truth commission impact: an assessment of how commissions ... · african truth and reconciliation...

The International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol 8 2014 6ndash30doi101093ijtjijt025

Advance Access publication 13 December 2013

Truth Commission Impact AnAssessment of How CommissionsInfluence Politics and Society

Onur Bakiner

Abstract1

This article explains whether or not and the specific ways in which truth commissions

established during a political transition in fact transform lessons from history into pol-

itical and judicial impact defined as influence on government policy and judicial pro-

cesses It isolates impact from the causal effects of similar postconflict institution

building and other transitional justice and conflict resolution measures Drawing upon

the existing literature it examines several causal mechanisms through which commis-

sions are expected to influence politics and society These include direct political impact

through the implementation of recommendations and indirect political impact through

civil society mobilization Truth commissions may also have positive judicial impact by

contributing to human rights accountability and negative judicial impact by promoting

impunity The article concludes that truth commissions do promote political and judicial

change albeit modestly especially when human rights and victimsrsquo groups pressure

governments for policy implementation

Keywords truth commissions impact assessment policy change judicial account-

ability vetting civil society mobilization

IntroductionIn what ways do truth commissions influence human rights policy and judicial

accountability The transitional justice literature suggests various mechanisms

through which truth commissions are expected to achieve a set of moral and

political objectives in peacebuilding and democratization contexts However

only a handful of studies have explored commission and postcommission pro-

cesses to assess hypotheses of truth commission impact Taking my cue from this

gap in the literature I explain whether or not and the specific ways in which truth

commissions transform lessons from history into policy and judicial impact

I define truth commission impact as the effect of truth commissions on gov-

ernment policy and judicial processes independent of the simultaneous effects of

Limited Term Assistant Professor School for International Studies Simon Fraser UniversityCanada Email obakinersfuca

1 The author would like to thank the participants of the Fall 2011 Simons Working Papers inSecurity and Development at Simon Fraser University and IJTJrsquos anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful comments on earlier versions of this article

The Author (2013) Published by Oxford University Press All rights reservedFor Permissions please email journalspermissionsoupcom

at Princeton University on A

ugust 19 2015httpijtjoxfordjournalsorg

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postconflict institution building and other transitional justice and conflict reso-

lution measures I employ a two-step research strategy to assess impact first I

identify all plausible causal explanations of how truth commissions are likely to

produce impact and second I assess those explanations in light of empirical

evidence from all transitional truth commission experiences I show that some of

the taken-for-granted explanations of truth commission impact hold in none or

only a few of the cases whereas others hold more often

Drawing upon the existing literature I identify four major explanations for

truth commission impact direct political impact indirect political impact

through civil society mobilization vetting and judicial accountability Political

impact refers to a truth commissionrsquos capacity to make key decision makers

acknowledge human rights violations publicly and to influence policy in the

areas of institutional reform and human rights policy through its findings and

recommendations Almost all truth commissions have produced political impact

albeit to different degrees I distinguish between direct and indirect impact to

separate those cases in which the government demonstrates political will imme-

diately to implement truth commission recommendations from other situations

where the government is pressured to adopt policy The distinction is important

because civil society mobilization around a truth commission is an important

contributor to policy reform when political will is weak or nonexistent Vetting

refers to the policy of removing perpetrators from public office

Truth commissionsrsquo contribution to human rights accountability or impunity

is a controversial issue I find that commissions have produced some positive

judicial impact understood as the use of findings for prosecutions This often

comes with a delay however highlighting the significance of an auspicious pol-

itical and judicial context as well as continued civil society activism for human

rights accountability Truth commissions may also promote impunity through

built-in amnesty procedures Despite the widespread tendency to associate truth

commissions with amnesties only two commissions in South Africa and Liberia

have actually granted or recommended immunity from prosecution Although

these amnesties benefited hundreds it should be noted that the beneficiaries

represent a fraction of the total number of perpetrators In other words the

overall failure of human rights accountability cannot be attributed to truth com-

missions alone even in the few cases where commissions promoted amnesty

I acknowledge that most truth commissions have tried to transform social

norms by cultivating nonviolence and respect for human rights (along with

other norms depending on the specific context) among the political elite as

well as the broader population Likewise they have advocated various concep-

tions of reconciliation It is difficult (if not impossible) however to measure the

independent causal effect of truth commissions on political and social norms

across cases in great part because normative change takes place over a very

long period of time and as a result of many factors Case studies and surveys

(such as James Gibsonrsquos surveys on the South African Truth and Reconciliation

Commission) provide compelling evidence for the achievements and

International Journal of Transitional Justice Vol 8 2014 6ndash30

How Truth Commissions Influence Politics and Society 7



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nloaded from

shortcomings of reconciliation in specific countries but the evidence for cross-

national normative change is suggestive at best Instead this article focuses on

evidence for truth commission impact on comparable and measurable domains

of public life government policy and judicial change

The first section of the article provides an account of the literature on truth

commissions highlighting some key challenges facing studies of impact such as

definitional inconsistencies biases arising from model specification the difficulty

of establishing causality and insufficient attention to causal mechanism The

second section describes my research strategy to address these challenges and

offers details on my data sources and case selection The third section provides

a theoretical account of causal explanations of truth commission impact and

assesses those theories in light of empirical evidence The article concludes with

some observations on the theory and practice of truth commissions

The Literature on Truth CommissionsTruth commissions are expected to contribute to human rights conduct and

democratic strengthening Ideally truth commissions acknowledge the victim-

hood of those affected by human rights violations under the outgoing regime by

providing a platform for truth telling2 and by setting the stage for symbolic and

material reparations3 They rewrite the countryrsquos history of political violence and

human rights violations focusing on the patterns causes and consequences in

order to forge a shared historical memory and draw lessons from history4 They

make recommendations for institutional reform to create a legal political and

cultural framework conducive to peace and democratic strengthening5 Some

facilitate the removal from office of public officials responsible for earlier cycles

of violence and violations6

Truth commissions may also serve national reconciliation a lsquohealthy social

catharsisrsquo7 as former enemies reach common understandings the incentives

2 Martha Minow Between Vengeance and Forgiveness Facing History after Genocide and MassViolence (Boston Beacon 1998)

3 Pablo de Greiff ed The Handbook of Reparations (New York Oxford University Press 2006)Andre du Toit lsquoThe Moral Foundations of the South African TRC Truth as Acknowledgment andJustice as Recognitionrsquo in Truth v Justice The Morality of Truth Commissions ed Robert IRotberg and Dennis Thompson (Princeton NJ Princeton University Press 2000)

4 Fiona Ross lsquoOn Having Voice and Being Heard Some After-Effects of Testifying before the SouthAfrican Truth and Reconciliation Commissionrsquo Anthropological Theory 3(3) (2003) 325ndash341Molly Andrews lsquoGrand National Narratives and the Project of Truth Commissions AComparative Analysisrsquo Media Culture and Society 25(1) (2003) 45ndash65

5 Lisa J Laplante lsquoOn the Indivisibility of Rights Truth Commissions Reparations and the Right toDevelopmentrsquo Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal 10 (2007) 141ndash177

6 Lisa Magarrell lsquoReparations for Massive or Widespread Human Rights Violations Sorting outClaims for Reparations and the Struggle for Social Justicersquo Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 22(2003) 85ndash98

7 Jose Zalaquett lsquoBalancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints The Dilemma of NewDemocracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violationsrsquo Hastings Law Journal 43(6) (1992)1425ndash1438


8 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

for revenge diminish and society is (re)united through tolerance and forgiveness

For some truth commissions genuine reconciliation is understood to be based on

the full disclosure of past atrocities and the provision of criminal justice as truth

justice and reparations complement one another8 Others point to the looming

threat of renewed violence or military coups during fragile transitions and con-

ceptualize the relationship between criminal justice and the other objectives of

transitional justice in particular democratic stability as a trade-off Accordingly

truth commissionsrsquo success rests upon their ability to sidestep retributive justice

and promote restorative justice and social reconciliation ndash what one commenta-

tor names lsquocompromise justicersquo9

This abundance of expectations has triggered scholars to evaluate truth com-

missionsrsquo achievements and shortcomings10 International institutions and non-

governmental organizations (NGOs) have published manuals on assessing truth

commissionsrsquo role in promoting postconflict peace and reconciliation using the

best practices approach11 Recently scholars have turned to rigorous hypothesis

testing by employing statistical survey experimental and ethnographic methods

as well as mixed-method strategies Studies that evaluate truth commission

impact tend to focus on the countryrsquos human rights conduct12 democratic sta-

bility13 social reconciliation14 and rule of law15 Although case studies of one or

8 Amnesty International Truth Justice and Reparation Establishing an Effective Truth Commission(2007)

9 Brian Grodsky lsquoInternational Prosecutions and Domestic Politics The Use of Truth Commissionsas Compromise Justice in Serbia and Croatiarsquo International Studies Review 11(4) (2009) 687ndash706Since the early days of transitional justice scholarship the specific applications of a statersquos duty toprosecute have fuelled disagreements For a summary of the debates on the duty to prosecute at the1988 Aspen Institute Conference one of the meetings that framed the field of transitional justicesee Paige Arthur lsquoHow ldquoTransitionsrdquo Reshaped Human Rights A Conceptual History ofTransitional Justicersquo Human Rights Quarterly 31(2) (2009) 321ndash354

