trust, institutions and economic growth in south caucasus

1

Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) – Armenia

This research has been implemented in the scope of CRRC-Armenia Research

Fellowship Program, financed by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

______________________________________________

Grants to Support Social Science and

Policy- Oriented Research # R08

Trust, Institutions and Economic Growth in South Caucasus

By

Mariam Matevosyan

Yerevan

2013

2

Contents Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................... 4

Abstract...................................................................................................................................... 5

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5

Literature Review ....................................................................................................................... 7

Research Methodology and Data ............................................................................................... 9

Hypothesis and Research Questions ........................................................................................10

Findings ....................................................................................................................................11

Time dependency. .................................................................................................................11

Frequencies...........................................................................................................................11

Correlations ...........................................................................................................................14

Regression Analysis. .............................................................................................................15

Conclusions ..............................................................................................................................16

References ...............................................................................................................................16

Appendix 1. Frequencies ..........................................................................................................18

Appendix 2. Correlations. ..........................................................................................................27

Appendix 3 Model .....................................................................................................................29

Appendix 4 Frequencies of Dummies ........................................................................................32

Appendix 5 Model Based on Dummy Variables .........................................................................35

4

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Jenny Paturyan, Valentina Gevorgyan and Anna Hakobyan for tolerating my

constant complaints about my work, to Ani Alekyan, Aleksandr Grigoryan and Hovhannes Galstyan for

their advice in econometrics and to CRRC team, especially to Anna Sarkisyan for their support

throughout the whole period of work.

5

Abstract

Numerous studies indicate that generalized public trust is beneficial for economic growth. (Beugelsdijk,

2006; Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004; Stephen Knack & Keefer, 1997) The paper

looks at a special subcategory of public trust that is at the level of public trust in core democratic

institutions hypothesizing that the latter positively relates to the rates of economic growth in three South

Caucasian countries. (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).Caucasus Barometer1 (2004-2012) is used to

estimate the level of public trust in core democratic institutions, while economic growth rates are

estimated based on International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) official data. The paper employs cross national

regression analysis to test the hypothesis.

Introduction

One group of economists has spoken in favor of alternative factors influencing core

economic institutions thus challenging the underlying philosophy of Washington Consensus.

(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Easterly and Levine 2002 et al.) Others argue that

growth is a function of economic institutions and technological advancements (Solow 1957) or

physical endowments such as geography. (Gallup, Mellinger and Sachs 2000, Sachs 2003). In

this study I critically examine both views and take a slightly different perspective on the

problem. I claim that a specific subcategory of public trust that is public trust in core democratic

institutions has its effect on rates of economic growth in three South Caucasian countries.

Scholars have profitably defined trust as basic evaluative orientation toward the

government (Stokes 1962) based on how well the government is operating according to people’s

normative expectations (A. Miller 1974). In this paper I am inclined to give an operational

definition to the term ‘public trust in core democratic institutions’ meaning that it refers to the

rates of effective communication and transmission of publicly significant information in between

and inside those institutions. It is hypothesized that this efficient transmission positively relates

to the level of public trust in core democratic institutions. Thus the paper particularly will be

looking at the dynamics of public trust (trust in institutions and interpersonal trust) in three south

Caucasian countries and examine its’ relationship with the level of development of basic

democratic institutions, economic growth in the region for the period of past 9 years. Caucasus

Barometer 2004-12 data is used to estimate the level of public trust in core democratic

institutions and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) official statistical data is taken to estimate 1 The Caucasus Barometer survey runs annually in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia based on the same

methodological approach and the same survey instrument. The 2004 survey was carried out only in the three capital

cities; the 2005 survey also included one region in each country. Since 2006, the survey has been carried out based

on a representative nationwide sample excluding territories affected by military conflicts. See

http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/overview/ for more detail.

http://www.crrccenters.org/caucasusbarometer/overview/

6

the levels of economic growth in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Regression analysis is

conducted to test the hypothesis.

7

Literature Review

Typical models of economic growth usually take a representative economy implying that

economies follow a shared path of economic development. In the framework of endogenous

growth models long term growth is fueled by technological innovation. (Romer, 1986) Empirical

evidence is also supporting the endogenous growth framework. After decades of growth

accounting in selected countries (Solow, 1957) it became clear that the long term fuel of

economic growth in the leading economies has been technological advance spurred by the

growth of income. However it is also argued that endogenous growth is not a general pattern to

characterize growth in all economies. (Sachs, 2003, p. 215) Instead, it is found in countries with

only about one-sixth of the world’s population. Thus, neoclassical models didn’t take into

account differences, assuming that developing countries sooner or later will follow the same

logic as technological advancements are accessible to everybody. Nevertheless practice shows

that so called developing countries do not haste to follow the logic.

Eggertsson is amongst those economists who stress out the importance of discussing and

redefining the concept of ‘technology’. While answering to the question “Why some countries

are poorer than others?” he says that per capita output of a given economy depends on country’s

ability to implement two complementary types of technologies: social technologies and

production technologies2. Social technologies describe methods or mechanisms whereas social

institutions create patterns of behavior, production technologies describe methods for

transforming inputs into outputs, but production processes are effective only within appropriate

institutional frameworks. (Eggertsson, 2005) Eggertsson’s analysis of social institutions is

backed by new institutional economics and, with some modifications, uses its frameworks,

concepts and theoretical insights. (Eggertsson & Eggertsson, 1990; Libecap, 1989; North, 1990;

Williamson, 1987) Eggertsson (2005) argues that analytically it is essential to make a distinction

between production technologies and social technologies because production technologies have

characteristics of public goods, whereas social technologies do not travel well. Moreover,

modern production technologies are not productive unless complemented by social technologies

of a minimum quality. (Eggertsson, 2005, p. 12) Reasoning along these lines Eggertsson

concludes that financial and engineering issues are not the ultimate cause of poverty in

2 Italics by the author.

8

developing countries, but rather the social and political factors associated with imperfect

institutions are. (Eggertsson, 2005)

In political economy growth theory social factors and particularly social trust have been

examined and are reflected in such measures as social capability, social infrastructure, social

capital and growth, including trust. (S. Knack & Keefer, 1997; S. Knack, 2003) Putnam (Putnam

& Leonardi, 1993a, p. 157) writes "Economics does not predict civics, but civics does predict

economics, better than economics itself". He stresses on what he has calls 'civicness,' or a sense

of civic community3. This community in turn may be characterized as a dense network of social

associations, where trust facilitates the workings of the society as a whole. (Putnam & Leonardi,

1993a, p. 167) Lipset (1994) finds a strong correlation between indices of modernization and

democratization. And if democratization in turn is related with the level of public trust as many

scholars show (Norris, 1999; Putnam & Leonardi, 1993b) then it may be claimed that public trust

in democratic institutions is a factor that affects economic growth.

Besides trust in democratic institutions interpersonal trust is also an important factor for

the economic growth of the country in general and particularly for the growth of personal

income. Zak and Knack (2001) argue that even in growing economies, interpersonal trust is a

powerful economic stimulant: a 15 percentage point increase in the proportion of people who

report that others in their country are trustworthy raises per capita output growth by 1% for every

year thereafter. Further, economic growth initiates a virtuous circle as income gains enhance

interpersonal trust. Model developed by Zak & Knack (2001) shows that trust emerges

endogenously among economic actors in order to reduce transactions costs driven by asymmetric

and costly information. North (1990, p. 54) takes a more political economic stance going from

institutions to trust emphasizing their capacity to build trust.

Based on the analysis of main trends in literature today and the questions that come out of

those, the logic of my argument is the following: public trust is a general normative term for

various types of mechanisms that actors use to cope with uncertainty and complexity in social

environments. Effective working of core democratic institutions is based on those normative

structures one of which is the level of public trust in those institutions, acting as an exogenous

variable in this study. Accordingly, economic policy making models, and reforms are possible to

successfully implement only in case there is public trust in core democratic institutions.

3 More on this see Almond G.; Verba S. (1963)

9

Previous cross-national regression studies conclude that policy of economic liberalization affects

positively and significantly growth in post-communist countries (Christoffersen & Doyle, 2000;

Hernández-Catá, 1997) Fischer, et al (Fischer, Sahay, & Végh, 1996) Economic liberalization

policy and macroeconomic stability were positively associated with growth in pooled cross-

section and time-series of 25 post-communist countries in 1992-1995. Selowsky and Martin

(Selowsky & Martin, 1997) note that the effect of economic reform policy on output becomes

positive with a time lag. Causality elaborated in this research is such that economic liberalization

policies and their effective implementation is possible only in the existence of strong democratic

institutions, the working of which in turn is heavily dependent upon the level of public trust in

those institutions.

Research Methodology and Data

The paper employs cross national regression analysis to determine the influence of trust

in several democratic institutions on GDP growth in three South Caucasian countries.

Caucasus Barometer (2004-12) is viewed as a main primary data source on measuring the levels

of trust in core democratic institutions in three South Caucasian countries. Total of seven

variables measuring trust in Courts, local NGO’s, Parliament, Executive Government, President,

Media and Ombudsman were chosen4 as exogenous variables. GDP data for three South

Caucasian countries is estimated from IMF World Economic Outlook Database 2013. Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) current prices, US dollar was taken as an endogenous variable5. Linear

regression models are used to explain dependent variable. A joint database by years has been

developed based on initial variables6. Frequencies were run based on the joint database.

Pearson’s correlations were studied before the linear regression model was constructed. The CB

data has also been analyzed from a binary perspective. Dummy variables were constructed to

build new models. Negative answers (fully distrust, rather distrust) have been coded as 0 and

positive answers (rather trust, fully trust) as 1. For Frequencies of dummy variables see

Appendix 3.

4 Variables were further coded as follows: Courts-X1; local NGO’s-X2; Parliament-X3; Executive Government-X4;

Media-X5; Ombudsman-X6; President-X7 5 See IMF report for more detail:

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=44&pr.y=11&sy=2004&ey=2012&scsm=1&ssd=

1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=911%2C912%2C915&s=NGDP%2CNGDPD&grp=0&a= 6 An aggregate database based on means wasn’t convenient to use and didn’t generate allowable models.

