trends in remote-control warfare: march-september 2014

8/11/2019 Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014

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Scott Hickie

Chris Abbott

Raphaël Zaffran

October 2014

Trends in remote-controlwarfare

March-September 2014



Published by Open Briefing, 13 October 2014

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Commissioned by the Remote Control project

remotecontrolproject.org

Scott Hickie is senior nlyst t Open Briefing 9e is lyer nd former politicl diser in the

#e South !les prliment 9e hs or:ed on climte chnge dpttion for the "ity of (oronto,

nd is currently policy officer ith the #e South !les goernment

Chris Abbott is the founder nd ;8ecutie 6irector of Open Briefing 9e is n 9onorry <isiting

=eserch >ello in the School of Socil nd ?nterntionl Studies t the &niersity of Brdford nd

s the 6eputy 6irector of O8ford =eserch Group until 200

Raphaël Zaffran is n ssocite resercher t Open Briefing 9e is n nlyst nd politicl scientist

reserching nd teching interntionl security issues 9e is currently pursuing Ph6 t the

Grdute ?nstitute of ?nterntionl nd 6eelopment Studies in Gene

Open Briefing is the orld@s first ciil society intelligence gency ?t is uniAue not5for5profit socil

enterprise, hich proides intelligence nd reserch serices to ciil society orgnistions nd

concerned citiens

Open Briefing td is not-for-profit social enterprise run nerly entirely by olunteers=egistered in ;nglnd C !les s compny limited by gurntee, #o 07D4D.D



ren!s in remote-control warfare

Erch5September 2014

Scott 9ic:ie, "hris $bbott nd =phFl ffrn



Contents

Preface i

I. Special operations forces 1

United States and European countries increases special operations

forces footprints across Africa 1

Significant developments in special operations forces technology 3

Russia coordinates special forces operations and cyber offensives

in Crimea and eastern Ukraine 4

II. Private military and security companies 5

rivate military and security companies play increasingly important

roles in Afghanistan and !ra" #

States attempt to regulate private military and security companies

internationally through domestic legislation $

Allegations of private military and security company use by Ukraine

and Russia play out in battle of narratives %

III. Unmanned vehicles and autonomous weapon systems 9

&ebate over unmanned aerial vehicles shifts to "uestions over

effectiveness and developing international norms '

U( bodies consider implications of lethal autonomous )eapons as

defence industry focusses on lo)er*level systems automation 1+

,roader range of states actively deploying unmanned aerial vehicles

and developing indigenous technologies 11

IV. Cyber warfare 1

United States seeks international cyber*security norms )hile

clashing )ith China over cyber espionage 13

Cyber attacks being deployed in conflicts in !srael- Syria and !ra" 1#

Cyber confrontation in Ukraine pushes (A./ to consider cyber

mutual defence doctrines 10

V. Intelli!ence" surveillance and reconnaissance 1#

(SA leaks force ive Eyes partners to reconfigure and 2ustify

surveillance activities 1$

&efence ministries building capabilities for informationoperations across social media 1'

Subversion of encryption standards part of intelligence toolkit +



Preface

Remote-control warfare is an emerging military and political framework that allows for warfare to

be actioned at a distance by relying on ‘smart’ technologies and light-footprint deployments, such as

armed drones and special forces. While in some respects it is more attractive than traditional

military approaches, it has two significant disadvantages. irstly, it allows actions to be approved

that would never be considered using conventional military means, yet the conse!uences and risks

of those actions are not being ade!uately considered. "econdly, it removes policymakers and

military planners one step further from the realities of war fighting for both the military operators

and civilian casualties. #owever, these downsides are being ignored as policymakers struggle to

respond to multiple conflicts and security threats around the world.

"ince $pril %&'(, )pen *riefing has produced a series of monthly intelligence briefings on remote-

control warfare. +hese briefings were commissioned by the Remote ontrol proect, which was

initiated by the etwork for "ocial hange and is hosted by )/ford Research 0roup. +hese briefings

focus on five key areas of remote-control warfare1 special operations forces 2")34 private military

and security companies 2P5"s34 unmanned vehicles and autonomous weapons systems4 cyber

warfare4 and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 26"R3. +hese are the areas that )pen

*riefing considers central to the development and application of remote-control warfare.

)ver the course of the past si/ months, it has become apparent that in some areas there is a

disconnect between civil society perception and the actual intentions and capabilities of

governments and militaries. +his is due, in part, to a lack of detailed understanding of ongoing

technological, political and doctrinal developments in certain key areas, including lethal

autonomous weapons systems and cyber warfare. )pen *riefing’s monthly briefings address this by

providing comprehensive but concise e/planations and analysis of such developments.

onversely, in other areas, civil society is driving the debate and forcing governments to enact

reforms. +his is particularly so in the cases of armed drones, mercenaries and mass surveillance. 6n

such instances, )pen *riefing’s monthly briefings bolster civil society efforts through the provision

of timely and reliable intelligence, which allows organisations to develop more-effective advocacy

strategies.

+his publication differs from the usual monthly format in that it provides a detailed overview of the

key trends in remote-control warfare that have emerged during the period covered by the previous

five briefings 25arch to "eptember %&'(3. "uch developments include the 7nited "tates and

8uropean countries increasing their ") footprints across $frica, P5"s playing increasingly

important roles in $fghanistan and 6ra!, the debate over unmanned aerial vehicles shifting to

!uestions over effectiveness and developing international norms, the 7nited "tates seeking

international cyber-security norms while clashing with hina over cyber espionage, and "$ leaks

forcing ive 8yes partners to reconfigure and ustify their surveillance activities. +hese, and the

other events analysed in the following pages, are significant developments in remote-control

warfare that warrant the deeper look provided in this briefing.

London

22 September 2014



Trends in remote-control warfare: March-September 2014 1

Section ISpecial operations forces

United States and European countries increases special operations

forces footprints across frica

The footprint of special operation forces !S"#$ across frica% especiall& in the Sahel and Sahara% has

recei'ed sustained attention o'er the last si( months% e'en as the insecurit& in Ira) and S&ria has

dominated securit& debates* Special forces from the United States and EU countries ha'e been

in'ol'ed in +e& securit& de'elopments on the continent% includin, operations trac+in, down the

ord.s /esistance rm& in U,anda% a,reement o'er the continued US S"# presence in ibouti at

amp emonnier% pressure for S"# assistance in freein, hosta,es ta+en b& 3o+o aram in 5i,eria

and multiple militar& and law enforcement counterterrorism trainin, pro,rammes*

The 6uadrennial efence /e'iew 2014 pro'ided the domestic ustification for the focus of US S"#

on the Ma,hreb% Sahel and orn of frica*1 The precise reasons for an increased US special

operations forces presence across these re,ions were hinted at in comments made to the New York

Times in 7une 2014 b& the commander of US Special "perations ommand frica% 3ri,adier 8eneral

7ames 3* inder% who ar,ued 9frica is the battle,round of the future. and 9the future of war is

about winnin, people% not territor&.*2 Such sentiments are indeed consistent with the operational

and tactical philosoph& of US Special "perations ommand !USS""M$* This be,s two +e&

)uestions: wh& is frica the battle,round of the future% and is S"# trainin, of indi,enous% national

forces sufficient preparation for this percei'ed future conflict

There are clearl& re,ional dri'ers of the US preoccupation with frican securit& hotspots that are

related to the strate,ic desire to den& ihadist ,roups and insur,ents operational opportunities in

wea+ and failin, states and the need to se'ere the connections that are li+el& to de'elop across the

continent between such or,anisations* The US defence establishment has not for,otten "sama bin

aden.s formati'e &ears in Sudan between 1;;1 and 1;;<% and is not +een to allow terrorist ,roups

the space to de'elop into transnational threats*

owe'er% a more si,nificant dri'er for the United States is the opportunit& countries li+e =en&a%

U,anda% 5i,er and ibouti pro'ide in terms of more-accommodatin, launch pads for S"#

operations in the Middle East and Southwest sia% particularl& unmanned combat air 'ehicle !U>$

and intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance !IS/$ operations*

