trigger-response transitions in foreign policy crises, 1929-1985

Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985Author(s): Jonathan WilkenfeldSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 143-169Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174208 .

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Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises, 1929-1985

JONATHAN WILKENFELD University of Maryland, College Park

This article focuses on the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in the context of the interactions of states in crisis. Matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). A model of matching or reciprocal behavior is proposed, and several factors-threat to basic values, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors - are examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of the matching process. An initial finding is that crises, like the much more heavily studied conflict processes in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior. However, there is considerable evidence that the factors examined here contribute to the disruption of these processes. A low threat to decision makers' values provides a context in which decision makers may respond with violence to nonviolent crisis triggers. Similarly, deteriorating sociopolitical conditions in countries experiencing a foreign policy crisis contribute to a higher than expected level of violence in crisis behavior. Finally, power parity among crisis actors was found to contribute to disruptions in matching behavior.

The past few decades have seen significant progress in the cumulation of systematic knowledge about conflict processes in general, and international conflict in particular. This article will explore one area in which theory and data have converged to generate replicable findings across a number of studies: the dynamics of the stimulus-response process in the behavior of nations in conflict. The particular vantage point for this study is crisis, and the research reported here focuses on the factors which contribute to distor- tions in the behavior-begets-behavior process.1

1. Among recent reviews of the conflict and war literature, see Gurr (1980), Small and Singer (1982, 1985), Midlarsky (1989). For extended treatment of the literature on international and foreign policy crisis, see Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988), Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser (1988), and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989).

AUTHOR'S NOTE: The author wishes to thank the readers of an earlier draft of this study: Michael Brecher, Mark Boyer, and Joseph Hewitt, as well as two anonymous reviewers. Data

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 35 No. 1, March 1991 143-169 ? 1991 Sage Publications, Inc.

143



144 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

At the outset, an important concept must be introduced, because it will serve as the focus for subsequent discussion. In conflict and crisis situations, matching behavior is defined as a reciprocal relationship between incoming behavior (crisis trigger) and outgoing behavior (crisis response). Three linkages between trigger and behavior are proposed for analysis in the present study: overall crisis management technique, the centrality of and the intensity of violence employed in crisis management. For each of these behavioral variables, matching is said to occur when the type of behavior which typifies the trigger - violent or nonviolent - is directly matched by the behavior of the crisis actor -again either violent or nonviolent.

Let us begin with the notion of matching in general. The basic assumption is that, exclusive of other factors (and we know there are many), there is no intrinsic reason to expect a state to overreact or underreact to incoming stimuli. Thus in the case of an incoming nonviolent conflict act, such as a protest, threat, demand, or accusation, the expectation is that the state will respond with a similar type of act. Likewise, violent acts are expected to engender violent responses. Two questions arise from this formulation. First, all other things being equal, should we expect to observe this same matching process in crisis situations? Second, what factors contribute to any disruptions which may occur in the matching process in crisis?

Considerable empirical work has focused on the behavior-begets-behavior phenomena in conflict and nonconflict interactions. Thus Wilkenfeld (1975), in a study of conflict interactions among Middle East states between 1949 and 1967, found that for virtually all states examined, the level of conflict received was the crucial predictor variable for conflict sent. For example, action-reaction explained between 82% and 85% of the variance in Israeli conflict behavior, and between 52% and 84% of the variance in Egyptian conflict behavior (Wilkenfeld 1975; see also Wilkenfeld et al. 1972). In a more elaborate study of fifty-six nations between 1966 and 1970, Wilkenfeld et al. (1980) found that action-reaction matching behavior was the over- whelming factor in explaining the use of military force. Other studies have also examined the behavior-begets-behavior linkage at the international level (see, for example, Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971; Most and Starr 1980; Ioole and Huang 1989). The action-reaction process is somewhat less imposing as an explanatory factor for nonmilitary conflict, and drops out of the picture completely when nonviolent, predominantly diplomatic behavior is the focus (Wilkenfeld et al. 1980, 192-3). A number of additional studies, including

handling and computational work were supported by the Computer Science Center of the University of Maryland. The ICB data used in this study are available from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (Study #9286).