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=44&pr.y=11&sy=2004&ey=2012&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=911%2C912%2C915&s=NGDP%2CNGDPD&grp=0&a=

http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=44&pr.y=11&sy=2004&ey=2012&scsm=1&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=911%2C912%2C915&s=NGDP%2CNGDPD&grp=0&a=

10

Regression equation is

Hypothesis and Research Questions

RQ 1: Is there a relationship between trust in core democratic institutions and economic growth

in Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan (2008-2012)?

RQ 2: Is there a difference between the level of trust in core democratic institutions and

economic growth based on country?

H: In Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan economic growth positively relates to the level of public

trust in core democratic institutions.

11

Findings

Time dependency.

SPSS’s ‘Regression Curve Estimation’ program allows as to observe GDP as it relates to

time. The results give important hints to understand the relationship stated in the initial

hypothesis of the study as well as reveal some additional information for further studies.

R

2 =0.52

R2 =0.95

R2 =0.88

Results show that each year GDP grows by 0.28 (Armenia), 3.44 (Azerbaijan), and 0.47

(Georgia), points. Armenia provides the slowest growth rates, which in turn are reflected in

several answers concerning trust thus resulting in strong mutual dependencies among variables.

Frequencies7

This section discusses the primary findings of research based on the observations of

frequencies of variables measuring public trust in different democratic institutions in three South

Caucasian countries8.

In Armenia trust in courts has been oscillating, going up and down (in 2007 it went down

from 30.4%9 to 24.0%, in 2009 from 30.2% to 22%, in 2010 22% to 16.4% and in 2012 from

20% to 16.2%) with no definite pattern to be easily identified. This may be largely due to the

sensitivity of the given variable to other affecting variables (such as trust in President, trust in

Parliament, GDP etc.). In Azerbaijan the same indicator has fallen from 47.2% (2008) to 25.2%

in 2011. The picture is even more unstable in Georgia with a fall up to 19.5% in 2007 with

lowest point reached in 2012 (18.3%).

7 For a complete description of frequencies see Appendix 1.

8 Questions were asked in the following ways:

2004-2006: “I will list several social institutions and please, assess your trust toward them on a 5 point scale, where

“5” means fully trust, “1” fully distrust.”

The scale for all years is the same: Fully trust, Rather trust, Neutral, Rather distrust. Don’t know, Refuse to answer,

Interviewer error were marked as missing. 9 For all cases valid percent is taken.

12

In Armenia public trust in NGOs declines in 2007 reaching to the point of 22.7% as

compared to 27.2% in 2006. This decrease might be partially due to the extensive decrease in the

number of NGOs in 2005 which mainly has to do with the closing down of USAID sponsored

World Learning NGO Strengthening Program. Decrease of trust in NGO’s continues in 2009

(23.0%) reaching to its lowest point in 2012 (18.5%).

In Georgia a major decline is observed in 2011 (19.4%) as compared to 28% (2010).

Highest levels of trust in NGOs has been recorded among Georgian people in 2010 (25.7%), in

2009 (44.4%), with the highest amount of trust in 2008 (44.4%).

For Azerbaijan public trust in NGOs has been the highest in 2008 (39.7%), with

minimum levels recorded in 2004 and 2012 (both 23.8%) which is more or less comparable to

the lowest points for Armenia (18.5% in 2004) and Georgia (19.4% in 2011).

For all the three countries, trust in NGOs has been the highest in 2008 (Armenia 30.3%,

Azerbaijan 39.7% and Georgia 44.4%) all coinciding with presidential elections in these

countries which is another indicator pointing out the possible mutual dependency between the

variables.

Trust in Parliament in Armenia records unstable increase for the period of 2004-2005

(11.5-16.2%), it fell down slightly in 2006 (15.7%), went upward for 2007 (20.5%) and 2008

(27.6%) which can largely be explained by Parliamentary elections in 2007. During last seven

years the lowest point of trust in Parliament has been recorded in 2012 (15.9%) again coinciding

with the year of last Parliamentary elections in Armenia, however as CB reflects the attitudes for

from the year prior to the survey, it cannot be stated that elections had their part in the decrease.

Similar unstable patterns are observable in Azerbaijan for the period of 2004-2005

(34.0% to 29.6%). The decrease can be largely due to public disenchantment from the acting

Parliament right before the upcoming 2005 Parliamentary elections. Increase in the level of trust

towards Parliament reaches its highest point in 2007 (52.9%) after which numbers remain more

or less the same with no significant oscillations in between.

In Georgia prior to the ‘Rose Revolution’ trust in Parliament has decreased for 2004-

2007 (48.5%-21.1%). The most dramatic increase was recorded in 2008: from 21.1% (2007) to

37.2% in 2008. For Georgia highest points in trust are observable in 2004 and 2012.

The highest point of public trust towards president in Armenia has been observed in 2008

(52.3%), prior to the much contested presidential elections in 2008, while the lowest point is in

2012 (27.4%), proceeded by a gradual decrease in the level of trust since 2008.

13

The lowest level of trust among Azeri towards the President is recorded in 2005 (67.0%),

while the highest was in 2004 (88.7%). Overall no coherent pattern is observable, as the levels of

trust have been oscillating in between 83.3% (2006) and 79.7% (2011).

Similar to Armenia in Georgia the lowest point in the level of trust of trust towards

President is observable in 2012 (27.6%) with the highest being the 2004 (87.4%), the year of the

‘Rose Revolution’. In between 2005-2011 the lowest point has been in 2007 (35.3%), the highest

in 2005 (79.3%) with no comparatively constant patterns to be outlined.

In Armenia trust towards Executive Government has been increasing for the period of

2004-2008 (17.1%-40.8% accordingly), it starts to decline since 2009 reaching to its lowest point

for that period in 2012 (20.3%) with the exception of a slight increase in 2011 (25.1%) as

compared to 2010 (21.1%).

In Azerbaijan trust towards Executive Government has shown almost similar pattern with

the two high ranking points in 2007 (52.3%) and in 2012 (52.0%). The most prominent major

decline is observable in 2005 (23.2%).

In Georgia trust towards Executive Government trust in the Executive Government

shows no constant patterns, the highest point is in 2012 (46.8%), the lowest is in 2007 (20.8%).

In Armenia trust in Media has been growing since 2004 (40.0%) reaching to its highest

point in 2006 (47.9%) immediately followed by a major decrease of 27.6% in 2007 with the

second lowest point of 23.8% in 2012.

In Azerbaijan the same indicator has been highest in 2004 (62%), lowest in 2011 (35.6%)

with increasing levels of trust in between those periods.

In Georgia trust towards media has been increasing for the period of 2004-06 (65.7-

69.7%) and constantly decreasing starting from 2007 up to 2012 (56.1-21.6%).

Increasing trust towards Ombudsman in Armenia is observable in 2004 (19.7%) through

2006 (36.4%). The number decreases in 2007 (29.8%) with the lowest point is in 2012 (26.2%),

with an increasing span between 2005 (36.0%) - 2008 (46.7%) and 2009 (32.4%)-2011(31.4%).

Much similar to Armenia is Azerbaijan’s public trust toward government is increasing for

2004-06 (26.7-47.8% accordingly). A major decrease is reached in 2007 (28.1%), followed by a

dramatic increase of 41.9% (2008) afterward numbers oscillate between 26.2% (2009) and

21.0% (2011) with a weak raising tendency.

14

Overall high levels of oscillation amongst almost all variables measuring public trust in

various democratic institutions provides rather sufficient support speaking in favor of those

variables being mutually linked or affected, highly sensitive toward external factors.

Correlations10

Growth literature speaks about a strong relationship between protection of property rights

and economic growth11

. When correlating GDP with the trust in courts a Pearson correlation

statistic shows that

r = -0.029**, N=20172, p < 0.01. Results indicate that there is a statistically significant but loose

and negative correlation between the variables.

A similar picture is observable in Azerbaijan where Pearson correlation statistic shows that

r = -0.205** N=17465, p < 0.01 and in Georgia r = -0.185** N=19901, p<0.01.

High level of social trust, cooperation and voluntarism are widely discussed to be one of

the measures leading to better economic performance in the developing countries (Putnam &

Leonardi, 1993a), in Armenia empirical testing of one aspect of this hypothesis measuring the

relationship between overall GDP growth and trust in local NGOs has shown that there is a

statistically significant (p < 0.01), nevertheless a very weak and negative (r = -0.080**),

N=17888, relationship between the variables. In Azerbaijan and Georgia more or less a similar

picture is observed r =-0.180** N=15880, p<0.01 and r =-0.210** N=18624, p<0.01

accordingly.

Three branches of democratic government; the Parliament, the Executive and the

Government constitute the major government structure in all three South Caucasian countries,

public trust in which is an important prerequisite for undertaking any meaningful and potentially

successful economic reforms and policies. Empirical testing of one aspect of this general

statement has shown that in Armenia there is weak but nevertheless statistically significant

positive correlation between GDP and trust in Parliament r = 0.068**, N=19565, there was not

found any statistically significant relationship between the discussed variables in Azerbaijan:

10

For more detail see Appendix 2. 11

See for example Torstensson, J. (1994). Property rights and economic growth: an empirical study. Kyklos, 47(2),

231-247.

15

p < 0.01. In Azerbaijan r =0.006 N=17591, while in Georgia there is a statistically significant,

meanwhile negative correlation between the variables r =-0.093** N=20413, p<0.01, which is

slightly stronger that it is in Armenia.

In Armenia GDP and trust in Executive Government positively correlate with each other:

r = 0.060**, N=19540, p < 0.01. In Azerbaijan a weak negative correlation is found: r =-0.018*

N=17593, p<0.05. In Georgia a slightly stronger but again negative correlation is observed:

r =-0.051** N=20285, p<0.01.

In Armenia GDP and trust in president surprisingly do not correlate with each other, no

statistically significant relationship is found: r = -0.005, N=19664, in Azerbaijan there is a very

weak correlation between the variables r =0.030** N=18123, p<0.01 and in Georgia a rather

strong (as compared to other correlations) and negative relationship is found r =-0.256**

N=20677, p<0.01.

A rather surprising finding is observed while studying correlations between GDP and

trust in Media in the three countries. In Armenia GDP and trust in media r = -0.083** N=19630,

p < 0.01, in Azerbaijan r =-0.153** N=17843, p<0.01 and in Georgia r =-0.273** N=20574,

p<0.01. Pearson correlations between GDP and trust in Ombudsman in Armenia show that r = -

0.016** N=17899, p < 0.01, in Azerbaijan r =-0.277**, N=16100, p < 0.01 and in Georgia r =-

0.223**, N=19553, p<0.01.