1 http:??www*defense*,o'?pubs?2014@6uadrennial@efense@/e'iew*pdf

2 http:??www*n&times*com?2014?0<?1A?ma,aBine?can-,eneral-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-ne(t-terrorist-

threat*html



2 "pen 3riefin,

#urthermore% from a US perspecti'e% a more ,eo,raphicall&-dispersed force proection and li,hter

S"# footprint ser'es as a sal'e for domestic war fati,ue and accommodates pressure for defence

spendin, austerit& after more than a decade in Ira) and f,hanistan*

number of re,ional partner ,o'ernments are pressurin, the United States% #rance and other

special forces trainin, partners% includin, anada and the United =in,dom% to loo+ be&ond trainin,

and +nowled,e transfer* l,eria% Mali% U,anda% 5i,eria% 5i,er% ibouti and =en&a ha'e all shown a

desire for ,reater access to US and European militar& and securit& e)uipment% with l,eria.s re)uest

for US unmanned aerial 'ehicles !U>s$ the most public* #urthermore% a number of frican countries

ha'e lon, ad'ocated for ,reater fle(ibilit& on usin, aid bud,ets for securit&% and ha'e ardentl&

rebu+ed critics who su,,est too much national re'enue is spent on militar& procurement and

securit&*

owe'er% pro'idin, e)uipment that creates an independent indi,enous capabilit& presents a

si,nificant ris+ for some US and European militar& planners and securit& polic&ma+ersC there are%

after all% numerous e(amples of the allies of toda& becomin, the enemies of tomorrow* #or special

operations forces trainers% there is also a si,nificant difference between mission support and

temporar& access to technolo,& and the full-scale transfer of S"# e)uipment to local partner

countries*

The challen,e is that e'en the li,ht-footprint approach is limited b& resources% and indi,enous

special operations forces and law enforcement a,encies will be without US or European support at

times* Dithout modern weapons% e)uipment and technolo,&% man& local forces will lose an&

strate,ic ad'anta,e o'er domestic militant ,roups* The failure of US counterterrorism trainin, for

the Malian militar& due to problems around e)uipment pro'ision and lon,-term en,a,ement with

S"# trainin, is a prime e(ample of this*

Some countries ma& not be in a position to demand ,reater support from their US and European

S"# trainin, partners% and will ,ladl& accept an& assistance on offer to confront terrorism and

insur,enc&* "thers% such as 5i,er% 5i,eria and U,anda% will li+el& de'elop hi,her e(pectations of

what their forei,n partners should be deli'erin,* These ele'ated e(pectations will come at a time

when Ira) and S&ria will be ta+in, up more and more US and European S"# resources* The decisions

o'er where to allocate limited S"# resources will clearl& be ta+en in li,ht of Destern securit&

concerns not frican% and will li+el& mean frican countries will continue to stru,,le to ade)uatel&

confront insur,ent and terrorist ,roups within their borders*




Si,nificant de'elopments in special operations forces technolo,&

The emer,in, technolo,ies de'eloped for special operations forces use pro'ide an insi,ht into the

future force capabilities militar& planners desire in li,ht of proected conflict theatre needs* In Ma&

2014% the then commander of US Special "perations ommand Europe !S"EU/$% Maor 8eneral

3rad Debb% ,a'e stron, indications that +e& areas of need for US S"# were in intelli,ence-,atherin,

and communication s&stems that can withstand the e(treme climatic conditions of frica and the

rctic*

There is an undoubtedl& stron, focus on intelli,ence collection tools* /ecent e(amples include

ad'anced satellite communications% impro'ed ,eo,raphic information s&stem !8IS$ data on

intelli,ence blind spots and enhanced sensiti'e site e(ploitation !SSE$ biometric and 5 testin,

techni)ues* The new capabilities are 'er& much ,eared towards hi,hl&-tar,eted% micro-scale conflict%

includin, tar,etin, indi'iduals% and are li+el& desi,ned to ,ain ad'anta,e o'er non-state actors who

emplo& non-con'entional means* The e(pandin, focus on biometrics and SSE% which ha'e been

widel& used in f,hanistan% is becomin, an important component of identit& dominance% emplo&ed

b& special operations forces as a means to undermine the anon&mit& of terrorist and criminal

networ+s*

ombat hardware has not% howe'er% been for,otten in this rush of inno'ation across intelli,ence

and communications technolo,&* #rench compan& >a&lon is de'elopin, a combination han, ,lider-

dune bu,,& for #rench special forces after a need for stealthier air transport was identified durin,

missions in Somalia* The US efence d'anced /esearch Froects ,enc& !/F$ has funded

research on a h&brid-powered motorbi+e to assist special operations forces to penetrate remote

areas and stealthil& e(ecute rapid raids in e(treme terrain conditions and contested en'ironments*

USS""M.s GH0 million Tactical ssault i,ht "perators Suit !T"S$ effort% collo)uiall& referred to

as the new .Iron Man. suit% has captured the public ima,ination* owe'er% )uestions about the

pro,ramme from the US ouse rmed Ser'ices ommittee su,,est that the h&pe around T"S is

unustified and that the suit will not be useful across a broad ran,e of battlefield scenarios*

"ne of the most si,nificant de'elopments in US S"# capabilities is the con'ersion of the maritime

support 'essel M> ra,side into a special operations base for up to 200 troops* Such a maritime

base% to,ether with the increased le'el of trainin, of US special operations forces commands in

amphibious operations !endin, the historical monopol& of this area b& US 5a'& SEs$% will pro'idesubstantial fle(ibilit& for US S"# operations% particularl& in the Middle East and 5orth frica* The

con'ersion of maritime support 'essels or container ships to S"# maritime bases could lessen the

dependence of special operations forces on aircraft carriers and terrestrial bases% and therefore

sidestep host countr& support* It would also increase the arra& of manned and unmanned aircraft

a'ailable for S"# missions under certain circumstances% as some ma& pre'iousl& ha'e been

inappropriate due to ran,e limitations*

http:??www*e(ecuti'e,o'*com?2014?0A?special-ops-leaders-outline-troop-re)uirements-for-intell-,atherin,?



4 "pen 3riefin,

/ussia coordinates special forces operations and c&ber offensi'es in

rimea and eastern U+raine

/ussia.s anne(ation of rimea and elements of their on,oin, acti'it& in eastern U+raine has

re'ealed the importance of SpetsnaB !special purpose forces$ to /ussia.s force proection* Indeed%

/ussian Fresident >ladimir Futin.s strate,& in U+raine can be characterised as somethin, closer to

paramilitar& co'ert action than wholesale militar& attac+* Unconfirmed reports su,,est that se'eral

hundred members of the 4Ath 8uards SpetsnaB /e,iment !a special reconnaissance unit within

/ussian irborne Troops% >>$ went into rimea without insi,nia and attempted to ,arner enou,h

support for a ci'ilian-led popular uprisin, or at least the appearance of it* Their acti'ities are

thou,ht to ha'e included bribin, +e& institutional fi,ureheads% acti'atin, local pro-/ussian militias%

co'ertl& mo'in, weapons and co-optin, some of the 2A%000 U+rainian militar& personnel based in

rimea*

The tactics used in rimea and eastern U+raine are not dissimilar to those /ussia applied somewhatmore haphaBardl& durin, their 200H war with 8eor,ia% where the& were mi(ed with tried and tested

So'iet-st&le strate,ic operations used effecti'el& durin, their conflict in f,hanistan in the 1;H0s* In

rimea% the principle of maskirovka camoufla,e or denial and deception allowed /ussia to

maintain a de,ree of plausible deniabilit& and swiftl& carr& out the operation before 5T"% the

European Union and the United States could properl& respond* s such% the SpetsnaB units

demonstrated an abilit& to carr& out politicall&-sensiti'e operations*

Dhat is different in rimea and eastern U+raine is the coordination of special forces operations and

c&ber offensi'es* Dhile c&ber offensi'es b& /ussia and non-state actors did not in'ol'e full-scale

c&ber warfare% distributed denial-of-ser'ice !oS$ attac+s and the Sna+e malware disrupted