Wilkenfeld / TRIGGER-RESPONSE TRANSITIONS 145

Bobrow (1982), Howell (1983), Hybel and Robertson (1978), Leng (1984), Leng and Walker (1982) and Phillips (1973) have focused on other aspects of the action-reaction dynamic in conflict behavior in general, and crisis situations in particular.

Should we expect decision makers in crisis situations to exhibit behavior similar to the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic noted in the studies of conflict in general? This is the general question which will be addressed throughout this study. Specifically, this study will explore the disruptive impact on the trigger-behavior dynamic of factors representing three different levels of analysis: the individual, the state, and the system (Waltz 1959). The specific factors considered are: (a) threat to basic values perceived by decision makers; (b) sociopolitical conditions internal to the state at the time that the major response to the crisis trigger must be formulated; and (c) the power relationship between the state and its principal adversary in the crisis (i.e., the triggering entity). Examined both individually and jointly, it is expected that these factors will help explain deviations in state behavior in crisis from the matching behavior which would normally be expected under conditions of stimulus-response theory.

It should be noted that, unlike an event-data approach in which the evolution of conflictual dyadic interaction is tracked throughout the conflict or crisis period, the present approach focuses only on the triggering event of the crisis (to be defined below), as well as on the principal crisis management technique employed by the actor in coping with the crisis.2 Thus, although it is certainly the case that an actor will usually undertake a range of responses to the initial trigger - some nonviolent and some violent, some bilateral and others multilateral - there will be a sense that either nonviolence or violence typified the general response.

In the sections below, the three disrupting or mediating factors will be explicated and their hypothesized impact on the trigger-behavior transitions specified.

THREAT TO BASIC VALUES

The first area of investigation is the concept of threat to basic values. According to Holsti and George (1975, 257),

2. Unlike more conventional approaches to crisis management, which tend to emphasize the efforts of the actor to avoid violence, th"e.present study construes crisis management to include the principal method employed by the actor, to cope with the situation resulting from the crisis trigger.




it is customary to regard stress as the anxiety or fear an individual experiences in a situation which he perceives as posing a severe threat to one or more values.... Psychological stress occurs either when the subject experiences damage to his values or anticipates that the stimulus situation may lead to it.

In the study of foreign policy behavior, stress refers to a state of mind among decision makers brought on by an environmental challenge requiring a response within a limited time; that is, stress is a psychological condition usually associated with anxiety and/or frustration produced by crisis and threat.

Our assumption is that interactions among states in crisis will break out of the matching mold under conditions of relatively low threat to values.3 Underlying this view is the premise that high stress, as evidenced by a grave threat to basic values, evokes greater attentiveness on the part of decision makers to both the content and intensity of incoming actions as the proper responses are formulated. That is, decision latitude is circumscribed by the greater need to respond meaningfully and accurately in highly threatening situations. Conversely, under conditions of low perceived threat, such matching is not as critical, since the dangers inherent in the situation are not viewed by the decision makers as grave. As a consequence, greater decision latitude exists, and we can expect to find some breakdown in the behavior-begets- behavior linkage.4

SOCIOPOLITICAL CONDITIONS

There is an extensive literature in social science in general, and in international politics in particular, on the relationship between societal factors and the occurrence of violence, either within or between nations (Wilkenfeld 1973; Gurr 1980; Stohl 1980; Ward and Widmaier 1982; Levy 1989). Most of the literature in these areas has led to the conclusion that such relationships are extraordinarily complex and difficult to summarize, but there is little doubt that the cumulative body of empirical evidence points generally to a linkage between deteriorating sociopolitical conditions and a propensity by some political leaders to employ diversion mechanisms such as external violence.

It should be noted, however, that the conditions of international crisis differ substantially from the setting in which the internal-external conflict

3. While all foreign policy crises are presumed to exhibit some degree of threat on decision makers' values, crises vary according to the level of such threat.