Overall strongest correlation in Armenia is found between Media and GDP (-0.083),

followed by trust in NGOs (-0.080), both correlations are negative. In Azerbaijan strongest, still

negative correlations are found between GDP and trust in Courts (-0.205), and GDP and trust in

Ombudsman (-0.277). In Georgia strongest, meanwhile negative correlations are found between

GDP and trust in President (-0.256) and GDP and trust in Media (-0.273).

Regression Analysis.

The study used a stepwise regression model was employed12

.

12

See Appendix 3 for more detail.

16

Results for Armenia showed that

For Azerbaijan the regression equation has the following form.

For Georgia the regression equation is

All the models are allowable based of F indicator, sig < 0.05. t values of all independent

variables taken in modules are bigger than two, meaning that their significance is also smaller

than 0.05.

Conclusions

The study showed that rather the contrary of what was hypothesized initially, is

supported. Negative correlations among dependent and independent variables show that the

opposite hypothesis is supported, meaning that there is a weak but nevertheless statistically

significant relationship between economic growth and trust in various institutions. In South

Caucasian countries historic reasons dealing with the Soviet legacy of conducting economic

reforms, lack of democratic governance norms and traditions and long lasting traditions of

statehood, institutionalization specificities, as well as short time period under study may have

had their part in explaining such findings.

References Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations.

Boston: Little Brown & Co.

Beugelsdijk, S. (2006). A note on the theory and measurement of trust in explaining differences in

economic growth. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 30(3), 371–387.

Christoffersen, P., & Doyle, P. (2000). From inflation to growth. Economics of Transition, 8(2), 421–451.

Eggertsson, T. (2005). Imperfect institutions: Possibilities and limits of reform. Michigan: University of

Michigan Press.

17

Eggertsson, T., & Eggertsson, Þ. (1990). Economic behavior and institutions: Principles of

Neoinstitutional Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fischer, S., Sahay, R., & Végh, C. A. (1996). Economies in transition: The beginnings of growth. The

American Economic Review, 86(2), 229–233.

Glaeser, E. L., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004). Do institutions cause growth?

Journal of economic Growth, 9(3), 271–303.

Hernández-Catá, E. (1997). Liberalization and the Behavior of Output during the Transition from Plan to

Market. International Monetary Fund.

Knack, S. (2003). Groups, growth and trust: Cross-country evidence on the Olson and Putnam

hypotheses. Public Choice, 117(3), 341–355.

Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country

investigation. The Quarterly journal of economics, 112(4), 1251–1288.

Knack, Stephen, & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country

investigation. The Quarterly journal of economics, 112(4), 1251–1288.

Libecap, G. D. (1989). Distributional issues in contracting for property rights. Journal of Institutional and

Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 6–24.

Lipset, S. M. (1994). The social requisites of democracy revisited: 1993 presidential address. American

Sociological Review, 1–22.

Norris, P. (1999). Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government: Global Support for

Democratic Government. USA: Oxford University Press, USA.

North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge: Cambridge

university press.

Putnam, R. D., & Leonardi, R. (1993a). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy.

Princeton university press.

Putnam, R. D., & Leonardi, R. (1993b). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy.

Princeton university press.

Romer, P. M. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth. The Journal of Political Economy, 1002–

1037.

Sachs, J. D. (2003). Institutions don’t rule: direct effects of geography on per capita income. National

Bureau of Economic Research.

Selowsky, M., & Martin, R. (1997). Policy performance and output growth in the transition economies.

The American Economic Review, 87(2), 349–353.

Solow, R. M. (1957). Technical change and the aggregate production function. The review of Economics

and Statistics, 39(3), 312–320.

Williamson, O. E. (1987). Transaction cost economics: The comparative contracting perspective. Journal

of economic behavior & organization, 8(4), 617–625.

Zak, P. J., & Knack, S. (2001). Trust and growth. The economic journal, 111(470), 295–321.

18

Appendix 1. Frequencies

Table 1 Frequencies. Year 2004

Courts Local NGOs Parliament Executive

Government President Media Ombudsman

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Arm

en

ia

Fully distrust

551 36.7 39.4 317 21.1 28.3 593 39.5 42.1 515 34.3 36.3 469 31.3 33.1 195 13.0 13.6 390 26.0 36.6

Rather distrust

339 22.6 24.3 184 12.3 16.4 402 26.8 28.5 389 25.9 27.5 221 14.7 15.6 286 19.1 19.9 181 12.1 17.0

Neutral 259 17.3 18.5 412 27.5 36.8 253 16.9 17.9 284 18.9 20.0 271 18.1 19.1 380 25.3 26.5 284 18.9 26.7

Rather trust

226 15.1 16.2 175 11.7 15.6 139 9.3 9.9 199 13.3 14.0 324 21.6 22.9 475 31.7 33.1 163 10.9 15.3

Fully trust 22 1.5 1.6 33 2.2 2.9 23 1.5 1.6 30 2.0 2.1 131 8.7 9.3 99 6.6 6.9 47 3.1 4.4

Subtotal 1397 93.1 100 1121 74.7 100 1410 94.0 100 1417 94.5 100 1416 94.4 100 1435 95.3 100 1065 71.0 100

Don’t know (missing)

92 6.1 370 24.7 43 4.9 69 4.6 64 4.3 55 3.7 426 28.4

Refuse to answer (missing)

11 .7 9 .6 17 1.1 14 .9 20 1.3 10 .7 9 .6

Subtotal 103 6.9 379 25.3 90 6.0 83 5.5 84 5.6 65 4.3 435 29.0

Total 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

142 9.5 10.6 131 8.8 12.8 185 12.4 13.7 93 6.2 7.1 24 1.6 1.7 60 4.0 4.3 154 10.3 14.4

Rather distrust

227 15.2 16.9 167 11.2 16.3 270 18.1 20.0 216 14.5 16.6 47 3.2 3.3 107 7.2 7.6 158 10.6 14.8

Neutral 488 32.8 36.3 484 32.5 47.2 435 29.2 32.2 427 28.7 32.7 90 6.0 6.3 368 24.7 26.1 470 31.6 44.0

Rather trust

425 28.5 31.6 193 13.0 18.8 388 26.1 28.7 476 32.0 36.5 682 45.8 47.9 750 50.4 53.2 197 13.2 18.5

Fully trust 62 4.2 4.6 51 3.4 5.0 72 4.8 5.3 92 6.2 7.1 581 39.0 40.8 124 8.3 8.8 88 5.9 8.2

Subtotal 1344 90.3 100 1026 68.9 100 1350 90.7 100 1304 87.6 100 1424 95.6 100 1409 94.6 100 1067 71.7 100


102 6.9 377 25.3 97 6.5 135 9.1 28 1.9 45 3.0 366 24.6


43 2.9 86 5.8 42 2.8 50 3.4 37 2.5 35 2.4 56 3.8

Subtotal 145 9.7 463 31.1 139 9.3 185 12.4 65 4.4 80 5.4 422 28.3

Total 1489 100 1489 100 1489 100 1489 100 1489 100 1489 100 1489 100

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

251 17.1 17.9 225 15.3 17.8 148 10.1 10.3 204 13.9 14.4 37 2.5 2.5 88 6.0 6.1 164 11.1 12.6

Rather distrust

273 18.5 19.5 180 12.2 142 201 13.7 14.0 189 12.8 13.3 24 1.6 1.6 103 7.0 7.1 142 9.6 10.9

Neutral 384 26.1 27.4 513 34.9 40.5 388 26.4 27.1 427 29.0 30.1 122 8.3 8.4 305 20.7 21.1 446 30.3 34.2

Rather trust

403 27.4 28.7 294 20.0 23.2 558 37.9 38.9 441 30.0 31.1 360 24.5 24.7 705 47.9 48.9 396 26.9 30.4

Fully trust 92 6.3 6.6 54 3.7 4.3 138 9.4 9.6 158 10.7 11.1 912 62.0 62.7 242 16.4 16.8 156 10.6 12.0

Subtotal 1403 95.3 100 1266 86.0 100 1433 97.4 100 1419 96.4 100 1455 98.8 100 1443 98.0 100 1304 88.6 100


62 4.2 202 13.7 35 2.4 48 3.3 14 1.0 24 1.6 163 11.1


7 .5 4 .03 4 .3 5 .3 3 .2 5 .3 5 .3

Subtotal 69 4.7 206 14.0 39 2.6 53 3.6 17 1.2 29 2.0 168 11.4

Total 1472 100 1472 100 1472 100 1472 100 1472 100 1472 100 1472 100

19




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Arm

en

ia

Fully distrust

354 23.6 25.4 222 14.8 19.5 533 35.5 37.4 515 34.3 36.3 280 18.7 19.2 140 9.3 9.6 205 13.7 17.6

Rather distrust

334 22.3 23.9 219 14.6 19.2 350 23.3 24.6 389 25.9 27.5 197 13.1 13.5 244 16.3 16.8 193 12.9 16.5

Neutral 320 21.3 22.9 400 26.7 35.1 311 20.7 21.8 284 18.9 20.0 295 19.7 20.3 387 25.8 26.7 349 23.3 29.9

Rather trust

319 21.3 22.9 230 15.3 20.2 203 13.5 14.2 199 13.3 14.0 438 29.2 30.1 577 38.5 39.8 290 19.3 24.8

Fully trust 69 4.6 4.9 67 4.5 5.9 28 1.9 2.0 30 2.0 2.1 245 16.3 16.8 103 6.9 7.1 131 8.7 11.2

Subtotal 1396 93.1 100 1138 75.9 100 1425 95.0 100 1417 94.5 100 1455 97.0 100 1451 96.7 100 1168 77.9 100


100 6.7 356 23.7 70 4.7 69 4.6 43 2.9 47 3.1 329 21.9


4 .3 6 .4 5 .3 14 .9 2 .1 2 .1 3 .2

Subtotal 104 6.9 362 24.1 75 5.0 83 5.5 45 3.0 49 3.3 332 22.1

Total 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

145 9.7 11.4 189 12.6 19.3 279 18.6 20.7 154 10.3 11.3 171 11.4 12.3 88 5.9 6.4 196 13.1 17.5