U+rainian communication networ+s and enabled si,nificant /ussian sur'eillance of those networ+s*

It is not clear how SpetsnaB troops le'era,ed this intelli,enceC howe'er% the timin, of

confrontations with U+rainian soldiers and the isolatin, of those soldiers from =ie' 'ia the bloc+in,

of communications would su,,est a le'el of cooperation between /ussian c&ber offensi'es and

special forces operations*

The emer,in, importance to /ussia of coordinatin, special operations forces with c&ber operations

is e'ident in a 7une 2014 ollecti'e Securit& Treat& "r,anisation !ST"$ announcement% which

noted that the or,anisation was creatin, oint special operations force to counteract c&ber attac+s

and use special means to intercept si,nals and information messa,es*4 It ma& also in'ol'e

information and ps&cholo,ical operations subdi'isions* TS".s preeminent member% /ussia% is hi,hl&

li+el& to ha'e used the announcement as strate,ic counter response to recent 5T" c&ber-

preparedness acti'ities% which were rein'i,orated b& the /ussian occupation of rimea and its c&ber

campai,ns a,ainst U+raine*

4

http:??www*eurasianet*or,?node?<HJA1




Section IIFri'ate militar& and securit& companies

Fri'ate militar& and securit& companies pla& increasin,l& important

roles in f,hanistan and Ira)

The upcomin, drawdown of international forces from f,hanistan has been challen,ed on se'eral

fronts durin, the past si( months* Specificall&% two maor de'elopments% namel& the dela&ed

finalisation of the bilateral securit& a,reement !3S$ and the disputed presidential election% are

li+el& to contribute to the creation of a political and securit& 'acuum* s such% it li+el& that pri'ate

militar& and securit& companies !FMSs$ will continue to pla& a central and increasin,l& important

role in f,hanistan past the ecember 2014 mar+*

The supremac& of FMSs in conflict and post-conflict situations is also apparent in Ira)% where

securit& has deteriorated si,nificantl& with the ad'ent of the Islamic State* In #ebruar& 2014% the

Wall Street Journal reported that A%000 contractors were wor+in, in Ira) as intelli,ence anal&sts%

securit& ,uards and militar& trainers or in ci'ilian obs% such as translators and coo+s*A 8i'en the

current securit& situation and the imminent threat posed b& the Islamic State% it is hi,hl& li+el& that

contractors will continue to ta+e on +e& securit& responsibilities in Ira) durin, the ne(t few months*

#or one thin,% FMSs ha'e the ad'anta,e of bein, readil&-a'ailable militar& resources% with

personnel not needin, to be recruited or trained*

"'erall% e'ents durin, the past si( months su,,est two +e& and interlin+ed trends* #irst% FMSs are

further consolidatin, their presence in fra,ile settin,s% where ,o'ernments are unwillin, or unable

to pro'ide troops and supplies* Second% national ,o'ernments% and especiall& the United States%

ha'e contributed to the pre'alence of FMSs b& hea'il& rel&in, on them for a si,nificant proportion

of their militar& missions abroad% includin, securit&% post-conflict reconstruction and trainin, duties*

n pril report from the Special Inspector 8eneral for f,hanistan /econstruction !SI8/$

confirmed this o'erreliance with the disclosure that <;K of the G4 billion the US state department

spent on reconstruction proects in f,hanistan from 2002 to March 201 went to a sin,le pri'atemilitar& contractor% &norp*

<

Ultimatel&% FMSs prosper in those countries presentin, particularl& wea+ and unstable structural

conditions% includin, a contested ,o'ernment and unclear urisdiction o'er forei,n soldiers% and

particularl& fra,ile settin,s% includin, lo&alt& and desertion issues within a new national arm&%

deepl&-embedded ethnic issues and securit& 'acuums created b& an out,oin, inter'enin, force*

A http:??online*ws*com?news?articles?S3100014240A2J0204HA1104AJ;<11J0141J0A420

<

http:??www*si,ar*mil?pdf?specialK20proects?SI8/-14-4;-SF*pdf



6 "pen 3riefin,

The apparent trends that ,o'ernments are increasin,l& rel&in, on FMSs and that FMSs are

successful in fra,ile settin,s su,,est that Ira)is and f,hans are li+el& to see lar,e numbers of

pri'ate securit& contractors on their soils for the foreseeable future* This poses a number of issues*

8i'en e(istin, le,islati'e ,aps and the difficulties inherent to the tas+ of prosecutin, pri'ate

securit& contractors% FMSs tend to operate with impunit&% which can be hi,hl& destabilisin, for

post-conflict countries that are slowl& reco'erin, from &ears of fi,htin, and the presence of forei,n

militaries* Foliticall&% the predominance of FMSs in Ira) and f,hanistan is thereb& li+el& to

undermine the democratic process and ,o'ernment accountabilit&% while wea+enin, formal securit&

actors% such as the f,han 5ational rm& and the national police*

#rom a securit& standpoint% lea'in, FMSs as central securit& pro'iders in Ira) and f,hanistan is

also problematic* 8i'en the business-oriented nature of FMSs% securit& will li+el& become

concentrated on those areas of political or financial importance where securit& contracts are

a'ailable% such as re,ional capitals and the oil producin, re,ions% thus lea'in, other areas

completel& at the merc& of armed ,roups dri'en b& political% ethnic or ideolo,ical a,endas% such asthe returnin, Taliban and e(tremists ,roups li+e al-6aeda and the Islamic State* This would further

threaten the alread& fra,ile territorial inte,rit& of both Ira) and f,hanistan* If the Dest deserts

both f,hanistan and Ira)% this could lea'e FMSs as the sole forei,n securit& pro'iders attemptin,

to fend off e(tremist ,roups alon,side host countries. militaries*

In f,hanistan% US Fresident 3arac+ "bama has declared that unless the f,han ,o'ernment si,ns

the 3S% the United States will pull all its troops out of the countr& b& the end of 2014* US e(it

strate,ies ha'e tended to rel& hea'il& on pri'ate contractors in order to protect its troops durin,

withdrawal processes* 8i'en that it was the out,oin, president% amid =arBai% who had refused to

si,n the 3S% f,hanistan.s presidential election ,enerated considerable hope for new be,innin,s*

owe'er% the election was contested b& both second-round candidates% bdullah bdullah and

shraf 8hani% amid accusations of widespread fraud* 3oth candidates ha'e a,reed to abide b& the

outcome of the internationall&-super'ised recount% and ha'e promised to form somethin, a+in to a

unit& ,o'ernment* E'en if a unit& ,o'ernment were to be formed% it will ha'e to deal with the

presence of FMSs on f,han soil% wor+in, not onl& in securit& obs but also contracted b&

diplomatic missions and for ci'il reconstruction efforts*

In Ira)% despite apparent unit& amon, international actors on the need to address the spread of the

Islamic State% it is li+el& that an& inter'ention will onl& in'ol'e limited airstri+es and not troops* s a

result% FMSs are bound to pla& a role in on-the-,round securit& duties% possibl& alon,side limited

numbers of special operations forces and I operati'es*

Ultimatel&% the ,radual withdrawal of international forces will undoubtedl& create a securit&

'acuum% which is li+el& to benefit pri'ate militar& and securit& companies* Dhile such companies

ha'e a role to pla&% ,o'ernments will ha'e to miti,ate their influence% especiall& when it comes to

securit& pro'ision*




States attempt to re,ulate pri'ate militar& and securit& companies

internationall& throu,h domestic le,islation

There ha'e been continuous efforts o'er the last si( months to better re,ulate FMSs% both

nationall& and internationall&* The Montreux Document of 1J September 200H is one of the first

a,reements definin, how international law applies to the acti'ities of FMSs in conflict Bones*J