4. For a more extended discussion of stress and crisis behavior, see Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Hill (1989); for a discussion of the general impact of stress on foreign policy behavior, see Holsti (1965).




hypotheses have been tested previously. In a noncrisis situation, our expectation is that the decision maker bent on employing a diversion mechanism such as external violence has some decision latitude in terms of both the timing and the target of such behavior. In an international crisis, the range of choices has essentially been eliminated: There is both a specific triggering entity (usually, although not always, another state) and a specific triggering act which must be urgently addressed (i.e., finite time for response). Under these circumstances, the employment of a diversion mechanism is undertaken at the risk of sending the wrong signal in a crisis situation which is already fraught with the danger of undesired escalation.

In crisis situations, therefore, we would expect that, when internal sociopolitical conditions have been deteriorating prior to the crisis, matching behavior will break down. Nonviolent triggers will exhibit a greater-than- expected tendency to produce violent responses, while nonviolent responses to violent triggers will be exceedingly rare.

POWER RELATIONS AMONG ADVERSARIES

Another body of literature deals with the question of power relations among adversaries and how this impacts on state behavior. One branch of this literature focuses on power transition and argues that war is most likely when power is approximately equally distributed among nations or, more precisely, when the power of the challenger approaches that of its more powerful opponent (Organski 1968; Organski and Kugler 1980). Balance of power theorists (Claude 1962; Waltz 1979; Wright 1965) have argued that equality of power among nations diminishes the chance of war, based primarily on the argument that uncertainty over outcomes caused by approximate power parity leads actors to make more careful calculations. Steinberg (1981) has argued that during the confrontation stages of a dispute, a challenger state with equal or less military capability than its opponent will pattern its behavior closely to that of the opponent, and a more powerful challenger will act primarily according to its own objectives. Leng (1980) also finds that nations frequently reciprocate conflict behavior by an opponent, particularly under conditions of power parity.5

5. The literature on crisis bargaining also focuses on the notion of matching or reciprocity. Thus Gochman and Leng (1983, 101) propose the following hypothesis: "The relative military- industrial capabilities of disputants are associated with the degree of reciprocity that character- izes interstate bargaining in militarized disputes. Bargaining among adversaries of relatively equal capabilities is more likely to be reciprocal in nature than is bargaining among unevenly matched adversaries."



148 JOURNAL OFCONFLICTRESOLUTION

Tricger Behavior

F Threat to Decision s Makersi'si Va pues s

Techn ique

a Trigger to-Crisis t t Sociopolitical Conditions l reltiose nth a Within Target State cll an ing ow

II ntensisty o f Power Relations A piong i Violence

that the adversaries m

Figure 1: A Model of Trigger-Behavior Transitions in Crisis

Taking something of a conceptual leap from the exclusive focus of these theoretical perspectives on war, the present study proposes that the choice of a response to the triggering event of a crisis will depend in part on the power relations between the adversaries. More specifically, and leaning toward the power transition notion, it is proposed that power parity is the situation most likely to lead to a breakdown of matching behavior, since it is in this context that the adversaries may risk an overreaction (i.e., violent response to a nonviolent trigger). Situations typified by power discrepancy among adversaries are quite different from those where there is power parity. In the case of positive power discrepancy (a target state more powerful than a triggering entity), the target state need not necessarily employ violence in order to achieve its crisis objectives. In the case of negative power discrepancy (a target state weaker than a triggering entity), the target state would be ill- advised to employ violence in the face of a nonviolent trigger emanating from a more powerful adversary.

By way of conclusion to this section, it should be noted that the general argument here is that the type of matching which has been identified empirically in conflict studies in general is expected to persist under conditions of crisis. The present study attempts to shed light on those particular and unusual circumstances under which significant deviations in matching behavior in crisis occur; in that regard , it proposes three factors for consideration: the level of threat to values being experienced by the decision makers, sociopolitical conditions in the state experiencing the crisis, and power relations among the adversaries. Figure 1 is a representation of the model to be analyzed in this study.




The analysis which follows focuses on the period from 1929 to 1985, with the predominantly intrawar crisis of the World War II period excluded.6 Data on 621 actor cases will be examined in the ensuing analysis. These data are taken from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) foreign-policy-level dataset (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988).

