liberty. The power to act as one wishes, without any restraint or control, unless by nature. 'This natural liberty ... being a right inherent in us by birth .... But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and, in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 121 (1765).

23. religious liberty. Freedom - as guaranteed by the First Amendment to express, without external control other than one's own conscience, any or no system of religious opinion and to engage in or refrain from any form of religious observance or public or private religious worship, as long as it is consistent with the peace and order of society.

24. License. A permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful; esp., an agreement that it is lawful for the licensee to enter the licensor's land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal.

25. private morality. A person's ideals, character, and private conduct, which are not valid governmental concerns.

26. OPERATE. (Black’s Law, 4th) This word, when used with relation to automobiles, signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of the automobile; that is, the driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself. Beard v. Clark, Tex.Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023,1025.

27. operate. to perform a function; exert power or influence. 28. privilege. A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a

person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability.

29. public. Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy. 30. punishment. A sanction - such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of

property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law. "Punishment in all its forms is a loss of rights or advantages consequent on a breach of law. When it loses this quality it degenerates into an arbitrary act of Violence that can produce nothing but bad social effects." Glanville Williams, Criminal Law 575 (2d ed. 1961).

31. punitive. Involving or inflicting punishment.


32. religion. A system of faith and worship usu. involving belief in a supreme being and usu. containing a moral or ethical code; esp., such a system recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect, or denomination. In construing the protections under the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, courts have interpreted the term religion quite broadly to include a wide variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.

33. remedial. Affording or providing a remedy; providing the means of obtaining redress <a remedial action>. 2. Intended to correct, remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or defect <a remedial statute>. 3. Of or relating to a means of enforcing an existing substantive right <a remedial right>.

34. absolute right. A right that belongs to every human being, such as the right of personal liberty; a natural right. 2. An unqualified right; specifically a right that cannot be denied or curtailed except under specific conditions

35. secta. Roman law. A group of followers, as of a particular religion or school of philosophy, law, etc.; a religious sect; a group adhering to a distinctive doctrine or to a leader.

36. secular. Worldly, as distinguished from spiritual. 37. sentiment. an attitude, thought, or judgment prompted by feeling; a

specific view or notion. 38. spiritual. Of or relating to ecclesiastical rather than secular matters.


IMPERATIVE JUDICIAL NOTICE

Before PETITIONER’s mother conceived and gave life to PETITIONER’s physical body, PETITIONER was I AM; the Divine Spirit, who consciously chose to inhabit the physical vessel of flesh, blood and bones of the human body to have an experience as a human being. Each atom and cell of this physical vessel which PETITIONER inhabits to travel across this land is infused with the spark of the Creator; I AM one with the light, one with Creator, the Alpha and the Omega, without beginning nor end, without time.

Natural Order of Law and Authority irrefutably begins with and is irrevocably governed by GOD and GOD’S LAW which includes, but are not limited to, Laws of Common Sense, Truth & Justice, Laws of Grammar and Proper Use of Words which can be considered by all men and women to be the higher laws of the universe.

Higher Laws are natural common laws which govern the behavior of every man, woman and child without exception beholding our allegiance to our own private Sovereign Ruler of the Universe and only according to our own private consciences and which our feelings, thoughts, words and beliefs are not to be regulated or injured by any government, sect or private individual.

PETITIONER, in alliance with every other man, woman and child, are collectively “The People”, and in whose authority our government was created and instituted for our benefit and who have an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when our safety and happiness requires it as guaranteed by Article 1, Section 2 of the Constitution of the State of Maine.

As a cooperative and collaborative group with a specific mutual purpose and goal, The People create the GRAND JURIES, the TRIAL JURIES and the ELECTIONS which are some of the tools and machinery by which behaviors that violate the CONSTITUTION are remedied and by which itself is protected, enforced, and amended as needed.

The body of the CONSTITUTION articulates provisions which created the EXECUTIVE, LEGISLATIVE and JUDICIAL branches of government which were also instituted for our protection and benefit and which each officer is Trustee of the Public Trust with such power having been bequeathed to them by The People upon swearing their public oath to uphold and protect the Constitution, adhering to ethical and moral principles above any private gain.

Within each branch of government are public offices and officers who are vested with specific legal duties, authorities and rights for the benefit of The People: the Executive Branch includes PRESIDENT, GOVERNOR, MAYOR and ALL PUBLIC OFFICERS; the Legislative Branch is divided into the HOUSE which represents citizens based on district populations and the SENATE which represents citizens on an equal state basis; and the Judicial Branch which is divided into the SUPREME COURT, the APPEAL COURT, the TRIAL COURT, and ALL LOWER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS.


Three branches of government were created with the intention to be a system of checks and balances to ensure The People’s representatives act with ethical, moral and lawful behavior in full adherence and loyalty to The People in whose power and authority they institute all federal, state, and local laws, statutes, codes, regulations, rules, orders and ordinances for the purpose of establishing justice, insuring tranquility, providing for our mutual defense, promoting our common welfare, and securing to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of life, liberty and the pursuit of prosperity and happiness, and with the irrevocable power to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when our safety and happiness requires it, which is a modern-day human experience in this third-dimensional world on planet Earth.

PETITIONER’s third-dimensional vessel of flesh, blood and bones was born into the Turcotte family on December 17, 1968, now simply known as Gina Lynn, who is a freeborn inhabitant, natural heir to the Divine Estate, Beneficiary to the Divine Trust, freeholder in fee simple absolute, one of the Posterity expressed in the Preamble of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Maine, to wit, “We the people of Maine, in order to establish justice, insure tranquility, provide for our mutual defense, promote our common welfare, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of liberty, acknowledging with grateful hearts the goodness of the Sovereign Ruler of the Universe in affording us an opportunity, so favorable to the design; and, imploring God's aid and direction in its accomplishment, do agree to form ourselves into a free and independent State, by the style and title of the State of Maine and do ordain and establish the following Constitution for the government of the same.”

The Constitution for the State of Maine was structured after and in acquiescence with the Constitution for the United States, each of which are documents of a dual nature:

1. the Constitution is a trust document, and 2. it is the articles of incorporation which created a unique trust res and

estate of inheritance for each inhabitant. It is a tenet of law that in order to determine the intent of a writing one must

look to the title, the Empowerment Clause in statute, which in the case of the Constitution is the Preamble. In writing the Constitution the founders followed the common law of England which stretches back some 1000 years. The Preamble fulfills the requirements necessary to establish a trust. It identifies the Grantor(s), Statement of Purpose, Grantee(s), Statement of Intent, Written Indenture, and the name of the entity being created and is written and constructed as a trust so that it would have the thrust of ageless law.

Let us take a look: WE THE PEOPLE (Grantors) of the United States (from or out of) in order to

form a more perfect union, establish justice, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty (statement of Purpose) to ourselves and our posterity (Grantees/heirs unnamed), do ordain and


establish (Statement of Intent) this constitution (Written Indenture) for the United States of America (name of the entity being created).

The trust res is in the Articles of the Confederation and the Declaration of Independence. The intent of the constitution was to bequeath freedom, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness to themselves and their posterity. The founders intended to secure and pass on the sovereignty of the people to the people of future generations of Americans, in perpetuity.

PETITIONER’s rights are derived from the land upon which she stands and her relation, or status, to that land. In America these rights originated with the Articles of Confederation and the Declaration of Independence and are attached to the land called America (The Laws of Real Property). PETITIONER’s status, or relation to that land, is determined by the laws of Descent and Distribution.

PETITIONER’s right to freedom, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness is her inheritance as bequeathed to her via the Constitution of the United States of America and upon which the Constitution of the State of Maine was drafted and enacted.

The constitution granted the government the power and authority to administrate and to carry on corporate functions. Under the common law, inherent rights cannot devolve to a 'body politic' through a corporation. Rights only devolve to human beings as through and by way of a trust. Under the constitutional law, in order to determine the meaning of a written instrument the court must look to the title. In this case, once again, it is the Preamble. Pursuant to the laws of real property that have been in existence from the beginning, the Preamble clearly shows a freehold in fee simple absolute in it. Freeholds in fee simple were instruments of trust, not corporate. "Our Posterity" cannot be speaking of a corporate entity because posterity can only mean a living man or woman, and only by birth and nativity.

The Articles of the Constitution are the Articles of Incorporation that established Congress as Trustees of the Trust and defines their power and authority as well as their limitations. Annexed to the Constitutional Trust is a will-like structure, the Amendments. The Trust and the trust res were already in existence when the will/codicil (Amendments) were added some four years later. The Amendments do not constitute the Trust in fact, they are annexed to the Trust as a codicil (a supplement or addition to the will, not necessarily disposing of the entire estate, but modifying, explaining or otherwise qualifying the will in some way.)

A Trust, once completed and in force, cannot be amended or altered without the consent of the parties in interest, except under reserved power of amendment and alteration. An amendment is ordinarily possible by parties in interest and against parties without vested interest. Prior to enactment of the 14th Amendment, the freeborn inhabitants, citizens of the states, were the parties in interest.

The 14th Amendment created the 14th Amendment legal fiction citizen “GINA LYNN TURCOTTE” who does not have a vested interest in the trust or the trust res. The 14th Amendment can be viewed as a codicil to the will that republished the constitution with new meaning, changed the intent behind it and


turned it into a testamentary instrument with capabilities of being used against the PETITIONER through a seemingly voluntary revocation.

When PETITIONER’s mother provided evidence of her birth and applied for a social security number on PETITIONER’s behalf, and when PETITIONER mistakenly claimed be a United States citizen, who is a party with no vested interest in a freehold, the trust or the trust res, the PETITIONER was literally declared to be deceased; therefore, the decedent (PETITIONER) retains no legal interest in the property and PETITIONER, in her new capacity as a legal fiction citizen, is then coerced to act as Executor of PETITIONER’s own estate.

PETITIONER, a freeholder and Beneficiary to the trust, has been tricked and coerced by the Trustees into testifying against herself when applying for a social security number, driver’s license, or when signing an IRS 1040 form, and which the Trustees have mislead PETITIONER into believing are all mandatory.

The Trustees have breached the trust having amended the will for their own personal profit and gain at the expense of the true heirs. PETITIONER has unwittingly, without full disclosure, become the Executor; the Trustees have become the Beneficiaries to the trust through Laws of Donations, effectively stealing PETITIONER’s Divine Inheritance.

A breach of trust of fiduciary duty by a Trustee is a violation of the correlative right of the Cestui Que Trust and gives rise to any correlative cause of action on the part of the Beneficiary for any loss to the estate Trust. This rule is applicable in respect to both positive acts or negligence constituting a breach of fiduciary duty by the Trustee. A Trustee's breach of fiduciary duty falls within the maxim that 'equity will not aid one who comes into court with unclean hands.'

When the Trustee's breach is by an act of omission the Beneficiary can scrutinize the propriety of the Trustee. A Beneficiary must always have full disclosure and full knowledge of the material facts and circumstances. A Beneficiary must also have had knowledge of and understood their rights and have no obligation to search the public records to obtain said knowledge.

The Trustees have committed acts of omission, misrepresentation, deceit and deception in order to mislead and coerce PETITIONER into giving up her beneficial interest in the trust and the trust res. The Trustees have compelled PETITIONER, a freeholder in fee simple, to accept benefits 'under the will' as perverted by the 14th Amendment, without freedom of choice for failure of full disclosure thereby preventing enforcement of contractual rights to property bequeathed to her by the will. The Trustees are trying to repudiate the Trust, employing a lifetime of propaganda and programming enforced through threats, violence and coercion, and failing to provide notice to the Beneficiary of the repudiation which must now be brought home and lawfully remedied.

The Doctrine of Election dictates, “that a party shall not be permitted to insist at different times upon the truth of two inconsistent and repugnant positions, according to the promptings of his own interest, as to first affirm and later disaffirm a contract, or the like” Myers v. Ross, D.C., 10 F.Supp. 409, 411, in connection with testamentary instruments is the principle that one who is given a benefit 'under the


will' must choose between accepting the benefits and asserting some other claim against the testator's estate or against the property disposed of by the will. PETITIONER’s right as a Beneficiary to elect whether to take 'under the will' or 'against the will' is a personal privilege to her which may be controlled by the creditors of the Beneficiary. If PETITIONER elected to take ‘against the will’ then creditors can claim no right or interest in the estate contrary to PETITIONER’S election.

Acceptance of benefits 'under the will' constitutes an election precluding PETITIONER from enforcing contractual rights to property bequeathed by the will. This rule is subject to the qualification that acceptance of a benefit 'under the will', when made in ignorance of the Beneficiaries’ rights or under a misapprehension or misrepresentation as to the condition of the Testator's estate, does not constitute an election upon full knowledge and disclosure.

In the beginning God gave men and women dominion over all things, as Beneficiaries of the Divine Trust. The founding fathers of the United States of America created the constitution for the United States, an estate trust, to pass sovereignty of the people onto the people of future generations, in perpetuity.

In America today, upon giving birth, a mother is compelled, under deceptive coercion and without full factual disclosure, to apply for the creation of a Cestui Que Vie trust, creating a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United States. Upon receipt of the mother's application the Trustees establish a trust under the error of assumptions that the child has knowingly elected to accept the benefits which are bequeathed by the will, 'under the will'. The Trustees further assume that the child is incompetent, a bankrupt and lost at sea and is presumed to be dead until the child reappears, knowingly reestablishes living status, challenges assumptions of any acceptance of the benefits 'under the will' as being one of free choice with full knowledge of the facts and thereby redeems the estate.

Under the assumption that the child is a 14th Amendment citizen, the child's footprint is placed by the hospital upon the birth certificate creating a slave bond which is sold to the federal reserve, who then converts it into a negotiable instrument and establishes a second Cestui Que Vie trust. The child's parents are coercively deceived to apply for a social security number for the child, unwittingly testifying that the child is a 14th Amendment paper citizen of the United States, not a party in interest to the trust or the trust res, and assumed to be dead after 7 years, and when the federal reserve cannot seize the physical child, they file for the issue of the salvage bond and the child is presumed to be legally dead.

When a child is Baptized by the church, the Baptismal certificate is forwarded to the Vatican who converts the certificate into a negotiable instrument and creates a third Cestui Que Vie trust. These three trusts represent the enslavement of the property, body and soul of the child. The civil administration, UNITED STATES, continues to operate today under this triple crown of enslavement based on the error of assumptions that we are 14th Amendment citizens of the United States based on the breach of trust by the Trustees.


PETITIONER has been lost in the sea of illusion, her divine estate placed in trust. PETITIONER has awakened to the truth, so long hidden from her, and now redeems her estate. PETITIONER hereby acknowledges and accepts the deed and her right as lawful and proper owner of the estate with exclusive right of use of all land, tenements and heredimants thereof, to have and to hold in fee simple forever.

This freehold in fee simple has been held under an assumed lease for forty-four years. Said fee has been held in abeyance, in expectation, remembrance, and contemplation in law there being no person in esse, in whom it can vest and abide: though the law has considered it as always potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears. It is hereby established, in fact, that PETITIONER, who was given the name Gina Lynn when she was born on December 17, 1968 into the Turcotte family, is the proper owner of the estate GINA LYNN TURCOTTE in whom vests and abides to have and to hold in fee simple forever.

Freely born, sovereign people have a common law and constitutionally-protected right to travel on the roads and highways of this land as maintained by their government on their behalf and specifically for their use and benefit. Licensing of private, not-for-hire travelers cannot be required of free sovereign private people because taking on the restrictions of a driver’s license requires the surrender of and creates encumbrances upon PETITIONER’s inalienable right to travel in her private property.

In England in 1215, the Magna Carta enshrined the right to travel in Article 42, to wit, “It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above.”

Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Maine are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation that would abrogate those rights. A claim or exercise of a constitutionally-protected right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no remedial action, civil sanction or criminal penalty imposed because PETITIONER lawfully exercised her constitutionally-protected rights.

PETITIONER has the inalienable right to use public roads unrestricted in any manner so long as she is not damaging property or violating rights of others. The government is effectively restricting PETITIONER’s freedom of locomotion by requiring PETITIONER to obtain a driver’s license and thus violating PETITIONER’s common law and constitutionally-guaranteed right to travel upon the public highways and possess and enjoy private property during her pursuit of safety, prosperity and happiness.

Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion in Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) that the right to travel “is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association...it


is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; but, holding that the right to travel is so fundamental the Framers thought it was unnecessary to explicitly include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights.

The PETITIONER’s right to travel upon public ways in her private property is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which every individual has under their right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Under this guarantee, the PETITIONER may, under normal conditions, travel at her inclination along the public highways or in public places using her private property in any way she deems suitable while conducting herself in an orderly and decent manner; thus, the Trustees do not have the power to abrogate the PETITIONER’s right to travel upon the public roads in her private property by passing legislation forcing her to waive that right and allegedly converting it into an alleged privilege of a ‘driver’s license’ which is in fact not a ‘privilege’ according to 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 which in fact mandates all Maine residents immediately apply to obtain a driver’s license.

29-A M.R.S. § 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENT’s willful violation of Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A, “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof.”

When PETITIONER registered her automobiles with RESPONDENT or obtained a driver’s license, she did so only reluctantly and under duress, blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental corruption in order to preserve whatever minimal freedoms are remaining.

“American history can easily be written in two parts: America before the arrival of automobiles and America after automobiles. Motorized vehicles altered everything from the demographic distribution of American society to the ways Americans live and work to the normative balance of home and family life… Nineteenth century Americans would scarcely recognize the immense quilt of laws which govern highway travel today. With the exception of the Civil War, nothing before or since has so fundamentally altered America's scheme of rights and freedoms as that of the laws now governing highway travel. Today, the vast majority of Americans voluntarily submit to a variety of registration, identification, and licensing schemes in order to travel by automobile. Today's laws [were] once viewed as unconstitutional. The hand of the State now extends over aspects of travel in ways which would have been impossible according to common law precedents familiar to earlier Americans.

Prior to the nineteenth century, courts generally held the public roadways were open to all users without regard to the travelers' methods or means of transport. Licenses or other indicia of governmental permission were thought unnecessary or even violative of [constitutionally-protected] rights. But widespread disdain and fear of the automobile led twentieth century policymakers to push aside these long-


standing constitutional barriers in order to regulate motorized driving. This new regulatory approach was justified on the grounds that motor vehicles were too dangerous to operate unlicensed and that traffic injuries were increasingly on the rise.” The Orphaned Right, Dr. Roots

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 - Supreme Court 1824, “The word "license," means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize.”

Title 29, Chapter 7: OPERATORS' LICENSES of the Maine Revised Statutes can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and in accordance with Black’s Law, Bouvier’s Law, and Merriam Webster, as, “A revocable permission given to an individual to exert power or influence over private property which actions would otherwise be unlawful”, later repealed.

The Maine Legislature then enacted Title 29-A, Chapter 11: DRIVER'S LICENSE, which can be expanded and literally defined under plain meaning rules, and in accordance with Black’s Law, Bouvier’s Law, and Merriam Webster, as, “A revocable permission given to an individual who is employed by another in steering or directing the course of a coach, carriage, wagon, or other vehicle, including horses, mules or other animals, for a fair wage paid to the driver by its employer for the driver’s safe and proper conduct while in control of the conveyance for which conduct and control would otherwise be unlawful.” to wit: a “driver operates the automobile for the owner, but the owner does not operate the automobile unless he drives it himself.” Beard v. Clark, Tex. Civ. App., 83 S.W.2d 1023, 1025.

The Trustees (legislators) who are empowered by, through and on behalf of the inhabitants of this state, have publicly memorialized a notable difference regarding the inherent meaning of the words “operator” and “driver” by which they knowingly and intentionally substituted the word “driver” in place of the word “operator” under 29-A M.R.S. when referring to any “driver’s license” to control or operate a motorized vehicle on the public highways of this state. The Maine legislature publicly acknowledged through their intentional use of the word “driver” within 29-A M.R.S. that the action which they feel requires a driver’s license is not that of a private action of enjoying and using one’s personal property on a public roadway, but instead a driver’s license for contractual for-hire employment for the purpose of controlling, steering and directing the course of a motor vehicle or animal in the driver’s employment by another with a fair wage paid for the driver’s time, energy and labor.

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, § 31(6) defines “motor vehicle” as “every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo.”

United States Criminal Code, Title 18, § 31(10) defines “used for commercial purposes” as “the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit.”


29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) Compliance with federal law. dictates, “The State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 and regulations adopted under those Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take precedence.” [emphasis added]

29-A M.R.S. § 101(42) defines "motor vehicle" as “a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include:

A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001; B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device” 29-A M.R.S. § 101(42) directly conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 31(6). 29-A M.R.S. § 101(91) defines “vehicle” as “a device for conveyance of

persons or property on a way. ‘Vehicle’ does not include conveyances propelled or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles as defined in Title 12, section 13001 or an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in this section.”

29-A M.R.S. § 101(50) defines "owner" as “a person holding title to a vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days or more.”

29-A M.R.S. § 101(59) defines "public way" as “a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass.”

29-A M.R.S. § 101(75) defines “street or highway” as “a public way”. 29-A M.R.S. fails to establish any clear difference between a private

automobile and a commercial motor vehicle as required by 18 U.S.C. § 31(6); therefore, 29-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) mandates that 18 U.S.C. § 31(6) take precedence.

It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 is “Class C” which is not a commercial driver’s license (CDL) and which has never had commercial endorsements.

It is a matter of this record that License #1491178 shows no offenses involving intoxication or serious bodily injury.

PETITIONER has been defrauded and coerced ad infinitum since February 3, 1989 through RESPONDENT’s willful nondisclosure effectively coercing and intimidating PETITIONER to obtain a ‘driver’s license’ whereby she unknowingly waived her sovereign right to travel without earning a fair wage in her private property without being restricted by unlawful and unconstitutional governmental encumbrances.

PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT has violated her freedom of religion as protected by Maine Constitution Article 1, Section 3, by coercively restraining PETITIONER in exercising her personal liberty to worship GOD in the manner and season most agreeable to PETITIONER’s own conscience.


PETITIONER’s religious beliefs oblige PETITIONER to reject all external authorities, both secular and spiritual, which are not aligned with the dictates of PETITIONER’s own conscience and personal sense of morality, including PETITIONER rejecting all organized, unorganized, incorporated and unincorporated governmental, political and religious sects.

PETITIONER’s religious beliefs prohibit all seizures and conversions of PETITIONER’s natural inherent rights through PETITIONER coercively obeying RESPONDENT’s assumed authority to convert PETITIONER’s possession and use of private property and her right of free locomotion into an alleged privilege, and an actual statutory mandate to obtain a driver’s license which is required for PETITIONER to use, enjoy, defend and protect her private property.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425 - Supreme Court 1886, “An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.”

Through RESPONDENT’s stealthy encroachment through the use of ambiguous statutes and rigid administrative rules, the corporate state “body politic” stole PETITIONER’s religious freedom and personal liberty and sold it back to her as a driver’s license. This stealthy encroachment process of the corporate state against PETITIONER depended on time and propaganda for its success. Most humans live perhaps 85 years; the corporate state enjoys eternal life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation which the corporate state depends upon in order to perpetuate.

Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 - Supreme Court 1886, “It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”

Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237 - Supreme Court 1895, “We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted”

Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649 - Supreme Court 1944, “Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.”

Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946),“A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it.”

City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248 – 1948, “Specifically or technically speaking, [a] license means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have the right to do-a special privilege rather than a right common to all persons.”

By looking back at historical disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we clearly see that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by each and every individual.

Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889, “Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right of


locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens.”

Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 – 1889, "The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law...."

City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 – 1898, “A license being regarded as a privilege cannot possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride over the highways by motor vehicle, or horse vehicle in a reasonable manner.”

Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193 – 1908, “This Court has said with respect to an unconstitutional law that the matter stands as if the law had not been passed.”

Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926), “it would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of Constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all.

It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.” [emphasis added]

Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367 - Va: Supreme Court 1930, “The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will. The exercise of such a common right the [RESPONDENT] may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259; Ex parte Dickey, 76 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L.R.A. 1918-B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 942.


The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to other of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions.

It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be; and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such acts; Taylor Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259, 263; State ex rel. Crumpton Montgomery, 177 Ala. 221, 59 So. 294; State Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675; City of St. Joseph Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S.W. 101, 49 Am.St.Rep. 577; Brown Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl. 227.

This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases involving the granting, refusing, and revoking of licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do other things which because of their character are, or tend to be, injurious, as for instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or operating a junk or pawn shop; and it has also been applied to cases involving permits or licenses to transport persons or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor Smith, supra, and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private automobile on the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to transport the driver's person and property.”

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105 - Supreme Court 1943, “It is contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.”

Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486 - Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956, “The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted into a crime.”

Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869 - RI: Supreme Court 1958, “The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be deprived without due process of law”

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 - Supreme Court 1958, “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: ‘If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments


of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery…”United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136.”

United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 - Supreme Court 1966, “The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State by common carrier, the Court took as its guide the statement of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492:

"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States."

Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177 (concurring opinion), 181 (concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U. S. 1, 6- 8; 12-16 (dissenting opinion)...

… Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is now 18 U. S. C. § 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now.”

Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46 - Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 “The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L. R. 317 (1927); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1960); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141 (Ky.1951); Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953).”


Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966,“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them.”

Under obligation to RESPONDENT’s unconstitutional licensing rules which violate PETITIONER’s freedom of religion, free speech, rights against self-incrimination and illegal search and seizure, PETITIONER unwillingly reported the existence of a prior medical condition which she mistakenly thought may impair her safe operation of her private property in order to prevent being harassed by RESPONDENT’s law enforcement, court and licensing agents.

PETITIONER innocently failed to comply with RESPONDENT’s rules by not promptly and perpetually changing her physical and mailing address each and every time she changed domiciles, which recently has been every week or every few months, then when PETITIONER exercised her right of locomotion by automobile without knowing that the ‘driver’s license’ had been suspended, she was immediately profiled as an ‘incompetent driver’ and a ‘criminal’ and subjected to excessive police power, coercion, intimidation, prejudice, harassment, arrest, assault, battery, kidnapping and false imprisonment by law enforcement, executive and judicial agencies in clear violation of federal and state constitutions.

PETITIONER has never been accused of operating under the influence of any intoxicating chemicals nor of refusing to submit to a chemical test nor of needing to submit to any chemical test nor of any type of negligent, unsafe or reckless operation since the license was first issued in 1989.

RESPONDENT cannot lawfully require PETITIONER to obtain a license to exercise a fundamental private liberty to travel in PETITIONER’s select method of transportation on a free, open public roadway because those roadways are reserved for public use and maintained by sovereign people as tenants in common. The body politic STATE OF MAINE would not exist without the free acknowledgement, support and participation by the free sovereign inhabitants.

INTRODUCTION

This action is being brought to challenge the authority of and decision by STATE OF MAINE, SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE to mandate, issue and then arbitrarily suspend license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to Medical Rules 29-250, Ch. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) and 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) despite RESPONDENT’s issuance of three (3) consecutive years violation free credits for 2008, 2009 and 2010 and without having any evidence that PETITIONER was incompetent to safely control an automobile or that she posed any risk whatsoever to the public at large as clearly evidenced by the administrative record filed by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013.

PETITIONER does not object to RESPONDENT’s filing the administrative record untimely because RESPONDENT’s tardy behavior proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that RESPONDENT presumes they will receive bias and favoritism, despite having thirty (30) years practice with Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, which is prima facie evidence of the basic principle at the crux of this petition –


RESPONDENT and their agents routinely and habitually violate the Maine Constitution and act outside the boundaries of law and fair play presuming their behavior will be condoned, supported and justified by the courts.

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A M.R.S. § 1251(1) states, “Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person commits an offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license if that person operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area:

A. Without being licensed. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime C. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 30 days but fewer than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction; D. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime E. With a license issued by this State that expired within the previous 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction. PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice that 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 (1-

A) mandates every living man, woman and child over the age of sixteen (16) who “[w]ithin 30 days of becoming a resident of this State…shall apply to obtain a license in accordance with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person who fails to comply with the requirement of this subsection and operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area commits:

A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90 days; or B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days. Evidently as shown by 29-A M.R.S. § 1251, when the word “shall” is used

without any qualifiers or exceptions, the definition must be taken literally and within the boundaries of the plain meaning rule which does declares the possessing and enjoying the use of a ‘driver’s license’ is not at all a privilege as this court and other courts in this state have alleged and adjudicated.

“There exists no absolute right to obtain and hold a driver's license. Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d 643, 649 (Me.1969). The driver's license is a privilege to which certain rights and responsibilities attach and for valid reasons involving public safety may be granted or withheld.” State v. Granville, 336 A.2d 861, 863 (Me.1975); Opinion of the Justices, 255 A.2d at 649.

Petitioner claims 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 violates the Maine Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A and 24 in that mandatory licensing under 29-A M.R.S. § 1251 prohibits private, unregulated and unalienable use of private property on all “public ways or parking areas” without having physical possession of a proper “driver’s license”, and which applies to all private property defined as a “self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks but does not include:

A. A snowmobile as defined in Title 12, section 13001;


B. An all-terrain vehicle as defined in Title 12, section 13001, unless the all-terrain vehicle is permitted in accordance with section 501, subsection 8 or is operated on a way and section 2080 applies; and C. A motorized wheelchair or an electric personal assistive mobility device. Evidently, according to certain sections of Title 29-A of the Maine Revised

Statutes Annotated, it is a “traffic infraction” or a “strict liability crime” to obtain private property as defined to be a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks and to use it for its intended purpose outside the physical limits of the owner’s private land without a proper “driver’s license” even when that property is not used for commercial purposes in compliance with 18 USC § 31(6).

A “public way” are roads which are financed by, created by, maintained for and used by sovereign people of this state by paying certain administrative fees, taxes, surcharges, and “remedial penalties” for “traffic infractions” and “strict liability crimes”.

RESPONDENT suspending PETITIONER’s “driver’s license” violates her inherent unalienable right of possessing and enjoying private property in the pursuit of and attempt to obtain basic safety and happiness into a “traffic infraction” or “strict liability crime” depending solely on the length of time residence is claimed to be within the boundaries of this state.

The alleged ‘administrative record’ submitted by RESPONDENT on May 29, 2013 is inconsistent, contradictory and does not justify RESPONDENT’s successive repeated refusals to grant mandatory administrative hearings after being notified by PETITIONER on March 18, 2013 that required notices and her actual knowledge of authority and subject matter of the suspension, or her right to an administrative hearing, did not occur until early March 2013.

RESPONDENT’s repeated refusal to grant compulsory pre-suspension and post-restoration administrative hearings despite the uncontested facts of the administrative record was contrary to law in that it was based on an interpretation inconsistent with statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was arbitrary and capricious.

RESPONDENT cannot suspend or revoke any license with arbitrary and capricious motives without a shred of evidence to support the suspension and without first following strict procedural due process as strictly required by the Constitution.

RESPONDENT issuing PETITIONER violation free credits for years 2008, 2009 and 2010 does not justify any type of license suspension because clearly no evidence exists of unsafe operation, obvious incompetence or of being any type of danger to the public immediately prior to the administrative suspension on January 5, 2010.

RESPONDENT’s sole purpose for communicating with PETITIONER in November and December 2009 was to induce PETITIONER to comply with an obligatory medical evaluation which was not provoked by any adverse reports of unsafe operation or incompetency and which was a blatant violation of


PETITIONER’s freedom of religion, freedom of speech, rights against self-incrimination, illegal search and seizure, due process and equal protection.

The administrative record shows that PETITIONER did not receive two (2) notices sent by RESPONDENT in November and December 2009 requiring her submission to the unconstitutional medical evaluation and then initiating an indefinite suspension for failure to comply with the medical evaluation request.

The administrative record does not indicate RESPONDENT complied with 5 M.R.S. § 9052, 5 M.R.S. § 10003(1), 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3), or 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(1).

RESPONDENT coercively used 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) to compel PETITIONER to fulfill a compulsory and unconstitutional medical evaluation and coercively forced her to revise her mailing address which was clearly contrary to law in that it was a blatant violation of PETITIONER’s freedom of speech, right against self- incrimination, illegal search and seizure and equal protection.

RESPONDENT’s actions were based on an interpretation inconsistent with clearly expressed statutory and constitutional duties, was made upon clearly unlawful procedure, was affected by bias or by error of law, was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record and was clearly arbitrary and capricious.

PETITIONER affirms that, during a thorough and detailed review of the record which was filed on May 29, 2013, PETITIONER noticed RESPONDENT has submitted absolutely no evidence whatsoever to support or defend their arbitrary and capricious actions suspending License #1491178 on January 5, 2010 under 29-A M.R.S. 2458(2)(D), stating PETITIONER “Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle”.

PETITIONER states that, as a matter of fact and which is abundantly evidenced within the record as submitted by RESPONDENT, there IS evidence of one or more of the following:

1. Governmental fraud. 2. Governmental complicity. 3. Governmental conspiracy to deprive PETITIONER of constitutionally secured rights. 4. Intentionally or negligently falsifying or altering official public records. 5. Blatant incompetence or willful disregard for written laws, rules and procedures. PETITIONER outlines the following facts as filed with this court on May 29,

2013 by RESPONDENT, Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, page 1 of STATE OF MAINE’s certification

“that the paper to which they attached is a true copy of the records of their office” at the DEPARTMENT OF STATE as sworn to by SECRETARY OF STATE Matthew Dunlap on May 22, 2013 under the GREAT SEAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE.


It should be obvious to the reader that a serious discrepancy and error has occurred in the maintenance of official motor vehicle records and which does in fact significantly compromise the integrity of RESPONDENT’s evidence and motivation to prosecute PETITIONER.

It is evidenced within this record under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was issued ONLY 2 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2009 and 2010.

It is also evidenced within this record, in two distinct locations under Tab 3, BMV files, that the RESPONDENT certified the PETITIONER was in fact properly issued 3 YEARS VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for years 2008, 2009 and 2010.

PETITIONER states that she was previously employed full time, in good standing, by STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLE from January 2007 through April 2008 in the OUI/Habitual Offender Unit which did in fact afford PETITIONER with expertise, a thorough education, comprehensive knowledge and special skills to expertly and correctly assess a driver record and its individual line items.

PETITIONER affirms that the information under Tab 3, BMV files, is perfectly accurate.

PETITIONER alleges that the information under Tab 2, Certified Driving Record, was intentionally falsified or negligently erroneous in order to weaken PETITIONER’s affirmative defenses and her likelihood of prevailing in this case and its criminal companion case.

PETITIONER alleges that RESPONDENT’s efforts to cloud the court’s judgment through filing deceptive and fraudulent records of evidence has been unsuccessful in spite of their exacerbated efforts to prevent PETITIONER from exercising her lawful, constitutionally-guaranteed rights.

The alleged administrative record shows that the violation free credit issued for year 2010 was in fact issued on March 8, 2011 which is the same day RESPONDENT restored the license without requiring reinstatement fees, civil sanctions or administrative charges after PETITIONER filed a completed medical evaluation from PETITIONER’s doctor affirming “minimal/no risk” of unsafe operation for any medical issues.

RESPONDENT restoring the license without reinstatement fees, civil sanctions or any administrative charges and immediately issuing violation free credits on March 8, 2011 for 2010 are two pieces of prima facie evidence that the “medical suspension” is not now, and never has been, a “traffic violation” or “strict liability crime” and which has no assigned civil or criminal penalty of any kind and cannot be used as a prior offense under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A.

Upon RESPONDENT restoring the license on March 8, 2011 with medical affirmation of competency, PETITIONER demanded removal of all “medical restrictions” from the license which were revealed to still be active many months later violating the equal protection clause and requiring a second demand for removal retroactive to March 8, 2011.


Upon further review, PETITIONER observed that RESPONDENT still has not removed the medical restriction from license 1491178 and which now shows a mandatory evaluation date of 2014 in clear violation of PETITIONER’s right to equal protection under the constitution and laws of this state.

An incorrect mailing address is not by itself, and cannot be used as any evidence of incompetency rising to the level of being a threat to public safety, or being any type of justification for suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) and 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), without being combined with adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.

RESPONDENT erred when they knowingly and willfully failed to provide ample public notice of an alleged threat to public safety, knowingly failing to consult the medical advisory board prior to suspending the license, nor does the RESPONDENT’s administrative record have any clear convincing evidence to justify a suspension under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) and 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) all of which violated many constitutional protections.

RESPONDENT violated the Maine Constitution, as well as 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3), by extending the administrative suspension beyond 30 days totaling 427 days and then again violating those same constitutional protections when it failed to notify PETITIONER on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings when PETITIONER completed and submitted the required medical evaluation.

RESPONDENT’s decision to illegally extend the January 5, 2010 medical suspension beyond the clear statutory limitation of 30 days was the direct and proximate cause for PETITIONER being prosecuted on July 5, 2011 for a ‘strict liability crime’ under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A with violation dates of February 10, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512 dismissed) and March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011- 513 guilty via coerced illegal plea agreement).

PETITIONER makes imperative judicial notice of the fact that if the RESPONDENT had adhered to the strict guidelines of M.R.S., and particularly to 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) and had released the medical suspension on the 31st day, then PETITIONER would not have been charged and convicted of operating after suspension in AUGDC-CR-2011-513 nor would the pending companion case AUGSC-CR-2012-286 be whatsoever pending or in existence.

PETITIONER filed a timely request for post-conviction review of the coerced plea agreement for AUGDC-CR-2011-513 on July 6, 2012 which was denied in September 2012; PETITIONER filed an immediate request for reconsideration which was denied in November 2012.

PETITIONER was not informed by RESPONDENT and was unaware of the statutory authority for the medical suspension on January 5, 2010, or her rights attached thereto, because she never received or saw any written notice from RESPONDENT until March 2013 while reviewing evidence for pending action AUGSC-CR-2012-286.

PETITIONER instantly demanded proper administrative hearings to challenge RESPONDENT’s statutory authority to suspend the license in January


2010 under Medical Rules 29-250 Ch. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) and 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) without any clear convincing evidence on the record, nor receiving adverse reports or other indications of dangerous operation.

RESPONDENT knowingly and willfully violated protections of the Maine Constitution when refusing, three times, to grant administrative hearings upon PETITIONER’s proper written requests in March and April 2013 at all times indicating PETITIONER’s demands were made untimely but without providing clear and convincing evidence that PETITIONER had received actual notice or knowledge on March 8, 2011 of her right to demand administrative hearings.

RESPONDENT knowingly violated protections of the Maine Constitution when suspending license 1491178 for incompetency without clear evidence of adverse operation, failing to provide notice or preliminary hearing, retaining suspension beyond clearly stated statutory limitations, and refusing to provide administrative hearings thrice demanded in March and April 2013.

Double jeopardy was effectively invoked when criminal charges were illegally filed and successfully prosecuted on July 5, 2011 under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) via a coerced plea agreement resulting directly from the medical suspension of January 5, 2010 and being the direct proximate cause for the pending action under AUGSC-CR-12-286 and which prompted this 80C action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES TO BE REVIEWED 1. WHETHER 29-A M.R.S. § 1251, 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION. 2. WHETHER THREE YEARS CONSECUTIVE VIOLATION FREE CREDITS EARNED DIRECTLY PRIOR TO SUSPENSION IS EVIDENCE OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY AND JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). 3. WHETHER INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). 4. WHETHER RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY. 5. WHETHER RESPONDENT CONSULTED MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D).


6. WHETHER RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD HAD CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING LICENSE SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29- A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). 7. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D)WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD. 8. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) BY EXTENDING ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION ON JANUARY 5, 2010 BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS ENDING ON MARCH 8, 2011. 9. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS ON MARCH 8, 2011 BY FAILING TO NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING. 10. WHETHER RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN REPEATEDLY REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013. 11. WHETHER RESPONDENT VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION WHEN SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013. 12. WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND PETITIONER is one of the freeborn, living, breathing, sovereign inhabitants

of the republic of Maine. PETITIONER has given lawful and properly certified notice reclaiming and

redeeming her sovereign status effectively nullifying all unlawful contracts in May 2012, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, those notifications consisting of Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority,


Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed and a certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth, to the following governmental and court authorities:

a. STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF VITAL RECORDS, 244 Water Street, STATE HOUSE STATION #11, AUGUSTA, MAINE b. Magistrate, Kennebec County Probate Court, 95 State Street, Augusta, Maine c. Charles E. Summers, Jr., 148 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333 d. William J. Schneider, 6 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333-0006 e. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, 400 Michigan Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C. 20017 f. U.S. Attorney General, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S. Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001 g. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20520 On August 23, 2012, PETITIONER certified mailed Writ of Mandamus and

Replevin, hereby attached to this brief as exhibits, to the following governmental authorities:

Mike Pool, Director, Bureau of Land Management Washington Office, 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5665, Washington DC 20240 Carole Carter-Pfisterer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management, Human Capital Management , 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5611, Washington, DC 20240 Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Records, SHS #11, Augusta Maine

PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February

3,1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to request a ‘drivers license’ whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

PETITIONER has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to request ‘vehicle registration plates’ whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private non-commercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 repeals ‘driver’s license’ requirements for common law reasons which can be found here: http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm

http://www1.legis.ga.gov/legis/2011_12/sum/hb7.htm


11/15/10: House Prefiled; 01/12/2011: House First Readers; 01/24/2011: House Second Readers; to wit:

Free people have a common law and constitutional right to travel on the roads and highways that are provided by their government for that purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an inalienable right; In England in 1215, the right to travel was enshrined in Article 42 of Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above. Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional rights; American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of others. The government, by requiring the people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the people's common law and constitutional right to travel; In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights; The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an orderly and decent manner; and Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive the right and convert that right into a privilege. PETITIONER peacefully asserts her sovereignty and personal liberty to

freely possess private property liberated from all governmental interferences and


encumbrances which is a guaranteed right to every citizen under our Constitution and common equity laws.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of not-for-hire traveling.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of possessing private property.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of using one’s own personal property as one deems suitable.

RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise one’s right to use public highways for private non-commercial traveling in one’s conveyance of free choice.

RESPONDENT cannot require “enrollment” of private data into RESPONDENT’s “registration records”.

Any person who travels in an automobile which is not registered, without ‘proper vehicle registration plates’, and who uses that private unregistered conveyance for private travel purposes does in fact put herself at very high risk for being arrested and imprisoned for failure to do a thing which patently violates Bill of Rights, 4th Amendment and Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 5 protections against unlawful search and seizure of persons, papers and things, “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures”.

29-A M.R.S. § 1251 is prima facie evidence of RESPONDENT’s willful infringement of protections under the Maine Constitution.

Any person who registers an automobile or obtains a license with the RESPONDENT complies reluctantly only under duress, blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental corruption.

Any person who innocently fails or knowingly refuses to comply with registration and licensing rules and who exercises the right of locomotion by automobile is immediately categorized as a ‘criminal’ and subjected to intimidation, harassment, arrest, assault and kidnapping by law enforcement and judicial agencies in violation of federal and state constitutional protections.

A person’s right to locomotion is a sacred right beholden to everyone. A license is a grant or permission that is often assigned and documented by

way of a piece of paper which affords the licensee to do an act that would otherwise be unlawful.

Exercising one’s right to travel and right to locomotion has never been ‘unlawful’.

Being sovereign has never been ‘unlawful’. RESPONDENT cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental

liberty to travel in one’s chosen conveyance on a free, open public way which is reserved for use by the sovereign people as tenants in common.

17-A M.R.S. § 2(19). Definitions state an "organization" means “a corporation, partnership or unincorporated association”.


17-A M.R.S. § 2(20). Definitions state a "person" means “a human being or an organization”.

RESPONDENT, State of Maine, Secretary of State is a legal corporation and a registered corporate person.

17 M.R.S. § 2931. Prohibition. “A person may not, by force or threat of force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Section 2 of the Bill of Rights clarifies “that all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them”.

Article 1, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution, states, “All power is inherent in the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it.”

Article 4 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, declares, “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause -- supported by oath or affirmation.”

RESPONDENT has violated and prevented due process of law. RESPONDENT has violated PETITIONER’s constitutionally protected

rights. RESPONDENT has unclean hands and cannot prevail pursuant to

maxims of law. Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959,

“This Court has held that there is no such license known to Texas law as a "driver's license". See Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400; Brooks v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 546, 258 S.W.2d 317.”

Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317 - Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953, “The information upon which this conviction was predicated alleged that appellant ‘did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon a public highway … while his … drivers license was suspended.’

In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 194 S.W.2d 400, 401, we said:

"There being no such license as a `driver's' license known to the law, it follows that the information, in charging the driving of a motor vehicle upon a public highway without such a license, charges no offense." See also Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 237 S.W.2d 303.


Because the information fails to charge an offense, the judgment is reversed and the prosecution ordered dismissed.”

ARGUMENT

A. 29-A M.R.S. § 1251, 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 VIOLATE MAINE CONSTITUTION.

29-A M.R.S. § 1251, 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D), 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) AND MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3 violate PETITIONER’s rights to possess, enjoy and protect private property under Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 9, and 24 of the Maine Constitution as well as PETITIONER being required to report PETITIONER’s medical conditions being a violation of PETITIONER’s natural rights as protected by Art. 1, Sec. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-A, 9, 19 and 24 in that RESPONDENT forces PETITIONER to ‘speak’ PETITIONER’s medical condition and then RESPONDENT ‘seizes’ PETITIONER’s medical records for RESPONDENT’s review so RESPONDENT can seize PETITIONER’s alleged ‘privilege to drive’ which is masked as a statutory mandate at RESPONDENT’s command after being required to get a ‘driver’s license’ to use PETITIONER’s private property on public roads which are paid for, maintained and used by the public (PETITIONER), and when RESPONDENT requires PETITIONER’s medical conditions to be disclosed pursuant to Motor Vehicle Rules as PETITIONER legally complied with, RESPONDENT then imposes excessive penalties and punishments outside of the realm of reasonable proportions and turns the innocent mistake, which does not rise to the offense of a civil action, into a criminal offense and then denies PETITIONER’s right to redress PETITIONER’s injuries with RESPONDENT about the original medical reporting requirement and basis for their alleged authority for their subsequent suspension for innocently forgetting to disclose PETITIONER’s physical whereabouts every thirty days while PETITIONER was unwillingly transient.

B. RECEIPT OF VIOLATION FREE CREDITS DOES NOT JUSTIFY

ANY TYPE OF SUSPENSION. This argument wins on its own. C. AN INCORRECT MAILING ADDRESS IS NOT CLEAR EVIDENCE

OF INCOMPETENCY RISING TO THE LEVEL OF BEING A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY OR JUSTIFICATION FOR SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) .

There is no legal precedent supporting a suspension imposed under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) for innocently forgetting to change an address when not coupled with other dangerous or negligent actions.


D. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN THEY FAILED TO PROVIDE PUBLIC NOTICE OF A THREAT TO PUBLIC SAFETY.

If RESPONDENT had posted mandatory public notice in November and December 2009 of the impending suspension of license 1491178 on January 5, 2010, PETITIONER’s family and friends who read the local news religiously would have promptly notified PETITIONER of the public notice and PETITIONER would have promptly changed her address and complied with the medical evaluation request under duress and RESPONDENT’s fraudulent coercive tactics.

E. RESPONDENT DID NOT CONSULT MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD

PRIOR TO SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

There is no evidence that RESPONDENT consulted with the Medical Advisory Board or any other medical professional in consultation about PETITIONER’s incompetency prior to suspending the license.

F. RESPONDENT’S ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD DOES NOT HAVE

ANY CLEAR EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING SUSPENSION UNDER MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONER’s claims of constitutional violations.

G. RESPONDENT ERRED WHEN SUSPENDING LICENSE UNDER

MEDICAL RULES 29-250 CH. 3, 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) AND 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) WITHOUT ANY ADVERSE REPORTS, CLEAR EVIDENCE OF DANGEROUS VIOLATIONS, OR CONSULT WITH THE MEDICAL ADVISORY BOARD.

The lack of evidence speaks for itself and supports PETITIONER’s claims of constitutional violations.

H. RESPONDENT VIOLATED 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) BY EXTENDING

ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION BEYOND 30 DAYS TOTALING 427 DAYS. The evidence speaks for itself in that the RESPONDENT had no basis to

preserve this suspension for 427 days despite its alleged authority. I. RESPONDENT ERRED ON MARCH 8, 2011 WHEN FAILING TO

NOTIFY PETITIONER OF RIGHT TO ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS. RESPONDENT had an obligation on March 8, 2011 to verbally notify

PETITIONER of her rights to an administrative hearing and the authority of the suspension upon their recorded knowledge that postal mail had twice been returned to them and that PETITIONER had no actual knowledge of said notices or the contents therein.


J. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED DUE PROCESS WHEN

REFUSING TO PROVIDE MANDATORY ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS. This argument needs no explanation. K. RESPONDENT KNOWINGLY VIOLATED MAINE CONSTITUTION

WHEN SUSPENDING FOR INCOMPETENCY WITHOUT EVIDENCE, FAILING TO PROVIDE NOTICE OR PRELIMINARY HEARING, RETAINING SUSPENSION BEYOND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS, AND REFUSING TO PROVIDE ADMINISTRATIVE POST-RESTORATION HEARINGS THRICE DEMANDED IN 2013.

RESPONDENT has no evidence to justify any type of suspension and then failing to properly notify PETITIONER of her rights and then denying PETITIONER’s rights to be heard after discovering two years later that RESPONDENT had deemed PETITIONER incompetent without just or good cause, evidence, facts or opinions to support any such sentiment or judgment.

L. DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS INVOKED WHEN CRIMINAL

CHARGES WERE FILED AND SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED ON JULY 5, 2011 UNDER 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) RESULTING DIRECTLY FROM THE MEDICAL SUSPENSION OF JANUARY 5, 2010 AND BEING DIRECT PROXIMATE CAUSE FOR PENDING ACTION AUGSC-CR-12-286.

PETITIONER was prosecuted in separate criminal proceedings on July 5, 2011 under coercive tactics by former A.D.A Steven Parker with full knowledge that the medical suspension had been DELETED FROM THE RECORD and continued to intimidate PETITIONER with excessive fines, an expressed and clear intention to seek imprisonment and punitive damages if PETITIONER did not agree to a plea agreement, which PETITIONER unwillingly agreed to and expressly reserved her unalienable rights on and for the record on July 5, 2011 in open court.

RELIEF REQUESTED 1. Declaratory judgment that RESPONDENT violated PETITIONER's rights and protections of the Maine Constitution Article 1, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 6-A, 8, 9, 19 and 24. 2. Void AUGDC-CR-2011-512/513 and directly refund all related monies. 3. Void all open and closed related companion cases in superior, district and violation bureau courts. 4. Release bail bond ($300) and bail conditions for AUGSC-CR-2012-286. 5. Order RESPONDENT to remove and delete the medical restriction on license #1491178 which is scheduled for review in 2014. 6. Order RESPONDENT to flag license #1491178ME as "DO NOT STOP" on the national driver registry on grounds of religious freedom. 7. Give PETITIONER leave to file civil rights suit against RESPONDENT. 8. All other legal, punitive, and compensatory remedies as deemed just.


9. All other equitable remedies as deemed just and appropriate.

CONCLUSION Common law has returned. Maritime law has gone back out to sea.

PETITIONER stands on solid ground with absolute clean hands, no evidence of malevolent motives or behaviors, with full transparency and truth, under GOD's LAW ONLY and rejecting all man-made statutory laws which violate her natural rights and explicit protections of those rights expressed in the Maine Constitution.

The time has come for all men and women to speak the truth, honor the truth, speak only facts with full transparency and complete accountability when errors and mistakes are committed. When injuries occur, the injured has full rights to require redress and remedy of those injuries despite the alleged immunity against prosecution for negligent, capricious, arbitrary and blatantly illegal use of words under GOD’s and common law herein.

DATED: July 15, 2013 Gina Lynn Turcotte


APPENDIX W STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss CIVIL ACTION

Docket No. CR-12-286

STATE OF MAINE v. GINA TURCOTTE, Defendant

Order At the request of the defendant and without objection from the State, these

proceedings were stayed on 4/23/13 pending outcome of the defendant's Rule 80C petition. The defendant continues to file motions, affidavits, and requests, notwithstanding the stay. No further action will be taken in this case until a decision is rendered on the Rule 80C petition.

The clerk is directed to incorporate this order into the docket by reference.

Date: May 28, 2013 Nancy Mills, Justice, Superior Court


APPENDIX X

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant Addendum to Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion

to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations

NOW COMES Defendant GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and upon her own knowledge, information, experiences and belief, and so far as upon her information and belief, she believes this information to be true and correct, submits this Addendum to Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations.

During the evening of May 8, 2013, Defendant slowly and diligently sorted through all of her compact discs looking for any evidence which may have been previously provided by the Oakland Police Department.

Defendant did in fact find a single compact disc for part of the April 5, 2012 arrest by Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert in Oakland which is saved on Animation brand CD-R 700Mb disc. This disc appears to have only one audio file with a recording that begins after Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert had already pursued, arrested, handcuffed and placed Defendant inside the patrol vehicle.

Defendant made the observation that this audio did not capture how both Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert did in fact use excessive police power against Defendant in multiple ways, namely, but not limited to, initiating an unconstitutional traffic stop without sufficient probable cause of a lawful crime, threat to destroy private property with a lethal weapon (tire iron, crow bar, etc.), threat to commit bodily injury with a lethal weapon (special training and skills), unlawful pursuit, drawing, pointing and threatening to use a lethal weapon (firearm), terrorizing, criminal threatening, assault, wrongful arrest, kidnapping, wrongful imprisonment, actual serious bodily injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, destruction of personal property, falsifying police records, willful destruction of known exculpatory evidence, malicious prosecution, breach of public trust, inter alia.


Defendant made the obvious observation that this audio recording does not visually illustrate the significant difference in physical stature between Defendant and each officer, individually, as well as collectively. Defendant states that her current weight and height is five (5) feet, five (5) inches and one hundred fifteen (115) pounds. Defendant made the observation that Ofc. Steven Corbett stands approximately five (5) feet, nine (9) inches and weighs no less than one hundred eighty (180) pounds; and Cpt. Rick Stubbert stands approximately six (6) feet and weighs no less than two hundred (200) pounds with a combined weight of about three hundred eighty (380) pounds which is more than enough physical force to successfully and easily subdue an unarmed petite female, without an actual threat and intent to use a firearm.

Defendant states that she does not possess any knowledge of martial arts, self-defense, specialized skills, nor any firearms which would give her an advantage over and unknown to an attacker.

Defendant affirms that in fact she was in fear for her life during all interactions with Ofc. Steven Corbett, beginning at 2:10pm on South Alpine Street and which were in fact exacerbated and aggravated by Cpt. Rick Stubbert at OneSteel Recycling when he drew and pointed his lethal weapon at Defendant, in excessive use of his police power, without probable cause or clear and convincing evidence of a substantial threat of harm or injury by Defendant.

Defendant restates the fact that all Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) knew, or should have known, the mandatory minimum standards for collection and preservation of LEO notes and records especially when the LEO activates blue emergency lights, siren, engages pursuit or when the LEO suspects a controversy will arise as to the material facts of the events leading up to and including arrest.

Defendant states two possible facts: 1. Ofc. Steven Corbett failed to have the proper equipment on his person or in his patrol vehicle for the purpose of recording interactions with Defendant which caused Ofc. Steven Corbett to request Cpt. Rick Stubbert provide an audio recording device upon physical arrest of Defendant while on the property of OneSteel Recycling, or 2. Ofc. Steven Corbett was carrying an audio recording device on his physical person in his shirt pocket and could have, and should have, activated the device upon the initial traffic stop on South Alpine Street which would have captured the initial traffic stop, conversation, pursuit and actual physical arrest of Defendant. Defendant asserts that this incomplete audio file does not in any way satisfy

Defendant's request for the in-car camera and audio recordings that should have been taken during the initial traffic stop on South Alpine Street, the subsequent pursuit and physical arrest by Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert at OneSteel Recycling, or the missing standard video and audio recordings taken during the booking process by the surveillance system installed within the Oakland Police Department.


As evidenced within Oakland Police Department Arrest Report 120AK-86-AR, Narrative for Patrol Steven J Corbett, Page 1, paragraph 4, Ofc. Steven Corbett indicates, "I told Ms. Turcotte that I had requested assistance and that if we had to, we would break her window to remove her from the car. Ms. Turcotte would not answer my questions and continued to cite law cases and accusing me of violating her civil rights. I returned to my car and went to the trunk to get a door tool used to unlock car doors. As I was walking back towards Ms. Turcottes [sic] car with the door tool, she suddenly put her car in drive and sped away from the roadside. I immediately got back into my car and advised my dispatcher that 'she just took off on me'. I turned on my siren and proceeded to catch up with Ms. Turcotte as she approached the intersection of South Alpine Street and Kennedy Memorial Drive. Ms. Turcotte came to a stop at the intersection before pulling out… While I was following Ms. Turcotte, I still had my emergency lights and siren on. As we traveled west on KMD, I observed Captain Stubbert approaching with his lights and siren on Ayer Street ends and becomes a driveway into a private business, OneSteel, a metal recycling operation."

Defendant avers that upon Ofc. Steven Corbett threatening to break her car window to forcefully (and unconstitutionally) remove Defendant from her automobile, Defendant did immediately envision her body being ripped to pieces by being dragged across jagged edges of tempered window glass by Ofc. Steven Corbett. Defendant avers that there was no way she could have known that Ofc. Steven Corbett was going to retrieve a tool to allegedly unlock her car door instead of to break her car window as Ofc. Steven Corbett had expressly threatened.

Defendant believed the item Ofc. Steven Corbett was bringing back from the trunk of his patrol vehicle was a dangerous weapon that could be used to destroy her property and cause grave bodily injury and possibly fatal harm. Defendant did in fact believe she would be killed by Ofc. Steven Corbett if she did not leave the scene for a safe public place with witnesses.

Defendant feared for her life and emergently decided to leave South Alpine Street to find a safe public place to surrender under threat, duress and coercion with unbiased witnesses causing her to choose the private property of OneSteel Recycling because Defendant did in fact know surveillance video was in use and she believed its close proximity to the Oakland Police station would confirm her self-defense claim.

Pursuant to Pursuits and Response to Calls, Mandatory Training Topic 2011, Prepared by Jim Birt, Maine Criminal Justice Academy Training Staff, Reviewed by Brian MacMaster, Office of Attorney General, Sgt. Tom Baran, York Police Department and instructed by Maine Criminal Justice Academy, on page 16, under Criterion Test Questions, all LEO's MUST know MANDATORY pre-pursuit vehicle check items which include, but are not limited to: Emergency lights Siren Four-way flashers Tire pressure


Tire wear In-car camera Engine fluids Radio checks - mobile and portable Start engine - listen for unusual noises Note: drive axle of cruiser. Front or rear wheel drive . Pursuit termination device (spike mat) available

As evidenced within Oakland Police Department Arrest Report 120AK-86-AR, Narrative for Patrol Steven J Corbett, Page 1, paragraph 4, Ofc. Steven Corbett indicates, "After driving past the gates of One Steel and into their yard, Ms. Turcotte turned left and came to a stop in front of one of the business' buildings ... As I was getting out of my car, I observed Ms. Turcotte get out of her car and start walking towards the rear of her car with her hands above her head.

As I came around the read of my car, I observed Captain Stubbert standing between his vehicle and the rear of Ms. Turcotte's vehicle with his handgun drawn."

For the purpose of this affidavit and which should have been captured by in-car camera and audio recordings, Defendant had already emerged from her private automobile,_ before Cpt. Rick Stubbert emerged from his vehicle, walking in surrender mode with both her hands over her head with her audio recording device grasped tightly in her left hand, which was recording the entire interactions beginning at the initial traffic stop on South Alpine Street, and which did capture Cpt. Rick Stubbert scream "Get on the ground! Get on the ground NOW!" while unnecessarily drawing and pointing his fully loaded lethal weapon at Defendant.

Cpt. Rick Stubbert's excessive use of police force did in fact cause Defendant to fear she would be shot dead by Cpt. Rick Stubbert in the parking lot of OneSteel Recycling.

Cpt. Rick Stubbert asked Ofc. Steven Corbett, "What the hell is going on here?”

Ofc. Steven Corbett in fact replied, "Oh it's a constitutional rights issue and I just violated all of hers ... "

As evidenced by this audio recording taken by Ofc. Steven Corbett on a handheld device, and in gross violation of LEO mandatory minimum standards for collecting and preserving evidence, Ofc. Steven Corbett evidently made one or more of these choices:

1. Ofc. Steven Corbett failed to acquire the necessary equipment to fulfill his duties, or 2. Ofc. Steven Corbett failed to use the recording devices at the initial traffic stop, or 3. Ofc. Steven Corbett intentionally destroyed the recordings of the initial traffic stop. As evidenced by the recording, it begins with a man saying, "Okay, you're

recording. Go ahead." and then a man said, "[inaudible] for the record. " The next conversation occurs between Ofc. Steven Corbett and Defendant

when Defendant requires retrieval of her legal notebook, cell phone and recorder.


Defendant told Ofc. Steven Corbett countless times to retrieve her legal notebook which Ofc. Steven Corbett responds, "There's nothing in there that you need .... You don't need it .... You don't need it where · we're going."

As evidenced on the recording at the 1 minute 30 seconds mark, Defendant can be heard insisting several times that Ofc. Steven Corbett retrieve her legal notebook stating, "Officer, you are a public servant. Get my notebook! [inaudible/ ... Please get my notebook"

As evidenced on the recording at the 2 minutes 35 seconds mark, Ofc. Steven Corbett calls into dispatch reporting the beginning of transport of Defendant to Oakland Police station ·with a beginning mileage of "203.2".

As evidenced on the recording at the 4 minutes mark, Ofc. Steven Corbett calls into dispatch reporting the completed transport of Defendant to Oakland Police station with an ending mileage of "203.5”, indicating the final arrest location was only (3/10ths) three-tenths of one mile, and 1 minute 25 seconds, away from the Oakland Police station.

Defendant affirms that her need to find a safe public place to surrender under threat, duress and coercion in the presence of unbiased witnesses caused her to choose the private property of OneSteel Recycling because Defendant knew surveillance video was in use and its close proximity to the Oakland Police station would confirm her self-defense claim.

As evidenced on the recording, it is difficult to understand many things Defendant says because Defendant was seated about 10 feet away from Ofc. Steven Corbett's desk and the audio recording device was still located inside Ofc. Steven Corbett's shirt pocket which caused many of Defendant's statements to be inaudible but which does clearly capture Ofc. Steven Corbett's verbal statements, responsive breathing patterns and occasional joyful whistling.

As evidenced on the recording at the 5 minutes 55 seconds mark, Defendant notified Ofc. Steven Corbett of her lawful right to record all public servants in the performance of their official duties as established in Simon Glik v. John Cunniffe et al, No. 10-1764, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit, August 26, 2011, and demanded that she be allowed to record the entire booking process with her black Samsung audio recording device.

Ofc. Steven Corbett continually denied Defendant's demand through non-action.

As evidenced on the recording at the 12 minutes 20 seconds mark, Defendant asks Ofc. Steven Corbett if he has a copy of the Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008-2010 which Ofc. Steven Corbett replies, "No."

Defendant informed Ofc. Steven Corbett that, on page 4-11 of the Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008-2010, bottom of the page, it clearly indicates all traffic stops of private automobiles does in fact automatically invoke protections of the 4th Amendment.

For the purpose of this affidavit which Defendant did not iterate during the booking process, page 4-11 states, in part, "With respect to private motor vehicles, however, "[t]he law is settled that in Fourth Amendment terms a traffic stop entails a


seizure of the driver "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." (citing Delaware v. Prouse) Brendlin v. California, U.S. , , 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405-06, 168 L.Ed.2d 132, 138 (2007). Furthermore, the Brendlin case held that when a police officer makes a traffic stop of a private vehicle, passengers are seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court stated that "the relationship between driver and passenger is not the same in a common carrier as it is in a private vehicle, and the expectations of police officers and passengers differ accordingly. In those cases, as here, the crucial question would be whether a reasonable person in the passenger's position would feel free to take. steps to terminate the encounter." U.S. at n. 6, 12 7 S. Ct. at 241 0 n. 6, 168 L.Ed.2d at 143 n. 6. It follows that "[p]assengers in a motor vehicle subjected to a traffic stop are deemed seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and, thus, are entitled to challenge the constitutionality of the stop." United States v. Brown, 500 F. 3d 48, 54 (1st Ci.J;. 2007)."

As evidenced in the recording at the 15 minutes 7 seconds mark Defendant asked Ofc. Steven Corbett if Cpt. Rick Stubbert's firearm was a stun gun or a bullet gun.

Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, 'I’m not sure.” Defendant asked "You don't know if he had a bullet gun or a stun gun in his hand when he drew it on me? I would think that you would know what kind of gun he was holding."

Ofc Steven Corbett replied, "I was." Defendant asked, "then what kind of gun was it?” Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, "what kind do you think?”' Defendant responded, "I don't know. I’m not into guns ... was it a bullet gun

he drew on me?' Ofc. Steven Corbett sharply replied, ''Yes, it was” As evidenced in the recording at the 17 minutes 55 seconds mark, Defendant

asks Ofc. Steven Corbett if their interactions were being recorded given that he made effort to read the standard Miranda warnings.

Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, ''Yes." Defendant can be heard throughout the booking process calling attention to

Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008-2010 page 4-11 as quoted above, as well as 17 M.R.S. § 2931 Prohibition which states, "A person may not, by force or threat of force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States."

As evidenced in the recording at the 20 minutes and 25 seconds mark, Ofc. Steven Corbett inappropriately and erroneously determined that Defendant was not eligible for a bail bond which is prima facie evidence of Ofc. Steven Corbett's negligent and improper use of the laws, rules and statutes of this state, and of his


willful, malicious actions against Defendant and his blatant arrogant abuse of power under color of law which caused severe injury.

As a direct result of Ofc. Steven Corbett's improper use of laws, rules and statutes of this state, through his overt, covert and excessive abuse of power under color of law, Defendant was kidnapped and wrongfully imprisoned totaling about 22 hours from time of arrest at 2:20pm April 5, 2012 until about 12:00pm April 6, 2012.

Bail bondsman Wayne Michaud did in fact authorize a cash bail bond of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1,500.00) on April 6, 2012 which was secured by Defendant's father.

As evidenced in the recording at the 21 minutes mark, Defendant clearly informed Ofc. Steven Corbett that his actions did in fact constitute a violation of Defendant's "civil rights" and that Ofc. Steven Corbett would be held personally liable for his actions.

As evidenced in the recording at the 26 minutes 50 seconds mark, Defendant asked Ofc. Steven Corbett, "So did you take an oath to uphold the Constitution?" Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, "I did."

Defendant asked, "You did? Are you familiar with what the Constitution says?'

Ofc. Steven Corbett said, "I am." Defendant asked, "Are you? So why are you stopping people unlawfully who

are traveling peacefully in a private automobile and seizing their property and arresting their body?"

Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, "I stopped you for not having an inspection sticker."

Defendant responded, "which is not a crime." Ofc. Steven Corbett stated, "It's a reason to stop you."

Defendant responded, "It's not a crime. You invoked the 4th and 14th Amendment when you stopped me. It was not a crime, Officer. You just admitted that you did not have probable cause to stop me. I was not committing a crime. You invoked the 4th and 14th Amendment."

Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, "You were committing a traffic infraction." Defendant declared, "It is not a crime, Officer!" Ofc. Steven Corbett indicates in his written narrative that the "reason for the

stop was that she did not have an inspection sticker on her car." clearly violating the foundational judicial opinion expressed on page 4-11 of the Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008-2010, "The Maine Supreme Judicial Court set out the standard for stopping a moving automobile in State v. Rowe, 453 A.2d 134, 136 (Me. 1982). “An officer may stop a moving automobile if he has specific and articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant suspicion of criminal conduct by the occupants...."[emphasis added] As evidenced in the recording at the 28 minutes mark, Defendant said, "I am acting lawfully and you're not. You HAVE violated my rights. You said that. You admitted it. You're still here admitting it and you're still gonna proceed with the unlawful processing, uh, arrest. I hope you have a good insurance company. And I AM


familiar with qualified immunity, and I AM aware that you don't have qualified immunity when are sued individually, which is exactly what I am going to do . ... You have as much responsibility for your actions as I have for my own. I have not committed a crime. You admitted that. You said it was an infraction.... An infraction is not a crime. You cannot arrest for an infraction. You might want to think about this before you move any further."

As evidenced in the recording at the 32 minutes and 45 seconds mark, Defendant asked Cpt. Rick Stubbert to retrieve a copy of Maine Law Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008-2010.

Ofc. Steven Corbett rebutted, “No one's going to read it!! No one's interested in it!!"

As evidenced in many places throughout the entire audio recording, Defendant adequately informed Ofc. Steven Corbett and others of the unequivocal prohibition against violation of her constitutionally secured rights as memorialized by 17 M.R.S. § 2931.

As evidenced in the recording up to and beyond the 45 minutes and 50 seconds mark, Ofc. Steven Corbett intentionally, knowingly, willfully and maliciously caused physical injury to Defendant's arms, shoulders and back by forcing her to sit in one position with her hands secured in handcuffs behind her back for the entirety without any specific articulable facts or clear and convincing evidence that Defendant would be a threat if the handcuffs were removed, or if her hands were placed in front of her body within handcuffs.

Defendant avers she posed no threat of injury to anyone regardless of handcuffs.

Defendant asserts that she was not offered any hydration while Ofc. Steven Corbett intentionally, knowingly, willfully and maliciously caused injury to Defendant's general health by forcing her to wear her outer winter coat while indoors during the heating season (on a day when outdoor temps did not exceed forty two (42) degrees Fahrenheit in Waterville) thereby causing Defendant to become dehydrated, overheated, faint, ill and physically weak.

As evidenced in the recording at the 48 minutes and 44 seconds mark, Defendant was ordered to stand up while her hands were still secured behind her back with handcuffs.

Defendant clearly stated, "I said I have a bad back. You understand it's difficult for someone to stand up with their hands cuffed behind their back while they have a bad back, correct?"

Defendant was offered assistance to stand up. Defendant affirms that severe pain shot through her entire body as she stood

up and resulting from not being able to shift positions or relieve the tension on her arms, shoulders and back caused by having her hands unnecessarily bound behind her back for more than an hour.

Defendant can be heard audibly, genuinely and clearly expressing the existence of severe pain through verbal sighs, gasps, moans and other expressions of pain upon first standing, shifting her spine and moving her arms and shoulders.


As evidenced in the recording at the 51 minutes and 25 seconds mark, Defendant tells Ofc. Steven Corbett, "You know I've got videos on YouTube. You're going to be famous. Ask Peter Cloutier in Augusta. He knows what it's like.''

As evidenced in the recording at the 56 minutes and 25 seconds mark, while Ofc. Steven Corbett was explaining the numerous summonses to Defendant, Cpt. Rick Stubbert in fact suggests that Ofc. Steven Corbett also charge Defendant with "refusing to stop".

Ofc. Steven Corbett indicated a court appearance date of June 19, 2012 in Waterville District Court.

As evidenced in the recording at the 57 minutes mark, Defendant and Ofc. Steven Corbett debated Defendant's guilt as to the "refusing to stop' charge.

Defendant stated, “I didn't fail to stop. I was finding a safe place to pull over. You know what…?"

Ofc. Steven Corbett interrupted, "you know what? I'm guessing you don't know the law as well as you think you do."

Defendant rebutted, "I think it will be your word against mine, especially after you already admitted on the scene that you already violated all my constitutional rights, all of my rights, and, if that recording disappears from my recorder, I will know why."

As evidenced in the recording at the 1 hour, 2 minutes and 40 seconds mark, Ofc. Steven Corbett said, "I'm going to give you another chance to sign these fingerprint cards. Do you want to do that?"

Defendant replied, "Let me go home, yeah." Ofc. Steven Corbett replied, "No, I can't. " Defendant rebutted, "Yeah, you can." Ofc. Steven Corbett responded, "No, because you violated conditions of

release. I'm sure you were explained that if you violated those conditions then there is no bail. You go directly to jail."

Defendant rebutted, "The stop was unlawful to begin with. I shouldn't even be here. ok? You arrested me without cause."

Ofc. Steven Corbett responded, ''That will be determined at a later date. " Defendant rebutted, "It's already been determined. You already agreed to

that. You already admitted that you violated my rights." Ofc. Steven Corbett responded, "I didn't admit to anything." Defendant rebutted, "You surely did! I heard you say it to your captain on the

scene at the recycling place. [inaudible] I'm not deaf As you were picking me up off the ground you said, ‘I’ve violated all her rights’. It's right here, Officer! Right HERE!” (referring to Defendant's audio recording device which Ofc. Steven Corbett had just given back to her with her cell phone)

Ofc. Steven Corbett rebutted, "So then it would be on this also, right?" Ofc. Steven Corbett patted his shirt pocket indicating the location of the

device. Defendant agreed, "Yeah, i[that was going when you got out of the car, ,yeah,

actually it would be! I hope you know what you're doing!"


Defendant declares that Ofc. Steven Corbett knew, or should have known, that his decision to leave the recording device inside his shirt pocket would in fact distort or prevent any of Defendant's testimony from being clearly archived for exculpatory evidence.

As evidenced in the recording at the 1 hour, 10 minutes, 50 seconds mark, Defendant asked for Cpt. Rick Stubbert's full legal name. Cpt. Rick Stubbert replied, "Just Captain." Defendant rebutted, “I can find it online. No problem. I'm pretty resourceful." Defendant declares that Ofc. Steven Corbett did in fact 1) fail to record initial

traffic stop, pursuit and arrest with in-car camera and audio, 2) destroy Defendant's independent exculpatory evidence at the final arrest location, 3) began recording audio with a handheld recording device after arresting Defendant, 4) prevent Defendant from recording the booking process in violation of law, 5) fail to record or preserve entire booking process.

Defendant avers that Ofc. Steven Corbett's audio recording ended abruptly at 1 hour 11 minutes after Defendant's last statement to Cpt. Rick Stubbert.

Defendant avers that her conversations with Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert continued despite lack of corroborating evidence.

Defendant avers that she has not found, nor believes she has ever been given any other multimedia files by either police department, other than those already specified.

Defendant declares that both Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert's failure to use their in-car camera and audio recorders during the entire incident was unfair and prejudicial.

Defendant declares that Cpt. Rick Stubbert's did in fact use excessive police power when he incorporated his firearm and pointed it at Defendant.

Defendant makes the observation that Cpt. Rick Stubbert did not collect or maintain exculpatory evidence to defend his excessive use of police power and lethal force which can be reasonably inferred to mean that if those events had been recorded they would in fact validate all of Defendant's claims of unlawful conduct by Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert.

Defendant makes the observation that Ofc. Steven Corbett's initial unconstitutional traffic stop provoked Ofc. Steven Corbett to threaten to unlawfully break Defendant's window using unnecessary excessive force which were in fact the causative factors provoking Defendant to leave South Alpine Street for self-defense and protection which were in fact the causative factors provoking Cpt. Rick Stubbert to join the pursuit which were in fact the causative factors provoking Cpt. Rick Stubbert to integrate his firearm, draw it and point it at Defendant with willful intention to intimidate Defendant under color of law with lethal harm.

Defendant does not have a violent criminal background. Defendant has never been accused of resisting arrest by any Oakland officer. Defendant restates judicial opinions from several United States Appeal

courts, to wit: The Fourth Amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless police officers have a founded suspicion


of criminal conduct. -United States v. Salinas, 940 F.2d 392, No. 89-10350. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, citing United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir.1989).

"Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop."--United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir.1988).

Founded suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts, that, together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 416-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir.1989).

"The fact the restraint on [Defendant's] liberty was minimal does not make the restraint a reasonable one. The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person including those consuming no more than a minute. (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 879-880 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 615-616].) People v. Spicer, 157 Cal.App.3d 213 [Crim. No. 45072. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven. June 15, 1984.]

The Fourth Amendment, of course, "applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." When the officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. -Brown v. Texas (citing Davis v. Mississippi) 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio) 392 U.S. 1, 392 U.S. 16-19 (1968)." [W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk [or drive] away, he has seized "that person," id. at 392 U. S. 16, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable." [Meaning reasonable suspicion of criminal activity]. –United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 422 U. S. 878 (1975).

Even assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits." -Delaware v. Prouse, at 440 U. S. 661.

“... the detainee is not obliged to respond." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). Shapiro v. Thompson, (1969) 394 US 618:

"…This Court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all citizens be free· to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement. That proposition was early stated by Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849):630.

"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States…"


Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 US 147: " ... a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it

and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license ... "

Lefkowitz v. Turley, 94 S. CT. 316, 414 U.S. 70 (1973): " ... The Fifth Amendment provides that no person 'shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself.' The Amendment not only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings. McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U. S. 34, 40 (1924), squarely held that [t]he privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. "'

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486, 71 S.CT.814, 95L.Ed. 1, 18 (1951):

“ ... The Fifth Amendment declares in part that 'No person. .. shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. ' This guarantee against testimonial compulsion, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, 'was added to the original Constitution in the conviction that too high a price may be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed.' Feldman v. United States, 322 U. S. 487, 489 (1944). This provision of the Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547; 562 (1892); Amdstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71, 72-73 (1920)."

Defendant declares that Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert did in fact violate:

United States Code, Title 18 Section 241, Conspiracy against Rights, specifically, “if two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; ... or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, ... they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. ", and

United States Code, Title 18 Section 242, Deprivation of Rights under Color of Law, “Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth,


Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both,· ... or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, ...shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death."

Defendant states that she has proven by and through the herein transcribed verbatim testimony of Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert that they did in fact act contradictory to their oaths to uphold and protect the Constitution of the state of Maine, in willful, blatant, and aggravated violation of Defendant's natural and common law rights as secured by the Constitution of the state of Maine and the laws, rules and statutes of this state and in violation of their LEO mandatory minimum standards for collection and maintenance of LEO notes, records and other evidence.

Defendant again reiterates her observation that this audio did not capture how both Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert did in fact use excessive police power against Defendant in multiple ways, namely, but not limited to, initiating an unconstitutional traffic stop without sufficient probable cause of a lawful crime, threat to destroy private property with a lethal weapon (tire iron, crow bar, etc), threat to commit bodily injury with a lethal weapon (special training and skills), unlawful pursuit, drawing, pointing and threatening to use a lethal weapon (firearm),terrorizing, criminal threatening, assault, wrongful arrest, kidnapping, wrongful imprisonment, actual serious bodily injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress, destruction of personal property, falsifying police records, willful destruction of known exculpatory evidence, malicious prosecution, breach of public trust, inter alia.

Defendant again expresses the obvious fact that this audio recording does not visually illustrate the significant difference in physical stature between Defendant and each officer, individually, as well as collectively. Defendant states that her current weight and height is five (5) feet, five (5) inches and one hundred fifteen (115) pounds. Defendant made the observation that Ofc. Steven Corbett stands approximately five (5) feet, nine (9) inches and weighs no less than one hundred eighty (180) pounds; and Cpt. Rick Stubbert stands approximately six (6)·feet and weighs no less than two hundred (200) pounds with a combined weight of about three hundred eighty (380) pounds which is more than enough physical force to successfully and easily subdue an unarmed petite female, without an actual threat and intent to use a firearm.

Defendant again states that she does not possess any knowledge of martial arts, self-defense, specialized skills, nor any firearms which would give her an advantage over and unknown to an attacker.


Defendant again swears that she was in fact in fear for her life during all interactions with Ofc. Steven Corbett, beginning at 2:10pm on South Alpine Street and Cpt. Rick Stubbert at OneSteel Recycling when he drew and pointed his lethal weapon at Defendant, in excessive use of their police power, without probable cause or clear and convincing evidence of a substantial threat of harm or injury by Defendant. Defendant's background does not substantiate the officers' need to use excessive force and they both knew it at time of arrest.

Defendant declares that Oakland Police Department's failure to deliver in-station video and audio booking surveillance recordings is unfair, prejudicial and in violation of due process.

Defendant affirms and swears upon her own knowledge, information, experiences and belief, and so far as upon her information and belief, she believes this information to be true and correct but it does not represent an exhaustive all-inclusive itemization of information. DATED in Augusta, Maine this 17th day of May 2013. In Peace,

GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX Y STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant Defendant's 2nd Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to Dismiss

for Discovery and Due Process Violations

NOW COMES Defendant GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and upon her own knowledge, information, experiences and belief, and so far as upon her information and belief, she believes this information to be true and correct, submits this 2nd Affidavit in Support of Defendant's 2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations.

All Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) knew, or should have known, the mandatory minimum standards for preservation of LEO notes and records adopted January 11, 2012, "Preservation of Recording and Notes: The LEO conducting the custodial interrogation or the case LEO is responsible for preserving the recording and investigative notes and records specifically related to the recording as part of the investigative file until such time as the defendant pleads guilty, is convicted, sentenced, direct appeal is exhausted, waived or procedurally defaulted,· ...All investigative notes kept or retained must be filed with the case. These notes are generally discoverable."

All Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) knew, or should have known, the subject matter of the Maine Constitution, Maine Revised Statutes Title 17-A and Title 29-A, all pertinent rules in Maine Rules of Evidence, all pertinent rules in Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, inter alia.

The District Attorney and its legal assistants can be presumed to be well educated about the Maine Constitution, Maine Revised Statutes, Maine Rules of Civil Procedure, Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Maine Rules of Evidence, inter alia, to a degree sufficient to guarantee their compliance and their knowledge of penalties for all violations thereof.

Exculpatory evidence comes in various forms. It may be witness testimony, real evidence or an object from the crime scene, or security video footage. Exculpatory evidence may be real or documentary, direct evidence or circumstantial evidence, testimony or a physical exhibit presented in court. If it tends to show the defendant might not be guilty of the crime, it is "exculpatory".


In Brady v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if the district attorney has access to exculpatory evidence, he is required to share that evidence with the defense. Failing to disclose the information to the defense may result in the case being thrown out in a motion to dismiss, as a mistrial, or being overturned on appeal. The Supreme Court based this ruling on the due process clauses of the Constitution, holding that part of a district attorney's responsibility to seek justice is to make sure that all evidence, not just evidence that supports the district attorney's case, is available at trial without the Defendant having to fight for it.

Exculpatory evidence must be handed over to the defendant even if the district attorney or police believe the evidence is not very solid. In the state of Maine, a rule is established under M.R.Crim.P. Rule 16(a)(3) which requires the district attorney to deliver all exculpatory evidence within 10 days from date of arraignment, which the district attorney has blatantly violated.

On February 17, 2012, the District Attorney, by and through the Augusta Police Department via email to Lt. Read from Defendant, was put on notice that all discoverable materials for Defendant's arrest made on February 16, 2012 was being demanded, specifically including "a true copy of the raw audio/video recording, as well as any other records I am lawfully permitted to receive". Lt. Read replied, "Any request for 'discoverable materials' will have to be through the District Attorney's office ... " indicating Lt. Read's official acknowledgment of Defendant's lawful demand to receive all exculpatory evidence and discoverable materials.

This email notification was sufficient to inform the District Attorney that Defendant would be demanding production of each and every discoverable piece of evidence in both of these cases without exception.

It is reasonable to conclude Defendant expected to receive any and all records which may be perceived as exculpatory which she is lawfully permitted to receive in both cases.

A proper discovery request was filed on April 10, 2012 by Defendant's first court-appointed counsel, Stephen Bourget, specifically requesting "all books, papers, documents, photographs, (including motion pictures or video tapes), tangible objects ...”

On or about August 27, 2012 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights demanding a dismissal with prejudice stating the Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute, has violated or has permitted the violation of due process of law, and has violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights.

Defendant was not given a prompt and appropriate hearing on her Motion to Dismiss.

On or about October 2, 2012 Defendant filed a Request for Discovery specifically requesting the following discoverable items from the District Attorney which included two (2) individual identical requests each referencing the involved police department.

Defendant believes she erred in her specific articulation of the police department in one of the requests intending to state the arrest of February 16, 2012


by the Augusta Police Department and its individual officers but mistakenly referring to April 5, 2012 by Oakland Police Department and its individual officers, as follows: 1. All dispatch audio between Officer Corbett, Captain Stubbert and Oakland Police

Dispatch on April 5, 2012. 2. All dispatch written transcripts between Officer Corbett, Captain Stubbert and

Oakland Police Dispatch on April 5, 2012. 3. All dashcam video recordings taken from Officer Corbett's cruiser on April 5,

2012. 4. All dashcam audio recordings taken from Officer Corbett's cruiser on April 5,

2012. 5. All dashcam video recordings taken from Captain Stubbert's SUV on April 5,

2012. 6. All dashcam audio recordings taken from Captain Stubbert's SUV on April 5,

2012. 7. All audio recordings from Officer Corbett's handheld mp3 recorder. 8. All audio recordings from Captain Stubbert's handheld mp3 recorder. 9. All booking video from Oakland Police Department on April 5, 2012. 10. All booking audio from Oakland Police Department on April 5, 2012. 11. All booking and surveillance video from Kennebec County jail from April 5, 2012

at/around 3pm through April 6, 2012, 12:00pm. 12. All booking and surveillance audio from Kennebec County jail from April 5, 2012

at/around 3pm through April 6, 2012, 12:00pm. 13. All internal email messages, written literature, documentation and official

training materials from Oakland Police Department regarding "sovereign citizens" (a misnomer).

It is reasonable to conclude the Defendant expected to receive identical

records from the Augusta Police Department as those specified above which may be perceived as exculpatory.

Defendant has received the following discovery items from the District Attorney: 1. Augusta Police Department, Arrest Report 12002-460-0F,

2. Augusta Police Department booking video, February 16, 2012 3. Augusta Police Department booking audio, February 16, 2012 4. Oakland Police Department, Arrest Report 120AK-86-AR. Defendant still has not received the following discovery items for

both arrests: 1. dispatch audio regarding Defendant's arrests in both cases, 2. written transcripts of dispatch audio in both cases, 3. all internal email messages and written communications about "sovereign citizens" from both police departments, 4. all official training materials regarding "sovereign citizens",


5. all in-car video recordings from both police departments, 6. all in-car audio recordings from both police departments, 7. all electronic audio recordings from handheld mp3 recorders for each officer from both police departments, 8. Kennebec County jail surveillance video of Defendant in her holding cell from April 5 3:00pm through April 6, 2012, 12:00pm, totaling 21 hours, 9. Kennebec County jail surveillance audio of Defendant in her holding cell from April 5, 3:00pm through April 6, 2012, 12:00pm, totaling 21 hours, Defendant states that her review of the aforementioned evidence will

probably provoke a request for supplemental discovery. Defendant states that the District Attorney has knowingly refused to comply

with this state's laws, rules and statutes in that they have not delivered all exculpatory evidence to Defendant pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. Rule 16(a)(3), "Charge of a Class D or Class E Crime in District Court. Discovery shall be provided to a defendant charged with a Class D or Class E crime inDistrict Court within 10 days of arraignment."

Defendant states that the District Attorney has knowingly and maliciously proceeded with this action in blatant violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, due process of laws, and with full knowledge that there is not sufficient evidence to prosecute Defendant.

Defendant states Augusta Police Department Sgt. Christopher Shaw personally incorporates and officially condones the use of excessive force, officers' violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, falsifying police reports, destruction of evidence, inter alia.

Defendant states that Augusta Police Department Ofc. Christopher Guay improperly and prejudicially named Defendant as a "suspect” on or about October 1, 2011 in police report 11002-2846-0F when there was no evidence that Defendant was accused of or had committed any crime or offense in that matter which was initiated by Defendant against her neighbor.

Defendant states Ofc. Christopher Guay in fact falsified police report 11002-2846-0F which was wholly rebutted, point for point, with a sworn affidavit signed and sealed by Defendant on November 18, 2011 and filed with Augusta Police Department as part of police report 11002-2846-0F.

Defendant states Ofc. Christopher Guay did not issue a counter-rebuttal defending his original report 11002-2846-0F which thereby indicated that Ofc. Christopher Guay does in fact affirm his original report 11002-2846-0F as being factual and accurate.

Defendant states that she had numerous civil interactions with several different officers of the Augusta Police Department between October 1, 2011 and January 18, 2012 regarding Defendant's downstairs neighbor and violent convict, Jack Hagop Alahverdian, which in fact absolutely prejudiced the Augusta Police Department against Defendant.

