travis lyon - dissertation - tcd-ucd
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Trinity College Dublin & University College Dublin Masters in Development Practice
Dissertation
Old Soldiers, New Country? Lessons learned and challenges faced during the Rwandan disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration process
By Travis Lyon
Student: Travis Lyon
Supervisor: Dr. Andy Storey
Date: August 31, 2016
Student TCD ID: 14309856
Student UCD ID: 14206272
Word Count: 10,192
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Declaration
I, Travis Lyon, declare that this thesis has not been previously submitted as an
exercise for a degree at this or any other university, and that it is 10,192 words in
length.
The work described herein is entirely my own work, except for the assistance
mentioned in the acknowledgments.
I agree that the library may lend or copy this thesis upon request. This permission
covers only single copies made for study purposes, subject to normal conditions of
acknowledgement.
Signed: _______________________________________
Date: August 31, 2016
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Abstract
The Rwandan DDR process is often seen in literature as either an example of exceptional
success that has fostered reconciliation through “locally owned” programming, or as a case
of “government ownership” where the RPF exerted its control over the DDR process in
order to force a new Rwandan identity based on nationalism rather than ethnicism. This
dissertation set out to determine the lessons learned and challenges faced during the
Rwandan DDR process that began in 1997 with the establishment of the Rwanda
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). Research, which consists of
interviews with staff from the RDRC, international organizations, donor governments and
ex-‐combatant led cooperative businesses, a survey of residents throughout Kigali, and data
obtained from the RDRC’s Management Information System (MIS) database, was analyzed
through the lenses of ex-‐combatant reintegration, reconciliation, and local ownership. The
research gathered for this dissertation showed that the overall Rwandan DDR experience is
far from black and white. Research indicates that while the RDRC has in fact found much
success with highly praised, contextually appropriate, and well-‐implemented DDR
programming, worries of “forced” reconciliation and socio-‐political repression are still
present. MIS information shows a disproportionate amount of disability benefits go to ex-‐
RDF combatants. Additionally evidence from interviews indicated that level of control
exercised by the Government of Rwanda was seen by some as excessive, as it prevents Hutu
voices from being heard within the DDR process and wider reconciliation efforts. Overall
these findings support some of the existing literature that argues for the exemplary success
of Rwandan DDR efforts, as well as literature arguing that Rwandan DDR is a case of
“government ownership” as opposed to “local ownership.” Additionally, research is needed
regarding the role of ex-‐combatant cooperative businesses, decentralization policy, and
divisionism laws in Rwandan DDR and reconciliation efforts. Finally, this dissertation
argues that due to the unique political, social, and economic situation of Rwanda the
exemplary aspects of its DDR process are unlikely to be easily repilicated in other post-‐
conflict situations.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the help of my supervisor Dr. Andy Storey as well as professors
Dr. Susan Murphy and Dr. Pádraig Carmody for their guidance and patience throughout the
writing and researching processes. I would also like to extend my thanks to Birasa
Nyamulinda who helped secure me access to the RDRC, and Jeanette who provided me with
nearly unlimited support during my field work in Kigali, and truly made this research
possible. Additionally, I thank all of those who participated in interviews and surveys about
this rather sensitive topic. Also, Elaine Elders must be thanked for her above and beyond
support during the fieldwork process. Furthermore, I would like to thank all of the faculty,
staff and alumni from the TCD-‐UCD Masters in Development Practice for being supportive
and allowing for constructive conversations inside and outside of class that have, I’ve been
told, allowed me to turn half-‐baked ideas into something resembling academic discourse. I
would also like to thank all of my fellow TCD-‐UCD Masters in Development Practice
students, except for one, for their friendship and peer support during stressful times, such
as the times spent writing this dissertation. As for Kurt Vonnegut, Paul Simon, and Werner
Herzog, they have made, respectively, books, songs, and films that have positively
challenged me and broadened my capacity to critically interpret information, so I will thank
them too. Finally, I want to thank my mother and father, Nancy and Bill, for allowing me to
exist and supporting my sorry hindquarters through a lot of my years here on Earth, I am
indebted to their love and sound parenting skills forever.
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Table of Contents
Figures and Tables 6
Abbreviations 7
Chapter 1: Introduction 8
Chapter 2: Literature Review 12
Chapter 3: Study Design 28
Chapter 4: Results 33
Chapter 5: Discussion 42
Chapter 6: Conclusion 47
Bibliography 49
Appendices 53
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Figures and Tables
Table 1
Successes of Rwandan DDR and/or successful strategies for 33
ex-‐combatant reintegration as seen by interviewees
Table 2
Challenges for Rwandan DDR and/or to ex-‐combatant 34
reintegration as seen by interviewees
Fig. 1
Distribution of disability benefit recipients by previous 35
military affiliation
Fig. 2
Ex-‐combatants processed by previous military affiliation 35
Fig. 3
Ex-‐combatant cooperatives by type 37
Fig. 4
Survey respondent's feelings of having ex-‐combatants live in 39
their communities by previous military affliation
Fig. 5
Survey respondent's feelings about government benefits for 39
ex-‐combatants by previous military affiliation
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Abbreviations
AG Armed Group
ALiR Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda
BNK Basic Needs Kit
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR Forces Armeés Rwandaises
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda
GoR Government of Rwanda
IDDDRS Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IGA Income Generating Activity
ILO International Labour Organization
IO International Organization
MINALOC Ministry of Local Government
MIS Management Information System
NGO Non-‐Government Organization
NURC National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PCB United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PFO Programme Field Officer
RDF Rwanda Defence Forces
RDRC Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RPA Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF Rwanda Patriotic Front
RSA Recognition of Service Allowance
SRC Socioeconomic Reintegration Coordinator
SRO Socioeconomic Reintegration Officer
SSA Sub-‐Saharan Africa
SSR Security Sector Reform
VSW Vulnerability Support Window
UN United Nations
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Since 1997 over 68,000 Rwandan ex-‐combatants have gone through the national
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program.1 DDR is considered by the
United Nations (UN) to be “an integral part of post-‐conflict peace consolidation” that can
help establish a secure environment so that other elements of a peacebuilding strategy can
proceed.2 However, despite the importance of DDR in post-‐conflict environments, DDR has
remained a persistent challenge to peacebuilding efforts around the world, particularly in
Africa’s Great Lakes region.3 In the Great Lakes region Burundi and the Eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) have experienced at-‐best tumultuous, at-‐worst failed attempts at
DDR, as well as subsequent challenges to their national peace and stability following social,
political and economic strife between Hutu and Tutsi populations.4 However, the Rwandan
DDR process has been praised for its successful DDR programming that has both
reintegrated ex-‐combatants and fostered reconciliation through “locally owned”
programming.5
While the 1994 Rwandan Genocide revealed many of humanity’s shortcomings, it
subsequently galvanized a somewhat miraculous transformation of Rwanda into one of the
most secure and economically prosperous nations in Sub-‐Saharan Africa (SSA).6 At the
center of Rwanda’s post-‐genocide peacebuilding process has been its DDR program, which
began in 1997 with the establishment of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration
Commission (RDRC), and has been widely hailed as a successful “model for the continent as
1 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Annual Activity Report 2013 (Kigali: Government of Rwanda, 2013). 2 See United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. “What is DDR?” (UNDDR: 2016); UNDDR. “2.10 The UN Approach to DDR.” In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, an Reintegration Standards (UN: 2006), 3. 3 Edmonds, Martin, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo." African Security 2, no. 1 (April 6, 2009), 29-‐58. 4 Ibid. 5 Wilén, Nina. 2012. "A Hybrid Peace through Locally Owned and Externally Financed ssr–ddr in Rwanda?." Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7 (August 2012), 1323-‐36. 6 Wicks, Laura H. "Rwanda 's Miracle: From Genocide and Poverty to Peace and Economic Prosperity." FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations, no. Paper 1526 (April 14, 2014): 1-‐66.
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a whole” due to its sound programming and inclusivity.7 However, others have stated that
Rwanda’s so-‐called success in DDR is the product of a controlling and autocratic
government that holds together a “fragile” and “virtual” peace in the country.8
This dissertation looks at the Rwandan DDR process, with a focus on the reintegration
phase and civilianization process for ex-‐combatants from both programmatic and socio-‐
political perspectives in order to answer the question “what are the lessons learned and
challenges faced during the Rwandan DDR process?” Qualitative data with some
quantitative measures gathered over a period of 5 weeks during June and July 2015 will be
drawn upon to discern the achievements of Rwandan DDR, and to explore the challenges
that have affected and may continue to affect the process.
The data is comprised of interviews with staff from the RDRC, international organizations
(IOs) and donor governments involved in supporting the Rwandan DDR efforts, and civilian
ex-‐combatant cooperative business representatives. Additionally, there is metadata
obtained from the RDRC’s Management Information System (MIS) database, and a survey of
residents throughout Kigali intended to measure the public perception and awareness of ex-‐
combatants and DDR efforts. This case study was chosen because it offers a high-‐level
overview of DDR efforts from the government organization that has overseen them for the
past 19 years as well as data from civilians who play a key role in the reintegration phase of
DDR and are collectively the end target of wider reconciliation efforts in post-‐conflict
situations.
In particular, this dissertation looks at three integral aspects of DDR and interprets existing
knowledge and data on Rwandan DDR as well as the data collected from field research as
they pertain to these aspects of DDR. These aspects are:
7 See Edmonds, et al., "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 31; Rusagara, Frank. "Peacebuilding in the Context of the Rwanda Defence Forces." In The African Military in the 21st Century: Report of the 2007 Tswalu Dialogue, by Jonathan Oppenheimer and Jennifer Oppenheimer. (London: Royal United Services Institute: 2007). 8 Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36.
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I. Reintegration
The final phase of DDR comes in two forms, social and economic. Some argue that economic indicators are over-‐stressed to the detriment of social reintegration and wider reconciliation efforts.9 Others see the entire reintegration process hollistically as “socioecomic.” 10 In this paper, the focus will primarily be on the programmatic aspects of reintegration.
II. DDR as a part of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding
The UN officially recognizes DDR can contribute to achieving long-‐term shared objectives as an early stage of reconciliation and peacebuilding processes.11 Willems argues that there are two main approaches to DDR: “minimalist,” which is short-‐term and security focused, and “maximalist,” which is implemented from day one with long-‐term development in mind.12
III. Local Ownership
Many identify the local ownership of DDR and wider reconciliation efforts as highly beneficial, if not essential to success, as it minimizes the chances of culturally incompetent DDR programming and allows for a more natural reconciliation process.13 Edmonds goes as far as to identify Rwandan complete ownership of its DDR efforts as a key factor in its success while others argue that when too much power is given to new governments in post-‐conflict situations there is a risk of “government ownership.”14
While this dissertation is operating on underlying assumptions that Rwandan DDR efforts
have generally been successful, it is important to note that it is not explicitly attempting to
undermine other less favorable assessments of Rwanda’s wider experience with
peacebuilding and reconciliation or create an absolutist argument that Rwanda’s DDR
efforts are beyond criticism. Rather, it is an effort to analyze the contextual “lessons
learned” from Rwanda’s experience with DDR and contribute to existing discourse in the
wider academic and policy spheres.