Since 200H% +e& sta+eholders% such as SwitBerland and the International ommittee of the /ed

ross% ha'e been attemptin, to stren,then the a,reement b& pushin, states to ta+e measures so

that their national practices compl& with international law* Such efforts ha'e also ta+en place within

U5-or,anised wor+in, ,roups and forums*

In the United States% the US ouse of /epresentati'es passed the 201A 5ational efence

uthorisation ct !5$% which aims to impro'e the US defence department.s use% mana,ement

and o'ersi,ht of pri'ate contractors in frica* The 5 is an attempt b& US lawma+ers to ta+e

measures at home in order to constrain the influence and impunit& of those pri'ate securit&

companies it contracts abroad% particularl& in the Sahel and 5orth frica but also in Ira) andf,hanistan* In contrast% South frican Fresident 7acob Luma has been dela&in, si,nin, an

amendment to his countr&.s Fri'ate Securit& Industr& /e,ulation ct !FSI/$* The amendment

in'ol'es far-reachin, international conse)uences for the re,ulation of FMSs throu,h domestic

le,islation% as it will compel forei,n securit& pro'iders to hand o'er A1K of their businesses to

South frican citiBens* owe'er% it ris+s eopardisin, the renewal of the United States. frican

8rowth and "pportunities ct !8"$% desi,ned to assist the economies of sub-Saharan frica and

to impro'e economic relations between the United States and the re,ion*

In earl& 7une% a seminar was or,anised in Sene,al in order to help increase the number of states

supportin, the Montreux Document while offerin, a platform for discussion for all concerned parties

to e(chan,e best practices in the re,ulation of FMSs in sub-Saharan frica*H Two maor challen,es

in the e(ecution of the Montreux Document appeared* #irst% it is crucial that a lar,e arra& of states

and companies be represented at such meetin,s for the document.s pro'isions to appl& effecti'el&%

as institutionalisation and institutional pressure are usuall& best at compellin, states to appl&

international le,al measures* Second% in the absence of authorit& abo'e their own ,o'ernments%

states are otherwise li+el& to fail to implement the document.s re,ulator& measures nationall&%

which defeats the o'erall document.s efforts*

The trend towards attempts to re,ulate FMSs internationall& throu,h domestic le,islation

su,,ests that international re,ulator& efforts ha'e not been entirel& satisfactor& when it comes to

implementation phases* The Montreux Document is a seminal a,reement but is li+el& to become

obsolete if it does not continue to increase its support from states and companies* The ,reatest

dan,er to the a,reement comes from the ineffecti'e domestic implementation of the measures it

promotes% due to political unwillin,ness or inade)uate monitorin, and o'ersi,ht mechanisms*

J https:??www*icrc*or,?en,?assets?files?other?icrc@002@0;;<*pdf

H https:??www*icrc*or,?en,?resources?documents?news-release?2014?0<-04-sene,al-seminaire-entreprises-militaires-

securite-pri'ees*htm



8 "pen 3riefin,

lle,ations of pri'ate militar& and securit& compan& use b& U+raine and

/ussia pla& out in battle of narrati'es

"'er the past si( months% there has been much contro'ers& and accusations from both sides o'er

the alle,ed presence of pri'ate militar& and securit& companies in the U+rainian conflict* Each side

uses the supposed use of FMSs and mercenaries b& the other side as propa,anda to discredit one

another* This su,,ests a 'er& interestin, dimension of FMSs: the 'er& essence of FMSs seems to

be at odds with the nationalistic and ethnic nature of the conflict% and their use is percei'ed as

unpatriotic* The& are seen as the last resort of cowards% and their use dele,itimises each side in the

e&es of the other* 3& and lar,e% the alle,ed presence of FMSs in U+raine has led to a battle of

narrati'es between =ie' and the =remlin% in which both sides ha'e attempted to frame the use of

FMSs as means to discredit the other side.s patriotism and le,itimac&*

Specificall&% =ie' was accused of contractin, US pri'ate militar& compan& 8re&stone to tac+le pro-

/ussian dissent in eastern U+raine* The former subsidiar& of 3lac+water?e Ser'ices !now cademi$is +nown to ha'e completed contracts in /ussia and entral sia but denied deplo&ments in U+raine*

In turn% there were suspicions that the unmar+ed troops who seiBed Se'astopol and Simferopol

airports in rimea in #ebruar& 2014 were from the Vnevedomstvenaya Okhrana % a )uasi-pri'ate force

within the /ussian interior ministr&* #urthermore% the Serbian authorities ha'e estimated that

doBens of Serbian nationals ha'e also been fi,htin, on both sides of the conflict in U+raine% with

Serbian Frime Minister le+sandar >ucic stressin, that in most cases these fi,hters are mercenaries

fi,htin, for mone& rather than ideolo,&*

"n 1J 7ul& 2014% the European parliament passed a resolution praisin, U+rainian Fresident Fetro

Foroshen+o.s 1A-point peace plan% which included the need to withdraw mercenaries from U+rainian

territor&* Foroshen+o has also offered amnest& to those mercenaries who ha'e not committed

,ra'e crimes* "'erall% the alle,ed presence of FMSs within the U+raine conflict has had a

destabilisin, effect% and is li+el& to further dela& resolution amon, the warrin, parties despite the

peace plan*




Section IIIUnmanned 'ehicles and autonomous weapon s&stems

ebate o'er unmanned aerial 'ehicles shifts to )uestions o'er

effecti'eness and de'elopin, international norms

number of +e& ,o'ernment in)uiries% thin+ tan+ reports and ci'il societ& re'iews on U>s ha'e

underscored a potential shift in polic& o'er 2014* The U5 special rapporteur on human ri,hts

published a report on ci'ilian deaths from US drone stri+es in MarchC; the /5 orporation

published a report on unmanned aerial 'ehicle capabilities% arms control and proliferation in prilC10

the Stimson entre.s Tas+ #orce on US rone Folic& reported in 7uneC11

and the 3ritish ouse of

ommons defence committee published a report on remotel& piloted air s&stems in 7ul&*12 Ta+en

to,ether% there is increasin, e'idence of ,reater debate about proliferation% operational controls

and the need for international norms* #urthermore% after their use in f,hanistan% Fa+istan and

Nemen% some in the securit& establishment are )uestionin, whether counterterrorism obecti'es

can actuall& be achie'ed usin, U>s !as current emplo&ed$% and indeed )uestionin, their

effecti'eness in a wider ran,e of missions% includin, IS/*

Increased interest from the US securit& establishment the creation of norms around the use of U>s

is li+el& dri'en b& concerns that US national securit& interests are not well ser'ed b& other state and

non-state actors adoptin, the same le,al% ethical and operational U> policies as the United States

has so far enacted* riticism of US drone stri+e practices from the U5 special rapporteur on human

ri,hts and the U5 uman /i,hts ouncil has also ,i'en state opponents of such practices increased

international diplomatic opportunities to pursue stricter compliance with international

humanitarian law*

The /5 report hi,hli,hted that U>s are not transformati'e weapons% in part because most

current models ha'e limited use a,ainst enemies with air defences* In the conte(t of rapid militar&

modernisation sweepin, East sia and parts of the Facific% the current fleet of drones therefore has

limited applicabilit&% which /5 su,,ests will actuall& temper proliferation* owe'er% thispresumes state-le'el conflict in a multi-polar sia Facific as opposed to continual conflicts in

hotspots where lac+ of rule of law% infrastructure and securit& allow non-state actors and

insur,encies to proliferate*

; http:??daccess-dds-n&*un*or,?doc?U5"?8E5?814?11;?4;?F#?81411;4;*pdf"penElement

10 http:??www*rand*or,?pubs?research@reports?//44;*html

11 http:??www*stimson*or,?ima,es?uploads?research-pdfs?tas+@force@report@#I5@DE3@0<2414*pdf

12

http:??www*publications*parliament*u+?pa?cm20141A?cmselect?cmdfence?<11?<1102*htm