OPERATIONALIZATION

At the outset, it will be useful to present the ICB definition of a foreign policy crisis. Viewed from the perspective of the state, a crisis is a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in its external or internal environment. All three conditions are perceptions held by the highest level decision makers: (a) threat to basic values, with a simulta- neous or subsequent awareness of (b) finite time for response, and (c) high probability of involvement in military hostilities (Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988, 2).

The dependent variables in this analysis consist of measures of matching behavior for crisis actors. As noted above, matching is said to be present when the type of behavior which typifies the crisis trigger - violent or nonviolent - is directly matched by the behavioral response - again either violent or nonviolent. Three specific manifestations of matching will be investigated below: trigger-crisis management technique; trigger-centrality of violence in crisis management; trigger-intensity of violence in crisis management.

Table 1 presents the various forms which this matching variable can take and the percentage of crises associated with each form. It should be noted that matching can take two forms for each behavioral variable: nonviolent trigger with nonviolent response, and violent trigger with violent response. The data show that both forms of matching behavior are considerably more prevalent than their nonmatching counterparts, confirming patterns for crisis behavior which have been observed previously in conflict situations in general. However, all three situations show that nonviolent matching is more prevalent than violent matching, a finding that is somewhat at odds with previous evidence which showed that the behavior-begets-behavior syndrome was strongest in situation in which force was employed, and weakest

6. The high levels of threat to basic values (including threat to existence and threat of grave damage) which typify all of the seventy-seven World War 11 intrawar-crisis actors meant that there was virtually no variance among these cases on this critical dimension. Hence, a decision to exclude them was taken.




TABLE 1

Dependent Variables

Trigger Behavior Classification Frequency Percentage Total

Crisis Management Technique

Nonviolent Nonviolent Matching 248 75 Nonviolent Violent Nonmatching 84 25

332

Violent Violent Matching 189 65 Violent Nonviolent Nonmatching 100 35

289 621

Centrality of Violence


332


289 621

Intensity of Violence


332


289 621

in nonviolent situations (Wilkenfeld et al. 1980). Subsequent portions of this analysis will attempt to provide greater specificity for the trends which are beginning to be apparent in the crisis data.

As noted, the three matching variables each examine transitions from trigger to a form of crisis behavior. Trigger refers to the act, event, or change which generates a perception of threat to basic values among the decision makers of a state. Nonviolent triggers include the following types: verbal (e.g., protests), political (e.g., alliance of adversaries), economic (e.g., em- bargo), external change (e.g., in weapon system), nonviolent internal change




(e.g., proclamation of new regime), and nonviolent military (e.g., mobiliza- tion). Violent triggers include direct (e.g., border clashes), indirect (e.g., violence against a client state), and violent internal change.

The second component of each matching variable is an indicator of the response to the crisis trigger. Unlike the more conventional event-data approaches to the analysis of conflictual situations, the approach adopted here seeks only to identify the single triggering act for the crisis actor, as well as the nature of the response which serves to summarize the general approach taken by the target state to manage the crisis. This response need not come during the very early stages of the crisis; but at some point the state makes a response which is so clear in its intent as to exemplify the crisis as a whole for that actor. For example, in the crisis for Britain and France triggered by Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, while bilateral and multilateral attempts to resolve the crisis were undertaken, ultimately violence was employed in late October 1956 as the primary crisis management technique.

Crisis management technique refers to the technique used by the crisis actor in coping with the crisis. Nonviolent refers to negotiation and other pacific techniques and nonviolent military techniques (e.g., threat to use violence). Violent refers to all forms of violence, and includes the use of multiple techniques including violence.

Centrality of violence refers to the extent of violence employed as a crisis management technique, that is, the relative importance decision makers attach to their use of violence in attaining their goals in a particular crisis. Centrality is classified as nonviolent if violence played no role or only a minor role in crisis management, and violent if violence was preeminent or important but supported by other crisis management techniques.

Finally, we assess the intensity of violence used as a crisis management technique. Nonviolent refers to minor or no violence, while violent refers to serious clashes and full-scale war.

Having specified the dependent variables for this analysis as three different manifestations of trigger-behavior transitions, it remains for us to specify the independent variables for analysis. It will be recalled that these independent variables represent three different levels of analysis and are proposed as factors that contribute to disruption of the trigger-behavior matching dynamic, such that the state may either over- or underreact to the stimuli of the incoming trigger.