9 Bowd, Richard, and Alpaslan Özerdem. 2013. "How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants." Journal Of Intervention & Statebuilding 7, no. 4 (December 2013), 453-‐75. 10 Kingma, Kees. "Demobilisation and Peacebuilding in Africa." In Recovering from Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace, and Development, edited by Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel. (London: Frank Cass: 2002), 181-‐201. 11 UNDDR. "2.20 Post-‐conflict Stabilization, Peacebuilding and Recovery Frameworks." In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (UN: 2006), 2. 12 Willems, Rens, and Mathijs van Leeuwen. "Reconciling reintegration: the complexity of economic and social reintegration of ex-‐combatants in Burundi." Disasters 39, no. 2 (April 2015), 316-‐38. 13 See Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58; Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36 14 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 41; Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36.
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There are five additional chapters in this dissertation: Chapter 2 will open with definitions
of DDR and a review of relevant literature across the three previously identified attributes
of “successful” DDR. Additionally, it will give overview of Tutsi-‐Hutu relations in Great Lakes
region, relevant military and armed-‐groups, and literature that specifically addresses
Rwandan DDR, reconciliation and peacebuilding processes. Chapter 3 will describe the
research design and the methods employed in collecting and analyzing the data gathered
whilst in Rwanda. Chapter 4 will articulate the results of the research as they relate to
reintegration, reconciliation, and local ownership. Chapter 5 will discuss these results
within the wider literature covered in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 6 will draw conclusions
based on the data and literature that was discussed.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The purpose of this chapter is to define DDR and discuss three primary areas of DDR
discourse in the practical and academic spheres, provide an overview of Hutu-‐Tutsi
dynamics in the pre and post genocide eras, and review literature specifically concerning
Rwanda’s DDR efforts. Please note that some of the literature covered may hold relevance in
more than one of the below categories.
2.1 Defining DDR
The World Bank defines Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) as a “a
process that contributes to security and stability by disarming combatants, removing them
from military structures, and socially and economically integrating them into society.”15
Disarmament is the first step of DDR that bundles all activities such as the collection,
documentation, and disposal of small arms from the combatants and civilian population.16
Demobilization is described as the “formal and controlled discharge of active combatants
from armed forces or other armed groups.”17 Demobilization is often implemented in two
stages, the first being the processing of individual combatants into temporary centers
where they receive education and training, and the second being “reinsertion,” wherein ex-‐
combatants are given a basic support package after their time at the center is through.
The UN describes the final phase of DDR, reintegration, as “essentially a social and economic
process with an open time-‐frame” in which ex-‐combatants “acquire civilian status and gain
sustainable employment and income.”18 Reintegration itself is often classified into two
categories: economic reintegration and social reintegration. However, while there are
distinctions between economic and social reintegration in both practice and literature,
there is also a growing trend towards identifying the reintegration process singularly as
“socioeconomic reintegration” in order to acknowledge that economic and social
15 Nezam, Taies, and Alexandre Marc. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration." Social Development Department. February 2009. 16 UNDDR, "2.10 The UN Approach to DDR,” 4. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., 5.
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reintegration efforts impact one another and do not exist in individual silos.19 Torjesen calls
reintegration the “underfinanced and understudied third element of DDR,” and represents a
relatively recent movement to bring reintegration to the forefront of DDR discourse.20
2.2 Reintegration
2.2.1 Economic Reintegration
The most common objective of economic reintegration is to provide support for ex-‐
combatants so that they can develop alternatives to violence-‐based livelihoods and become
“productive members in a peaceful society.”21 Economic reintegration for ex-‐combatants
comes in the form of fairly straightforward programming and generally includes
reintegration allowances, education, vocational training, and the creation of employment
for ex-‐combatants which often comes with the assistance of public funding for either public
or private sector jobs.22 Bowd and Özerdem believe that “economic reintegration initiatives
continue to be the main approach and applications undertaken by DDR programmes around
the world.”23
Willems and van Leeuwen write that economic reintegration is “easily defined,” as its
success can be measured by employment, income, and education numbers gleaned from
surveys of ex-‐combatants.24 However, even though economic reintegration measures are
often considered easy to measure and define, it has been noted that even these “easy”
processes such as labor market analysis for ex-‐combatants are sometimes ignored.25 One
example of this from Afghanistan cited ex-‐combatants who were provided computer
19 See ILO. Socio-‐Economic Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants. Geneva: International Labour Office, 2009; Lamb, Guy. Assessing the Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants in the Context of Instability and Informal Economies. (Washington, DC: World Bank: 2011). 20 Torjesen, Stina. "Towards a theory of ex-‐combatant reintegration."Stability: International Journal Of Security & Development 2, no. 3 (September 2013), 1-‐13. 21 See UNDDR. "2.30 Participants, Beneficiaries, and Partners." In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (UN: 2006), 27; Knight, W. Andy. "Linking DDR and SSR in post conflict peace-‐building in Africa: An overview." African Journal Of Political Science & International Relations 4, no. 1 (January 2010), 29-‐54. 22 UNDDR. "3.10 Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures." In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (UN: 2006),29. 23 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess the Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 4. 24 Willems and van Leeuwen,"Reconciling reintegration,” 316-‐38. 25 Ibid.
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trainings despite the fact that their home communities lacked electricity.26 While economic
reintegration measures are an undoubtedly important part of the DDR process, it is also
now widely recognized that even “strictly” economic measures have both social and
economic impacts on the reintegration of ex-‐combatants.27
2.2.2 Social Reintegration and Socioeconomic Reintegration
Unlike economic reintegration, social reintegration is a considerably less measureable
concept. Most practical definitions of social reintegration revolve around making positive
contributions to social cohesion and peacebuilding by allowing ex-‐combatants and their
families to be accepted back into communities, and sensitizing the recipient communities so
that may eventually have positive attitudes towards ex-‐combatants.28
Nordstom states that in the worst of times civilians and ex-‐combatants can face “the
destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, and of valued traditions and the
integrity of the community” after war.29 Bowd and Özerdem believe that for these reasons,
social reintegration is absolutely vital to the success of DDR programs because its success
has been proven to help ease the various social tensions rife in post-‐conflict societies.30
There is also a growing trend to look at ex-‐combatant reintegration with fewer strict
divisions between the social and the economic. Kingma states that reintegration has
economic, political, and social spheres, and they should be understood both as individual
entities and as interwoven parts that affect one another.31 In line with Kingma’s explanation
of the reintegration process, Bowd and Özerdem have argued that more qualitative
indicators should be used to ensure a more comprehensive assessment of reintegration
impacts in order to capture numerically intangible elements.32
26 Palau, Rainer G. Socio-‐Economic Reintegration and Livelihoods. Series 3. CIMIC, 2012. 27 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 460. 28 Ibid., 1. 29 Nordstrom, Carolyn. A Different Kind of War Story (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 1997). 30 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 448. 31 Kingma, "Demobilisation and Peacebuilding in Africa,” 181-‐201. 32 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 453-‐75.
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Torjesen also argues that core assumptions of ex-‐combatant reintegration must be
rethought and issues addressed holistically. She states that reintegration is a “process, not a
programme,” and that “reintegration is a misnomer” because there are not always inherent
social or economic challenge for ex-‐combatants to return to their communities.33
Additionally, she cites evidence that combatants can actually gain useful skills and social
capital during war that they can use to add value to their reintegration process.34 In short,
Tojesen’s arguments succinctly sum up the “socioeconomic reintegration” approach as one
that aims contextually to address social, political and economic reintegration issues without
strict adherence to “box-‐ticking” or universal assumptions of ex-‐combatants.
2.3 DDR as a part of Reconciliation and Peacebuilding
Özerdem notes that the study and recognition of interlinkages between successful DDR and
other post-‐conflict strategies such as reconciliation and peacebuilding are relatively recent
developments.35 Even as new research and literature arises, few authors directly address
these relationships head-‐on, and often choose to focus on the security impacts of DDR
rather than the reconciliatory impacts.36 However, there is a small but growing body of
literature and policy that recognizes these interlinkages, particularly in regards to the
reintegration phase of DDR.37
Özerdem and Knight both argue that there is a clear positive relationship between
successful ex-‐combatant reintegration and successful peacebuilding efforts, but that in
order for DDR to be beneficial for reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts programming
must walk a fine line in order to specifically target ex-‐combatants and foster their new
civilian identities whilst simultaneously avoiding preferential treatment or excessive 33 Torjesen, "Towards a theory of ex-‐combatant reintegration,” 1-‐13. 34 Ibid. 35 Özerdem, Alpaslan. "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-‐Cultural Perspective." Third World Quarterly 23 (October 2002), 961-‐75. 36 Theidon, Kimberly Susan. "Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia." Human Rights Quarterly no. 1 (February 2009), 1-‐34. 37 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 453-‐75; Porto, João Gomes., Chris Alden, and Imogen Parsons. From Soldiers to Citizens: Demilitarization of Conflict and Society. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Hazen, Jennifer M. "Social Integration of Ex-‐Combatants after Civil War." In United Nations Expert Group Meeting “Dialogue in the Social Integration Process: Building Peaceful Social Relations—By, For, and With People,” (UN: 2005), 1-‐11.
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benefits that can inspire resentment towards ex-‐combatants from the communities in which
they resettle.38 In this same line of thinking, Zena claims that the common practice of
reintegrating ex-‐combatants into security services like a national army or police force has
directly contributed to conflict relapse and failed reconciliation efforts throughout Africa
because it creates community resentment towards an “unprofessional security sector” that
undermines peacebuilding efforts.39
Estrada also believes in these inherent links between DDR and reconciliation, but explicitly
states that ex-‐combatants should be viewed as leaders rather than beneficiaries of what is a
normally top-‐town DDR process.40 In a study of ex-‐combatant reintegration in El Salvador,
she found that while “grassroots peacemaking” led by ex-‐combatants can seem
contradictory, it has the ability to plant seeds for “social healing” that can help unite divided
societies and bring about lasting “democratic peace” through expanded community
dialogues.41 A 2009 concept note from the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) shares this
lean towards “grassroots” DDR and argues that reintegration should “enhance coexistence
opportunities among divided communities” through projects that can bring diversified
groups such as ex-‐combatants, civilians, civil society, or “members of diverse cultural or
ethnic groups” to work together towards a common goal.42
International organizations involved in DDR processes have also began to formally
recognize links between DDR, reconciliation and peacebuilding over the past decade, albeit
primarily through a top-‐down lens. The UN, most notably in the 2006 Integrated DDR
Standards (IDDRS) which provide the most comprehensive “official” theoretical and
technical basis for UN DDR efforts, identifies DDR as an “early step” that can “lay the
groundwork” for long-‐term peace, security, and development.”43 One the other hand, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) recognizes the role of reintegration in
38 Özerdem, Alpaslan, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan,” 961-‐975; Knight, “DDR and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa,” 29-‐54. 39 Zena, Prosper. "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa." Africa Security Brief, no. 24 (January 2013), 1-‐8. 40 Estrada, Ruth Elizabeth Velásquez. "Grassroots Peacemaking : The Paradox of “reconciliation” in El Salvador." UT Electronic Theses and Dissertations, May 2011, 1-‐39. 41 Ibid. 42Bertrand, Pierre, Awa Dabo, Luca Dall'Oglio, Alejandro Eder, and Carmen Hernandez. "Lessons Learned on Sustainable Reintegration in Post-‐Conflict Situations." In UN PCB Workshop on Lessons Learned, (New York: UN PCB: 2009), 1-‐3. 43 UNDDR, "2.10 The UN Approach to DDR,” 3.