10 "pen 3riefin,

The US national securit& communit& and con,ressional committee debates on the US 5a'&.s

re)uirements for the Unmanned arrier-launched irborne Sur'eillance and Stri+e !USS$

pro,ramme ha'e t&pified the discussions on U> capabilities and future conflict needs% which must

balance the benefits of new technolo,& with the cost within ti,htened defence bud,ets* "ne 'ision

for USS is to pro'ide the na'& with a carrier-'ersion of non-stealth& sur'eillance drones instead

of the na'&.s e(perimental -4J3 U>% which o'er the lon,er term is li+el& to ha'e stealth

capabilit&% lon,er ran,e and more si,nificant armament* "thers ar,ue that this 'ision pro'ides no

real strate,ic ad'anta,e for US sea power if confronted with hina.s nti-ccess?rea enial

!2?$ capabilities% specificall& lon,-ran,e ballistic and cruise missiles*

Mar+et proections su,,est that the ,lobal annual e(port mar+et for U>s is li+el& to ,row from

G;42 million to G2* billion o'er the decade from 201 to 202* 3& 201J% worldwide U> production

could a'era,e about ;<0 unmanned aircraft annuall&* This creates proliferation concerns% which%

to,ether with hinese ad'ancements in militar& U>s% is the li+el& dri'er behind some in the

defence industr& and securit& establishment tal+in, more openl& about international norms around

U> use* Indeed% the Stimson entre.s tas+force recommendations on a cost-benefit anal&sis of

drone use in counterterrorism operations and impro'ed public disclosure around U> use show

that some in the securit& mainstream see the merit in ,reater e(amination and consideration of the

use of drones*

U5 bodies consider implications of lethal autonomous weapons as

defence industr& focusses on lower-le'el s&stems automation four-da& meetin, in Ma& 2014 of e(perts from HJ countries part& to the U5 on'ention on ertain

on'entional Deapons !D$ was the first multilateral discussion on lethal autonomous weapons

s&stems !DS$* The meetin, pro'ided an opportunit& for +e& ci'il societ& ,roups and U5

institutions to hi,hli,ht the potential implications of DS for international humanitarian law*

"nl& fi'e of the D dele,ates supported a moratorium on full&-automated weapon s&stems: uba%

Ecuador% E,&pt% Fa+istan and the ol& See* Man& dele,ates reected a moratorium on the basis that

it would undermine de'elopment of automation technolo,& in ci'ilian fields and stunt inno'ation in

non-lethal autonomous combat and militar& s&stems% such as intelli,ence collection% search and

rescue% lo,istics and transportation* espite disa,reement% comments made b& U5 hi,h

representati'e for disarmament affairs n,ela =ane to the secretar&-,eneral.s d'isor& 3oard on

isarmament Matters seem to su,,est that a number of U5 bodies% such as the D% need to ha'e

on,oin, discussions around lethal autonomous weapons s&stems*1

1

https:??s*amaBonaws*com?unoda-web?wp-content?uploads?2014?0J?#I5@/@/emar+s@3M@<2@2-7ul&-2014*pdf




The D meetin, demonstrated that confusion around definitions and the 'aried focus on different

s&stems mean that ci'il societ& ,roups are possibl& tal+in, about different technolo,ies to the

defence industr& and national militaries* Some ci'il societ& ,roups ha'e focused on autonomous

militar& hardware li+el& to replace infantr& weapons and combat s&stems* Some precursor

technolo,&% such as the 3E S&stems stealth and semiautonomous demonstrator U> Taranis fit

this mould* owe'er% it is li+el& that defence companies and militaries are more focused on s&stem

automation of IS/% transportation% communication and c&ber protection rather than autonomous

lethal weapon capabilities* In fact% the automation of defence and militar& operations much earlier

in the chain of functions% such as tar,et identification and weapon selection% should raise concerns

of a similar ma,nitude as those related to full&-automated weapons*

The de'elopments around buildin, independence from human inter'ention appear more focused in

areas of c&ber defence and IS/% particularl& 'ideo sur'eillance s&stems* The recent re'elation b&

former 5S contractor Edward Snowden that the 5S has de'eloped an automated c&ber-attac+

pro,ramme codenamed MonsterMind is a case in point* Snowden.s ustification for disclosin, thepro,ramme was based on the concern that as an automated counter-attac+ s&stem MonsterMind

posed inherent ris+s of miscalculation* The efence d'anced /esearch Froects ,enc& !/F$

has run a number of competitions see+in, software that implements autonomous c&ber-defence

action% su,,estin, that the US militar& is particularl& interested in this capabilit&*

3roader ran,e of states acti'el& deplo&in, unmanned aerial 'ehicles

and de'elopin, indi,enous technolo,ies

broader ran,e of states are acti'el& deplo&in, U>s and de'elopin, indi,enous technolo,ies%challen,in, the international dominance of US and Israeli U> technolo,&* In 7ul& 2014% the #rench

and 3ritish defence ministers si,ned a O120 million feasibilit& stud& on an unmanned combat air

'ehicle% which is part of a broader #uture ir ombat S&stem where U>s will be deplo&ed

alon,side #-A 7oint Stri+e #i,hters* European defence companies% includin, ir 3us% ha'e made

o'ertures to the 8erman% Italian and #rench ,o'ernments to de'elop a European U> platform to

encoura,e EU and potentiall& 5T" interoperabilit&* 3E S&stems is de'elopin, the Taranis U>

for the 3ritish Ministr& of efence% /ussian defence a,encies aim to test So+ol and TranBas U>s

in 201J and l,eria is reportedl& +een to procure ian,lon, !Soarin, ra,on$ U>s from the

hinese militar&*

There are clear political indicators that EU members are not comfortable with the le'el of reliance

on US and Israeli U>s but are stru,,lin, to a,ree partnerships for the de'elopment of European

U> platforms* 8erman& cancelled its Euro aw+ order with 5orthrop 8rumman in 201% thou,h

#rance was reported as mo'in, ahead with its ac)uisition of 8eneral tomics M6-; /eaper drones

for operations in Mali in addition to U> de'elopment wor+ with 3ritain*

Europe% Israel and the US do not ha'e a total monopol& o'er U> de'elopment as Iran has recentl&

demonstrated* In Ma& 2014% Iran un'eiled its re'erse-en,ineered 'ersion of the US /6-1J0 Sentinel*

Iran was able to re'erse en,ineer the Sentinel after it was either compromised b& Iranian c&ber

forces and safel& landed or simpl& crashed in Iran*



12 "pen 3riefin,

/eports indicate that Iran.s maturin, drone de'elopment pro,ramme% which includes a number of

Iranian drones the Shahed% Bem% Mohaer% amaseh and Sarir is benefitin, from operational use

in S&ria and% more recentl&% Ira)* This all-important combat usa,e pro'ides ,reater opportunit& for

,o'ernments to assess the true capabilities of Iran.s U> pro,ramme* #or Israel in particular% it ma&

pro'ide some insi,ht into the technolo,& that Iran ma& ma+e a'ailable to amas*




Section I>&ber warfare

United States see+s international c&ber-securit& norms while clashin,

with hina o'er c&ber espiona,e

Espiona,e% crime and attac+s in the c&ber realm ha'e been +e& diplomatic sore points in relations

between hina and the United States throu,hout 2014* t the rmed #orces ommunications and

Electronics ssociation on 24 7une% the commander of US &ber ommand !USN3E/"M$% dmiral

Michael /o,ers% warned that the United States will li+el& be tar,eted b& c&ber efforts desi,ned to

dama,e critical US infrastructure* t the spen Securit& #orum on 24 7ul&% the deput& director of

the 5S% /ichard ed,ett% ad'ocated the need for international c&ber norms% and ar,ued that hina

poses the ,reatest c&ber threat to the United States because state actors share intelli,ence and

intellectual propert& with businesses*14

In turn% hina has pointed to the 5S.s c&ber sur'eillance

acti'ities and the complicit& of US technolo,& companies in 5S pro,rammes*

In pril% US defence secretar& huc+ a,el sou,ht to open dialo,ue with Feoples. iberation rm&