10 It should be noted that most of the studies cited below explore the effects of a number of tran-sitional justice measures and not solely those of truth commissions This article has a narrower yet(hopefully) more precise focus the specific contributions of truth commissions

11 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Rule of Law Tools for Post Conflict SocietiesTruth Commissions (2006) Amnesty International supra n 8 David Bloomfield Teresa Barnesand Luc Huyse eds Reconciliation after Violent Conflict A Handbook (Stockholm InternationalIDEA 2003)

12 Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm Truth Commissions and Transitional Societies The Impact on HumanRights and Democracy (New York Routledge 2010) Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn SikkinklsquoExplaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional CountriesrsquoInternational Studies Quarterly 54(4) (2010) 939ndash963 Tricia D Olsen Leigh A Payne andAndrew G Reiter Transitional Justice in Balance Comparing Processes Weighing Efficacy(Washington DC US Institute of Peace Press 2010)

13 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri lsquoTrials and Errors Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies ofInternational Justicersquo International Security 28(3) (2003) 5ndash44 Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 12

14 James L Gibson and Amanda Gouws lsquoTruth and Reconciliation in South Africa Attributions ofBlame and the Struggle over Apartheidrsquo American Political Science Review 93(3) (1999) 501ndash517James L Gibson lsquoThe Contributions of Truth to Reconciliation Lessons from South AfricarsquoJournal of Conflict Resolution 59(3) (2006) 409ndash432

15 James L Gibson lsquoTruth Reconciliation and the Creation of a Human Rights Culture in SouthAfricarsquo Law and Society Review 38(1) (2004) 5ndash40





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nloaded from

several truth commissions initially dominated the field16 recent studies increas-

ingly use large-n regression analysis17

A striking characteristic of the existing literature is the coexistence of compet-

ing if not outright contradictory theories about truth commission impact18 For

example Tricia Olsen Leigh Payne and Andrew Reiter find that truth commis-

sions when used alone lsquohave a significant negative effectrsquo on democracy and

human rights but yield positive outcomes when combined with trials and amnes-

ties19 Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink on the other hand argue that truth

commissions have a positive independent effect on human rights conduct which

increases in magnitude if accompanied by prosecutions Others find truth com-

missions to have weak negative impact20 or no observable impact at all21 on

democracy and human rights

What explains the divergent results between studies that explore the same causal

relationship Qualitative and quantitative research strategies are known to pro-

duce systematically different results in human rights research22 Moreover even

studies using the same data collection and analysis method (eg large-n regres-

sion analysis) arrive at divergent results due to differences in their conceptual-

ization of key variables codification and collection of data as well as model

specification Below I identify the main problems with research on truth com-

mission impact

Definition and Codification

Scholarly disagreement on the definition of a truth commission has implications

for coding data and testing theories Transitional justice databases often codify

the same procedure under different categories which in part explains divergent

16 Examples include but are not limited to Richard A Wilson The Politics of Truth andReconciliation in South Africa Legitimizing the Post-Apartheid State (Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press 2001) William J Long and Peter Brecke War and Reconciliation Reason andEmotion in Conflict Resolution (Cambridge MA MIT Press 2003) Emily Brooke Rodio lsquoMorethan Truth Democracy and South Africarsquos Truth and Reconciliation Commissionrsquo (PhD dissSyracuse University 2009)

17 Charles D Kenney and Dean E Spears lsquoTruth and Consequences Do Truth CommissionsPromote Democratizationrsquo (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American PoliticalScience Association Washington DC 1ndash4 September 2005) Kim and Sikkink supra n 12Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 12 Olsen et al supra n 12

18 Oskar NT Thoms James Ron and Roland Paris lsquoState-Level Effects of Transitional Justice WhatDo We Knowrsquo International Journal of Transitional Justice 4(3) (2010) 329ndash354

19 Olsen et al supra n 12 at 153ndash15420 Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 1221 David Mendeloff cites several Amnesty International reports to conclude that truth commissions

do not contribute to human rights progress while Carmen Gonzalez Enrıquez AlexandraBarahona de Brito and Paloma Aguilar Fernandez put into question the democracy-promotioneffects of truth commissions based on four case studies David Mendeloff lsquoTruth-SeekingTruth-Telling and Postconflict Peacebuilding Curb the Enthusiasmrsquo International StudiesReview 6(3) (2004) 355ndash380 Carmen Gonzalez Enrıquez Alexandra Barahona de Brito andPaloma Aguilar Fernandez eds The Politics of Memory Transitional Justice in DemocratizingSocieties (Oxford Oxford University Press 2001)

22 Emilie M Hafner-Burton and James Ron lsquoSeeing Double Human Rights Impact throughQualitative and Quantitative Eyesrsquo World Politics 61(2) (2009) 360ndash401


10 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

outcomes Some scholars count parliamentary investigation commissions (such

as Uruguayrsquos 1985 Commission for the Investigation of the Situation of the

Disappeared and Related Events and Germanyrsquos 1992 Study Commission for

Working through the History and the Consequences of the SED Dictatorship

in Germany) as truth commissions while others object to this classification

noting that a truth commission should have sufficient autonomy from the ex-

ecutive and legislative branches of government Commissions that were dissolved

before terminating their work (such as Boliviarsquos 1982 National Commission for

Investigation for Forced Disappearances and Ecuadorrsquos 1996 Truth and Justice

Commission) are particularly divisive since unfinished commissions invoke con-

ceptual and empirical questions about whether a commission process regardless

of the outcome (or in these cases lack thereof) can generate substantial political

and social change Furthermore some studies identify a relatively large number of

investigative or deliberative procedures as truth commissions with little or no

attention to definitional criteria For example the Transitional Justice Data Base

Project sets the number of truth commissions established between 1970 and 2007

at 6023 while the figure ranges between 28 and 40 in all other studies24

Model Specification

Once the concepts are defined and data codified the specification of relevant

variables can generate differences too For example two recent studies of human

rights accountability disagree over the evidence for a lsquojustice cascadersquo (ie un-

precedented human rights accountability) in the 1990s and 2000s While Kim and

Sikkink get statistically significant results supporting the theory Olsen Payne and

Reiter argue that the incorporation of amnesty laws into the statistical model

eliminates overwhelming support for the justice cascade25 Given the extremely

complex nature of causal relations among relevant variables statistical analyses of

large-n datasets are particularly prone to the omitted variable bias

Multicollinearity

Another set of complications arises from the intrinsic difficulty of measuring

truth commission impact26 Critics rightly warn against confounding other

causal processes with the independent impact of truth commissions27 It makes

23 Olsen et al supra n 1224 Mark Freeman counts 28 commissions excluding five panels listed as truth commissions by

Priscilla Hayner Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm includes 29 panels as truth commissions for the sameperiod Hayner counts a total of 40 truth commissions including six new ones since 2006 and 34commissions for the period covered by Freemanrsquos and Wiebelhaus-Brahmrsquos accounts MarkFreeman Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge Cambridge University Press2006) Priscilla B Hayner Unspeakable Truths Confronting State Terror and Atrocity 2nd ed(London Routledge 2001) Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 12

25 Olsen et al supra n 1226 Eric Brahm lsquoUncovering the Truth Examining Truth Commission Success and Impactrsquo

International Studies Perspectives 8(1) (2007) 16ndash3527 Snyder and Vinjamuri supra n 13





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nloaded from

intuitive sense to expect improvements in human rights conduct and democratic

governance during and after the truth commission process in great part because

truth commissions are likely to be established during democratic transitions and

when the human rights situation has already improved at least to the extent that

transitional justice becomes a viable possibility

The reverse case that is when the truth commission process is followed by

increasing levels of violence and instability does not offer much analytical lever-

age either Countries that have undergone civil wars are more likely to suffer from

violent conflict in the future28 but truth commissionsrsquo role in provoking such

conflict is unclear Therefore the variety of factors that might lead to democratic

strengthening and nonviolence (which in turn make the creation of a truth

commission possible) or to renewed conflict should not be conflated with the

independent effect of truth commissions

Insufficient Attention to Causal Mechanism

Many scholars prefer regression analysis to make causal inferences on the inde-

pendent effect of truth commissions on democracy and human rights Causal

inference may indeed address the challenges of endogeneity multicollinearity and

counterfactual reasoning but its successful implementation depends critically on

using a large and accurate dataset and as importantly on correct model specifi-

cation Statistical analyses should first have a consistent theory of how and why a

transitional justice mechanism (or combination of them) produces outcomes

and then proceed to testing Insufficient attention to causal processes may aggra-

vate the problems of omitted variable bias endogeneity and multicollinearity

Many of the works mentioned above propose one or several causal mechanisms

to link a truth commission process to the outcomes of interest but even the most

influential studies fail to develop consistent theories and provide supporting

evidence For example Olsen Payne and Reiter attribute the potential positive

effects of truth commissions to their capacity to provide a forum for dialogue lsquoa

fundamental building block for peace and democratic trustrsquo29 However they

conclude that the combination of trials and amnesties without truth commissions

contributes to democracy and human rights as well as the combination of trials

amnesties and truth commissions In what ways then are truth commissions

relevant30 Moreover the claim that truth commissions foster dialogue among

victims perpetrators and bystanders does not conform to empirical evidence

28 Paul Collier Anke Hoeffler and Mans Soderbom Post-Conflict Risks (Oxford Centre for the Studyof African Economies University of Oxford 2006) Barbara Walter lsquoDoes Conflict Beget ConflictExplaining Recurring Civil Warrsquo Journal of Peace Research 41(3) (2004) 371ndash388

