‘trust’ and new participatory forms of governance for (bio)technological change
DESCRIPTION
‘Trust’ and New Participatory Forms of Governance for (Bio)Technological Change. Richard Hindmarsh Tee Rogers-Hayden Griffith University, Australia Univ. of East Anglia, UK. TOPICS. Crisis in public trust re S&T 2. Australia’s GM regulatory legitimisers - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
‘Trust’ and New Participatory Forms of Governance for
(Bio)Technological Change
Richard Hindmarsh Tee Rogers-Hayden Griffith University, Australia Univ. of East Anglia, UK
TOPICS
1. Crisis in public trust re S&T 2. Australia’s GM regulatory
legitimisers
3. NZ & the RCGM as a regulatory legitimiser
4. Ideas for new forms of governance
TOPIC 1: Crisis in public trust re S&T • A deep crisis in public trust of science now
apparent• 1980s – positioned as lack of public
understanding of science• more recently, its the catalyst for institutional
redesign towards participatory governance • to strengthen reflexivity and legitimacy of
governing• The drivers:
– The Public: increasing questioning of govt’s ability to handle risk, now GM building on food safety scares of the 1980s, & the BSE crisis
– Science & Biotech industries: concerned about opposition to GM– The State: concerned about the challenge to innovation & govt.– The Critics: opportunity to reduce authority of science & open up
new possibilities for public engagement, improved governance, and trust
1 Catalyst for distrust: actions
• 1997 Monsanto's unsegregated soya• contamination of non-GM: Spain, Mexico &
Canada, etc• patenting and ownership of ‘nature’• non-labelling of GM foods • GM regulation’s reliance on pro-GM expert
committee’s• overall: intermeshed state, business &
scientific interests
2 Catalyst for distrust: re institutional response
• Institutional response to distrust seen as biased, inadequate & out of touch:– portrayal of regulation as thorough despite narrowness– continued reliance on the rhetoric of ‘sound science’
and ‘increase science literacy’– increasing public acceptance routines, eg, exhibitions,
forums, websites, surveys, inquiries
• overall, existing institutions are seen as unable to address effectively the new policy challenges raised: – bioethics, value conflicts, responsibility to future
generations and non-human nature, monopoly power, need for precaution as GM can only be partially controlled, high consequence risks, democratic governance, etc.
3. Catalyst for distrust: manoeuvres exposed
• continued exposure of manipulative manoeuvres• increasing resort to PR, propaganda, rhetoric in
pro-GM discourses to booster claims– which themselves are increasingly criticised, eg ‘RR’
crops
• tactics of marginalisation and delegitimisation of critics and public – critics = anti-science, neo-luddites, extremists – public = ignorant and alarmist– even as uncertainty and risk of science increasingly
apparent
• science articles rely on increasing favourable public understanding:– ‘In Science we Trust’– ‘How to Restore Public Trust in Science’– seen as inadequate in not addressing the depth of the
debate and out of touch with the public
What’s a regulatory legitimiser?
