trying, desire, and desiring to try

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Trying, Desire, and Desiring to TryAuthor(s): Frederick AdamsSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Dec., 1994), pp. 613-626Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231889 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 613 Volume 24, Number 4, December 1994, pp. 613 - 626

Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try1

FREDERICK ADAMS Central Michigan University Mount Pleasant, MI 48859 USA

What is the relationship between trying, desire, and desiring to try? Is it necessary to desire to do something in order to try to do it? Must Dave desire to quit smoking in order to try to quit? I shall defend the view that desiring to do A is necessary for trying to do A. First, Dave needs motivation to quit smoking and motivation comes in the form of desire. So it seems straightforward that when one tries to do something A, one's desire to do that thing A is one's motivation. Second, when Dave throws out a pack of cigarettes, this may or may not be part of an attempt to quit smoking. It may be a political protest against R.J.R. Nabisco (Dave may be changing brands, not lifestyles). Dave's throwing out the cigarettes only counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, if it is done for the right reason, out of the right motivation. Again, the right motivation seems to be the desire to quit smoking. Thus, the desire to do A appears to play important roles in the attempt to do A. At the very least, it helps to motivate, guide, and constitute the attempt as the attempt to do A. It is because Dave wants to quit smoking that his throwing out his cigarettes counts as part of his attempt to quit smoking, not as a political protest.

1 I would like to thank Ken Aizawa, Myles Brand, Fred Dretske, Gary Fuller, Terry Horgan, Jennifer Hornsby, Hugh McCann, Al Mele, Kirk Ludwig, Robert Stecker, Raimo Tuomela, and the editor and reviewers of this journal for helpful comments and discussion on the ideas contained in this paper. I would also like to thank the Center For the Study of Language and Information of Stanford University for

support.



614 Frederick Adams

This is a view that seems both elegant and true, but some deny it, maintaining that it is possible to try to do something A, desiring only to try to do A, not desiring to do A.2 How might this be possible? One might think that this is one way. Doing A (lifting a great weight) may require great strength, more than Al thinks he has. Trying to lift the weight may consist of grasping it and pulling with all of one's might. Al knows he can do this. Al may desire to try to lift the weight, even if Al were not confident that he could lift the weight and would not be distressed, were he to fail. Thus, Al may try to do A (tug hard at the weight), without really caring if he succeeds (actually lifts the weight). What Al desires is to try to do A, without really desiring to do A (or so one may believe).

Pursuing this issue leads directly to the nature of trying. For if Al desires to try to do A, there must be something, viz. the attempt to do A, that Al desires. The view being rejected (the one I shall defend) says that the attempt to do A itself requires the desire to do A. If, while Al is tugging at the weight, he really does not desire to lift it (only to tug mightily at it), by virtue of what does his tugging constitute an attempt to lift (rather than to tug at) the weight? What is his motivation for tugging at the weight? To lift it? To impress his friends? For exercise? What? If Al's goal, his desire, is not to lift the weight, then lifting the weight is not the intentional object of his attempt. Something else is (or so I shall maintain). Those who reject the view that a desire to do A is required for an attempt at doing A, maintain that an attempt at doing A can be made with the desire to try to do A (alone). This, it would be said, is motivation enough.

In what follows, I shall defend what I think is the elegant view that genuine attempts to do A require the desire to do A. Desires to try to do A involve the desire to do A because they have attempts to do A as their intentional objects and attempts to do A involve desires to do A. I will show how this issue fits into a much larger account of intentional behavior; sketch an account of the nature of trying, as it arises within that larger account; and defend the account against a type of putative counterexample.

2 See A. Mele, 'He Wants to Try/ Analysis 50 (1990) 251-3; and 'He Wants to Try Again: A Rejoinder/ Analysis 51 (1991) 225-8.



Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try 615

I Why Trying Matters

Before I proceed, let me say why it matters to become clear about this. It is not just because inquiring minds want to know, though the matter has intrinsic merit. Rather, understanding the nature of trying is part of a much larger project of understanding intentional or purposive behavior. There is a special relationship between intentional behavior and minds (mental abilities or functions). Things that behave intentionally have minds, or the makings of minds. Things that cannot behave intentionally are likely not to have minds. To the extent that we understand the intentional activity of trying, we are that much closer to understanding the nature and function of the mind (the mental). Furthermore, trying is essentially intentional. One can accidentally break the glass figurine (while trying to dust it), but one cannot accidentally try to break it. It is important to understand and explain this fact about trying. The account to follow explains that intentions (and hence beliefs and desires) are essentially involved in attempts and that is why trying is essentially intentional.