29 Olsen et al supra n 12 at 15530 In a recent article drawing largely upon the 2010 book Olsen Payne Reiter and

Wiebelhaus-Brahm leave aside the lsquowith or without truth commissionsrsquo explanation focusinginstead on the conditions under which truth commissions promote human rights most effectivelyThey advocate truth commissions that strike a balance between amnesties and trials stability andaccountability which the authors name the lsquojustice balancersquo Tricia D Olsen Leigh A PayneAndrew G Reiter and Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm lsquoWhen Truth Commissions Improve HumanRightsrsquo International Journal of Transitional Justice 4(3) (2010) 457ndash476


12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

from the majority of cases where perpetrators do not testify before a commission

and often try to close the space for dialogue Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm provides

several explanations for how truth commissions might influence political behav-

ior but his statistical analysis which finds a negative correlation with human

rights conduct and no significant relation with democratic politics tends to

contradict many of the possible causal mechanisms coming from his case

studies31

Kim and Sikkink provide a plausible causal explanation for their findings truth

commissionsrsquo findings and advocacy of human rights norms build pressure on

perpetrators making prosecutions more likely The observable implication of

their theory is that prosecutors would initiate trials following the truth commis-

sion process building their cases on commission findings However their dataset

Human Rights Trials in the World 1979ndash2006 shows that few truth commissions

have created the impulse for prosecution Furthermore even if one assumes that

truth commissions do produce normative transformations their study does not

produce evidence that politicians civil society actors attorneys and judges have

changed behavior as a result of the truth commission process32

Defining and Explaining ImpactlsquoImpactrsquo refers to the causal effect of a truth commission process on individualsrsquo

and institutionsrsquo decisions interests beliefs and values The epistemological and

methodological challenges of establishing causality are well known In the social

sciences and humanities one rarely observes lsquosmoking gunrsquo evidence that con-

firms one hypothesis beyond doubt while discarding alternative explanations33

Transitional justice scholarship has recently taken steps to address the question of

causality by conducting large-n regression analysis to assess the impact of tran-

sitional justice mechanisms on outcome variables (the shortcomings of this ap-

proach to causal inference are discussed above) Studies in the qualitative

tradition meanwhile seek to establish causal connections by getting the causal

mechanism right which raises the evidentiary standards for linking transitional

justice processes to outcomes

What kinds of data amount to lsquosmoking gunrsquo evidence in explaining truth

commission impact Two examples come to mind a political leader declaring

that heshe was urged influenced or inspired exclusively by a truth commission to

enact a policy and a representative sample of the population telling researchers

that their views on human rights or reconciliation changed exclusively or pri-

marily as a result of the truth commission process Such unambiguous evidence

on decisions and values is lacking in most cases and the existing evidence is

insufficient for cross-national comparison

31 Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 1232 Kim and Sikkink supra n 1233 Stephen van Evera Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca NY Cornell

University Press 1997)





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nloaded from

Although irrefutable evidence is often lacking I argue that it is possible to set

a reasonably high standard for establishing causal impact if the collected evidence

satisfies two tests For example if there are two hypothesized causal explanations

[TC fi A fi I] andor [TC fi B fi I] where a truth commission process (TC)

generates impact (I) through the intermediary steps A andor B confirming

the veracity of a causal explanation requires that (1) I should be observed

so that policies and judicial processes after a truth commission should re-

flect its findings and recommendations and (2) only A only B or both A and

B should be observed so that the researcher should find empirical evidence

for the intermediate steps (ie intervening variables) that connect a truth com-

mission to the outcomes of interest to confirm or disconfirm contending

hypotheses

The second test is crucial in overcoming problems of equifinality (the likelihood

that an outcome results from a causal mechanism other than that hypothesized by

the researcher) and multicollinearity (the failure to account for the interactions

between various factors that lead to an outcome) There may be more than one

mechanism that produces similar impact As I show in the following section truth

commissionsrsquo recommendations are incorporated into policy in some countries

because politicians take the initiative to implement them whereas in other cases

implementation takes place despite the reluctance or even hostility of the pol-

itical leadership as a result of continuous civil society mobilization Assessing

impact therefore requires accounting for all the intermediate steps in the causal

process

What causes a truth commission to generate impact in the first place This

article is a descriptive account of causal mechanisms that connect truth commis-

sions to postcommission outcomes Due to space limitations it does not address

the causes for the causes that is the sources of variation in impact across coun-

tries Nonetheless it is important to highlight two factors that play into the dir-

ection and magnitude of impact by shaping the precommission and commission

processes First a truth commission is simultaneously enabled and constrained by

its mandate which determines its tasks powers and organizational structure

Second the commissioners and staff exercise considerable agency in terms of

how they interpret the mandate how they identify and carry out their tasks

what they choose to include in the final report and how they interact with victims

presumed perpetrators politicians bureaucrats armed actors and civil society

organizations Part of their impact is attributable to the product that is the final

report which contains findings a historical narrative and recommendations In

addition the truth commission process itself is credited for giving voice to victims

of human rights violations (and occasionally perpetrators) and building linkages

among various civil society actors34

34 For the distinction between product- and process-driven impact see Priscilla B Hayner lsquoPastTruths Present Dangers The Role of Official Truth Seeking in Conflict Resolution andPreventionrsquo in International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War ed Paul C Stern andDaniel Druckman (Washington DC National Academy Press 2000)


14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Thus the truth commission process is a constant struggle between forces that

seek to delimit and predetermine a commissionrsquos capabilities and the commis-

sionrsquos striving for autonomy and transformative agency In great part as a result

of this interplay of mandate and agency various decision makers and civil

society actors endorse reject mobilize around or ignore a truth commissionrsquos

findings and recommendations Impact is constituted by the content of the

final report and equally importantly by the process itself It is shaped but not

predetermined by the mandate limits

Data and Methods

Research Strategy

Many of the shortcomings of the literature as described in the first section can

be addressed if the research strategy pays close attention to causal processes rather

than correlations between a truth commission and outcomes of interest such

as democracy human rights and the rule of law In other words what is needed

is a theoretically informed process-tracing approach to generate and assess

theories of impact Thus drawing upon the existing literature on truth commis-

sions I build a theoretical framework to document the specific mechanisms

through which a truth commission experience is expected to influence the

decisions of policy makers armed actors judges civil society activists and ordin-

ary citizens Then I identify the observable implications of the hypothesized

causal mechanisms Finally I look for supporting empirical evidence from

truth commission experiences to confirm those observable implications (see

Table 1)

Case Selection

Aggravating the conceptual and methodological problems of assessing impact is

the failure to account for the heterogeneity of truth commission experiences

Several consolidated democracies like Brazil and ongoing authoritarian regimes

like Morocco have established truth commissions Those commissions tend to

investigate violations that happened decades ago rather than in the immediate

past The political stakes self-declared goals and methodologies are radically

different from those characterizing transitional truth commissions Ensuring

democratic stability or forging reconciliation between victims and perpetrators

(most of whom are too old or perhaps deceased) for example are not outstand-

ing goals for nontransitional commissions In countries like Chile and South

Korea follow-up truth commissions have investigated violations not covered

by an earlier commission Therefore lumping all truth commissions in one data-

base obscures the distinct character of causal processes that produce impact in

transitional and nontransitional settings

Instead of including all truth commissions in a large-n dataset I separate tran-

sitional commissions from nontransitional ones to explain the dynamics specific

to the former group A transitional truth commission is established within zero to





Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

three years after the transition to peace andor democracy35 To date 15 truth

commissions have begun and finished their work in the context of a political

transition36 All other truth commissions either are nontransitional or were dis-

solved before completing their investigations37 For reasons explained above a

new set of conceptual tools is needed to study nontransitional (or one may say

posttransitional) commissions which is why I exclude them in this study

Data

I use two data sources in this article (1) studies that analyze broad patterns for a

large number of truth commissions such as the US Institute of Peace Truth

Commissions Digital Collection as well as articles and books that explore all

truth commissions and (2) case studies which provide in-depth information

about one or a small number of commissions Keeping in mind the various

deficiencies and biases that arise from relying on a few sources or a specific

type of research (say academic or journalistic) I cross-check the veracity of a

variety of sources for each country38

Empirical Evidence for Causal ExplanationsSeveral causal mechanisms have been proposed to evaluate truth commissionsrsquo

capacity to produce changes in policy and judicial practices Most accounts pay

attention only to some parts of the causal chain that links the initial conditions to

the outcomes of interest I draw upon the literature on truth commissions from

enthusiasts as well as skeptics to outline these mechanisms in full here but if

the existing explanations have missing causal links I identify those missing parts