!F$ commanders durin, a 'isit to hina in which he pro'ided some details of US c&ber capabilities

and emer,in, c&ber doctrines* The stated aim of this diplomatic candour was to ensure that hina

understood US c&ber red lines* owe'er% this approach chan,ed in the followin, months*

stream of reports from pri'ate information securit& companies on alle,ed hinese c&ber units and

9bad actors. ha'e pointed to F units tar,etin, US and Israeli companies and ,o'ernment a,encies

to obtain confidential business and ,o'ernment information* US tar,ets ha'e included

Destin,house Electric% lcoa% lle,hen& Technolo,ies% the United Steelwor+ers Union% SolarDorld

and the United States Steel orporationC while Israeli tar,ets included defence contractors in'ol'ed

with Israel.s Iron ome air defence s&stem* "ther operations ha'e focused on US tar,ets with

specific sian ,eopolitical e(pertise and subect matter +nowled,e and more recentl& US thin+ tan+

specialists on Ira)* The shift in hac+in, tar,ets is li+el& to stem from e(tensi'e Sino interests in Ira)i

oil production% with hina bein, the lar,est forei,n in'estor in Ira).s oil sector*

In Ma& 2014% the US ustice department named fi'e members of a hinese Feople.s iberation rm&

ad'anced persistent threat !FT$ unit +nown as Unit <1;H in an indictment for c&ber espiona,e%

which has put a diplomatic chill on continuin, ne,otiations between the two countries o'er c&ber

issues* This is the first criminal hac+in, char,e that the United States has filed a,ainst specific

forei,n officials*

14

http:??www*aspendail&news*com?section?home?1<200



14 "pen 3riefin,

There is no e(tradition treat& between hina and the United States% which ma+es it hi,hl& unli+el&

indeed that the Unit <1;H members will face a US court* Instead% the indictment seems in part

desi,ned to s&mbolicall& shame hina in international forums* In li,ht of e(tensi'e re'elations

about 5S interception and sur'eillance acti'ities% particularl& the installation of bac+doors in

routers scheduled for forei,n e(port% a ran,e of commentators and the hinese ommunist Fart&

ha'e su,,ested that the US indictment is h&pocritical* "thers speculate that the indictment is a US

strate,& to deflect attention from Edward Snowden.s lea+s on US c&ber sp&in, and intelli,ence-

,atherin, acti'ities*

nother moti'ation for the indictment ma& be internal pressure within the US administration to

pursue international norms for c&ber warfare and offensi'es% and the indictment is part of

de'elopin, le,itimac& around c&ber acti'ities* This re)uires the US administration to craft a

con'incin, and easil& understandable distinction between c&ber acti'it& for national securit&

purposes !the supposed 5S approach$ and c&ber espiona,e for the purposes of intellectual

propert& theft and commercial ad'anta,e !the focus of hinese efforts$* "therwise% 3eiin, needs

do no more than hi,hli,ht the contro'ersial 5S acti'ities re'ealed b& Snowden and the complicit&

of US technolo,& companies in 5S sur'eillance pro,rammes*

3eiin, cancellin, its participation in a US-hina wor+in, ,roup on c&bersecurit& after the US

indictments raised 'er& little public criticism* Dith countries such as India% 3raBil and /ussia

harbourin, si,nificant ,rie'ances o'er 5S acti'ities% 3/IS countries are unli+el& to ,i'e an&

si,nificant consideration to US pressure for international c&ber norms* hina.s a,reement to wor+

closel& with the EU on c&bersecurit& issues throu,h enhancin, the wor+ of the hina-EU &berTas+force is li+el& to further isolate the United States and #i'e E&e partners from open dialo,ue and

c&ber-securit& confidence buildin, with hina* #urthermore% there is little strate,ic incenti'e for

less-de'eloped c&ber powers% such as hina% to disclose their current capabilities to a more

dominant c&ber power% such as the United States*

The 7ul& 2014 report of the state department.s International Securit& d'isor& 3oard recommended

that the US administration use bilateral dialo,ues and multilateral discussions establish a broad

multinational cooperati'e response mechanism to promote c&ber stabilit&*1A

owe'er% the limited

capacit& of the United States to influence or catal&se the settin, of c&ber norms is li+el& to reinforce

efforts to increase Fenta,on spendin, on c&ber operations earmar+ed at G2< billion o'er the ne(t

fi'e &ears and to build a <%000 stron, c&ber force b& 201<% ma+in, USN3E/"M one of the

lar,est c&ber forces in the world* s such% the United States is li+el& to continue to pursue both a

norm-settin, a,enda and offensi'e and defensi'e c&ber capabilities*

1A

http:??www*state*,o'?documents?or,aniBation?22;2A*pdf




&ber attac+s bein, deplo&ed in conflicts in Israel% S&ria and Ira)

/ecent conflicts in Israel% S&ria and Ira) ha'e witnessed the c&ber dimension bein, more effecti'el&

inte,rated into +inetic warfare% insur,enc& and terrorism operations* laims such as those made b&

US ssistant ttorne& 8eneral 7ohn arlin that al-6aeda ha'e de'eloped c&ber capabilities% adopted

c&ber warfare as a strate,& and tested the feasibilit& of such operations ha'e captured media

attention*1<

The threat of non-state actors initiatin, full-scale c&ber warfare on the critical

infrastructure of modern economies supports political ustifications for increased c&ber defences*

owe'er% on the ,round reports indicate that the c&ber dimension of the maor Middle East

conflicts is more a+in to c&ber ,uerrilla warfare than sophisticated ad'anced persistent threats

!FTs$ and si,nals interception b& non-state ,roups*

In the conte(t of Israel.s "peration Frotecti'e Ed,e% c&ber attac+s and counter-attac+s ha'e spi+ed

durin, the conflict between amas and the Israeli efence #orce* istributed denial-of-ser'ice

!oS$ and omain 5ame S&stem !5S$ attac+s were launched a,ainst Israeli ,o'ernment a,encies%

financial ser'ices and militar& websites% includin, Mossad and the prime minister.s office% with J0K

of attac+s appearin, to ori,inate or ha'e been routed throu,h 6atar* espite the scale and alle,ed

in'ol'ement of the Iranian &ber rm& and Tur+e&.s c&ber forces in attac+s% the actual le'el of

intrusion% disruption and dama,e to Israeli operations appears limited* Israel.s c&ber defence

capabilities are at this point in time much more ad'anced than those of amas or non-state hac+in,

collecti'es* More capable actors% such as Iran and Tur+e&% ma& ha'e shown strate,ic restraint in not

wantin, to raise the sta+es b& seriousl& attac+in, Israel% a countr& with mature c&ber offensi'e

capabilities*

In Ira)% si,nificant malware distribution and networ+ monitorin, is on the rise* Specificall&% the

popular remote access tool n/T% commonl& used a,ainst S&rian opposition rebels% appears to

bein, widel& used across Ira)i internet ser'ice pro'ider !ISF$ networ+s* The troans and malware are

distributed 'ia malicious web lin+s% most li+el& embedded in political material on social media% and

are li+el& bein, used to e(ecute screen ,rabbin, and +e&-lo,,in, acti'ities* In addition to the

remote access tools% anal&sts ha'e noted a sur,e in use of the T"/ anon&mit& networ+ in Ira) o'er

the last few wee+s% with internet users tr&in, to hide their ISF addresses when underta+in,

malicious acti'ities*

The increase in malware and the broad distribution of n/T in Ira) raises the )uestion of whetherstate-sponsored actors are in'ol'ed% usin, c&ber tools to either disrupt Islamic State

communications or ,ather intelli,ence on the militant ihadist ,roup.s mo'ements* There is the

possibilit& of S&rian Electronic rm& in'ol'ement in c&ber attac+s on the Islamic State for the

purpose of ,atherin, intelli,ence on behalf of the S&rian and Iranian ,o'ernments*

1<

http:??www*ustice*,o'?nsd?pr?remar+s-assistant-attorne&-,eneral-ohn-p-carlin-c&ber-crime-carne,ie-mellon-uni'ersit&