Also we are interested in the nature of trying because of its intimate relationship with moral responsibility. If one does something unintentionally (accidentally drops the precious Ming Vase) and could not have foreseen this action, we are inclined to withhold blame. However, if one genuinely tries to break the vase by dropping it, we feel justified in heaping on the blame. Thus, there are several reasons why we should be interested in becoming clear on the nature of trying and what it requires.

Next, I will give an account of the relationship between trying and desire that places it within the context of a broader theory of intentional behavior. I will motivate the account of the relationship between trying and desire and defend the account from attack.

II Trying and Desire: Within a Theory of Intentional Action

Trying and desire take place within a broad context. I shall list theses of an overall theory of intentionality that I have argued for elsewhere. I shall not be able to argue for each thesis here, but it will help to motivate and understand the defense of the particular piece (thesis 4) to be defended here to see the broader context.

I accept the following claims:



616 Frederick Adams

(1) Intentionally doing A requires the intention to do A.3

(2) Trying to do A is essentially intentional.4

(3) Trying to do A requires the intention to do A.5

(4) Trying (and, hence, intending) to do A requires the desire to do A.

Theses (l)-(4) yield a simple (i.e., elegant), unified view of the role of intention (and trying) in the domain of intentional action. A more complete account of intentional action would involve the role of belief as well as that of desire in intending and trying. I have elsewhere defended the view that intending (and trying) to do A requires lack of the belief that doing A is impossible and requires some belief about how what one is doing may lead to A (see my 'Trying'). Here I shall concentrate almost exclusively upon the role of desire in intentional activity.

Where there is intentional activity, this view posits an intention (in the attempt).6 An intention is causally involved in rendering activity intentional. A necessary (but not sufficient) part of what makes an action or

3 I argue for this elsewhere, defending it against the attacks of Michael Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1987) and others. See my 'Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View/ Mind & Language 1 (1986) 281-301; Review of Michael Bratman's Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasons, Ethics 100 (1989) 198-9; 'He Doesn't Really Want to Try,' Analysis 51 (1991) 109-12; and 'Trying: You've Got to Believe,' Discipline Filosofiche (forthcom- ing). Also, I maintain that every intentional doing requires a trying, as does J. Hornsby, Actions (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1980).

4 H. McCann argues for this in 'Volition and Basic Action,' The Philosophical Review 83 (1974) 451-73. I think it is as firmly entrenched as that knowing that p requires p's truth.

5 This is part of the overall view I defend (in my 'Intention and Intentional Action' and 'Trying/ and in F. Adams and A. Mele, 'The Intention /Volition Debate/ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1992) 323-38. Also, just to be clear, (3) helps to

explain (2).

6 For my purposes, it will not be necessary to take a stand on whether intentions can be reduced to belief -desire pairs. Whether they are reducible or not, intending to do A requires relevant beliefs and desires about doing A. If one has a preference for belief-desire pairs, over intentions, to explain the intentionality of trying, that is sufficient for my purposes here. For more on reduction of intention to belief and desire, see A. Mele, Springs of Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992).




attempt of doing A intentional is that the act is guided7 by the intention to do A. It is sufficient for an action A to be unintentional8 that it was not guided by an intention to do A.

Intentions and attempts can form at the speed of thought. They need not involve deliberation. This theory does not require unrealistic bouts of mental energy to be spent prior to each intentional act or attempt. The formation of many intentions is routine, habitual, instantaneous and without effort (as the intention and attempt to duck a punch or answer a ringing phone).