Rather distrust

290 19.3 22.9 162 10.8 16.5 267 17.8 19.8 347 23.1 25.4 134 8.9 9.6 244 16.3 17.8 208 13.9 18.6

Neutral 412 27.5 32.5 435 29.0 44.3 402 26.8 29.9 411 27.4 30.1 154 10.3 11.1 311 20.7 22.7 389 25.9 34.7

Rather trust

321 21.4 25.3 125 8.3 12.7 299 19.9 22.2 358 23.9 26.2 415 27.7 29.8 545 36.3 39.8 227 15.1 20.3

Fully trust 101 6.7 8.0 70 4.7 7.1 99 6.6 7.4 97 6.5 7.1 517 34.5 37.2 182 12.1 13.3 100 6.7 8.9

Subtotal 1269 84.6 100 981 65.4 100 1346 89.7 100 1367 91.1 100 1391 92.7 100 1370 91.3 100 1120 74.7 100


181 12.1 374 24.9 117 7.8 83 5.5 49 3.3 89 5.9 305 20.3


50 3.3 145 9.7 37 2.5 50 3.3 60 4.0 41 2.7 75 5.0

Subtotal 231 15.4 519 34.6 154 10.3 133 8.9 109 7.3 130 8.7 380 25.3

Total 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100.0

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

210 14.0 16.0 204 13.6 17.4 162 10.8 11.4 158 10.5 11.5 58 3.9 4.0 61 401 4.3 149 9.9 11.9

Rather distrust

204 13.6 15.5 144 9.6 12.3 141 9.4 9.9 206 13.7 15.0 52 3.5 3.6 88 5.9 6.2 141 9.4 11.2

Neutral 465 31.0 35.4 530 35.3 45.2 488 32.5 34.4 498 33.2 36.2 190 12.7 13.1 329 21.9 23.3 514 34.3 41.0

Rather trust

383 25.5 29.2 251 16.7 21.4 514 34.3 36.2 423 28.2 30.7 464 30.9 32.0 688 45.9 48.8 351 23.4 28.0

Fully trust 50 3.3 3.8 43 2.9 3.7 115 7.7 8.1 92 6.1 6.7 685 45.7 47.3 243 16.2 17.2 100 6.7 8.0

Subtotal 1312 87.5 100 1172 78.1 100 1420 94.7 100 1377 91.8 100.0

1449 96.6 100 1409 93.9 100.

0 1255 83.7 100.

0


176 11.7 320 21.3 72 4.8 112 7.5 40 2.7 84 5.6 235 15.7


12 .8 8 .5 8 .5 11 .7 11 .7 7 .5 10 .7

Subtotal 188 12.5 328 21.9 80 5.3 123 8.2 51 3.4 91 6.1 245 16.3

Total 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100 1500 100.0

1500 100.0

1500 100.0

1500 100.0

20




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

626 30.3 32.7 484 23.4 30.3 921 44.6 47.0 693 33.6 36.2 543 26.3 28.8 288 13.9 14.6 453 21.9 28.7

Rather distrust

314 15.2 16.4 181 8.8 11.3 399 19.3 20.4 320 15.5 16.7 222 10.8 11.3 255 12.3 13.0 145 7.0 9.2

Neutral 393 19.0 20.5 500 24.2 31.3 331 16.0 16.9 393 19.0 20.5 313 15.2 16.0 481 23.3 24.5 408 19.8 25.8

Rather trust

491 23.8 25.6 335 16.2 20.9 262 12.7 13.4 428 20.7 22.3 581 28.1 29.7 746 36.1 37.9 434 21.0 27.5

Fully trust 91 4.4 4.8 100 4.8 6.3 46 2.2 2.3 83 4.0 4.3 297 14.4 15.2 196 9.5 10.0 141 6.8 8.9

Subtotal 1915 92.7 100.0 1600 77.5 100.0 1959 94.9 100.0 1917 92.8 100 1956 94.7 100 1966 95.2 100 1581 76.6 100


131 6.3 448 21.7 90 4.4 131 6.3 93 4.5 85 4.1 466 22.6


17 .8 17 .8 16 .8 17 .8 16 .8 14 .7 18 .9

Subtotal 150 7.3 465 22.5 106 5.1 148 7.2 109 5.3 99 4.8 484 23.4

System 2 .1 100 100 100 100

Total 2065 100.0 2065 2065 2065 2065 2065 100 2065 100

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

153 6.4 7.7 252 10.5 15.1 242 10.1 12.1 189 7.9 9.4 74 3.1 3.3 64 2.7 3.0 147 6.1 8.1

Rather distrust

217 9.0 11.0 222 9.3 13.3 264 11.0 13.2 229 9.5 11.4 58 2.4 2.6 126 5.3 6.0 182 7.6 10.0

Neutral 764 31.8 38.6 702 29.3 42.2 701 29.2 35.1 761 31.7 37.8 242 10.1 10.8 604 25.2 28.7 617 25.7 34.0

Rather trust

576 24.0 29.1 297 12.4 17.8 528 22.0 26.5 527 22.0 26.2 563 23.5 25.1 941 39.2 44.7 512 21.3 28.2

Fully trust 269 11.2 13.6 192 8.0 11.5 260 10.8 13.0 305 12.7 15.2 1302 54.3 58.2 371 15.5 17.6 355 14.8 19.6

Subtotal 1979 82.5 100 1665 69.4 100 1995 83.1 100 2011 83.8 100 2239 93.3 100 2106 87.8 100 1813 75.5 100


361 15.0 676 28.2 351 14.6 328 13.7 102 4.3 237 9.9 530 22.1


60 2.5 59 2.5 54 2.3 61 2.5 59 2.5 57 2.4 57 2.4

Subtotal 421 17.5 735 30.6 405 16.9 389 16.2 161 6.7 294 12.3 587 24.5

Total 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

563 23.5 27.4 226 9.4 13.5 433 18.0 20.5 478 19.9 23.1 250 10.4 11.6 80 3.3 3.7 152 6.3 7.8

Rather distrust

419 17.5 20.4 233 9.7 14.0 333 13.9 15.8 434 18.1 21.0 205 8.5 9.5 128 5.3 5.9 228 9.5 11.7

Neutral 544 22.7 26.5 636 26.5 38.1 632 26.3 29.9 582 24.3 28.2 429 17.9 19.9 447 18.6 20.6 556 23.2 28.6

Rather trust

426 17.8 20.7 468 19.5 28.0 593 24.7 28.1 463 19.3 22.4 737 30.7 34.2 1052 43.8 48.5 743 31.0 38.2

Fully trust 102 4.3 5.0 106 4.4 6.4 121 5.0 5.7 109 4.5 5.3 533 22.2 24.7 460 19.2 21.2 267 11.1 13.7

Subtotal 2054 85.6 100 1669 69.5 100 2112 88.0 100 2066 86.1 100 2154 89.8 100 2167 90.3 100 1946 81.1 100


293 12.2 667 27.8 234 9.8 279 11.6 185 7.7 190 7.9 397 16.5


53 2.2 64 2.7 54 2.3 55 2.3 61 2.5 43 1.8 57 2.4

Subtotal 346 14.4 731 30.5 288 12.0 334 13.9 246 10.3 233 9.7 454 18.9

Total 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100 2400 100

21




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

436 17.7 19.4 439 17.9 22.8 713 29.0 31.2 619 25.2 26.9 510 20.8 22.0 393 16.0 17.5 440 17.9 23.2

Rather distrust

535 21.8 23.9 479 19.5 24.8 494 20.1 21.6 438 17.8 19.1 310 12.6 13.3 448 18.2 20.0 383 15.6 20.2

Neutral 733 29.8 32.7 573 23.3 29.7 612 24.9 26.7 590 24.0 25.7 478 19.5 20.6 783 31.9 34.9 507 20.6 26.8

Rather trust

319 13.0 14.2 278 11.3 14.4 292 11.9 12.8 388 15.8 16.9 481 19.6 20.7 416 16.9 18.6 276 11.2 14.6

Fully trust 220 9.0 9.8 160 6.5 8.3 177 7.2 7.7 262 10.7 11.4 544 22.1 23.4 202 8.2 9.0 287 11.7 15.2

Subtotal 2243 91.3 100 1929 78.5 100 2288 93.1 100 2297 93.5 100 2323 94.5 100 2242 91.2 100 1893 77.0 100


178 7.2 492 20.0 123 5.0 112 4.6 81 3.3 177 7.2 525 21.4


8 .3 8 .3 18 .7 20 .8 25 1.0 10 .4 11 .4

Subtotal 217 8.7 528 21.5 169 6.9 160 6.5 134 5.5 215 8.8 564 23.0

System 28 1.1 28 1.1 28 1.1 28 1.1 28 1.1 28 1.1 28 1.1

Total 2457 100 2457 100 2457 100 2457 100 2457 100 2457 100 2457 100

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

130 6.1 6.5 284 13.2 17.3 144 6.7 7.2 128 6.0 6.3 39 1.8 1.9 129 6.0 6.4 360 16.8 21.6

Rather distrust

298 13.9 14.9 451 21.0 27.4 238 11.1 11.9 268 12.5 13.3 60 2.8 2.9 385 17.9 19.0 446 20.8 26.8

Neutral 692 32.2 34.5 460 21.4 28.0 564 26.3 28.2 566 26.4 28.0 174 8.1 8.4 657 30.6 32.5 390 18.2 23.5

Rather trust

557 25.9 27.8 290 13.5 17.6 687 32.0 34.3 594 27.7 29.4 437 20.3 21.1 568 26.4 28.1 252 11.7 15.2

Fully trust 328 15.3 16.4 160 7.4 9.7 370 17.2 18.5 462 21.5 22.9 1360 63.3 65.7 285 13.3 14.1 215 10.0 12.9

Subtotal 2005 93.3 100 1645 76.6 100 2003 93.2 100 2018 93.9 100 2070 96.4 100 2024 94.2 100 1663 77.4 100


131 6.1 480 22.3 114 5.3 99 4.6 42 2.0 108 5.0 470 21.9


2 .1 13 .6 21 1.0 21 1.0 26 1.2 6 .3 5 .2

Subtotal 143 6.7 503 23.4 145 6.8 130 6.1 78 3.6 124 5.8 485 22.6

System 10 .5 10 .5 10 .5 10 .5 10 .5 10 .5 10 .5

Total 2148 100 2148 100 2148 100 2148 100 2148 100 2148 100 2148 100

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

737 22.3 27.6 267 8.1 12.0 728 22.0 25.7 793 24.0 28.0 657 19.9 22.3 109 3.3 3.8 145 4.4 5.8