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reconciliation and peacebuilding efforts as continuous process rather than an “early step.”
They believe that the reintegration of ex-‐combatants must “be inclusive and part of wider
recovery strategies and linked to a long-‐term, sustainable recovery process” in order to
ensure that reintegration remains linked with “further reconstruction and development.”44
Willems and van Leeuwen best encapsulate the main differences between the IDDRS
interpretation of DDR and the ILO interpretation. They argue that “minimalist” DDR, as put
forth the aforementioned section of the IDDRS, is meant to support “short-‐term security” in
order to deter ex-‐combatants form being “spoilers” of the peace process, and that
“maximalist” DDR, as broadly proposed by the ILO, is meant to be focused on long-‐term
development goals.45 In their opinion, there are arguments for both “minimalist” and
“maximalist” approaches and that the needs of both short-‐term security and long-‐term
development should be addressed in DDR programming in order to ensure stability
throughout the reconciliation and peacebuilding processes.46
2.4 Local Ownership of DDR
The underlying theory of local ownership in DDR is that DDR cannot be an “outside-‐in”
activity, and must include local actors at “all levels of society” in order to ensure culturally
and contextually appropriate planning and implementation.47 The IDDRS enshrines local
ownership as “essential to the success and sustainability” of DDR, and stresses that the
outcome of DDR efforts “rests with the national and local actors who are ultimately
responsible for peace, security and development.”48
Additionally, local ownership is often intrinsically tied with reviving a civil society that
functions with “democratic standards and good governance” within a post-‐conflict
environment.49 Kilroy shares this belief and argues that when local ownership is respected
in DDR there are statistically better outcomes in terms of social capital indicators such as 44ILO, Socio-‐Economic Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants, 9. 45 Willems and van Leeuwen,"Reconciling reintegration,” 316-‐20. 46 Ibid. 47 UN PBSO. "From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-‐Conflict Peacebuilding." In UN PBSO Workshop Report June 2011 (UN PBSO: 2011), 1. 48 UNDDR, "2.10 The UN Approach to DDR,” 4. 49 Hänggi, Heiner, and Vincenza Scherrer. Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo. (Berlin: Lit: 2008).
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work, economic status, and community relations.50 When it is not respected, von Billerbeck
argues international staff involved in the planning, advising, and implementation of
peacebuilding efforts often end up trying to engage in the “social engineering” of their host
country to “force” DDR and reconciliation, which leads to less than desirable results.51
However, there is still an ongoing belief within the UN PCB that it is “far from clear how the
concept [of local ownership] should be put into practice” as there is yet to be a standardized
answer to the question of “who owns what?”52 Both the UN and Wilén believe that the crux
of the question lies within the definition of local ownership itself. They argue that while in
theory local ownership should encompass every level of society, when it is present in
practice it is often in the form of “government ownership,” where a domineering national
government and elites dictate the terms of national DDR programming and reporting.53
However, others see the same issue in a different light, essentially arguing that government
ownership is essential to the success of DDR.54
2.5 Overview of Pre-‐1994 Hutu-‐Tutsi Relations
Understanding the context for Rwandan DDR efforts first requires the understanding of
Hutu-‐Tutsi relations and conflicts within the Great Lakes region that go back much farther
than the Rwandan Genocide. Within the areas that are now Rwanda, Burundi, and Eastern
DRC Tutsi pastoralists subjugated Hutu agriculturalists and Twa hunter-‐gatherers during
the 15th and 16th centuries. Hutus were, and still are, a majority group accounting for
around 80-‐85% of the population, while Tutsis and Twa were and are minority groups,
accounting respectively for about 10-‐20% and 1-‐2% of the population in the region.55
Cyuma believes that although the three groups shared the same geographical location,
language, tradition, and religion, the Tutsi rule “gradually became offensive and
50 Kilroy, Walt. "From Conflict to Ownership: Participatory Approaches to the Re-‐integration of Ex-‐Combatants in Sierra Leone."Irish Studies in International Affairs, (March 2012): 127-‐144. 51 von Billerbeck, Sarah B. K. "Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding: Discourse Versus Operationalization." Global Governance 21, no. 2 (April 2015): 299-‐315. 52 UN PBSO, "From Rhetoric to Practice,” 1. 53 See Ibid.; Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1331. 54 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 51. 55 Appiah, Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates. "Ethnicity in Rwanda: An Interpretation." In Encyclopedia of Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2010), 447-‐53.
19
discriminated against the grassroots people, mainly the Hutu and Twa” and noted that this
age-‐old tension still exists to some degree, but has been under-‐explored and suppressed
because most early historical accounts of Rwanda came from Tutsi dignitaries.56 Contrary to
the views of Cyuma, the Government of Rwanda (GoR) states that although the Tutsi king
was “supreme” the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa “lived in symbiotic harmony.”57
Despite these differing interpretations of early Hutu-‐Tutsi relations, it is universally agreed
that ethnic divisionism was greatly exacerbated and formally codified during the Belgian
colonization of Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. During colonization, the Belgians adopted a
policy of indirect rule and imposed a strict racial hierarchy that was formalized in 1933
when they required all colonial subjects to carry identity cards indicating if they were Hutu,
Tutsi, or Twa. No longer were people able to move from class to class by marriage or wealth
acquisition. All social mobility between the groups ceased, and the Tutsis were given highly
preferential status, amplifying any previously existing ethnic tensions by an innumerable
factor.58
Following the Belgian decolonization process that began in 1960 Rwanda, Burundi, and the
DRC were left newly independent and grossly unprepared for statehood as ethnic tensions
came to a head. Before Rwanda had formally gained its independence a Hutu nationalist
party assumed power and began to carry out attacks against the Tutsi population that left
tens of thousands dead. This violence led over 100,000 Tutsi refugees to subsequently flee
into neighboring countries.59 Some of these Tutsi refugees then formed rebel groups and
launched attacks into Rwanda, prompting the Hutu government to carry out several
additional waves of Tutsi exterminations within Rwanda.60
In Burundi, after an initial challenge from the 85% majority Hutu population, a series of
Tutsi military dictators sympathetic to exiled Rwandan Tutsis remained in power while
disenfranchising the Burundian Hutu population until 1993.61 In Zaire’s (now the DRC)
56 Cyuma, Samuel. Picking up the Pieces: The Church and Conflict Resolution in South Africa and Rwanda. (Oxford: Regnum Books International: 2012), 133-‐61. 57 Government of Rwanda. "Brief History of Rwanda." (Republic of Rwanda: 2014). 58 Appiah and Gates, "Ethnicity in Rwanda: An Interpretation,” 447-‐53. 59 Ibid., 450-‐53. 60 Ibid. 61 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 38.
20
North and South Kivu provinces, the Hutu and Tutsi relationship became especially strained
in the early 1990s due to a combination of Mobutu Sésé Seko’s ‘Zairinization’ policies and an
influx of Rwandan and Burundian refugees who began coming into the region after 1993.62
By this time Rwanda’s Hutu regime was also using newspapers and government-‐backed
radio to create a constant barrage of propaganda that vilified and incited public hatred
against the Tutsi population while quietly arming extreme Hutu-‐nationalist groups. This set
the stage for the Rwandan Genocide.
2.6 Post-‐1994 Hutu-‐Tutsi Relations and Relevant Combatant Groups
The culmination of ethnic tensions in Rwanda came to a head in the form of the 1994
Rwandan Genocide when the Hutu government began a systematic killing of over 800,000
Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The killings were carried out by Interhamwe militias and sects
of the then-‐national military, the Forces Armeés Rwandaises (FAR).63
Following the international community’s failure to intervene in the genocide, the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF), which consisted primarily of Tutsi refugees who had been living in
Uganda and was led by General Paul Kagame, invaded Rwanda to end the genocide and take
control of the country. Following the end of the genocide, the RPF controlled Rwanda as the
dominant party and Paul Kagame became the de-‐facto leader, first as Vice President, then as
Minister of Defence, and then as President of the Republic since 2000.64
Simultaneously in the immediate post-‐genocide period, many Hutus fled to Zaire (DRC).
Some of those fleeing feared violent revenge while others were from the Interahamwe or
radical sects of the FAR and formed various armed groups (AGs) to fight the new Rwandan
government from across the border. The most notable AG formed at this time was the
Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), which maintained an anti-‐Tutsi genocide
ideology and fought against a Rwandan-‐led invasion of Eastern DRC in the first Congo War
that led to the downfall of Sésé Seko’s regime in 1997. During the Second Congo War, which
62 See Ibid., 37; Romkema, Hans. Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo : The Case of the FDLR, FNL, and ADF/NALU. (Washington, DC: World Bank: 2007), 31. 63 Appiah and Gates, "Ethnicity in Rwanda: An Interpretation,” 447-‐50. 64 Waugh, Colin M. Paul Kagame and Rwanda: Power, Genocide and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. (Jefferson, NC: McFarland &, Publishers: 2004), 143.
21
lasted from 1998 to 2003, ALiR evolved into the Forces Démocratiques de Liberation du
Rwanda (FDLR). The FDLR continues to operate today in the Kivu provinces of DRC, albeit
at a diminishing capacity.65
Understanding the background narrative of social, political and economic relations between
Hutus and Tutsis in the Great Lakes region provides essential context for the immense
challenge of disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating Rwandan ex-‐combatants from
various factions and backgrounds that have been at odds for decades, if not centuries.
2.7 Rwandan DDR
Over 68,000 combatants have gone through Rwandan demobilization and reintegration
processes since 1995.66 To date, DDR efforts in Rwanda have targeted ex-‐combatants from
four sometimes-‐overlapping military groups: (1) the FAR, defeated in 1994; (2) the RPF,
from General Kagame’s army that defeated the genocidal regime in 1994; (3) the Rwanda
Patriotic Army (RPA), who were later renamed the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) and are
the post-‐genocide Rwandan military; (4) AGs, which encompass combatants from ALiR,
FDLR and other Rwandan Hutu rebels in the DRC that have fought under various military
and political labels.67
The RDRC has implemented DDR efforts in three major stages, Stage I from 1997 to 2001,
Stage II from 2002 to 2007 and Stage III from 2008 to present. Many ex-‐RPA and ex-‐FAR
were reintegrated into the national post-‐genocide military, and the majority of the rest were
demobilized during Stages I and II.68 This dissertation primarily concerns DDR processes in
the civilianization track of Phase II and Phase III. While not overly abundant, there is a
substantial amount of literature concerning Rwanda’s DDR experience in regards to its
social and economic reintegration efforts, ties with national reconciliation and
peacebuilding, and embracement of local ownership.
65 Romkema, Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament and Repatriation, 1-‐11. 66 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Annual Activity Report 2013, 18. 67 Waldorf, Lars. "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda." ITCJ, 2009, 10. 68 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 42.