Further, the theory holds that tryings are complex, not simple. They involve intendings causing things - intentions at work, as it were. My trying to remember a phone number may consist of my intention to remember causing a mental event (the phone number coming to me from memory), or my trying to tie my shoe may consist of my intention to tie my shoe causing bodily movements (of my shoe's being tied by me).9

The theory also says that intending is not brute or isolated, but requires other mental states to form; specifically beliefs and desires of the appropriate contents. Dave's attempt to quit smoking is a complex event of his intention to quit causing appropriate mental and bodily events. Since intentions require (or consist, at least in part, of) specific beliefs and desires, Dave's trying to quit smoking involves the very beliefs and desires required for the corresponding intention to quit smoking to form (or so I shall maintain). Dave must desire to quit and believe that it is not impossible for him to quit, in order for Dave to intend and try to quit smoking. The contents of the beliefs and desires must match the nature of the attempt. The elegance of this theory lies in the match between the contents of the contentful states (beliefs, desire, intentions) and the

7 This view does not require that one have a sequence of intentions in rapid succession to account for the intentionality of actions involving rapid sequences of bodily movements (Mele, Springs of Action, 113-14).

8 I call an action unintentional if not intended, even if done knowingly. Some would

disagree (see, for instance, G. Harman, Change in View [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press /Bradford 1986]). I defend my opposition and discuss cases of double effect in my 'Intention and Intentional Action/

9 Tryings need not be successful. Some attempts fail to achieve their intended goals (Adams & Mele, 'The Intention /Volition Debate'). Tryings on this view consist of

components and of one component's causing another. This is called a 'component' view of action (see my 'Causal Contents,' in B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and His Critics [Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1991] 131-56.



618 Frederick Adams

contents of the descriptions10 under which the action or attempt is intentional. Thus, Dave intentionally bought the nicotine chewing gum (A) and in doing so unintentionally bought the gum made in New Brunswick, NJ (B). Dave intended and tried to do A, but not B (because he did not know or care where the gum was made). Dave's attempt was to do A (not B) because it was guided by the intention to do A (not B). Dave's intention was to do A, at least in part, because Dave's desire was to do A and Dave believed it to be possible to do A and, perhaps, Dave had settled upon doing A (had a cognitively minimal plan). Dave's attempt was intentional because it was guided by an intention. His attempt was intentionally the attempt to do A because it was guided by his intention to do A (and hence by his beliefs and desires about doing A). The content of Dave's intention (and beliefs and desires) is relevant to determining the intentional object of Dave's attempt. This package of claims is the overall view into which (4) fits, since the intention to do A requires the desire to do A. I now turn to (4).

Ill The Functional Roles of Intending and Trying

My strategy in defending (4) is to establish that it is of the very nature of attempts that they have the relationship with desires described in (4). To begin, lack of desire to do A prohibits the attempt to do A to form. Some activity may take place, but it will not be guided or sustained via information about the presence or absence of A. There will be no goal to do A, nothing internal to the organism or system set for the doing of A. Thus, there will be no ground upon which the activity of the system counts as an attempt at A. I maintain that an activity only constitutes an attempt to do A, if caused and sustained by the desire for A. I shall first investigate why such a link between attempts and desires exists and then I shall defend against purported counterexamples.

Intentional action (behavior) is goal-directed.11 Internal states (desires) of the organism or system set goals and causally direct the system toward

10 I use the Anscombe-Davidson 'description' talk here, but could also make the point by referring to properties of the act or attempt intentionally undertaken vs. those unintentionally achieved.

11 I have developed this view in a series of works (see my 'A Goal-State Theory of Function Attribution/ Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 [1979] 493-518; Goal-Directed Systems [Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International 1982]; 'Intention and Intentional Action'; 'Feedback About Feedback: Reply to Ehring/ The Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 [1986] 123-31; 'Tertiary Waywardness Tamed/ Critica 21




satisfaction of its goals. For intentional action to be successful usually requires sensory feedback and error-correction via comparison of the system's actual state with its desired goal-state. Desires play a role in setting goals because desires are for certain actions or their outcomes (ends). Desires also, in conjunction with beliefs, play a role in motivating action. They are among the springs of action, sources of the (electrical- chemical) 'juice' that moves us.

Beliefs play a role in helping set goals because beliefs represent one's actual states (as informed by efferent and afferent feedback).12 Beliefs also are involved in the comparison of one's actual state with the presence or absence of one's goal-state. Furthermore, beliefs are involved in one's attempts to diminish the difference between one's actual state (where one is) and one's goal-state (where one desires to be). Beliefs are representations of this difference. Beliefs also are about means or lack of means of bringing about one's goal-state. Beliefs may influence us in determining which desires will become goal-states (become desires that will move us in attempts to satisfy them). We may have desires that we know not to be satisfiable or know not how to satisfy and, therefore, do not adopt as goals, as desires upon which we will act. Also we may have desires that we believe to conflict with other desires or believe to be inappropriate to act upon or to be too costly to pursue. Beliefs play a role, with desires, in mapping out and coordinating goals to pursue and means of satisfying desired goals. Beliefs represent the world, its current states, and the lawful ways in which actions and behavior affect the current state of the world and bring about future states.