16 "pen 3riefin,

&ber confrontation in U+raine pushes 5T" to consider c&ber mutual

defence doctrines

&ber attac+s between /ussian and U+raine% which encompassed broad scale oS attac+s and

malware distribution for sur'eillance and sabota,e% ha'e spilt o'er into c&ber offensi'e a,ainst

5T"* &ber3er+ut% a ,roup of pro-/ussia hac+ers% were attributed with oS attac+s on 5T"websites in March 2014 as well as malware distribution usin, 'ariations of Sna+e for c&ber-

espiona,e campai,ns* t this point% /ussian Fresident >ladimir Futin has not launched a full-scale

c&ber offensi'e a,ainst U+raine% and while it is unli+el& in the short term% 5T" members are now

much more co,nisant of the need for formal c&ber-defence doctrines*

The recentl&-appro'ed 5T" c&ber pol&,on base in Estonia and the e(istin, 5T" ooperati'e

&ber efence entre of E(cellence !"E$ were ,i'en new rele'ance b& c&ber operations

between /ussia and U+raine* E(ercises% includin, the oc+ed Shields c&ber-warfare drill in March

2014% also enabled 5T" to test its c&ber defences* owe'er% such 5T" acti'ities are unli+el& to

ha'e a si,nificant deterrent effect on the intended tar,et% /ussia% for a number of reasons* #irstl&%/ussia has no need to intensif& the le'el of c&ber attac+ or push the offensi'e to a le'el that would

endan,er human life* Secondl&% challen,es around attributin, attac+s still pro'ide a temporar&

period of plausible deniabilit&*

5T" members are also considerin, c&ber offensi'es in relation to rticle A of the 5orth tlantic

Treat&% the collecti'e defence clause* In li,ht of /ussia.s anne(ation of rimea and pre'ious c&ber

attac+s on Eastern European countries% 5T" has been updatin, its c&ber defence polic& to clarif&

the implications of maor c&ber attac+s on member states* This update builds upon the wor+ of

appro(imatel& 20 e(perts who% at the behest of the "E% e(amined the application of the laws

of armed conflict to c&ber warfare*1J The +e& principle to be established in the polic& is that a certain

intensit& of c&ber attac+ and malicious intention could be treated as the e)ui'alent of an armed

attac+* t the 5T" summit in Dales on 4 September 2014% members indicated support for an

enhanced c&ber defence polic& and made +e& announcements on c&ber defence% includin,

enhancin, the c&ber securit& of national networ+s upon which 5T" depends*1H

The polic& is% howe'er% beset b& a number of political challen,es% and does not detract from the fact

that man& 5T" partners are not necessaril& comfortable with sharin, information on their c&ber

capabilities* =e& Destern European countries and the United States are li+el& to be concerned about

the c&ber 'ulnerabilities of 5T" partners in Eastern Europe who ha'e de'elopin, economies and

reduced le'els of c&ber maturit&* The US department of defence announced in 7une 2014 that the

United States and specific allies are wor+in, to bolster the c&ber offensi'e and defensi'e

capabilities of 'ulnerable US allies% which is a clear indication that there is a fear opponents ma&

focus their attac+s on c&ber-'ulnerable and strate,icall&-important partners in Eastern Europe%

includin, at'ia and ithuania*

1J http:??www*cambrid,e*or,?,b?academic?subects?law?humanitarian-law?tallinn-manual-international-law-applicable-c&ber-

warfare

1H

http:??www*nato*int?cps?en?natoh)?official@te(ts@112;<4*htm




Section >Intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance

5S lea+s force #i'e E&es partners to reconfi,ure and ustif&

sur'eillance acti'ities

The release of information about 5S operations b& Edward Snowden has re)uired man& #i'e E&es

partners to publicall& defend and clarif& the nature of ,o'ernment sur'eillance acti'ities* Snowden

and media outlets holdin, his tro'e of 5S documents ha'e re'ealed a wide-spannin, intelli,ence-

collection networ+ spannin, multiple communication modes and countries* 5S pro,rammes% such

as F/ISM% MNSTI% /ET/"% /MF/T- and S"M8ET% ha'e allowed the a,enc& to collect 'ast

'olumes of communications intelli,ence and metadata% despite pushin, the le,al en'elope*

The international debate o'er the 5S.s acti'ities forced the United =in,dom.s si,nals intelli,ence

a,enc&% 86% to re'eal its polic& on mass sur'eillance% which due to an interpretation loophole

defines communications 'ia social media networ+in, sites and search en,ines outside of the United

=in,dom as 9e(ternal communication. because the ser'ers are based outside 3ritain% usuall& in the

United States* The implication is that 86 can appl& the sur'eillance standard for forei,n

communications in a domestic conte(t% enablin, a form of mass sur'eillance* n ustralian

constitutional affairs committee in)uir& into telecommunication data stora,e and interception has

showed a number of ustralian a,encies collectin, personal telecommunications information

without a warrant* anada is also e(periencin, an emer,in, debate o'er collection% stora,e and

access to personal telecommunications metadata* In response the 3ritish% ustralian and anadian

,o'ernments ha'e needed to formulate clear public polic& on mass sur'eillance*

The 5S.s intelli,ence% sur'eillance and reconnaissance !IS/$ acti'ities ha'e raised the ire of national

,o'ernments% includin, 8erman&% 3raBil% hina and India% international telecommunication

pro'iders% such as >eriBon% US IT companies and ser'ice pro'iders and ci'il libertarians* The US

ouse intelli,ence committee chairman% Mi+e /o,ers% accused the companies of puttin, business

profits from European mar+ets ahead of US national securit&*

1;

owe'er% the political and economicimplications of the 5S.s acti'ities are startin, to become more tan,ible for the US administration%

includin, direct economic costs to US businesses% the loss of credibilit& for the US internet freedom

a,enda and serious dama,e to internet securit& throu,h the wea+enin, of +e& encr&ption

standards% stoc+pilin, information about software securit& 'ulnerabilities and the insertion of

sur'eillance bac+-doors into widel&-used software and hardware*20

1; http:??www*politico*com?blo,s?under-the-radar?2014?0<?ro,ers-lashes-out-at-,oo,le-on-sur'eillance-stance-1;01;;*html

20

http:??oti*newamerica*net?sites?newamerica*net?files?polic&docs?Sur'eilance@osts@#inal*pdf



18 "pen 3riefin,

e,islatures in #i'e E&e urisdictions are ur,entl& considerin, re,ulator& reforms to address public

concerns o'er mass sur'eillance while still maintainin, e(istin, IS/ capabilit& and ensurin,

harmonisation and interoperabilit& between #i'e E&e partners* The US on,ress has alread& seen

two iterations of the US #reedom ct aimed at re,ulatin, 5S acti'ities* The bill initiall& passed

the ouse of /epresentati'es b& a mar,in of nearl& three to one% but the emocrat senator and

chair of the US Senate udiciar& committee% Fatric+ eah&% introduced a re'ised US #reedom ct*The new 'ersion is hailed as stren,thenin, pri'ac& pro'ision where the ori,inal ouse 'ersion of the

bill was too wea+*

In the United =in,dom the three maor political parties ha'e supported le,islation that re)uires

telecommunication companies to retain customer metadata for 12 months and reasserts the

application of data interception obli,ations on o'erseas communication ser'ices pro'iders

deli'erin, ser'ices to 3ritish citiBens* The 3ritish ,o'ernment ar,ued that the ata /etention and

In'esti,ator& Fowers 3ill is an emer,enc& response to the European ourt of 7ustice !E7$ rulin, in

pril 2014 that in'alidated a 200< EU directi'e allowin, telecommunication companies to store

customer metadata for up to two &ears* The E7 held that the directi'e disproportionatel&interfered with the fundamental ri,hts of pri'ac& and protection of personal data*

ustralia and anada.s political establishments are also contendin, with contentious reforms to

sur'eillance and data-retention acti'ities* In ustralia% the director-,eneral of the ustralian