22
2.7.1 Ex-‐Combatant Reintegration in Rwanda
Rwanda heavily stresses both social and economic reintegration in its DDR policy. The
RDRC’s official mission is:
To support the successful demobilization, social and economic, reintegration of ex-‐combatants in their respective communities so as to realize national security, reconciliation, and development. This will be achieved through demobilizing ex-‐combatants and supporting their social and economic reintegration into communities of their own choice.69
In the realm of short and medium-‐term economic reintegration measures, all ex-‐combatants
from Phase II onwards have received reinsertion support upon returning to their host
communities. This comes in the form of a Basic Needs Kit (BNK) which consists of $100 and
basic household supplies and general reintegration support cash assistance. All professional
soldiers (ex-‐RPA, ex-‐RDF, and ex-‐FAR) receive a Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA) of
between $300 and $1000 depending on their rank. Ex-‐combatants can also request
Reintegration Grants (RGs) for micro-‐projects or household necessities. Finally, the most
vulnerable ex-‐combatants are allowed a Vulnerability Support Window (VSW) allowance,
which began in 2008. The VSW program is for ex-‐combatants that are economically
vulnerable after exhausting mandatory benefits. VSW grants can come in the form of cash,
vocational or apprenticeship skills training, formal education, or Income Generating
Activities (IGAs) training.70
In the realm of long-‐term economic reintegration, the RDRC awards startup and
performance-‐based funding to cooperative businesses that are either owned or staffed
primarily by ex-‐combatants. These co-‐operatives allow ex-‐combatants (and civilians) to
pool their money together in order grow businesses that range from arts and crafts-‐makers
to private security and police forces.71 Additionally, many physically and mentally disabled
69 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Project Implementation Manual: Second Emergency Demobilisation and Reintegration Project (Kigali: Government of Rwanda: 2010), 7. 70 This paragraph is based on information from the RDRC’s Annual Activity Report 2013 and Project Implementation Manual. 71 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. DemobRWANDA, October 2015. 2-‐32.
23
ex-‐combatants are granted living allowances, IGA training if applicable, and special needs-‐
accessible houses.72
The RDRC’s social reintegration program is grounded in an age-‐old Rwandan tradition
known as the ingando. In Kinyarwanda, ingando translates to a military “solidarity camp,”
but in the modern sense it is meant to help soldiers, ex-‐combatants and civilians:
Overcome mutual fear and suspicion, and the temptation for revenge; talk about the history of the conflict; heal the wounds of hatred; accept responsibility for any harm done to each other; demystify negative perceptions of each other; [foster] collective ownership of the tragedy that resulted from the conflict; and agree on what the future portends for them.73
The ingando is formally present in the form of the demobilization camps where ex-‐
combatants undergo trainings in topics like Rwandan history, use of public services,
national unity and reconciliation, transitional justice, and public health before returning to
their home communities.74 These initial trainings at the demobilization camps last two
weeks for ex-‐RDF and ex-‐FAR combatants, and two months for ex-‐AG combatants coming
from outside of Rwanda.
Once the reintegration stage formally begins for ex-‐combatants, social reintegration
measures are carried out via various “sensitization” efforts for ex-‐combatants and recipient
communities. These include outreach activities where newly demobilized ex-‐combatants
are formally introduced to their community leaders, trainings for counselors and local
sensitization program leaders, public discussions of ex-‐combatants and community rights
and obligations, specialized counseling for ex-‐combatants classified as vulnerable, and
regular field visits from RDRC staff for check-‐ins and conflict-‐resolution purposes.75
It should be noted that although the RDRC explicitly recognizes separately social and
economic reintegration measures, its programming structure structure leans towards the
reintegration process as a socioeconomic one. This is reflected in the technical literature of
72 Ibid, 5. 73 See Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1330; Rusagara, "Peacebuilding in the Context of the Rwanda Defence Forces.” 74 Rusagara, "Peacebuilding in the Context of the Rwanda Defence Forces.” 75 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Project Implementation Manual, 17-‐18.
24
the RDRC, which addresses the general reintegration issues and specific issues such as
mental health, physical disability, and community acceptance as issues that affect the social
and economic well being of ex-‐combatants.76 Structurally, the head of reintegration efforts
at the RDRC is the Socioeconomic Reintegration Coordinator (SRC). Under the SRC, Social
Reintegration Officers (SROs) and Programme Field Officers (PFOs) are dispatched to
communities to track community acceptance rates, employment rates, physical and mental
health issues, shelter issues, family conflicts, and education progress of ex-‐combatants.77
While there is not a plethora of publicly available research on the ground-‐level
reintegration of Rwandan ex-‐combatants, most of what does exist can be found in a 2005
tracer study commissioned by the RDRC. One survey of 941 ex-‐combatants found that they
had reintegrated well into their chosen communities and had not experienced any
discrimination.78 Another based on focus group discussions found that ex-‐combatants were
well integrated and some had even held positions of local authority despite the fact that
55% expressed dissatisfaction with their reintegration experience.79 That same study also
indicated that ex-‐combatants were seen as responsible for petty crime and faced economic
difficulties, but were not financially worse off than the majority of the population.80 Finally,
given the fact that the majority of Rwandans are Hutu, ex-‐FAR and ex-‐AG combatants were
found to be better reintegrated into their communities than those who were ex-‐RPA and ex-‐
RDF.81 However, despite imperfections, most studies and surveys paint a relatively positive
picture for the reintegration of ex-‐combatants in Rwanda.82
2.7.2 DDR, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding in Rwanda
In addition to strong programmatic commitments to foster socioeconomic reintegration, the
RDRC also has mandates use DDR to foster “national security and reconciliation,” and be a
part of Rwanda’s Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) in order
to maintain “consistency with national realities and priorities in social protection and social
76 Ibid. 77 Ibid. 78 Mehreteab, Amanuel. TRACER Study. (Kigali: Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission: 2005). 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 See Ibid.; Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR,” 1-‐35.
25
development for the entire population.”83 Several academics have argued that Rwanda’s
alignment of DDR with reconciliation and development efforts has played out well in reality.
A study by Tobie and Masabo found that reintegration activities in Rwanda, for both ex-‐
combatants and other conflict-‐affected groups, have had positive impacts on reconciliation
efforts. They attributed this to a multi-‐dimensional and inclusive approach to reintegration
that included various GoR ministries and an emphasis on providing support to the most
vulnerable and genocide-‐affected populations.84 Lötscher similarly argues that Rwanda’s
DDR policy and programming has allowed for a “bi-‐directional, reciprocal” relationship
where inclusive ex-‐combatant reintegration has allowed for success in the wider
reconciliation process.85 Edmonds, Mills and McNamee also share these views, and state
that Rwanda’s DDR program has served as “role model for wider justice and reconciliation
efforts.”86
Focusing on a different track than other authors, Waldorf suggests that Rwanda’s DDR
efforts have been effective at fostering reconciliation because they have been decoupled
from transitional justice measures. He particularly focuses on the community-‐based gacaca
court system that was used to prosecute and sentence genocidaires. In what he calls an
“unexpected” finding, Waldorf states that Rwandan law sees killing during the 1994
genocide as a “completely different crime” than wartime killing, so gacaca and other
potential fears of prosecution have not negatively impacted reconciliation for Hutu ex-‐
combatants.87
2.7.3 Local Ownership of DDR in Rwanda
Rwanda’s embracement of local ownership in its DDR programming has been a somewhat
contentious issue. Edmonds, Mills and McNamee argue that Rwanda had success because it
was able to establish a “genuine” local ownership with a stronger “national vision” than its
83 Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Annual Activity Report 2013. 84 Tobie, Aurélien, and François Masabo. Healing Fractured Lives: Reconciliation and Reintegration in Rwanda (London: International Alert: 2012). 85 Lötscher, Wilma. "Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants and Reconciliation in Rwanda: A Case Study." ETH Electronic Theses and Dissertations,, April 2016, 19-‐20. 86 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58. 87 Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda,” 1-‐35.
26
neighbors via powerful government led by Paul Kagame, and without the help of the UN.88
They describe the process as “focusing entirely on the future and referring to the population
by their nationality and not by their ethnic origins,” the opposite of their neighbor Burundi’s
efforts to “keep the lid” on Hutu-‐Tutsi tensions. Finally, they state that ingando has been the
overarching “guiding ethos and principle means for promoting stability, reconciliation, and
professionalization within the military” in the post-‐genocide period, and the fact that it is
local in origin has been vital to its success.89
Contrary to Edmonds, Mills and McNamee, Mgbako harshly attacks the idea of ingando as a
“political indoctrination” tool for Paul Kagame’s political party, the RPF, making a case for
“government ownership” rather than “local ownership.”90 Several have suggested that
ingando undermines reconciliation because it is used to perpetuate the official RPF
narrative that only Tutsi and moderate Hutu killed during the genocide count as victims,
and almost completely ignores any present ethnic tension, including the tension caused by
well-‐documented cases of Hutu massacres led by the RPF, mostly in DRC, from 1994
onwards.91 However, Mgbako still concludes that if ingando can “create a curriculum that
includes honest critiques of the current administration and open discussions about history,”
it could be a “worthy and creative take on the difficult business of societal healing.”92
Wilén also sees Rwanda’s complete control of its DDR planning and implementation in a
critical light, in what she describes as a system that is “locally owned and externally
financed.”93 This system, fueled by the international community’s “genocide guilt,” has
allowed Rwanda to block external influence whilst picking and choosing donors who can
offer largely unconditional aid. This creates a paradoxical situation where Western donors
who normally push beneficiary states towards inclusive democracy are praising the elite-‐
led, sometimes autocratic government of Paul Kagame for its “local ownership,” even
88 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 51. 89 Ibid., 42. 90 Mgbako, Chi. "Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-‐Genocide Rwanda." Harvard Human Rights Journal, no. 201 (2005): 201-‐24. 91 See Ibid.; Melvin, Jennifer. "Correcting History: Mandatory Education in Rwanda." Journal of Human Rights in the Commonwealth, no. 2 (October 2013), 14-‐22; Kron, Josh. "For Rwandan Students, Ethnic Tensions Lurk." The New York Times, May 16, 2010. Accessed May 9, 2016. 92 Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 224. 93 Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36
27
though the RPF is said to favor “stability over democracy” and hold a questionable human
rights record.94
94 Ibid.
28
Chapter 3: Study Design
This chapter will provide an overview of this study’s methodology, methods, ethical
considerations, and limitations.
3.1 Methodology
The research conducted in Rwanda employs an inductive methodology to explore the ways
in which DDR in Rwanda has been successful and perceived as successful. It is qualitative in
design, but does employ some quantitative measures. A participatory approach was used in
this study, because it encourages participants to analyze their situations and critically
evaluate problems and propose solutions.95 For the analysis of surveys and data, a basic
descriptive statistical approach was used in order to graphically present the trends and
central tendencies of the data.96
3.2 Methods97
This study employed a mixed-‐method approach utilizing in-‐depth interviews, surveys, and
descriptive data analysis. Three methods were used for the purpose of triangulation.
Triangulation allows for the research question to b examined from different perspectives to
ensure for validity of results. All field research was carried out between June 22, 2015 and
July 28, 2015.
Prior to field research in Rwanda, intensive desk based research was conducted including
self-‐education on research methodologies including survey design, interview techniques
and data analysis. In-‐depth reading was also used to gain background knowledge on
research ethics, and the roles and responsibilities of the researcher.