Intentions have this cognitive, functional essence. They are settled plans based upon beliefs and desires that are ready to be put to work, to be put into action.13Attempts (tryings) are, if you will, intentions at work (Adams & Mele, 'The Intention/Volition Debate'). What makes an attempt the attempt to do A involves the same thing that makes the

[1989] 117-25; Review of Michael Bratman; 'Causal Contents'; 'He Doesn't Really Want to Try'; 'Trying'; and F. Adams & A. Mele, 'The Role of Intention in Intentional Action/ Canadian journal of Philosophy 19 (1989) 511-32; and 'The Intention /Volition Debate.'

12 For differences in types of feedback and their relevance to intentional action, see my 'Feedback About Feedback' and Adams & Mele, 'The Role of Intention.' There is also another form of feedback, introspective feedback. When I try to remember a

phone number, I know when I have or have not recalled the number. This is feedback, but is not afferent nor efferent feedback.

13 See M. Brand, Intending and Acting (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press /Bradford 1987); M. Bratman, Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasons.



620 Frederick Adams

intention at work in the attempt the intention to do A, viz. the A part of the content of the relevant beliefs and desires required for the formation of the intention (and attempt). What makes something an attempt to do A, is that it has the functional role of attempts; the appropriate causes by relevant desires for A, beliefs about how A may be accomplished, and settling upon doing A. An attempt also must have the appropriate effects.14 The system's intention to do A sets the system's sights on A. The attempt to do A is the launching or unfolding of the system's plan for arriving at A. Or, at least, that is the theory that I am defending. Why, then, must desires be involved in attempts? Because they set the intentional objects of the attempts. Without the desire for A, there would literally be nothing for the system to attempt. There would be no basis for beliefs about the difference between the system's goal state (a desire upon which the system is acting) and its present state. There would be no activity engaged in to diminish that difference. There would be nothing to attempt.

IV Putative Counterexample to Thesis (4)

With this motivation in place for (4), let us turn to purported counterexamples. I shall maintain that there are no counterexamples. In this way, I can muster support of (4) and continue to explicate the link between attempt and desire. Support for (l)-(4) lies in its overall simplicity and explanatory power. If a purported counterexample to (4) has an inter- pretation consistent with this overall theory, then the example alone may provide no reason to reject the overall theory. Unless an example clearly cannot be fit to the theory, is overwhelming, or the rescue of the theory is clearly ad hoc, the virtues of the theory may well warrant the rejection of the purported counterexample. My claim is that no known example warrants the overthrow of (4), given the explanatory virtues of the overall theory. I shall consider the best attempted counterexample I have found.

Alfred Mele believes that it is possible for a person S to try to do A, and perhaps succeed in doing A intentionally, while not desiring to do A (Mele, 'He Wants to Try'; 'He Wants to Try Again'). Mele does not

14 I am not saying that an attempt must succeed at what is intended. Rather, an intention to do A may cause bodily (or mental) events in which the attempt to do A consists. However, not just any effect that an intention causes constitutes an attempt. For instance, my intention to do A may cause awareness of my intention to do A, but that causing does not constitute an attempt to do A.




reject the notion that some conative component is required of trying and of intentional action. However, Mele claims that conative component can be the desire to try to do A, rather than the desire to do A, itself. Thus, Mele maintains that one can desire to try to do A, and, thereby, try to do A, without desiring to do A. I shall maintain that even if one can desire to try to do A, without desiring to A,15 still one cannot try to do A, without desiring to do A. Thus, I will maintain, that Mele has given us no reason to reject (4).

Mele's purported counterexample to (4) is as follows. Brett will pay Belton fifty dollars if Belton tries to solve a mate-in-two chess problem within five minutes. Belton is very bad at solving this type of chess problem and he knows this about himself. Brett assures Belton that Belton need not actually solve the problem to get the money, he must only try to solve it. Further, Belton is convinced that Brett can read minds and can tell whether Belton has tried, independently of his succeeding.