This section combines theories of truth commission impact (possible causal

mechanisms along with their observable implications) with empirical evidence

(see Table 2) I also provide evidence for cases where policy change may be

wrongly attributed to a commissionrsquos direct or indirect impact in order to

avoid conflating truth commission impact with similar causal processes

35 The notion of transition itself is questionable as authoritarian enclaves andor violent conflictoften continue during the transitional period My criterion for defining a transition is the presenceof significant political-institutional change rather than whether that change precludes futureauthoritarian and violent backlashes For a more detailed discussion of this definitional problemsee Onur Bakiner lsquoComing to Terms with the Past Power Memory and Legitimacy in TruthCommissionsrsquo (PhD diss Yale University 2011)

36 The list of finished transitional commissions by country name and starting year Argentina (1983)Uganda (1986) Nepal (1990) Chile (1990) Chad (1991) El Salvador (1992) Sri Lanka (1994)Haiti (1995) South Africa (1995) Guatemala (1997) Nigeria (1999) Peru (2001) East Timor(2002) Sierra Leone (2002) and Liberia (2006) The commissions in Kenya and Togo are excludedfrom this list since they had not completed their work as of late 2012

37 I do not include unfinished truth commissions because the dissolution of a commission beforepublishing a final report violates its essential task of providing public information on human rightsviolations

38 The country-specific information is subject to change as this article captures information availableat the time of writing Furthermore as long-term trends may reproduce but also contradictshort-term findings some of the outcomes may change over time





Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from

Direct Political Impact

The most straightforward causal impact is when the findings and recommenda-

tions of a truth commissionrsquos final report are incorporated into policy If a gov-

ernment acknowledges the commissionrsquos final report legislates reparations for

victims and establishes watchdog institutions for human rights protection then

these reforms are likely to lead to progress in democratic governance and human

rights conduct Direct political impact crucially depends on political decision

makersrsquo ability and willingness to implement commissionsrsquo recommendations

Only in El Salvador and Sierra Leone did the commission mandate stipulate that

the recommendations would be binding on all parties and even then politicians

enjoyed a high degree of discretion on which reform proposals to adopt

Given that truth commissions make context-specific recommendations and

given that the quality of policy implementation can be quite varied39 comparative

measures are bound to be imperfect Nevertheless one observes near-universal

demand for certain policies and political gestures which I employ as indicators of

direct political impact (1) public endorsement of the commissionrsquos work by

government leadership (2) government publication of the commissionrsquos final

report (3) implementation of a reparations program (this measure is applicable

in 12 cases where the truth commission recommended reparations) and (4) the

creation of follow-up institutions to carry out the recommended reforms and

monitor progress40

It is important to note that a government might implement human rights

policies whether or not it abides by a truth commissionrsquos recommendations

Direct political impact captures only truth commission-induced political

change It is often confounded with the countryrsquos overall human rights improve-

ment leading to the under- or overstatement of truth commission impact The

measures described above refer to political change relative to the commissionrsquos

recommendations for reform In conducting cross-national comparisons I take

into account variations in discursive and policy change relative to the expect-

ations of each countryrsquos truth commission rather than variation in overall pol-

itical reform Thus I isolate the independent effect of truth commissions from

broader reform processes during democratic transition by distinguishing the

cases in which reform results from the commissionrsquos findings and recommenda-

tions from those cases in which this does not happen Direct political impact is the

chief mechanism through which commissions influence policy but the imple-

mentation is always selective

39 For example the payment of reparations is an important step for the progress of transitionaljustice but the meager amounts allocated to individual victims put into question the actualsuccess See Lisa Schlein lsquoWar Reparations Program in Sierra Leone Needs Moneyrsquo Voice ofAmerica 24 April 2010

40 It is important to note that these four categories can be considered indicators of impact as theydemonstrate a governmentrsquos capacity and willingness to implement policies in line with a truthcommissionrsquos recommendations as well as measures of impact as they indeed capture the publiceffect of a commission


20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Evidence for Direct Political Impact

Table 2 shows that every transitional truth commission except the one in Nepal

has produced some direct political impact Of the 15 transitional truth commis-

sions 10 published their final reports within one year of their termination State

presidents backed by the governments they represented endorsed the commis-

sionrsquos work upon receiving the final report in Argentina41 Chile42 South Africa43

Guatemala44 and Nigeria45 Acknowledgment did not take place in eight coun-

tries and in Sierra Leone it happened only after a new president assumed office

Uganda46 Chile47 Sri Lanka48 Haiti49 East Timor50 Sierra Leone51 and Liberia52

immediately established follow-up institutions to monitor the postcommission

reform process whereas eight did not The least favored policy by the govern-

ments was reparations 12 truth commissions demanded compensation for vic-

tims and only the Chilean government initiated a reparations program without

delay Governments in El Salvador53 Haiti Nigeria54 and Liberia55 ignored the

recommendation for reparations completely

41 US Institute of Peace lsquoTruth Commission Argentinarsquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationstruth-commission-argentina (accessed 21 October 2013)

42 US Institute of Peace lsquoTruth Commission Chile 90rsquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationstruth-commission-chile-90 (accessed 21 October 2013) Jose Zalaquett lsquoBalancing Ethical Imperativesand Political Constraints The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human RightsViolationsrsquo Hastings Law Journal 43 (1992) 1425ndash1438

43 In the case of South Africa the issue of endorsement heightened the tension within the executive asPresident Nelson Mandela endorsed the final report despite opposition from the governingAfrican National Congress his own party Dorothy C Shea The South African TruthCommission The Politics of Reconciliation (Washington DC US Institute of Peace Press 2000)

44 US Institute of Peace lsquoTruth Commission Guatemalarsquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationstruth-commission-guatemala (accessed 21 October 2013)

45 Elizabeth Knight lsquoFacing the Past Retrospective Justice as a Means to Promote Democracy inNigeriarsquo Connecticut Law Review 35 (2002) 867ndash914

46 Joanna R Quinn lsquoConstraints The Un-Doing of the Ugandan Truth Commissionrsquo Human RightsQuarterly 26 (2004) 401ndash427

47 Teivo Teivainen lsquoTruth Justice and Legal Impunity Dealing with Past Human Rights Violationsin Chilersquo Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 30(2) (2000) 55ndash82

48 Anna Neistat Recurring Nightmare State Responsibility for Disappearances and Abductions in SriLanka (New York Human Rights Watch 2008)

49 Joanna R Quinn lsquoHaitirsquos Failed Truth Commission Lessons in Transitional Justicersquo Journal ofHuman Rights 8(3) (2009) 265ndash281

50 US Institute of Peace lsquoTruth Commission Timor-Leste [East Timor]rsquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationstruth-commission-timor-leste-east-timor (accessed 21 October 2013)

51 US Institute of Peace lsquoTruth Commission Sierra Leonersquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationstruth-commission-sierra-leone (accessed 21 October 2013)

52 Paul James-Allen Aaron Weah and Lizzie Goodfriend Beyond the Truth and ReconciliationCommission Transitional Justice Options in Liberia (New York International Center forTransitional Justice 2010)

53 Cath Collins lsquoState Terror and the Law The (Re)Judicialization of Human Rights Accountabilityin Chile and El Salvadorrsquo Latin American Perspectives 35(5) (2008) 20ndash37

54 Hakeem O Yusuf Transitional Justice Judicial Accountability and the Rule of Law (New YorkRoutledge 2007)

55 There are ongoing efforts in Liberia that have not yet changed policy See lsquoLiberiarsquos First VictimsrsquoGroup Holds Workshop in Monroviarsquo New Liberian 27 May 2009