The first factor proposed as disrupting the trigger-behavior transition under crisis conditions is the level of threat to values being experienced by



152 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

the crisis decision makers at the time of the crisis. Threat to values is assessed from the point of view of the principal decision makers of the state. Value threats are classified as follows: high threat (67%), including threats to existence, threat of grave damage, threat to influence (for the great or super- powers), threat to territorial integrity, and threat to the political system; and low threat (33%), including threat to influence (of nongreat or nonsuper- powers), threat to economic interests, and limited danger to population and property.

The second such disruptive factor is sociopolitical conditions in the state during the period immediately preceding the crisis trigger. Two variables are operationalized here. The first, societal unrest, assesses the level of internal disruption as evidenced by assassinations, terrorism, general strikes, demon- strations, and riots. This variable differentiates between cases in which no such disruption was in evidence, and those in which there was evidence of a significant increase in societal unrest. Data on the 621 actor cases under examination here show that 37% of all actors experiencing a crisis were also experiencing an unusually high level of societal unrest immediately prior to the crisis trigger.

The second sociopolitical variable is mass violence, assessing the extent of such phenomena as insurrections, civil war, and revolutionary behavior. Once again, the variable differentiates between cases in which no such disruption was in evidence, and those in which there was evidence of a significant increase in mass violence. The data show that 17% of all crisis actors for the period from 1929 to 1985 were experiencing an unusually high level of mass violence during the period immediately prior to the crisis.

A composite sociopolitical conditions variable is used in the ensuing analysis. Its categories are (a) no change in either societal unrest or mass violence from levels existing prior to the crisis (61%), (b) moderate deterioration in either societal unrest or mass violence (25%), and (c) large deterioration in both societal unrest and mass violence (14%).

The final factor proposed as disrupting the behavior-begets-behavior dynamic in crisis situations is the power relation between the crisis actor and its principal adversary in the crisis (although not necessarily the actor that triggered the crisis itself. For example, in the communism in Czechoslovakia crisis of 1948, for the USSR, the triggering entity was Czechoslovakia, but the source of threat for the USSR was the USA; for North Korea in the Korean War crisis of October 1950, the triggering entity was South Korea, but the source of threat was the USA). A power score was determined for each crisis actor and its principal adversary on the basis of the total of six separate scores measuring size of population, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, mili-




tary expenditure, and nuclear capability. The power of a crisis actor and the power available to it from tight alliance partners (if any) - immediately prior to the crisis actor's major response - were then compared to that of its principal adversary or adversaries to create a final power relation score. Prelim- inary analyses were run in which three categories of power relation were examined: positive power discrepancy was the situation in which the crisis actor was more powerful than its adversary; negative power discrepancy existed when the crisis actor was found to be less powerful than its adversary; and power parity was the case when the power levels of the adversaries were virtually indistinguishable. However, these analyses demonstrated that there were no substantial differences in behavior under conditions of positive and negative power discrepancy. Although the motivations for their behavior might have been different, crisis actors in both these situations tended to react similarly. Hence, these two categories were collapsed, and the power relation variable used in the analyses below has only two categories: power discrepancy (76%) and power parity (24%).

ANALYSIS

Because all of the independent and dependent variables in this study are dichotomous in nature, only a limited set of statistical procedures was available for exploring the relationships proposed. The analyses which follow are based on the examination of data arrayed in contingency tables; the chi-square statistic and probability levels are reported so that the reader can gauge the relative strength of the relationships highlighted in the different tables.

We turn to an examination of the impact of perceived threat to values on the matching behavior exhibited by a state. These results are presented in Table 2.

The data clearly show that matching behavior is more prevalent under conditions of high threat than under low threat. This finding holds across all three types of behavior: crisis management technique, centrality of, and intensity of violence. Thus for the nonviolent trigger-crisis management technique transition matching occurred in 66% of the low threat cases, and it occurred in 79% of the high threat cases. Although matching behavior, in general, is somewhat less prevalent for cases with violent triggers, these cases show the same increase in the rate of matching behavior under high threat that was evident for the crisis with nonviolent triggers. Thus for the violent trigger-centrality of violence transition, 54% of low threat crises showed



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matching behavior, and 71% of the high threat cases also indicated matching behavior.