95 Beazley, Harriot, and Judith Ennew. "Participatory Methods and Approaches: Tackling Two Tyrannies." In Doing Development Research, by Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter, 189-‐98. London: SAGE, 2006. 96 Jaggi, Seema. Descriptive Statistics and Exploratory Data Analysis. New Delhi: Indian Agricultural Statistics Research Institute, 2008. 97 Copies of research instruments can be found in Appendices A through E.
29
3.2.1 Semi-‐Structured Interviews
Private, semi-‐structured interviews were conducted with staff from the RDRC, Rwandan ex-‐
combatant representatives, and representatives of international organizations and donor
governments involved in supporting the Rwandan DDR efforts. Questions went across the
three primary topics discussed in the literature review. These recordings were transcribed
and coded thematically.
3.2.2 Surveys
The initial survey was constructed to measure public awareness and opinions of the RDRC
and ex-‐combatants of ex-‐RDF/RPA, FAR, and FDLR affiliations. Questions were based on
metrics proposed by Bowd and Özerdem to measure social reintegration.98 Consultation
was carried out with the RDRC and the field supervisor prior to the dissemination of the
survey. Small adjustments were made and the questionnaire was translated by a
professional from English to Kinyarwanda, participants could choose which language they
wanted to take the survey in. The results of these surveys were analyzed visually and with a
descriptive statistics analysis using Microsoft Excel and SPSS.
3.2.3 Descriptive Data Analysis
The researcher was given access to the RDRC’s MIS database, which tracks case-‐by-‐case
information on processed ex-‐combatants and ex-‐combatant co-‐operative businesses. It
holds information on the benefits received and other numerical and binary indicators of
their reintegration status and demographic information such as previous military affiliation.
Data in the MIS was analyzed visually and with a descriptive statistics using Microsoft Excel
and SPSS.
Additionally, the researcher was granted access to non-‐classified internal memos and
publications.
98 Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 453-‐75.
30
3.3 Sampling
3.3.1 Semi-‐Structured Interviews
To ensure that a well-‐rounded sample of those involved in Rwandan DDR were included in
the research, purposeful sampling was used to target members of the RDRC across the
Commission, Technical Secretariat, Programme Field Office, and Local Authority levels of
the organization. Similarly purposeful sampling was used in order target staff from donor
governments, and international organizations. This was relatively simple because there
were only a small handful of in-‐country staff from donor governments and international
organizations. For ex-‐combatant cooperatives, the head civilian representatives were
targeted.
Twenty interviews were taken in total, and seventeen were recorded electronically for
durations between fifteen minutes and two hours. Three interviewees were not comfortable
being recorded and interview notes were taken by hand by the researcher and their
interpreter. Interviews were carried out within various areas in Kigali City province, the
town of Mutobo in Southern Province, and Musanze in Northern Province. Sites included
various RDRC centers, including the headquarters, health center, demobilization center,
medical center, and ex-‐combatant processing centers.
3.3.2 Surveys
Random-‐walk convenience sampling throughout Kigali City province was used. To limit
possible bias due to interaction with a foreigner on the sensitive topic of the survey, a
trusted Rwandan interpreter distributed surveys while the researcher stayed nearby.
Criteria for eligible participants was Rwandan civilians, not ex-‐combatants, who were over
the age of 18.
42 Surveys were distributed in each of Kigali City province’s three districts, Gasabo,
Kicukiro, and Nyarugenge, making for a total of 126 distributed surveys. Of these, five were
deemed incomplete or unacceptable for use, making for a total of 121 useable surveys.
31
3.3.3 Descriptive Data Analysis
The majority of the data obtained from the MIS database at RDRC headquarters was
rendered unusable outside of RDRC headquarters due to file corruption and incompatibility,
leaving only four spreadsheets of data useable externally. The available data gave master
rosters of ex-‐combatants who have received disabled-‐housing benefits, VSW grants,
disabled medical allowances, and information on all registered ex-‐combatant cooperatives.
3.4 Ethical Considerations
Due to the classification of ex-‐combatants as a vulnerable population, highly sensitive
nature of Hutu-‐Tutsi relations in Rwanda, and laws in Rwanda that ban broadly defined
“divisionism” and “genocide ideology,” the principle of primum non nocere, or “do no harm”
was followed at all times. All interview and survey participants read and signed consent
forms, and were verbally informed of the research and assured that they could withdraw
from participation at any time without reason or explanation. Similarly all participants were
informed that all information was held securely with the researcher and the researcher
alone in a way that guaranteed their anonymity.
Due to the way in which surveys were distributed, it was sometimes impossible to have
participants fill out the surveys in complete privacy. In such cases the participants were
doubly reminded of the purpose of the study and their guaranteed anonymity.
Finally, the research for this dissertation was proposed to the Trinity College Dublin Ethics
Committee and granted Level I approval prior to it being carried out. Additionally, the
research permission was obtained from the Rwandan Ministry of Education.
3.5 Limitations
3.5.1 Lack of Ex-‐Combatant Participation
Due to time constraints the researcher was unable to acquire the Level II ethics approval
from Trinity College Dublin to study vulnerable populations. This meant that the researcher
32
was unable to survey or interview ex-‐combatants directly, despite being granted access to
ex-‐combatants by the RDRC. Therefore there were attempts in interviews to gauge ex-‐
combatant voices, especially from those who worked directly with them. However, it cannot
be said that the voices of ex-‐combatants are directly included in this research.
3.5.2 Researcher’s Position
It was critical to remain aware that the research comes from a different socio-‐cultural
background than the majority of those interviewed and surveyed in this study and holds
social norms and values that could sometimes be unfamiliar to them. As such, every
precaution was taken to make sure that the unfamiliarity did not cause misunderstandings
that could prove detrimental to the research.
3.5.3 Time and Funding
Due to unforeseen circumstances and bureaucracy, the researcher was not granted
permission to research until 5 weeks into their 10 week stay in Rwanda. This granted the
researcher only five weeks to establish proper connections and conduct research.
Additionally, due to limited funding the researcher was unable to travel everywhere they
desired to conduct surveys and interviews.
Finally due to these limitations, there is a low number of surveys that are only somewhat
representative of the Kigali populace, which is not necessarily representative of the
Rwandan populace as a whole because Kigali is not demographically identical, and is
wealthier and more secure than other areas of Rwanda.99
99 Goodfellow, Tom, and Alyson Smith. 2013. "From Urban Catastrophe to ‘Model’ City? Politics, Security and Development in Post-‐conflict Kigali." Urban Studies (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 50, no. 15, 3185-‐202.
33
Chapter 4: Results
This chapter will discuss results as they relate to reintegration, reconciliation, and local
ownership.
4.1 Reintegration
As seen in Tables 1 and 2, several key themes arose from the interviews regards to
perceived successes of and challenges to the RDRC in the realm of ex-‐combatant
reintegration. The most cited success from interviewees was the impact of ingando, which
was also referred to as “sensitization,” and also includes umuganda, a monthly mandatory
day of community service for everyone aged 18 to 65 where sensitization activities
sometimes take place. One interviewee cited that sensitizations “work across all levels of the
reintegration process” and are “never a one time occurrence” for ex-‐combatants or their
recipient communities, and that they occur “while they (ex-‐combatants) demobilize, when
they return, and before they get a job or join a cooperative.”100
Table 1: Successes of Rwandan DDR and/or successful strategies for ex-‐combatant
reintegration as seen by interviewees
Success/Strategy # of Interviewees Who Mentioned
Sensitization / Ingando / Umuganda 15 / 20
VSW Grants 14 / 20
Pragmatism / Expectations 11 / 20
Government Leadership / Decentralization 11 / 20
Eliminating Stigma of Status and Affiliations 9 / 20
Co-‐Operatives 7 / 20
Disability/Insurance/Mental Health Support 6 / 20
State Security 6 / 20
Many interviewees, particularly from the RDRC, claimed that when ex-‐combatants return
they are almost immediately seen as civilians. One stated that civilians in recipient
communities “don’t look at them differently, and when they are demobilized they are all
100 Ex-‐combatant cooperative representative.
34
united and people don’t consider which army they served in.”101 However, a number of non-‐
RDRC staff members cited stigmatization as a problem. One member of an international
organization stated that “they remain soldiers and they act like soldiers and they think
soldiers. Armed or not. So people still see them as soldiers. Sometimes as thieves.”102 This
echoed several other interviewees who stated that removing military mindsets from ex-‐
combatants remained a challenge. Interestingly, interviews and access to the MIS database
revealed that the RDRC does not keep track of ex-‐combatant recidivism, crime conviction
rates.
Table 2: Challenges for Rwandan DDR and/or to ex-‐combatant reintegration
as seen by interviewees
Challenge # of Interviewees Who Mentioned
Poverty 17 / 20
Support for Disabled Ex-‐Combatants 12 / 20
Unemployment 11 / 20
Lack of Funding at Local Government Level 11 / 20
Military Mindsets 10 / 20
Mainstreaming 6 / 20
Providing Mental Health Support 4 / 20
Marginalization/ Stigmatization 4 / 20
Social services provided to ex-‐combatants were also mentioned substantially, including
VSW grants, subsidized health insurance, mental health services, and disability support. One
interviewee noted that VSW grants “have made a big difference, but are not for everyone and
only go to the most, most, most vulnerable” and that because the panel that designates
disability status is comprised of two ex-‐combatants, two community members, and one
RDRC staff member, they added it is a “relatively objective process where the community is
deciding who gets the benefits.”103 Several members of donor governments and international
organizations also highly praised Rwanda’s support for disabled ex-‐combatants. One
101 RDRC staff member. 102 International organization interviewee. 103 RDRC staff member.
35
interviwee said “the mentally and physically disabled troops used to be the sore spot for the
RDRC, but they knew it, and now the disabled receive some of the best care in Africa.”104
Contrary to other interviewees, one cited that benefits for vulnerable and disabled ex-‐
combatants go “all to the ex-‐RDF because they are the heroes.”105 This interviewee’s claims
were backed up by RDRC MIS data, seen in Fig. 1, which indicated that ex-‐RDF have been
granted 92% of all 35,799 VSW grants, 86% of all 2,840 disabled medical allowances, and
81% of all 638 houses for disabled ex-‐combatants issued to date. Ex-‐RDF constitute 66% of
the total processed ex-‐combatant population, as seen in Fig. 2.
Source (Above and Below): RDRC MIS database
104 Donor government representative. 105 International organization interviewee.
66%
19%
15%
Fig. 2: Ex-‐combatants processed by previous military af]iliation
EX-‐RDF
EX-‐FAR
EX-‐AG
VSW Grants Disabled Medical Allowance Disabled Housing
RDF 92% 86% 81% FAR 0% 8% 13% AG 8% 6% 6%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Percent of Recipients
Fig. 1: Distribution of disability bene]it recipients by previous military af]iliation
36
Another hindrance to reintegration often mentioned was a lack of funding at the local level.