Dow

nloaded from

Indirect Political Impact through Civil Society Mobilization

Several accounts argue that a truth commission might improve a countryrsquos

human rights record by drawing attention to past violations56 Domestic and

international actors most notably human rights organizations and victimsrsquo asso-

ciations build sufficient pressure on politicians and state functionaries to reform

human rights policy and behave in conformity with a truth commissionrsquos rec-

ommendations57 What distinguishes indirect from direct political impact is that

decision makers adopt truth commission recommendations and related human

rights initiatives only as a result of civil society pressure Thus implementation is

typically delayed although such delay does not prove the existence of civil society

mobilization in and of itself Therefore I look for evidence of civil society pressure

to confirm the specific impact mechanism outlined here

Indirect political impact results from what I label lsquocivil society mobilizationrsquo or

a truth commissionrsquos ability to motivate human rights activism especially in the

postcommission period I use two measures to account for civil society mobil-

ization (1) nongovernmental initiatives to publish andor disseminate the com-

missionrsquos final report if the government fails to do so and (2) activism on the part

of local national and international NGOs to monitor progress on the implemen-

tation of recommendations especially concerning a reparations program

Civil society mobilization a key causal step in policy change only measures the

capacity of a truth commission to motivate civil society actors Human rights

activism may exist independently of and conceivably in opposition to a truth

commission Civil society mobilization around a commission does not capture

the overall quality of civic relations (ie social capital) it instead focuses on those

civic groups most likely to pursue the truth commissionrsquos agenda and maximize

its impact since the primary concern is to explain the precise mechanisms

through which truth commissions produce impact Finally the model of civil

society advocacy presented here does not make a priori assumptions about state-

civil society relations ndash it does not claim right away that they are antagonistic or

mutually reinforcing It is plausible to expect that impact driven by political will

and impact driven by civil society mobilization are both high both low or in an

56 Wiebelhaus-Brahm supra n 12 Amnesty International supra n 857 Generally domestic human rights groups make alliances with international organizations and

transnational networks to hold governments accountable to human rights norms See CharlesBeitz lsquoWhat Human Rights Meanrsquo Daedalus 132(1) (2003) 36ndash46 Whether domestic humanrights activism originates from or merely follows transnational actors is a matter of controversySome see transitional justice advocacy networksrsquo capacity to pressure governments by naming andshaming them in the international arena as crucial whereas others point to the predominantlydomestic nature of legitimacy and norm change In the case of truth commission recommenda-tions what I observe is that even when international actors initiate the commission process thesuccess of the reform process ultimately depends on pressure built by domestic human rightsgroups See Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink Activists Beyond Borders Advocacy Networks inInternational Politics (Ithaca NY Cornell University Press 1998) Andrew Moravcsik lsquoTheOrigins of Human Rights Regimes Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europersquo InternationalOrganization 54(2) (1997) 217ndash252 Alejandro Anaya lsquoTransnational and Domestic Processesin the Definition of Human Rights Policies in Mexicorsquo Human Rights Quarterly 31(1) (2009)35ndash58


22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

inverse relationship in any given country although in practice politicians and civil

society actors have more often than not had contrasting views on a truth

commission

Evidence for Indirect Political Impact through Civil SocietyMobilization

Several but not all truth commissions have provided a platform for domestic and

international human rights groups to make demands on the government and

evaluate policy progress There is evidence of civil society mobilization around

truth commissions in 10 countries although to varying degrees In countries

where governments initially chose not to publish the final report or adopt a

reparations program human rights activism led to delayed policy change In

South Africa58 Guatemala59 Peru60 and Sierra Leone61 reluctant governments

found themselves pressured into legislating reparations programs although the

speed and efficiency with which reparations were actually disbursed generated

discontent in most cases In East Timor domestic and international groups suc-

cessfully lobbied for the 2012 National Reparations Programme Bill62

In Nepal63 Sri Lanka64 and Haiti65 it took domestic andor international

human rights organizations several years of pressuring to get the govern-

ment to publish the truth commissionrsquos final report and in Nigeria a private

initiative undertook the publication66 Civil society groups were also crucial in

58 Hayner supra n 24 David Backer lsquoWatching a Bargain Unravel A Panel Study of VictimsrsquoAttitudes about Transitional Justice in Cape Town South Africarsquo International Journal ofTransitional Justice 4(3) (2010) 443ndash456 Christopher J Colvin lsquoOverview of the ReparationsProgram in South Africarsquo in de Greiff supra n 3

59 Anika Oettler lsquoEncounters with History Dealing with the ldquoPresent Pastrdquo in Guatemalarsquo EuropeanReview of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 81 (2006) 3ndash19

60 The Peruvian reparations law was passed in 2005 but actual payments to individuals did not beginuntil 2011 For the role of civil society groups in advocating for the legislation and implementationof the reparations program in Peru see Lisa J Laplante and Kimberly S Theidon lsquoTruth withConsequences Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Perursquo Human Rights Quarterly29(1) (2007) 228ndash250

61 Justice in Perspective lsquoSierra Leone Reparations Programmersquo httpwwwjusticeinperspectiveorgzaafricasierra-leonereparations-programmehtml (accessed 21 October 2013)

62 Amnesty International Remembering the Past Recommendations to Effectively Establish thelsquoNational Reparations Programmersquo and lsquoPublic Memory Institutersquo (2012)

63 lsquoOver the next few years Amnesty International and local human rights groups repeatedly urgedthe government to publish the commissionrsquos report and ensure that any persons implicated inhuman rights violations be brought to justicersquo Hayner supra n 24 at 244ndash245 Also see USInstitute of Peace lsquoCommission of Inquiry Nepal 90rsquo httpwwwusiporgpublicationscommis-sion-of-inquiry-nepal-90 (accessed 21 October 2013)

64 For Sri Lanka see Hayner supra n 2465 The final report lsquowas not made public until a year later [1997] after considerable pressure from

rights groupsrsquo Ibid 54 The report received limited publicity as a result of being in French ratherthan Creole and few copies were made available to the public

66 lsquoFinally in January 2005 after pushing for the release of the report for over two and a half yearsseveral civil society organizations independently released the report by placing it on the internetrsquoIbid 250





Dow

nloaded from

publishing abridged versions of the final report in Peru East Timor and Sierra

Leone67

Not every policy in the area of human rights can be attributed to a truth com-

missionrsquos recommendations or its capacity to mobilize civil society In Chad

human rights groups successfully campaigned for reparations even though the

truth commission did not recommend the policy In Argentina reparations laws

were enacted more than a decade after the commissionrsquos work without any clear

indication that the commissionrsquos recommendations prompted their legislation68

Likewise there is no evidence suggesting that Sri Lankarsquos compensatory policies

followed from the truth commission

Vetting

Truth commissions might recommend the removal of alleged perpetrators and

their political supporters from public office Also known as lustration this tran-

sitional justice tool has often been used in the absence of a truth commission

especially in the Central and Eastern European transitions of the early 1990s

Here I seek to identify not all vetting initiatives but only those recommended

by truth commissions This causal mechanism is relatively easy to measure a

commission may or may not make an explicit recommendation for vetting

and if it does the government may or may not implement it It is also plausible

that a government removes individuals from public office in the absence of a

commissionrsquos recommendation Therefore the research strategy defended here

distinguishes the cases where a truth commissionrsquos recommendation for vetting

was implemented as policy from those where vetting had no direct relation to the

commissionrsquos work

Evidence for Vetting

Despite truth commissionsrsquo best efforts recommending vetting does not appear

to be a significant impact mechanism69 Although four of the 15 transitional truth

commissions demanded the removal of presumed perpetrators from office only

one government has met this demand partially (El Salvador)70 In Chad East

Timor and Liberia the call for vetting was disregarded In one of the countries

where vetting was used Nigeria the truth commission did not recommend the

67 Furthermore new civil society organizations were formed in South Africa Peru Sierra Leone andLiberia to monitor the progress of reforms in the wake of the truth commissions

68 The commission was nonetheless helpful in drawing up the list of beneficiaries lsquoTo receive pay-ment victims had to be listed in the final report of the National Commission on the Disappearanceof Persons (Conadep) or have been reported to the statersquos Human Rights Office and confirmed asdisappeared or killed The total tally of potential beneficiaries includes family members of about15000 disappeared personsrsquo Ernesto Verdeja lsquoReparations in Democratic Transitionsrsquo ResPublica 12(2) (2006) 129

69 For the data on vetting see Hayner supra n 24 Olsen et al supra n 1270 Many violators who were dismissed from one position found other public jobs in El Salvador See

Mike Kaye lsquoThe Role of Truth Commissions in the Search for Justice Reconciliation andDemocratisation The Salvadorean and Honduran Casesrsquo Journal of Latin American Studies 29(1997) 693ndash716


24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

measure In other words evidence does not support the claim that removal of

violators follows from the recommendations of a truth commission

Judicial Impact Accountability and Impunity

Do truth commissions contribute to human rights accountability Commissions

are not allowed to deliver sentences but their findings may be used during crim-

inal proceedings either as evidence or as contextual information71 Judicial

impact depends as much on the powers granted by the truth commission man-

date as on judgesrsquo and prosecutorsrsquo willingness to incorporate commission find-

ings the existence of laws and conditional amnesty procedures that precede or

operate simultaneously with the commission and civil society mobilization

around the commission72 Truth commissions differ with respect to their

search and subpoena powers and the power to name perpetrators Setting man-

date limits on commissionsrsquo judicial attributes is justified on the grounds of fair

trial guarantees73

Yet human agency during and after the truth commission may challenge the

structural limits imposed by the commissionrsquos mandate Commissioners may or

may not choose to refer cases to courts ndash a decision that depends critically on civil

society agendas Prosecutors may be willing or more likely unwilling to use

findings to initiate trials against alleged perpetrators claiming in the latter case

that commission procedures fail to satisfy the evidentiary standards of the

courtroom

Skeptics have long noted the possibility that truth commissions far from con-

tributing to justice in fact serve to perpetuate impunity as they provide an im-

perfect substitute for human rights trials It is generally assumed that the truth

commission is a moderate transitional justice tool used to meet victimsrsquo demands

in the context of a negotiated political transition74 Jon Elster for example notes

that a new democratic regime may have to lsquochoose between justice and truthrsquo75