We turn next to an examination of the impact of sociopolitical conditions on the matching behavior exhibited by crisis actors. Table 3 reports the findings on the impact of the composite societal unrest and mass violence variable on the behavior-begets-behavior transitions. The patterns are substantially the same across all three types of transitions -trigger-crisis management technique, trigger-centrality of violence, and trigger-intensity of violence. We note that among cases triggered by nonviolent acts, matching behavior is considerably more prevalent when sociopolitical conditions are at normal levels for that society than when there has been a significant increase in these types of societal disruption in the period immediately prior to the crisis. That is, the presence of internal instability is associated with an increased likelihood that nonviolent triggers will generate violent responses. Although these increases in violent responses to nonviolent triggers of about 22% are not enormous, they are particularly striking in that they are occurring against the backdrop of strong underlying tendencies toward matching behavior. These findings are all significant at the .01 level or better.

The situation for violent triggers is considerably different. All tables show a slight increase in matching behavior -the opposite of the trend observed for nonviolent triggers -although none of the chi-squares is significant.

The results to this point show that insofar as internal factors such as societal unrest and mass violence are concerned, a deterioration in those conditions is likely to lead to greater violence in crisis responses than was found in the triggering event. Thus, with nonviolent triggers, leaders may feel some ability to engage in diversion mechanisms involving the choice of violence as a behavioral response in crisis situations. However, in crises characterized by violent triggers, where matching behavior is already at a somewhat lower level than was the case for nonviolent triggers, the existence of higher-than-normal levels of societal unrest and mass violence have virtually no impact on the breakdown or strengthening of the behavior- begets-behavior dynamic.

We turn now to a consideration of the power relations among crisis adversaries and how this factor impacts on trigger-to-behavior transitions. Specifically, we are interested in a comparison of situations characterized by significant power discrepancy between the crisis actor and its adversary, and situations in which approximate power parity exists. The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.

The data show that power relations among adversaries has a significant impact on trigger-to-behavior transitions, where nonviolent triggers are

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concerned. Specifically, situations characterized by power parity have a statistically significant lower rate of matching behavior than is the case for situations characterized by power discrepancy. In other words, when the actor is faced with a situation in which its power is either greater or smaller than that of its adversary, there is a greater tendency to match nonviolent triggers to nonviolent responses than is the case when power parity exists. Matching behavior for power discrepancy ranges from 77% for crisis management technique, 78% for centrality of violence, and 81% for intensity of violence. Under power parity, the comparable matching figures are 63%, 63%, and 65%, respectively.

The data reveal a far different pattern insofar as violent triggers are concerned. Not only are the results not statistically significant, but insofar as any trend at all is apparent, it is in the opposite direction than that observed in the case of nonviolent triggers. That is, matching behavior in the case of violent triggers is slightly higher in crisis situations involving power parity than it is in the case of power discrepancy. Although the weakness of these latter relationships precludes the drawing of any strong conclusions, it is clear that the dynamics for the two types of crisis triggers are quite different, and that power relationships play an important role in determining whether matching behavior is likely to occur.

Thus we observe that matching behavior for nonviolent triggers occurs at a greater rate under power discrepancy than under power parity. This trend is reversed for violent triggers, although these latter findings are too weak to draw any meaningful conclusions from.

To summarize, we have found confirmation for disruptions in the trigger- to-behavior dynamic in crisis situations from all three realms investigated. For threat to values, the disruption associated with low threat was found for both nonviolent and violent triggers. For sociopolitical factors and power relations, the data point to significant disruption only in the case of nonviolent crisis triggers.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS

The dichotomous nature of both the independent and dependent variables in this analysis preclude the use of powerful multivariate statistical techniques. An elaborate use of controls would quickly run up against the limitations growing out of the number of cases available for analysis These restrictions notwithstanding, in the sections below we will examine some summary statistics relevant to interactions among independent variables,




TABLE 5

Disruptions in Trigger-Behavior Matching: Nonviolent Triggers and Violent Crisis Management Techniques

Deterioration in Sociopolitical

Conditions Power Parity Low Threat Number of Crises

X X X 1 X X 4 X X 6 X 19

X X 11 X 21

X 36

followed by an analysis of matching behavior using level of threat as a control variable.