Defendant states that the Augusta Police Department maintained and followed a prejudicial policy that allowed regular and abusive disturbances of the


peace by convict Jack Hagop Alahverdian in the residential 2-family building shared with Defendant through the

Augusta Police Department's refusal to summons Jack Hagop Alahverdian for disorderly conduct, terrorizing, criminal threatening, and a general disturbance of the peace.

Defendant states that the Augusta Police Department failed to take any successful corrective action in response to Defendant's countless requests for help via 911 Emergency regarding violent and abusive disturbances of the peace by convict Jack Hagop Alahverdian.

Defendant states that Augusta Police Department, through the actions of Ofc. Peter Cloutier and Ofc. Douin, violated Defendant's constitutionally secured rights on January 18, 2012 when the two officers knocked on Defendant's residential door under the false pretense of "asking" her to stop video recording and taking pictures of her downstairs neighbor and violent convict Jack Hagop Alahverdian which the officers knew or should have known was in violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured right to record any and all public activity without exception or interference.

Defendant states that Ofc. Peter Cloutier and Ofc. Douin maliciously initiated contact with Defendant under false pretenses, without probable cause, in excess of their statutory authority, in violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, and in violation of this state's laws, rules and statutes.

Defendant states that she captured Augusta Police Ofc. Peter Cloutier on audio mp3 recording on January 18, 2012 attempting to maliciously and forcefully gain unlawful access to Defendant's private living space under false pretenses, color of law in his official capacity.

Defendant states that she ordered Ofc. Peter Cloutier several times to remove himself from the inside of her private domicile since he had no probable cause to enter or search.

Defendant states that Ofc. Peter Cloutier threatened Defendant with kidnapping, wrongful imprisonment, bodily harm and loss of liberty if she did not allow him to unlawfully enter and search her private living space.

Defendant states that Ofc. Peter Cloutier did in fact put his hands on her in an attempt to gain unlawful access to her domicile and did in fact knowingly, willfully and maliciously cross the threshold of her entry door and entered the interior of her entry way at the bottom of the stairway that leads to the living space in his attempt to ascend the stairway to her home.

Defendant states she successfully prevented Ofc. Peter Cloutier from entering her domicile by physically blocking the ascending stairway into her living space with her body and by telling Ofc. Peter Cloutier that his actions were being recorded at that moment and that he was in fact violating Defendant's constitutionally protected rights against unlawful search and seizure as articulated by the 4th and 14th Amendments to the Bill of Rights.

Defendant states that she informed Ofc. Peter Cloutier that he should contact Chief Robert Gregoire because Defendant had been in extensive communication


with the Chief about the numerous violations by the Augusta Police Department officers of Defendant's rights which had been consistently occurring and was once again occurring with Ofc. Peter Cloutier.

Defendant states that she directed Ofc. Peter Cloutier to leave her home several times by saying, "You do not have my permission to enter. You need to leave, NOW."

Defendant states that Ofc. Peter Cloutier falsely. threatened that he was going to obtain a search warrant as he left Defendant's property but which he failed to do.

Defendant states that she suspected Ofc. Peter Cloutier was staking out her property hoping to witness Defendant in a public place at which time Defendant would not have the same protections that her private domicile provides; therefore, as a direct result of Ofc. Peter Cloutier's actions, Defendant felt like a virtual prisoner in her home without due process or probable cause which was intentionally, prejudicially and fraudulently imposed upon Defendant and condoned through non-action by Sgt. Christopher Shaw.

Defendant states that although she was significantly emotionally and physically distressed, she immediately created an email message attaching the audio recording of Ofc. Peter Cloutier which was sent to Chief Robert Gregoire of Augusta Police, several law enforcement individuals in the sheriff's office, select local and state representatives, Timothy Cason, and two news reporters at two local newspapers.

Defendant states that she did in fact create a video from the audio recording and uploaded the file to YouTube for public viewing o~ January 19, 2012 with the title, “Peter Cloutier, Augusta Maine Police, violated My 4th Amend. Rights" which has received 1,384 views.

Defendant and Timothy Cason met with Sgt. Christopher Shaw on January 25, 2012, which was wholly recorded and now published publicly on YouTube and other video sharing websites, discussing specific details of Ofc. Peter Cloutier's unlawful behaviors and essentially authenticating the audio file sent to Augusta Police Department; and discussing how Defendant wanted to proceed against Ofc. Peter Cloutier for his unprofessional conduct.

Defendant states that she did in fact reserve her right to file a civil lawsuit for economic and non-economic damages pending disciplinary sanctions issued by Sgt. Christopher Shaw.

Defendant states she demanded an immediate internal investigation which was commenced and completed by Sgt. Christopher Shaw and Major Jared Mills on or about February 21, 2012 stating, “On January 18th 2012, Officers Cloutier and Drouin met with you in response to a complaint they received from your neighbor. During the course of their investigation Officer Cloutier began to question you in reference to the odor of marijuana he believed he smelled coming from your apartment. You filed a complaint with the Chief of Police in regards Officer Cloutier's behavior during this incident. Sergeant Shaw investigated the incident and determined that Officer Cloutier did in fact act inappropriate in regards to his


demeanor, and the way in which he questioned you. Due to the fact that Officer Cloutier's behavior was unprofessional, sanctions have been taken against him and his behavior has been corrected. I want to apologize on behalf of Officer Cloutier and the Augusta Police Department for this unfortunate situation you had to endure. Thank you for bringing this incident to our attention, and please contact me if you have any issues with the Augusta Police Department in the future. If you have any questions or if you would like to discuss this situation in person or by telephone please let me know and I will make myself available upon your request. Major Jared Mills"

Defendant states Sgt. Christopher Shaw did in fact, as evidenced above, find Ofc. Peter Cloutier guilty of unprofessional conduct and violating Defendant's constitutionally secured rights against unlawful search and seizure on January 18, 2012.

Defendant states that she has never been informed of the disciplinary sanctions issued against Ofc. Peter Cloutier referenced in the aforementioned message from Major Jared Mills.

Defendant alleges that Sgt. Christopher Shaw did not sanction nor discipline Ofc. Peter Cloutier for the unlawful intrusion and criminal trespassing upon Defendant's private domicile under false pretenses, citing fraudulent probable cause, and in fact using excessive physical force against Defendant in order to enter Defendant's domicile.

Defendant states that Major Jared Mills and Sgt. Christopher Shaw do in fact condone through their non-action, support and encourage the use of excessive physical force, improper application of laws, rules and statutes, regular destruction of evidence, falsifying police reports, and general violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, inter alia.

Defendant alleges Sgt. Christopher Shaw of the Augusta Police Department did in fact intentionally and knowingly destroy exculpatory evidence on February 16, 2012 of his and his officers' improper, excessively forceful and unlawful actions which were evidenced and preserved on Defendant's personal handheld mp3 recorder which was in Sgt. Christopher Shaw's personal possession while Defendant was in police custody.

Defendant discovered upon her immediate release from police custody on February 16, 2012 while standing outside the Augusta Police Department, in the company of and witnessed by Clark Leach and Timothy Cason, that the audio recording taken of the entire interaction between the Augusta Police Department and Defendant was in fact manually deleted.

Defendant, Clark Leach and Timothy Cason immediately went directly to Defendant's residence where Defendant checked again and confirmed that the recording was in fact deleted by or under the direction of Sgt. Christopher Shaw.

Defendant showed Clark Leach and Timothy Cason that the file was in fact deleted and then proceeded to use file recovery software which allowed her to successfully recover parts of the deleted mp3 audio file. Defendant successfully and sequentially joined the parts together into one file of which the contents and


timeline can be authenticated by Timothy Cason as accurate and genuine because he was a direct witness to all of the events on the recording.

Defendant states Timothy Cason is able to authenticate the audio because he was listening to the entire interaction between Defendant and Ofc. Christopher Guay and Sgt. Christopher Shaw via cell phone speakerphone which continued until Sgt. Christopher Shaw ended the call himself, which is also captured on the audio recording recovered by Defendant.

Defendant states that she tested her audio recording device's functionality and confirmed its fail-safe settings were then, and still are, in fact, working properly in that the recorder automatically saves all recordings in process even if the active recording is not manually saved by the operator prior to the device being powered off.

Defendant states the use of file recovery software is not necessary to gain access to a file which was preserved by fail-safe options built into the device's default functionality.

Defendant states that she has continued to use this same audio recording device to the present day with virtually no incidents of device failure or inexplicable deletions of audio recording files.

Defendant states the only way a file would virtually disappear from the file directory would be through and by an operator's manual and willful deletion of the file.

Defendant affirms that the partially recovered mp3 audio file will in fact prove that Sgt. Christopher Shaw had motive and opportunity to destroy exculpatory evidence which he knew did not belong to him and with the willful intention to hide his and his officers' improper, excessively forceful and unlawful behaviors.

Sgt. Christopher Shaw can be heard saying, "phone and recorder she does not get, either one. do not give those to her ... don’t let her have that so we can see if we can actually get a recording off of that. i don’t know if we can ... legally ... "

Defendant affirms that Sgt. Christopher Shaw's attempt to delete exculpatory evidence did in fact damage part of the audio recording which would have shown that Sgt. Shaw and his officers did in fact act outside of their statutory authority, without jurisdiction to arrest or detain, with excessive force, in violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, without probable cause that a lawful crime had been, was about to be, or was being committed, and in violation of this state's laws, rules and statutes.

Defendant states the Augusta Police Department used excessive force with underlying prejudicial and malicious motives in that Ofc. Christopher Guay and Sgt. Christopher Shaw had previous adversarial interactions with Defendant for unrelated civil incidents which prejudiced the Augusta Police Department against Defendant causing the Augusta Police Department to maliciously target Defendant as a "sovereign citizen" and a person of high risk for firearm possession and violent actions.


Defendant affirms that she did in fact intentionally, knowingly and willfully activate the recording device upon the initial traffic stop by Ofc. Steven Corbett on South Alpine Street in Oakland on April 5, 2012, 2:10pm.

Defendant states the Oakland Police Department did in fact use excessive force with prejudicial and malicious motives on April 5, 2012 in that Ofc. Steven Corbett threatened to break Defendant's car window in order to forcefully extract Defendant from the automobile because Ofc. Corbett suspected Defendant to be a "sovereign citizen" and a person of high risk for firearm possession and violent actions without any specific evidence that Defendant posed any risk of harm or bodily injury to Ofc. Steven Corbett.

Defendant states that her physical build is currently 5 feet, 5 inches in height, one hundred fifteen (115) pounds in weight, and who opposes firearms and all violence. Defendant obviously posed no risk of injury, bodily harm or threat to Ofc. Steven Corbett.

Defendant affirms that her decision to leave the original location of the Oakland traffic stop on South Alpine Street was provoked by her fear of grave bodily injury and possibly fatal harm which Ofc. Steven Corbett had maliciously threatened and the fact that they were in a deserted residential neighborhood with no witnesses and that Defendant was scared for her life and feared that Ofc. Steven Corbett would fatally assault her if he was successful in breaking her car window and forcefully extracting her without any public oversight or supervision.

Defendant states that her decision to leave the scene of the original traffic stop on South Alpine Street was in her desperate effort to find a safe public place where she could voluntarily surrender, under threat, duress, and coercion, to Ofc. Steven Corbett without the risk of being fatally injured or assaulted and without unbiased witnesses.

Defendant decided to travel back in the direction of the Oakland Police Department, and in fact passed by the police station on her way to the final arrest location, in an effort to display her fear-provoked need to find a publicly safe place to show that she had no intention of fleeing or escaping arrest. In fact, Defendant intentionally travelled down a dead end road past the police department into a private commercial parking lot which she knew used surveillance video cameras with the expectation that the incident would be recorded by their surveillance system.

Defendant states that she traveled and parked safely and emerged from the car holding the black Samsung audio recording device in her left hand which was actively recording audio at the time of Defendant's arrest and which was in the air above her head along with her right hand in an act of submission.

Defendant states that Cpt. Rick Stubbert unnecessarily and without probable cause drew his firearm and pointed it at Defendant with intention to intimidate her with grave bodily injury while screaming, "Get on the ground!! Get on the ground NOW !'


Defendant states that she heard Cpt. Rick Stubbert ask Ofc. Corbett, "what the hell is going on here??" which Ofc. Corbett replied, "Oh it's a constitutional rights issue and I just violated all of hers...”

Defendant states Cpt. Rick Stubbert personally incorporates and condones the use of excessive force, unnecessary and improper use of a firearm, officers' violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, falsifying police reports, destruction of evidence, inter alia.

Defendant states that she observed Ofc. Steven Corbett and Cpt. Rick Stubbert attempting to turn off the audio recording device but appeared to have difficulty understanding how to release the "hold" which protected any interruption of the current active recording.

Defendant alleges Ofc. Steven Corbett and/ or Cpt. Rick Stubbert of the Oakland Police Department, acting together and/ or individually, did in fact intentionally and knowingly destroy exculpatory evidence of their improper, excessively forceful and unlawful actions which were evidenced and preserved on Defendant's personal handheld audio recorder which was in Ofc. Steven Corbett's and/ or Cpt. Rick Stubbert's personal possession while Defendant was in police custody on April 5, 2012.

Defendant communicated with Ofc. Steven Corbett during the entire booking process at Oakland Police Department clearly, explicitly and adequately informing him of the unlawful arrest and detention he had just committed against her giving him an opportunity to correct his mistakes.

Defendant specifically asked Ofc. Steven Corbett if the firearm that Cpt. Rick Stubbert pulled and pointed at her was a bullet gun or a stun gun. Ofc. Steven Corbett replied that it was a bullet gun.

Defendant explicitly, clearly and adequately informed Ofc. Steven Corbett that his unlawful and malicious actions were captured on her audio recording device and that Defendant was going to upload it to YouTube upon her release from custody.

Defendant states that she was told by Ofc. Steven Corbett that their conversation was also being captured by his handheld audio recording device at which time he patted his shirt pocket indicating that was where the device was located.

Defendant discovered upon her immediate release from police custody on April 6, 2012 that the audio recording of the entire interaction between the Oakland Police Department and Defendant on her Samsung audio recording device had in fact been manually deleted.

Defendant used file recovery software which did not successfully recover any evidence of Ofc. Steven Corbett's and/ or Cpt. Rick Stubbert's unlawful behaviors because Ofc. Steven Corbett and/or Cpt. Rick Stubbert did in fact successfully delete and completely destroy the audio recording which would have shown that Ofc. Corbett and Cpt. Stubbert did in fact act outside of their statutory authority, without jurisdiction to arrest or detain, with excessive force, in violation of Defendant's constitutionally secured rights, without probable cause that a lawful


crime had been, was about to be, or was being committed, and in violation of this state's laws, rules and statutes.

Defendant affirms that Kennebec County Jail intake inventory list of Defendant's possessions dated April 5, 2012 does in fact show that Defendant possessed a black Samsung audio recording device.

Defendant again alleges that Ofc. Steven Corbett and/or Cpt. Rick Stubbert of the Oakland Police Department, acting together and/or individually, did in fact intentionally and knowingly destroy exculpatory evidence of their improper, excessively forceful and unlawful actions which were evidenced and preserved on Defendant's personal handheld mp3 recorder which was in Ofc. Steven Corbett's and/or Cpt. Rick Stubbert's personal possession while Defendant was in police custody on April· 5, 2012.

Defendant states that Ofc. Steven Corbett did in fact issue a fraudulent Uniform Summons and Complaint for OAS, supported by Ofc. Steven Corbett's own statement made within Oakland Police Department Arrest Report 120AK-86-AR, Page 2, middle of the bottom paragraph, "Ms. Turcotte was initially issued a USAC for OAS, but after she was taken to Kennebec County jail, I realized that her OAS was for failure to pay fines and fees, which she should have been given a VSAC for."

Defendant states that Ofc. Steven Corbett indicates in the police report 120AK-86-AR, Page 2, end of the bottom paragraph, "Ms. Turcotte signed each summons, 'TDC'. When I asked what 'TDC' stood for, Ms. Turcotte stated, 'threat duress, coercion'."'

Defendant states that Ofc. Steven Corbett indicates in police report 120AK-86-AR, Page 2, middle of the bottom paragraph, "Throughout the booking process, Ms. Turcotte continued to accuse me of violating all her civil rights and maintaining that I had conducted an illegal stop and thus an unlawful arrest. The entire booking process was recorded, see enclosed CD.”

Defendant states that Oakland Police Department's continued, willful and intentional failure to produce the raw audio and video recordings of the booking process is a gross and substantial violation of Defendant's right to receive prompt unedited exculpatory discovery. Defendant affirms that she has never received any CD of the booking process on April 5, 2012 from District Attorney, Oakland Police Department or from her stand-by counsel. Defendant alleges that the failure of both the Augusta Police Department and the Oakland Police Department to properly deliver raw, unedited video and audio of the initial traffic stop, the subsequent pursuit, and arrest and detention of Defendant can be reasonably inferred to indicate the evidence either was not properly collected and maintained or was in fact manually, purposefully and willfully destroyed.

Defendant alleges that all law enforcement officers involved in these cases did in fact violate their internal mandatory minimum standards for collection and preservation of evidence with the knowledge that their actions would have substantial negative implications on Defendant's ability to properly defend her actions in these matters.


Defendant states that two distinct Requests for Discovery were sent on or about October 2, 2012 to the District Attorney regarding individual cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667 (which has been joined with AUGSC-CR-2012-286) itemizing an extensive list of evidence Defendant is requesting from both the Augusta and Oakland police departments.

Defendant states that she requested a hearing on her Motion to Dismiss plus other motions in a letter to the court dated October 5, 2012 notifying the court, in part, that, "Proceeding with any jury selection at this juncture would be a gross violation of constitutional due process, a gregarious waste of court time and resources, and would also provide Defendant with several valid grounds for appeal to a higher court."

Defendant states that the court did not schedule a proper hearing as requested.

Defendant states she received two (2) discovery packages from the District Attorney in late November 2012, one for each arrest, both consisting of the respective arrest records and supplemental background data. Defendant also received multiple copies of the booking video and audio from Augusta Police Department dated February 16, 2012.

Defendant has never received any audio or video from Oakland Police Department nor any other supplemental evidence as requested.

Defendant was given a brief opportunity on February 11, 2013 to argue her Motion to Dismiss at which time the court rejected her claims and sustained AUGSC-CR-2012-286 for trial.

Defendant filed another Request for Discovery, individually in each case, with the District Attorney in a letter dated March 4, 2013 specifically itemizing an extensive, but not all-inclusive, list of requested exculpatory evidence from both police departments and county jail.

Defendant states that Oakland Police Department has knowingly and willfully failed to produce the audio and video footage of the April 5, 2012 booking process, which Ofc. Steven Corbett reported did in fact exist, for the purpose of concealing their unlawful behavior.

Defendant states the District Attorney has failed to produce all the requested evidence after repeated specific written requests without a reasonable and lawful explanation.

Defendant states the District Attorney has not provided any acceptable reasons for the unlawful exclusion of exculpatory evidence except to indicate the evidence does not exist.

Defendant states the police officers' failure to properly collect, maintain, preserve and deliver all requested, and unrequested, exculpatory evidence is a blatant violation of their mandatory minimum standards for collection and preservation of evidence, records and notes, as well as a blatant and gross violation of this state's laws, rules and statutes regarding production of, or providing a reasonable explanation for missing, exculpatory evidence.


Defendant states the behavior of each individual police officer acting in concert with their commanding officer and the District Attorney did in fact knowingly conspire to conceal and destroy exculpatory evidence which may have proved Defendant's innocence and prove her claims of the police officers' unprofessional, malicious and unlawful behavior.

Defendant restates the opinion in Kronisch v. United States (1998), United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, "It is a well-established and long-standing principle of law that a party's intentional destruction of evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction ... In order for an adverse inference to arise from the destruction of evidence, the party having control over the evidence must have had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was· destroyed. This obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation most commonly when suit has already been filed, providing the party responsible for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation."

Defendant states the undisputed fact that all police officers in both arrests were adequately informed or aware, or should have been adequately informed or aware, that all relevant evidence, recordings, notes and information pertinent to Defendant's arrests should have been collected, saved, catalogued, and delivered immediately upon request.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that neither police department have rebutted the existence of in-car camera (i.e. 'dashcam') and audio systems in their police vehicles.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that none of the officers have rebutted the existence of handheld audio recording devices held on their person and manually activated.

Defendant states the logical fact that if in-car camera and audio systems did not exist in the respective police patrol vehicles, or if the officers do not carry pocket-size audio recording devices, those facts would have been explicitly stated in response to Defendant's request for discovery of those items of evidence.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that all dispatch audio is recorded and preserved for evidentiary purposes but neither the District Attorney, nor the police departments, have produced any of the dispatch audio recordings nor the written transcripts as requested in both of Defendant's requests for discovery.

Defendant states that her requests for discovery also includes a request for all internal email messages, written literature, documentation and official training materials from both police departments regarding "sovereign citizens" (a misnomer).

Defendant states she received a response from the District Attorney, through Augusta Police Department, that the mandatory "sovereign citizens" on-line training materials could be requested from their contract partner, Justice Planning and Management Associates, which included their address and website information.


Defendant states that it was improper for the District Attorney to only provide the name of the agency who produces the materials and failing to provide the actual training materials, because Defendant will now have to issue a subpoena to the contracted agency in order to gain access to these exculpatory records which is a gross and blatant violation of the District Attorney's obligation under M.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(3) to provide ALL EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE which may, or may not, be requested and retained on site within 10 days of arraignment.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that Ofc. Christopher Guay has failed to produce the email message regarding "sovereign citizens" which Ofc. Christopher Guay mentioned in his arrest report 12002-460-0F, specifically, "I had recently read an email containing a picture of a similar license plate that read 'USDOT' on top and 'Private Peaceful' on the bottom."

Defendant restates an official statement made by Ofc. Christopher Guay as recorded in arrest report 12002-460-0F, Page 2, middle of first paragraph, to wit, "I then informed Turcotte that if she did not exit the vehicle she would also be charged with refusing to submit to arrest."

Defendant states the undisputed fact that Ofc. Christopher Guay did in fact arrest and charge Defendant with a crime which Ofc. Christopher Guay knew, or should have known, was improper and unsubstantiated, specifically the crime of "Refusing to submit to arrest when Ofc. Christopher Guay knew, or should have known, that Defendant had not committed any offense to justify a charge under that section, to wit:

1. A person is guilty of refusing to submit to arrest or detention ~t with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting the arrest or detention of that person, the person·

A Refuses to stop on request or signal of a law enforcement officer. B. Uses physical force against the law enforcement officer. or C. Creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the law enforcement officer.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that no evidence exists within the arrest report 12002-460-0F or any other records to indicate Defendant had "refused to stop on request', "used physical force against the law enforcement officer', or that Defendant had "created as substantial risk of bodily injury to anyone involved in the arrest and detention.

Defendant states the undisputed fact that the charge of "refusing to submit to arrest or detention" within arrest report 12002-460-0F and criminal complaint AUGSC-CR-2012-286 is more prima facie evidence of prejudicial and malicious behavior by Ofc. Christopher Guay and Sgt. Christopher Shaw in their attempt to maliciously prosecute Defendant for actions that are not lawful crimes.

Defendant states the logical fact that both police departments would have preserved the in-car camera "dashcam" video and audio recordings if the Defendant had committed any aggressive or violent action against the officers knowing full well raw video and audio evidence is virtually irrefutable.


Defendant states the logical fact that if the video and audio evidence was beneficial to the District Attorney's case, it is reasonable to conclude that both police departments would take special care to preserve and deliver that evidence in a timely fashion to support their case.

Defendant states the obvious fact that the District Attorney and the police departments are attempting to apply only those laws, rules and statutes which benefit their actions but are requiring Defendant to comply with every written law, rule and statute and even those laws, rules and statutes that do not exist (i.e. operating after administrative medical suspension).

Defendant affirms and swears upon her. own knowledge, information, experiences and belief, and so far as upon her information and belief, she believes this information to be true and correct but it does not represent an exhaustive all-inclusive itemization of information.

DATED in Augusta, Maine this 2nd day of May 2013. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX Z STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286/AUGSC-CR-2012-00667 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v. GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

Defendant's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations

NOW COMES Defendant GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and upon her own

knowledge, information, experiences and belief, and so far as upon her information and belief, she believes this information to be true and correct, submits this affidavit in support of her Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations.

Defendant unwillingly became transient in September 2007 after surviving a dangerous and destructive micro-burst tornado in Windsor, Maine which severely damaged her rented residence and consequently caused her residency to become stopgap and unstable for the next few years. Defendant has since lived in no less than two dozen different residences with some of those residencies lasting for less than two weeks. Defendant's residency has recently stabilized.

Consequently, Defendant was unable to keep a current mailing address consistently on file with Plaintiff which prevented Plaintiffs notices from being properly and immediately delivered directly to Defendant. As a result of Defendant's inability to receive timely correspondences from Plaintiff, Defendant unknowingly and innocently failed to fulfill a request for a medical evaluation in late 2009 because those requests were returned to Plaintiff marked as "UNDELIVERABLE" by the United States Postal Service. The record shows that the Plaintiff did not post subsequent public notices in their attempt to follow du e process nor did they give required notices to the public at large of a potential "health or safety hazard" allegedly caused by Defendant's continued operation. In fact, no notices, private or public, were properly served to support a legal suspension of any kind.

Despite Plaintiff's own knowledge and records showing that Defendant had not received on or been served with the required notices, Plaintiff knowingly ignored procedural due process by not posting public notices and did in fact suspend driver’s license #1491178 on January 5, 2010 pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) and 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) without holding a preliminary hearing, without having clear and sufficient evidence of incompetency, without receiving any reports of


adverse operation, without having clear and sufficient evidence of a health or safety hazard, and without the advice of the Medical Advisory Board or any other competent medical professional. Additionally, Plaintiff maintained the administrative medical suspension for 397 days beyond the statutory limitations as imposed by 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) Action without Hearing which states:

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 10003 and 10051, an agency may

revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when:

3. Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days.

Plaintiff initially suspended license# 1491178 under the statutory authority

of 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) citing incompetence; therefore, it is reasonable that Plaintiff was also invoking 5 M.R.S. § 10004(3) Action without Hearing because of the alleged potential danger allegedly caused by Defendant's continued operation; but which also places clear restrictions on Plaintiff's statutory authority and their irrevocable duties to Defendant.

On February 10, 2011, Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos initiated a traffic stop without jurisdiction or any evidence that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, and which resulted in Defendant being released from the scene after being issued a Violation Summons and Complaint for failure to obey a traffic control device. Officer DosSantos did not indicate in any way nor inform Defendant that license #1491178 was suspended or revoked.

On March 7, 2011, which was four hundred twenty seven (427) days after the administrative medical suspension began, Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos, without jurisdiction or any evidence that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed, affected a traffic stop and twice asked Defendant if her license was suspended which Defendant twice denied; this communication served as Defendant's first actual notice of the administrative medical suspension only. Officer DosSantos asked Defendant if she knew any reason the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle would have to suspend the license which Defendant declined any knowledge and insisted the license should be active.

Officer DosSantos advised Defendant that she was being served with two (2) Uniform Summons And Complaints under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) (for February 10, 2011 and March 7, 2011) with a court appearance for April 13, 2011.

Officer DosSantos and Defendant discussed the medical suspension at length at which time Officer DosSantos indicated there was a possibility the District Attorney's office would dismiss both complaints upon Defendant immediately


providing proof that the medical suspension was properly terminated. Defendant called a friend for a ride from traffic stop to her residence at which time she immediately contacted the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle but because of the lateness of the day, Defendant was unable to contact her physician's office until the next day.

On March 8, 2011, Defendant fulfilled Plaintiffs request for a medical evaluation by submitting a declaration signed by Defendant's physician that Defendant, in fact, was not under the influence of any medications nor did her mild medical conditions cause any known difficulty to her safely operating any type of automobile.

At no time on March 7th or 8th, 2011, or at any time thereafter, during Defendant's conversations with the employees in the Medical Unit at Bureau of Motor Vehicle, did Defendant receive any type of notice that she was entitled to an administrative hearing or that the license had been suspended for incompetency without any adverse report or the advice of the Medical Advisory Board.

Effectively, all medical restrictions against license # 1491178 were terminated on March 8, 2011.

Plaintiff did not require Defendant to remit any reinstatement fee nor surrender to any other civil sanctions, administrative remedies or criminal penalties.

Plaintiff “deleted” the administrative medical suspension from record #1491178 on March 8, 2011.

Plaintiff properly issued a "violation free credit" on March 8, 2011 for the calendar year 2010.

Defendant personally contacted the District Attorney's office immediately upon Plaintiff administratively reinstating license # 1491178 asking that the USAC's be dismissed with prejudice, which the District Attorney explicitly rejected.

Defendant had no reason to know the Assistant District Attorney Steve Parker would knowingly and passionately prosecute Defendant for actions not defined as any type of crime under the Maine Constitution or laws of this state, and that Defendant would be continually intimidated, coerced and threatened with excessive and punitive fines, wrongful imprisonment and a continued violation of her liberties if she did not plead guilty to at least one of the USAC's issued on March 7, 2011.

Defendant has expressly reserved and continues to expressly reserve all of her natural and common law rights as protected and guaranteed by the federal and Maine Constitutions, on and for the record, nunc pro tunc.

On July 5, 2011, Defendant submitted a certified copy of driving record #1491178 to the court which was printed and certified by Plaintiff on July 5, 2011 clearly showing that no suspension existed on February 10, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-513) nor on March 7, 2011 (AUGDC-CR-2011-512), but the District Attorney’s office willfully and knowingly refused to accept Plaintiff’s true and certified records issued by Plaintiff on that day as evidence of Defendant’s innocence.


Defendant repeatedly expressed to the court that she had not received notice nor did she have actual knowledge of any suspension until March 7, 2011 and that all charges must be dismissed for Plaintiff's failure to comply with notice requirements under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(l-A)(A) which specifies:

1-A. Offense; penalty. A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person:

A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person:

(1) Has received written notice of a suspension or revocation from the Secretary of State or a court; (2) Has been orally informed of the suspension or revocation by a law enforcement officer or a court; (3) Has actual knowledge of the suspension or revocation; (4) Has been sent written notice in accordance with section 2482 or former Title 29, section 2241, subsection 4; or

Driving record# 1491178 clearly shows evidence of two failed notices, lack of evidence to support a suspension for incompetence nor any other kind of violation, and, in fact, the administrative medical suspension was not an offense of any kind as evidenced by no reinstatement fee and the violation free credit issued on March 8, 2011.

Plaintiff's records clearly prove that proper notices were not served pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2482(3) which clarifies "The notice is deemed received 3 days after mailing, unless returned by postal authorities."

Because both notices were returned to Plaintiff by the United States Postal Service, Plaintiff cannot claim that proper notices were either sent or received by Defendant because those notices were returned to Plaintiff by postal authorities effectively nullifying any notices Plaintiff attempted to serve.

DELETE DATE

ENTRY DATE

ACTION DATE

DESCRIPTION

010109

123108

VIOLATION FREE CREDITS

111009

111009

USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009

122909

122909

USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809

010110

123109


030811

110109

010510

DELETED DRV SUSP INDEFINITE (BMV)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MED. EVAL REQ

FL FILE MED EVAL

..

RESTORED: 03/08/11

030811

123110



Despite both the District Court and the Assistant District Attorney having

clear evidence that continued prosecution of Defendant was suspect, the court knowingly accepted a coerced plea agreement from Defendant for one violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A (1-A)(A) for the offense dated February 10, 2011 docketed under AUG-CR-2011-513. Defendant expressly reserved all her natural and common law rights, on and for the record, and expressly indicated that her acceptance of the plea agreement was being made under threat, duress and coercion. Nonetheless, the court entered a guilty verdict and assessed a $250 fine and a 60-day license suspension.

On December 19, 2011, Defendant was attending to unrelated civil personal business at district court at which time she was ordered by Judge Beth Dobson to answer a bench warrant for failure to pay the fine assessed on July 5, 2011. Defendant indicated that her refusal to pay the fine was a peaceful civil protest for the illegal and improper prosecution of a non-crime which was pursued in express violation of the statutes of this state. Judge Dobson ordered Defendant to pay the fine or immediately be arrested and taken to jail. Defendant once again expressly reserved all her natural and common law rights and indicated her payment of the fine was made under threat of being kidnapped, duress, intimidation and coercion by the court. Judge Dobson indicated that she took exception to Defendant's use of the word "kidnapped"; Defendant responded that she took exception to being threatened with being kidnapped for peacefully and civilly protesting something that was not a crime.

Defendant has been attempting to exhaust her lawful and procedural remedies for the unlawful prosecution of AUG-CR-2011-513 through Defendant filing a Petition for Post-Conviction Review on July 6, 2012 which was summarily dismissed by Justice William Anderson on September 13, 2012 and filed with this court on September 1, 2012, followed up by Defendant's Motion to Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Review dated and filed on October 5, 2012 which was denied by Justice William Anderson on October 31, 2012 and filed Defendant claims that Justice Anderson's denial for post-conviction review was made with this court on November 5, 2012 without having all the necessary facts and evidence describing the improper basis and lack of required notices for the administrative medical suspension because that administrative action was not reviewable under Justice Anderson's jurisdiction at the time the petition for post-conviction review was filed.

At the time of her petition for post-conviction review Defendant was still unaware of her right to request an administrative hearing to challenge the integrity of the administrative medical suspension, nor did Defendant know the specific statutory authority and subject matter of the administrative medical suspension until March 2013 which was discovered during her review of evidence for pending cases docketed as AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667.

On March 18, 2013, Defendant sent her first request for an administrative hearing to Plaintiff which was rejected by Assistant Director Susan Cole on March


20, 2013 citing no statutory authority for her rejection and only that Defendant's "current suspensions" do not allow for an administrative hearing with the agency.

On March 28, 2013, Defendant sent her second demand for an administrative hearing clarifying the administrative medical suspension was commenced improperly, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, without required notices and in violation of due process which was addressed and sent directly to Robert O'Connell, Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings.

On April 2, 2013, Mr. O'Connell rejected Defendant's demand for an administrative hearing specifying, "Your request for an administrative hearing on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely."

On April 8, 2013, Defendant sent her third demand for an administrative hearing and notice of violation of procedural due process to Plaintiff again demanding an administrative hearing and the opportunity to review the evidence which supported Plaintiff's decision to suspend license #1491178 without notice or opportunity for preliminary hearing.

On April 10, 2013, Mr. O'Connell rejected Defendant's demand for an administrative hearing specifying, "I am in receipt of your correspondence of April 8, 2013 in response to my letter of April 2, 2013 to you denying your request for an administrative hearing. As I advised you in that letter, my decision represents final agency action in this matter. You may seek judicial review of this final agency action pursuant to the provisions of 5 M.R.S. § 11001-11008."

At no time has Plaintiff disputed or contested any facts as set forth in the record including the facts stated above. Nor has Plaintiff presented any other facts or evidence in considering and denying Defendant's statutory demands.

Plaintiff has abused their discretion by suspending license #1491178 without sufficient and clear evidence and in violation of procedural due process, and then improperly denying Defendant's right to an administrative hearing upon the unfounded presumption that Defendant's actual knowledge of her right to an administrative hearing was properly given by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff improperly suspending license# 1491178 has resulted in Defendant being abusively prosecuted under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A (1-A)(A) for actions which are protected and secured by the Maine constitution and which do not constitute any type of civil or_ criminal violation and docketed as AUG-CR-2011-512 (violation date March 7, 2011) and AUG-CR-2011-513 (violation date February 10, 2011).

Defendant is being required to defend herself against 'criminal' charges in this court for 'operating after suspension' which are all based on an improper administrative medical suspension from January 2010 which was not known until March 7, 2011 and a coerced plea agreement from July 5, 2011.

Defendant has been consistently asserting that the administrative medical suspension from January 2010 was commenced without clear evidence of incompetency, without the advice and consult of the Medical Advisory Board, without proper notices and in clear violation of the administrative suspension process.


Defendant has been faithfully challenging this court's jurisdiction to prosecute these alleged criminal cases in light of the unresolved and improper administrative medical suspension from January 2010.

Defendant was coerced into a plea agreement with threats of excessive fines and imprisonment, on July 5, 2011 by A.D.A. Steve Parker, for 'criminal' 'operating after suspension' charges which were the direct result of an improper and unresolved administrative medical suspension from January 20 10 which was not discovered until March 7, 20 11 at an unconstitutional traffic stop by Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos.

Defendant asserts that there is no existing statutory or criminal penalty for 'operating after administrative medical suspension'; therefore, the coerced plea agreement under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A( 1-A)(A) on July 5, 2011 was wholly unlawful and in violation of federal and Maine Constitutions and the laws of this state.

Defendant asserts that the District Attorney is improperly using the coerced plea agreement from July 5, 2011 as a prior offense for the purpose of enhancing the sentence in these cases, clearly violating 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A).

Defendant asserts that she has not exhausted her administrative remedies under 5 M.R.S. § 8001-11008, the Maine Administrative Procedures Act, for the January 2010 administrative suspension and would like the opportunity to exhaust all of her options and follow due process of law for the improper January 2010 administrative suspension before proceeding with these alleged criminal charges.

Defendant has recently filed a demand for an administrative hearing at Bureau of Motor Vehicles to review the subject matter, statutory authority and evidence in support of the previous administrative suspension from January 2010.

Defendant asserts that a positive outcome in her favor at the motor vehicle administrative hearing could very likely reverse the coerced plea agreement from July 5, 2011 and quash all charges in these pending cases.

Defendant's constitutionally secured right to due process has been blatantly trampled and abused by the Plaintiff in that their failure to promptly provide exculpatory evidence within the 10 day compulsory timeframe pursuant to Rule 16(a)(3) has caused the Defendant's inability to receive a significant proportion of video and audio evidence showing the Plaintiff did in fact act outside of their authority and beyond statutory provisions and constitutional protections in both cases.

Defendant has independent audio footage from AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 which was claim that Plaintiff and their agents did not maintain, did in fact attempt to destroy, and did in under the Plaintiff's control for a significant portion of time which will corroborate Defendant's fact destroy, a significant portion of exculpatory evidence which would show a jury that Plaintiff's actions were in fact outside of their authority and beyond statutory provisions and constitutional protections of this state.

Additionally, all Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) knew or should have known the mandatory minimum standards for preservation of LEO notes and


records as adopted January 11, 2012, "Preservation of Recording and-Notes: The LEO conducting the custodial interrogation or the case LEO is responsible for preserving the recording and investigative notes and records specifically related to the recording as part of the investigative file until such time as the defendant pleads guilty, is convicted, sentenced, direct appeal is exhausted, waived or procedurally defaulted; ... All investigative notes kept or retained must be filed with the case. These notes are generally discoverable."

Neither Augusta or Oakland police department, nor their individual officers, nor the various Assistant District Attorneys who have worked on this case can claim good cause for their gregarious failure to follow the rules of procedure and due process which they expect and require the Defendant to strictly obey. The time has come for this court to thoroughly review all the evidence on the record and dismiss all seven (7) charges with prejudice and with sanctions against the Plaintiff.

On February 17, 2012 Defendant sent an email to Lt. Read of the Augusta Police Department requesting "raw audio/video recording, as well as any other records I am lawfully permitted to receive, that were taken during the booking process yesterday." Lt. Read replied that "any request for 'discoverable materials' will have to be through the District Attorney's Office."

On February 28, 2012 Plaintiff provided Defendant with a pink document entitled "Automatic Discovery" which does not sufficiently satisfy Defendant's discovery request. Defendant is unsure if the purpose for this form is Defendant's request for discovery from Plaintiff or if this is Plaintiff's discovery statement.

On April 12, 2012 Stephen Bourget filed a discovery request on Defendant's behalf which included "all books, papers, documents, photographs (including motion pictures or video tapes), tangible objects...”

On August 27, 2012 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statement of Facts, Points and Authorities in Support moving this court to dismiss all charges with prejudice on the grounds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute, has not followed or has permitted its agents to violate due process of law and has violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights. Defendant was not given a prompt and complete hearing on this Motion.

On October 2, 2012 Defendant filed a Request for Discovery with an extensive list of paper and digital evidence being requested from both Augusta and Oakland police departments.

On October 2, 2012 Defendant files a request for the court to schedule an immediate and proper hearing on her Motion to Dismiss stating, "proceeding with any jury selection at this juncture would be a gross violation of constitutional due process, a gregarious waste of court time and resources, and would also provide Defendant with several valid grounds for appeal to a higher court."

On October 6, 2012 the court continued the matter for 60 days because Defendant's stand-by counsel was not available to be in court due to illness.

On December 4, 2012 this matter was once again scheduled for Docket Call without any 4:10pm at which time she expressed the court's inability to properly


hear her motions with the acknowledgment of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's case was not called until lateness of the day and requested a continuance which the court granted for 60 days.

On February __2013 the court scheduled this matter once again for Docket Call without any acknowledgement of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. This matter was once again continued so Defendant could schedule a meeting with the newly-appointed District Attorney Maeghan Maloney.

On February 7, 2013 Defendant was scheduled to argue her motions at 3pm which this court cancelled at last minute. Defendant was notified of this cancellation when she arrived to meet with District Attorney Maeghan Maloney at 1pm.

On February 11, 2013 Defendant was finally afforded some time to briefly argue her Motion to Dismiss which was summarily rejected by the court in gross error of law.

On March 4, 2013 Defendant filed another Request for Discovery with an extensive list of paper and digital evidence being requested from the Kennebec County Jail and both Augusta and Oakland police departments.

On April 2, 2013 Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings, Motion to Continue and Motion to Reset the Scheduling Order pending the outcome of Defendant exhausting lawful administrative remedies for an improper administrative medical suspension which was used as the basis for AUG-CR-2011-513 which is now used as a prior offense in these pending cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667.

On this day, April 22, 2013 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and Petition for Review of Final Agency Action under Rule 80C for an administrative medical suspension commenced by Bureau of Motor Vehicle in violation of procedural due process and statutory provisions and which caused the improper prosecution of the prior offense of AUG-CR-2011-513. DATED in Augusta, Maine this 22nd day of April 2013.

In Peace, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE


APPENDIX AA STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. AUGSC-CR-2012-00286/AUGSC-CR-2012-00667 STATE OF MAINE Plaintiff v GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Defendant

2nd Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support

NOW COMES Defendant GINA LYNN TURCOTTE and moves this court to

dismiss, with prejudice, all seven charges in both cases against her for the STATE OF MAINE's continuing and aggravated violations of Defendant's constitutionally secured right to due process and prompt compulsory discovery of all exculpatory evidence, regardless if the Defendant directly requested the evidence or not. Fourteen (14) months into AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 and twelve (12) months into AUGSC-CR-2012-00667 have now passed and the STATE OF MAINE has failed to completely produce compulsory exculpatory evidence pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. Rule 16(a)(3), "Discovery shall be provided to a defendant charged with a Class D or Class E crime in District Court within 1 0 days of arraignment."

Defendant's constitutionally secured right to due process has been blatantly trampled and abused by the Plaintiff in that their failure to promptly provide exculpatory evidence within the 10 day compulsory timeframe pursuant to Rule 16(a)(3) has caused the Defendant's inability to receive a significant proportion of video and audio evidence showing the Plaintiff did in fact act outside of their authority and beyond statutory provisions and constitutional protections in both cases.

Defendant has independent audio footage from AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 which was under the Plaintiff's control for a significant portion of time which will corroborate Defendant's claim that Plaintiff and their agents did not maintain, did in fact attempt to destroy, and did in fact destroy, a significant portion of exculpatory evidence which would show a jury that Plaintiff's actions were in fact outside of their authority and beyond statutory provisions and constitutional protections of this state.

"It is a well-established and long-standing principle of law that a party's intentional destruction of evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial can support an inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction. See, e.g., Nation-Wide Check Corp. v. Forest Hills Distributors, 692 F.2d 214, 217-18 (1st Cir.1982) ... In order for an adverse inference to arise from


the destruction of evidence, the party having control over the evidence must have had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed. This obligation to preserve evidence arises when the party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation - most commonly when suit has already been filed, providing the party responsible for the destruction with express notice, but also on occasion in other circumstances, as for example when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation. See Turner, 142 F.R.D. at 72-73;" Kronisch v. United States, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1998

Additionally, all Law Enforcement Officers (LEO) knew or should have known the mandatory minimum standards for preservation of LEO notes and records as adopted January 11, 2012, "Preservation of Recording and Notes: The LEO conducting the custodial interrogation or the case LEO is responsible [or preserving the recording and investigative notes and records specifically related to the recording as part o[the investigative tile until such time as the defendant pleads guilty, is convicted, sentenced, direct appeal is exhausted, waived or procedurally defaulted; ... All investigative notes kept or retained must be filed with the case. These notes are generally discoverable."