Mark Osiel takes the tension between truth commissions and prosecutions to an

extreme when he claims that most commissionsrsquo inability to take testimonies

from perpetrators not only undermines justice but also defeats the justification

for the presence of the truth commission to establish the historical truth which

71 Jason S Abrams and Priscilla B Hayner lsquoDocumenting Acknowledging and Publicizing theTruthrsquo in Post-Conflict Justice ed M Cherif Bassiouni (Ardsley NY Transnational Publishers2002) Amnesty International supra n 8

72 I do not separate positive judicial impact with and without civil society mobilization because in allobserved cases of impact significant civil society activism on the part of domestic and interna-tional actors has been a major intervening factor

73 Mark Freeman Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge Cambridge UniversityPress 2006)

74 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly eds Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict Options for Negotiators(Stockholm International IDEA 1998) Priscilla Hayner lsquoTruth Commissionsrsquo NACLA Report onthe Americas 32(2) (1998) 30ndash32

75 Jon Elster Closing the Books Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective (Cambridge CambridgeUniversity Press 2004) 116ndash117





Dow

nloaded from

involves the full disclosure of violations and names of perpetrators76 Some claim

that truth commissions promote impunity through amnesty laws built into their

mandates or legislated as a result of the commissionrsquos work The South African

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in particular has raised serious

concerns about the extent to which truth commissions serve to sidestep account-

ability as a specialized Amnesty Committee granted amnesty to those perpetra-

tors who fully confessed their crimes and the TRC itself constantly invoked the

language of forgiveness and reconciliation77

Finally other skeptics argue that the spectacle of a truth commission creates a

distraction from prosecution More specifically the recognition of victims and

the provision of material and symbolic reparations through truth commissions

may assuage public demand for truth and some kind of justice78 Furthermore

the decision to establish a truth commission itself is a sad admission of the

countryrsquos inability to prosecute which undermines the rule of law at the outset

of a democratic transition79 The observable implication of this hypothesis is that

public calls for prosecutions would decrease andor civil society groups advocat-

ing retributive justice would get demobilized during and after the truth commis-

sion process

Evidence for Positive Judicial Impact

Several truth commissions have generated judicial impact but the magnitude of

the impact is small80 The commissions in Argentina Chile Chad El Salvador Sri

Lanka Guatemala81 Nigeria and Peru saw their findings incorporated into a

76 Mark J Osiel lsquoWhy Prosecute Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocityrsquo Human Rights Quarterly22(1) (2000) 118ndash147

77 lsquoIn transitional justice circles the indistinction between forgiveness and amnesty has been ren-dered murkier by the fact that the one instance where binding amnesty decisions were made by atruth commission South Africa was also an instance where the idiom of forgiveness played acentral rolersquo Rebecca Saunders lsquoQuestionable Associations The Role of Forgiveness inTransitional Justicersquo International Journal of Transitional Justice 5(1) (2011) 125

78 The temptation to establish truth commissions as a means to avoid justice has provoked normativedebates over the nature of the relationship among truth justice and reconciliation Juan Mendezargues against the counterpoising of truth and justice as well as reconciliation and justice asbinary opposites Instead he claims lsquoTruth commissions are important in their own right butthey work best when conceived as a key component in a holistic process of truth-telling justicereparations and eventual reconciliationrsquo Juan E Mendez lsquoNational Reconciliation TransnationalJustice and the International Criminal Courtrsquo Ethics and International Affairs 15(1) (2001) 29Likewise Ernesto Verdeja resists the appropriation of reconciliation as a pretext for impunity andamnesia He argues for a notion of reconciliation understood as lsquomutual respect among formerenemiesrsquo that implies truth telling accountability victim recognition and the rule of law as fun-damental tenets Ernesto Verdeja Unchopping a Tree Reconciliation in the Aftermath of PoliticalViolence (Philadelphia PA Temple University Press 2009)

79 International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Prosecutor Carla del Ponte for in-stance helped stop the formation of a truth commission for Bosnia because she feared such acommission would undermine her judicial cases Charles T Call lsquoIs Transitional Justice ReallyJustrsquo Brown Journal of World Affairs 11(1) (2004) 101ndash114

80 For data on judicial impact see Hayner supra n 2481 For the specific case of Guatemala see Elizabeth Oglesby lsquoHistory and the Politics of

Reconciliation in Guatemalarsquo in Teaching the Violent Past Reconciliation and HistoryEducation ed Elizabeth A Cole (New York Rowman and Littlefield 2007)


26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

small number of domestic or foreign legal cases as contextual information For

example the Argentinian commission transferred files to prosecutors which re-

sulted in the lsquoconviction and imprisonment of five generalsrsquo82 A truth commis-

sionrsquos judicial impact is typically delayed Even the preliminary investigation for

prosecutions takes place several years after the publication of the final report

Often one observes surprising turns in which a commission acquires renewed

significance thanks to changing domestic and international circumstances

Chadrsquos commission

unexpectedly took on new importance as rights advocates turned to it as a primary

source of information in an effort to prosecute [former dictator Hissene] Habre at the

international level It was still the only detailed record of rights crimes under Habre

and was thus critical in providing leads to witnesses for a trial83

In none of the cases did judicial impact extend beyond one or two high-profile

cases such as the arrest of Augusto Pinochet (Chile) the indictment of Hissene

Habre (Chad) and the conviction of Alberto Fujimori (Peru) which brings up

normative and practical questions about prioritizing accountability for the lsquobig

fishrsquo rather than the rank and file Arguably the design of truth commissions

which curtails their judicial powers accounts for their relative insignificance in

judicial processes However evidence suggests that even when commissions have

made full use of their capacity to facilitate prosecutions courts have neglected

their findings The Special Court for Sierra Leone for example had the power to

force the Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission to share the

information at its disposal but the prosecutor rejected the possibility84 In the

end truth commissions produce limited judicial impact but not necessarily due

to their own fault

Evidence for Negative Judicial Impact

Do truth commissions promote impunity then There is a tendency to exaggerate

the prevalence of amnesty laws accompanying truth commissions as a result of the

attention given to the South African TRCrsquos amnesty procedures85 South Africa

and Liberia are the only countries where an amnesty-for-truth option was built

into the commission86 but it would be unfair to fault the amnesty procedure for

82 Hayner supra n 24 at 28083 Ibid 247 Also see Justice in Perspective lsquoChad Minister of Justicersquos Commission of Inquiry on

the Crimes Committed by the Hissene Habre Regimersquo httpwwwjusticeinperspectiveorgzaafricachadminister-of-justices-commission-of-inquiry-on-the-crimes-committed-by-the-his-sene-habre-regimehtml (accessed 21 October 2013)

84 Elizabeth M Evenson lsquoTruth and Justice in Sierra Leone Coordination between Commission andCourtrsquo Columbia Law Review 104(3) (2004) 730ndash767

85 Max Pensky lsquoAmnesty on Trial Impunity Accountability and the Norms of International LawrsquoEthics and Global Politics 1(1ndash2) (2008) 1ndash40

86 In the case of Liberia the commission was mandated to recommend not grant amnesty to allegedperpetrators The commissionrsquos mandate is available at Truth and Reconciliation Commission ofLiberia lsquoMandatersquo httptrcofliberiaorgabouttrc-mandate (accessed 21 October 2013)





Dow

nloaded from

the obstruction of justice The South African TRC dismissed or rejected about 88

percent of the 7112 amnesty applications it received and many perpetrators did

not testify at all87 Thus the majority of perpetrators are available for prosecu-

tion88 The results in Liberia where the truth commission could only recommend

but not grant amnesty are yet to be seen The peace accords in Guatemala and

Sierra Leone89 initially had amnesty provisions but pressure from the interna-

tional community and domestic NGOs forced the exclusion of serious charges

such as genocide and crimes against humanity from the amnesty laws90 In other

words the failure to prosecute results less from amnesty laws accompanying truth

commissions than other factors such as the unwillingness of the judiciary or

political pressures

In Chile and Sri Lanka amnesty laws preceded the truth commission by over a

decade Chilersquos amnesty law dates back to 1978 and Sri Lankarsquos to 1982 ndash long

before the respective truth commissions were established in 1990 and 1994 El

Salvador and Nepal are the only countries where a truth commission resulted in

amnesty but precisely as counterevidence for the lsquoimpunity through amnestyrsquo

hypothesis An amnesty law was passed hastily in each country as the release of the

final report generated fear of prosecution among the political and military elite91