Table 5 presents a summary of cases which fall into various categories of disruption of the trigger-behavior dynamic. This table deals only with situations in which the disruption takes the form of nonviolent triggers and violent crisis management techniques.7 The three independent variables have all been set at the values found to be associated with this disruption: sociopolitical condition is set for increases in these phenomena, power relations is set at parity, and threat is set at a low level.

A first observation is that while each of the indicators individually is associated with a relatively high number of cases of nonmatching behavior (nonviolent triggers and violent crisis management technique) - sociopolitical conditions = nineteen cases, power relations = twenty-one cases, and threat = thirty-six cases -when we begin to combine them the number of cases falls dramatically. The most extreme situation, in which all three indicators are set at disruption levels, shows only a single case -Peru in the Leticia crisis of 1932 to 1933. There were eleven crisis actors of this type (i.e., nonviolent trigger, violent CMT) with power parity and low threat -among them Peru in Leticia 1932, Japan in the Marco Polo Bridge 1937, Jordan in Israel independence 1948, Hungary in Prague Spring 1968, and Indonesia in East Timor 1975. There were six crises characterized by low threat and deteriorating sociopolitical conditions-Peru in Leticia 1932, Iraq and Syria in

7. While the second nonmatching pattern-violent triggers and nonviolent responses-is also of interest, space considerations preclude its examination at this point.




Israel independence 1948, France in Suez nationalization 1956, France in Bizerta 1961, and Cambodia in Mayaguez 1975. Finally, there were four crisis actors with deteriorating sociopolitical conditions and power parity - China in Shanghai 1932, Peru in Leticia 1932, Algeria in Algeria/Morocco border 1963, and Yemen in Yemen War IV 1966. An analysis of the cases characterized by violent triggers and nonviolent responses -the other con- figuration which violates the matching assumption-yielded similar findings, leading to the conclusion that there is not a great deal of interaction among the predictor variables of this model. That is, disruptions in matching behavior may result from unusually high levels of any one of the three domains examined in this study.

In an attempt to more accurately assess some of the interaction effects in this model, the variable pertaining to level of threat will be separated from the other independent variables and used as a control. There are two justifi- cations for this modification of the original model (see Figure 1). First, since threat to basic values is one of the defining elements of a crisis from the ICB perspective (see Wilkenfeld, Brecher, and Moser 1988), it could be argued that its status as an independent variable representing the first level of analysis in the present study is somewhat different from the variables employed as indicators of the other two levels. Second, the bivariate results discussed above indicated that, unlike sociopolitical conditions and power relations, level of threat perceived by decision makers significantly affected both nonviolent as well as violent transitions.

In addition to use of level of threat as a control variable, another modification was also introduced below. Because the three transition variables exhibited similar findings, only the findings for the trigger-crisis management technique variable will be reported below.

Table 6 highlights the central findings of the multivariate analysis of matching behavior. These results reinforce and help clarify the earlier bivariate findings. As we have noted previously, matching behavior is somewhat more prevalent in crises with nonviolent triggers than it is among crises triggered by violent acts. However, once the potentially disrupting factors are considered, it is the crises triggered by nonviolence which show the greatest deterioration in terms of the matching syndrome. The two central findings highlighted in this table indicate the following:

1. When the level of threat to basic values for decision makers was high, increases in societal unrest in the target country were associated with a significant breakdown of matching behavior. That is, while nonviolent matching behavior for societies experiencing no societal unrest was 85%, it dropped to 76% when societal unrest showed a moderate level of deteriora-