Based upon this example, Mele claims that Belton can try to solve the puzzle (A), even if Belton is 'absolutely indifferent to his actually solving the puzzle' (to his actually doing A) ('He Wants to Try/ 225). Thus, we are to conclude that Belton can try to do A while not wanting or desiring to A - indeed, while being absolutely indifferent to his doing A.

The main difficulty with Mele's example, is that, consistent with the account of trying in the last section, if Belton does not want to solve the puzzle (A), then in moving the chess pieces around the board (B), he is just 'going through the motions' (B) that someone who did want to solve the puzzle (say, Dave) might go through. However, if Belton is only going through the motions, his activity is not being guided by the appropriate desire (to do A) in order to constitute an attempt to solve the puzzle. He seems to be doing just what Mele says that he must not do in order to get the money. He seems to be pretending to be trying, and if Brett really can read minds he would know this and not pay the fifty dollars.

Taking Mele at his word that Belton is 'indifferent to solving the puzzle,' it appears that what Belton really desires, and is really trying to do, is to get the fifty dollars (C), without genuinely trying to solve the puzzle. Belton has a different intentional object (different goal-state) guiding his attempt. He is trying to do C (get the fifty dollars) by way of doing B (moving the chess pieces as one would if one were trying to solve the puzzle). Belton cares not about solving the puzzle (A), only about

15 Even if this were possible, it would only be made possible by fiddling with the times of the desires and attempts. I may now desire to try to do A tomorrow without now

desiring to A. However, I shall deny that one can desire now to try to A without

desiring now to A.



622 Frederick Adams

getting the money (C), and the latter is the only thing he is attempting. B is something one would normally do, if one wanted to do A, and Belton is hoping Brett will judge Belton's attempt by his bodily movements alone. The problem, of course, is that trying is cognitive. It requires more than just bodily movements. It requires the proper beliefs and desires guiding the movements, as well. Mele's example, therefore, does not satisfy a necessary condition of trying to do A and is not a counterexample to (4).

Mele, aware of this reply, admits that trying has a cognitive requirement, but he contends that Belton satisfies that cognitive requirement via his desire to try to solve the puzzle (Dr). According to Mele, the desire present and guiding Belton's attempt is the desire to try to solve the puzzle, not the desire to solve it. Normally, one's trying to solve the puzzle consists in one's moving the chess pieces with the desire to solve the puzzle. In this case, Mele contends, Belton's trying consists in the guiding of his movements by his desire to try vs the desire to solve. Just as doing A is guided by the desire to do A, so trying to do A is guided by the desire to try to do A.

There are several reasons why we should reject this account. First there is the matter of what the desire to try involves. Mele (Adams & Mele, 'The Intention/ Volition Debate') accepts that there is an essence to trying to A that involves a conative component such as a desire (coupled with beliefs and being settled upon doing A) that causes some relevant effect. Let us symbolize this as the desire component 'D' causing the relevant outcome 'O' in this way D- >O. This complex (suppressing the belief and settling components of intentions) represents an attempt. Now the desire to try is the desire to perform that complex. If the desire to try causes the attempt, let the desire to try (to perform the attempt) = 'DY Then we can symbolize the causal role of the desire to try to perform the attempt as D'-»(D->O). What is the relationship between D' and D? If they are different desires, how are they different and how are they related? Mele's account requires that D and D' have the same content, viz. to try to A. If they have the same content, then D' seems to be the desire to try to try to do A - a second-order or self-referential desire of the sort that Searle embraces (Intentionality [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1983]), but that Mele shuns (Adams & Mele, 'The Role of Intention'; Mele, Springs of Action).16 More importantly, it seems plainly false that infants or animals that attempt things have such complex desires.

16 Searle thought that self-referential intentions would block problems of causal deviance, but they do not (Adams & Mele, "The Role of Intention'). There is no other good reason to think that such intentions or desires are self-referential.