Rather distrust

643 19.5 24.1 398 12.0 17.9 695 21.0 24.5 702 21.2 24.8 542 16.4 18.4 204 6.2 7.1 248 7.5 9.9

Neutral 767 23.2 28.8 858 26.0 38.6 810 24.5 28.6 746 22.6 26.3 707 21.4 24.0 946 28.6 32.9 945 28.6 37.8

Rather trust

320 9.7 12.0 483 14.6 21.8 380 11.5 13.4 381 11.5 13.4 492 14.9 16.7 1005 30.4 34.9 688 20.8 27.5

Fully trust 200 6.1 7.5 214 6.5 9.6 219 6.6 7.7 211 6.4 7.4 549 16.6 18.6 613 18.5 21.3 477 14.4 19.1

Subtotal 2667 80.7 100 2220 67.2 100 2832 85.7 2833 85.7 100 2947 89.2 100 2877 87.0 100 2503 75.7 100


581 17.6 1019 30.8 400 12.1 100 395 12.0 281 8.5 374 11.3 741 22.4


35 1.1 44 1.3 51 1.5 55 1.7 55 1.7 32 1.0 39 1.2

Subtotal 638 19.3 1085 32.8 473 14.3 472 14.3 358 10.8 428 13.0 802 24.3

System 22 .7 22 .7 22 .7 22 .7 22 .7 22 .7 22 .7

Total 3305 100 3305 100 3305 100 3305 100 3305 100 3305 100 3305 100

22




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Valid 4 .2 .2 4 .2 .3 4 .2 .2 3 .1 .2 3 .1 .2 3 .1 .2 3 .1 .2

Arm

enia

Fully distrust 445 21.4 24.1 341 16.4 22.3 625 30.0 32.6 442 21.2 23.1 381 18.3 19.7 310 14.9 15.8 226 10.9 14.1

Rather distrust 339 16.3 18.4 233 11.2 15.2 296 14.2 15.5 281 13.5 14.7 189 9.1 29.4 301 14.5 15.3 164 7.9 24.2

Neutral 500 24.0 27.1 489 23.5 31.9 462 22.2 24.1 406 19.5 21.2 355 17.1 47.7 589 28.3 29.9 472 22.7 53.3

Rather trust 413 19.8 22.4 368 17.7 24.0 414 19.9 21.6 576 27.7 30.1 619 29.7 79.5 568 27.3 28.9 504 24.2 84.3

Fully trust 143 6.9 7.8 97 4.7 6.3 114 5.5 6.0 205 9.8 10.7 399 19.2 100 197 9.5 10.0 255 12.2 100

Subtotal 1844 88.6 100 1532 73.6 100 1915 92.0 100 1913 91.9 100 1946 93.5 1968 94.5 100 1624 78.0


237 11.4 548 26.3 166 8.0 166 8.0

132 6.3 113 5.4 457 22.0


1 .0 2 .1 1 .0 3 .1

4 .2 1 .0 1 .0

Subtotal 238 11.4 550 26.4 167 8.0 169 8.1 136 6.5 114 5.5 458 22.0

Total 2082 100 2082 100 2082 100 2082 100 2082 100 2082 100 2082 100

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust 185 9.2 10.5 166 8.2 11.4 261 13.0 14.6 237 11.8 13.3 75 3.7 4.0 181 9.0 9.9 198 9.8 14.9

Rather distrust 232 11.5 13.2 203 10.1 13.9 189 9.4 10.623.0

172 8.5 9.6

54 2.7 2.9 206 10.2 11.3 197 9.8 14.8

Neutral 512 25.4 29.1 509 25.3 35.0 412 20.5 34.7 406 20.2 22.7 110 5.5 5.8 550 27.3 30.1 378 18.8 28.4

Rather trust 604 30.0 34.3 462 22.9 31.7 621 30.8 17.2 611 30.3 34.2 372 18.5 19.7 744 36.9 40.7 376 18.7 28.3

Fully trust 228 11.3 12.9 116 5.8 8.0 307 15.2 100 360 17.9 20.2 1281 63.6 67.7 146 7.2 8.0 181 9.0 13.6

Subtotal 1761 87.4 100 1456 72.3 100 1790 88.9 1786 88.7 100 1892 93.9 100 1827 90.7 100 1330 66.0 100


205 10.2 507 25.2 172 8.5 170 8.4

77 3.8 139 6.9 602 29.9


48 2.4 51 2.5 52 2.6 58 2.9

45 2.2 48 2.4 82 4.1

Subtotal 253 12.6 558 27.7 224 11.1 228 11.3 122 6.1 187 9.3 684 34.0

Total 2014 100 2014 100 2014 100 2014 100 2014 100 2014 100 2014 100

Valid 33 1.8 2.2 37 2.0 2.8 33 1.8 2.0 30 1.6 1.8 30 1.6 1.8 43 2.3 2.5 33 1.8 2.1

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust 256 13.9 17.0 120 6.5 9.0 221 12.0 13.3 191 10.4 11.7 175 9.5 10.2 97 5.3 5.6 42 2.3 2.6

Rather distrust 243 13.2 16.1 151 8.2 11.3 311 16.9 18.8 312 17.0 19.1 201 10.9 11.7 152 8.3 8.8 91 5.0 5.7

Neutral 489 26.6 32.5 436 23.7 32.6 477 26.0 28.8 540 29.4 33.1 369 20.1 21.5 515 28.0 30.0 402 21.9 25.3

Rather trust 382 20.8 25.4 473 25.7 35.4 465 25.3 28.1 414 22.5 25.4 546 29.7 31.9 646 35.2 37.6 574 31.2 36.2

Fully trust 103 5.6 6.8 121 6.6 9.0 150 8.2 9.1 144 7.8 8.8 392 21.3 22.9 266 14.5 15.5 44 24.2 28.0

Subtotal 1506 82.0 100 133 72.8 100 1657 90.2 100 1631 88.8 100 1713 93.2 100 1719 93.6 100 1586 86.3 100


314 17.1 481 26.2 162 8.8 186 10.1

107 5.8 103 5.6 243 13.2


17 .9 18 1.0 18 1.0 20 1.1

17 .9 15 .8 8 .4

Subtotal 331 18.0 499 27.2 180 9.8 206 11.2 124 6.8 118 6.4 251 13.7

Total 1837 100 1837 100 1837 100 1837 100 1837 100 1837 100 1837 100

23




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Val

id1

3 -3 2 .1 .1 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2

-2 6 .3 .3 15 .8 .8 7 .4 .4 8 .4 .4 9 .5 .5 6 .3 .3 5 .3 .3

-1 205 10.4 10.4 411 20.8 20.8 109 .5 .5 108 5.5 5.5 80 4.1 4.1 92 4.7 4.7 441 22.3 22.3

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

411 20.8 20.8 241 12.2 12.2

455 23.0 23.0

335 17.0 17.0

313 15.8 15.8

185 9.4 9.4 197 10.0 10.0

Rather distrust

344 17.4 17.4 201 10.2 10.2

311 15.7 15.7

264 13.4 13.4

175 8.9 8.9

219 11.1 11.1 177 9.0 9.0

Neutral 573 29.0 29.0 649 32.9 32.9 591 29.9 29.9 537 27.2 27.2 441 22.3 22.3 817 41.4 41.4 511 25.9 25.9

Rather trust

304 15.4 15.4 342 17.3 17.3

370 18.7 18.7

530 26.8 26.8

627 31.7 31.7

520 26.3 26.3 419 21.2 21.2

Fully trust 130 6.6 6.6 113 5.7 5.7 129 6.5 6.5 190 9.6 9.6 327 16.6 16.6 133 6.7 6.7 222 11.2 11.2

Total 1975 100 100 1975 100 100 1975 100 100 1975 100 100 1975 100 100 1975 100 100 1975 100 100

Val

id -3 3 .2 .2 4 .2 .2 1 .1 .1 5 .3 .3 5 .3 .3 3 .2 .2 6 .3 .3

-2 13 .7 .7 16 .9 .9 10 .6 .6 12 .7 .7 17 .9 .9 8 .4 .4 28 1.6 1.6

-1 149 8.3 8.3 321 17.9 17.9 93 5.2 5.2 100 5.6 5.6 52 2.9 2.9 68 3.8 3.8 487 26.6 26.6

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

308 17.2 17.2 192 10.7 10.7

196 10.9 10.9

222 12.4 12.4

49 2.7 2.7

154 8.6 8.6 200 11.1 11.1

Rather distrust

276 15.4 15.4 114 6.4 6.4

171 9.5 9.5

184 10.3 10.3

44 2.5 2.5

211 11.8 11.8 141 7.9 7.9

Neutral 441 24.6 24.6 529 29.5 29.5 397 22.1 22.1 362 20.2 20.2 153 8.5 8.5 494 27.5 27.5 471 26.2 26.2

Rather trust

411 22.9 22.9 444 24.7 24.7

571 31.8 31.8

491 27.4 27.4

371 20.7 20.7

617 34.4 34.4 315 17.5 17.5

Fully trust 194 10.8 10.8 175 9.7 9.7 356 19.8 19.8 419 23.3 23.3 1104 61.5 61.5 240 13.4 13.4 156 8.7 8.7

Total 1795 100 100 1795 100 100 1795 100 100 1795 100 100 1795 100 100 1795 100 100 1795 100 100

Val

id

-3 7 .4 .4 22 1.1 1.1 3 .2 .2 14 .7 .7 3 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 11 .6 .6

-2 27 1.4 1.4 26 1.3 1.3 38 1.9 1.9 39 2.0 2.0 49 2.5 2.5 25 1.3 1.3 29 1.5 1.5

-1 281 14.1 14.1 491 24.7 24.7 141 7.1 7.1 165 8.3 8.3 86 4.3 4.3 138 6.9 6.9 450 22.6 22.6

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

210 10.5 10.5 103 5.2 5.2

213 10.7 10.7

202 10.1 10.1 173 8.7 8.7

81 4.1 4.1 47 2.4 2.4

Rather distrust

334 16.8 16.8 197 9.9 9.9

295 14.8 14.8

267 13.4 13.4 169 8.5 8.5

155 7.8 7.8 109 5.5 5.5

Neutral 646 32.4 32.4 639 32.1 32.1 696 35.0 35.0 681 34.2 34.2 546 27.4 27.4 801 40.2 40.2 561 28.2 28.2

Rather trust

359 18.0 18.0 371 18.6 18.6

442 22.2 22.2

458 23.0 23.0 561 28.2 28.2

609 30.6 30.6 526 26.4 26.4

Fully trust 127 6.4 6.4 142 7.1 7.1

163 8.2 8.2

165 8.3 8.3 404 20.3 20.3 1799.