According to one RDRC staff member who worked in a community where many ex-‐FDLR
combatants had returned, “the biggest challenge to reintegration for these men is when the
ex-‐combatants have projects proposed and we have no money to support them. So they live
without jobs and find it difficult to live with civilians.”106 The same interviewee also said “the
local budget for supporting them is so small, so we always ask the central government to
increase it. If that budget could be increased it would be better for everyone.”107
Finally, interviews revealed that ex-‐combatant co-‐operatives were seen as useful tools for in
fostering reintegration for a variety of reasons. Reasons cited included mandates from the
GoR that such cooperatives simultaneously employ civilians and ex-‐combatants from
different ex-‐affiliations together, and the fact that cooperatives require these mixed groups
to pool their money and work together towards common goals. Interestingly, the largest
proportion of cooperatives are in the private security sector, as seen in Fig. 3. When asked
about concerns regarding ex-‐combatants handling weapons again, several suggested that it
is actually encouraged by the GoR because many have the skills required to be professional
security guards. Additionally, because ex-‐combatants most commonly return to their old
home communities, interviewees stated it avoids the potential of a security cooperative run
disproportionately by a community’s old enemies. Speaking about security cooperatives,
one member of an international organization stated:
“I was surprised at this aspect of reintegration when we used to do field visits. That the local defense is elected by local leaders, and this is where many ex-‐combatants wind up. They return to their civilian lives and when they’re back in their communities they are elected to local defense and local defense is paid by sector taxes. So people trust these returnees, even ex-‐FDLR from Eastern Congo to the extent that they elect to give them a gun and be protected by them in the nighttime. This is a good sign.”108
A representative from an ex-‐combatant security cooperative had similar views, and held
that entrepreneurial trainings provided from the RDRC as well as the forced integration of
ex-‐combatants and civilians from different affiliations and backgrounds were difficult things
at first, but in the end helped “foster unity” and help them realize they “are all Rwandans no
106 RDRC staff member. 107 RDRC staff member. 108 International organization interviewee.
37
matter what. As we are stronger when we work together, even in hard times.”109
MIS data revealed that 43% of the 142 ex-‐combatant cooperatives in Rwanda were
registered in the security service sector, followed by agriculture and livestock related
trades, and skilled trades such as carpentry, plumbing and bricklaying.
Source: RDRC MIS database
Finally, while the cooperatives and other socioeconomic reintegration measures such as
VSW grants for IGAs and vocational training were highly regarded, most interviewees
expressed that pragmatism was the key to successful reintegration programming. One
member of an international organization stated “we are talking about RE-‐integration. We are
not talking about creating new opportunities, which we do, but the basic sense is…if they used
to farm, get them back to farming, if they used to be a mechanic, this is great, they can do that
109 Ex-‐combatant cooperative representative.
43%
22%
12%
5%
4%
4% 4%
2% 2% 1% 1%
Fig. 3: Ex-‐combatant cooperatives by type
Security Services
Agriculture or Livestock
Skilled Trades
Environmental Protection
Storefront Business
Unskilled Trades
Taxi Service
Transport of Goods
Fishing
Forex Trading
Sanitation
38
again.”110 An RDRC staff member and a cooperative representative both expressed similar
opinions encompassing this pragmatism. The cooperative representative stated that “we
working in the cooperatives, we put together our ideas and strength so people get jobs and
they get money then they can pay for school fees and health insurance. But we for example
don’t have a car for transport, so our business is limited.”111 They added “we can afford the
basics, but not much else, but this is the same for most people.”112 This fell in line with poverty
being the most mentioned hindrance to reintegration.
4.2 Reconciliation and Peacebuilding
Regarding reconciliation, sensitization and ingando, as discussed in the previous section of
this chapter, were the most commonly identified way that Rwandan DDR efforts were
linked directly to reconciliation efforts. Interviewees from every group mentioned that
sensitization meetings and programs were rooted in reconciliation efforts, and sometimes
even directly involved or were planned by the Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission (NURC). One RDRC staff member forcefully stated that “if you sensitize a
community very well, you are successful, if not, there will be problems. Sensitization at the
roots is a reconciliation method.”113
The survey results shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 on the next page show high levels of awareness
about DDR and positive opinions of combatants from the civilian respondents. Over 89% of
respondents were aware of the RDRC and its DDR efforts before the survey, and 64% of
respondents were aware of ex-‐combatants currently living in their community. On the
following page Figures 4 and 5 show the respondents’ feelings when asked about their
opinions of ex-‐combatants from various affiliations living in their community and how they
felt about ex-‐combatants receiving benefits from the government. Although ex-‐RDF
received the highest proportion of positive reception from respondents, over 75% felt
positively about ex-‐FAR and ex-‐AG combatants living in their communities and receiving
government benefits.
110 International organization interviewee. 111 Ex-‐combatant cooperative representative. 112 Ex-‐combatant cooperative representative. 113 RDRC staff member.
39
Source: RDRC MIS database
Source: RDRC MIS database
Positive Neutral Negative Doesn't Know RDF 93% 1% 2% 4% FAR 79% 4% 4% 13% AG 76% 9% 7% 8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Percent of Respondents
Fig. 4: Survey respondents' feelings of having ex-‐combatants live in their communities by previous military af]liation
Positive Neutral Negative Doesn't Know RDF 89% 5% 1% 5% FAR 79% 8% 5% 8% AG 78% 10% 4% 8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Percent of Respondents
Fig. 5: Survey respondents' feelings about government bene]its for ex-‐combatants by previous military af]iliation
40
4.3 Local Ownership
The influence of the GoR was a common theme during discussions with interviewees, as
seen previously in Tables 1 and 2. One of the most cited instances of government control
was the national decentralization policy, which was implemented over the course of 2011
and 2012. Interviewees from all groups saw it as a useful tool for fostering local government
and ex-‐combatant accountability during the reintegration process. It was also referred to as
“mainstreaming.”
At least one interviewee from every group mentioned that decentralization has increased
accountability for local authorities. In the words of one RDRC staff member “mainstreaming
makes it easy for PFOs and SROs organize meetings with the mayors of sectors, cells, and
villages to work with ex-‐combatants, address problems, track newcomer ex-‐combatants and
benefits, and yell at them [local leaders] if they [sic] bad.”114
Other mentions of government control over the DDR process involved common allusions to
divisionism laws. Another interviewee explicitly cited divisionism laws, stating that
“because of these laws we cannot see a person is short, that he has a big nose, etc… this is
finished. Good leadership is key, and we are not allowed to see differences, they [ex-‐
combatants] are equal and benefit equally, so no problem.”115 It should be noted that the
aforementioned interviewee saw the laws in a positive light. However, another interviewee
mentioned that the GoR
“Makes you be very careful with communications. You cannot say anything charged
about Hutu or Tutsi, although the government radio still calls it ‘the genocide of the
Tutsi’ so they charge it, but not politicians themselves. Some still want to be Tutsi
kings. At the very start the government didn’t want to give ex-‐FAR a full reintegration
package because they were ‘negative forces’, but we helped make it equal and
convinced them its better this way.”116
114 RDRC staff member. 115 RDRC staff member. 116 International organization interviewee.
41
Another member of an international organization stated that there were times when the
government was too controlling and shirked good ideas. They recalled one instance during
a DDR planning session where former FDLR officers requested funding for a comprehensive
and well thought out project that would train and employ ex-‐combatants in an industrial
production facility, and the government rejected it without discussion. In the interviewee’s
words “grouping soldiers in larger groups under the command former senior officers doesn’t
sound interesting to a government who wants to keep control of everything.”117 Additionally
an interviewee from a donor government stated “due to the architecture of DDR here it is a
political project. We can’t deal with that, the political, and so we have little influence on it.”118
Finally in regards to the style of control from the GoR in DDR efforts, several members of
donor governments and international organizations frankly expressed that the GoR fully
understood the short, long and medium-‐term implications of DDR and brought a sense of
gravity into all planning and implementation meetings. One interviewee stated that the GoR
holds close the idea that “DDR opens a window of opportunity for key actors, and they know
that if the root conflict is not addressed and conflict relapses it is not DDR that has failed. It
will be that the key actors have failed their responsibilities.”119
117 International organization interviewee. 118 Donor government representative. 119 International organization interviewee.
42
Chapter 5: Discussions
This chapter will discuss how the results of this study support or detract from ideas and
theories provided by the literature to discern some of the lessons learned and challenges
faced during the Rwandan DDR process.
5.1 Reintegration
This research primarily found that Rwanda’s approach ex-‐combatant reintegration falls in
line with the “socioeconomic” model discussed in Chapter 2120 that does not over-‐value
economic reintegration as an indicator of success and instead largely looks to address social
and economic reintegration together. While interviewees did praise methods traditionally
associated with economic reintegration such as grants, vocational training and education,
they were almost always mentioned in tandem with ingando or sensitizations. This
demonstrates a pattern of thought within Rwandan DDR that seeks to simultaneously
address social and economic reintegration issues. The results from this research also
indicate that the RDRC, which is 19 years old and still maintains relationships with ex-‐
combatants from Stage I, views DDR in line with Torjesen who argues that ex-‐combatant
reintegration is “a process not a programme.”121
Ex-‐combatant cooperatives encapsulate the socioeconomic approach to ex-‐combatant
reintegration since they combine the economic measures of vocational training and project
management training with social reintegration measures that come in the form of
sensitization meetings, and most importantly, the mandatory coexistence of ex-‐combatants
and civilians. Evidence from the RDRC MIS database indicating that the majority of
cooperatives in the security sector, and interviews demonstrating the interwoven nature of
local government and the election of the local defense demonstrate in-‐practice Torjesen’s
argument that ex-‐combatants can indeed gain skills and social capital during wartime that
can ease their reintegration into society.
120 See Kingma, "Demobilisation and Peacebuilding in Afric,” 181-‐201; Bowd and Özerdem, “How to Assess Social Reintegration of Ex-‐Combatants,” 453-‐75; Torjesen, "Towards a theory of ex-‐combatant reintegration,” 1-‐13. 121 Torjesen, "Towards a theory of ex-‐combatant reintegration,” 1-‐13.
43
Additionally, the story behind the relatively large amount of social and economic supports
for disabled and vulnerable ex-‐combatants, including VSW grants and mental health
services that are now available paint the picture of a DDR process that is truly evolving to
the needs of its caseload. It appears in these respects the RDRC and other government
bodies involved in the DDR process have remained dynamic, and as a result ex-‐combatants
are seeing the benefits.
That said, the disproportionate allocation of disability benefits to ex-‐RDF still begs
questions. While the MIS database shows that no ex-‐FAR combatants have been given a
VSW grant, this can be explained by the fact that the VSW program didn’t begin until 2008,
which is several years after the vast majority of ex-‐FAR had gone through the RDRC.