Neither Augusta or Oakland police department, nor their individual officers, nor the various Assistant District Attorneys who have worked. on this case can claim good cause for their gregarious failure to follow the rules of procedure and due process which they expect and require the Defendant to strictly obey. The time has come for this court to thoroughly review all the evidence on the record and dismiss all seven (7) charges with prejudice and with sanctions against the Plaintiff. I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR DISCOVERY AND MOTION TO DISMISS a. On February 17, 2012 Defendant sent an email to Lt. Read of the Augusta Police Department requesting “raw audio/video recording, as well as any other records I am lawfully permitted to receive, that were taken during the booking process yesterday.” Lt. Read replied that "any request for 'discoverable materials' will have to be through the District Attorney's Office." b. On February 28, 2012 Plaintiff provided Defendant with a pink document entitled “Automatic Discovery” which does not sufficiently satisfy Defendant's discovery request. Defendant is unsure if the purpose for this form is Defendant's request for discovery from Plaintiff or if this is Plaintiff's discovery statement. c. On April 12, 2012 Stephen Bourget filed a discovery request on Defendant's behalf 8 which included "all books, papers, documents, photographs (including motion pictures or video tapes), tangible objects...” d. On August 27, 2012 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statement of Facts, Points and Authorities in Support moving this court to dismiss all charges with prejudice on the grounds that the Plaintiff lacks standing to prosecute, has not followed or has permitted its agents to violate due process of law and has violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights. Defendant was not given a prompt and complete hearing on this Motion.


e. On October 2, 2012, Defendant filed a Request for Discovery with an extensive list of paper and digital evidence being requested from both Augusta and Oakland police departments. f. On October 5, 2012 Defendant files a request for the court to schedule an immediate and proper hearing on her Motion to Dismiss stating, "proceeding with any jury selection at this juncture would be a gross violation of constitutional due process, a gregarious waste of court time and resources, and would also provide Defendant with several valid grounds for appeal to a higher court." g. On October 6, 2012 the court continued the matter for 60 days because Defendant's stand-by counsel was not available to be in court due to illness. h. On December 4, 2012 this matter was once again scheduled for Docket Call without any acknowledgment of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant's case was not called until 4:10pm at which time she expressed the court's inability to properly hear her motions with the lateness of the day and requested a continuance which the court granted for 60 days. i. On February 5, 2013 the court scheduled this matter once again for Docket Call without any acknowledgement of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. This matter was once again continued so Defendant could schedule a meeting with the newly-appointed District Attorney Maeghan Maloney. j. On February 7, 2013 Defendant was scheduled to argue her motions at 3pm which this court cancelled at last minute. Defendant was notified of this cancellation when she arrived to meet with District Attorney Maeghan Maloney at 1pm. k. On February 11, 2013 Defendant was finally afforded some time to briefly argue her Motion to Dismiss which was summarily rejected by the court in gross error of law. l. On March 4, 2013 Defendant filed another Request for Discovery with an extensive list of paper and digital evidence being requested from the Kennebec County Jail and both Augusta and Oakland police departments. m. On April 2, 2013 Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings, Motion to Continue and Motion to Reset the Scheduling Order pending the outcome of Defendant exhausting her lawful administrative remedies for an improper administrative medical suspension which was used as the basis for AUG-CR-2011-513 which is now being used as a prior offense in these pending cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667. n. On this day, April 22, 2013 Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss for Discovery and Due Process Violations with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support, Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss, and Petition for Review of Final Agency Action under Rule 80(C) for an administrative medical suspension commenced by Bureau of Motor Vehicle in violation of procedural due process and statutory provisions and which caused the improper prosecution of the prior offense of AUG-CR-2011-513. II. DEFENDANT'S REQUESTS FOR RELIEF


p. A review of the extensive evidence in this case of Defendant's innocence and the blatantly incomplete discovery which has now culminated in the destruction of exculpatory evidence should easily lead the court to the conclusion that both these cases must be dismissed because the Plaintiff's failure to follow due process, their agents' knowing and willful destruction of or failure to maintain compulsory discoverable evidence and the severity of the prejudice that has been shown during the past fourteen months undeniably supports the extreme sanction of a complete dismissal with prejudice. q. This extreme case requires an extreme response by the court with the sanction of a dismissal because the allegedly skilled and knowledgeable Assistant District Attorneys and Law Enforcement Officers obviously failed to fulfill their obligations thereby trampling all over Defendant's constitutional protected rights which has caused Defendant irreparable harm causing both economic and non-economic injuries including but not limited to wrongful imprisonment, double jeopardy, and gross violations of many amendments to the Bill of Rights including but certainly not limited to the 4th, 5th, 6th Amendments. III. MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS

"The general principles concerning the inferences to be drawn from the loss or destruction of documents are well established. When the contents of a document are relevant to an issue in a case, the trier of fact generally may receive the fact of the document's nonproduction or destruction as evidence that the party which has prevented production did so out of the well-founded fear that the contents would harm him. Wigmore has asserted that nonproduction is not merely "some" evidence, but is sufficient by itself to support an adverse inference even if no other evidence for the inference exists:

The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or the destruction of it, is evidence from which alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to the possessor ...

2 Wigmore on Evidence§ 291, at 228 (Chadbourn rev. 1979) (emphasis added). The inference depends, of course, on a showing that the party had notice that the documents were relevant at the time he failed to produce them or destroyed them.

The adverse inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one not. The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the common sense observation that a party who has notice that a document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy the document is more likely to have been threatened by the document than is a party in the same position who does not destroy the document. The fact of destruction satisfies the minimum requirement of relevance: it has some tendency, however small, to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable than it would otherwise be. See Fed.R.Evid. 401. Precisely how the document might have aided the party's adversary, and what evidentiary shortfalls its destruction may be taken to redeem, will depend on the particular facts of each case, but the general evidentiary rationale for the inference is clear.


The other rationale for the inference has to do with its prophylactic and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact to draw the inference presumably deters parties from destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at trial. The inference also serves as a penalty, placing the risk of an erroneous judgment on the party that wrongfully created the risk."

Fundamental error is shown when "the Government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995). Brady and Due Process Violations:

It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-154 (1972), the Due Process Clause is implicated when the government destroys evidence that might have proved favorable to a criminal defendant; see also, United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1178 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2714 (1994); see also Fed. R. Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(C) (discovery relating to documents material to defense); 16(c) (continuing duty to disclose).

The U.S. Supreme Court has developed a two-pronged test that turns upon whether or not the good faith of the government actors involved must be considered in determining whether failure to disclose evidence is a violation of the rights of due process or "what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence." United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982):

(1) Clearly Exculpatory Evidence: If the missing evidence is shown to be exculpatory, the Defendant's rights to fundamental fairness under the due process are violated, regardless of the good or bad faith of the state actors involved. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused violates the Defendant's rights of due process where the evidence has been requested by the accused and is material either to the guilt or punishment irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland (1963), 373 U.S. 83,87 83 S.Ct. 1194,_ 10 L.Ed.2d 215,_).

In order to mount a successful Brady challenge, a defendant must establish that "the evidence is material, that is, that 'there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d. 481 (1985)." United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94,97 (1st Cir. 1997).

Although courts have used different terminologies to define "materiality," the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that evidence is material if there exists a "reasonable probability" that its disclosure to the defense would have changed the result of the trial. Kyles v. Whitley,_ U.S._,_, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985).


A "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). However, this standard does not require the defendant to prove that it is more likely than not that disclosure of the evidence would result in acquittal. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1566. A reasonable probability of a changed result exists where the suppression of evidence "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial." Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 105 S. Ct. at 3381).

"The 'missing evidence' must possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed' and must be 'of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) (breath alcohol test). Id. at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534; see also Femia, 9 F.3d at 993." United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94,97 (1st Cir. 1997) [the preceding citation is to United Statesv. Femia, 9 F.3d 990 (1st Cir. 1993)].

Broadening Brady: In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court extended its Brady holding to include that the prosecution had a duty to disclose some evidence of an exculpatory nature even though no requests were made for it, but at the same time, rejected the notion that a "prosecutor has a constitutional duty routinely to deliver his entire file to defense counsel." Id. at 111; see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) and Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795 (1972) ("We know of no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all. police investigatory work on a case").

(2) Potentially Exculpatory Evidence: If the missing evidence is not provably exculpatory, but is merely potentially useful, the defendant must show bad faith on the part of the police, who, by their conduct, may indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant, thereby violating due process. Arizona v. Youngblood, 448 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, _,102 L.Ed.2d 281,_ (1988). "Under this precedent, the initial burden is on the defendant to show the evidence existed." United States v. Marshall, 109 F.3d 94,97 (1st Cir. 1997). When the government fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, the "good faith/bad faith" question regarding the government actors is dispositive. Arizona v. Youngblood, 448 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, _,102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988).

In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Youngblood, observed that when evidence that is merely potentially exculpatory is permanently lost, courts face "the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed." Arizona v. Youngblood, 448 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) citing to and discussing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984).

The case of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) arose out of a drunk driving prosecution in which the State had introduced test results indicating the concentration of alcohol in the blood of two motorists. The defendants sought to suppress the test results on the ground that the State had failed to preserve the breath samples used in the test. The Supreme Court rejected this argument for


several reasons: first, "the officers here were acting in "good faith and in accord with their normal practice," id. at 488, quoting Killian v. United States, 368 U.S. 231, 242 (1961); second, in the light of the procedures actually used, the chances that preserved samples would have exculpated the defendants were slim, 467 U.S. at 489; and, third, even if the samples might have shown inaccuracy in the tests, the defendants had "alternative means of demonstrating .their innocence." Id. at 490.

In relying upon Trombetta and several other cited cases for deciding that the issue turned upon the good or bad faith of the state actors involved, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Youngblood explained that it was unwilling to read the fundamental fairness requirement of the Due Process Clause, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941), as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.

The Court concluded that in order to establish a due process violation through the loss or destruction of "potentially useful" evidence (as distinguished from Brady's standard that dealt with "(clearly exculpatory" evidence), the defendant is required to show bad faith on the part of the police, limiting the finding of a due process violation resulting from the loss of merely potentially useful, but not provably exculpatory, evidence to ''those cases in which the police themselves, by their conduct, indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exonerating the defendant." Arizona v. Youngblood, 448 U.S. 51 (1988).

The Sixth Amendment also guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). There is a narrow category of cases in which prejudice to the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is presumed. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The presumption applies when there has been an "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; see Rauter v. U.S., 871 F.2d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1989) (denial of counsel at evidentiary hearing held to withdraw guilty plea prejudiced defendant); and when there are "various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In this case, misrepresentation and deliberate concealment and then destruction of evidence by the government has prevented [Defendant] from being able to adequately prepare his defense and has deprived [Defendant] of exculpatory and possibly exculpatory, relevant and probative evidence, in clear violation of his rights to due process and to adequate assistance of counsel.

The U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized that prosecutorial misconduct may "so infec[t] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)).


To determine a Brady violation, the Court must first determine that a due process violation has occurred by the loss or destruction of evidence that is provably exculpatory to the defendant. If it was clearly exculpatory, then it must also be material and not cumulative. If these conditions are met, then the Court need look no further, the Defendant's rights of due process have been violated.

If the evidence was not provably exculpatory, but merely potentially useful, it must also be material and not cumulative. If these conditions are met, the Court must determine whether the police acted in bad faith, to determine whether the defendant's due process rights are implicated under the Arizona v. Youngblood standard.

If the Court finds a due process violation under either standard, because the evidence is missing or destroyed, there is no possibility of a trial or of preventing or curing the due process violation in a trial or re-trial. The only remedy is dismissal of the charge against the defendant. This dismissal is not a sanction against the government, rather, it is the preservation of the Defendant's right to fundamental fairness as articulated by the Fifth due process clause and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense and to confront witnesses, which the Court is bound by law to uphold, pursuant to Article VI, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

This textbook example of failure to maintain or destruction of evidence, and continued violations of due process does in fact merit the prophylactic and punitive effects of a dismissal with prejudice to send the strong message that no constitutional violations are acceptable none will be tolerated by anyone.

WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this court to DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE all seven (7) 2 charges in cases AUG-CR-2012-286 and AUG-CR-2012-667 for the aforementioned reasons. DATED in Augusta, Maine this 22nd day of April 2013. In Peace,

GINA LYNN TURCOTTE 3 WASHINGTON STREET PLACE, UNIT 1 AUGUSTA, MAINE


APPENDIX BB Department of

the Secretary of State BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Matthew Dunlap Patty A. Morneault Secretary of State Deputy Secretary of State

Robert E. O'Connell, Jr. Director of Legal Affairs, Adjudications & Hearings

April 10, 2013 Gina L. Turcotte 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta ME 04330 Dear Ms. Turcotte: I am in receipt of your correspondence of April 8, 2013 in response to my letter of April 2, 2013 to you denying your request for an administrative hearing. As I advised you in that letter, my decision represents final agency action in this matter. You may seek judicial review of this final agency action pursuant to the provisions of 5 M.R.S. § 11001-11008. Sincerely, Robert E. O’Connell Director, Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings


APPENDIX CC April 8, 2013 Robert E. O'Connell, Jr., Director Legal Affairs, Adjudications & Hearings Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Hearing Section 101 Hospital Street Augusta, Maine 04333 RE: License Number/Class: 1491178/C CDL: NO OUI: NO ENDORSEMENTS: NONE Notice printed: December 17, 2009 Notice USPS RETURNED: December 28, 2009 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Effective: January 5, 2010 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Restored: March 8, 2011 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Reason: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL EVALUATION REQUEST

Notice Of Violation Of Procedural Due Process

OBJECTION TO YOUR REFUSAL TO GRANT ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING for ADMINISTRATIVE MEDICAL SUSPENSION

Dear Bob:

Your letter dated April 2, 2013 refusing to grant an administrative hearing for the prior administrative medical suspension from January 5, 2010 as being requested untimely is a blatant violation of "procedural due process", as defined by Black's Law, 9th Edition, "The minimal requirements of notice and a hearing guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments, esp. if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur."

As previously indicated, your assistance is required to resolve an improper administrative medical suspension which was commenced in violation of due process of laws, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, and without proper notices being served prior to the effective date of the suspension of January 5, 2010.

The records in this matter clearly show that Secretary of State failed to follow

procedural due process in the improper administrative medical suspension of license 1491178; therefore, an administrative hearing must be granted without further delay.


Secretary of State's continued refusal to grant an administrative hearing will be a violation of procedural due process protections of the 5th and 14th Amendments and a substantial violation of my right and responsibility to exhaust all administrative remedies.

Black's Law, 9th Edition, defines "due process" as "The conduct of legal

proceedings according to established rules and principles (or the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing."

Your letter stated, "Your request [or an administrative hearing on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely."

I object to your decision that my request was untimely for the reason that the State of Maine is using the administrative medical suspension (AUG-CR-2011-513) which was prosecuted on July 5, 2011) .under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) as a companion case to enhance the sentences of pending 'criminal' offenses (AUG-CR-2012-286, AUG-CR-2012-667 also being prosecuted under 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A) and directly resulting from the improper administrative medical suspension.

The subject matter and statutory authority, as cited in MD-LT-18, was not known until March 2013 when properly discovered exculpatory evidence was being reviewed for AUG-CR-2012-286 which included the DMV letter dated December 17, 2009.

Additional exculpatory evidence was also discovered in March 2013 that driving record 1491178 shows USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009 and USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809 which serves as prima facie evidence that required notices were not properly served nor received.

Driving record 1491178 shows that VIOLATION FREE CREDITS were properly issued for 2008, 2009 and 2010. "Every person holding a Maine operator's license whose driving record does not contain any convictions, adjudications, suspensions or revocations during a calendar year shall be awarded 1 (one} violation free credit at the end of each calendar year ... "

No evidence exists that the Medical Advisory Board was properly consulted as required by 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4)(A). Board Review.

Driving record 1491178 shows no evidence of incompetency to justify suspension under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D).

As indicated in 5 M.R.S. § 10001. Adjudicatory proceedings, "When licensing is required as a matter of constitutional right or by statute to be preceded by notice


and opportunity for hearing, the provisions of subchapter IV concerning adjudicatory proceedings shall apply."

Furthermore, 5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right to Hearing indicates Opportunity for hearing. Subject to the provisions of section 10004, an agency may not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, ... In any such proceeding determined by the agency to involve a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV.

Secretary of State instead decided to take action pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action without hearing "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 10003 and 10051, an agency may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when ... [t]he health or safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days; Notice of hearing. Upon suspending or revoking a…license… pursuant to subsection 2, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of opportunity for hearing as provided in. section 2483...

Actual notice of my right to a hearing was not received until March 2013 during my review of the previously-stated exculpatory evidence provided by the District Attorney's office.

It was also recently discovered that the administrative medical suspension was improperly maintained beyond the statutory boundaries of 5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action without hearing, which states any such suspension "shall not continue for more than 30 days.”

The administrative medical suspension commenced on January 5, 2010 and

terminated on March 8, 2011 totaling 427 days clearly violating statutory protections. Secretary of State must grant an administrative hearing to allow review of all adverse evidence and opinions of the Medical Advisory Board which supported suspending license 1491178 without a preliminary hearing.

Secretary of State has not indicated that any public notices were properly posted to inform the public of the potential dangers allegedly posed by not suspending license 1491178 and an opportunity for the public to attend and give testimony at the public hearing.

Secretary of State's refusal to post required public notices effectively prevented anyone who reads the public notices and who knows me to inform me of


the pending suspension so I could properly resolve the incorrect mailing address and immediately complete the medical evaluation showing that no potential dangers existed.

Driving record 1491178 shows that, in fact, no potential dangers existed "at the time of the agency's action" as evidenced by the Driver Medical Evaluation dated March 8, 2011, which states, "Current prescribed medications: None" and the Functional Ability Profile indicates "none/minimal' adverse reactions resulted from the indicated medical diagnoses of "Bipolar Disorder" and "Malnutrition".

Further exculpatory evidence will show that all psychiatric medications were in fact completely terminated in late 2006.

Secretary of State has no evidence "that ... continued operation of a motor vehicle presents a potential danger' "at the time of the agency's action' because VIOLATION FREE CREDITS were in fact issued for consecutive years 2008, 2009 and 2010.

Secretary of State cannot claim that required notices were properly served and received because driving record 1491178 shows notices were returned undeliverable by the postal service on 111009 & 122809, and there is no evidence that the Secretary of State posted any public notices to satisfy the notification requirement.

When notices are returned undeliverable and public notices are not posted, Secretary of State knows, or should have known, that the person has no knowledge of the notice because Secretary of State did not post required public notices in an effort to notify the person.

There is no evidence that Secretary of State posted required notices pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 9052.

Actual knowledge of the request for medical evaluation and subsequent suspension ONLY did not occur until March 7, 2011 when Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos gave verbal notice during an unconstitutional traffic stop.

Secretary of State's request for medical evaluation was satisfied on March 8, 2011 with a favorable medical evaluation effectively nullifying all medical restrictions and restoring license 1491178 without reinstatement fees or limitations.

DMV employees DID NOT advise me on March 8, 2011, nor at any time

thereafter, of my right to request a hearing.


A copy of MD-LT-18 was not received nor reviewed until March 2013 thereby preventing receipt and actual knowledge of the statutory authority, subject matter and hearing rights as provided by Maine statutes.

Knowledge of my right to a hearing was not known until March 2013.

A timely request for an administrative hearing was impossible due to lack of actual notice or knowledge of the medical evaluation request, notice of suspension, statutory authority, subject matter and hearing rights as guaranteed by law.

In preparation for a full administrative hearing, you are required to answer the following questions completely and with specificity. ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: 1. Provide the date and time the medical restriction was entered on driving record 1491178. 2. Provide the name of the person who entered the medical restriction on record 1491178. 3. List names of all employees, date and time each employee accessed Driving Record 1491178 and action initiated, beginning January 1, 2006 through present day, which are preserved in the Driving record's log of events. 4. Show proof of recent explicit behavior occurring prior to March 7, 2011 clearly indicating incompetency which "presents a potential danger” as evidenced by Driving Record 1491178. 5. Specify how three (3) years of consecutive VIOLATION FREE CREDITS serves as substantial factual evidence of incompetency for medical reasons. 6. Specify how failure to update a mailing address serves as substantial factual evidence of incompetency to operate a motor vehicle for medical reasons. 7. Provide the names of all Medical Advisory Board members who were consulted prior to suspending license 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 8. Provide a. summary of individual expert opinions derived from members of the Medical Advisory Board in consultation to suspend license 1491178. 9. Provide the name, address, phone number and professional credentials of all independent medical professionals who analyzed Driving Record 1491178 prior to suspending the license. 10. Provide a summary of individual expert opinions derived from all independent medical professionals consulted prior to suspending license 1491178. 11. Provide the names of all other people who were consulted, credentials and individual opinions about evidence of incompetency in Driving Record 1491178 prior to suspending the license. 12. Specify if the Request for Medical Review issued in 2009 on License 1491178 was provoked by an adverse report of operation, the subject matter, date and location of alleged incompetent operation, name of person making the adverse report and date the adverse report was filed.


13. Specify and itemize all pieces of evidence, sources of evidence. and the date that evidence was acquired by the Medical Advisory Board to support suspending license 1491178. 14. Provide actual proof and indicate the date, time and source of publication(s) where successful public notice was served, if any, prior to suspending license 1491178. If no public notice was posted, specify and give reasons. 15. Indicate the procedure used and all steps taken to justify suspension of license 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 16. Indicate all adverse symptoms and other items from the "Functions Profile'' which supported suspension of License 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 17. Indicate and specify all other information, documentation, records, opinions or laws which were relied upon to justify suspending License 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 18. Specify the relevant statutory authority and all penalties (judicial/criminal and administrative) for "operating after medical suspension", if any. If none exist, so specify. 19. MD-LT-18 specifies, "the further operation by you of any motor vehicle, until your privilege to operate has been restored will be in violation of the laws of this state for which you will be liable to arrest and prosecution.'' QUESTION: Specify all statutory authority the .Secretary of State relies upon for "arrest and prosecution" of 'operating after medical suspension' for "failure to file medical evaluation request". 20. YES or NO?? Cam an administrative "medical suspension" be deemed to be a "prior offense'' for the purpose of calculating previous "criminal" operating after suspension convictions? 21. YES or NO?? When an entry on a driving record is "deleted" can that entry be used in the calculation of prior offenses? Please provide an enumerated list of complete and specific answers in the same letter indicating the date and time of the administrative hearing. Please allow no less than 30 days advance notice of the date of the administrative hearing so witnesses and evidence can be obtained and reviewed prior to that date. Thank you for your immediate attention to this matter. In Peace, Gina Turcotte

No. _____________


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------


Petitioner

v.


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------



___________________________________________

APPENDIX, VOLUME III ___________________________________________



APPENDIX DD

Department of the Secretary of State

BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Matthew Dunlap Patty A. Morneault Secretary of State Deputy Secretary of State


April 2, 2013 Gina L. Turcotte 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta ME 04330 Dear Ms. Turcotte:

I am in receipt of your letter dated March 28, 2013 requesting an administrative hearing on a driver's license suspension for failure to file a medical evaluation with the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, effective January 5, 2010, which suspension was terminated on March 8, 2011 when the evaluation was received.

The notice of suspension was mailed to the address you had provided to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, although returned to the Bureau by the United States Postal Service, and you were given actual notice of the suspension by a law enforcement officer on March 7, 2011.

Your request for an administrative hearing on a license suspension of which you became knowledgeable two years ago and that was terminated two years past is denied as untimely. This letter represents final agency action in this matter. Sincerely, Robert E. O’Connell Director, Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings


APPENDIX EE March 28, 2013 Robert E. O'Connell, Jr., Director Legal Affairs, Adjudications & Hearings Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Hearing Section 101 Hospital Street Augusta, Maine 04333 RE: License Number/Class: 1491178/C CDL: NO OUI: NO ENDORSEMENTS: NONE Notice printed: December 17, 2009

Notice USPS RETURNED: December 28, 2009 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Effective: January 5, 2010 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Restored: March 8, 2011 ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION Reason: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL EVALUATION REQUEST

Demand for Administrative Hearing for Prior Administrative (Medical) Suspension

Dear Bob:

Your assistance is required to resolve an improper administrative (medical) suspension which was commenced in violation of due process of laws, without sufficient evidence to support the suspension, and proper notices were not served prior to the effective date of the suspension of January 5, 2010.

Secretary of State failed to follow statutory procedure in the improper

suspension of license 1491178; therefore, an administrative hearing must be granted without further delay.

Driving record 1491178 shows VIOLATION FREE CREDITS for 2008, 2009

and 2010. "Every person holding a Maine operator's license w hose driving record does not contain any convictions, adjudications, suspensions or revocations during a calendar year shall be awarded 1 (one) violation free credit at the end of each calendar year..."

Driving record 1491178 shows USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 ON 111009 and

USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 ON 122809 which serves as prima facie evidence that required notices were not properly served nor received.

MD-LT-18 dated December 17, 2009 cites statutory authority from 29-A

M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) Suspension or revocation without hearing. The Secretary of


State, without preliminary hearing, may suspend or revoke a…license…of a person on showing by the Secretary of State's records or other sufficient evidence that the person:

D. Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle;

Black's Law Dictionary, 1st Edition, defines "incompetency' as "lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty."

Driving record 1491178 shows no evidence of incompetency to justify

suspension under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). There is no evidence that the Medical Advisory Board was properly consulted

pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 1258(4)(A). Board Review. The Secretary of State, having cause to believe that a licensed driver or applicant may not be physically or mentally qualified to be licensed, may obtain the advice of the board, a member of the board or another medical or paramedical professional licensed or certified in a medical specialty as follows.

A. The board may formulate advice from records and reports or may cause an

examination and report to be made by a member or another qualified person. Pursuant to 29-250 Chapter 1: RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE

SUSPENSION RELATING TO DEMERIT POINT ACCUMULATION, CONVICTIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS

2. SUSPENSION FOR INCOMPETENCE The license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle of any person, whom the Secretary of State or Deputy Secretary of State determines to be incompetent to operate a motor vehicle, such incompetence to include, but not limited to, adverse physical, mental or emotional impairments may be suspended without preliminary hearing pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. Section 2458(2)(D). Incompetence relative to physical, mental or emotional impairments shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 3, Rules of Secretary of State (or Physical, Emotional and Mental Competence to Operate a Motor Vehicle, as amended. Pursuant to 29-250 Chapter 3: Medical Rules for the Bureau of Motor

Vehicles, "The Secretary of State shall determine the physical, emotional and mental competence of a person to operate a motor vehicle with the advice of the Medical Advisory Board…

D. Action by the Secretary of State


2. Upon receipt of a medical report indicating that a person is not competent to operate a motor vehicle, or upon the failure or refusal of a person to submit the requested information, the Secretary of State shall follow one or more of the following procedures:

a. If, from records or other sufficient evidence, the Secretary of State has cause to believe that a person is not physically, emotionally, or mentally competent to operate a motor vehicle, the Secretary of State may:

i. Obtain the advice of any member of the Medical Advisory Board or the Board collectively. The Board or any member may formulate advice from the existing records and reports or may request that an examination and report be made by the Board or any other qualified person so designated. The licensed driver or applicant may present a written report from a physician of the person' s choice to the Board or the member reviewing the matter and such report must be given due consideration...

ii. Require a person to submit to a driving evaluation. Upon the conclusion of such an evaluation, the Secretary of State shall take action as may be appropriate. The Secretary of State may suspend the license of such person, allow the person to retain a license, or issue a license subject to any conditions or restrictions deemed advisable, having in mind the safety of the public and the person.

iii. After hearing, suspend any certificate of registration, operator's license, operating privileges, or privilege to apply for and obtain a license in the State of Maine.

iv. Without preliminary hearing, suspend any certificate of registration or any operator's license, operating privilege, or privilege to apply for and obtain a license in the State of Maine if the Secretary of State determines that the person's continued operation of a motor vehicle presents a potential danger to the person or other persons or property. The Secretary of State shall notify the person that a hearing will be provided without undue delay."

Secretary of State has no evidence that…continued operation of a motor

vehicle presents a potential danger because VIOLATION FREE CREDITS were issued for consecutive years 2008, 2009 and 2010.

Driving record 1491178 shows no evidence of incompetency to justify

suspension under 29-250 Chapter 3 or 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). Secretary of State cannot claim that required notices were properly served

and received because driving record 1491178 shows notices were returned undeliverable by the postal service on 111009 & 122809, and there is no evidence that the Secretary of State posted any public notices to satisfy the notification requirement.


When notices are returned undeliverable and public notices are not posted,

Secretary of State knows, or should have known, that the person has no knowledge of the notice because Secretary of State did not post required public notices in an effort to notify the person.

There is no evidence that Secretary of State posted required notices pursuant

to 5 M.R.S. § 9052.

29-A M.R.S. § 112. NOTICE OF HEARING

Notice of any hearing held by the Secretary of State or by the Secretary of State's authority under this Title must be consistent with Title 5, section 9052 and notify the licensee or registrant that the licensee or registrant may then and there appear, in person or through counsel, to show cause why that license or certificate of registration should not be suspended or revoked. Service of that notice is sufficient if sent by regular mail [unless returned by the postal service[ to the address given by the licensee or registrant at least 10 days before the date set for hearing.

29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(l-A)(A) Offense; penalty. A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person:

A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person:

(1) Has received written notice of a suspension or revocation from the Secretary of State or a court; (2) Has been orally informed of the suspension or revocation by a law enforcement officer or a court; (3) Has actual knowledge of the suspension or revocation; (4) Has been sent written notice in accordance with section 2482 ...

29-A M.R.S. § 2482. NOTICE OF SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF LICENSE

1. Notification by Secretary of State. Upon determining that a person is subject to license suspension or revocation, the Secretary of State shall immediately notify the person, in writing, of the license suspension or revocation. The notice:

A. Must be sent to the last name and address provided under section 1407 or, if the person has not applied for a license, on record with the Secretary of State; B. Must be sent to the address provided in the report of the law enforcement officer if that address differs from the address of record; or C. May be served in hand.

2. Notice contents. The notice must clearly state:


A. The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation; B. The effective date of the suspension or revocation; C. Unless the suspension or revocation is ordered by a court or rests solely upon a conviction or adjudication in court of an offense that is, by statute, expressly made grounds for that suspension or revocation, the right of the person to request a hearing and the procedure for requesting a hearing...

3. Receipt date. The notice is deemed received 3 days after mailing, unless returned by postal authorities.

5 M.R.S. § 9052. NOTICE

1. Notice of hearing. When the applicable statute or constitutional law requires that an opportunity for hearing shall be provided, notice shall be given as follows:

A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired; and B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired.

2. Hearing required. When a hearing is required by the applicable statute or by agency regulation, or has been requested pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph A, or has been set in an exercise of the agency's discretion, notice shall be given as follows:

A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit. evidence and argument; and B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument and to petition to intervene pursuant to section 9054.

3. Notice to the public. Notice to the public shall be given: A. By publication, at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state affected; B. By publication in any other trade, industry, professional or interest group publication which the agency deems effective in


reaching persons who would be entitled to intervene as of right under section 9054, subsection 1; and C. In any other manner deemed appropriate by the agency.

4. Notice. Notice shall consist of A. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the proceeding is being conducted; B. A reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule provisions involved; C. A short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the proceeding and of the matters asserted; D. A statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within which a hearing may be requested; E. A statement of the manner and time within which evidence and argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a hearing has been set; and F. When a hearing has been set, a statement of the manner and time within which applications for intervention under section 9054 may be filed.

5 M.R.S. § 10001. Adjudicatory proceedings

When licensing is required as a matter of constitutional right or by statute to be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing;, the provisions of subchapter IV concerning adjudicatory proceeding s shall apply.

5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right to Hearing

1. Opportunity for hearing. Subject to the provisions of section 10004, an agency may not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, nor may it refuse to renew any license unless it has afforded the licensee either an opportunity for an agency hearing in conformity with subchapter IV or an opportunity for a hearing in the District Court. In any such proceeding determined by the agency to involve a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV. 2. Proceeding. In any proceeding involving a proposed modification or amendment of a license which was the subject of an earlier hearing, the agency shall give notice thereof to all parties to the earlier proceeding and in any other manner required by section 9052, and may reopen the earlier proceeding for consideration of the proposed amendment or modification.

5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action without hearing

Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 10003 and 10051, an agency may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when:


3. Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days; 4. Notice of hearing. Upon suspending or revoking a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license or fuel use decal pursuant to subsection 2, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of opportunity for hearing as provided in section 2483…

29-A M.R.S. § 2483. Hearing request

1. Request for hearing. A person may make a written request for a hearing to review the determination of the Secretary of State. The request must be made within 1 0 days from the effective date of the suspension. 2. Issuance of decision. The Secretary of State shall conduct a hearing and issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of a written request for hearing. 3. Delayed requests. If a request is made after the 10-day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack actual notice of the suspension or due to factors of physical incapacity, the Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and grant the hearing request, except a stay may not be granted .

Actual knowledge of the request for medical evaluation and subsequent

suspension did not occur until March 7, 2011 when Augusta Police Officer Eric DosSantos gave verbal notice during an unconstitutional traffic stop.

Secretary of State's request for medical evaluation was satisfied on March 8, 2011 with a favorable medical evaluation effectively nullifying all medical restrictions and restoring license 1491178 without restoration fees or limitations.

The subject matter and statutory authority cited in MD-LT-18 dated December 17, 2009 was not known until recently.

A letter dated March 18, 2013 was sent to Hearing Unit explicitly requesting an ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING for the ADMINISTRATIVE MEDICAL SUSPENSION dated January 5, 2010 for FAILURE TO FILE MEDICAL EVALUATION.

In response, Assistant Director Susan Cole's letter dated March 20, 2013 stated “I have reviewed your driving record and determined that your current suspensions do not offer opportunity for hearing through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles”.

Ms. Cole's decision has no application or relevance to the explicit request. Secretary of State failed to follow statutory procedure in the improper suspension of license 1491178 on January 5, 2010, therefore, an administrative hearing must be granted without further delay to discuss supplementary remedial action.


A timely request for an administrative hearing was impossible due to lack of actual notice of both the medical evaluation request and notice of suspension.

In preparation for a full administrative hearing, please answer the following questions completely and with specificity.

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS

1. Provide the names of all Medical Advisory Board members who were consulted prior to suspending license 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 2. Provide a summary of individual expert opinions derived from members of the Medical Advisory Board in consultation to suspend license 1491178. 3. Provide the name, address, phone number and professional credentials of all independent medical professionals who analyzed Driving Record 1491178 prior to suspending the license. 4. Provide a summary of individual expert opinions derived from all independent medical professionals consul ted prior to suspending license 1491178. 5. Provide the names of all other people who were consulted, credentials and individual opinions about evidence of incompetency in Driving Record 1491178 prior to suspending the license. 6. Specify if the Request for Medical Review issued in 2009 on License 1491178 was provoked by an adverse report of operation, the subject matter, date and location of alleged incompetent operation, name of person making the adverse report and date the adverse report was filed. 7. Show proof of recent explicit behavior occurring PRIOR TO MARCH 7, 2011 clearly indicating incompetency which " presents a potential danger' as evidenced by Driving Record 1491178. 8. Specify how three (3) years of consecutive VIOLATION FREE CREDITS serves as substantial factual evidence of incompetency for medical reasons. 9. Specify how failure to update a mailing address serves as substantial factual evidence of in competency to operate a motor vehicle for medical reasons. 10. Specify and itemize all pieces of evidence, sources of evidence, and the date that evidence was acquired by the Medical Advisory Board to support suspending license 1491178. 11. Provide actual proof and indicate the date, time and source of publication(s) where successful public notice was served, if any, prior to suspending license 1491178. If no public notice was posted, specify and give reasons. 12. Indicate the procedure used and all steps taken to justify suspension of license 1491178 without preliminary hearing.


13. Indicate all adverse symptoms and other items from the "Functions Profile" which supported suspension of License 1491178 without preliminary hearing. 14. Indicate and specify all other information, documentation , records, opinions or laws which were relied upon to justify suspending License 1491178 without preliminary bearing. 15. List names of all employees, date and time each employee accessed Driving Record 1491178 and action initiated, beginning January 1, 2006 through present day, which are preserved in the Driving record's log of events. 16. Specify the relevant statutory authority and all penalties (judicial, criminal and administrative) for "operating after medical suspension, if any . If none exist, so specify. 17. MD-LT-18 specifies, ''the further operation by you of any motor vehicle , until your privilege to operate has been restored, will be in violation of the laws of this state for which you will be liable to arrest and prosecution."' QUESTION: Specify all statutory authority the Secretary of State relies upon for "arrest and prosecution'' of 'operating after medical suspension' for "failure to file medical evaluation request". 18. YES or NO Can an administrative "medical suspension be deemed to be a "prior offense" for the purpose of calculating previous "criminal" operating after suspension convictions? 19. YES or NO?'? When an entry on a driving record is "deleted" can that entry be used in the calculation of prior offenses? Please provide an enumerated list of complete and specific answers in the

same letter indicating the date and time of the administrative hearing. Please allow no less than 30 days advance notice of the date of the

administrative hearing so witnesses and evidence can be obtained and reviewed prior to that date.

Thank you for your immediate attention to this matter. In Peace, Gina Turcotte


APPENDIX FF Department of

the Secretary of State BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES

Matthew Dunlap Patty A. Morneault Secretary of State Deputy Secretary of State


March 20, 2013 Gina L. Turcotte 3 Washington Street Place, Unit 1 Augusta ME 04330 Dear Ms. Turcotte:

We received your request for a hearing on March 20, 2013. I have reviewed your driving record and determined that your current

suspensions do not offer opportunity for hearing through the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.

The suspensions of your operating privileges were placed by the District Court Violations Bureau and must be removed by them either through fulfillment of court requirements and a $350.00 reinstatement fee or an indication they were submitted in error. I've provided their phone number below for your convenience.

District Court Violations Bureau 85 Park Street PO Box 480 Lewiston ME 04243 207-783-5422

You will also need to provide an SR-22 proof of insurance requirement. You may contact the Financial Responsibility Section of this Bureau for more information at 207-624-9000, extension 52108 .

You may contact the Court Records Section for eligibility dates and requirements for reinstatement. Their telephone number is (207) 624-9000 ext. 52100.

Sincerely, Susan Cole Assistant Director Legal Affairs, Adjudications & Hearings


APPENDIX GG March 18, 2013 Bureau of Motor Vehicles Hearing Section 101 Hospital Street Augusta, Maine 04333 RE: License Number/Class: 1491178/ C CDL: NO OUI: NO ENDORSEMENTS: NONE Notice printed: December 17, 2009 Notice returned UNDELIVERED: December 28, 2009 Suspension effective: January 5, 2010 Suspension reason: FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL EVALUATION REQ.

Request For Administrative Hearing An administrative hearing is requested for the above-referenced suspension commenced without a reasonable basis, without giving proper notices, and without following due process. This request is made pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. Ch. 23, 5 M.R.S. § 9051-9064 and Chapter 2, Rules for Hearings of the Secretary of State. A timely request was impossible due to lack of actual notice of both the medical evaluation request and notice of suspension. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LAW The statutory authority cited for this suspension is 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D) 2. Suspension or revocation without hearing. The Secretary of State, without preliminary hearing. may suspend or revoke a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license, fuel use decal or privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle of a person on showing by the Secretary of State's records or other sufficient evidence that the person: D. Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; Black's Law Dictionary, 1st Edition, defines "incompetency' as "lack of ability, legal qualification, or fitness to discharge the required duty." Driving record 1491178 shows:


VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 010109 for 2008 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 on 111009 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 on 122809 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 010110 for 2009 DRIVING SUSPENSION INDEFINITE VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 030811 for 2010 No evidence of incompetency exists to justify suspension under 29-A M.R.S. § 2458(2)(D). 29-A M.R.S. § 112. NOTICE OF HEARING Notice of any hearing held by the Secretary of State or by the Secretary of State' s authority under this Title must be consistent with Title 5, section 9052 and notify the licensee or registrant that the licensee or registrant may then and there appear, in person or through counsel, to show cause why that license or certificate of registration should not be •suspended or revoked. Service of that notice is sufficient if sent by regular mail to the address given by the licensee or registrant at least 10 days before the date set for hearing. 5 M.R.S. § 9052. NOTICE 1. Notice of hearing. When the applicable statute or constitutional law requires that an opportunity for hearing shall be provided, notice shall be given as follows: A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired; and B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired . 2. Hearing required. When a hearing is required by the applicable statute or by agency regulation, or has been requested pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph A, or has been set in an exercise of the agency's discretion, notice shall be given as follows: A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument; and B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the


hearing date to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument and to petition to intervene pursuant to section 9054. 3. Notice to the public. Notice to the public shall be given: A. By publication, at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state affected; B. By publication in any other trade, industry, professional or interest group publication which the agency deems effective in reaching persons who would be entitled to intervene as of right under section 9054, subsection 1; and C. In any other manner deemed appropriate by the agency. 4. Notice. Notice shall consist of' A. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the proceeding is being conducted; B. A reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule provisions involved; C. A short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the proceeding and of the matters asserted; D. A statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within which a hearing may be requested; E. A statement of the manner and time within which evidence and argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a hearing has been set; and' F. When a hearing has been set, a statement of the manner and time within which applications for intervention under section 9054; may be filed. 5 M.R.S. § 10001. Adjudicatory proceedings When licensing is required as a matter of constitutional right or by statute to be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing, the provisions of subchapter IV concerning adjudicatory proceedings shall apply. 5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right to Hearing 1. Opportunity for hearing. Subject to the provisions of section 1 0004, an agency _may not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, nor may it refuse to renew any license unless it has afforded the licensee either an opportunity for an agency hearing in conformity with subchapter IV or an opportunity for a hearing in the District Court. In any_ such proceeding determined by the agency to involve a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV.


2. Proceeding. In any proceeding involving a proposed modification or amendment of a license which was the subject of an earlier hearing, the agency shall give notice thereof to all parties to the earlier proceeding and in any other manner required by section 9052, and may reopen the earlier proceeding for consideration of the proposed amendment or modification. 5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action without hearing Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 1 0003 and 10051, an agency may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when: - 1. Judicial action. The decision to take that action rests solely upon a finding or conviction in court of any violation which by statute is expressly made grounds for revocation; 2. Reciprocal license. The Maine license has been issued upon the basis of a reciprocal agreement with another government, and the Maine action is based upon evidence, in the form of a certified copy, that the authority issuing the license which provided the basis for reciprocal licensing in Maine has revoked or suspended their license; 3. Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days; 4. Notice of hearing. Upon suspending or revoking a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license or fuel use decal pursuant to subsection 2, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of opportunity for hearing as provided in section 2483, except when: A. The suspension or revocation rests solely upon a conviction in court of an offense that by statute is expressly made grounds for that suspension or revocation; B. The basis of the Secretary of State's action is a condition of bail or conditional release pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph Q; or C. The suspension or revocation is required by federal statute or regulation. Driving record 1491178 serves as prima facie evidence that required notices were NOT properly served. VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 010109 for 2008 USPS RETURNED MD-LT-01 on 111009


USPS RETURNED MD-LT-18 on 122809 VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 010110 for 2009 DRIVING SUSPENSION INDEFINITE VIOLATION FREE CREDITS on 030811 for 2010 The Secretary of State claims the basis for the suspension was "incompetent to drive a motor vehicle" which caused a "health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource to be in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action"; if this was a viable claim to justify an arbitrary suspension of the license without ensuring proper notices, then it is reasonable that this “proceeding [was] deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest...” and therefore the Secretary of State should have complied with 5 M.R.S. § 9052(3) by giving: Notice to the public. Notice to the public shall be given: A. By publication, at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state affected; B. By publication in any other trade, industry, professional or interest group publication which the agency deems effective in reaching persons who would be entitled to intervene as of right under section 9054, subsection 1; and C. In any other manner deemed appropriate by the agency The Secretary of State's violation of due process of law, improper use of the suspension process and unlawfully suspending License # 1491178 without giving proper notices is grounds for immediate reversal and nullification of all administrative and court actions which have resulted either directly. or indirectly from the unlawful suspension. A full administrative hearing is required. Gina Turcotte


APPENDIX HH Order Denying Petitioner's Motion To Reconsider

STATE OF MAINE UNIFIED CRIMINAL DOCKET KENNEBEC, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CR-12-553 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Petitioner v. STATE OF MAINE Respondent

Petitioner, Gina Turcotte, has filed a petition for post-conviction review pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § § 2121-2132 (2011). The petitioner's initial challenge stemmed from the criminal judgments entered against him in District Court (Kennebec County, Dobson, J) on July 5, 2011. The Court summarily dismissed the petitioner's petition post-conviction review by written order on September 13, 2012.