0 9.0 9.0 258 13.0 13.0

Total 1991 100 100 1991 100 100 1991 100 100 1991 100 100 1991 100 100 1991 100 100 1991 100 100

13

-3 Interviewer error, -2 refuse to answer, -1 don’t know. -3; -2 and -1 values are marked as missing.

24


Courts Local NGOs Parliament Executive Government President Media Ombudsman

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Val

id1

4 -3 16 .4 .4 4 .1 .1 4 .1 .1 8 .2 .2 8 .2 .2 18 .5 .5 2 .1 .1

-2 12 .3 .3 10 .3 .3 8 .2 .2 8 .2 .2 14 .4 .4

-1 422 11.0 11.0 912 23.7 23.7 240 6.2 6.2 186 4.8 4.8 152 4.0 4.0 70 1.8 1.8 732 19.0 19.0

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

1000 26.0 26.0 474 12.3 12.3

1040 27.1 27.1

906 23.6 23.6

812 21.1 21.1

572 14.9 14.9 438 11.4 11.4

Rather distrust

776 20.2 20.2 410 10.7 10.7

790 20.6 20.6

762 19.8 19.8

554 14.4 14.4

700 18.2 18.2 412 10.7 10.7

Neutral 988 25.7 25.7 1214 31.6 31.6 1142 29.7 29.7 1164 30.3 30.3 1138 29.6 29.6 1550 40.3 40.3 952 24.8 24.8

Rather trust

396 10.3 10.3 596 15.5 15.5

424 11.0 11.0

548 14.3 14.3

720 18.7 18.7

654 17.0 17.0 832 21.6 21.6

Fully trust

234 6.1 6.1 224 5.8 5.8

196 5.1 5.1

262 6.8 6.8

446 11.6 11.6

280 7.3 7.3 476 12.4 12.4

Total 3844 100 100 3844 100 100 3844 100 100 3844 100 100 3844 100 100 3844 100 100 3844 100 100

Val

id -3 4 .1 .1 10 .2 .2 4 .1 .1 4 .1 .1 4 .1 .1 4 .1 .1 6 .1 .1

-2 30 .7 .7 52 .9 .9 56 .6 .6 60 1.5 1.5 44 1.1 1.1 14 .3 .3 74 1.8 1.8

-1 504 12.6 12.6 810 17.9 17.9 244 5.2 5.2 262 6.5 6.5 62 1.5 1.5 138 3.4 3.4 1156 28.9 28.9

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

626 15.6 15.6 200 10.7 10.7

378 10.9 10.9

360 9.0 9.0

112 2.8 2.8

218 5.4 5.4 488 12.2 12.2

Rather distrust

682 17.0 17.0 402 6.4 6.4

530 9.5 9.5

514 12.8 12.8

64 1.6 1.6

498 12.4 12.4 374 9.3 9.3

Neutral 1114 27.8 27.8 1354 29.5 29.5 1094 22.1 22.1 970 24.2 24.2 350 8.7 8.7 1292 32.3 32.3 932 23.3 23.3

Rather trust

762 19.0 19.0 900 24.7 24.7

1156 31.8 31.8

1178 29.4 29.4

854 21.3 21.3

1486 37.1 37.1 770 19.2 19.2

Fully trust

280 7.0 7.0 274 9.7 9.7

540 19.8 19.8

654 16.3 16.3

2512 62.8 62.8

352 8.8 8.8 202 5.0 5.0

Total 4002 100 100 4002 100 100 4002 100 100 4002 100 100 4002 100 100 4002 100 100 4002 100 100

Val

id -3 26 .6 .6 46 1.1 1.1 8 .2 .2 10 .2 .2 14 .3 .3 32 .8 .8 4 .3 .3

-2 32 .8 .8 40 1.0 1.0 42 1.0 1.0 40 1.0 1.0 44 1.1 1.1 6 .1 .1 34 1.1 1.1

-1 1000 23.9 23.9 1208 28.9 28.9 370 8.9 8.9 424 10.1 10.1 142 3.4 3.4 354 8.5 8.5 1034 3.4 3.4

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

274 6.6 6.6 192 4.6 4.6

262 6.3 6.3

234 5.1 5.1

210 5.0 5.0

142 3.4 3.4 106 5.0 5.0

Rather distrust

382 9.1 9.1 274 6.6 6.6

466 11.2 11.2

460 11.0 11.0

312 7.5 7.5

384 9.2 9.2 172 7.5 7.5

Neutral 1170 28.0 28.0 1248 29.9 29.9 1352 32.4 32.4 1298 31.1 31.1 970 23.2 23.2 1728 41.4 41.4 1168 23.2 23.2

Rather trust

878 21.0 21.0 834 20.0 20.0

1256 30.1 30.1

1270 30.4 30.4

1362 32.6 32.6

1152 27.6 27.6 1230 32.6 32.6

Fully trust

416 10 10 336 8.0 8.0

422 10.1 10.1

442 10.6 10.6

1124 26.9 26.9

380 9.1 9.1 430 26.9 26.9

Total 4178 100 100 4178 100 100 4178 100 100 4178 100 100 4178 100 100 4178 100 100 4178 100 100

14


25




Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Val

id1

5 -3 2 .1 .1 2 .1 .1 1 .0 .0 1 .0 .0 1 .0 .0 2 .1 .1 1 .0 .0

-2 7 .3 .3 4 .2 .2 8 .3 .3 7 .3 .3 7 .3 .3 2 .1 .1 4 .2 .2

-1 305 12.9 12.9 529 22.4 22.4 141 6.0 6.0 140 5.9 5.9 114 4.8 4.8 71 3.0 3.0 503 21.3 21.3

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

595 25.2 25.2 348 14.7 14.7

703 29.7 29.7

655 27.7 27.7

612 25.9 25.9

371 15.7 15.7 334 14.1 14.1

Rather distrust

439 18.6 18.6 259 11.0 11.0

438 18.5 18.5

415 17.5 17.5

355 15.0 15.0

352 14.9 14.9 191 8.1 8.1

Neutral 544 23.0 23.0 719 30.4 30.4 585 24.7 24.7 553 23.4 23.4 489 20.7 20.7 829 35.1 35.1 589 24.9 24.9

Rather trust

354 15.0 15.0 393 16.6 16.6

374 15.8 15.8

451 19.1 19.1

552 23.3 23.3

612 25.9 25.9 515 21.8 21.8

Fully trust

119 5.0 5.0 111 4.7 4.7

115 4.9 4.9

143 6.0 6.0

235 9.9 9.9

126 5.3 5.3 228 9.6 9.6

Total 2365 100 100 2365 100 100 2365 100 100 2365 100 100 2365 100 100 2365 100 100 2365 100 100

Val

id

-3 4 .3 .3 6 .4 .4 3 .2 .2 2 .1 .1 2 .1 .1 2 .1 .1 8 .5 .5

-2 9 .6 .6 15 1.0 1.0 11 .7 .7 10 .7 .7 23 1.6 1.6 4 .3 .3 22 1.5 1.5

-1 203 13.7 13.7 409 27.6 27.6 78 5.3 5.3 78 5.3 5.3 32 2.2 2.2 78 5.3 5.3 437 29.5 29.5

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

190 12.8 12.8 85 5.7 5.7

107 7.2 7.2

115 7.8 7.8

29 2.0 2.0

81 5.5 5.5 139 9.4 9.4

Rather distrust

327 22.1 22.1 194 13.1 13.1

229 15.5 15.5

211 14.2 14.2

56 3.8 3.8

297 20.1 20.1 245 16.5 16.5

Neutral 375 25.3 25.3 392 26.5 26.5 415 28.0 28.0 369 24.9 24.9 158 10.7 10.7 492 33.2 33.2 318 21.5 21.5

Rather trust

270 18.2 18.2 276 18.6 18.6

398 26.9 26.9

413 27.9 27.9

243 16.4 16.4

392 26.5 26.5 211 14.2 14.2

Fully trust

103 7.0 7.0 104 7.0 7.0

240 16.2 16.2

283 19.1 19.1

938 63.3 63.3

135 9.1 9.1 101 6.8 6.8

Total 1481 100 100 1481 100 100 1481 100 100 1481 100 100 1481 100 100 1481 100 100 1481 100 100

Val

id -3 8 .3 .3 6 .3 .3 4 .2 .2 4 .2 .2 1 .0 .0 9 .4 .4 5 .2 .2

-2 22 1.0 1.0 20 .9 .9 26 1.1 1.1 29 1.3 1.3 21 .9 .9 21 .9 .9 23 1.0 1.0

-1 627 27.4 27.4 857 37.5 37.5 302 13.2 13.2 336 14.7 14.7 142 6.2 6.2 314 13.7 13.7 747 32.7 32.7

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

216 9.4 9.4 125 5.5 5.5

202 8.8 8.8

170 7.4 7.4

145 6.3 6.3

115 5.0 5.0 70 3.1 3.1

Rather distrust

210 9.2 9.2 193 8.4 8.4

228 10.0 10.0

208 9.1 9.1

144 6.3 6.3

178 7.8 7.8 97 4.2 4.2

Neutral 539 23.6 23.6 641 28.0 28.0 727 31.8 31.8 676 29.6 29.6 518 22.6 22.6 952 41.6 41.6 612 26.8 26.8

Rather trust

523 22.9 22.9 364 15.9 15.9

624 27.3 27.3

667 29.2 29.2

763 33.4 33.4

572 25.0 25.0 560 24.5 24.5

Fully trust

142 6.2 6.2 81 3.5 3.5

174 7.6 7.6

197 8.6 8.6

553 24.2 24.2

126 5.5 5.5 173 7.6 7.6

Total 2287 100 100 2287 100 100 2287 100 100 2287 100 100 2287 100 100 2287 100 100 2287 100 100