Securit& and Intelli,ence "r,anisation% a'id Ir'ine% made a rare media appearance to e(plain

proposed le,islation*21

Ir'ine also told the ustralian senate.s le,al and constitutional affairs

references committee that it is appropriate that telecommunication companies retain metadata

upwards of two &ears* In anada% a Gloe and Mail article re'ealed that reforms to anada.s

electronic intelli,ence a,enc&% the ommunications Securit& Establishment anada !SE$% fla,,ed

as a critical le,islati'e priorit& b& then defence minister Feter Mac=a&% were derailed in 200;*22

The 5ew Lealand parliament alread& passed reform to the 8o'ernment ommunications Securit&

3ureau ct in 201* owe'er% re'elations on the e'e of the 5ew Lealand election b& the Intercept

show a de,ree of cooperation between 5ew Lealand and the United States to establish a le'el of

public communications sur'eillance in 2012 and 201*2

In all urisdictions% the current concerns around the threat of fi,hters returnin, from S&ria and Ira)

are pro'in, an important catal&st for ,o'ernments to push ahead with reforms* In the case of the

United =in,dom% reforms were concurrent with the announcement of a O1*1 billion pac+a,e to

e)uip the armed forces for modern conflicts% which includes an o'er OH00 million boost to 3ritish

intelli,ence% sur'eillance and c&ber capabilities* Such mo'es are li+el& to be repeated across other

urisdictions% despite an& pled,es for defence bud,et austerit&% to potentiall& offset an& operational

inefficienc& introduced b& political-acceptable IS/ reforms* #urthermore% there is li+el& a le'el of

coordination between the #i'e E&e urisdictions in order to ensure interoperabilit& and retain

e(istin, sur'eillance capabilities% e'en if those capabilities are distributed across the alliance*

21 http:??www*abc*net*au?news?2014-0H-0H?asio-chief-sa&s-securit&-plan-not-mass-sur'eillance-e(ercise?A<AHA2<

22 http:??www*the,lobeandmail*com?news?politics?wiretap-o'ersi,ht-bill-derailed-in-200;?article200A4;0J?

2

https:??firstloo+*or,?theintercept?2014?0;?1A?new-Bealand-,csb-spear,un-mass-sur'eillance?




efence ministries buildin, capabilities for information operations

across social media

efence ministries are increasin,l& interested in open source intelli,ence !"SI5T$ collectable from

social media networ+s* /ecent e(amples where "SI5T has pro'ided critical e'idence to e(plain

important ,lobal e'ents include NouTube 'ideos of a 3u+ missile launcher in eastern U+raine after

the downin, of Mala&sia irlines #li,ht 1J and Eliot i,,ins. wor+ under the pseudon&m 3rown

Moses on barrel bombs and other weapons used in the S&rian ci'il war*

8o'ernments% the pri'ate sector and 58"s are de'elopin, comple( research pro,rammes that use

bi, data for conflict prediction and pre'ention* These include the US defence departmentPs

Information >olume and >elocit& !I>2$ pro,ramme% the I.s "pen Source Indicators pro,ramme

and the United 5ationPs 8lobal Fulse initiati'e* Most intelli,ence ser'ices monitor social media

networ+s* The 8erman forei,n intelli,ence ser'ice% the 3undesnachrichtendienst !35$% recentl&

committed Q00 million to support real-time social media monitorin, to brin, it in line with theUnited States. 5S and 3ritain.s 86*

owe'er% more recent announcements and re'elations about 5S acti'ities indicate that

,o'ernments are also interested in social media networ+s as a social terrain on which information

operations and propa,anda campai,ns can be carried out with the aim of influencin, audience

responses* #or e(ample% 3E S&stems are e(pected to recei'e a total of O0 million from the U=

Ministr& of efence for proects to e(plore wa&s for the militar& to use social media and

ps&cholo,ical techni)ues to influence peoplePs beliefs* ocuments lea+ed b& Edward Snowden show

that 86.s 7oint Threat /esearch Intelli,ence 8roup !7T/I8$ has alread& de'eloped a number of

information operation applications* The applications pro'ide 86 with the abilit& to manipulate

and alter information presentation across social media platforms% bloc+ email and website access%

co'ertl& record real-time S+&pe con'ersations and retrie'e pri'ate #aceboo+ photos*

The US department of defence.s militar& research arm% the efence d'anced /esearch Froects

,enc& !/F$% pre-empti'el& released information on its Social Media in Strate,ic

ommunication !SMIS$ pro,ramme after re'elations about #aceboo+.s emotional conta,ion news

feed e(periment and the 7T/I8 applications* The ustralian efence #orce !#$ has also re'ealed

that it has de'eloped offensi'e information operation doctrines* Media reports su,,est that the

/ussian ,o'ernment recruits an arm& of 9online patriots. who consistentl& post pro-/ussian

sentiment on Destern media websites% such as #o( 5ews% uffin,ton Fost and Folitico*

Such social terrain acti'ities are most li+el& ,oin, to be deplo&ed b& militaries durin, combat

operations or ci'il unrest to mana,e the social d&namics of conflict% and will be more ad'anced and

sophisticated than historical propa,anda campai,ns* onsistent with trends in other areas of

remote-control warfare% these information operations are li+el& to be hi,hl& tar,eted and based on

detailed intelli,ence on social networ+ structures% includin, +e& decision ma+ers and people of

influence*



20 "pen 3riefin,

Sub'ersion of encr&ption standards part of intelli,ence tool+it

ocuments lea+ed b& Edward Snowden in September 201 implicated the 5S in the co'ert

underminin, of encr&ption standards throu,h a G2A0 million si,nals intelli,ence !SI8I5T$ enablin,

pro,ramme* In ecember 201% information came to li,ht that re'ealed the 5S.s encoura,ement

of and support for tech-securit& compan& /S in ma+in, a now-discredited cr&pto,raph& s&stem

used b& a wide ran,e of companies and ser'ices* fter the fallout from the eartbleed "penSS bu,

disco'ered in pril 2014 and the discontinuation of the freeware encr&ption tool Truer&pt in Ma&

2014 left consumers and businesses concerned about encr&ption securit&% pressure has built on the

US on,ress to address 5S e(ploitation of encr&ption bac+doors for sur'eillance and intelli,ence

collection*

espite the director of national intelli,ence% 7ames lapper% ma+in, it clear in bud,et re)uests that

US a,encies need cr&ptanal&tic capabilities to defeat enem& cr&pto,raph& and e(ploit internet

traffic% more recent deliberations of the US ouse science and technolo,& committee adopted an

amendment from #lorida emocrat lan 8ra&son to remo'e the mandator& re)uirement for the

5ational Institute of Standards and Technolo,& !5IST$ to consult with the 5S when de'elopin,

securit& standards* The aim of the amendment is to pre'ent the 5S from influencin, the peer

re'iew process for encr&ption standards de'eloped b& the 5IST* The amendment% which is now part

of the 5IST /eauthorisation ct of 2014% was passed b& the ouse of /epresentati'es on 22 7ul&

2014*

The sub'ersion of encr&ption standards poses a 'e(in, challen,e for man& ,o'ernments* /ecent

anal&sis b& /ecorded #uture showed that a number of muahideen fi,hters and operati'es are usin,

open-source% off-the-shelf encr&ption tools% which ma& ha'e in-built 'ulnerabilities that can be

e(ploited b& intelli,ence a,encies*24

owe'er% lea'in, in-built 'ulnerabilities ma& allow them to be

e(ploited b& non-state actors and c&ber criminals* 3oth le,itimate multinational companies and

terrorist ,roups such as al-6aeda use encr&ption tools for communication* s such% in-built

'ulnerabilities and bac+doors can be e(ploited for unauthorised sur'eillance% c&ber espiona,e and

intelli,ence% or can be used to tar,et terrorist or criminal ,roups*

24

https:??www*recordedfuture*com?al-)aeda-encr&ption-technolo,&-part-2?

trends in remote-control warfare: march-september 2014

Documents