However, the disability allowances and disabled housing should technically be available to
all ex-‐combatants regardless of when they demobilized. If the committees responsible for
granting disability status, which consist of community members, ex-‐combatants, and a
single RDRC staff member, are favoring ex-‐RDF, this would go against Waldorf’s findings
that Hutu ex-‐combatants were generally favored because of their majority status in the
population.122
There is also evidence from interviewees, as well as a minority of survey respondents, that
some animosity towards ex-‐combatants still exists and that poverty remains a threat to
their social and economic reintegration. Additionally, the fact that the RDRC keeps no
records of ex-‐combatant poverty, recidivism, or criminal conviction rates makes it difficult
for them to address these issues, or know if they exist at any substantial level. It should also
be noted that although the RDRC Commissioner recently claimed that 80% of ex-‐
combatants have reintegrated successfully in the community, the RDRC has no concrete
criteria for successful reintegration in its Project Implementation Manual, nor does it keep
data indicating the outcome of the reintegration process for each ex-‐combatant. This
suggests that, despite the a substantial number of claims from RDRC staff that ex-‐
combatants are near-‐instantly reintegrated and face no problems, not much has changed
regarding the reintegration status of Rwandan ex-‐combatants since the 2005 Mehreteab
122 See Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, Project Implementation Manual, 17-‐18; Sayinzoga, Jean. "Editorial." DemobRWANDA, October 2015, 4-‐6.
44
tracer study that indicated a peaceful and complacent, but somewhat dissatisfied ex-‐
combatant population.123
5.2 Reconciliation and Peacebuilding
DDR in Rwanda seems to be primarily tied to reconciliation through the ingando-‐based
sensitization meetings and programs that are tailored to ex-‐combatants, cooperative
members and recipient communities, and the nationwide practice of umuganda. Ingando,
umuganda, and cooperatives are all practices that bring diversified groups together to work
towards a common goal with the intention of promoting coexistence and reconciliation.
These types of programs are in-‐practice examples of ideal UN “DDR as reconciliation”
policies from the IDDRS and UN PBC, and a “maximalist” DDR approach.124 It should also be
noted that the large-‐scale reincorporation of ex-‐combatants into the national army and
private security cooperatives was interpreted by interviewees as a positive force for
reconciliation, and has not contributed to a perceived “unprofessional security sector” that
undermines reconciliation as Zena suggests happens in similar situations.125
Additionally, involvement of the NURC and the Ministry of Local Government (MINALOC) in
ingando and umuganda, as well as the inclusion of RDRC guidelines mandating the
participation of ex-‐combatants and civilians in all ex-‐combatant classification processes for
disability benefit allocation points to an inclusive DDR system. This research thus indicates
that inclusiveness in DDR, in line with arguments from Tobie and Masabo, Lötscher, and
Kilroy, has had a positive impact on reconciliatory efforts.
Despite the limitations of the survey data, respondents revealed little animosity toward ex-‐
combatants or towards government benefits provided to them. However, as previously
discussed, ex-‐RDF were generally held in higher regard by respondents, and received a
disproportionate amount of disability benefits. As one interviewee suggested this hints at
the possibility of preferential treatment to ex-‐RPF, the type that both Özerdem and Knight
123 Mehreteab, TRACER Study. 124 See UNDDR, "2.10 The UN Approach to DDR,” 3; UN PBSO, "From Rhetoric to Practice”; Willems and van Leeuwen,"Reconciling reintegration,” 316-‐38. 125 Zena, "The Lessons and Limits of DDR in Africa,” 1-‐8.
45
warn may undermine reconciliation efforts by inspiring animosity from some civilians or
other ex-‐combatant groups.126
Another worthwhile note is the guarded nature of several RDRC staff during interviews who
insisted that “nothing is wrong” or that ex-‐combatants face no problems, and the somewhat
surprisingly positive, yet RPF-‐favoring perception of ex-‐combatants from survey
respondents. This evidence does generally serve the GoR narrative of post-‐1994 history
that largely ignores war crimes perpetrated against Hutus. When interviewees from outside
the RDRC who stated age-‐old as well as modern Hutu-‐Tutsi tensions still exist are taken into
account, it lends to Mgbako’s belief that the dominance of the government narrative is
leaving Hutu victims without a voice, and could negatively impact reconciliation amongst
the ex-‐combatant population and wider civilian population.127
5.3 Local Ownership
This research adds further evidence to support existing literature128 that argues local
ownership has played a central role in Rwandan DDR efforts. Firstly, the recently
implemented decentralization policies actually centralize government control and RDRC
authority by making specific bodies in charge, and thus accountable, for ex-‐combatant
reintegration in each province, district, sector, cell and village. According to interviewees
decentralization also allows for the RDRC to effectively carry out sensitizations and keep
track of ex-‐combatants even if they move, as they are required to notify local village leaders
so that notice can be reported up the chain to the RDRC. Thus, the streamlining of
communication and accountability processes that the decentralization plan allows for
actually enables the GoR and RDRC to maintain centralized control over DDR efforts, even
after ex-‐combatants have dispersed and reintegrated into their communities.
Secondly, divisionism laws set forth by the government impose a strict regimen to the DDR
process that requires ex-‐combatants to forget, or at least pretend to forget, their ethnicity.
126 See Özerdem, Alpaslan, "Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan,” 961-‐75; Knight, “DDR and Post Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa,” 29-‐54. 127 Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 201-‐224. 128 See Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58; von Billerbeck, "Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding,” 299-‐315; Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Rwanda,” 1-‐35; Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36.
46
As interviewees mentioned, ex-‐combatants constantly undergo ingando meetings during
demobilization, during reintegration, before joining cooperatives, and with the rest of their
communities once a month during umuganda. As Edmonds, Mills and McNamee, and
Rusagara have argued, ingando-‐based meetings and programs are inherently local and an
essential part of Rwanda’s DDR and wider reconciliation regimen.129 The very spirit of
ingando brings people from different backgrounds to work together and see themselves as
Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi. However, as discussed by Melvin, Wilén, and Mgbako,
the GoR also uses ingando for repressive purposes that sometimes connote the forcing,
rather than the nurturing of reconciliation. This level of local ownership goes against Hänggi
and Scherrer who identify DDR as a process meant to foster the “principles of democratic
governance,” and leans in a more autocratic direction.130
Finally, the data from interviews in this study suggests the GoR’s control over the DDR
process is seen with mixed interpretations. On one hand pragmatism from the GoR has
driven a constantly evolving DDR process rooted in Rwandan culture and norms, allowing
for what many see as an exemplary DDR process.131 On the other, as interviewees from
donor governments and international organizations noted, the GoR’s control of the DDR
process is used at times to unilaterally shut down propositions or politically shut-‐out
external actors who may have positive contributions, or at the very least, good intentions to
offer.
129 See Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58; Rusagara, "Peacebuilding in the Context of the Rwanda Defence Forces.” 130 Hänggi and Scherrer, Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated Missions. 131 Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58.
47
Chapter 6: Conclusion
This paper has examined the Rwandan DDR process to discern the lessons learned from it
and challenges faced during it from programmatic and socio-‐political perspectives. In order
to find answers to the research question, data obtained from field research on the Rwandan
DDR process was analyzed in the ways it related to ex-‐combatant reintegration,
reconciliation, and local ownership. A large majority of DDR literature tends to see Rwanda
as either an exceptional case of success following the traumatic 1994 genocide, or as a case
of “government ownership” where the RPF has exerted its control over the DDR process in
order to force a new Rwandan identity based on nationalism rather than ethnicism into ex-‐
combatants.132 However, the research gathered for this dissertation gives weight to the
notion that the Rwandan DDR experience is far from black and white.
Overall, the RDRC runs a successful, and in many ways exemplary DDR program that has
evolved and adapted to its changing caseload as focus has shifted away from ex-‐FAR and ex-‐
RDF to ex-‐FDLR combatants, balancing the needs of “minimalist” and “maximalist”
approaches to DDR. This is especially the case regarding their increased support for
disabled and vulnerable ex-‐combatants. At the same time, a powerful national government
has intentionally guided the DDR process to be interwoven with wider reconciliation
efforts, particularly through the use of ingando-‐based sensitizations for ex-‐combatants and
the communities they resettle in. However, there is also evidence hinting that ex-‐RDF
combatants receive preferential treatment, and that the GoR intentionally suppresses Hutu
voices that are either advocating for the acknowledgement of their victimhood or are
otherwise critical of the RPF in the DDR or reconciliation processes. The suppression of
Hutu voices in the DDR process is particularly striking because the majority of demobilized
ex-‐combatants in these past years have been from fundamentalist Hutu groups.
While this dissertation has employed a somewhat comprehensive overview of the lessons
learned and challenges faced during the Rwandan DDR process, more research is still
required. Particularly, more attention should be paid to the allocation of benefits to ex-‐
132 See See Edmonds, et al. "Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership,” 29-‐58; Mgbako, "Ingando Solidarity Camps,” 201-‐224; Tobie and Masabo, Healing Fractured Lives; Waldorf, "Transitional Justice and DDR,” 1-‐35; Wilén, “A Hybrid Peace,” 1323-‐36.
48
combatants from various affiliations, their crime and recidivism rates, and the role of
divisionism laws in the Rwandan DDR process. Additionally, research into the reconciliatory
impacts of ex-‐combatant led cooperative businesses could prove a valuable addition to DDR
discourse and policy.
While Rwanda currently remains a peaceful nation with a thriving economy, the impact of
the genocide is ever present in the country. Although the nation need not be defined by
tragedy, it is difficult to ignore the complex nature of Hutu-‐Tutsi relations that are now
largely repressed by the RRF government in Rwanda, but ever present in Rwanda’s
neighbors: Burundi and the DRC. Thus, while it is safe to say that the Rwandan DDR process
is one that reveals triumphs of a nation outwardly committed to reconciliation unity, the
unique social, political and economic situation in Rwanda makes it hard to say that the
lessons learned from its 19 year experience with DDR could easily be applied to other post-‐
conflict situations.
49
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Genocide Rwanda." Harvard Human Rights Journal, no. 201 (2005): 201-‐24. Accessed May 5, 2016. http://www.leitnercenter.org/files/Publications/Mgbako.pdf.
Nezam, Taies, and Alexandre Marc. "Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration."
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Government of Rwanda, 2013. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. DemobRWANDA, October 2015. Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Project Implementation Manual:
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and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia." Human Rights Quarterly no. 1 (February 2009): 1-‐34.
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Journal Of Security & Development 2, no. 3 (September 2013): 1-‐13. United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Centre. "What Is
DDR?" UNDDR. 2016. Accessed March 14, 2016. http://unddr.org/what-‐is-‐ddr/introduction_1.aspx.
UN PBSO. "From Rhetoric to Practice: Operationalizing National Ownership in Post-‐Conflict
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UNDDR. "2.10 The UN Approach to DDR." In Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and
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Appendices
A. Sample Interview Questions A.1 For RDRC Staff
• What are your responsibilities at the RDRC?
• Do you interact regularly with ex-‐combatants?
• What are the biggest challenges to reintegration for ex-‐combatants?
• What have been the biggest successes for the Rwandan DDR program?
• What have been the biggest challenges for the Rwandan DDR program?
• Is there anything that hasn’t been asked in this interview that you would like
to add?
A.2 For Representatives of Cooperatives
• What does your cooperative do?
• What has the cooperative’s experience been with the RDRC?
• How do ex-‐combatants from different military affiliations interact?
• How do communities receive ex-‐combatants?
• Is there anything that hasn’t been asked in this interview that you would like
to add?
A.3 For Donor Governments and NGOs/INGOs
• What roles does your government/organization play in the Rwandan DDR
process?
• What has your experience been working with the Rwandan government?
• What have been the biggest success and challenges for the Rwandan DDR
program?
• Is there anything that hasn’t been asked in this interview that you would like
to add?