15


26


Courts Local NGOs Parliament Executive Government President Media Ombudsman

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id p

erce

nt

Freq

uen

cy

Pe

rcen

t

Val

id P

erce

nt

Val

id1

6 -3 2 .1 .1 9 .4 .4 2 .1 .1 3 .1 .1 5 .2 .2 6 .3 .3

-2 7 .3 .3 11 .5 .5 15 .6 .6 15 .6 .6 18 .8 .8 10 .4 .4 8 .3 .3

-1 360 15.1 15.1 520 21.8 21.8 152 6.4 6.4 131 5.5 5.5 124 5.2 5.2 89 3.7 3.7 520 21.8 21.8

Arm

enia

Fully distrust

651 27.3 27.3 404 16.9 16.9

764 32.0 32.0

706 29.6 29.6

643 27.0 27.0

389 16.3 16.3 350 14.7 14.7

Rather distrust

392 16.4 16.4 272 11.4 11.4

412 17.3 17.3

382 16.0 16.0

321 13.5 13.5

341 14.3 14.3 171 7.2 7.2

Neutral 588 24.7 24.7 725 30.4 30.4 662 27.8 27.8 662 27.8 27.8 624 26.2 26.2 982 41.2 41.2 704 29.5 29.5

Rather trust

304 12.8 12.8 368 15.4 15.4

309 13.0 13.0

394 16.5 16.5

491 20.6 20.6

479 20.1 20.1 431 18.1 18.1

Fully trust

80 3.4 3.4 75 3.1 3.1

68 2.9 2.9

91 3.8 3.8

163 6.8 6.8

89 3.7 3.7 194 8.1 8.1

Total 2384 100 100 2384 100 100 2384 100 100 2384 100 100 2384 100 100 2384 100 100 2384 100 100

Val

id -3 2 .1 .1 1 .1 .1 1 .1 .1 1 .1 .1 2 .1 .1 1 .1 .1 3 .2 .2

-2 5 .3 .3 5 .3 .3 4 .2 .2 3 .2 .2 9 .5 .5 3 .2 .2 26 1.4 1.4

-1 225 12.3 12.3 497 27.2 27.2 68 3.7 3.7 77 4.2 4.2 34 1.9 1.9 109 6.0 6.0 486 26.6 26.6

Aze

rbai

jan

Fully distrust

293 16.0 16.0 129 7.1 7.1

254 13.9 13.9

201 11.0 11.0

88 4.8 4.8

170 9.3 9.3 200 10.9 10.9

Rather distrust

300 16.4 16.4 190 10.4 10.4

214 11.7 11.7

168 9.2 9.2

35 1.9 1.9

190 10.4 10.4 221 12.1 12.1

Neutral 482 26.4 26.4 572 31.3 31.3 424 23.2 23.2 429 23.5 23.5 153 8.4 8.4 538 29.4 29.4 495 27.1 27.1

Rather trust

316 17.3 17.3 303 16.6 16.6

585 32.0 32.0

621 34.0 34.0

438 23.9 23.9

619 33.8 33.8 264 14.4 14.4

Fully trust

206 11.3 11.3 132 7.2 7.2

279 15.3 15.3

329 18.0 18.0

1070 58.5 58.5

199 10.9 10.9 134 7.3 7.3

Total 1829 100 100 1829 100 100 1829 100 100 1829 100 100 1829 100 100 1829 100 100 1829 100 100

Val

id

-3 16 .6 .6 15 .6 .6 6 .2 .2 5 .2 .2 2 .1 .1 6 .2 .2 9 .4 .4

-2 29 1.2 1.2 33 1.3 1.3 41 1.6 1.6 40 1.6 1.6 51 2.0 2.0 27 1.1 1.1 36 1.4 1.4

-1 672 26.8 26.8 798 31.9 31.9 418 16.7 16.7 451 18.0 18.0 230 9.2 9.2 312 12.5 12.5 859 34.3 34.3

Ge

org

ia

Fully distrust

276 11.0 11.0 59 2.4 2.4

61 2.4 2.4

44 1.8 1.8 387

15.5 15.5 82 3.3 3.3 27 1.1 1.1

Rather distrust

363 14.5 14.5 164 6.6 6.6

146 5.8 5.8

125 5.0 5.0 377

15.1 15.1 263 10.5 10.5 82 3.3 3.3

Neutral 689 27.5 27.5 818 32.7 32.7 768 30.7 30.7 667 26.6 26.6 766 30.6 30.6 1271 50.8 50.8 692 27.6 27.6

Rather trust

384 15.3 15.3 535 21.4 21.4

849 33.9 33.9

868 34.7 34.7 492

19.7 19.7 489 19.5 19.5 642 25.6 25.6

Fully trust

74 3.0 3.0 81 3.2 3.2

214 8.5 8.5

303 12.1 12.1 198

7.9 7.9 53 2.1 2.1 156 6.2 6.2

Total 2503 100 100 2503 100 100 2503 100 100 2503 100 100 2503 100 100 2503 100 100 2503 100 100

16


27

Appendix 2. Correlations.

Table 10

Country GDP Courts Local

NGOs Parliament Executive


Arm

enia

GDP 1 .

20172

-.029** .000 19363

-.080** .000

17888

.068** .000

19565

.060** .000

19540

-.005 .448

19664

-.083** .000

19630

-.016* .029

17899

Court/Justice -.029** .000

19368

1 .

19363

.415** .000

17690

.454

.000 19093

.442** .000

19066

.402** .000

19100

.322** .000

19091

.345** .000

17636

Local NGOs -.080** .000

17888

.415** .000

17690

1 .

17888

.335** .000

17715

.327** .000

17724

.294** .000

17747

.287** .000

17781

.393** .000

17019

Parliament .068** .000

19565

.454** .000

19093

.335** .000

17715

1 .

19565

.729** .000

19316

.611** .000

19353

.352** .000

19274

.305** .000

17705

Executive Government .060** .000

19540

.442** .000

19066

.327** .000

17724

.729** .000

19316

1 .

19540

.748** .000

19403

.379** .000

19252

.309** .000

17728

President -.005 .448

19664

.402** .000

19100

.294** .000

17747

.611** .000

19353

.748** .000

19403

1 .

19664

.372** .000

19330

.305** .000

17759

Media -.083** .000

19630

.322** .000

19091

.287** .000

17781

.352** .000

19274

.379** .000

19252

.372** .000

19330

1 .

19630

.309** .000

17785

Ombudsman -.016** .029

17899

.345** .000

17636

.393** .000

17019

.305** .000

17705

.309** .000

17728

.305** .000

17759

.309** .000

17785

1 .

17899

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table 11

Country GDP Courts Local NGOs Parliament Executive Government

President Media Ombudsman

Aze

rbai

jan

GDP 1 .

1865

-.205** .000

17465

-.180** .000

15880

.006

.415 17591

-.018* .015

17593

.030** .000

18123

-.153** .000

17843

-.277** .000

16100

Court -.205** .000

17465

1 .

17465

.374

.000 15616

.453** .000

17134

.429** .000

17071

.235** .000

17286

.326** .000

17210

.325** .000

15766

Local NGOs -.180** .000

15880

.374** .000

15616

1 .

15880

.322** .000

15685

.274** .000

15672

.130** .000

15746

.291** .000

15769

.412** .000

15228

Parliament .006 .415

17591

.453** .000

17134

.322** .000

15685

1 .17591

.690** .000

17265

.384** .000

17428

.334** .000

17304

.301** .000

15873

Executive Government

-.018* .015

17593

.429** .000

17071

.274** .000

15672

.690** .000

17265

1 .

17463

.438** .000

17463

.332** .000

17289

.296** .000

15896

President .030** .000

18123

.235** .000

17286

.130** .000

15746

.384** .000

17428

.438** .000

17463

1 .

18123

.302** .000

17642

.145** .000

15969

Media -.153** .000

17843

.326** .000

17210

.291** .000

15769

.334** .000

17304

.332** .000

17289

.302** .000

17642

1 .

17843

.267** .000

15946

Ombudsman -277** .000

16100

.325** .000

15766

.412** .000

15228

.301** .000

15873

.296** .000

15896

.145** .000

15969

.267** .000

15946

1 .

16100



28

Table 12

Country GDP Court Local NGOs

Parliament Executive Government

President Media Ombudsman G

eo

rgia

GDP 1 .

21473

-.185** .000

19901

-.210** .000

18624

-.093** .000

18624

-.093** .000

20413

-.051** .000

20285

-.273** .000

20574

-.223** .000

19553

Courts -.185** .000

19901

1 .

19901

.536** .000

18341

.436** .000

19645

.419** .000

19553

.355** .000

19689

.420** .000

19656

.446** .000

18972

Local NGOs -.210** .000

18624

.536** .000

18341

1 .

18624

.368** .000

18481

.353** .000

18451

.239** .000

18516

.447** .000

18494

.530** .000

18266

Parliament -.093** .000

20413

.436** .000

19645

.368** .000

18481

1 .

20413

.755** .000

20087

.542** .000

20241

.394** .000

20123

.353** .000

19250

Executive Government

-.051** .000

20285

.419** .000

19553

.353** .000

18451

.755** .000

20087

1 .

20285

.546** .000

20149

.383** .000

20043

.358** .000

19230

President -.256** .000

20677

.355** .000

19689

.239** .000

18516

.542** .000

20241

.546** .000

20149

1 .

20677

.337** .000

20276

.268** .000

19380

Media -.273** .000

20574

.420** .000

19656

.447** .000

18494

.394** .000

20123

.383** .000

20043

.337** .000

20276

1 .

20574

.464** .000

19387

Ombudsman -.223** .000

19553

.446** .000

18972

.530** .000

18266

.353** .000

19250

.358** .000

19230

.268** .000

19380

.464** .000

19387

1 .