• a significant device, mechanism, strategy or intervention of governance
• to control regulation & absorb dissent, & thus control ‘problem populations’
• to legitimise & enable GM experimentation; then commercialisation
• What’s governance? = a regime of governability: state ministeries, agencies and interests; R&D networks; agencies of civil societyBiotech: 1. Scientists (1970s), 2. State agencies (late
70s), 3. Industrial interests (1980s)
Topic 2: Australia’s 4 key GMregulatory legitimisers
1. 1975 peer-review in-house regulation
2. 1979 Australian Academy of Science report
3. 1990 GM Inquiry
4. Gene Technology Act 2000
1. peer-review in-house regulation
• Controversy arises post 1973 • Asilomar (1975) – [National Institutes of Health]
– broader hazards marginalised – benefits > risks– ‘responsible scientific review’– compulsory regulation & moratorium unnecessary– voluntarily self‑regulation the way
• NIH developed minimalist or low risk international guidelines
• ASCORD: supervision by supportive scientists– no role for public– No opportunities for scientific and public dissent
within regulation
m in im a lis t re gu la tion
A s ilo m arC o nfe ren ce
F o rm u la tiono f rD N A
g u id e lin es
In -ho u sese lf-re gu la to ry
co m m itte es
N IH
publicdissenting
scientists
social, ethical, broader
ecological risks &
biohazards
Shaping regulation: Asilomar to ASCORD
2. Australian Academy of Science Report
• public concerns persist but ‘contained’ overseas
– scientists: ‘epidemic pathogen hypothesis’ – bureaucrats in Australia
• University of Melbourne Assembly inquiry (1977)
– halt research! [background: GM issue redefined from safety to economic opportunity & int’ competitiveness]
• Australian Academy of Science report– rDNA low risk– Commercial opportunity
3. GM Inquiry
• regulatory committee moved into pro-GM Science department (1980)
• intense battle inside bureaucracy • 1988 ‘mutant meat’ scandal forced Inquiry • terms of reference biased• conducted by parliamentary Standing
Committee for Industry, Science & Technology
• 1992 inquiry report favourable to bio-business; public input token
• real outcome: establish mandatory uniform legislation to facilitate bio-business
4. Gene Technology Act 2000• Gene Technology Bill introduced to Oz parliament• Senate inquiry re. the Bill makes 3 key
recommendations 1. community & ethics input in proposed OGTR (deemed
detrimental to science-based decision-making)2. GTR should be statutory authority of 3 people,
independent of bioindustry (economically unviable) (1 pro-industry)
3. provision for review of regulator (no provision)
• Lawson’s risk assessment of the 1st release• broader environment ignored (only gene flow &
weediness) • no mention of PP (section 4aa of the Act) or ESD
Bayer Cropscience and Monsanto GM canola approved 2003/4
critics call for major review, trust a major issue
“The canola applications have focussed attention on the Act. If the nationally consistent scheme enabling the use of gene technology is to regain some credibility a review of the Act should be commenced before the statutory date of June 2005.”
NZ: Background• Latecomer to the GM debate, ERMA 1988• no releases yet, GM in processed foods• set to change with moratorium lifted 29 Oct. 2003 • much resistance before and since• like anti-nuke campaign, GE-free zones (districts,
people’s homes, properties), & resistance groups• ‘hot’ issue in 1999 national elections • Green Party pressured for Royal Commission• Signified loss of trust by environmentalists• New Labour/Alliance government instigated one on
8 May 2000
Diverging viewpoints…
GM proponents• GE the solution• needed to ‘develop’ a
sustainable response• more progress• all innovation positive
• decision-making is a science domain
• GE over-regulated
Environmentalists• more industrialisation
for industrial problems• unsustainable
approach
• sustainable GE-free organic nation
• PP needed
The Royal Commission on Genetic Modification
• 11,000 submissions: c10,000 against or tending to be against GM
• RCGM reported on the 29 July 2001
• ‘proceed with GM but with caution’
• the report read as one more of sustaining progress than of progressing sustainability
NZ’s RCGM as a ‘regulatory legitimiser’…
Marginalised dissent:• quasi-legal process advantaged well
resourced GM interests (e.g. Life Sciences Network: Avcare key industry group)
• submission template– stand alone questions advantaged a modernist
parts approach– answers collated into a summary report– environmental & Maori voices disadvantaged
• subjective public survey by Commissioners advantaged GM supporters
• Outcome: protest & distrust heightened
Conclusions...
• case studies illustrate highly political discourses legitimating modernist governance rather than building trust
• deep distrust has resulted regarding the new challenges of GM
• institutional re-design needed to regain trust
• what might they be?
TOPIC 4:1. Ideas for new forms of governanceMillstone & van Zwanenberg (2000)
• acknowledge uncertainties & limitations of science • acknowledge risks & benefits for different publics• inclusive decision-making• establish scientific & democratic legitimacy
Conditions: – open information (limit commercial
confidentiality)– separate regulatory and development agencies– separate scientific and political risk
management – pluralistic scientific views & conditional advice
in regulation
2. Ideas for new forms of governance
PLUS• pluralistic knowledge approaches• civic participatory governance approaches
that engender communication and trust• new political mechanisms/spaces
integrating citizen and expert participation & dialogue
• broad social, cultural, ethical & economic technological assessment pre-technology adoption, & for regulation once adopted
• post technological monitoring & adjustment to knowledge possessed at any one time