BACKGROUND

As recounted in its prior summary dismissal order, the following background facts are relevant to the petitioner's second filing of a petition for post-conviction review:

On April 6, 2011, Petitioner was charged by criminal complaint in the Kennebec County District Court (AUGDC-CR-11-512, 513) with two counts of operating while her license was suspended or revoked, a class E misdemeanor. On July 5, 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to one count and was ordered to pay a fine of $250 (CR-11-513). Petitioner's other charge was dismissed (CR-11-512). Petitioner did not appeal her conviction to the Law Court. Petitioner filed the petition now before the Court alleging grounds of post-conviction review on July 6, 2012, and the Court received the petition on July 23, 2012. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on October 5, 2012, and the Court received the motion on October 15, 2012.

DISCUSSION

The Petitioner claims that the Court erred in concluding that she did “not labor under restraint or impediment” pursuant to the requirements of the post-conviction review statute. 15 M.R.S. § 2124. In particular, Petitioner states that she "does in fact labor under restraint and impediment because the State of Maine is using this conviction as a sentencing enhancer for two cases currently pending before Maine Superior Court, docket numbers AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 and AUGSC-CR-2012-0067." (M. Reconsid.) (internal citations and emphasis omitted). Petitioner


also asserts that she only paid her fine under "duress, coercion, and intimidation" because "Judge Dobson was telling her, 'pay your fine or go to jail."' (M. Reconsid.)

The post-conviction review statute does permit a person to collaterally challenge a conviction when that conviction is being used to enhance a sentence in a pending action, under certain circumstances. 15 M.R.S. § 2124(3)(A) permits post-conviction review for an indirect impediment when "[i]ncarceration pursuant to a sentence imposed in this State, in another state or in a Federal Court for a crime punishable by incarceration for a year or more, if the length of the incarceration is greater than it would otherwise have been in the absence of the challenged criminal judgment of this State." (emphasis added). In the present case, none of the pending charges in CR-12-286 and CR -12-667 are punishable by a year or more because the highest charge is a Class D. 17 M.R.S. § 1252(D).

Petitioner's claim that she only paid the fine under duress is similarly unavailing. Petitioner's election to pay the fine rather than go to jail took her out of the purview of the post-conviction review statute. Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The entry is:

The petitioner's motion to reconsider the summary dismissal of the petitioner's May 2012 post-conviction petition in DENIED. Dated: October 31, 2012 William R. Anderson, Justice, Superior Court


APPENDIX II STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. DOCKET NO. AUGSC-CR- 12-553 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE v STATE OF MAINE Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider Petition for Post-Conviction Review of

AUGDC-CR-11-512 and AUGDC-CR-11-513 [Erroneously reported as CR-11-511 and CR-11-512)

NOW COMES Petitioner, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, and respectfully requests reconsideration of the order dismissing her petition because: Petitioner, does in fact "labor under restraint and impediment" because the State of Maine is using this conviction as a sentencing enhancer for two cases currently pending before Maine Superior Court, docket numbers AUGSC-CR-2012-00286 and AUGSC-CR-2012-00667. Petitioner paid the fine under duress, coercion and intimidation, and only after being ORDERED to go into the courtroom before Judge Dobson UNDER THREAT OF ARREST AND ~IMPRISONMENT for failure to pay fine out of protest. Petitioner's fine payment was unlawfully coerced and therefore valid grounds for relief under Title 15. Petitioner was at the courthouse on the date of her fine payment to inquire about getting visitation with her granddaughter and when she gave her name to the girl in the court clerk's office Petitioner was told that the Judge required to speak with her. Petitioner told Judge Dobson ON THE RECORD, with at least two (2) court officers present, that she would pay her fine ONLY UNDER DURESS AND THREAT OF KIDNAPPING because that is what Judge Dobson was telling her, "Pay your fine or go to jail.” Dated: October 5, 2012 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, Petitioner


APPENDIX JJ STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CRIMINAL ACTION

DOCKET NO. CR- 12-553 GINA LYNN TURCOTTE Petitioner v STATE OF MAINE Respondent

Order Summarily Dismissing Post-Conviction Petition

Petitioner, Gina Turcotte, has filed a petition for post-conviction review pursuant to 15 M.RS. § § 2121-2132 (2011). Petitioner is requesting court-appointed counsel. Petitioner's challenge stems from the criminal judgment entered against her in the District Court (Kennebec County, Dobson, J) on July 5, 2011.

BACKGROUND On April 6, 2011, Petitioner was charged by criminal complaint in the

Kennebec County District Court (AUGDC-CR-11-512, 513) with two counts of operating while her license was suspended or revoked, a class E misdemeanor. On July 5, 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to one count and was ordered to pay a fine of $250 (CR-11-513). Petitioner's other charge was dismissed (CR-11-512). Petitioner did not appeal her conviction to the Law Court. Petitioner filed the petition now before the Court alleging grounds of post-conviction review on July 6, 2012, and the Court received the petition on July 23, 2012.

GROUNDS ALLEGED Petitioner alleges coercion or duress in making her plea agreement. (Pet.

¶27(A)). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that the District Attorney “coerced [her] through nondisclosure of statutory facts,” because the District Attorney, "refused to acknowledge or validate 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(8)." (Id.) Petitioner also asserts that the plea agreement violated statutory requirements. (Pet.¶27(B)).

While coercion or duress in securing the plea is cognizable grounds for post-conviction review, State v. Huntley, 676 A.2d 501,503 (Me. 1996), it appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner no longer labors under any restraint or impediment that would satisfy the statute's jurisdictional prerequisite, because she paid her fine on December 2, 2011, and she is not currently incarcerated or subject to other restraint or impediment. See 15 M.R.S. § 2124 (requiring "present restraint or other specified impediment" as defined by statute). Petitioner does not allege, and the Court cannot discern, any additional restraint or impediment to which she is subject. The petition must therefore be summarily dismissed.

CONCLUSION


Because it plainly appears from the face of the petition that Petitioner fails to show subject matter jurisdiction, the petition is summarily dismissed. M. R. Crim. P. 70(b). Therefore it is hereby ORDERED: The petition for post-conviction review is summarily dismissed. Dated: September 13, 2012 William R. Anderson, Justice, Superior Court


APPENDIX KK STATE OF MAINE


Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing; Failure to Follow Due Process of Law; Violation of Constitutionally Protected Rights; Statements of Facts,

Points and Authorities in Support Now comes Defendant, GINA LYNN TURCOTTE, under special appearance to correct errors in assumptions and mistakes of ignorance, retaining and reserving all her unalienable and constitutionally protected rights, and demands this court dismiss all charges with prejudice and immediately release pre-conviction cash bail being held in the amount of $300.00 on the grounds that Plaintiff, State of Maine, lacks standing to prosecute, has not followed or has permitted its agents to violate due process of law and has violated Defendants' constitutionally protected rights. 5 M.R.S. § 5. Oath of office; before whom taken. "The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court and of the Superior Court, the Judges of the District Court and all state officials elected by the Legislature shall take and subscribe the oath or affirmation required by the Constitution, before the Governor ... " The Maine Oath of Office is defined by Article IX, Section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Maine. It requires "Every person elected or appointed to either of the places or offices provided in this Constitution, and every person elected, appointed, or commissioned to any judicial, executive, military or other office under this State" to take two oaths of office:

I, (name) do swear, that I will support the Constitution of the United States

and of this State, so long as I shall continue a citizen thereof So help me God. I (name) do swear, that I will faithfully discharge, to the best of my abilities,

the duties incumbent on me as (office) according to the Constitution and laws of the State. So help me God. Let it be known by these words that the Oaths and bonds of all public officers are hereby accepted and confirmed and Defendant hereby binds them to it.


17-A M.R.S. § 2 defines "public servant" as "any official officer or employee of any branch of government and any person participating as juror, advisor, consultant or otherwise, in performing a governmental junction. A person is considered a public servant upon the person's election, appointment or other designation as such, although the person may not yet officially occupy that position. " 5 CFR § 2635.101 Basic obligation of public service.

Public service is a public trust. Each employee has a responsibility to the United States Government and its citizens to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws and ethical principles above private gain. General principles. The following general principles apply to every employee and may form the basis for the standards contained in this part. Where a situation is not covered by the standards set forth in this part, employees shall apply the principles set forth in this section in determining whether their conduct is proper.

(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private gain. (2) Employees shall not hold financial interests that conflict with the conscientious performance of duty. (7) Employees shall not use public office for private gain. (8) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any private organization or individual. (11) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate authorities. (14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances create an appearance that the law or these standards have been violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

Maine Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble “... is founded on the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust…" and "is to be applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, rules of court, decisional law, and common sense and in the context of all relevant circumstances ... " The following Statements of Fact, Points of Law, and Judicial Authorities are offered in support thereof:

1. Defendant is one of the freeborn, living, breathing, sovereign inhabitants of the republic of Maine.

2. Defendant has given lawful and properly certified notice reclaiming and redeeming her sovereign status effectively nullifying all unlawful contracts in May 2012, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, those notifications


consisting of Ecclesiastic Deed Poll, Statement of Identity, Certificate of Authority, Entitlement Order, Acknowledgement of Deed and a certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth, to the following governmental and court authorities: a. STATE OF MAINE, DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION

OF VITAL RECORDS, 244 Water Street, STATE HOUSE STATION # 11, AUGUSTA, MAINE

b. Magistrate, Kennebec County Probate Court, 95 State Street, Augusta, Maine

c. Charles E. Summers, Jr., 148 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333 d. William J. Schneider, 6 State House Station, Augusta, ME 04333-0006 e. Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, 400

Michigan Avenue, Northeast, Washington, D.C. 20017 f. U.S. Attorney General, Executive Office of the U.S. Trustee, U.S.

Department of Justice, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001

g. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street NW,

Washington, DC 20520 3. On August 23, 2012, Defendant certified mailed Writ of Mandamus and

Replevin, hereby attached to this Motion as exhibits, to the following governmental authorities: a. Mike Pool, Director, Bureau of Land Management Washington Office,

1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5665, Washington DC 20240 b. Carole Carter-Pfisterer, Assistant Director, Bureau of Land Management,

Human Capital Management, 1849 C Street NW, Rm. 5611, Washington, DC 20240

c. Department of Health and Human Services, Vital Records, SHS # 11, Augusta Maine

4. Defendant has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to request a 'driver’s license' whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private noncommercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

5. Defendant has been continuously and unlawfully coerced since February 3, 1989 through willful nondisclosure and governmental fraud to request 'vehicle registration plates' whereby unknowingly waiving her sovereign right to travel in her private conveyance for private noncommercial purposes without being restricted by unlawful encumbrances.

6. Georgia General Assembly House Bill 7 http://www1.1egis.ga.gov/legis/201112/sum/hb7.htm

11/15/10: House Prefiled; 01/12/2011: House First Readers; 01/24/2011: House Second Readers; repeals 'driver’s license' requirements for common law reasons:

http://www1.1egis.ga.gov/legis/201112/sum/hb7.htm


a. Free people have a common law and Constitutional right to travel on the roads and highways that are provided by their government for that purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an inalienable right;

b. In England in 121 the right to travel was enshrined in Article of Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it said above.

c. Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional rights;

d. American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of others. The government, by ·requiring the people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the people's common law and constitutional right to travel;

e. In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association ... it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights;

f. The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an orderly and decent manner; and

g. Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive the right and convert that right into a privilege.

As to Count I of Plaintiffs Complaint, 17-A M.R.S. § 751-A "REFUSING TO SUBMIT TO ARREST"


7. 17-A M.R.S. § 751-A has been REPEALED. 8. 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B Refusing to submit to arrest or detention

A person is guilty of refusing to submit to arrest or detention if, with the intent to hinder, delay or prevent a law enforcement officer from effecting the arrest or detention of that person, the person: A. Refuses to stop on request or signal of a law enforcement officer,

i. Plaintiff does not allege the Defendant refused to stop when signaled. ii. Defendant in fact stopped within 500 feet after being first signaled

to stop. B. Uses physical force against the law enforcement officer,

i. Plaintiff does not allege physical force by Defendant against Plaintiff. ii. Plaintiffs agent, Ofc. Christopher Guay, states, a. "I then informed Turcotte that if she did not exit the vehicle she

would also be charged with refusing to submit to arrest. Turcotte stated she was not going to exit her vehicle and again stated we had no legal right to compel her to do so. ''

iii. Plaintiffs agent, Ofc. Christopher Guay, states, a . "At this time Sgt. Shaw and myself took Turcotte from her vehicle by

her arms and used minimal force to do so. Turcotte did not resist being place[d] in hand cuffs or being place[d] in the rear passenger seat of my cruiser.''

iv. Defendant did not use physical force against Plaintiff. C. Creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the law enforcement officer.

i. Plaintiff does not allege risk of bodily injury created by Defendant. ii. Defendant did not create any risk of bodily injury to Plaintiff.

D.... It is a defense to prosecution under subsection 1, paragraph A that the law enforcement officer acted unlawfully in attempting to effect the arrest or detention. i. Plaintiffs agents (Ofc. Guay, Ofc. Harris, Sgt. Shaw) were all

knowingly acting unlawfully, individually and jointly, nunc pro tunc, and had no probable cause that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed by Defendant thereby constitutionally prohibiting the initial traffic stop which provoked the aggressive physical interactions.

9. 17-A M.R.S. § 12. De Minimus Infractions. "The court may dismiss a prosecution if, upon notice to or motion of the prosecutor and opportunity to be heard, having regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds the defendant's conduct: B. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the crime or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; C. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in defining the crime."


10. Defendant's actions "did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented".

11. Defendant did not violate 17-A M.R.S. § 751-A nor 17-A M.R.S. § 751-B. As to Count III of Plaintiffs Complaint, 29-A M.R.S. § 2104(1-A) "IMPROPER

PLATES" 12. § 2104(1-A). Improper plates. Permitting attachment of false plates. "A person

commits a Class E crime if that person permits to be attached to a vehicle a registration plate assigned to another vehicle or not currently assigned to that vehicle.”

13. 29-A M.R.S. § 451(4) dictates the mandatory standard design of all vehicle registration plates: Registration plate design. Registration plates must be designed as follows: B. Registration plates must bear the year of issue or the last 2 numerals of

that year and the word "Maine" or the abbreviation "Me." in letters of at least 3/4 inch in height centered at the top of the registration plate.

C. Except on motorcycle plates, registration plate numbers may not be substantially less than 3 inches high.

D. On registration plates issued for private use, the word "Vacationland" must be centered at the bottom...

14. Plaintiffs Agent, Ofc. Christopher Guay states, "I had recently read an email containing a picture of a similar license plate that read 'USDOT' on top and 'Private Peaceful' on the bottom. The plate number I observed was 2177825 and this did not register in any DMV checks."

15. A false 'vehicle registration plate cannot be deemed to be 'false' unless it substantially mimics or appears to replicate, or is in fact an authentic 'vehicle registration plate'.

16. Defendant affixed a black and white sign obviously contrasting a vehicle registration plate.

17. Defendant's private sign does not resemble nor mimic a vehicle registration plate.

18. Defendant did not attempt to forge, counterfeit nor replicate a vehicle registration plate.

19. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay states, "The plate number I observed was 2177825 and this did not register in any DMV checks." being prima facie evidence of the irrelevance and inapplicability of 29-A M.R.S. § 2104(1-A).

20. Defendant has never requested a state vehicle registration plate for her 1994 Toyota Celica.

21. Defendant did not attach a state vehicle registration plate assigned to another motor vehicle.

22. Defendant did not have possession of a false state vehicle registration plate upon arrest.

23. Defendant did not violate 29-A M.R.S. § 2104(1-A).


24. Defendant did not commit any crime to substantiate any traffic stop by Ofc. Guay.

25. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay did not know the identity of the Defendant before the traffic stop.

26. Plaintiffs Agent, Ofc. Guay did not have articulable suspicion of the commission of any crime prior to seizing Defendant via an unlawful and constitutionally prohibited traffic stop for "having a false plate attached" which was not a 'false plate' in any way whatsoever.

27. Plaintiffs Agent, Ofc. Christopher Guay violated Defendant's 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure without reasonable suspicion or objective justification.

28. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay states, "I am aware that people who claim to be 'sovereign citizens' display these types of plates."

29. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay did not "reasonably suspect that [Defendant] is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment." thereby prohibiting the traffic stop, nunc pro tunc.

30. See, e. g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U S. 47, 51 (1979) " ... before detaining an individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that he is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment. (to detain, officers must "have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity'');"

31. Plaintiffs Agents cannot lawfully initiate a traffic stop because the Defendant was suspected of being sovereign.

32. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights by initiating a traffic stop based on the unfounded assumption that the woman who entered the automobile was a 'sovereign citizen' (which is impossible. One cannot be sovereign and a citizen at the same time).

33. Defendant is in fact divinely, spiritually, lawfully, legally, and statutorily sovereign.

34. Being sovereign is not a crime. 35. Defendant was not "engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that

moment". 36. 17-A M.R.S. § 12. De Minimus Infractions. "The court may dismiss a

prosecution if, upon notice to or motion of the prosecutor and opportunity to be heard, having regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds the defendant's conduct: B. Did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented by the

law defining the crime or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction;

C. Presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the Legislature in defining the crime."

37. Defendant's actions "did not actually cause or threaten the harm sought to be prevented ".


38. Defendant's right to unhindered locomotion and free speech, inter alia, have been and are now violated by Plaintiffs requirement that all owners of automobiles register their private property and display 'vehicle registration plates' for the effective purpose of unlawfully monitoring, controlling and restricting Defendant's free movement in blatant violation of federal and state constitutional protections.

39. 18 U.S.C. § 31(6) defines "Motor vehicle" as "every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo."

40.18 U.S.C. § 31(10) defines "Used for commercial purposes" as "the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit."

41. Plaintiffs 29-A M.R.S. § 101(42) defines "Motor vehicle" as "a self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively on tracks ...” in direct conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 31(6).

42. 29-A M.R.S. § 101(91) defines "vehicle" as "a device for conveyance of persons or property on a way. “Vehicle" does not include conveyances propelled or drawn by human power or used exclusively on tracks or snowmobiles as defined in Title 12, section 13001 or an electric personal assistive mobility device as defined in this section."

43. 29-A M.R.S. § 101(50) defines "Owner" as a person holding title to a vehicle or having exclusive right to the use of the vehicle for a period of 30 days or more."

44. 29-A M.R.S. § 101(59) defines "public way" as "a way, owned and maintained by the State, a county or a municipality, over which the general public has a right to pass."

45. 29-A M.R.S. § 101(75) defines "street or highway" as "a public way." 46. 29-A M.R.S. § 351. Registration required "The owner of a vehicle that is

operated or remains on a public way is responsible for registering the vehicle." 47. Plaintiffs 29-A M.R.S. fails to establish any difference between a private

conveyance and a commercial motor vehicle as required by 18 U.S.C. § 31(6). 48. Defendant solely owns her 1994 Toyota Celica which is not a commercial

motor vehicle. 49. Defendant does not use her 1994 Toyota Celica for hire nor for commercial

purposes. 50. Plaintiff cannot enforce state 'laws' which directly and blatantly contradict

federal 'laws'. 51. 29-A M.R.S. § 351 is prima facie evidence of Plaintiffs willful infringement o~

several constitutional protections. As to Count II of Plaintiffs Complaint, 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(D)

"OPERATING AFTER SUSPENSION''


52. 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A (1-A). A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person: A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that

person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person: 1. Has received written notice of a suspension or revocation from the

Secretary of State or a court; 2. Has been orally informed of the suspension or revocation by a law

enforcement officer or a court; 3. Has actual knowledge of the suspension or revocation; 4. Has been sent written notice .in accordance with section 2482 or former

Title 29, section 2241, subsection 4; D. Violates paragraph A, the suspension was not for OUI or an OUI offense

and the person has one or more prior convictions for violating this section. 53. The aforementioned "prior offense" (AUGDC-11-CR-512; dismissed) and

AUGDC-11-CR-513 resulted from an unlawful fraudulent plea agreement willfully and knowingly coerced by Plaintiffs Agent, A.D.A. STEVE PARKER, on July 5, 2011.

54. The aforementioned ''prior offense" is now pending post-conviction review filed on July 6, 2012, for unlawful criminal prosecution of a 'traffic violation' which may be exclusively adjudicated, if at all, by:

29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(8) Traffic infraction. A person commits a traffic infraction operating while license suspended as described in subsection 1-A, paragraph A if the person has not been convicted or adjudicated of a prior offense under this section and the sole basis for the suspension is:

A. Failure to pay a fine; B. Failure to pay a license reinstatement fee; or C. Suspension for a dishonored check.

a. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit made a record entry on # 1491178 for an 'indefinite suspension' for 'failure to comply with medical e valuation request' on November 10, 2009 effective January 5, 2010, without due process of law.

b Defendant did not commit any actions to provoke the request for medical review.

c. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit, attempted to send two (2) undelivered notices to Defendant's last known mailing address.

d. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit, received both notices returned undeliverable as addressed, dated November 10, 2009 and December 28, 2009.

e. Defendant never received any written notice of suspension as required by 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-A)(A)(1) evidenced by two entries on driving record# 1491178, USPS RETURNED.

f. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit cannot claim Defendant "Has been sent written notice in accordance with section


2482" which implies successful delivery because said notices were USPS RETURNED on November 10, 2009 and December 28, 2009, respectively.

g. Defendant did not have knowledge of any suspension prior to March 7, 2011.

h. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit, despite knowingly and willfully violating due process of law and without holding mandatory hearings, suspended driver's license #1491178 on January 5, 2010.

1. Driver's license #1491178 received "violation free credits" for years 2008, 2009, and 2010.

J. Defendant completed Bureau of Motor Vehicle's medical evaluation on March 8, 2011.

k. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit immediately 'restored' license #1491178 without 'restoration fees' on March 8, 2011.

1. Plaintiffs Agent, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Medical Review Unit effectively 'deleted' the aforementioned 'medical suspension' from record #1491178 on March 8, 2011.

m. A "medical suspension" is not and can not be calculated as a prior offense "operating after suspension" pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A(1-Al(D).

n. Driving record # 1491178 is void of all "medical" restrictions, effective March 8, 2011.

55. Plaintiff has unclean hands and cannot prevail, pursuant to maxims of law. 56. By stealthy encroachment through the use of 'statutes' and 'administrative

rules', the corporation/state takes away our liberty and sells it back to us as a license. The stealthy encroachment process of the corporation/ state against the human depends on time for its success. The human lives perhaps 85 years. The corporation/state has eternal life. As each succeeding generation dies off, the next generation fails to remember the lessons and history of the previous generation. The corporation/state depends on that. Defendant remembers the way it was. We use the road as common tenants- not as renters/licensees from the corporation/state. By looking back at old disputes regarding roads, rivers, and other ways of passage, we see clearly that public property is nothing more than property held in common tenancy for use by the public.

57. Defendant peacefully asserts her sovereignty and personal liberty to freely possess private property liberated from all governmental interferences and encumbrances which is a guaranteed right to every citizen under our Constitution and common equity laws.

58. The Plaintiff cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of not-for-hire traveling.

59. The Plaintiff cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of possessing private property.


60. The Plaintiff cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental liberty of using one's own personal property as one deems suitable.

61. The Plaintiff cannot require or issue a license to exercise one's right to use public highways for private non-commercial traveling in one's conveyance of free choice.

62. The Plaintiff cannot require "enrollment" of private data into Plaintiffs "registration records".

63. Any person who travels in an automobile which is not registered, without 'proper vehicle registration plates', and who uses that private unregistered conveyance for private travel purposes does in fact put him/herself at very high risk for being arrested and imprisoned for failure to do a thing which patently violates Bill of Rights, 4th Amendment and Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 5 protections against unlawful search and seizure of persons, papers and things, "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures".

64. 29-A M.R.S. § 351 is prima facie evidence of Plaintiffs willful infringement of Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6-A, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of that person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof"

65. Any person who registers an automobile with the Plaintiff complies reluctantly only under duress, blatant intimidation, willful nondisclosure, criminal conspiracy, aggravated fraud and governmental corruption.

66. Any person who innocently fails or knowingly refuses to comply with registration and licensing rules and who exercises the right of locomotion by automobile is immediately categorized as a 'criminal' and subjected to intimidation, harassment, arrest, assault and kidnapping by law enforcement and judicial agencies in violation of federal and state constitutional protections.

67. A person's right to locomotion is a sacred right beholden to everyone. 68. A license is a grant or permission that is often assigned and documented by

way of a piece of paper which affords the licensee to do an act that would otherwise be unlawful.

69. Exercising one's right to travel and right to locomotion has never been 'unlawful'.

70. Being sovereign has never been 'unlawful'. 71. The Plaintiff cannot require or issue a license to exercise a fundamental

liberty to travel in one's chosen conveyance on a free, open public way which is reserved for use by the sovereign people as tenants in common.

72. 17-A M.R.S. § 2(19). Definitions state an "organization" means "a corporation, partnership or unincorporated association".

73. 17-A M.R.S. § 2(20). Definitions state a ''person" means "a human being or an organization').

74. Plaintiff, State of Maine, is a registered corporation and a corporate person.


75. 17 M.R.S. § 2931. Prohibition. A person may not, by force or threat of force, intentionally injure, intimidate or interfere with, or intentionally attempt to injure, intimidate or interfere with or intentionally oppress or threaten any other person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege, secured to that person by the Constitution of Maine or laws of the State or by the United States Constitution or laws of the United States."

76. Section 2 of the Bill of Rights clarifies "that all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that Magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them".

77 Article 1, Section 2 of the Maine Constitution, states, "All power is inherent in -the people; all free governments are founded in their authority and instituted for their benefit; they have therefore an unalienable and indefeasible right to institute government, and to alter, reform, or totally change the same, when their safety and happiness require it."

78. Article 4 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution and Article 1, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution, declares, "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from all unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without a special designation of the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized, nor without probable cause -- supported by oath or affirmation."

79. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 -Supreme Court 1824, "The word "license," means permission, or authority; and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the right to do whatever it purports to authorize."

80. Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616- Supreme Court 1886, "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon."

8l. Mattox v. United States, 156 US 237- Supreme Court 1895, "We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted':

82. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 US 425- Supreme Court 1886, "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."

83. 29-A M.R.S. § 351. Registration required is null pursuant to Norton v. Shelby Cty.

84. 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A Operating After Suspension is null pursuant to Norton v. Shelby Cty.

85. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573- 1889, "Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws, consists of the right of locomotion,-to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that which


may lead to one's business or pleasure, only so far restrained as the rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens."

86. Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573- 1889, "The right to travel is a part of the liberty of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law ....”

87. City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445 - 1898, "A license being regarded as a privilege can not possibly exist with reference to something which is a right, free and open to all, as is the right of the citizen to ride over the highways by motor vehicle, or horse vehicle in a reasonable manner."

88. Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193- 1908, "This Court has said with respect to an unconstitutional law that the matter stands as if the law had not been passed."

89. 29-A M.R.S. § 351. Registration required is null pursuant to Bonnett v. Vallier.

90. 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A Operating After Suspension is null pursuant to Bonnett v. Vallier.

9l. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583; 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926), "it would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of Constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."

92. Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367- Va: Supreme Court 1930, "The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will.

The exercise of such a common right the city may, under its police power, regulate in the interest of the public safety and welfare; but it may not arbitrarily or unreasonably prohibit or restrict it, nor may it permit one to


exercise it and refuse to permit another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, to exercise it. Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259; Ex parte Dickey, 75 W.Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915-F, 840; Hadfield Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, 168 Pac. 516, L.R.A. 1918-B, 909, Ann. Cas. 1918-C, 942. The regulation of the exercise of the right to drive a private automobile on the streets of the city may be accomplished in part by the city by granting, refusing, and revoking, under rules of general application, permits to drive an automobile on its streets; but such permits may not be arbitrarily refused or revoked, or permitted to be held by some and refused to other of like qualifications, under like circumstances and conditions. It has been said that when the State or a city has the power to prohibit the doing of an act altogether, it has the power to permit the doing of the act upon any condition, or subject to any regulation, however arbitrary or capricious it may be; and may lawfully delegate to executive or administrative officers an uncontrolled and arbitrary discretion as to granting and revoking permits or licenses to do such acts; Taylor v. Smith, 140 Va. 217, 124 S.E. 259, 263; State ex rel. Crumpton Montgomery, 177 Ala. 221, 59 So. 294; State Gray, 61 Conn. 39, 22 Atl. 675; City of St. Joseph Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31 S. W 101, 49 Am.St.Rep. 577; Brown Stubbs, 128 Md. 129, 97 Atl.227 This doctrine has been pronounced most often in cases involving the granting, refusing, and revoking of licenses or permits to sell intoxicating liquors, or to do other things which because of their character are, or tend to be, injurious, as for instance keeping a gambling house or a bawdy-house, or operating a junk or pawn shop; and it has also been applied to cases involving permits or licenses to transport persons or property for hire along the streets. See Taylor Smith, supra, and cases there cited. But this doctrine has no application to permits issued for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the common right to operate a private automobile on the streets of a city, in the usual and ordinary way, to transport the driver's person and property."

93. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105- Supreme Court 1943, "It contended, however, that the fact that the license tax can suppress or control this activity is unimportant if it does not do so. But that is to disregard the nature of this tax. It is a license tax a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. A state may not impose a charge for the enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution."

94. Smith v. Allwright, 321 US 649- Supreme Court 1944, “Constitutional rights would be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied."

95. Payne v. Massey, 145 Tex. 237, 196 S.W.2d 493, 495 (1946), "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful. The object of a license is to confer a right or power which does not exist without it."

96. City of Louisville v. Sebree, 214 SW 2d 248- 1948, "Specifically or technically speaking,[a] license means to confer on a person the right to do


something which otherwise he would not have the right to do-a special privilege rather than a right common to all persons."

97. Miller v. United States, 230 F. 2d 486- Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit 1956, "The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot thus be converted into a crime."

98. Berberian v. Lussier, 139 A. 2d 869- RI: Supreme Court 1958, "The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the right to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the constitutional guarantees of which the citizen may not be deprived without due process of law"

99. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 US 1 -Supreme Court 1958, "No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it. Chief Justice Marshall spoke for a unanimous Court in saying that: 'If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself becomes a solemn mockery…' United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 136."

100. United States v. Guest, 383 US 745 -Supreme Court 1966, "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another, and necessarily to use the highways and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized. In Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wan 35, invalidating a Nevada tax on every person leaving the State by common carrier, the Court took as its guide the statement of Chief Justice Taney in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492:

"For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States." Although the Articles of Confederation provided that "the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State," that right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason, it has been suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. See Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 274; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97; Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 177 (concurring opinion), 181 (concurring opinion); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 6-8; 12-16 (dissenting opinion)… …Although there have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the source Of the constitutional right of interstate travel, there is no need here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right exists. Its explicit recognition as one of the federal rights protected by what is now 18 U.


S. C. § 241 goes back at least as far as 1904. United States v. Moore, 129 F. 630, 633. We reaffirm it now."

101. Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46- Idaho: Supreme Court 1966 "The right to operate a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the fede ral-and state constitutions. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76 P.2d 917 (1938); Packard v. O'Neil, 45 Idaho 427, 262 P. 881, 56 A.L. R. 31-7(1927); Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P. 724 (1922); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz_ 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1960); Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N. W2d 620, 35 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N. W2d 52 (1951); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S. W2d 141 (Ky.1951); Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958); Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878 (1st Cir. 1953). "

102. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 - Supreme Court 1966, "Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them."

103. Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 -Supreme Court 1968, "Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.''

104. Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1 - Supreme Court 1965, "The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs. For, as this Court has always recognized, "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).

We have recently held that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,” Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable "expectation of privacy," id., at 361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Of course, the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. For "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures. " Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 222 (1960). Unquestionably petitioner was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he walked down the street in Cleveland. Beck v. Ohio, 379 US


89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 US 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 US 98 (1959); United States v. Di Re, 332 US 581 (1948); Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132 (1925). The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street encounter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure.”

105. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 US 147- Supreme Court 1969, “ ... our decisions have made clear that a person faced with such an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the exercise of the right of free expression for which the law purports to require a license ... "

106. People v. Horton, 14 Cal. App. 3d 930- Cal: Court of Appeal, 5th Appellate Dist. 1971, " ... the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality, is a fundamental constitutional right which must be protected by the courts."

107. Defendant did not commit any crime to substantiate any traffic stop by Ofc. Guay.

108. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay did not know the identity of the Defendant before the traffic stop.

109. Plaintiffs Agent, Ofc. Guay did not have articulable suspicion of the commission of any crime prior to seizing Defendant via an unlawful and constitutionally prohibited traffic stop for "having a false plate attached" which was not a 'false plate' in any way whatsoever.

110. Plaintiffs Agent, Ofc. Christopher Guay violated Defendant's 4th Amendment protections against unlawful search and seizure without reasonable suspicion or objective justification.

111. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay states, "I am aware that people who claim to be 'sovereign citizens ‘ display these types of plates."

112. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay did not "reasonably suspect that [Defendant] is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment.'' thereby prohibiting the traffic stop, nunc pro tunc.

113. See, e. g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979) " ... before detaining an individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that he is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment. (to detain, officers must "have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity'');"

114. Plaintiffs Agents cannot lawfully initiate a traffic stop because the Defendant was suspected of being sovereign.

115. Plaintiffs Agent Ofc. Guay violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights by initiating a traffic stop based on the unfounded assumption that the woman who entered the automobile was a 'sovereign citizen' (which is impossible. One cannot be sovereign and a citizen at the same time).

116. Defendant is in fact divinely, spiritually, lawfully, legally, and statutorily sovereign.


117. Being sovereign is not a crime. 118. Defendant was not "engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that

moment". 119. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 US 873- Supreme Court 1975,

"The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis. v. Mississippi, 394 U. S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16-19 (1968). "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person," id., at 16, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be "reasonable."

120. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648- Supreme Court 1979, "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments are implicated in this case because stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of those Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief)} United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 556-558 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 878 (1975); cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 16 (1968).

121. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 US 544- Supreme Court 1980, 'The Fourth Amendment's requirement that searches and seizures be founded upon an objective justification, governs all seizures of the person, "including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1968)." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878.[5] Accordingly, if the respondent was "seized" when the DEA agents approached her on the concourse and asked questions of her, the agents' conduct in doing so was constitutional only ifthey reasonably suspected the respondent of wrongdoing. But "[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, at 19, n. 16. )}

122. State v. Cloukey, 486 A. 2d 143- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 1985, "In Delaware v Prouse, 440 US 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) the Supreme Court affirmed an order suppressing evidence and held that the roving stop of a motorist, without at least an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a violation might be occurring, violates the Fourth Amendment."

123. United States v. Sokolow, 490 US 1 -Supreme Court 1989, "The Fourth Amendment cabins government's authority to intrude on personal privacy and security by requiring that searches and seizures usually be supported by a showing of probable cause. The reasonable suspicion standard is a derivation of the probable-cause command, applicable only to those brief detentions which fall short of being full-scale searches and seizures and which are necessitated by law enforcement exigencies such as the need to stop ongoing


crimes, to prevent imminent crimes, and to protect law enforcement officers in highly charged situations. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 30 (1968). By requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to such seizures, the Fourth Amendment protects innocent persons from being subjected to "overbearing or harassing" police conduct carried out solely on the basis of imprecise stereotypes of what criminals look like, or on the basis of irrelevant personal characteristics...

To deter such egregious police behavior, we have held that a suspicion is not reasonable unless officers have based it on "specific and articulable facts." Id., at 21; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 880 (1975). It is not enough to suspect that an individual has committed crimes in the past, harbors unconsummated criminal designs, or has the propensity to commit crimes. On the contrary, before detaining an individual, law enforcement officers must reasonably suspect that he is engaged in, or poised to commit, a criminal act at that moment. See e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 US 47, 51 (1979) (to detain, officers must "have a reasonable suspicion” based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity'); Terry, supra, at 30 (reasonable suspicion exists only where policeman reasonably concludes, inter alia, "that criminal activity may be afoot')."

124. US v. Salinas, 940 F. 2d 392- Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 1991, "The fourth amendment forbids stopping a vehicle even for the limited purpose of questioning its occupants unless police officers have a founded suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir.1989). "Founded suspicion must exist at the time the officer initiates the stop." United States v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir.1988). In evaluating whether founded suspicion exists, the totality of the circumstances should be considered. United States v. Sokolow, 490 US 1,8, 109 S.Ct, 1581,1586, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir.1989). Founded suspicion exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts, that, together with rational inferences drawn from them, reasonably warrant a suspicion that the person to be detained has committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Cortez, 44 9 U.S. 411, 416-18, 101 S.Ct. 690,694-95, 66L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); United States v. Roberts., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir.1989) (no founded suspicion where driver quickly glanced at officers and did not break any traffic laws, and vehicle had large trunk which did not appear heavily loaded). "Permissible deductions or rational inferences must be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation." "

125. State v. Patterson, 868 A. 2d 188- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2005, "The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article 1, Section 5 o[the Maine Constitution, offer identical protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Gulick, 2000 ME 170, f: 9 n. 3, 759 A2d 1085, 1087. '~n encounter between a police officer and a citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment only if the officer 'seizes' the citizen." State v. Cilley, 1998


ME 34, , 7, 707 A.2d 79, 82. A seizure occurs when an officer, by a show of authority, in some way restrains a citizen such that "he is not free to walk away." Id. (quotation marks omitted). The test for whether a seizure has occurred is an objective one, i.e., whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554. 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)."

126. State v. Ronald A. LaPlante, 26 A. 3d 337- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2011, '~ traffic stop of a motorist by a law enforcement officer is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 5, of the Maine Constitution. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425-26, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004); State v. Hutchinson, 2009 ME 44, , 18 n. 9, 969 A.2d 923, 928; State v. Brewer, 1999 ME 58, , 12,727 A.2d 352, 355. A seizure is unlawful if it is unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Me. Canst. art. I,§ 5. In almost all circumstances, a warrantless seizure is unreasonable in the absence of an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion "that criminal conduct has taken place, is occurring, or imminently will occur."[2] State v. Donatelli, 2010 ME 43, 11, 995 A.2d 238, 241 (quotation marks omitted). However, the Supreme Court recognized in Brown that even in the absence of reasonable articulable suspicion, a seizure for information-seeking purposes may be reasonable if "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure [and] the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest" outweigh "the severity of the interference with individual liberty. "443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637 ...”

" ... We thus examine the reasonableness of the trooper's stop of LaPlante by evaluating (1) the gravity of the public concern in addressing a civil speeding infraction; (2) the degree to which the seizure of a motorist advances a speeding investigation; and (3) the severity of the interference with a motorist's constitutionally-protected liberty interest when that motorist is stopped for questioning by law enforcement ...”

" ... The requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable "reflects the Framers' recognition 'that searches and seizures were too valuable to law enforcement to prohibit them entirely' but that 'they should be slowed down.”” Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment: Its History and Interpretation§ 11.1 at 466 (2008) (quoting Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 75, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting). Accordingly, when the State points to a public concern to justify the reasonableness of a search or seizure, courts must consider the gravity of that public concern in the context of the constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99 S. Ct. 2637 ... "

" ...In contrast, the investigation of noncriminal offenses is generally not a sufficiently grave public concern to outweigh the interference with a motorist's liberty interest that occurs when the motorist is stopped without any reasonable articulable suspicion.[3] See, e.g., State v. Ryland, 241 Neb. 74, 486 N. W2d 210, 213-14 (1992).


In this case, the trooper was investigating a noncriminal speeding offense.[4] In contrast with the burglary investigation considered in Gorneault or the serious crimes considered in Gipson, Baxter, and Williamson, the civil speeding infraction that led the trooper to stop LaPlante did not present a matter of grave public concern ... "

" ... The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's reasonable desire for privacy, which arises from "the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S.Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Every traffic stop involves some degree of interference with that liberty interest because the motorist, whether law-abiding or not, loses the freedom to travel without interruption. The resulting intrusion on a person's individual autonomy is not insubstantial ... ''

" .. .In contrast with Gorneault and Lidster, in State v. Kent, we recently concluded that a stop and seizure resulting from a sobriety checkpoint was constitutionally unreasonable, noting that the detention of motorists for an average of three to five minutes, in the absence of "accountability, oversight, or adherence to protocol," "suggested more than a minimal intrusion of a motorist's liberty interest. "2011 ME 42, ~~ 13, 14, 15, 20, 15 A.3d 1286,1289,1290, 1291. We noted in that case that "the crucial underlying criterion of reasonableness is the amount of discretion that a police officer is allowed to exercise in conducting a stop." Id. ~ 16, 15 A. 3d at 1290 (quotation marks omitted)."

“Here, none of the elements that might have minimized the interference with LaPlante's liberty interest were present. The trooper's stop of LaPlante was not part of a pre-planned roadblock and was, in all salient respects, a function of the trooper's individual discretion. LaPlante's stop was more likely to cause alarm and anxiety than a roadblock stop because upcoming roadblocks are clearly visible) whereas LaPlante had no indication that he would be stopped. See Sitz 496 U.S. at 4531 110 S.Ct. 2481. Viewed objectively, once a motorist such as LaPlante, submits to the authority of a law enforcement officer by pulling over and stopping, the motorist is not free to leave until given permission by the officer.[5] An individual who is pulled over under these circumstances, while operating in a manner consistent with the posted speed limit and all other laws, has no basis to know the reason for, or the likely length of, the stop that will ensue.

Because there were no formal restrictions on the trooper's exercise of discretion, and, under the circumstances of the stop, there was a significant potential to cause alarm and anxiety, the interference with LaPlante's liberty interest was significant. "

127. State v. Daniel Whitney, 2012 ME 105- Me: Supreme Judicial Court 2012, "In contrast, we observed that a civil speeding infraction did not present a similarly grave public concern. Id. ¶13. The crime here, failure to report a non-fatal accident, although more serious than a civil speeding infraction, is a


Class E misdemeanor. See 29-A M.R.S. § 2251(8)(A) (2011). Accordingly, this crime, although of greater concern than a civil speeding infraction, does not present a matter of grave public concern similar to the more serious felony offenses we have discussed in our prior decisions. See LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, 'II 13, 26 A. 3d 337.”

“... we have recognized that traffic stops intrude on a person's liberty to a degree that is not insubstantial. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ~ 16, 26 A. 3d 337. Indeed, we concluded in LaPlante that the officer's stop in that case significantly interfered with LaPlante's liberty interest because "there were no formal restrictions on the trooper's exercise of discretion, and, under the circumstances of the stop there was a significant potential to cause alarm and anxiety." Id ¶21. We explained that the information-seeking stop in that case was "in all salient respects, a function of the trooper's individual discretion" and "more likely to cause alarm and anxiety than a roadblock stop because upcoming roadblocks are clearly visible, whereas LaPlante had no indication that he would be stopped." Id. ¶20 ...”

“See LaPlante, 2011 ME 85, ¶20, 26 A.3d 337; see also Sitz, 496 US at 453 (explaining that roving patrols usually take place at night and "their approach may frighten motorists[,]" whereas, at a checkpoint stop, motorists can see other vehicles being stopped and can observe visible signs of the police officers' authority (quotation marks omitted)). Sanctioning this seizure would significantly expand the discretion of an officer on an unsupervised roving patrol to seize motorists who otherwise are committing no offense and have no apparent involvement in, or knowledge of, relatively minor crimes that have occurred in an area distant from where the stop occurs."