The postcommission amnesties in Argentina served to stop criminal accountabil-

ity but they were not recommended by or established as a process of the com-

mission The 1986 Full Stop Law halted the prosecution of most perpetrators and

Carlos Menemrsquos 1989 presidential pardon of military officers accused of viola-

tions further undermined retributive justice

There is no empirical evidence to show that actors who actively seek prosecu-

tion are lsquodistractedrsquo by the nonretributive promises of truth commissions like

healing reconciliation or monetary compensation What one observes is that

truth commissions have restructured their investigation methods to respond to

persistent advocacy for trials (eg Peru) or have found themselves severely cri-

ticized for failing to respond to this demand (eg Chile) While it is true that

many politicians military leaders and armed groups have accepted the creation of

87 Data available at Truth and Reconciliation Commission lsquoAmnesty Hearings amp Decisionsrsquo httpwwwjusticegovzatrcamntransindexhtm (accessed 21 October 2013)

88 In fact the South African TRC exposed many presumed perpetrators whose applications foramnesty were rejected However lsquonone recommended by the TRC were prosecutedrsquo Haynersupra n 24 at 281

89 lsquoThe [TRC]rsquos work was confidential and both the SCSL [Special Court for Sierra Leone] and theTRC made clear that there would be no sharing of information Thus nothing from the TRC wasutilized by the SCSL Also the Lome Accord amnesty precluded domestic prosecutionsrsquo Emailcommunication Beth Dougherty professor at Beloit College 11 October 2011

90 The UN Representative at the Sierra Leonean peace process introduced a last-minute disclaimerlsquoThe United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty and pardon in Article IX of theagreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide crimes against humanity warcrimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian lawrsquo Quoted in Priscilla BHayner Negotiating Peace in Sierra Leone Confronting the Justice Challenge (Geneva Center forHumanitarian Dialogue and International Center for Transitional Justice 2007) 5

91 Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza lsquoTruth as Justice Investigatory Commissions in LatinAmericarsquo Law and Social Inquiry 20(1) (1995) 79ndash116


28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

truth commissions under the impression that they would replace or distract from

prosecutions commissions have neither advocated impunity nor dampened the

energies of activists who seek trials The failure to prosecute has resulted from

many other factors but not from the existence of truth commissions

ConclusionThis article conceptualizes truth commission impact as a set of political institu-

tional societal and judicial transformations resulting from the truth commission

process in the course of a political transition The processes that generate the

largest effects are direct political impact and delayed political impact through civil

society mobilization The former points to the quasi-official character of truth

commissions while the latter is a reminder of the need for continued civil society

activism to keep politicians accountable to otherwise nonbinding recommenda-

tions Civil society mobilization is a crucial factor in generating long-term judicial

and normative impact as well Truth commissions are neither state institutions

nor NGOs their liminal position vis-a-vis public authorities necessitates a

broader discussion of their agency and vulnerability stated goals and unantici-

pated consequences It is through the relations of mutual cooperation and com-

petition autonomy and dependence legitimation and delegitimation among

politicians domestic and international human rights activists and commissioners

that truth commissions generate impact

The discussion above discards commission-induced vetting (effective only in El

Salvador) as a significant impact mechanism Truth commissionsrsquo positive judicial

impact (ie human rights accountability) tends to appear several years after the end

of the process in great part as a result of broader changes in politiciansrsquo and judgesrsquo

attitudes on human rights trials Negative judicial impact (ie impunity) favors

only a small subsection of perpetrators while the overall climate of impunity is

likely caused by factors other than truth commissionsrsquo amnesty procedures

This article is a modest attempt to capture the specific mechanisms through

which a truth commission influences political judicial and societal processes

Needless to say commissions do much more Many commissions have devised

ways to increase public awareness of their findings and recommendations such as

publishing the final report as a marketable book or in a newspaper producing an

accessible version of the final report for adults andor children (Peru and Sierra

Leone) organizing outreach activities and so forth They have sought to delegit-

imize presumed perpetrators in the eyes of citizens Eight of the 15 transitional

truth commissions I identified have published the names of individual perpetra-

tors and in at least one other case (Argentina) the list of perpetrators was lsquoleakedrsquo

to the press Beyond individuals truth commissions have also criticized institu-

tional actors such as the military police armed opposition political parties and

judicial institutions for committing or condoning human rights violations and

for contributing to a political context in which violations would happen They

have promoted consensus mutual understanding and some notion of





Dow

nloaded from

lsquoreconciliationrsquo (arguably the most contentious term in transitional justice schol-

arship) between victims and perpetrators between former enemies or across

various social groups and political actors As the normative impact of truth com-

missions on politics and society is undeniable future research should devise in-

novative and precise data collection and analysis tools to assess the magnitude

direction and specific causal mechanism of cross-national variation in normative

change

In conclusion truth commissions do produce significant changes and in favor

of human rights accountability more often than not but the magnitude of the

change should not be exaggerated Their ad hoc and nonbinding character limits

their potential for impact Nevertheless sustained postcommission pressure

on the part of human rights organizations and victimsrsquo groups where it happens

has to some extent compensated for the intrinsic weakness of truth commissions

to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

postconflict institution building and other transitional justice and conflict reso-

lution measures I employ a two-step research strategy to assess impact first I

identify all plausible causal explanations of how truth commissions are likely to

produce impact and second I assess those explanations in light of empirical

evidence from all transitional truth commission experiences I show that some of

the taken-for-granted explanations of truth commission impact hold in none or

only a few of the cases whereas others hold more often

Drawing upon the existing literature I identify four major explanations for

truth commission impact direct political impact indirect political impact

through civil society mobilization vetting and judicial accountability Political

impact refers to a truth commissionrsquos capacity to make key decision makers

acknowledge human rights violations publicly and to influence policy in the

areas of institutional reform and human rights policy through its findings and

recommendations Almost all truth commissions have produced political impact

albeit to different degrees I distinguish between direct and indirect impact to

separate those cases in which the government demonstrates political will imme-

diately to implement truth commission recommendations from other situations

where the government is pressured to adopt policy The distinction is important

because civil society mobilization around a truth commission is an important

contributor to policy reform when political will is weak or nonexistent Vetting

refers to the policy of removing perpetrators from public office

Truth commissionsrsquo contribution to human rights accountability or impunity

is a controversial issue I find that commissions have produced some positive

judicial impact understood as the use of findings for prosecutions This often

comes with a delay however highlighting the significance of an auspicious pol-

itical and judicial context as well as continued civil society activism for human

rights accountability Truth commissions may also promote impunity through

built-in amnesty procedures Despite the widespread tendency to associate truth

commissions with amnesties only two commissions in South Africa and Liberia

have actually granted or recommended immunity from prosecution Although

these amnesties benefited hundreds it should be noted that the beneficiaries

represent a fraction of the total number of perpetrators In other words the

overall failure of human rights accountability cannot be attributed to truth com-

missions alone even in the few cases where commissions promoted amnesty

I acknowledge that most truth commissions have tried to transform social

norms by cultivating nonviolence and respect for human rights (along with

other norms depending on the specific context) among the political elite as

well as the broader population Likewise they have advocated various concep-

tions of reconciliation It is difficult (if not impossible) however to measure the

independent causal effect of truth commissions on political and social norms

across cases in great part because normative change takes place over a very

long period of time and as a result of many factors Case studies and surveys

(such as James Gibsonrsquos surveys on the South African Truth and Reconciliation

Commission) provide compelling evidence for the achievements and





Dow

nloaded from


































8 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from
































Dow

nloaded from




















mission impact












10 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


















Model Specification










Multicollinearity












Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


































8 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from
































Dow

nloaded from




















mission impact












10 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


















Model Specification










Multicollinearity












Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from
































Dow

nloaded from




















mission impact












10 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


















Model Specification










Multicollinearity












Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from




















mission impact












10 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


















Model Specification










Multicollinearity












Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from


















Model Specification










Multicollinearity












Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







































12 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







studies31





































Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

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monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

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Dow

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22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from












hypotheses











process




















14 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

dfo

r

retr

ibu

tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

-A

mn

esty

bu

ilt

into

o

rle

gisl

ated

alo

ng

wit

h

tru

thco

mm

issi

on

-Im

pu

nit

yre

sult

ing

fro

mtr

uth

com

mis

sio

n

-C

ivil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n

-C

on

dit

ion

alam

nes

tyb

uil

tin

toco

mm

issi

on

(So

uth

Afr

ica

Lib

eria

)m

ost

per

pet

rato

rsn

ot

cove

red

-N

oev

iden

ceo

fci

vil

soci

ety

dem

ob

iliz

atio

n


16 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from









Data and Methods

Research Strategy













Table 1)

Case Selection






















Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le1

H

ypo

thes

eso

fT

ruth

Co

mm

issi

on

Imp

act

Nam

eo

fca

usa

lm

ech

anis

mH

ypo

thes

ized

cau

sal

pro

cess

Hyp

oth

etic

alo

bse

rvab

leim

pli

cati

on

sE

mp

iric

alev

iden

ce(s

eeT

able

2fo

rd

etai

led

dat

a)

