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Trust America morePeregrine WorsthornePublished online: 03 Mar 2008.

To cite this article: Peregrine Worsthorne (1963) Trust America more, Survival: Global Politics andStrategy, 5:2, 52-53, DOI: 10.1080/00396336308440377

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TrustAmericaMorePEREGRINE WORSTHORNEFrom the Sunday Telegraph6 January 1963

The Skybolt decision aroused considerable anger andmisgivings among Conservatives in Britain. Thisarticle, by one of the best-known exponents of Britishconservative views, is significant in drawing contrarydeductions from the Nassau agreements to those ofthe majority of Conservatives.

(By permission of the Sunday Telegraph)

WHAT ARE THE basic political lessons ofSkybolt? Most British people I have talked

to since returning from Washington have drawntotally the wrong conclusion.

They say: 'Put not your trust in Presidents'. Myown conclusions are that the Skybolt humiliationstems precisely from putting too little trust inPresidents, and that if henceforth we put even lesstrust in them than we have hitherto, Skybolt willturn out to be only the first of a regular series ofsimilar humiliations.

In other words, the correct reaction is forBritain to trust the United States more rather thanless, particularly as the current Administration isundoubtedly the most pro-British in Americanhistory.

Just recall the origins of the Skybolt fiasco. Itarose from the fundamental British decision thatan independent deterrent was necessary becausethe United States could not be trusted to defendBritish interests in all circumstances. That soundsreasonable enough. But when examined a littlemore closely this motive is clearly not quite whatit seems, since it is not easy for most people tobelieve that a British deterrent could on its ownreally deter. The central argument for it hasalways been that it enables Britain to involve theUnited States in war even against her will.

So far so good. Judged by all the traditional

assumptions about international behaviour, thistheory made excellent sense and I have oftenargued it myself in the past. What I overlookedthen, and what so many Tory backbenchers stilldo not seem to have quite grasped, is that thispolicy, rooted in military distrust of the UnitedStates, can be effectively implemented only withreliance on American economic and technicalassistance.

Skybolt spectacularly underlined this funda-mental inconsistency. For we suddenly found our-selves arguing an inherently contradictory propo-sition: namely, that the Americans must continueto develop a weapon which they had written offfor their own purposes so that we would be in aposition, if need be, to involve them in war againsttheir will.

Admittedly an earlier Administration had quix-otically agreed to do precisely this. But, with thebenefit of hindsight it is now quite clear that theSkybolt undertaking given by President Eisenhowerwas of a kind that Britain should never have in-sisted on being honoured, since to do so provedfar more humiliating than to overlook the breachof promise.

This, I think, is the crucial lesson. The searchfor an independent deterrent has forced us intolodging against America a complaint which hasdone more to expose our weakness and more tolower our prestige in the world than any con-ceivable episode arising from Britain's not havingan independent deterrent. Far from defending usfrom humiliations, it has invited one of the worstin recent history.

What worries me about some Tory backbenchreaction, however, is that it shows no real appre-ciation of what has happened. Instead of recog-nizing the inherent absurdity of relying on indis-pensable American help for maintaining anindependent deterrent, the critics spend their timeseeking to discover whether the latest Polarisversion of this kind of bargain can be expected towork better than its predecessor.

My recent Washington experience convinces methat it won't. The Americans just will not con-tinue decade after decade to furnish Britain withthe ever-changing and evermore expensive meansof manifesting British distrust of the United States.To expect them to do so is inherently unreasonable.For if it is reasonable to suppose that in certaincircumstances they may let us down in war, thenit is unreasonable to suppose that they will refrainfrom doing likewise in peace.

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We have to make up our minds. In the finalanalysis, we must either decide to trust the UnitedStates to honour its treaty obligations in war - inwhich case there is no overriding reason forBritain to have an independent deterrent - or wemust decide that fundamentally she is untrust-worthy, and that we must build a deterrententirely from our own sources.

France is quite consistent about this. De Gaullerefuses to trust the United States, and insists onproducing a nuclear force that is independent bothstrategically and economically. He dismisses withcontempt the idea that France can have a deter-rent that is militarily independent and technolo-gically dependent. It may well be that in time hewill discover that this proud stance is cripplinglyexpensive. But until he does, his position is logicaland consistent.

Lack of ConfidenceMy submission is that our present policy has

neither the courage of British convictions nor theimagination to appreciate those of the UnitedStates. It displays a lack of confidence in ourselvesas much as in our principal ally, in that we doubtour own willingness to sacrifice enough to be gen-uinely independent, while refusing to believe inAmerican willingness to make this sacrificeunnecessary.

This far from dignified posture can be correctedin two ways. On the one hand we can choosegenuine nuclear independence, perhaps in con-junction with France. Personally I very muchdoubt whether General de Gaulle, who is asdistrustful of Britain as he is of the United States,would ever agree to such co-operation. But without

it genuine independence would be intolerablyexpensive.

Nor do I believe that we have France's romanticability to ignore these harsh realites of cash. HerPresident can do so because he is General deGaulle, the political hypnotist, whom nobody inFrance has the stature effectively to contradict.But no British leader could possibly hope to defythe facts so successfully. Only autocrats can ruleby faith in miracles.

To my mind, therefore, genuine nuclear inde-pendence is to all intents and purposes a non-starter. What is left? Painful as some may find itto be, I am convinced that there is only one otherchoice-to trust the United States more, muchmore.

For let us be crystal clear about one vital matter.The Americans are passionately convinced of theirresponsibility to maintain a virtual monopoly ofWestern nuclear weapons. I believe, therefore,that the alliance cannot last for long if Britain andFrance reject this cardinal tenet of PresidentKennedy's faith. The search for nuclear indepen-dence contradicts the deepest-held convictions ofthe strongest member of the alliance.

Indeed, the search for nuclear independencecould eventually bring about the very result itwas intended to avoid. Instead of giving Britainthe power to make sure that America would neverdesert her, it could lead to this disaster morequickly than anything else.

The Skybolt affair surely was the writing on thewall. A weapon designed to augment the securityof two allies ended by setting both countries ateach other's throats.

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