"we conclude that because Whitney was seized in the absence of any reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal conduct during a police officer's roving patrol, the seizure was unconstitutional. Further, the public's interest concerning the misdemeanor crime of failure to report an accident, and the degree to which that interest is advanced when a motorist is stopped at random, more than an hour after police have responded to the accident, to verify that the motorist and his passenger were not involved in the accident, is outweighed by the significant interference with the stopped motorist's liberty interest."

128. Plaintiff lacks standing to proceed. 129. Plaintiff has violated and prevented due process of law. 130. Plaintiff has violated Defendant's constitutionally protected rights. 131. Plaintiff has unclean hands and cannot prevail pursuant to maxims of

law. 132. Callas v. State, 320 SW 2d 360- Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1959,

“This Court has held that there is no such license known to Texas law as a "driver's license". See Hassell v. State, 149 Tex. Cr.R. 333, 194 S. W2d 400; Brooks v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 546, 258 S. W2d 317."


133. Brooks v. State, 258 SW 2d 317- Tex: Court of Criminal Appeals 1953, "The information upon which this conviction was predicated alleged that appellant 'did then and there unlawfully drive and operate a motor vehicle upon· a public highway ... while his .. . drivers license was suspended.'

In Hassell v. State, 149 Tex.Cr.R. 333, 194 S. W2d 400, 401, we said: "There being

no such license as a 'driver's' license known to the law, it follows that the information, in charging the driving of a motor vehicle upon a public highway without such a license, charges no offense." See also Holloway v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 237 S. W2d 303.

Because the information fails to charge an offense, the judgment is reversed and the

prosecution ordered dismissed. " 134. Plaintiffs Law Enforcement Agents must all know about Maine Law

Enforcement Officer's Manual 2008- 2010, pg 4-11 which clearly and well advises its readers that 4th Amendment protections exist for ALL traffic stops of private non-commercial automobiles.

WHEREFORE, DEFENDANT hereby requires this court dismiss all charges

with prejudice. Dated: August, 27, 2012 Gina Lynn Turcotte


APPENDIX LL Petition For Post-Conviction Review


APPENDIX MM Secretary Of State Certificate Of Suspension Apr 6 2012


APPENDIX NN Narrative Of Steven J. Corbett Apr 6 2012


APPENDIX OO Confidential Screening Sheet

ARRAIGN: April 06, 2012 D.A.: David W. Jackson DATE SCREENED: 4/6/2012 9:23:00 AM JW #: 12-1961 STATE v. GINA L. TURCOTTE DOB: 12/17/1968 CO-DEFENDANT: NONE APPROVED COUNT 1: VIOLATION OF CONDITION OF RELEASE CHARGES: COUNT 2: OPERATING AFTER SUSPENSION BAC =

COUNT 3: IMPROPER PLATES BAC = COUNT 4: FAILURE TO STOP FOR AN OFFICER BAC =

VICTIM(S): OFFICER(S): Steven Corbett, Oakland Police Dept.· WITNESS(ES): OFFENSE DATE: 4/5/2012 OFFENSE LOCATION: Oakland 4/6/2012 9:53:17 AM David W. Jackson ADA SCREEN-- Defendant may claim "sovereign citizen" status. D was operator of a car stopped for having no inspection sticker. D told Officer she had no license, registration, inspection or insurance. Registration plate on car came back to a Gina Turcotte with a suspended license and bail conditions of not to operate a motor vehicle unless lawfully licensed. D then drove away. Officer followed with lights and siren on down KMD until D eventually pulled into a business parking area and was arrested. D was suspended November 28, 2011 for Failing to Pay a Fine. PRIOR OAS conviction AUGDC-CR-11-513. July 5, 2011 -fine imposed was $250. PRIORS: 02/12 Refuse to sub, OAS/Prior, Improper plates PEND 07/11 OAS Nolo FINE 03/02 Assault OFFER: WAT --$500 fine on OAS and 48 hrs CC on VCR, Improper plates and Fail to stop AUGDC-CR-12-301 $500 OAS, 48 hrs CC on Refuse to sub, Improper plates CASE STATUS: ACTIVE DISSEMINATION IS A CLASS E CRIME IN VIOLATION OF THE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION ACT. 16 M.R.S. § 611 ET. SEQ.


APPENDIX PP Narrative Of Christopher Guay And Christopher Shaw


APPENDIX QQ Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Aug 9 2011


APPENDIX RR Judgment And Commitment July 5, 2011


APPENDIX SS Complaint AUGDC-CR-11-512/513


APPENDIX TT Notice Of Suspension Deletion

Department of

the Secretary of State Bureau of Motor Vehicles

Charles E. Summers, Jr. Thomas Arnold Secretary of State Deputy Secretary of State Patty Morneault Director of Driver License Services Gina L. Turcotte Print Date: March 8, 2011 239 Cony St, Apt 2 Date of Birth: December 17, 1968 Augusta, ME 04330 License Number/Class: 1491178/C

License Expiration: December 17, 2012 l. Your privilege(s) to operate/apply for a motor vehicle operator's license in the State of Maine has been restored as of March 8,, 2011 03:36:00 PM. 2. The suspension(s) listed below have been deleted from your record: January 5, 2010, FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH MEDICAL EVALUATION REQUEST. Sincerely, Charles E. Summers, Jr. Secretary of State


APPENDIX UU Notice of Suspension and Opportunity for Hearing Dec. 17, 2009


APPENDIX VV Medical Evaluation Request NOV. 2, 2009


APPENDIX WW Driving Record 04/02/13


APPENDIX XX Petition for Review of Final Agency Action MRCivP 80C


APPENDIX YY Motion for Reconsideration Denied


APPENDIX ZZ Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration


APPENDIX AAA Motion for Reconsideration

No. _____________


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------


Petitioner

v.


---------------------------------∞---------------------------------



___________________________________________

APPENDIX, VOLUME IV ___________________________________________



BLACK’S LAW, 9TH EDITION LEGAL MAXIMS

Actus curiae neminem gravabit. An act of the court will prejudice no one. Actus legis nemini est damnosus. An act of the law prejudices no one. Actus legis nemini fadt injuriam. An act of the law does no one wrong. Actus repugnans non potest in esse produci. A repugnant act cannot be brought into being (that is, cannot be made effectual). Acta exteriora indicant interiora secreta. Outward acts indicate the thoughts hidden within. A l'impossible nul n'est tenu. No one is bound to do what is impossible. Cessa regnare, si non vis judicare. Cease to reign if you wish not to adjudicate. Consuetudo debet esse certa, nam incerta pro nullis habentur. A custom should be certain, for uncertain things are held as nothing. Consuetudo est optimus interpres legum. Custom is the best expounder of the law. Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege. A contemporaneous exposition is the best and most powerful in the law. A statute is best explained by following the construction put on it by judges who lived at the time it was made, or soon after.


Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum. Discretion is to discern through law what is just. Discretio est scire per legem quid sit justum. Discretion consists in knowing what is just in law. Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit. No guilt attaches to a person who is compelled to obey. Error juris nocet. An error of law injures. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Extortio est crimen quando quis colore officii extorquet quod non est debitum, vel supra debitum, vel ante tempus quod est debitum. Extortion is a crime when, by color of office, any person extorts what is not due, or more than due, or before the time when it is due. Extremis probatis praesumuntur media. Extremes having been proved, intermediate things are presumed. Ex turpi contractu non oritur actio. No action arises from a wrongful contract. Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur. Defendants are rather to be favored than plaintiffs. Hominum causa jus constitutum est. Law was established for the benefit of humankind. Ignorantia eorum quae quis scire tenetur non excusat.


Ignorance of those things that anyone is bound to know does not excuse. Ignorantia excusatur non juris sed facti. Ignorance of fact is excused but not ignorance of law. Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of fact excuses; ignorance of law does not excuse. Every person must be considered cognizant of the law; otherwise, there is no limit to the excuse of ignorance. Ignorantia judicis est calamitas innocentis. The ignorance of the judge is the misfortune of the innocent. Ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of the law does not excuse. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur neminem excusat. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one. Ignorantia juris sui non praejudicat juri. Ignorance of one's right does not prejudice the right. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Ignorance of law excuses no one. Ignorantia praesumitur ubi scientia non probatur. Ignorance is presumed where knowledge is not proved. Ignorare legis est lata culpa. To be ignorant of the law is gross neglect of it. Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertat; non favet. A person is to be judged impious and cruel who does not favor liberty.


Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. There is no obligation to perform impossible things. In favorem vitae, libertatis, et innocentiae omnia praesumuntur. All presumptions are in favor of life, liberty, and innocence. Infinitum in jure reprobatur. That which is endless is condemned in law. In genere quicunque aliquid dicit, sive actor sive reus, necesse est ut probat. In general, whoever alleges anything, whether plaintiff or defendant, must prove it. In novo casu novum remedium apponendum est. In a novel case a new legal remedy must be applied. Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur. The judge is condemned when the guilty party is acquitted. Juris ignorantia est cum jus nostrum ignoramus. It is ignorance of law when we do not know our own right. Juris praecepta sunt haec, honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere. These are the precepts of the law: to live honorably, not to injure another, to render to each person his due. Juris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti verum ignorantiam non nocere. Ignorance of law is prejudicial to everyone, but ignorance of fact is not. Jus est ars boni et aequi. Law is the science of what is good and just. Jus est norma recti; et quicquid est contra normam recti est injuria.


The law is the rule of right; and whatever is contrary to the rule of right is an injury. Jus respicit aequitatem. Law regards equity. Justitia nemini neganda est. Justice is to be denied to no one. Justitia non est neganda, non differenda. Justice is not to be denied or delayed. La ley favour la vie d'un home. The law favors a man's life. Leges naturae perfectissimae sunt et immutabiles; humani vero juris conditio semper

in infinitum decurrit, et nihil est in eo quod perpetuo stare possit. The laws of nature are most perfect and immutable; but the condition of human law is an unending succession, and there is nothing in it that can stand forever. Leges suum ligent latorem. Laws should bind their own author. Lex aequitate gaudet. Law delights in equity. Lex aequitate gaudet; appetit perfectum; est norma recti. The law delights in equity: it covets perfection; it is a rule of right. Lex nemin; facit injuriam. The law does wrong to no one. Libertas est naturalis facultas ejus quod cuique facere libet, nisi quod de jure aut vi prohibetur.


Liberty is the natural power of doing whatever one pleases, except what is prevented by law or force. Libertas omnibus rebus favorabilior est. Liberty is more favored than all things. Maxime ita dicta quia maxima est ejus dignitas et certissima auctoritas, atque quod maxime omnibus probetur. A maxim is so called because its dignity is chiefest and its authority is the most certain, and because it is most approved by all. Neminem laedit qui jure suo utitur. A person who exercises his own rights injures no one. Neminem oportet esse sapientiorem legibus. No one ought to be wiser than the laws. Obedientia est legis essentia. Obedience is the essence of the law. Quotiens dubia interpretatio libertatis est, secundum libertatem respondendum erit. Whenever there is an interpretation doubtful as to liberty (or slavery), the decision must be in favor of liberty. Probandi necessitas incumbit illi qui agit. The necessity of proving rests on the one who sues. Regula est, juris quidem ignorantiam euique nocere, facti vero ignorantiam non noeere. The rule is that ignorance of the law is harmful (or prejudicial) to anyone, but ignorance of a fact is not. Ignorance of a fact may excuse a party from the legal consequences of his conduct, but not ignorance of law. Regula pro lege, si deficit lex.


If the law is inadequate, the maxim serves in its place. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Literally, to stand by previous decisions and not to disturb settled matters. To adhere to precedents, and not to depart from established principles.

DEFINITIONS automobile exception. The doctrine that when probable cause exists, a law-enforcement officer need not obtain a warrant before searching a movable vehicle (such as a car or boat) in which an individual has a lessened expectation of privacy. This is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for search and seizure; exigent circumstances are presumed to exist. Once the right to conduct a warrantless search arises, the actual search may take place at a later time. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464 (1974); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991). reasonably believe. To believe (a given fact or combination of facts) under circumstances in which a reasonable person would believe. probable cause. 1. Criminal law. A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause - which amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a conviction must be shown before an arrest warrant or search warrant may be issued. exigent circumstances. 1. A situation that demands unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent usual procedures. 2. A situation in which a police officer must take immediate action to effectively make an arrest, search, or seizure for which probable cause exists, and thus may do so without first obtaining a warrant. Exigent circumstances may exist if (1) a person's life or safety is threatened, (2) a suspect's escape is imminent, or (3) evidence is about to be removed or destroyed. coercion n. 1. Compulsion by physical force or threat of physical force. 2. Conduct that constitutes the improper use of economic power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it. commerce. The exchange of goods and services, esp. on a large scale involving transportation between cities, states, and nations.


adhesion contract. A standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms. contract, n. 1. An agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law. doctrine of precedent. 1. The rule that precedents not only have persuasive authority but also must be followed when similar circumstances arise due process. The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and enforcement of private rights, including notice and the right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case. equity, n. 1. Fairness; impartiality; evenhanded dealing 2. The body of principles constituting what is fair and right; natural law. 3. The recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circumstances. fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Criminal procedure. The rule that evidence derived from an illegal search, arrest, or interrogation is inadmissible because the evidence (the "fruit") was tainted by the illegality (the "poisonous tree") . government. 1. The structure of principles and rules determining how a state or organization is regulated. 2. The sovereign power in a nation or state. 3. An organization through which a body of people exercises political authority; the machinery by which sovereign power is expressed. incompetence. n. 1. The state or fact of being unable or unqualified to do something. labor. Work of any type, including mental exertion. labor. vb. 1. To work, esp. with great exertion. liberty. 1. Freedom from arbitrary or undue external restraint, esp. by a government. 2. A right, privilege, or immunity enjoyed by prescription or by grant; the absence of a legal duty imposed on a person. "[Liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626 (1923).


license. A permission, usu. revocable, to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful. originalism. Constitutional law. The theory that the U.S. Constitution should be interpreted according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted it. overbreadth doctrine. Constitutional law. The doctrine holding that if a statute is so broadly written that it deters free expression, then it can be struck down on its face because of its chilling effect - even if it also prohibits acts that may legitimately be forbidden. penalty. 1. Punishment imposed on a wrongdoer, usu. in the form of imprisonment or fine; esp., a sum of money exacted as punishment for either a wrong to the state or a civil wrong. Though usu. for crimes, penalties are also sometimes imposed for civil wrongs. civil penalty. A fine assessed for a violation of a statute or regulation. statutory penalty. A penalty imposed for a statutory violation; esp., a penalty imposing automatic liability on a wrongdoer for violation of a statute's terms without reference to any actual damages suffered. power. 1. The ability to act or not act; esp., a person's capacity for acting in such a manner as to control someone else's responses. 2. Dominance, control, or influence over another; control over one's subordinates. 3. The legal right or authorization to act or not act; a person's or organization's ability to alter, by an act of will, the rights, duties, liabilities, or other legal relations either of that person or of another. privilege. 1. A special legal right, exemption, or immunity granted to a person or class of persons; an exception to a duty. A privilege grants someone the legal freedom to do or not to do a given act. It immunizes conduct that, under ordinary circumstances, would subject the actor to liability. public, adj. 1. Relating or belonging to an entire community, state, or nation. 2. Open or available for all to use, share, or enjoy. public, n. 1. The people of a nation or community as a whole. 2. A place open or visible to the public. punishment, n. 1. A sanction - such as a fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law. reasonable suspicion. A particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity.


remedial, adj. 1. Affording or providing a remedy; providing the means of obtaining redress. 2. Intended to correct, remove, or lessen a wrong, fault, or defect. 3. Of or relating to a means of enforcing an existing substantive right. repugnant adj. Inconsistent or irreconcilable with; contrary or contradictory to. residence. 1. The act or fact of living in a given place for some time. 2. The place where one actually lives, as distinguished from a domicile. Residence usu. just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place; domicile usu. requires bodily presence plus an intention to make the place one's home. A person thus may have more than one residence at a time but only one domicile. Sometimes, though, the two terms are used synonymously. right, n. 1. That which is proper under law, morality, or ethics. 2. Something that is due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle. 3. A power, privilege, or immunity secured to a person by law. 4. A legally enforceable claim that another will do or will not do a given act; a recognized and protected interest the violation of which is a wrong. 5. (often pl.) The interest, claim, or ownership that one has in tangible or intangible property. absolute right. 1. A right that belongs to every human being, such as the right of personal liberty; a natural right. 2. An unqualified right; specif., a right that cannot be denied or curtailed except under specific conditions. right to travel. A person's constitutional right guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause to travel freely between states. sanction, n. 1. Official approval or authorization 2. A penalty or coercive measure that results from failure to comply with a law, rule, or order. involuntary servitude. The condition of one forced to labor for pay or not for another by coercion or imprisonment. slavery. A situation in which one person has absolute power over the life, fortune, and liberty of another. 2. The practice of keeping individuals in such a state of bondage or servitude. stare decisis n. The doctrine of precedent, under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation. supreme law of the land. 1. The U.S. Constitution. 2. Acts of Congress made in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.


traffic, n. 1. Commerce; trade; the sale or exchange of such things as merchandise, bills, and money. 2. The passing or exchange of goods or commodities from one person to another for an equivalent in goods or money. 3. People or things being transported along a route. 4. The passing to and fro of people, animals, vehicles, and vessels along a transportation route. transient adj. Temporary; impermanent. transient, n. 1. A person or thing whose presence is temporary or fleeting. 2. transient person. transient person. One who has no legal residence within a jurisdiction for the purpose of a state venue statute. work. Physical and mental exertion to attain an end.


CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of

Citizens in the several States.” United States Constitution, Article VI: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States…shall be the supreme Law

of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby…” United States Constitution, Amendment I: “Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech…” United States Constitution, Amendment IV : “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” United States Constitution, Amendment V: “No person shall…be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law…” United States Constitution, Amendment IIVX: “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime

whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”

United States Constitution, Amendment IVX: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”


CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: The Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by

Automobile, 1890-1950


STATUTES United States Code

18 U.S. Code § 31(a) (6) Motor vehicle.— The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo. 18 U.S. Code § 31(a) (10) Used for commercial purposes.— The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. 18 U.S. Code § 1589 - Forced labor

(a) Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person; (2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person; (3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or (4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint, shall be punished as provided under subsection (d).

(b) Whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of the means described in subsection (a), knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services by any of such means, shall be punished as provided in subsection (d). (c) In this section:

(1) The term “abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process” means the use or threatened use of a law or legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not


designed, in order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.

(2) The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.

23 U.S. Code § 159(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section— (1) Driver’s license.— The term “driver’s license” means a license issued by a State to any individual that authorizes the individual to operate a motor vehicle on highways. 23 U.S. Code § 154(a) Definitions. In this section, the following definitions apply: (2) Motor vehicle.— The term “motor vehicle” means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechanical power and manufactured primarily for use on public highways, but does not include a vehicle operated exclusively on a rail or rails. 42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia. 42 U.S. Code § 1985 - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights (1) Preventing officer from performing duties If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from accepting or holding any office, trust, or place of confidence under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof; or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave any State, district, or place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his


property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his official duties; (2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, witness, or juror If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his person or property on account of any verdict, presentment, or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being or having been such juror; or if two or more persons conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws; (3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 42 U.S. Code § 1986 - Action for neglect to prevent Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages may be recovered in an action on the case; and any number of persons guilty of such


wrongful neglect or refusal may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding $5,000 damages therein, for the benefit of the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the deceased. But no action under the provisions of this section shall be sustained which is not commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued. 42 U.S. Code § 10801 - Congressional findings and statement of purpose (a) The Congress finds that—

(1) individuals with mental illness are vulnerable to abuse and serious injury; (2) family members of individuals with mental illness play a crucial role in being advocates for the rights of individuals with mental illness where the individuals are minors, the individuals are legally competent and choose to involve the family members, and the individuals are legally incompetent and the legal guardians, conservators, or other legal representatives are members of the family; (3) individuals with mental illness are subject to neglect, including lack of treatment, adequate nutrition, clothing, health care, and adequate discharge planning; and (4) State systems for monitoring compliance with respect to the rights of individuals with mental illness vary widely and are frequently inadequate.

(b) The purposes of this chapter are— (1) to ensure that the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected; and (2) to assist States to establish and operate a protection and advocacy system for individuals with mental illness which will—

(A) protect and advocate the rights of such individuals through activities to ensure the enforcement of the Constitution and Federal and State statutes; and (B) investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness if the incidents are reported to the system or if there is probable cause to believe that the incidents occurred.

42 U.S. Code § 10802 – Definitions For purposes of this subchapter:


(1) The term “abuse” means any act or failure to act by an employee of a facility rendering care or treatment which was performed, or which was failed to be performed, knowingly, recklessly, or intentionally, and which caused, or may have caused, injury or death to a [1] individual with mental illness, and includes acts such as—

(A) the rape or sexual assault of a [1] individual with mental illness; (B) the striking of a [1] individual with mental illness; (C) the use of excessive force when placing a [1] individual with mental illness in bodily restraints; and (D) the use of bodily or chemical restraints on a [1] individual with mental illness which is not in compliance with Federal and State laws and regulations.

(2) The term “eligible system” means the system established in a State to protect and advocate the rights of persons with developmental disabilities under subtitle C of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C. 15041 et seq.]. (3) The term “facilities” may include, but need not be limited to, hospitals, nursing homes, community facilities for individuals with mental illness, board and care homes, homeless shelters, and jails and prisons. (4) The term “individual with mental illness” means, except as provided in section 10804 (d) of this title, an individual—

(A) who has a significant mental illness or emotional impairment, as determined by a mental health professional qualified under the laws and regulations of the State; and (B)

(i) (I) who is an inpatient or resident in a facility rendering care or treatment, even if the whereabouts of such inpatient or resident are unknown; (II) who is in the process of being admitted to a facility rendering care or treatment, including persons being transported to such a facility; or”; [2] (III) who is involuntarily confined in a municipal detention facility for reasons other than serving a sentence resulting from conviction for a criminal offense; or

(ii) who satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (A) and lives in a community setting, including their own home.

(5) The term “neglect” means a negligent act or omission by any individual responsible for providing services in a facility rendering care or treatment which caused or may have caused injury or death to a [1] individual with mental illness or which placed a [1] individual with mental illness at risk of injury or death, and includes an act or omission such as the failure to establish or carry out an appropriate individual program plan or treatment plan for a [1] individual with mental illness, the failure to provide adequate nutrition, clothing, or health care to

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a [1] individual with mental illness, or the failure to provide a safe environment for a [1] individual with mental illness, including the failure to maintain adequate numbers of appropriately trained staff. (6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Health and Human Services. (7) The term “State” means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 42 U.S. Code § 9501 - Bill of Rights and 42 U.S. Code § 10841 - Restatement of bill of rights It is the sense of the Congress that, as previously stated in title V of the Mental Health Systems Act [42 U.S. Code 9501 et seq.], each State should review and revise, if necessary, its laws to ensure that mental health patients receive the protection and services they require, and that in making such review and revision, States should take into account the recommendations of the President’s Commission on Mental Health and the following: (1) A person admitted to a program or facility for the purpose of receiving mental health services should be accorded the following:

(A) The right to appropriate treatment and related services in a setting and under conditions that—

(i) are the most supportive of such person’s personal liberty; and

(ii) restrict such liberty only to the extent necessary consistent with such person’s treatment needs, applicable requirements of law, and applicable judicial orders.

(B) The right to an individualized, written, treatment or service plan (such

plan to be developed promptly after admission of such person), the right to treatment based on such plan, the right to periodic review and reassessment of treatment and related service needs, and the right to appropriate revision of such plan, including any revision necessary to provide a description of mental health services that may be needed after such person is discharged from such program or facility.

(C) The right to ongoing participation, in a manner appropriate to such

person’s capabilities, in the planning of mental health services to be provided such person (including the right to participate in the development and periodic revision of the plan described in subparagraph (B)), and, in connection with such participation, the right to be provided with a reasonable explanation, in terms and language appropriate to such person’s condition and ability to understand, of—



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(i) such person’s general mental condition and, if such program or facility has provided a physical examination, such person’s general physical condition; (ii) the objectives of treatment; (iii) the nature and significant possible adverse effects of recommended treatments; (iv) the reasons why a particular treatment is considered appropriate; (v) the reasons why access to certain visitors may not be appropriate; and (vi) any appropriate and available alternative treatments, services, and types of providers of mental health services.

(D) The right not to receive a mode or course of treatment, established

pursuant to the treatment plan, in the absence of such person’s informed, voluntary, written consent to such mode or course of treatment, except treatment—

(i) during an emergency situation if such treatment is pursuant to or documented contemporaneously by the written order of a responsible mental health professional; or (ii) as permitted under applicable law in the case of a person committed by a court to a treatment program or facility.

(E) The right not to participate in experimentation in the absence of such

person’s informed, voluntary, written consent, the right to appropriate protections in connection with such participation, including the right to a reasonable explanation of the procedure to be followed, the benefits to be expected, the relative advantages of alternative treatments, and the potential discomforts and risks, and the right and opportunity to revoke such consent.

(F) The right to freedom from restraint or seclusion, other than as a mode or

course of treatment or restraint or seclusion during an emergency situation if such restraint or seclusion is pursuant to or documented contemporaneously by the written order of a responsible mental health professional.

(G) The right to a humane treatment environment that affords reasonable

protection from harm and appropriate privacy to such person with regard to personal needs.

(H) The right to confidentiality of such person’s records. (I) The right to access, upon request, to such person’s mental health care

records, except such person may be refused access to— (i) information in such records provided by a third party under assurance that such information shall remain confidential; and


(ii) specific material in such records if the health professional responsible for the mental health services concerned has made a determination in writing that such access would be detrimental to such person’s health, except that such material may be made available to a similarly licensed health professional selected by such person and such health professional may, in the exercise of professional judgment, provide such person with access to any or all parts of such material or otherwise disclose the information contained in such material to such person.

(J) The right, in the case of a person admitted on a residential or inpatient

care basis, to converse with others privately, to have convenient and reasonable access to the telephone and mails, and to see visitors during regularly scheduled hours, except that, if a mental health professional treating such person determines that denial of access to a particular visitor is necessary for treatment purposes, such mental health professional may, for a specific, limited, and reasonable period of time, deny such access if such mental health professional has ordered such denial in writing and such order has been incorporated in the treatment plan for such person. An order denying such access should include the reasons for such denial.

(K) The right to be informed promptly at the time of admission and

periodically thereafter, in language and terms appropriate to such person’s condition and ability to understand, of the rights described in this section.

(L) The right to assert grievances with respect to infringement of the rights

described in this section, including the right to have such grievances considered in a fair, timely, and impartial grievance procedure provided for or by the program or facility.

(M) Notwithstanding subparagraph (J), the right of access to (including the

opportunities and facilities for private communication with) any available— (i) rights protection service within the program or facility; (ii) rights protection service within the State mental health system designed to be available to such person;

(iii) system established under subchapter I of this chapter to protect and advocate the rights of individuals with mental illness; and (iv) qualified advocate; for the purpose of receiving assistance to understand, exercise, and protect the rights described in this section and in other provisions of law.

(N) The right to exercise the rights described in this section without reprisal,

including reprisal in the form of denial of any appropriate, available treatment.


(O) The right to referral as appropriate to other providers of mental health

services upon discharge. (2)

(A) The rights described in this section should be in addition to and not in derogation of any other statutory or constitutional rights.

(B) The rights to confidentiality of and access to records as provided in subparagraphs (H) and (I) of paragraph (1) should remain applicable to records pertaining to a person after such person’s discharge from a program or facility.

(3)

(A) No otherwise eligible person should be denied admission to a program or facility for mental health services as a reprisal for the exercise of the rights described in this section. (B) Nothing in this section should—

(i) obligate an individual mental health or health professional to administer treatment contrary to such professional’s clinical judgment;

(ii) prevent any program or facility from discharging any person for whom the provision of appropriate treatment, consistent with the clinical judgment of the mental health professional primarily responsible for such person’s treatment, is or has become impossible as a result of such person’s refusal to consent to such treatment;

(iii) require a program or facility to admit any person who, while admitted on prior occasions to such program or facility, has repeatedly frustrated the purposes of such admissions by withholding consent to proposed treatment; or

(iv) obligate a program or facility to provide treatment services to any person who is admitted to such program or facility solely for diagnostic or evaluative purposes.

(C) In order to assist a person admitted to a program or facility in the exercise or protection of such person’s rights, such person’s attorney or legal representatives should have reasonable access to—

(i) such person; (ii) the areas of the program or facility where such person has received treatment, resided, or had access; and


(iii) pursuant to the written authorization of such person, the records and information pertaining to such person’s diagnosis, treatment, and related services described in paragraph (1)(I).

(D) Each program and facility should post a notice listing and describing, in language and terms appropriate to the ability of the persons to whom such notice is addressed to understand, the rights described in this section of all persons admitted to such program or facility. Each such notice should conform to the format and content for such notices, and should be posted in all appropriate locations.

(4)

(A) In the case of a person adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction as being incompetent to exercise the right to consent to treatment or experimentation described in subparagraph (D) or (E) of paragraph (1), or the right to confidentiality of or access to records described in subparagraph (H) or (I) of such paragraph, or to provide authorization as described in paragraph (3)(C)(iii), such right may be exercised or such authorization may be provided by the individual appointed by such court as such person’s guardian or representative for the purpose of exercising such right or such authorization.

(B) In the case of a person who lacks capacity to exercise the right to consent to treatment or experimentation under subparagraph (D) or (E) of paragraph (1), or the right to confidentiality of or access to records described in subparagraph (H) or (I) of such paragraph, or to provide authorization as described in paragraph (3)(C)(iii), because such person has not attained an age considered sufficiently advanced under State law to permit the exercise of such right or such authorization to be legally binding, such right may be exercised or such authorization may be provided on behalf of such person by a parent or legal guardian of such person.

(C) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (A) and (B), in the case of a person admitted to a program or facility for the purpose of receiving mental health services, no individual employed by or receiving any remuneration from such program or facility should act as such person’s guardian or representative.

49 U.S. Code § 30301. Definitions In this chapter—

(1) “alcohol” has the same meaning given that term in regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation.

(2) “chief driver licensing official” means the official in a State who is authorized to—

(A) maintain a record about a motor vehicle operator’s license issued by the State; and


(B) issue, deny, revoke, suspend, or cancel a motor vehicle operator’s license issued by the State. (3) “controlled substance” has the same meaning given that term in

section 102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 802).

(4) “motor vehicle” means a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on public streets, roads, or highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line.

(5) “motor vehicle operator’s license” means a license issued by a State authorizing an individual to operate a motor vehicle on public streets, roads, or highways.

(6) “participating State” means a State that has notified the Secretary under section 30303 of this title of its participation in the National Driver Register.

(7) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

(8) “State of record” means a State that has given the Secretary a report under section 30304 of this title about an individual who is the subject of a request for information made under section 30305 of this title.

Maine Revised Statutes Annotated

5 M.R.S. § 9052. Notice

1. Notice of hearing. When the applicable statute or constitutional law requires that an opportunity for hearing shall be provided, notice shall be given as follows:

A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired; and

B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the anticipated time of the decision to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument, and to request a hearing if so desired. 2. Hearing required. When a hearing is required by the applicable statute or

by agency regulation, or has been requested pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph A, or has been set in an exercise of the agency's discretion, notice shall be given as follows:


A. To the person or persons whose legal rights, duties or privileges are at issue, by regular mail, sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument; and

B. In any proceeding deemed by the agency to involve the determination of issues of substantial public interest, to the public sufficiently in advance of the hearing date to afford interested persons an adequate opportunity to prepare and submit evidence and argument and to petition to intervene pursuant to section 9054.

3. Notice to the public. Notice to the public shall be given:

A. By publication, at least twice in a newspaper of general circulation in the area of the state affected;

B. By publication in any other trade, industry, professional or interest group publication which the agency deems effective in reaching persons who would be entitled to intervene as of right under section 9054, subsection 1; and

C. In any other manner deemed appropriate by the agency. 4. Notice. Notice shall consist of:

A. A statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which the proceeding is being conducted;

B. A reference to the particular substantive statutory and rule provisions involved;

C. A short and plain statement of the nature and purpose of the proceeding and of the matters asserted;

D. A statement of the time and place of the hearing, or the time within which a hearing may be requested;

E. A statement of the manner and time within which evidence and argument may be submitted to the agency for consideration, whether or not a hearing has been set; and F. When a hearing has been set, a statement of the manner and time within which applications for intervention under section 9054 may be filed. 5. Cancellation or change of hearing. If a scheduled hearing is cancelled or

postponed to a later date, the agency shall provide timely notice to the persons described in section 9051 and, if applicable, to the persons and localities listed in section 9051-A and other persons the agency is required to notify or customarily notifies of hearings.

5 M.R.S. § 9053. Disposition without Full Hearing Unless otherwise provided by law, agencies may:


1. Responsibility. Place on any party the responsibility of requesting a hearing if the agency notifies him in writing of his right to a hearing, and of his responsibility to request the hearing; 2. Stipulation, settlement, consent order. Make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by stipulation, agreed settlement or consent order; 3. Default. Make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by default, provided that notice has been given that failure to take required action may result in default, and further provided that any such default may be set aside by the agency for good cause shown; and 4. Issues limited. Limit the issues to be heard or vary any procedure prescribed by agency rule or this subchapter if the parties and the agency agree to such limitation or variation, or if no prejudice to any party will result. 5 M.R.S. § 9056. Opportunity to Be Heard 1. Opportunity for hearing. The opportunity for hearing in an adjudicatory proceeding shall be afforded without undue delay. 2. Rights. Unless limited by stipulation under section 9053, subsection 4, or by agency order pursuant to section 9054, subsections 2 or 4, or unless otherwise limited by the agency to prevent repetition or unreasonable delay in proceedings, every party shall have the right to present evidence and arguments on all issues, and at any hearing to call and examine witnesses and to make oral cross-examination of any person present and testifying. 5 M.R.S. § 10001. Adjudicatory Proceedings When licensing is required as a matter of constitutional right or by statute to be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing, the provisions of subchapter IV concerning adjudicatory proceedings shall apply. 5 M.R.S. § 10003. Right To Hearing 1. Opportunity for hearing. Subject to the provisions of section 10004, an agency may not amend or modify any license unless it has afforded the licensee an opportunity for hearing in conformity with subchapter IV, nor may it refuse to renew any license unless it has afforded the licensee either an opportunity for an agency hearing in conformity with subchapter IV or an opportunity for a hearing in the District Court. In any such proceeding determined by the agency to involve a substantial public interest, an opportunity for public comment and participation must also be given by public notice in conformity with subchapter IV. 2. Proceeding. In any proceeding involving a proposed modification or amendment of a license which was the subject of an earlier hearing, the agency shall give notice thereof to all parties to the earlier proceeding and in any other manner required by section 9052, and may reopen the earlier proceeding for consideration of the proposed amendment or modification.


5 M.R.S. § 10004. Action Without Hearing Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 10003 and 10051, an agency may revoke, suspend or refuse to renew any license without proceedings in conformity with subchapters IV or VI, when: 1. Judicial action. The decision to take that action rests solely upon a finding or conviction in court of any violation which by statute is expressly made grounds for revocation; 3. Health or safety hazard. The health or physical safety of a person or the continued well-being of a significant natural resource is in immediate jeopardy at the time of the agency's action, and acting in accordance with subchapter IV or VI would fail to adequately respond to a known risk, provided that the revocation, suspension or refusal to renew shall not continue for more than 30 days; 16 M.R.S. § 402. Common law and statutes Every court of this State shall take judicial notice of the common law and statutes of every state, territory and other jurisdiction of the United States. 17-A M.R.S. § 1348. Eligibility for Deferred Disposition A person who has pled guilty to a Class C, Class D or Class E crime and who consents to a deferred disposition in writing is eligible for a deferred disposition. 17-A M.R.S. § 1348-A. Deferred Disposition 1. Following the acceptance of a plea of guilty for a crime for which a person is eligible for a deferred disposition under section 1348, the court may order sentencing deferred to a date certain or determinable and impose requirements upon the person, to be in effect during the period of deferment, considered by the court to be reasonable and appropriate to assist the person to lead a law-abiding life. The court-imposed deferment requirements must include a requirement that the person refrain from criminal conduct and may include a requirement that the person pay to the appropriate county an administrative supervision fee of not more than $50 per month, as determined by the court, for the term of the deferment. In determining the amount of the fee, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the person and the nature of the burden its payment imposes. In exchange for the deferred sentencing, the person shall abide by the court-imposed deferment requirements. Unless the court orders otherwise, the requirements are immediately in effect. 2. During the period of deferment and upon application of the person granted deferred disposition pursuant to subsection 1 or of the attorney for the State or upon the court's own motion, the court may, after a hearing upon notice to the attorney for the State and the person, modify the requirements imposed by the court, add further requirements or relieve the person of any requirement imposed by the court that, in the court's opinion, imposes an unreasonable burden on the person.


3. During the period of deferment, if the person cannot meet a deferment requirement imposed by the court, the person shall bring a motion pursuant to subsection 2. 4. For purposes of a deferred disposition, a person is deemed to have been convicted when the court imposes the sentence. 29-A M.R.S. § 103. Traffic Infraction 1. Traffic infraction. A traffic infraction is not a crime. The penalty for a traffic infraction may not be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal punishment. 2. Jury trial. There is no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction. 3. Exclusive penalty. The exclusive penalty for a traffic infraction is a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, unless specifically authorized, or suspension of a license, or both. 4. Standard of proof. The burden of proof that a traffic infraction has occurred is on the State and must be established by a standard of a preponderance of the evidence. 29-A M.R.S. § 104. Penalty for Violation of Provisions of Title Except as otherwise provided, a person who violates a provision of this Title commits a traffic infraction. When a violation of this Title has a designated minimum sentence, the court may not suspend the sentence. 29-A M.R.S. § 105. Enforcement 1. Authority to stop motor vehicle. If a law enforcement officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that a violation of law has taken or is taking place, that officer, if the officer is in uniform, may stop a motor vehicle for the purpose of: A. Arresting the operator for a criminal violation; B. Issuing the appropriate written process for a criminal or civil violation or a traffic infraction; or C. Questioning the operator or occupants. 2. Scope of inspection. A law enforcement officer who has stopped a motor vehicle pursuant to subsection 1 may demand and inspect the driver's license, certificate of registration, permits and the identification numbers of the motor vehicle. A state police officer who is trained pursuant to the motor carrier safety rules of the motor carrier safety regulations of the United States Department of Transportation may demand and inspect the driver's record of duty status and medical examiner's certificate, if applicable. 3. Impoundment. When a motor vehicle is operated by a person not able to produce a certificate of registration, or by a person other than the person in whose name the vehicle is registered and the operator is unable to present reasonable evidence of authority to operate that vehicle, an officer may impound and hold that vehicle until that vehicle is claimed by the registered owner or until the registered owner


verifies the authority of the operator. The registered owner must be notified immediately of the impoundment. 4. Violation. A person is guilty of a Class E crime if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the person violated or is violating this Title and the person intentionally fails or refuses upon request to give the person's correct name, address or date of birth to a law enforcement officer. 29-A M.R.S. § 112. Notice Of Hearing Notice of any hearing held by the Secretary of State or by the Secretary of State's authority under this Title must be consistent with Title 5, section 9052 and notify the licensee or registrant that the licensee or registrant may then and there appear, in person or through counsel, to show cause why that license or certificate of registration should not be suspended or revoked. Service of that notice is sufficient if sent by regular mail to the address given by the licensee or registrant at least 10 days before the date set for hearing. 29-A M.R.S. § 113. Computer Transcripts as Evidence 1. Transcript. A properly certified transcript of entries of conviction, adjudication, suspension or revocation in official records stored within a computer or data processing device is admissible in evidence to show the truth of the facts stated in the transcript. 2. Certification. A transcript may be certified by:

A. A clerk or deputy clerk of any judicial division of the District Court or the violations bureau for records from a judicial division or the violations bureau; B. A clerk or deputy clerk of a Superior Court for Superior Court records; or C. The Secretary of State for any court's records received by the Secretary of State from a court, including records received by electronic means.

3. Secretary of State's certification. Notwithstanding any other law or rule of evidence, the certificate of the Secretary of State or a deputy, under seal of the State, must be received in a judicial or administrative proceeding as prima facie evidence of any fact stated in the certificate or documents attached to the certificate. 29-A M.R.S. § 256. Federal Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 The Secretary of State shall comply with the provisions of Title 18, United States Code, Chapter 123 in disclosing records. 29-A M.R.S. § 351. Registration Required The owner of a vehicle that is operated or remains on a public way is responsible for registering the vehicle. 1. Failure to register. A person who operates a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this Title, fails to register a vehicle or permits a vehicle that is not registered to remain on a public way commits:


A. A traffic infraction for which a forfeiture of not more than $50 may be adjudged if the vehicle was registered and the registration has been expired for more than 30 days but less than 150 days; or B. A Class E crime if the vehicle was not registered or the registration has been expired for 150 days or more. 1-A. Residents required to register. An owner of a vehicle who becomes a resident of this State shall register that vehicle in this State within 30 days of establishing residency. A person who operates or allows a vehicle that is not registered in accordance with this subsection to remain on a public way commits: A. A traffic infraction for which a fine of not more than $50 may be adjudged if more than 30 days but less than 150 days has elapsed since establishing residency; or B. A Class E crime if more than 150 days have elapsed since establishing residency. 29-A M.R.S. § 1251. License required

1. Violation. Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person commits an offense of operating a motor vehicle without a license if that person operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area: A. Without being licensed. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime as defined in Title 17-A, section 34, subsection 4-A; B. In violation of a condition or restriction on the license. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime as defined in Title 17-A, section 34, subsection 4-A; C. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 30 days but fewer than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction; D. Without a license issued by this State if a resident of this State for more than 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime as defined in Title 17-A, section 34, subsection 4-A; or E. Unless a permit is issued pursuant to subsection 7, with a license issued by this State that expired within the previous 90 days. Violation of this paragraph is a traffic infraction. 1-A. Residents required to obtain license. Within 30 days of becoming a resident of this State, a person shall apply to obtain a license in accordance with section 1301. Except as provided in section 510, subsection 1, a person who fails to comply with the requirement of this subsection and operates a motor vehicle on a public way or parking area commits: A. A traffic infraction if the person has been a resident for less than 90 days; or B. A Class E crime if the person has been a resident for at least 90 days. 2. Penalty. 3. Issue restrictions. A person may not receive a license unless: A. That person surrenders all valid licenses in that person's possession issued by any jurisdiction; and B. The Secretary of State is satisfied that the applicant is a proper person to receive a license.