Second, Belton's desire is to try to solve the puzzle. Since there is something that constitutes the attempt (D- >O), surely it is this complex that Belton desires. Now, by inference to the best explanation, the simplest and most elegant account would be for the desire in the attempt to solve the puzzle (D) to be the desire to solve the puzzle and for the desire in the desire to try to solve the puzzle (D') to include that desire plus the desire to perform any motions deemed relevant to the solving (deemed relevant to diminishing the difference between one's actual state - puzzle not solved - and one's goal-state - puzzled solved). Thus, the desire to try to solve the puzzle (D') would include the desire to solve it (D), plus a bit more. Mele's account drops the desire to solve the puzzle from the nature of the attempt itself and replaces it with the desire to try to solve the puzzle. This corrupts the control-theoretic nature of the attempt because (as explained in Section III), when a goal-directed system launches an attempt to do A, its goal is set for doing A. Trying consists in making the motions deemed to be required to A. The goal is to A. The system seeks feedback about whether or not it has A-ed in the process of making corrections within the attempt. Of course, the system will be getting information about the attempt as a by-product, but the system must set its sights, its goal, on doing A, if it is to launch the attempt. It can only compare information about whether it has diminished the difference between its present state and its goal-state of doing A, if it has a goal-state of (a desire for) doing A. In order to have a goal of trying to do A, the system must have a goal of doing A, and the trying consists in the steps taken to reach the goal. Mele's account flies in the face of this overall control-theoretic account of trying and intentional behavior that he elsewhere defends (Adams & Mele, 'The Role of Intention'; 'The Intention/Volition Debate'; Mele, Springs of Action).

On thesis (4), the 'try' part of the desire to try to do A reflects that one's desire comprises more than just the desire to A. It comprises the desire that at least some appropriate steps toward A-ing be taken, even if those steps fall short. It also may reflect one's low cognitive estimate of success, as in the weight-lifting example, or in the smoking example. Al and Dave may not be confident of success at lifting the weight or quitting smoking. However, the fact that one desires to try to A, rather than to do A straightaway, need not suggest that one is sliding the intentional object of one's attempt closer to the body or brain - it is not as if one's distal goal were too risky so that one must choose a more proximal goal. If that were true, then one's attempt would be at the more proximal goal, not the distal one. Belton would be trying, not to solve the puzzle, but to move the chess pieces. Al would be trying, not to lift the weight, but just to strain and tug at it. Dave would be trying, not to quit smoking, but just to throw away cigarettes and purchase nicotine gum.



624 Frederick Adams

Third, one may reject this reasoning and cling to Mele's claim that the desire D in the attempt to do A is just the desire to try to do A (D' = D). However, that cannot be correct. Sometimes people attempt to solve puzzles and their movements are guided by their very confident desires to solve the puzzle, not by the desire to try (that is, sometimes people are dead serious and confident about solving the puzzle - not indifferent at all). If the desire in the attempt to solve the puzzle were just the desire in the desire to try (D' = D), this could not happen (but it does happen).

Fourth, Mele gives no non ad hoc motivation for why the desire component of the attempt itself should be the desire to try to A, rather than the desire to A. Mele gives us no independent account of trying. Since trying has a nature independent of the desire to try, there needs to be independent motivation for thinking that the desire within the attempt is identical in content to the desire to perform that attempt.

Fifth, we have just considered very good reasons, based upon the control-theoretic account of trying, for thinking that the desire to try to do A and the desire to do A do not come apart at the time of action. Perhaps the best example where they might come apart separates the time of the desire to try from the time of the trying. Al desires to try to quit smoking. He doesn't want to quit smoking badly enough and that is what has been missing. Even here, Al's desire to try to quit seems to involve the desire that he desire to quit smoking badly enough that it will lead to his taking steps toward quitting (steps he has so far avoided taking).

Confounding matters is that it seems natural to say that the intentional doing of A involves a desire 'to do A,' so trying to do A should involve only a desire 'to try to do A.' Since these desires are different, one can desire the one without the other. The matter which is hidden in this reasoning, as we have seen, is that the attempt to do A, all by itself, may involve the desire to do A. Mele denies this, but, for the reasons I have given concerning the overall coherence and explanatory power of the theory of intentional behavior into which thesis (4) fits, we should accept it. We should reject the appearance that desiring to try to A, desiring to A, and trying to A, can radically come apart.