TABLE 6

Multivariate Analysis

Low Threat

Nonviolent Trigger

Nonviolent CMT Violent CMT

Power Discrepancy 63 25 88 Power 72% 28% 82%

Relations Power Parity 8 11 19

42% 58% 18%

71 36 107 66% 34% 100%

X2= 4.84, p = .03

High Threat

Nonviolent Trigger

Nonviolent CMT Violent CMT

No Change 111 20 131 85% 15% 60%

Sociopolitical Moderate 41 13 54 Conditions Deterioration 76% 24% 25%

Large Deterioration 21 13 34 62% 38% 15%

173 46 219 79% 21% 100%

x2 = 8.99,p = .01

a. Crisis Management Technique.

tion and to 62% when there had been a large deterioration in societal unrest. There were twenty-six crisis actors which exhibited violent responses to nonviolent triggers under circumstances of deteriorating sociopolitical conditions, including China in the Shanghai crisis of 1932, India in Junagadh during 1947 and Hyderabad during 1948, Egypt in the Suez Canal crisis of




1951, Portugal in Goa during 1955, China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Straits during 1958, USSR in Prague Spring of 1968, Pakistan in Bangladesh during 1971, and Argentina in Falklands/Malvinas during 1982.

2. When the level of threat was low, the existence of power parity was found to be associated with a breakdown in matching behavior. Thus, under conditions of power discrepancy, 72% of crises with nonviolent triggers exhibited nonviolent responses, as compared to only 42% matching under power parity. There were eleven crisis actors which exhibited violent responses to nonviolent triggers under these circumstances, including Japan in Marco Polo Bridge during 1937, Netherlands in the Indonesian independence crises of 1945, 1947, and 1948, Jordan in Israel independence during 1948, and Indonesia in East Timor during 1975.

To summarize, the results of this analysis show a general trend toward matching behavior, with that matching being somewhat more prevalent among crises triggered by nonviolent than by violent acts. High decision maker threat, combined with deteriorating societal conditions, led to a significant breakdown in nonviolent matching. Low threat, combined with power parity among the crisis adversaries, also led to a breakdown in nonviolent matching behavior. However, the multivariate findings added nothing to our ability to explain the smaller deteriorations we have observed in violent matching behavior.

CONCLUSION

This study has focused on matching or reciprocal behavior among actors in international crises, focusing specifically on the transitions from triggering acts to principal crisis management technique. A model of matching behavior was proposed, and several factors - threat perceived by decision makers, sociopolitical conditions, and power relations among crisis actors-were examined from the perspective of their potential disruption of matching behavior. All actors in international crises between 1929 and 1985 were examined with the exception of crises of the Second World War.

The first finding of import was that crises, like conflict situations in general, exhibit a very high degree of matching behavior across all types of transitions examined - trigger-crisis management technique, trigger- centrality of violence, and trigger-intensity of violence. We have also found confirmation for the disruptive nature of the three factors examined. Thus, for threat to values (an indirect measure of decision maker stress), it was found that disruption occurred primarily under conditions of relatively low




threat to values. Furthermore, such disruption was found both among crises initiated by nonviolent acts and those initiated by violence. For sociopolitical factors - societal unrest and mass violence - disruption of the trigger- behavior dynamic was found almost exclusively among cases triggered by nonviolent acts. That is, when societal unrest and/or mass violence were present, nonviolent triggers were more likely to be followed by violent behavior than was the case when sociopolitical conditions were at normal levels (for that society). Finally, the results also show that disruption of the trigger- behavior pattern was most likely when the power relations among the parties to the crisis were at approximate parity.

Results of a preliminary multivariate analysis, using level of threat to basic values as a control variable, tended to confirm the trends apparent in the bivariate findings. High decision maker threat, combined with deteriorating societal conditions, led to a higher proportion of violent responses to nonviolent triggers. Low decision maker threat, combined with power parity with the adversary, led to a similar breakdown in nonviolent matching behavior.

Once again, it should be noted that all of the disruptions identified in this analysis have occurred within the context of a very strong tendency toward matching behavior among parties to an international crisis. Nevertheless, the significance of this study lies in the identification of conditions under which we might expect a breakdown of such a pattern. Because these situations are fraught with particular danger for the international system in general, the findings reported here should be useful in building crisis management mechanisms for the international community in general, and for individual states in particular.

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trigger-response transitions in foreign policy crises, 1929-1985

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