19553



29

Appendix 3 Model

Table 13 Model Summary

30

Table 14 Anovat

31

Table 15 Coefficients

32

Appendix 4 Frequencies of Dummies Table 16 Trust in Courts

Table 17 Trust in Local NGOs

Table 18 Trust in Parliament

COURTD

15129 75,0 78,1 78,1

4234 21,0 21,9 100,0

19363 96,0 100,0

809 4,0

20172 100,0

11452 61,4 65,6 65,6

6013 32,2 34,4 100,0

17465 93,6 100,0

1193 6,4

18658 100,0

14537 67,7 73,0 73,0

5364 25,0 27,0 100,0

19901 92,7 100,0

1572 7,3

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Frequency Percent Valid Percent

Cumulat iv e

Percent

TRUNGD

13823 68,5 77,3 77,3

4065 20,2 22,7 100,0

17888 88,7 100,0

2284 11,3

20172 100,0

11316 60,6 71,3 71,3

4564 24,5 28,7 100,0

15880 85,1 100,0

2778 14,9

18658 100,0

13373 62,3 71,8 71,8

5251 24,5 28,2 100,0

18624 86,7 100,0

2849 13,3

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

PARLD

15882 78,7 81,2 81,2

3683 18,3 18,8 100,0

19565 97,0 100,0

607 3,0

20172 100,0

9835 52,7 55,9 55,9

7756 41,6 44,1 100,0

17591 94,3 100,0

1067 5,7

18658 100,0

13016 60,6 63,8 63,8

7397 34,4 36,2 100,0

20413 95,1 100,0

1060 4,9

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

33

Table 19 Trust in Executive Government

Table 20 Trust in President

Table 21 Trust in Media

EXECUTD

14429 71,5 73,8 73,8

5111 25,3 26,2 100,0

19540 96,9 100,0

632 3,1

20172 100,0

9323 50,0 53,0 53,0

8270 44,3 47,0 100,0

17593 94,3 100,0

1065 5,7

18658 100,0

13079 60,9 64,5 64,5

7206 33,6 35,5 100,0

20285 94,5 100,0

1188 5,5

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

PRESD

12044 59,7 61,2 61,2

7620 37,8 38,8 100,0

19664 97,5 100,0

508 2,5

20172 100,0

3083 16,5 17,0 17,0

15040 80,6 83,0 100,0

18123 97,1 100,0

535 2,9

18658 100,0

9550 44,5 46,2 46,2

11127 51,8 53,8 100,0

20677 96,3 100,0

796 3,7

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

MEDD

13158 65,2 67,0 67,0

6472 32,1 33,0 100,0

19630 97,3 100,0

542 2,7

20172 100,0

9147 49,0 51,3 51,3

8696 46,6 48,7 100,0

17843 95,6 100,0

815 4,4

18658 100,0

11094 51,7 53,9 53,9

9480 44,1 46,1 100,0

20574 95,8 100,0

899 4,2

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

34

Table 22 Trust in Ombudsman

OMBUDD

12054 59,8 67,3 67,3

5845 29,0 32,7 100,0

17899 88,7 100,0

2273 11,3

20172 100,0

11444 61,3 71,1 71,1

4656 25,0 28,9 100,0

16100 86,3 100,0

2558 13,7

18658 100,0

11382 53,0 58,2 58,2

8171 38,1 41,8 100,0

19553 91,1 100,0

1920 8,9

21473 100,0

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

0

1

Total

Valid

Sy stemMissing

Total

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia


Cumulat iv e

Percent

35

Appendix 5 Model Based on Dummy Variables Table 23 Model Summary

Table 24 Anova

Model Summary

,105a ,011 ,011 1976,895

,135b ,018 ,018 1969,641

,147c ,022 ,021 1966,323

,155d ,024 ,024 1964,043

,160e ,026 ,025 1962,433

,118a ,014 ,014 18037,210

,146b ,021 ,021 17969,692

,188f ,035 ,035 17841,662

,203g ,041 ,041 17786,881

,215h ,046 ,046 17741,734

,220i ,048 ,048 17724,063

,280a ,078 ,078 2975,903

,322b ,104 ,104 2934,990

,383j ,147 ,147 2863,744

,384k ,148 ,147 2862,332

Model

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

R R Square

Adjusted

R Square

Std. Error of

the Est imate

Predictors: (Constant), MEDDa.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTDb.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDDc.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDD, PRESDd.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDD, PRESD,

COURTD

e.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTDf .

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDDg.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDD,

TRUNGD

h.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDD,

TRUNGD, PRESD

i.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, PRESDj.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, PRESD, TRUNGDk.

ANOVAl

7,21E+08 1 721340115,2 184,575 ,000a

6,53E+10 16709 3908113,765

6,60E+10 16710

1,20E+09 2 601776682,7 155,118 ,000b

6,48E+10 16708 3879486,453

6,60E+10 16710

1,43E+09 3 475211068,7 122,907 ,000c

6,46E+10 16707 3866426,038

6,60E+10 16710

1,58E+09 4 394807543,3 102,349 ,000d

6,44E+10 16706 3857463,357

6,60E+10 16710

1,69E+09 5 337730141,1 87,696 ,000e

6,43E+10 16705 3851144,107

6,60E+10 16710

6,84E+10 1 6,839E+10 210,224 ,000a

4,82E+12 14810 325340943,5

4,89E+12 14811

1,05E+11 2 5,236E+10 162,154 ,000b

4,78E+12 14809 322909824,9

4,89E+12 14811

1,73E+11 3 5,765E+10 181,093 ,000f

4,71E+12 14808 318324899,3

4,89E+12 14811

2,02E+11 4 5,054E+10 159,745 ,000g

4,68E+12 14807 316373151,8

4,89E+12 14811

2,26E+11 5 4,524E+10 143,739 ,000h

4,66E+12 14806 314769130,4

4,89E+12 14811

2,36E+11 6 3,930E+10 125,111 ,000i

4,65E+12 14805 314142420,8

4,89E+12 14811

1,35E+10 1 1,346E+10 1520,127 ,000a

1,58E+11 17860 8856000,629

1,72E+11 17861

1,78E+10 2 8895032546 1032,605 ,000b

1,54E+11 17859 8614163,890

1,72E+11 17861

2,52E+10 3 8392159867 1023,306 ,000j

1,46E+11 17858 8201026,902

1,72E+11 17861

2,53E+10 4 6332243616 772,890 ,000k

1,46E+11 17857 8192946,382

1,72E+11 17861

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Regression

Residual

Total

Model

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

Sum of

Squares df Mean Square F Sig.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDDa.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTDb.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDDc.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDD, PRESDd.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, OMBUDD, PRESD, COURTDe.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTDf .

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDDg.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDD, TRUNGDh.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, COURTD, OMBUDD, TRUNGD, PRESDi.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, PRESDj.

Predictors: (Constant), MEDD, EXECUTD, PRESD, TRUNGDk.

Dependent Variable: GDPl.

36

Table 25 Coefficients

Coefficientsa

8975,371 18,532 484,307 ,000

-445,732 32,809 -,105 -13,586 ,000

8907,564 19,440 458,202 ,000

-567,787 34,473 -,133 -16,471 ,000

407,381 36,540 ,090 11,149 ,000

8857,858 20,486 432,391 ,000

-627,349 35,301 -,147 -17,772 ,000

341,019 37,515 ,075 9,090 ,000

265,269 35,001 ,062 7,579 ,000

8897,181 21,390 415,953 ,000

-601,448 35,498 -,141 -16,943 ,000

525,093 47,487 ,116 11,058 ,000

283,336 35,078 ,067 8,077 ,000

-269,472 42,704 -,066 -6,310 ,000

8904,676 21,419 415,746 ,000

-569,027 35,986 -,133 -15,812 ,000

575,514 48,382 ,127 11,895 ,000

315,850 35,576 ,074 8,878 ,000

-251,309 42,805 -,061 -5,871 ,000

-224,946 42,201 -,047 -5,330 ,000

46718,868 204,889 228,020 ,000

-4302,324 296,730 -,118 -14,499 ,000

45640,531 228,039 200,144 ,000

-5350,160 311,689 -,147 -17,165 ,000

3305,821 311,674 ,091 10,607 ,000

46048,176 228,120 201,859 ,000

-4425,982 315,842 -,122 -14,013 ,000

5161,478 334,410 ,142 15,435 ,000

-5164,706 352,806 -,134 -14,639 ,000

46289,306 228,800 202,314 ,000

-3904,227 319,519 -,107 -12,219 ,000

5675,198 337,642 ,156 16,808 ,000

-3429,601 356,878 -,085 -9,610 ,000

-4459,744 359,291 -,116 -12,413 ,000

46067,538 229,624 200,622 ,000

-4229,450 320,871 -,116 -13,181 ,000

5421,992 338,027 ,149 16,040 ,000

-4140,619 365,141 -,103 -11,340 ,000

-5088,284 365,518 -,132 -13,921 ,000

3166,924 362,190 ,079 8,744 ,000

44573,389 354,581 125,707 ,000

-4459,179 323,236 -,123 -13,795 ,000

4881,195 351,585 ,134 13,883 ,000

-4200,604 364,939 -,104 -11,510 ,000

2302,602 416,678 ,048 5,526 ,000

-5198,236 365,695 -,135 -14,215 ,000

3239,029 362,064 ,081 8,946 ,000

12114,863 29,710 407,770 ,000

-1749,666 44,876 -,280 -38,989 ,000

11860,662 31,420 377,491 ,000

-2055,011 46,308 -,329 -44,377 ,000

1071,597 47,808 ,166 22,414 ,000

12266,454 33,506 366,092 ,000

-1691,033 46,783 -,271 -36,146 ,000

1746,291 51,783 ,271 33,724 ,000

-1533,104 51,084 -,247 -30,011 ,000

12248,971 33,734 363,103 ,000

-1745,760 48,450 -,279 -36,032 ,000

1694,025 53,156 ,263 31,869 ,000

-1539,596 51,081 -,248 -30,140 ,000

227,733 52,786 ,033 4,314 ,000

(Constant)

MEDD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

PRESD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

PRESD

COURTD

(Constant)

MEDD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

COURTD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

COURTD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

COURTD

TRUNGD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

OMBUDD

PRESD

COURTD

TRUNGD

(Constant)

MEDD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

PRESD

(Constant)

MEDD

EXECUTD

PRESD

TRUNGD

Model

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

1

2

3

4

Country

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

B Std. Error

Unstandardized

Coefficients

Beta

Standardized

Coefficients

t Sig.

Dependent Variable: GDPa.

trust, institutions and economic growth in south caucasus

Documents