Finally, if, contrary to the view I have been defending, a desire to try to do A were not to involve a desire to do A, then when a desire to try to do A causes a sequence of bodily movements, the movements caused by that desire need not constitute an attempt to do A. For although one desires to try, one may not yet have launched the attempt because one does not desire to do A. Consider Al, who, unlike Dave, does not want to quit smoking badly enough to start the attempt. Al desires to try, and, like Dave, throws away his cigarettes and buys nicotine gum. Unlike, Dave, however, Al has not yet launched the attempt to quit smoking - Al is just mimicking Dave's attempt (perhaps in Sartrian bad faith). For




Al's actions are not guided by a genuine desire to quit smoking. Dave's actions are guided by the desire to quit. This example confirms that a desire to try to A would not be sufficient for an attempt to A, if the desire to try to A and desire to do A were to come apart.

There are further replies that one may make to my claims. One may maintain that Belton's attempt to solve the puzzle consists in his moving the chess pieces, not with the intention to solve the puzzle (for intentions involve desires), but with the 'goal' of solving the puzzle - attempting to contrast having a desire to solve the puzzle with having a goal of solving it (Mele, 'He Wants to Try/ 252). This response rings hollow, however, because having a goal and having one's movements initiated, guided, committed, and sustained by that goal just is what it is to want or desire that goal.17

One may also deny that Belton wants to solve the puzzle because, if he were to desire that, 'he would be wanting more than he is convinced is required for getting the money. He is convinced that he need not actually solve the puzzle (figure out how to mate the king) to win the money: He need only try to do it' (Mele, 'He Wants to Try Again/ 225-6). This play on 'satisfaction' is a non-sequitur. It moves illicitly from the fact that the two desires have different conditions of satisfaction (true) to the conclusion that the desire to try to solve the puzzle does not involve the desire to solve it (false). It is true that the desire to try to solve the puzzle and the desire to solve it differ in content. They have different satisfaction conditions. The desire to try to solve the puzzle does not require that the desire to solve the puzzle itself be satisfied. It only requires that the desire to solve the puzzle exist and cause appropriate steps directed toward its satisfaction. This can be satisfied even if the desire to solve the puzzle is not itself satisfied. However, the desire to

try to do A involves the desire to do A, even though they are not

equivalent desires. A desire to try to A is more than a desire to A because an attempt to A is more than a desire to A. An attempt to A is a desire to A plus steps taken toward A-ing. So, of course, the desires to do A and to attempt to do A are different. However, it is still true that an attempt to solve the puzzle requires a desire to solve it. The reason a desire to try to solve it is satisfied by less is that it does not require success in the way that the desire to solve the puzzle does.

17 I take it that Belton's chess moves would even cease, were he to realize that goal. This too, satiation, is a mark of desire. When one's desire is knowingly satisfied or satiated, one will normally cease, at least temporarily, seeking that goal.



626 Frederick Adams

V Conclusion

Trying, desiring, and desiring to try are all different. If I am right, the first requires the second, for the reasons I have given. Suppose that I am right about the relation between trying, desire, and desiring to try. What is gained? We have a simple, elegant, coherent theory of intentional behavior into which thesis (4) fits. We have a control-theoretic model of intentional activity that gives us an account of the functional role of trying and explains why trying is essentially intentional. Trying is a species of goal-directed, purposive behavior. It conforms to the analysis of goal-directed behavior, generally. Goals are set and error-corrections are made upon the basis of information fed back about goal-success or failure. This directed process is that in which the trying, the attempts, of such systems consist.

Further, desiring to try, though different than desiring to do (that is contained within an attempt), involves a desire to do. The fact that these desires differ enables us to distinguish someone like Al, who may desire to try to quit smoking, from someone like Dave who has already begun the attempt. Even though both may have thrown away their cigarettes and bought nicotine gum, if Al currently lacks the desire to quit smoking (though he would like to desire this), Al, unlike Dave who has the desire, has not yet launched the attempt to quit. Al is just going through the motions. Trying to quit smoking requires the desire to quit. Desiring to try to quit smoking (in the future), unless it includes the present desire to quit, is not sufficient to launch the attempt. Going through the motions of one who is trying to quit smoking is not the same as trying to quit, no matter how much one would like to try to quit. Rejecting (4) would lose this distinction between Al and Dave, but, as reluctant smokers know, it exists.

Received: May, 1993 Revised: January, 1994



trying, desire, and desiring to try

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