4. Number limited. A person may not have more than one valid license, unless authorized by the Secretary of State. A person may not have more than one commercial license. 5. Age limit. A license, except a special restricted license under section 1256, may not be issued to a person who has not attained 16 years of age. 6. Exemptions. The following people are exempt from the license requirements of this chapter: A. A nonresident who is 16 years of age or older and who has in that person's possession a valid license or learner's permit issued by that person's state or province. A nonresident operator shall adhere to all restrictions applied to the license or learner's permit issued by that person's state or province. A nonresident who is not yet 16 years of age may not operate a motor vehicle; B. A person on active duty in the United States Armed Forces, if that person possesses: (1) A valid license issued by that person's state of domicile; or (2) For a period of 45 days after return from duty outside the United States, a valid license issued by the United States Armed Forces in foreign countries; C. A spouse of a member of the United States Armed Forces while accompanying that member on active duty assignment to this State, and who is not a resident of this State and who has a valid license issued by another jurisdiction; and D. A person operating a motor vehicle in a parking area under the supervision of an instructor during career and technical education as defined by Title 20-A, section 8301-A, subsection 2-A. 7. Temporary permit to operate a motor vehicle with an expired license. Upon stopping an operator of a motor vehicle who is in violation of subsection 1, paragraph E, a law enforcement officer may issue a permit to the operator of the motor vehicle to operate the motor vehicle to the operator's residence or to an office of the bureau for the sole purpose of renewing the operator's license. 29-A M.R.S. § 1253. Commercial Licenses 1. Classifications. A Class A or Class B license, or a Class C license carrying an endorsement under subsection 3, is a commercial license. 2. Compliance with federal law. The State must comply with the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986, Public Law 99-570, Title XII, the federal Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Public Law 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 and regulations adopted under those Acts in issuing or suspending a commercial license. In the case of any conflict between the federal statute or regulation and a statute or rule of this State, the federal statute or regulation must apply and take precedence. To ensure compliance, the Secretary of State shall adopt rules, administrative procedures, practices and policies, organizational structures, internal control mechanisms and resource assignments. These compliance measures must include, but are not limited to, provisions that: A. Provide for full state participation in the national commercial driver's license clearinghouse;


B. Require commercial drivers to have a single license; C. Reduce and prevent commercial motor vehicle accidents, fatalities and injuries by disqualifying commercial drivers who have committed serious traffic or other designated offenses from operating commercial motor vehicles; D. Protect public safety by removing from public ways a commercial driver who has: (1) Operated or attempted to operate a commercial vehicle while having an alcohol level of 0.04 grams or more of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 210 liters of breath; (2) Refused to submit to or complete a lawfully requested test to determine that driver's alcohol level; or (3) Operated or attempted to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs; and E. Provide maximum safety on public ways. 29-A M.R.S. § 1258. Medical Advisory Board 1. Board. The Medical Advisory Board, as established by Title 5, section 12004-I, subsection 84, consists of members appointed by the Secretary of State. Membership of the board is as follows. A. The board must include licensed physicians representing the specialties of cardiology, gerontology, internal medicine, neurology or neurological surgery, ophthalmology, psychiatry, family practice and rehabilitative medicine and may include additional members who are professionals in relevant medical fields. B. The Secretary of State shall designate the chair of the board. C. Members of the board are entitled to compensation in accordance with Title 5, chapter 379. 2. Duties. The duties of the board are as follows. A. The board shall meet at least once every 2 years and may hold as many meetings as necessary. B. The board shall advise the Secretary of State on written medical and vision standards related to operator's licensing. Standards may only be adopted as rules. C. The board shall coordinate efforts to educate health care providers and the public in the medical aspects of motor vehicle operator licensing. 3. Determination of competency. The Secretary of State may request written medical reports to determine who receives records, testimony, recommendations and reports of the board and determine the competency of a person to operate a motor vehicle. 4. Board review. The Secretary of State, having cause to believe that a licensed driver or applicant may not be physically or mentally qualified to be licensed, may obtain the advice of the board, a member of the board or another medical or paramedical professional licensed or certified in a medical specialty as follows. A. The board may formulate advice from records and reports or may cause an examination and report to be made by a member or another qualified person. B. The person under review may deliver a written report to the board and the board must give due consideration to the report.


C. The Secretary of State may request that the board interview in person someone whose ability to operate a motor vehicle safely is unascertainable through written reports or records. 5. Suspension pending compliance. The license of a person under review who refuses to submit to an examination or to provide information as requested by the Secretary of State pursuant to this subchapter may be suspended until the individual complies with the request. 29-A M.R.S. § 1407. Change of Location or Status When a person, after applying for or receiving a driver's license or registration, moves from the address named in the application or on the license or registration issued or changes name, that person shall, within 30 days, notify the Secretary of State, in writing or by other means approved by the Secretary of State, of the old and new addresses or former and new names and of the number of the licenses and registrations held. 29-A M.R.S. § 2412-A. Operating While License Suspended Or Revoked 1. Offense; penalty. 1-A. Offense; penalty. A person commits operating while license suspended or revoked if that person: A. Operates a motor vehicle on a public way or in a parking area when that person's license has been suspended or revoked, and that person: (1) Has received written notice of a suspension or revocation from the Secretary of State or a court; (2) Has been orally informed of the suspension or revocation by a law enforcement officer or a court; (3) Has actual knowledge of the suspension or revocation; (4) Has been sent written notice in accordance with section 2482 or former Title 29, section 2241, subsection 4; or (5) Has failed to answer or to appear in court pursuant to a notice or order specified in section 2605 or 2608; B. Violates paragraph A and the suspension was for OUI or an OUI offense; C. Violates paragraph A and the suspension was for OUI or an OUI offense, the person was subject to the mandatory minimum sentence and the person: (1) Has one prior conviction for violating this section; (2) Has 2 prior convictions for violating this section; or (3) Has 3 or more prior convictions for violating this section; or D. Violates paragraph A, the suspension was not for OUI or an OUI offense and the person has one or more prior convictions for violating this section. Except for an offense under subsection 8 or as otherwise provided, operating while license suspended or revoked is a Class E crime, which is a strict liability crime as defined in Title 17-A, section 34, subsection 4-A. 2. Exception. This section does not apply to a person whose license has been revoked under the laws in subchapter V governing habitual offenders.


3. Minimum mandatory sentences for certain suspension. If the suspension was for OUI or an OUI offense, the court shall impose a minimum fine of $600, a term of imprisonment of 7 consecutive days and a suspension of license of not less than one year nor more than 3 years consecutive to the original suspension. The penalties may not be suspended. A. If the person has a prior conviction for violating this section within a 10-year period and was subject to the minimum mandatory sentences, then the following minimum penalties, which may not be suspended by the court, apply in the event the suspension was for OUI: (1) A minimum fine of $1,000, a term of imprisonment of 30 consecutive days and a suspension of license for not less than one year nor more than 3 years consecutive to the original suspension in the event of one prior conviction; (2) A minimum fine of $2,000, a term of imprisonment of 60 consecutive days and a suspension of license for not less than one year nor more than 3 years consecutive to the original suspension in the event of 2 prior convictions; or (3) A minimum fine of $3,000, a term of imprisonment of 6 months and a suspension of license for not less than one year nor more than 3 years consecutive to the original suspension in the event of 3 or more prior convictions. The sentencing class for this offense is a Class C crime. B. For all other suspensions, the minimum fine for a first offense is $250, which may not be suspended by the court. The minimum fine for 2nd and subsequent offenses is $500, which may not be suspended by the court. A separate reading of the allegation and a separate trial are not required under this subsection. 4. Suspension of license. The following provisions apply when a person's license is required to be suspended under this section. A. The court shall give notice of the suspension and shall take physical custody of an operator's license or permit as provided in section 2434. B. If the court fails to impose a suspension as provided in subsection 3, the Secretary of State shall impose the minimum one-year suspension. C. The minimum mandatory sentences of subsection 3 apply only to the original period of suspension imposed by the court or the Secretary of State or as extended by the Secretary of State. The minimum mandatory sentences of subsection 3 do not apply to any extension of the original suspension imposed to compel a person's compliance with conditions for the restoration of a license or for failure to pay a reinstatement fee for a license. 5. Prior convictions. For purposes of this section, a prior conviction or suspension has occurred within a 10-year period if the date of the suspension or the docket entry of a judgment of conviction by the clerk is 10 years or less from the date of the new conduct that is penalized or for which the new penalty may be enhanced. 6. Ignition interlock device. 7. Ignition interlock device. As a condition of license reinstatement, the Secretary of State, pursuant to section 2508, may require a person subject to the minimum mandatory sentencing provisions of subsection 3 to have installed in the motor vehicle the person operates for a period of up to 2 years an ignition interlock


device approved by the Secretary of State. 8. Traffic infraction. A person commits a traffic infraction operating while license suspended as described in subsection 1-A, paragraph A if the person has not been convicted or adjudicated of a prior offense under this section and the sole basis for the suspension is: A. Failure to pay a fine; B. Failure to pay a license reinstatement fee; or C. Suspension for a dishonored check. 29-A M.R.S. § 2458. Suspension or Revocation of License, Title, Registration or Fuel Use Decal 1. Suspension or revocation after hearing. The Secretary of State, after hearing, may suspend or revoke a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license, fuel use decal or privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle for any cause considered by the Secretary of State to be sufficient. 2. Suspension or revocation without hearing. The Secretary of State, without preliminary hearing, may suspend or revoke a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license, fuel use decal or privilege to operate a commercial motor vehicle of a person on showing by the Secretary of State's records or other sufficient evidence that the person: A. Has committed an offense for which mandatory suspension or revocation of license or registration is required; B. Has been convicted or adjudicated for offenses against traffic regulations governing the movement of vehicles with such frequency as to indicate a disrespect for traffic laws and disregard for the safety of other persons on public ways; C. Is a reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle, as established by the demerit point system authorized by subsection 3, a record of accidents or other evidence; D. Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; 2-A. Minimum suspension for negligent operation. The Secretary of State without preliminary hearing shall suspend for a period of at least 3 years a person's license if the Secretary of State, based on the Secretary of State's records or other sufficient evidence, finds that person to have recklessly or negligently operated a motor vehicle in a manner so as to cause the death of another person. Prior to the determination and issuance of the suspension, the Secretary of State shall notify any family of the victim and shall consider written or oral statements received from the family in response to the notice. Upon suspending the person's license, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of an opportunity for hearing as provided in section 2483. 3. Demerit point system. For the purpose of identifying reckless or negligent operators and habitual or frequent violators of traffic regulations, the Secretary of State shall adopt rules establishing a uniform system of assigning demerit points for convictions or adjudications of violations of statutes or rules governing the operation of motor vehicles, including violations of Title 17-A, section 360, subsection 1, paragraphs A and B.


The rules must include a designated level of point accumulation that identifies those drivers. The Secretary of State may assess points for convictions or adjudications in other states or provinces of offenses that, if committed in this State, would be grounds for assessment. Notice of assessment of points must be given when the point accumulation reaches 50% of the number at which suspension is authorized. Points may not be assessed for violating a provision of this Title or a municipal ordinance regulating standing, parking, equipment, size or weight. 4. Notice of hearing. Upon suspending or revoking a certificate of title, certificate of registration, license or fuel use decal pursuant to subsection 2, the Secretary of State shall notify that person of opportunity for hearing as provided in section 2483, except when: A. The suspension or revocation rests solely upon a conviction in court of an offense that by statute is expressly made grounds for that suspension or revocation; B. The basis of the Secretary of State's action is a condition of bail or conditional release pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph Q; or C. The suspension or revocation is required by federal statute or regulation. 29-A M.R.S. § 2482. Notice of Suspension or Revocation of License 1. Notification by Secretary of State. Upon determining that a person is subject to license suspension or revocation, the Secretary of State shall immediately notify the person, in writing, of the license suspension or revocation. The notice: A. Must be sent to the last name and address provided under section 1407 or, if the person has not applied for a license, on record with the Secretary of State; B. Must be sent to the address provided in the report of the law enforcement officer if that address differs from the address of record; or C. May be served in hand. 2. Notice contents. The notice must clearly state: A. The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation; B. The effective date of the suspension or revocation; C. Unless the suspension or revocation is ordered by a court or rests solely upon a conviction or adjudication in court of an offense that is, by statute, expressly made grounds for that suspension or revocation, the right of the person to request a hearing and the procedure for requesting a hearing; and D. E. F. If the suspension or revocation is based on a report under section 2453-A or 2481, that a copy of the report of the law enforcement officer and any alcohol test certificate and the confirmed positive drug or metabolite test result and the report of the drug recognition expert will be provided to the person upon request to the Secretary of State. 3. Receipt date. The notice is deemed received 3 days after mailing, unless returned by postal authorities.


4. Effective date. A suspension or revocation is effective on the date specified by the Secretary of State on the notice, which may not be less than 10 days after the mailing of the notification of suspension by the Secretary of State. 29-A M.R.S. § 2483. Hearing Request 1. Request for hearing. A person may make a written request for a hearing to review the determination of the Secretary of State. The request must be made within 10 days from the effective date of the suspension. 2. Issuance of decision. The Secretary of State shall conduct a hearing and issue a decision within 30 days of receipt of a written request for hearing. 3. Delayed requests. If a request is made after the 10-day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension or due to factors of physical incapacity, the Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and grant the hearing request, except a stay may not be granted.

Other State Statutes Minnesota Statutes 2014 169.985 169.985 TRAFFIC CITATION QUOTA PROHIBITED.

A law enforcement agency may not order, mandate, require, or suggest to a peace officer a quota for the issuance of traffic citations, including administrative citations authorized under section 169.999, on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis.

History: 1990 c 482 s 3; 2009 c 158 s 4 Nebraska Revised Statute 48-235 48-235. Law enforcement officers; ticket quota requirements; prohibited. A state agency or political subdivision shall not directly require a law enforcement officer employed by the state agency or political subdivision to issue a certain number or percentage of traffic citations, police citations, memoranda of traffic violations, memoranda of faulty equipment, or any other type of citation on any periodic basis. The purpose of this section is to prohibit all types of ticket quota requirements for law enforcement officers. For purposes of this section, law enforcement officer includes peace officers as defined in section 49-801 and conservation officers of the Game and Parks Commission. Laws 2000, LB 204, § 1. N.Y. VAT. LAW § 155: Traffic infraction - The violation of any provision of this chapter, except articles forty-seven and forty-eight, or of any law, ordinance, order, rule or regulation regulating traffic which is not declared by this chapter or other law of this state to be a misdemeanor or a felony. A traffic infraction is not a crime and the punishment imposed therefor shall not be deemed for any purpose a penal

http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/statutes.php?statute=49-801

http://nebraskalegislature.gov/FloorDocs/96/PDF/Slip/LB204.pdf


or criminal punishment and shall not affect or impair the credibility as a witness or otherwise of any person convicted thereof.


LEGISLATION http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20112012/108135.pdf

11 Georgia House Bill 7 LC 34 2781 By: Representative Franklin of the 43rd

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT

To amend Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to motor vehicles and traffic, so as to repeal Chapter 5, relating to drivers' licenses; provide for a short title; to report the findings of the General Assembly regarding the constitutionality of certain laws relating to drivers' licenses; to provide for an effective date; to repeal conflicting laws; and for other purposes.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA:

SECTION 1. This Act shall be known and may be cited as the "Right to Travel Act."

SECTION 2. The General Assembly finds that: (1) Free people have a common law and constitutional right to travel on the roads and highways that are provided by their government for that purpose. Licensing of drivers cannot be required of free people because taking on the restrictions of a license requires the surrender of an inalienable right; (2) In England in 1215, the right to travel was enshrined in Article 42 of Magna Carta: It shall be lawful to any person, for the future, to go out of our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land or by water, saving his allegiance to us, unless it be in time of war, for some short space, for the common good of the kingdom: excepting prisoners and outlaws, according to the laws of the land, and of the people of the nation at war against us, and Merchants who shall be treated as it is said above. (3) Where rights secured by the Constitution of the United States and the State of Georgia are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate these rights. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be

http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20112012/108135.pdf


converted into a crime. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon an individual because of this exercise of constitutional rights; (4) American citizens have the inalienable right to use the roads and highways unrestricted in any manner so long as they are not damaging or violating property or rights of others. The government, by requiring the people to obtain drivers' licenses, is restricting, and therefore violating, the people's common law and constitutional right to travel; (5) In Shapiro v Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), Justice Potter Stewart noted in a concurring opinion that the right to travel "is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association...it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all." The Articles of Confederation had an explicit right to travel; and we hold that the right to travel is so fundamental that the Framers thought it was unnecessary to include it in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights; (6) The right to travel upon the public highways is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will but the common right which every citizen has under his or her right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his or her inclination along the public highways or in public places while conducting himself or herself in an orderly and decent manner; and (7) Thus, the legislature does not have the power to abrogate the citizens' right to travel upon the public roads by passing legislation forcing the citizen to waive the right and convert that right into a privilege.

SECTION 3. Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, relating to motor vehicles and traffic, is amended by repealing Chapter 5, relating to drivers' licenses, and designating said chapter as reserved.

SECTION 4. This Act shall become effective upon its approval by the Governor or upon its becoming law without such approval.

SECTION 5. All laws and parts of laws in conflict with this Act are repealed.


http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A3500/3457_I1.PDF ASSEMBLY, No. 3457

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 216th LEGISLATURE INTRODUCED JUNE 26, 2014 Sponsored by: Assemblyman DECLAN J. O'SCANLON, JR. District 13 (Monmouth) Co-Sponsored by: Assemblywoman McHose, Assemblymen Space and Webber SYNOPSIS Prohibits law enforcement agencies from considering number of arrests made and citations issued when evaluating police officer’s professional performance. CURRENT VERSION OF TEXT As introduced. (Sponsorship Updated As Of: 9/12/2014) AN ACT concerning quotas for arrests and citations and amending P.L.2000, c.164. BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey:

1. Section 2 of P.L.2000, c.164 (C.40A:14-181.2) is amended to read as follows: 2. a. A State, county or municipal police department or force engaged in the

enforcement of Title 39 of the Revised Statutes or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to this title shall not establish any quota for arrests or citations. The department or force may, however, collect, analyze and apply information concerning the number of arrests and citations in order to ensure that a particular officer or group of officers does not violate any applicable legal obligation and for the purpose of forwarding that information to the Superintendent of State Police for inclusion in the Uniform Crime Report.

b. The department or force shall not use the number of arrests or citations issued by a law enforcement officer [as the sole] when evaluating the performance of a law enforcement officer, or as a criterion for promotion, demotion, dismissal, discipline, or the earning of any benefit provided by the department or force. [Any such arrests or citations, and their ultimate dispositions, may be considered in evaluating the overall performance of a law enforcement officer.] EXPLANATION –

http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A3500/3457_I1.PDF


Matter enclosed in bold-faced brackets [thus] in the above bill is not enacted and is intended to be omitted in the law. Matter underlined thus is new matter. (cf: P.L.2000, c.164, s.2) 2. This act shall take effect immediately. STATEMENT This bill prohibits law enforcement agencies from using the volume of an officer’s arrests or citations as a factor when evaluating that officer’s overall performance or when making personnel determinations such as promotions, demotions and other benefits of employment. The bill provides that a law enforcement agency may collect, analyze and apply information concerning the number of arrests and citations for the purpose of forwarding that information to the Superintendent of State Police for inclusion in the Uniform Crime Report. Under current law, State and local law enforcement agencies are prohibited from establishing policies requiring officers to meet quotas for arrests and citations in enforcing the State’s motor vehicle code. However, these agencies may consider arrest and citation data as part of the officer's overall performance evaluation. This bill prohibits this practice.


2015 STATE OF WYOMING 15LSO-0366 http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2015/Introduced/HB0125.pdf HOUSE BILL NO. HB0125 Law enforcement citation quotas-prohibition. Sponsored by: Representative(s) Pelkey, Baker, Byrd, Edmonds, Esquibel, K., Halverson, Kroeker and Krone and Senator(s) Rothfuss A BILL for AN ACT relating to regulation of traffic on highways; prohibiting the use of citation quotas by law enforcement for traffic violations; and providing for an effective date. Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Wyoming: Section 1. W.S. 31-5-1215 is created to read: 31-5-1215. Citation quotas prohibited. (a) No state, county, municipal or other governmental entity engaged in the enforcement of any motor vehicle laws of this state or any local ordinance governing motor vehicle traffic, may establish or maintain any policy, formally or informally, requiring any officer to meet a quota or suggest, formally or informally, a quota for any such officer. (b) As used in this section: (i) "Officer" means any peace officer as defined in W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv)(A) and (B); and (ii) "Quota" means any requirement regarding the number of arrests or investigative stops made, or summonses or citations issued, by an officer regarding motor vehicle traffic violations. Section 2. This act is effective July 1, 2015. (END)

http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2015/Introduced/HB0125.pdf


http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/52leg/1r/bills/hb2410h.pdf House Engrossed

State of Arizona HOUSE BILL 2410 House of Representatives Fifty-second Legislature First Regular Session 2015 AN ACT AMENDING TITLE 9, CHAPTER 4, ARTICLE 8, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 9-500.34; AMENDING TITLE 11, CHAPTER 3, ARTICLE 2, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 11-459.02; AMENDING TITLE 41, CHAPTER 12, ARTICLE 3, ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES, BY ADDING SECTION 41-1757; RELATING TO MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT. Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Arizona: Section 1. Title 9, chapter 4, article 8, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding section 9-500.34, to read: 9-500.34. Traffic complaint quota; determination of rank or classification based on traffic complaints; prohibition

A MUNICIPALITY OR POLICE DEPARTMENT MAY NOT ESTABLISH A TRAFFIC COMPLAINT QUOTA FOR PEACE OFFICERS EMPLOYED BY THE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BASE THE DETERMINATION OF A PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION ON THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS THE PEACE OFFICER ISSUES OR CONSIDER AS A FACTOR THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS A PEACE OFFICER ISSUES WHEN DETERMINING THE PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION. Sec. 2. Title 11, chapter 3, article 2, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding section 11-459.02, to read: 11-459.02. Traffic complaint quota; determination of rank or classification based on traffic complaints; prohibition

A BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OR SHERIFF MAY NOT IMPLEMENT A TRAFFIC COMPLAINT QUOTA FOR PEACE OFFICERS EMPLOYED BY THE SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, BASE THE DETERMINATION OF A PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION ON THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS THE PEACE OFFICER ISSUES OR CONSIDER AS A FACTOR

http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/52leg/1r/bills/hb2410h.pdf


THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS A PEACE OFFICER ISSUES WHEN DETERMINING THE PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION.

Sec. 3. Title 41, chapter 12, article 3, Arizona Revised Statutes, is amended by adding section 41-1757, to read: 41-1757. Traffic complaint quota; determination of rank or classification based on traffic complaints; prohibition

THE DEPARTMENT MAY NOT IMPLEMENT A TRAFFIC COMPLAINT QUOTA FOR PEACE OFFICERS EMPLOYED BY THE DEPARTMENT, BASE THE DETERMINATION OF A PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION ON THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS THE PEACE OFFICER ISSUES OR CONSIDER AS A FACTOR THE NUMBER OF TRAFFIC COMPLAINTS A PEACE OFFICER ISSUES WHEN DETERMINING THE PEACE OFFICER'S RANK OR CLASSIFICATION.


http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/349/I/025

WISCONSIN STATE LEGISLATURE CHAPTER 349

VEHICLES — POWERS OF STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES SUBCHAPTER I

GENERAL PROVISIONS 349.025 Quotas relating to the enforcement of traffic regulations prohibited. (1) In this section:

(a) "Law enforcement officer" has the meaning given in s. 165.85 (2) (c). (b) "Political subdivision" means a city, village, town or county. (c) "State agency" means an office, commission, department or independent agency in the executive branch of state government. (d) "Traffic regulation" means a provision of chs. 194 or 341 to 348 or an ordinance enacted in accordance with this chapter.

(2) No state agency or political subdivision of this state may require a law enforcement officer to issue a specific number of citations, complaints or warning notices during any specified time period for violations of traffic regulations. (3) A state agency or political subdivision may, for purposes of evaluating a law enforcement officer's job performance, compare the number of citations, complaints or warning notices issued by the law enforcement officer to the number of citations, complaints or warning notices issued by all law enforcement officers employed by the state agency or political subdivision who have similar job duties and who serve in the same administrative unit as the law enforcement officer. History: 1999 a. 16.

http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/349/I/025

http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/165.85(2)(c)

http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/ch.%20194



http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/acts/1999/16


https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/321.492a.pdf

Iowa Code - 2015 Title VIII – TRANSPORTATION CHAPTER 321 MOTOR VEHICLES AND LAW OF THE ROAD 321.492A QUOTAS ON CITATIONS PROHIBITED. A political subdivision or agency of the state shall not order, mandate, require, or in any other manner, directly or indirectly, suggest to a peace officer employed by the political subdivision or agency that the peace officer shall issue a certain number of traffic citations, police citations, memorandums of traffic violations, or memorandums of faulty equipment on a daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or yearly basis.

Section History: Recent Form

85 Acts, ch 226, §1; 96 Acts, ch 1034, § 25

https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/code/321.492a.pdf


RULES

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements (a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions:

(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (2) a nolo contendere plea; (3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or (4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.

(b) Exceptions. The court may admit a statement described in Rule 410(a)(3) or (4): (1) in any proceeding in which another statement made during the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced, if in fairness the statements ought to be considered together; or (2) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement, if the defendant made the statement under oath, on the record, and with counsel present.

Maine Rules of Evidence

Rule 410. Pleas, Plea Discussions, and Related Statements In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the person who made the plea or participated in the plea discussions: (a) A guilty plea that was later withdrawn; (b) A nolo contendere plea; (c) A statement made in connection with a guilty or nolo contendere plea or during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable Federal or state procedure; or (d) An offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere..

Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure RULE 16. Discovery by the Defendant (a) Automatic Discovery. (1) Duty of the Attorney for the State. The attorney for the state shall furnish to the defendant within a reasonable time: (A) A statement describing any testimony or other evidence intended to be used against the defendant which:

http://www.law.cornell.edu/jureeka/index.php?doc=FRCrimP&rule=11&ruleDec=undefined

http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_410#rule_410_a_3

http://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_410#rule_410_a_3


(i) Was obtained as a result of a search and seizure or the hearing or recording of a wire or oral communication; (ii) Resulted from any confession, admission, or statement made by the defendant; or (iii) Relates to a lineup, showup, picture, or voice identification of the defendant. (B) Any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant. (C) A statement describing any matter or information known to the attorney for the state which may not be known to the defendant and which tends to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt as to the crime charged. (D) A copy of any notification provided to the Superior Court by the attorney for the state pursuant to Rule 6(h) that pertains to the case against the defendant. (2) Continuing Duty to Disclose. The attorney for the state shall have a continuing duty to disclose the matters specified in this subdivision. (3) Charge of a Class D or Class E Crime in District Court. Discovery shall be provided to a defendant charged with a Class D or Class E crime in District Court within 10 days of arraignment. (b) Discovery Upon Request. (1) Duty of the Attorney for the State. Upon the defendant’s written request, the attorney for the state, except as provided in subdivision (3), shall allow access at any reasonable time to those matters specified in subdivision (2) which are within the attorney for the state’s possession or control. The attorney for the state’s obligation extends to matters within the possession or control of any member of the attorney for the state’s staff and of any official or employee of this state or any political subdivision thereof who regularly reports or with reference to the particular case has reported to the attorney for the state’s office. In affording this access, except as otherwise limited by 15 M.R.S. § 1121 relative to sexually explicit material, the attorney for the state shall allow the defendant at any reasonable time and in any reasonable manner to inspect, photograph, copy, or have reasonable tests made. (2) Scope of Discovery. The following matters are discoverable: (A) Any books, papers, documents, photographs (including motion pictures and video tapes), tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are material to the preparation of the defense or which the attorney for the state intends to use as evidence in any proceeding or which were obtained or belong to the defendant; (B) Any reports or statements of experts, made in connection with the particular case, including results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons; (C) The names and, except as provided in Title 17-A M.R.S. § 1176(4), addresses of the witnesses whom the state intends to call in any proceeding; (D) Written or recorded statements of witnesses and summaries of statements of witnesses contained in police reports or similar matter;


(E) The dates of birth of the witnesses the state intends to call in any proceeding. The fact that a listed witness is not called shall not be commented upon at trial. (3) Exception: Work Product. Disclosure shall not be required of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or memoranda to the extent that they contain the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the attorney for the state or members of his or her legal staff. (4) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If matter which would have been furnished to the defendant under this subdivision comes within the attorney for the state’s possession or control after the defendant has had access to similar matter, the attorney for the state shall promptly so inform the defendant. (5) Charge of a Class D or Class E Crime in District Court. Discovery shall be provided to a defendant charged with a Class D or Class E crime in District Court within 10 days of the request. (6) Protective Order. Upon motion of the attorney for the state, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires. (c) Discovery Pursuant to Court Order. (1) Bill of Particulars. The court for cause may direct the filing of a bill of particulars if it is satisfied that counsel has exhausted the discovery remedies under this rule or it is satisfied that discovery would be ineffective to protect the rights of the defendant. The bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires. (2) Grand Jury Transcripts. Discovery of transcripts of testimony of witnesses before a grand jury is governed by Rule 6. (3) Order for Preparation of Report by Expert Witness. If an expert witness whom the state intends to call in any proceeding has not prepared a report of examination or tests, the court, upon motion, may order that the expert prepare and the attorney for the state serve a report stating the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, the substance of the facts to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the expert’s opinions and the grounds for each opinion. (d) Sanctions for Noncompliance. If the attorney for the state fails to comply with this rule, the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion may take appropriate action, which may include, but is not limited to, one or more of the following: requiring the attorney for the state to comply, granting the defendant additional time or a continuance, relieving the defendant from making a disclosure required by Rule 16A, prohibiting the attorney for the state from introducing specified evidence and dismissing charges with prejudice.

Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3. Docketing the Appeal (a) Law Court Docket. Upon receipt of the notice of appeal and, when required, the requisite fee or waiver, the trial court clerk shall mark the case “Law” on the


docket. The trial court clerk shall then transmit a copy of the notice of appeal together with a copy of all docket entries to the Clerk of the Law Court. Upon receipt of the copies of the notice of appeal and the docket entries, the Clerk of the Law Court shall forthwith docket the appeal and send each party of record a written notice of the docketing, the Law Court docket number, and the date within which the record on appeal and the reporter’s transcript must be filed. (b) Further Trial Court Action. The trial court shall take no further action pending disposition of the appeal by the Law Court except: (1) in criminal cases, the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant; the granting of stay of execution and the fixing or revocation of bail pending appeal; and proceedings either for a new trial or for the correction or reduction of a sentence under M.R.Crim. P. 35(a) or (c); Rule 14. Mandate; Reconsideration; and Suspension of the Rules in the Law Court (b) Motions for Reconsideration. (1) A motion for reconsideration of any decision of the Law Court, together with the fee specified in the Court Fees Schedule, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Law Court within 14 days after the date of that decision. An original and seven copies of the motion and any supporting papers shall be filed and shall conform to Rule 9(f). The motion shall state with particularity the points of law or fact that the moving party asserts the Court has overlooked or misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the motion as the moving party desires to present. No response to a motion for reconsideration shall be filed unless requested by the Law Court. The motion is not subject to oral argument except by specific order of the Court. (2) A motion for reconsideration will not be granted except at the instance of a justice who concurred in the decision and with the concurrence of a majority of the justices who participated in the original decision and are still available and qualified to act on the motion. (3) If a motion for reconsideration is granted, the Law Court may make a final disposition of the cause without reargument or may restore it to the calendar for reconsideration or may make such other orders as are appropriate. Frivolous or repetitive motions for reconsideration may result in the imposition of appropriate sanctions. (c) Suspension of Rules. In the interest of expediting decision upon any matter, or for other good cause shown, the Law Court may modify or suspend any of the requirements or provisions of these Rules, except those of Rule 2 and those of Rule 14(b), on application of a party or on its own motion, and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction.


Bureau of Motor Vehicle Rules 29-250 SECRETARY OF STATE BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 1: RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION RELATING TO DEMERIT POINT ACCUMULATION, CONVICTIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS SUMMARY: These rules have been promulgated for the purpose of identifying the reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle and to establish a uniform system of assigning demerit points for specified convictions or adjudications of violations of statutes and regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles. These rules will serve as the basis for the Secretary of State or any Deputy Secretary of State to suspend the license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle or the certificate of registration of any person without preliminary hearing whom is determined to be incompetent to operate a motor vehicle, or whom is found to be a reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle, or whom has been convicted or adjudicated of specified convictions or adjudications. These rules repeal and replace prior regulations adopted by the Secretary of State entitled "The Maine Point System". 1. PURPOSE Pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. Section 2458, subsection 3, the Secretary of State has adopted these

rules for the purpose of identifying the reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle and to establish a uniform system of assigning demerit points for specified convictions or adjudications of violations of statutes and regulations governing the operation of motor vehicles. These rules will serve as the basis for the Secretary of State or any Deputy Secretary of State to suspend the license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle or the certificate of registration of any person without preliminary hearing determined to be incompetent to operate a motor vehicle, or whom is found to be a reckless or negligent operator of a motor vehicle, or whom has been convicted or adjudicated of designated traffic offenses.

2. SUSPENSION FOR INCOMPETENCE The license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle of any person, whom the Secretary of State or

Deputy Secretary of State determines to be incompetent to operate a motor vehicle, such incompetence to include, but not limited to, adverse physical, mental or emotional impairments may be suspended without preliminary hearing pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. Section 2458(2)(D). Incompetence relative to physical, mental or emotional impairments shall be determined in accordance with Chapter 3, Rules of Secretary of State for Physical, Emotional and Mental Competence to Operate a Motor Vehicle, as amended.

7. VIOLATION FREE CREDITS


Every person holding a Maine operator's license whose driving record does not contain any convictions, adjudications, suspensions or revocations during a calendar year shall be awarded one (1) violation free credit at the end of each calendar year, except that no person may be permitted to accumulate more than four (4) violation free credits. The Secretary of State may apply such credits to offset an equivalent number of demerit points assigned to a traffic violation. If the Secretary of State receives notice of any motor vehicle violation which resulted in a conviction or adjudication which violation occurred during the period that violation free credits were awarded, the violation free credits shall become invalid.

8. HEARING Any person whose license, permit or privilege to operate is suspended by the Secretary of State

pursuant to these rules may request a hearing and the suspension may remain in effect pending such hearing.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY: 29-A M.R.S. § § 153 and 2458 EFFECTIVE DATE: January 1, 1978 AMENDED: September 8, 1981 December 12, 1982 November 17, 1987 REPEALED & REPLACED: July 1, 1990 EFFECTIVE DATE (ELECTRONIC CONVERSION): May 4, 1996 NON-SUBSTANTIVE CORRECTIONS: December 15, 2000 - converted to MS Word, adjusted formatting AMENDED: July 25, 2012 – filing 2012-205


29 DEPARTMENT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 250 BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 2: RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SUMMARY: These rules describe the conduct of civil administrative hearings held by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles pursuant to Title 29-A M.R.S. and Title 5 M.R.S., Chapter 375, Subchapter IV, to deny, suspend, revoke, probate or otherwise modify a license, registration certificate or plate, motor vehicle driver’s license, permit, certificate of title, operating authority, license or fuel use identification decal. These rules set out legal notice requirements, discovery provisions, conduct of hearings, the presentation of evidence, the creation of a hearing record, issuance of decisions, and appeal rights.

SECTION 1. Scope of rules.

These rules are applicable to hearings held before the Secretary of State or any of his or her deputies or designees that involve the denial, suspension, revocation, probation or other modification of a license, certificate, registration certificate and plate, motor vehicle driver’s license, permit, certificate of title, or fuel use identification decal pursuant to Title 29-A M.R.S.

SECTION 2. Notice of opportunity for hearing.

Subject to the provisions of 29-A M.R.S. § 2458 (4), the Secretary of State upon suspending or revoking a person’s license, certificate of registration, title or other such certificate or license, shall notify that person that the person has a right to and may request a hearing. The notice must state: 1. The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension or revocation; 2. The effective date of the suspension or revocation; 3. The procedure for requesting a hearing; and 4. The date by which that request for hearing must be made.

If the suspension or revocation is based on a law enforcement officer’s report, a copy of that report and any blood-alcohol test certificate will be provided to the person upon request to the Secretary of State.


SECTION 3. Request for hearing. Unless the Secretary of State has set a date certain for a hearing, after a notice of suspension or revocation and opportunity for hearing has been sent or delivered to a person, that person has ten days from the effective date of the suspension or revocation to request in writing a hearing. For suspensions issued pursuant to Chapter 1, Rules for Administrative Suspension Relating to Demerit Point Accumulation, Convictions and Adjudications, a hearing may be requested by telephone. If a request is made after the ten day period and the Secretary of State finds that the person was unable to make a timely request due to lack of actual notice of the suspension or due to factors of physical incapacity, the Secretary of State shall waive the period of limitation, reopen the matter and grant the hearing request, except a stay may not be granted.

SECTION 4. Notice of hearing.

Unless otherwise provided or notice is waived, notice must be mailed to the last address on record with the Secretary of State of the party requesting the hearing or to the person ordered to appear at the hearing at least ten days prior to the hearing date. If an attorney requests a hearing on behalf of a person, all subsequent correspondence and communication from the Secretary of State relative to the hearing will be forwarded to the attorney and no further correspondence or communication will be forwarded directly to the person. In the event an attorney no longer represents the person, the person or the attorney shall file a written statement of this fact with the Secretary of State, allowing subsequent correspondence and communication from the Secretary of State to be directed to the person. The notice must state:

1. Issues contestable; and 2. Failure to appear will result in a finding by default.

SECTION 5. Disposition without full hearing.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles may:

1. Make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by stipulation,

agreed settlement or consent order; 2. Make informal disposition of any adjudicatory proceeding by default,

provided that notice has been given that failure to take required action may result in default, and further provided that any such default may be set aside by the Bureau for good cause shown; and


3. Limit the issues to be heard or vary any procedure prescribed by Bureau rule if the parties and the Bureau agree to such limitation or variation, and if no prejudice to any party will result.

SECTION 6. Default.

1. If a party who requested a hearing fails to appear at the hearing, the hearing request shall be dismissed. If within ten days following the dismissal a party submits information demonstrating good cause for the failure to appear, the request for hearing may be reinstated, at the discretion of the Hearing Examiner.

2. Good cause. The following circumstances constitute good cause for the

purpose of Subsection 1:

A. a death or serious illness in the family;

B. a personal injury or illness which reasonably prevents the party from attending the hearing;

C. an emergency or unforeseen event which reasonably prevents the party from attending the hearing;

D. an obligation or responsibility which a reasonable person in the conduct of his or her affairs could reasonably conclude takes precedence over attendance at the hearing;

E. lack of receipt of adequate or timely notice; or F. excusable neglect, excusable inadvertence, or excusable mistake.

SECTION 7. Participation at Hearing.

1. Intervention by persons substantially and directly affected by proceeding.

A. Petition. A person, including any agency of federal, state or local

government, who establishes that the person is or may be substantially and directly affected by the proceeding, may file a timely petition to intervene as a party to the proceeding. All petitions must be made in writing and received by the Secretary of State, Hearings Section, at least five days before the scheduled proceeding. Untimely petitions may not be accepted or considered.

B. Information required. The petition must include:


(1) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner’s interests are or may be substantially and directly affected by the proceeding or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor pursuant to any provision of State law; and

(2) a statement of the reasons and purposes for which intervention

is sought.

C. Responsibilities of Hearing Examiner. Prior to the conduct of the proceeding, the Hearing Examiner shall issue an order granting or denying each pending petition for intervention, specifying any conditions, and briefly stating the reasons for the order. The order shall be entered on the formal record of the proceeding. The Hearing Examiner may modify the order at any time, stating the reasons on the record therefore.

(1) Factors Hearing Examiner must consider. The Hearing

Examiner shall consider the following factors when considering petitions for intervention:

(a) the nature of the petitioner’s right pursuant to any

statute to be made party to the proceeding; (b) the precise nature and extent of the petitioner’s interest

in the subject matter or outcome of the proceeding; (c) the effect of any order which may be entered in the

proceeding on the petitioner’s interest;

(d) the nature of the contested issues; (e) the availability of other means whereby the petitioner’s

interest may be protected, e.g., presentation of written views or argument;

(f) the extent to which the petitioner’s interests will be

represented by existing parties; (g) the extent to which the petitioner’s participation may

reasonably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record;

(h) the extent to which the participation of the petitioner

will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding; (i) the ability of the petitioner to present relevant evidence

and argument; and


(j) the effect of the participation of the petitioner on existing parties to the proceeding.

2. Conditions imposed on intervenors. The Hearing Examiner may impose

conditions on the intervenor’s participation in the proceeding, either at the time that intervention is granted or at any subsequent time. The Hearing Examiner is responsible for establishing reasonable conditions on intervenors in order to limit the presentation of redundant evidence, to reasonably restrict interrogation and argument to relevant matters, to protect the interests of the parties, including the right to a timely decision, and to prevent avoidable delay. Such conditions may include, but are not limited to, the following:

A. restricting the intervenor’s participation to designated issues in which

the intervenor has a particular interest demonstrated by the petition; limiting the intervenor’s use of discovery, cross-examination, and other procedures so as to promote the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceeding; and

B. limiting the intervenor’s use of discovery, cross-examination, and

other procedures so as to promote the orderly and prompt conduct of the proceedings; and

C. requiring two or more intervenors to combine their presentations of

evidence and argument, cross-examination, discovery, and other participation in the proceeding.

3. Intervention by other interested persons.

A. Petition. An interested person may file a timely petition to intervene as full or limited party to the proceeding. All petitions must be made in writing and received by the Secretary of State, Hearings Section, at least five days before the scheduled proceeding. Untimely petitions may not be accepted or considered. The granting of a petition for intervention by an interested person is discretionary with the Secretary of State.

B. Information required. The petition must include: (1) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner’s

interest is or may be affected by the proceeding, and (2) a statement of the reasons and purposes for which intervention

is sought.

C. Responsibilities of Hearing Examiner. The responsibilities of the Hearing Examiner are those listed in Section 1(C), and the Hearing Examiner must consider the factors outlined in Section 1(C) (1).


SECTION 8. Pre-hearing conference.

Prior to any hearing, the Hearing Examiner may, at the request of a party or in the Examiner’s discretion, confer with the parties. If a pre-hearing conference is scheduled, all parties will be notified and given an opportunity to participate. Conferences may be held by telephone or in person or may be conducted in writing. Frequently, such conferences are held immediately prior to the scheduled hearing and may include such matters as: the parties’ estimation of the time required for the hearing; the identification of the legal issues likely to arise at hearing; the development of stipulations and admissions; the identification and, if possible, agreement as to admissibility of any evidence; the clarification of the issues; the resolution of disputes as to evidence requested to be produced by subpoena or otherwise; or any other action which will aid in the proper and fair conduct of the hearing.

SECTION 9. Discovery and subpoenas.

1. Discovery. Prior to the scheduled hearing, a party has the right to obtain copies of any documents, records or exhibits intended to be introduced into evidence at the hearing. Problems or disagreements shall be made known to the Hearing Examiner at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date.

2. Subpoenas.

A. Right to issuance. A party has the right to the issuance of subpoenas

in the name of the Secretary of State to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence relevant to any issue of fact at the hearing.

B. Petition to vacate or modify subpoena. Any witness issued a subpoena may petition the Secretary of State to vacate or modify the subpoena. The Secretary of State shall promptly give notice of such petition to the party who requested the issuance of the subpoena. The Secretary of State may conduct an investigation as deemed necessary and appropriate. The Secretary of State may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, vacate or modify the subpoena or, if the party in whose behalf the subpoena is issued shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot otherwise be met without undue hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is issued will be reasonably compensated, the Secretary of State may order appearance or production only upon specified conditions. (1) Factors to be considered in deciding petitions. In addition to

any other applicable statutory provisions, the Secretary of


State shall consider the following factors when deciding to vacate or modify subpoenas: (a) whether the information sought by the subpoena is

relevant to the proceeding; (b) whether the subpoena allows a reasonable time for

compliance; (c) whether the subpoena requires a person to incur a

substantial expense to travel more than one hundred miles one way to attend the hearing;

(d) whether the subpoena requires disclosure of privileged

or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies;

(e) whether the subpoena requires disclosure of a trade

secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; and

(f) whether the subpoena subjects a person to undue

burden.

SECTION 10. Conduct of hearings.

1. Hearings shall be scheduled by the Secretary of State without undue delay. 2. The Hearing Examiner shall have full and exclusive control of the conduct of

the hearing. In cases of disorder or refusal to comply with the rules of the hearing or orders of the Hearing Examiner, the Hearing Examiner shall use reasonable means to control the hearing. Parties, representatives, and witnesses shall not engage in bitter exchanges, vulgarities, or abuse or make offensive or insulting comments. When such conduct occurs, the Hearing Examiner shall admonish the offender, reminding the person that such behavior does not contribute to a fair hearing and impedes the orderly disposition of a case. If the offense is repeated and further admonition appears fruitless, the Hearing Examiner shall exclude a disorderly person from the hearing. If a disorderly person’s offensive conduct is so flagrant that it prevents the completion of the case, the disorderly person shall be removed from the hearing room and the hearing will proceed without the attendance of the disorderly person.