Dir

ect

Po

liti

cal

Imp

act

Fin

din

gsan

dre

com

men

dat

ion

sfi

Offi

cial

pu

bli

-

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

dim

ple

men

tati

on

-S

tate

men

to

fp

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

tco

m-

mis

sio

nre

com

men

dat

ion

s

-Im

med

iate

pu

bli

cati

on

ac

kn

ow

led

gmen

tan

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

-M

ost

com

mis

sio

ns

pro

du

ceim

med

iate

po

lit-

ical

imp

act

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Ind

irec

tP

oli

tica

lIm

pac

t

thro

ugh

Civ

ilS

oci

ety

Mo

bil

izat

ion

Civ

ilso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

nar

ou

nd

the

com

mis

sio

nfi

Pre

ssu

reo

n

gove

rnm

entfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n

(typ

ical

lyd

elay

ed)

-H

um

anri

ghts

and

vict

imsrsquo

gro

up

so

rgan

izin

g

aro

un

dth

etr

uth

com

mis

sio

nrsquos

fin

alre

po

rt

-G

ove

rnm

ent

imp

lem

enta

tio

nu

nd

erp

ress

ure

-S

om

eco

mm

issi

on

sp

rod

uce

ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

l

imp

act

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

ym

ob

iliz

atio

n

-V

aria

tio

nac

ross

com

mis

sio

ns

Vet

tin

gV

etti

ng

reco

mm

end

edfi

Offi

cial

imp

lem

enta

tio

n-

Rec

om

men

dat

ion

of

vett

ing

-P

oli

tica

lw

ill

toim

ple

men

t

-V

etti

ng

pro

gram

afte

rth

eco

mm

issi

on

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

93

)o

nly

Po

siti

veJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Acc

ou

nta

bil

ity

Fin

din

gsfi

Jud

ges

and

pro

secu

tors

use

in

pro

ceed

ings

im

med

iate

lyo

rd

elay

ed

-U

seo

ftr

uth

com

mis

sio

nre

po

rtin

pro

ceed

ings

Lim

ited

use

of

som

eco

mm

issi

on

srsquofi

nd

ings

in

do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

Neg

ativ

eJu

dic

ial

Imp

act

Am

nes

ty

Co

mm

issi

on

sac

com

pan

yam

nes

tyla

ws

or

pro

mo

team

nes

tyfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

rato

rs

OR

Co

mm

issi

on

sd

amp

enth

ed

eman

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retr

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tio

nfi

Imp

un

ity

for

per

pet

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-A

mn

esty

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ilt

into

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alo

ng

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tru

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mm

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pu

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ob

iliz

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-C

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uth

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red

-N

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ceo

fci

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soci

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ob

iliz

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n


16 O Bakiner



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Data




























Dow

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le2

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mp

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alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

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jud

icia

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imp

act

imp

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ity

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icat

ors

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imp

act

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arat

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reco

mm

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imm

edia

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imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

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of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

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(yes

n

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edia

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imp

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izat

ion

Arg

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(19

83

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esn

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epar

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ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

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No

no

Do

mes

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cou

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imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

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on

cili

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Imm

edia

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(19

92

)

Imm

edia

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po

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No

no

Do

mes

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and

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ign

cou

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No

Ch

ad(1

99

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No

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Yes

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rep

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no

Fo

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92

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edia

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Yes

yes

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93

p

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del

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Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

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den

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Co

mm

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nic

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arat

ion

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19

98

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(20

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edia

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rep

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ion

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es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

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le2

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20 O Bakiner



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24 O Bakiner



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30 O Bakiner



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Dow

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Tab

le2

E

mp

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alE

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Imm

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20

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Imm

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Do

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6)

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no

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No

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Rig

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Co

mm

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rep

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sN

op

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Nep

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99

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No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

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sY

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99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

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Ch

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90

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92

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Ch

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1)

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Yes

No

No

ne

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rep

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med

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po

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Yes

no

Fo

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No

El

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92

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esn

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par

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Imm

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Yes

yes

(19

93

p

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Fo

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Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

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Sri

Lan

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94

)Y

esy

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Co

mm

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Eth

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Yes

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19

98

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(20

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Offi

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rep

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99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

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tp

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So

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20

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20

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Imm

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99

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oY

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on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from







Data




























Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

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izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

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asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

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ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

E

mp

iric

alE

vid

ence

for

Imp

act

in1

5T

ran

siti

on

alC

om

mis

sio

ns

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Arg

enti

na

(19

83

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

oN

o(r

epar

atio

ns

20

04

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

tean

d

del

ayed

No

Uga

nd

a(1

98

6)

No

no

No

No

Uga

nd

an

Hu

man

Rig

hts

Co

mm

issi

on

No

rep

arat

ion

sN

op

ub

lica

tio

nN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Nep

al(1

99

0)

No

no

No

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

4)

No

no

No

ne

Yes

(19

91

de

fact

o)

Ch

ile

(19

90

)Y

esy

es

(19

92

)

Yes

Yes

Nat

ion

al

Co

rpo

rati

on

for

Rep

arat

ion

and

Rec

on

cili

atio

n

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

(19

92

)

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

No

no

Do

mes

tic

and

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Ch

ad(1

99

1)

No

no

Yes

No

No

ne

No

rep

arat

ion

sIm

med

iate

po

licy

Yes

no

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

No

El

Sal

vad

or

(19

92

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Imm

edia

te

po

licy

Yes

yes

(19

93

p

arti

al)

Fo

reig

nco

urt

s

del

ayed

Yes

(19

93

bla

nk

et)

Sri

Lan

ka

(19

94

)Y

esy

esN

oN

oP

resi

den

tial

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Eth

nic

Vio

len

ce

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

19

98

)

Yes

(20

01

)N

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Hai

ti(1

99

5)

Yes

no

No

No

Offi

ceo

fth

e

Pu

bli

cP

rose

cuto

r

No

rep

arat

ion

sY

es(1

99

8)

No

no

No

ne

No

(co

nti

nu

ed)


18 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

f

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

So

uth

Afr

ica

(19

95

)Y

esn

oY

esY

es

(go

vern

men

t

div

ided

)

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

03

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)

Gu

atem

ala

(19

97

)Y

esn

oY

esY

esN

on

eY

es(r

epar

atio

ns

20

05

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

can

d

fore

ign

cou

rts

del

ayed

No

Nig

eria

(19

99

)Y

esn

oN

oY

esN

on

eN

ore

par

atio

ns

Yes

(20

05

un

offi

cial

)

No

yes

(19

99

)

Do

mes

tic

cou

rts

imm

edia

te

No

Per

u(2

00

1)

Yes

no

Yes

Yes

No

ne

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

fort

hco

min

g)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oD

om

esti

cco

urt

s

imm

edia

te

and

del

ayed

No

Eas

tT

imo

r(2

00

2)

Yes

no

Yes

No

Tec

hn

ical

Sec

reta

riat

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

bil

l2

01

2)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eN

o

Sie

rra

Leo

ne

(20

02

)Y

esn

oY

esN

o(d

elay

ed

end

ors

emen

t)

Nat

ion

alC

om

mis

sio

n

for

So

cial

Act

ion

Yes

(rep

arat

ion

s

20

08

)

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyN

on

oN

on

eN

o

Lib

eria

(20

06

)Y

esn

oY

esN

oIn

dep

end

ent

Nat

ion

al

Co

mm

issi

on

on

Hu

man

Rig

hts

On

goin

gci

vil

soci

ety

cam

pai

gn

Imm

edia

tep

oli

cyY

esn

oN

on

eY

es(b

uil

t-in

par

tial

)





Dow

nloaded from





















monitor progress40



















20 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



































Dow

nloaded from



































22 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from



commission






























Dow

nloaded from


Leone67









Vetting


























24 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














trial guarantees73







courtroom




















Dow

nloaded from


















sion process












26 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

























to their own fault
















Dow

nloaded from











political pressures


























28 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from














































Dow

nloaded from







change







to date


30 O Bakiner



Dow

nloaded from

Tab

le2

C

on

tin

ued

Dir

ect

po

liti

cal

imp

act

Ind

irec

tp

oli

tica

lim

pac

t

thro

ugh

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Vet

tin

gP

osi

tive

jud

icia

l

imp

act

acco

un

tab

ilit

y

Neg

ativ

e

jud

icia

l

imp

act

imp

un

ity

Ind

icat

ors

of

imp

act

Rep

arat

ion

s

reco

mm

end

ed

imm

edia

tely

imp

lem

ente

d

(yes

yes

yes

no

no

no

)

Imm

edia

te

pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

(yes

n

o)

Offi

cial

end

ors

emen

t

(yes

n

o)

Imm

edia

te

crea

tio

no

f

foll

ow

-up

inst

itu

tio

ns

Rec

om

men

ded

rep

arat

ion

s

imp

lem

ente

das

are

sult

of

civi

lso

ciet

y

mo

bil

izat

ion

Pu

bli

cati

on

of

fin

al

rep

ort

asa

resu

lto

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truth commission impact: an assessment of how commissions ... · african truth and reconciliation...

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