3. All witnesses shall be sworn.

4. Persons may be represented by counsel or other representatives in a hearing before the Secretary of State.


5. Continuances. A hearing may be continued to a later time at the request of a

party or a material witness or upon the Secretary of State’s or a Hearing Examiner’s own initiative as justice may require. Continuances may be granted only for good cause and are discretionary with the Secretary of State. Requests for continuances must be made at least twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled hearing. Emergency requests for continuances may be entertained at any time and are discretionary with the Secretary of State. A continuance may be granted on the condition that a party waives any applicable time limits. All parties and witnesses must be informed of continuances or denials of requests for continuances in a timely manner. A. Grounds for granting continuances. The grounds for granting a

continuance include but are not limited to the following: (1) to accommodate the appearance of a witness;

(2) to implement a party’s rights regarding choice of

representation at hearing; (3) to assure that a party has adequate opportunity for

preparation and presentation of evidence and argument; (4) to assure that a party has adequate opportunity to review,

evaluate, and respond to new evidence; or where appropriate, to require that a party review, evaluate and respond to new evidence;

(5) to permit a party to reconsider a previous action or decision;

(6) to permit or require performance of actions not previously

taken; and (7) to secure additional time or to permit or require additional

activity by a party as justice may require.

SECTION 11. Issues resolved at the hearing.

The issues at the hearing shall be limited to those outlined in the applicable statute and shall be stated for the record by the Hearing Examiner at the beginning of each hearing.

SECTION 12. Hearings recorded.

All hearings must be recorded.


SECTION 13. Ex parte communication.

No Hearing Examiner shall communicate directly or indirectly about any material issue involved in a hearing with any party, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate. This section does not prohibit a Hearing Examiner from communicating in any respect with other Bureau members or having the aid or advice of Bureau members, counsel or consultants retained by the Bureau who have not participated and will not participate in that hearing in an advocate capacity.

SECTION 14. Presentation of evidence; official notice.

1. Persons may present evidence bearing directly on the issues involved in the hearing, call and examine witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. In lieu of live testimony, video and telephone testimony may be offered.

2. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 M.R.S. Chapter 375, Subchapter IV,

shall control the admissibility of evidence at hearings. Evidence shall be admitted if it is the kind of evidence upon which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs.

3. The rules of privilege recognized by law shall be observed.

4. The Hearing Examiner may exclude evidence that is irrelevant or unduly

repetitious. 5. The Hearing Examiner may take official notice of records maintained by the

Secretary of State, e.g., accident reports, affidavits and any information of which a court could take judicial notice. Parties shall be notified of the material so noticed, and they shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the substance or materiality of the facts noticed. Facts officially noticed shall be included and indicated as such in the record.

SECTION 15. Record.

1. The Hearing Examiner shall make a record consisting of: A. A brief statement of the issues to be decided; B. Evidence received or considered; C. A statement of facts officially noticed; D. Offers of proof, objections and ruling thereon; E. Proposed findings and objections, if any;


F. The recommended decision, opinion, or report, if any, by the Hearing

Examiner;

G. Staff memoranda;

H. The decision.

2. Copies of recordings, transcriptions of recordings and copies of the full record shall be available to any person at actual cost. Affected parties may object to the release of confidential, proprietary, or otherwise protected material or information.

3. All material the Hearing Examiner utilizes as evidence in making a decision

shall be offered and made a part of the record and no other factual information or evidence, other than that offered by a party or intervenor and admitted, shall be considered in rendering a decision.

SECTION 16. Recommended findings and decision.

In any case in which law or regulations or special instructions from the Secretary of State dictate that an individual other than the Hearing Examiner will make a final hearing decision, the Hearing Examiner will prepare a recommended decision rather than a final hearing decision. A recommended decision will be made on the same basis and in the same form as a final decision. Copies of recommended decisions will be provided to all parties who will have an opportunity to submit responses and exceptions to the final decision maker. These written responses and exceptions will be due within twenty days of receipt of the recommended decision and copies provided to all parties, the Hearing Examiner, the Secretary of State and/or the Secretary of State’s designee.

The responses and exceptions shall contain: 1. a clear statement of the party’s position and the reason for it; 2. a listing of any errors or omissions made by the Hearing Examiner during the

hearing;

3. any relevant legal arguments the party wishes to offer.

Additional factual information which could have been presented and considered during the hearing need not be considered by the final decision maker.

SECTION 17. Decisions.


1. Decisions shall be in writing or stated in the record, and shall include findings of fact sufficient to apprise the person involved of the basis for the decision.

2. A copy of any written decision shall be delivered or mailed to the person

involved and his or her representative. 3. The decision of the Hearing Examiner constitutes the final agency action by

the Secretary of State.

SECTION 18. Notice of right to appeal; request for stay.

Written notice of the person’s right to appeal the decision to the Superior Court, of the action required to file or perfect the appeal, and the time within which this action must be taken in order to exercise the rights of appeal must be given with the decision. Requests for stay of administrative suspension pending appeal to the Superior Court must be made in writing first to the Director of the Division of Legal Affairs, Adjudications and Hearings, Bureau of Motor Vehicles. A stay may be issued only upon showing of irreparable injury to the petitioner, a strong likelihood of success on the merits and no substantial harm to adverse parties or the general public. The Director or a designee shall issue a prompt response to any request, basing the decision on whether the hearing was conducted in accordance with all applicable rules, regulations and statutes, whether the decision is supported by the evidence, whether an appeal is likely to succeed, and whether the petitioner’s prior driving record indicates the petitioner does not present a significant threat to the safety of the motoring public.

SECTION 19. Correction or amendment of hearing decision.

Either at the request of a party or sua sponte, a Hearing Examiner may correct or amend a decision to correct a ministerial or typographical error, to clarify or correct the record, or to rule upon any issue that was heard but not ruled upon. If the correction or amendment is substantive, the Hearing Examiner shall reiterate the mechanism for appeal of the decision.

SECTION 20. Reopening of hearings.

Either at the request of a party or sua sponte, the Hearing Examiner may upon notice to all parties reopen the record of any hearing under the following circumstances: 1. a party to the original hearing has discovered new evidence which could

reasonably have affected the outcome of the proceeding but could not have


been discovered by due diligence in time to present during the original proceeding, or;

2. there was fraud or misrepresentation regarding an issue of fact material to

the original proceeding, which could reasonably be determined to have affected the outcome of the proceeding, if known at the time or;

3. all parties agree to reopen.

A motion to request to amend or reconsider a decision or to reopen the hearing does not extend the statutory appeal period (which is jurisdictional).

SECTION 21. Advisory rulings.

An interested person may request the Department of the Secretary of State, Bureau of Motor Vehicles to make an advisory ruling with respect to the applicability of any statute or rule administered by the Bureau to the person or the person’s property or actual state of facts. All advisory rulings must be in writing and are not deemed binding upon the Bureau. An interested person shall direct the written request for an advisory ruling to: Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 29 State House Station, Augusta, Maine 04333.

STATUTORY AUTHORITY: 29-A M.R.S. § 153 EFFECTIVE DATE: July 10, 1978 AMENDED: May 7, 1979 - Sec. 2 (D) July 31, 1983 March 5, 1988 EFFECTIVE DATE (ELECTRONIC CONVERSION): May 4, 1996 NON-SUBSTANTIVE CORRECTIONS: December 14, 2000 - converted to MS Word, formatting REPEALED AND REPLACED: February 1, 2006 – filing 2006-51


29 DEPARTMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE 250 BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES Chapter 3: PHYSICAL, EMOTIONAL AND MENTAL COMPETENCE TO OPERATE A MOTOR VEHICLE SUMMARY: These rules describe the standards to be used by the Secretary of State in determining physical, emotional and mental competence of persons to operate motor vehicles. The rules establish a reporting system which requires persons to submit medical information to the Secretary of State. Persons found incompetent to operate a motor vehicle in accordance with procedures outlined in these rules may have their driving privileges suspended, revoked or restricted. 1. Standards A. Secretary of State. The Secretary of State shall determine the physical, emotional,

and mental competence of a person to operate a motor vehicle with the advice of the Medical Advisory Board and on the basis of the Functional Ability Profiles.

B. Functional Ability Profiles. Standards to determine the competence of a person to

operate a motor vehicle are those contained in the "Functional Ability Profiles" adopted by the Secretary of State with the assistance of the Medical Advisory Board.

2. Reporting System A. Medical conditions requiring report. Conditions for which a person is required to

submit a report to the Secretary of State include, but are not limited to, neurological, cardiovascular, metabolic, musculoskeletal, visual, emotional and psychiatric and substance abuse.

B. Sources of information. Sources of information concerning medical conditions

include, but are not limited to: 1. Permits, licenses, renewal applications, and accident reports; 2. Written reports from family, physicians, law enforcement personnel and

other government agencies, and; 3. Signed statements from citizens.


C. Nature of medical report. Upon receipt of information concerning the existence of a medical condition for which a report is required or which may affect a person's ability to operate a motor vehicle, the Secretary of State shall request the person involved to submit a medical report from a physician or from other competent treatment personnel, who may be specified.

1. To be acceptable, the medical report must be made on forms supplied or

approved by the Secretary of State and must contain the physician's or other treatment personnel's diagnosis of the patient's condition(s) and any prescribed medication(s).

2. The Secretary of State may require an individual to certify in writing the

date of the person's last seizure. D. Action by the Secretary of State 1. Upon receipt of a medical report indicating that a person is competent to

operate a motor vehicle, the Secretary of State may approve the person's competence to operate a motor vehicle, with or without restrictions, taking into consideration the safety of the public and the welfare of the driver.

2. Upon receipt of a medical report indicating that a person is not competent

to operate a motor vehicle, or upon the failure or refusal of a person to submit the requested information, the Secretary of State shall follow one or more of the following procedures:

a. If, from records or other sufficient evidence, the Secretary of State

has cause to believe that a person is not physically, emotionally, or mentally competent to operate a motor vehicle, the Secretary of State may:

i. Obtain the advice of any member of the Medical Advisory

Board or the Board collectively. The Board or any member may formulate advice from the existing records and reports or may request that an examination and report be made by the Board or any other qualified person so designated. The licensed driver or applicant may present a written report from a physician of the person's choice to the Board or the member reviewing the matter and such report must be given due consideration. Members of the Board and other persons making examinations and reports are not liable for their opinions and recommendations pursuant to this subsection.

ii. Require a person to submit to a driving evaluation. Upon

the conclusion of such an evaluation, the Secretary of State


shall take action as may be appropriate. The Secretary of State may suspend the license of such person, allow the person to retain a license, or issue a license subject to any conditions or restrictions deemed advisable, having in mind the safety of the public and the person.

iii. After hearing, suspend any certificate of registration,

operator's license, operating privileges, or privilege to apply for and obtain a license in the State of Maine.

iv. Without preliminary hearing, suspend any certificate of

registration or any operator's license, operating privilege, or privilege to apply for and obtain a license in the State of Maine if the Secretary of State determines that the person's continued operation of a motor vehicle presents a potential danger to the person or other persons or property. The Secretary of State shall notify the person that a hearing will be provided without undue delay.

E. Confidentiality of reports. Reports received under this rule are confidential in

accordance with the Maine Motor Vehicle Statutes. FUNCTIONAL ABILITY PROFILES Functional ability to operate a vehicle safely may be affected by a wide range of physical, mental or emotional impairments. To simplify reporting and to make possible a comparison of relative risks and limitations, the Medical Advisory Board has developed Functional Ability Profiles for ten categories, with multiple levels under each profile. Each profile follows the same format: 1. No diagnosed condition. This section is used for a patient who has

indicated to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles a problem for which no evidence is found, or for which no ongoing condition can be identified. For example, this category might apply to a person with a heart murmur as a young child who indicates heart trouble, or to a teenager who fainted in gym class once on a hot day who indicates blackouts.

2. Condition, fully recovered/compensated. This category indicates a

history of a condition which has been resolved or which does not warrant review. Guidance for the use of this section is given in each profile.

3. Active impairment. a. Minimal. This section may call for periodic review because of an

ongoing condition which could deteriorate.


b. Mild. This section deals with conditions which may impair driving but which are controlled so that a person can still operate a motor vehicle safely. Reviews are more frequent than in (a).

c. Moderate. This section identifies impairment which often

precludes driving, but for which there is the potential for recovery to the point of allowing safe operation of a motor vehicle.

d. Severe. This section identifies permanent conditions with little or

no potential for improvement and which preclude safe operation of a motor vehicle.

4. Condition under investigation. This section is for newly identified

conditions. Follow-up reports will place condition in its proper part of section 3.

In all cases, periodic reviews may place the driver being evaluated in a higher or lower

section as the condition improves or deteriorates. PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS There is no certain way of predicting which persons with psychiatric illness will have

accidents, but many high risk drivers are such because of psychiatric conditions. Many individuals with psychiatric illness are maintained on medications on an ambulatory

status. These drugs have varying degrees of sedative side effects and can potentiate other central nervous system depressants. Persons receiving such medications should be screened in terms of severity of side effects incident to medication and the adequacy of the remission.

If a physician believes there may be a problem but is not sufficiently familiar with the

patient's psychiatric status to make a valid judgment, he should refrain from doing so until he gains access to current psychiatric information or records or makes an appropriate referral for evaluation.

FUNCTIONAL ABILITY PROFILE:

Psychiatric Disorders

Profile Levels Circumstances* Condition Example Interval for Review

1.

No diagnosed condition

No known disorder.

2. Condition fully recovered & compensated

Past history of psychiatric or behavioral disorder, asymptomatic, off medication

N/A


3. Active impairment: a. Minimal b. Mild c. Moderate d. Severe

a. Current psychiatric disorder without

impaired judgment, destructive thinking or intent, controlled with or without medication.

b. Same as (a), with potential for

impaired judgment. ROAD EVALUATION

REQUIRED c. Active psychiatric/behavioral

disorder with indications of risk to self or others; or with treatment or medications which interfere with alertness or coordination, but with potential for improvement

d. Same as (c), not expected to recover.

a. 4 years b. 1 year c. No driving d. No driving

4.

Condition under investigation

Newly discovered psychiatric/behavioral disorder

As needed

* For further explanation refer to page 1


NEWS ARTICLES http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2013-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-and-assaulted

FBI Releases 2013 Statistics on Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted

Washington, D.C. November 24, 2014 FBI National Press Office(202) 324-3691 According to statistics collected by the FBI, 76 law enforcement officers were killed in line-of-duty incidents in 2013. Of these, 27 law enforcement officers died as a result of felonious acts, and 49 officers died in accidents. In addition, 49,851 officers were victims of line-of-duty assaults. Comprehensive data tables about these incidents and brief narratives describing the fatal attacks and selected assaults resulting in injury are included in the 2013 edition of Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted, released today.

Felonious Deaths

The 27 felonious deaths occurred in 16 states. The number of officers killed as a result of criminal acts in 2013 decreased by 22 when compared with the 49 officers who were feloniously killed in 2012. The five- and 10-year comparisons show a decrease of 21 felonious deaths compared with the 2009 figure (48 officers) and a decrease of 30 deaths compared with 2004 data (57 officers).

Officer Profiles: The average age of the officers who were feloniously killed was 39 years. The victim officers had served in law enforcement for an average of 13 years at the time of the fatal incidents. Twenty-five of the officers were male, and two were female. Twenty-five of the officers were white, and two were black.

Circumstances: Of the 27 officers feloniously killed, six were killed in arrest situations, five were investigating suspicious persons or circumstances, five were ambushed, four were involved in tactical situations, four were answering disturbance calls, and two were conducting traffic pursuits/stops. One was conducting an investigative activity, such as surveillance, a search, or an interview.

Weapons: Offenders used firearms to kill 26 of the 27 victim officers. Of these 26 officers, 18 were slain with handguns, five with rifles, and three with shotguns. One officer was killed with a vehicle used as a weapon.

Regions: Fifteen of the felonious deaths occurred in the South, six in the West, four in the Midwest, and two in the Northeast.

Suspects: Law enforcement agencies identified 28 alleged assailants in connection with the felonious line-of-duty deaths. Twenty of the assailants had prior criminal arrests, and six of the offenders were under judicial supervision at the time of the felonious incidents.

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2013-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-and-assaulted

http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-2013-statistics-on-law-enforcement-officers-killed-and-assaulted


Accidental Deaths

Forty-nine law enforcement officers were killed accidentally while performing their duties in 2013. The majority (23 officers) were killed in automobile accidents. The number of accidental line-of-duty deaths increased by one from the 2012 total (48 officers).

Officer Profiles: The average age of the officers who were accidentally killed was 41 years; the average number of years the victim officers had served in law enforcement was 13. All 49 of the officers were male. Forty-one of the officers were white, six were black, and race was not reported for two officers.

Circumstances: Of the 49 officers accidentally killed, 23 died as a result of automobile accidents, nine were struck by vehicles, four officers died in motorcycle accidents, four officers were killed in falls, two were accidentally shot, two drowned, one died in an aircraft accident, and four officers died in other types of duty-related accidents. Seatbelt usage was reported for 22 of the 23 officers killed in automobile accidents. Of these, 14 officers were not wearing seatbelts, three of whom were seated in parked patrol vehicles. Eight officers were wearing their seatbelts at the times of the accidents.

Regions: Thirty-one of the accidental deaths occurred in the South, nine in the West, five in the Northeast, and 4 in the Midwest.

Assaults

In 2013, of the 49,851 officers assaulted while performing their duties, 29.2 percent were injured. The largest percentage of victim officers (31.2 percent) were assaulted while responding to disturbance calls. Assailants used personal weapons (hands, fists, feet, etc.) in 79.8 percent of the incidents, firearms in 4.5 percent of incidents, and knives or other cutting instruments in 1.8 percent of the incidents. Other types of dangerous weapons were used in 13.9 percent of assaults. Expanded assault details have been included in the 2013 publication. Data for assaults during which officers were injured with firearms or knives/other cutting instruments are located in new tables, figures, and selected narratives.


LA police win $6M settlement over ticket quotas

12/17/2013 http://www.policeone.com/pc_print.asp?vid=6678308 The $5.9-million settlement approved Tuesday resolves two lawsuits filed in 2010 by 11 LAPD officers assigned to a motorcycle unit By Joel Rubin and Catherine Saillant Los Angeles Times LOS ANGELES — The Los Angeles City Council on Tuesday agreed to pay nearly $6 million to a group of police officers who accused their superiors of imposing a secret traffic ticket quota system on the Westside. The settlement, approved unanimously, brings to more than $10 million the amount of taxpayer money spent on payouts and legal fees from the ticket quota cases. But that number could grow because one more officer's case is still pending. The ticket controversy has been a black eye for the Los Angeles Police Department. Ticket quotas are against state law. After the officers' allegations were made public, LAPD officials met with police union representatives and signed a letter emphasizing that the department prohibits quotas. Dennis Zine, a former City Council member and career LAPD motorcycle officer, said the settlement calls into question LAPD's traffic division management. Zine is also incensed that Capt. Nancy Lauer, who ran the LAPD's West Traffic Division at the time of the allegations, has been promoted. "This whole thing clearly shows me that management did not do what they needed to do, and taxpayers are footing the bill for that,'' said Zine, who lost a bid for city controller in this year's municipal elections. Matthew McNicholas, one of the officers' attorneys, called the action "a very fair" resolution. "These guys had targets put on their backs and nothing happens to this captain. In fact, she's since been promoted. The message that sends from the department is, 'We do what we want, how we want.'" The $5.9-million settlement approved Tuesday resolves two lawsuits filed in 2010 by 11 LAPD officers assigned to a motorcycle unit. In the lawsuits, the officers detailed what they said were strict demands for tickets placed on them by Lauer. The lawsuits alleged that Lauer, who ran the division starting in 2006, required officers to write at least 18 traffic tickets each shift and demanded that 80% of the citations be for major violations. Officers who failed to meet the minimums or raised concerns about them were reprimanded, denied overtime assignments, given undesirable work schedules and subjected to other forms of harassment, according to the lawsuits. In a few instances, Lauer attempted to kick officers out of the motorcycle unit, the lawsuits said.

http://www.policeone.com/pc_print.asp?vid=6678308


In a statement, Chief Charlie Beck defended the division's practices. Management set "goals" to reduce traffic violations that resulted in serious injury and death, Beck said, but the jury in a separate 2009 case interpreted that as quotas, he said. "We do not agree with the original jury's findings," he said. "Unfortunately the large jury award in the earlier court case made settling this case the most prudent business decision." Lauer, who currently runs one of the department's patrol divisions, said she instructed officers to ticket illegal driving but did not set quotas. The focus at West Traffic Division "was always on reducing traffic collisions and saving lives," Lauer said. "We saw too many innocent people die at the hands of speeding and other dangerous drivers." The payment is the latest fallout from Lauer's time at the helm of the traffic division, which patrols for traffic violations throughout the city's Westside. In 2009, two other motorcycle officers, Howard Chan and David Benioff, made similar allegations against Lauer and members of her command staff in a separate lawsuit. In testimony, Lauer denied she had enforced a quota, saying there was "apparently some confusion" among officers, records show. If a certain number of tickets had been mentioned, it would have been used as "a goal" for officers instead of a quota, she said. Similarly, lawyers for the city tried to persuade jurors that the department had simply established broad goals rather than specific quotas, and that supervisors were trying to reduce traffic injuries and fatalities. The officers testified that they were ordered to scrap regular patrol assignments and sent instead to specific streets where they were more likely to catch motorists committing moving violations. Though not illegal, being sent to those so-called orchards or cherry patches, they said, reinforced the belief that hitting ticket targets trumped other aspects of the job. The jury sided with the officers, awarding them $2 million. The verdict was a particularly sharp rebuke because lawyers for then-City Atty. Carman Trutanich had rejected an earlier offer to settle the case for $500,000, according to officials from the union that represents rank-and-file officers. In August 2011 — after the current group of 11 officers, along with another officer who filed his own lawsuit — followed with their allegations of retaliation, Trutanich outsourced the legal work in the cases to a private law firm, Albright, Yee & Schmit. The firm billed the city nearly $2.4 million for its work on the cases, according to figures provided by the city attorney's office. The officers appeared to have a strong case. A lieutenant who monitored workplace issues for the department testified in a deposition that after looking into the officers' allegations, he concluded that Lauer had, in fact, imposed a ticket quota, court records show.


When Trutanich was unseated as city attorney by Mike Feuer this year, Feuer changed course, instructing his assistants to try to settle with the officers, according to city records and interviews. The settlement is the latest in a long string of seven-figure payments the city has made to resolve police officers' reports of retaliation, discrimination and other workplace misconduct. In the last several years more than a dozen other officers have won million-dollar-plus jury verdicts or settlements from the city. An earlier Times review of city records from 2005 to 2010 found police officers filed more than 250 lawsuits against the department over workplace issues. The city paid more than $18 million in about 45 of those cases and had appealed other verdicts worth several million dollars more, the records showed. As the losses continued to pile up, the department came under increasing scrutiny for its apparent inability to identify workplace problems and resolve them before they blew up into legal action. With the Police Commission, which oversees the department, demanding improvements, LAPD officials have made changes and have said that the number of lawsuits brought by officers has dropped. Commission members, however, have said it is too early to conclude that the problem is under control. Copyright 2013 Los Angeles Times


http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=12344 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE June 15, 2014

Governor Quinn Signs Legislation to Ban Police Ticket Quotas

Senate Bill 3411 Will Eliminate Ineffective System and Improve Safety

CHICAGO – Governor Pat Quinn today signed legislation to prohibit municipalities from requiring police officers to meet ticket quotas. The new law also prevents quotas from being used to evaluate an officer’s performance. Today’s action is part of Governor Quinn’s agenda to maintain integrity in local government.

“Law enforcement officers should have discretion on when and where to issue traffic citations and not be forced to ticket motorists to satisfy a quota system,” Governor Quinn said. “This new law will improve safety and working conditions for police officers and prevent motorists from facing unnecessary anxiety when they encounter a police vehicle.”

Senate Bill 3411, sponsored by State Senator Andy Manar (D-Bunker Hill) and State Representative Jay Hoffman (D-Swansea), prohibits a county or municipality from requiring a law enforcement officer to issue a specific number of citations within a designated period of time. It also says a county or municipality may not compare the number of citations issued by the law enforcement officer to the number of citations issued by any other law enforcement officer for purposes of job performance evaluation. The new law applies to local, county and state police officers, and is effective January 1, 2015.

“With today’s technology, there are more effective ways to evaluate the performance of a police officer," Senator Manar said. “Using the number of citations is an outdated and ineffective evaluation tool. It doesn't lead to better policing, it doesn't lead to better use of taxpayer money and it doesn't lead to better relationships with the community, all of which are challenges we face.”

“Arbitrary quotas on the number of tickets that have to be issued by police officers undermines the public trust in the police departments’ priorities,” Representative Hoffman said. “By eliminating these quotas, we can restore that trust and ensure that police officers are free to do their job protecting the public.”

http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=12344

http://www3.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=12344



Police Union Calls For Elimination Of Traffic-Ticket Quota October 10th, 2014 TUCSON, AZ – The Tucson Police Officers Association on Thursday called for the department to eliminate the ticket quota for patrol officers. “We’re just philosophically opposed to any kind of quota,” said Jason Winsky, government affairs director for the union. “It’s a morale issue for us because the officer no long has discretion. It’s mandatory.” Tucson Police Department patrol officers are expected to make at least one “traffic contact” a day on average that results in a citation or a warning, according to Chief Roberto Villaseñor. “One ticket a day is not something that would be considered a quota in my mind,” he said. The purpose of the requirement was to encourage proactive traffic enforcement, the police chief said. Traffic contacts deter “bad driving habits,” and Villaseñor said it required his officers to do their jobs, which is ensuring “the smooth flow of traffic.” “Our traffic enforcement had become almost non-existent (before the requirement),” he said. “There was less than one traffic contact per week and that was unacceptable.” Villaseñor first implemented what he calls a “performance expectation” in January 2013. The original requirement was for patrol officers to issue at least one citation or warning a day on average, which is the same as the current version. He then amended it July this year to require at least one hazardous citation before changing it again on Sept. 26. Having a strong traffic program saves more lives and property damage than anything else the department can do, Villaseñor said. There are more traffic accidents than any property or violent crime. “A chief of police should not be challenged for requiring his officers to enforce traffic laws,” he said. The TPOA is working with House Rep. Bruce Wheeler on a legislation to ban ticket quotas in Arizona for the next legislative section. Wheeler, who is looking for re-election in Legislative District 10 this season, said that the requirement is “not a good idea.” “We can double speak all we want, but it’s still a quota,” he said. “It’s still an arbitrary, disruptive requirement.” Having a quota does not help the community’s impression of the police and disrupts police officers’ more vital investigation work, Wheeler said. And if it’s designed to generate revenue, “that’s certainly not a way to do it,” he added. One of his opponents in the election, Republican Todd Clodfelter, weighed in on the issue, saying he agrees with Wheeler that ticket quotas are “unnecessary.” He said





too much enforcement could make people apprehensive about police officers, though he did not agree that there should be a state law banning ticket quotas. “I’m not sure we really need legislation to make that happen,” Clodfelter said. “Not from a state level.” A fellow Democrat in the race, Stefanie Mach, said she supports Wheeler’s effort, saying that the police officers and the public both do not like quotas for traffic tickets. Bill Wildish, another candidate in Legislative District 10, could not be reached for comment. From The Arizona Daily Star

http://tucson.com/news/blogs/police-beat/police-union-calls-for-elimination-of-traffic-ticket-quota/article_2cde50a7-10a0-5e18-8908-7335510ce811.html


http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/01/20/police-quotas-for-traffic-tickets-could-be-outlawed-by-state-lawmakers/

Police quotas for traffic tickets could be outlawed by state lawmakers January 20, 2015 Following the passage last year of an Illinois law that bars police departments from setting quotas for traffic citations, other states are looking into similar measures. Bills have been filed this year in Missouri and Wyoming. Missouri’s proposal would prohibit citation numbers from being used in officer job performance evaluation, while Wyoming’s would do away with quotas altogether. A New Jersey bill filed last year related to citation numbers and officer job performance was also filed and is still active, although no action has been taken since August, according to the state legislature Web site. Assemblyman Declan O’Scanlon (R), who introduced the bill, called it “good policy all around” that will “really allow police men and women to focus on safety and take the emphasis off writing tickets.” “It’s unfortunate that I have to introduce this bill at all, but it’s a dirty little secret that some police forces are blatantly considering ticketing rates in the officer assessment process,” he said in a statement. “Not only is that a terrible policy, it diminishes the value of all that our officers do by turning them into revenue generating machines.” Former Illinois governor Pat Quinn (D) said when he signed that state’s bill in June the legislation would increase public trust and “prevent motorists from facing unnecessary anxiety when they encounter a police vehicle.” A similar bill was also passed by lawmakers in Oklahoma last year, although Gov. Mary Fallin (R) did not sign it, according to a review of the 2014 session.





http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/Bills/A3500/3457_I1.PDF

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/06/16/illinois-bans-ticket-quotas-to-boost-public-trust-in-police/

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/06/16/illinois-bans-ticket-quotas-to-boost-public-trust-in-police/

http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/legislative_summary/2014_Session_Overview.htm


URL to article: http://watchdog.org/204420/traffic-ticket-quota/

Lawmakers put skids on ticket quotas, but speed traps continue Posted By William Patrick On March 6, 2015 @ 11:59 am

SPEED TRAPPED: A nascent legislative proposal would ban traffic citation quotas, but local law enforcement agencies could still raise up to 50 percent of revenue through tickets. TALLAHASSEE, Fla. — A Florida lawmaker is ending police quotas for traffic tickets, but not before a rural town in his district was the subject of national ridicule. CNN [2]and CBS news [3], to name two media outlets, reported the city of Waldo’s seven police officers wrote nearly 12,000 speeding tickets and collected more than $400,000 in fines in a year. The fines amounted to 50 percent of the city’s entire revenue and 60 percent of the small North Florida police department’s budget. As a result, Sen. Rob Bradley [4], R-Fleming Island, is taking action. “It’s important for people to understand that if their local law enforcement agency is being supported by nothing but traffic revenue or, if it’s a large part, they need to be aware of that and decide if that’s an important way to fund a law enforcement agency,” Bradley said Thursday during a Fiscal Policy Committee [5]meeting at the Capitol. But north Florida speed traps, one of the worst kept secrets in the state, would persist, and Bradley’s fix would allow local law enforcement agencies to continue raising significant sums through ticketing. Commonly thought to be illegal, a gray area in state law allows county sheriffs and municipal police departments to use ticketing quotas. “Agents of the state,” such as the Florida Highway Patrol, cannot. Bradley’s bill would close the loophole. His proposal, Senate Bill 264 [7], triggers a state audit if a local government’s total revenue from traffic tickets exceeds 50 percent of its law enforcement budget. Arguably, the measure gives the appearance of solving an embarrassing problem while simply capping ticketing schemes at a generous threshold. “If a town wants to hand out tickets and use it as a revenue source, this doesn’t prevent them from doing it, it just says that they have to tell people about it,” said Sen. Jeff Clemens [8], D-Lake Worth. The bill has so far received unanimous bipartisan support [9], with the Police Benevolent Association and the Florida Police Chiefs Association giving it a thumbs, as well. Motorists should still beware. “Speed traps really have nothing to do with public safety and everything to do with generating revenue from writing as many speeding tickets as possible,” John Bowman, spokesman for the National Motorist Association, [10]told Watchdog. In 2012, NMA listed Waldo, Fla., as the third-worst speed trap in the country, which belies the notion the city’s dubious ticketing practices were previously unknown.

http://watchdog.org/204420/traffic-ticket-quota/

http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/09/us/hampton-florida-corruption/

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/florida-town-infamous-for-speed-traps-disbanding-police-force/

http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/S7

http://www.flsenate.gov/media/videoplayer?EventID=2443575804_2015031106

http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/0264

http://www.flsenate.gov/Senators/S27

http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2015/0264/?Tab=VoteHistory

http://www.motorists.org/


Hampton, another Bradford County [11] town, was dinged months earlier for ticketing problems. Upon review, the Florida Auditor General [12] found 31 accountability issues, some dating back years. Time magazine [13] picked up on that story. H. Lee Moffitt, a lobbyist for AAA auto, said Thursday the Legislature has known about the practice for decades but hasn’t had “the appetite” to pass reform — until now. “Cities bitterly complained that the only reason was for public safety,” said Moffitt, a former House speaker. “Almost 20 years later, it’s finally time to put an end to citation quotas.” Moffitt, a former House Speaker, said AAA has even paid for billboards in the area to warn drivers of the abusive ticketing practices. In some instances, quotas have been used as a way to measure police officers’ performance, according to a Senate bill analysis [14]. But that’s on its way out. Several emails obtained by Watchdog from the Senate Transportation Committee say abolishing the quotas would prohibit officers from being evaluated, promoted, compensated or disciplined for failing to write a specific number of tickets. “Over-ticketing is effective to raise revenues,” said Bowman, “unfortunately, it takes advantage of motorists who may be driving in a responsible manner.” “The handing out of more tickets does not result in less accidents,” Clemens said.

http://maps.flsenate.gov/de1/map.html?plan=s016s9030&district=07

http://www.myflorida.com/audgen/pages/pdf_files/2014-100.pdf

http://nation.time.com/2014/02/13/hampton-florida-might-be-dissolved/

http://www.flsenate.gov/PublishedContent/Committees/2014-2016/FP/MeetingRecords/MeetingPacket_2889.pdf


http://www.gainesville.com/article/20150115/ARTICLES/150119807

Bill would toughen state ban on traffic ticket quotas By Arek Sarkissian, Staff writer Published: Thursday, January 15, 2015 at 6:01 a.m. Legislation that would give teeth to Florida’s prohibition on traffic ticket quotas and require local police departments to be upfront about budget funding is up for discussion during this year’s session. State Sen. Rob Bradley, R-Fleming Island, said SB 264 would clarify ambiguous language in the state’s current ticket quota ban to specifically include all law enforcement agencies. Also, the bill would create consequences for agencies found in violation of the ban, but lawmakers would later define those penalties. Bradley filed the bill on Jan. 7, and state Rep. Ray Rodrigues, R-Fort Myers, will file a House companion bill next week. “This is the first quarter of a four-quarter game,” Bradley said. “I’m already receiving outstanding feedback from my colleagues in the Senate.” Bradley said he filed the bill in response to trouble last year in Hampton and Waldo that revealed both cities were using ticket fine revenue to support budgets. The Florida Joint Legislative Auditing Committee learned that Hampton had received hundreds of thousands of dollars from tickets written by officers patrolling a short distance on U.S. 301. Also, the committee learned much of the revenue was misspent. In response, the city saved its charter by agreeing to decommission its police department. The City of Waldo was dragged into controversy by its own police officers in August after they alerted the City Council that they were under an imposed ticket quota. The allegation led to an investigation by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, which led State Attorney Bill Cervone to determine Waldo had adopted a ticket quota, but there were no consequences and it was not clear if the state’s ban only applied to state law enforcement. An investigation by The Gainesville Sun revealed that 62 percent of the Waldo Police Department budget came from ticket fine revenue, and the majority of the thousands of citations filed by the agency’s seven officers were written on a stretch of U.S. 301 where the speed limit was 45 mph for a flea market only open on weekends. Previous budgets and a proposed plan for the current fiscal year indicated Waldo mostly relied on traffic ticket fines to support its law enforcement. That reliance on ticket revenue prompted Sen. Bradley to urge the Waldo City Council to find another way to support its police department or close the agency. In response, the department was shuttered on Oct. 1, leaving law enforcement patrol in Waldo up to the Alachua County Sheriff’s Office and the Florida Highway Patrol. Bradley’s proposed legislation also would require counties and cities that use more than 50 percent of traffic fine revenue to support law enforcement operations to

http://www.gainesville.com/article/20150115/ARTICLES/150119807

http://www.gainesville.com/personalia/areksarkissian


submit a report to the Joint Legislative Auditing Committee detailing how much money it collects and total expenses. The bill already received support from the Florida Police Benevolent Association, which represents thousands of law enforcement professionals across the state. PBA Director Matt Puckett said the contentious relationship that the police department in Ferguson, Missouri, shared with its residents was initially fractured by performance quotas. “The police department in Ferguson was balancing its budget on the backs of its citizens by writing tickets,” Puckett said. “That’s an extreme example of what could happen when a government does that very thing.” Puckett also said traffic ticket quotas eliminated proactive police work. “We want police officers to keep the peace,” Puckett said. “Officers should not be wondering if they met their quota.” An official with the Florida League of Cities said it was too early to tell if the league would support Bradley’s proposed legislation, but an established companion measure in the House gives it a reasonable shot at being assigned to committees in both legislative chambers. Rodrigues said he believes that law enforcement agencies that support budgets with ticket fines are of no help to the communities they serve. “This will definitely put the sunshine on the bad actors,” Rodrigues said. State Attorney Cervone also said he supports the bill, and Bradley said he hopes it would also bring the Lawtey Police Department in line. Like Hampton and Waldo, Lawtey uses traffic fines written on U.S. 301 to support much of its police department budget. “What it’s going to do is, like Waldo did, communities will have that discussion about how they fund their police department,” Bradley said. “This allows them to make that decision.”


http://wtvr.com/2014/07/14/chesterfield-quota-investigation/ Former police officer exposes Chesterfield’s ticket quota goals

POSTED 11:52 PM, JULY 14, 2014, BY MELISSA HIPOLIT, UPDATED AT 09:04AM, JULY 15, 2014 CHESTERFIELD COUNTY, Va. – Two Virginia delegates who represent voters in Chesterfield County said they would consider banning ticket quotas at law enforcement agencies after CBS 6 uncovered traffic stop and arrest mandates at the Chesterfield County Police Department. Lieutenant Colonel Dan Kelly with the Chesterfield Police Department said the mandates were not quotas and called them a perfectly legitimate performance standard. A former officer with the Chesterfield Police Department came to CBS 6 investigative reporter Melissa Hipolit with concerns about the way he said the department measured officer performance. His recent review contained traffic stop and arrest mandates. It showed the following work goals: Two-three traffic stops per day One arrest per day “Failure to meet the expectation during this work performance plan will result in further disciplinary action,” the review read. The former officer said he resigned after he was denied a one percent raise for not making enough traffic stops and arrests. “This is…this is shocking…it really is,” Del. Riley Ingram (R – Chesterfield) said. “This is a little disconcerting,” Del. Delores McQuinn (D – Chesterfield) said. She said she had never seen something like that in writing before. When questioned about the document, leaders at the Chesterfield Police Department sought to clarify its intent. “If you think Chesterfield County Police officers are evil and out to target our citizens, that’s just completely false,” Lieutenant Colonel Kelly said. Kelly admitted the department does expect every patrol officer to make three traffic stops and one arrest during each shift. That adds up to about 270 stops and 90 arrests every day. “Our officers are on the road 12 hours a day, so in a 12-hour period of time they stop three cars, I don’t think that’s unfairly targeting our citizens,” Kelly said. He said the department comes up with those benchmarks after an in-depth review of all stop and arrest numbers from the previous year. They then come up with an average, which becomes the mandate. “I don’t sit behind my desk and arbitrarily come up with some number of a performance standard that I think our officers should meet,” Kelly said. “They are held accountable to what their peers do.” “Would you call this a quota system?” Hipolit asked Kelly. “Absolutely not,” Kelly said. “Why?” Hipolit pressed. “It’s a performance standard,” Kelly replied.

http://wtvr.com/2014/07/14/chesterfield-quota-investigation/

http://wtvr.com/author/melissahipolit/


At least one Chesterfield driver we spoke with said he is perfectly okay with that standard. “If somebody is in the wrong, then they’re in the wrong, they’re just doing their job, I understand,” Lequan Mcelwain. Kelly said the department’s officers are fairly lenient. He pointed to numbers that showed officers issued tickets to just 40 percent of the cars they stopped last year. “I think those are legitimate stops by our officers that observed a legitimate violation of the law,” Kelly said. Chesterfield Police Department Master Officer Matt McCory said he pulled over an average of four to five drivers every day, but only wrote one or two tickets. “I generally can help them out a little bit, issue a warning instead of a summons,” McCory said. The state of Illinois recently banned police ticket quotas. After our investigation, Delegates Riley and McQuinn both said Virginia should consider doing the same thing. “I would hope this kind of practice would cease immediately,” Del. McQuinn said. “I think as we go back into the General Assembly it needs to be addressed.” We asked both the Richmond and Henrico Police departments if they had similar systems in place to evaluate officer performance. The Richmond Police Department said it does not have any traffic stop or arrest requirements. A Henrico Police spokeswoman said there are no stop or arrest quotas for officers, but they do encourage traffic stops in crime hot spots and high accident locations.


http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/21079

Sheriff Lieutenant Caught on Video Saying Officers Disciplined for Not Writing Enough Tickets

Michigan has law banning ticket quotas By ANNE SCHIEBER | March 7, 2015 It is against the law in Michigan for police agencies to impose a traffic ticket quota on officers. So when a Newaygo County sheriff’s deputy was caught on video telling county commissioners he would reprimand subordinates for not writing enough tickets to comply with a federal grant, motorists bristled. “The damage this sort of abuse does to the credibility of police officers being there to 'protect and serve' is enormous,” said Jim Walker, executive director of the National Motorists Association Foundation. “We have had 40 years of it, and it is time to stop. And the feds are a major offender in promoting abusive enforcement for profits, by paying for overtime enforcement grants that are often abused for revenue.” Newaygo County Sheriff Patrick Hedlund, who has been on the job for seven weeks, said his officers were not on a quota system. “I can’t say what happened in the 15 years before I arrived, but the deputy made a silly statement, something, from what I can tell, he made up,” Hedlund said. The video, which can be found in a news report of The Free Thought Project, shows road patrol Lt. Chad Palmiter telling commissioners in January that while he knows ticket quotas are against the law, he is a “numbers guy” when it comes to issuing tickets. Palmiter was seeking approval to accept a grant from the Michigan Office of Highway Safety Planning. “The guys that can't perform those numbers have been removed from all overtime for that particular grant, for the remainder of the year,” he said, referring to federal grants administered through the state. On March 2, one day after the video was uploaded to the Internet, Hedlund issued a press release stating he immediately took action after became aware of the statements on Feb. 9. He said Palmiter has been disciplined according to union rules and banned from supervising personnel under the grant program. Hedlund added that if he becomes aware of a quota system, he would call in an outside agency to conduct a criminal investigation. Hedlund said he did inquire about practices under his predecessor, Sheriff Mike Mercer, who retired in 2014, and was assured that a quota system was not in place. He added that the department wrote 1,895 tickets in 2014, but not all tickets were moving violations. Michigan banned ticket quotas years ago, but tickets have become an expensive annoyance for motorists who may feel they were driving safely. Motorists face at least a $100 fine. “Points” on the driver's license, which can accompany a ticket,


http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/bio.aspx?ID=632

http://thefreethoughtproject.com/bombshell-video-sheriff-entire-board-commissioners-admit-breaking-federal-state-laws

http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(i0yidytvq552k4ggywwo1qc4))/mileg.aspx?page=getObject&objectName=mcl-257-750


may trigger auto insurance surcharges. Until October of 2017, drivers may also be subject to costly state “driver responsibility” fees. While the state does not keep track of the number of speeding tickets issued, it does have a record of the assessments levied on all traffic tickets (not just speed violations) that are earmarked to a state “Justice System Fund.” According to the House Fiscal Agency, in 2011 the state collected $40.8 million dollars in assessments, which would work out to over $130 million in traffic ticket revenue. One problem has been roads with improper speed limits, which motorists may not recognize, and thus plead guilty to tickets. A 2006 law requires government agencies to set limits based on bona fide speed studies or a formula, described in the law, based on access points. Hedlund said he does not support speed traps, and believes Palmiter was referring to grant requirements set forth by the federal government. Agencies that receive the grant in question must make 1.29 stops per hour when patrolling for impaired driving. Retired Trooper Thad Pederson, who has been an advocate for mandating scientifically set speed limits, remembers the federal grants well. “While I was running Traffic Services, I was able to keep the grant performance criteria moderated to some extent so that it read 'contacts per hour' rather than stops. Patrol time does not include the time when an officer is tied up on an arrest or call, so this makes a huge difference and takes the heat off the officer from making stops simply for the sake of making stops,” he said. Hedlund says outside of the remarks to the commissioners, Palmiter has had an “impeccable record” and has never been disciplined. Citing privacy reasons, he did not divulge what Palmiter's discipline involved.

http://www.michiganvotes.org/2014-HB-5414