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B.1 English Version of the Interview Participant Information Form
Participant Information Form Masters in Development Practice, Trinity College Dublin
Lessons Learned from the DDR Process in Rwanda
Details: Travis Lyon from Trinity College Dublin, Ireland, researching for a project that intends to find out what lessons can be learned from Rwanda’s DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) programs and applied to other post-‐conflict situations. Introduction: The question being researched is: What lessons can be learned from Rwanda’s experience with DDR and applied to other post-‐conflict situations. I hope to recruit at least 10 participants to interview for this study. Should you agree to participate in this study I will be asking you to discuss your perception of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, and your perception of the successes and challenges faced in Rwanda’s DDR experience. Interviews will take place in your workplace or in your home, which ever is more convenient for you. Interviews will take approximately 1 hour. Your confidentiality is very important to this study, and no personal information will be accessed by anyone other than the lead researcher. With your permission, all interviews will be recorded on a voice recorder, and all information from these recordings will be kept in a locked and secure location. You are welcome to view your transcript of the interview afterwards at your convenience. Results from this study may be published. Procedures: -‐ The researcher plans to approach potential participants to see if they are interested in participating. If they show interest they will be given the participant information leaflet. Once you have the leaflet, you will be asked if you have any questions about the study. -‐ You will be given time to consider your willingness to participate. After consideration time (2 days) I will contact you once again to see if you are still interested in participating in this study. -‐ Should you state that you are still interested, a date for the interview will be set and consent will be sought out on that date.
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-‐ During the consent process you will be asked if you have any questions, reminded of your right to confidentiality and informed that you may withdraw from the study at any time without consequence. -‐ Once the interview will be conducted, and transcripts will be prepared, you will be given the opportunity to review your transcripts if you wish to do so. Benefits: This research, once completed, will be accessible to participants in the hope that it will bring unique information pertaining the field of DDR. If you choose not to participate in this study, the findings and report will still be made available to you and your workplace. Risks: There are no expected risks to participants in participating in this study. Exclusion from participation: Inclusion
-‐ Must be 18 years or older -‐ Participants in this study should be:
o Officials working in the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
o Officials working in partner organizations of the RDRC o Local (district, cell, etc…) leaders who work with ex-‐combatants o Academic experts in the field of DDR
Exclusion -‐ All persons under the age of 18 will be excluded from this study
Confidentiality: If you so wish your identity and contact information will remain confidential and will not be used in the report or shared with others. Your personal information will not be kept with your interview data, and your name will never be used in connection with any of the information you provide, so there will be no way to identify you through your transcript. To ensure this you will be given a number on all transcripts and interview forms. All files for this study will be encrypted and held on a password-‐protected computer.
Voluntary Participation: You have volunteered to participate in this study. You may quit at any time. If you decide not to participate, or if you quit, you will not be penalized and will not give up any benefits that you had before entering the study. Your decision to participate in this study will have no effect on your position in your workplace.
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Reimbursements: There will be no travel reimbursements for participants because the researcher will travel to the participant. There will be no incentives for participating in this study. Stopping the study: You can stop your participation in the study at any time, and you do not have to answer any questions you do not want to. Your refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefit to which you are currently entitled. Your refusal to participate will not effect your implication in your workplace. Any new findings that occur during the course of this research that may relate to your willingness to continue your participation will be provided to you. Permission: The School of Natural Sciences, Trinity College Dublin, SNS Ethics Committee has approved this study. The University of Rwanda has given research ethics approval for this study. Sharing the results: Results of this study, presented in a short report, will be shared with the overseeing organization. This report will also be made available to you if you wish to have access to it. Further information: For more information or questions, please do not hesitate to contact Travis Lyon [email protected]
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B.2 Kinyrwanda Version of the Interview Participant Information
Form
URUPAPURO RUSOBANURIRA ABAZAFASHA MU BUSHAKASHATSI
IBIGAMIJWE ICYICIRO CYA GATATU CYA KAMINUZA MU ISHAMI RY’IBY’ITERAMBERE,
ISHURI RIKURU RYA ‘’TRINITY’’ RY’I DUBLIN. Isomo ryigiwe ku kigo gishinzwe gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze mu ngabo mu Rwanda. Imvo: Travis Lyon uturutse mu ishuri rikuru ry’I Dublin ho muri Irlande, ari gukora ubushakashatsi agamije ureba isomo ryakwigirwa kuri gahunda z’ icyigo cy’u Rwanda gishinzwe gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze mu ngabo(DDR) noneho iryo somo rikaba ryakwifashishwa mu gukemura ibibazo byaba biri ahandi habaye amakimbirane. Intangiriro Ikibazo kiri kwigwaho ni: Ni ayahe masomo twakwigira ku Rwanda mu birebana na gahunda zo gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze mu ngabo kandi iryo somo rikanafasha n’ahandi bavuye mu bibazo by’amakimbirane. Ndateganya gufata abantu nibura 10 ngomba kubaza ibibazo bagasubiza mu rwego rwo gushaka amakuru yafasha muri ubu bushakashatsi. Nzajya rero nkubaza icyo utekereza kuri gahunda za komisiyo y’u Rwanda ishinzwe gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze mu ngabo n’icyo utekereza ku byagezweho n’iyo komisiyo kimwe n’ingorane yahuye nazo. Ibi biganiro bizabera aho ukorera cyangwa aho utuye, icyakorohera. Ugereranyije ibiganiro bizamara nk’isaha imwe. Kugira ibanga mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi ni ingirakamaro kandi ntawundi muntu uzamenya amakuru watanze uretse nyir’ubwite, ukora ubushakashatsi. Ibiganiro byose bizafatwa amajwi hifashishijwe akuma gafata amajwi, nubitwemerera kandi amakuru yose azaba yafashwe azabikwa neza ahantu hari umutekano kandi hafunze. Wemerewe rwose kuba wakumva ibiganiro uzaba waratanze nyuma kandi ukabyumvira ahakunogeye. Ibizava muri ubu bushakashatsi bizatangazwa mu buryo bw’inyandiko. Uko bizakorwa: -‐Ukora ubushakashatsi arateganya kwegera abantu babifitiye ubushobozi kugirango arebe niba bashishikariye kwitabira Nibagaragaza ubushake, bazahabwa inyandiko igenewe uwitabira gutanga amakuru yo gukoresha mu bushakashatsi, uzabazwa niba ntakibazo ufite ku bijyanye n’ubushakashatsi -‐Uzahabwa umwanya wo gusesengura no gufata icyemezo ku bijyanye n’ubwitabire.Nyuma y’iminsi ibiri (2) yo gutekereza, nzongera nkubaze niba ukomeje kwemera kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi -‐Uvuze ko ukibishaka, hazahita hagenwa itariki yo gutanga amakuru mu buryo bwo kubazwa imbonankubone n’ubushake buzahita bugaragara kuri iyo tariki
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-‐Muri icyo cyiciro cyo kureba niba ubyemera uzabazwa niba ntakibazo waba ufite, wibutswe uburenganzira bwawe ku bijyanye no kuzakubikira ibanga kandi umenyeshwe ko ushobora igihe icyo aricyo cyose guhakana kugira uruhare mu bushakashatsi kandi nta nkurikizi. -‐Ibibazo n’ibisubizo bitanzwe ku buryo bw’imbonankubone nibirangira, hazategurwa utubaho mbikamakuru, uzahabwa,nubishaka, umwanya wo kuba wakumva ibiganiro byawe ku buryo bw’amajwi. Umusaruro witezwe: Ubu bushakashatsi niburangira, ibyavuyemo bizamurikirwa abazaba bitabiriye itangwa ry’amakuru twizeye ko buzatanga amakuru nyayo ku birebana n’icyigo cy’u Rwanda gishinzwe gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze mu ari abasirikare. Nutemera kwitabira mu itangwa ry’amakuru, nihahandi uzabona ibizaba byavuye mu bushakashatsi ndetse na raporo ubibone wowe ku giti cyawe ndetse n’aho ukorera. Ingorane: Nta ngorane ziteganywa abazagira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi bazagira. Kubuzwa kwitabira: Uwakwakirwa nk’uwatanga amakuru -‐Agomba kuba afite imyaka 18 cyangwa akuze -‐Abitabira mu itangwa ry’amakuru mu bushakashatsi bagomba kuba:
• Abayobozi bakuru bakora muri komisiyo yo gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze ari abasirikare
• Abayobozi bakuru bakora mu miryango ikorana na komisiyo yo gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze ari abasirikare
• Abayobozi mu nzego z’ibanze ku nzego z’(akarere, akagali n’izindi) • Inzobere mu birebana na Gusezerera no gusubiza abahoze ari abasirikare mu
buzima busanzwe
Abatafatwa nk’abatanga amakuru Abantu bose bari munsi y’imyaka 18 ntibazemererwa kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi Ibijyanye no kubika ibanga: Iyo ushatse ko umwirondoro wawe n’amakuru yawe mu bijyanye n’itumanaho bizagirwa ibanga kandi ntibinakoreshwe mu ikorwa rya raporo cyangwa ngo ahabwe abandi. Amakuru akwerekeyeho wowe ubwawe ku giti cyawe ntabwo azabikwa hamwe n’amakuru uzaba wavuze mu gihe cy’ibazwa-‐imbonankubone, kandi n’izina ryawe ntirizigera rikoreshwa mu bifitanye isano n’amakuru ayariyo yose uzaba waratanze , ubwo rero ntakuntu wazamenyekanira mu biganiro ku buryo bw’amajwi. Kugirango tubyizere neza, ibiganiro byafashwe ku buryo bw’amajwi bizahabwa nomero kimwe n’inyandiko z’ibibazo uzaba wabajijwe. Inyandiko zose z’ubu bushakashatsi zizahiswa muri mudasobwa hifashishijwe imibare y’ibanga(kodi) Kwitabira ku bushake: Wagiye muri ubu bushakashatsi ku bushake.Ushobora kuvamo igihe icyo aricyo cyose. Ntiwiyemeza kugira uruhare cyangwa kuva muri ubu bushakashatsi,
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ntangaruka uzagira ntanicyo uzatakaza wabonaga mbere y’uko uza muri ubu bushakashatsi. Kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi ntacyo bizongere ku mwanya urimo aho ukorera. Udushimwe: Ntakanozangendo kazahabwa uwitabira kuko umushakashatsi ubwe azajya amusanga aho akorera. Nta bihembo bigenewe abazitabira gutanga amakuru muri ubu bushakashatsi Guhagarika ubushakashatsi: Ushobora, igihe icyo aricyo cyose kuvana akarenge kawe mu bushakashatsi, kandi ntugomba gusubiza ikibazo udashaka gusubiza. Kwanga kugira ururare mu ikorwa ry’ubushakashatsi kwawe, ntabwo bizatuma hari inkurikizi cyangwa ngo hagire icyo wamburwa mubyo wari wemerewe ubu. Kubyanga kwawe ntabwo bizagira icyo bigutware ku kazi aho usanzwe ukorera.Hgize ikintu gishya kigaragara nk’icyasaba ko ukomeza kugira uruhare muri iyi nzira y’ubushakashatsi, uzakimenyeshwa. Uruhushya: Komite ishinzwe imyifatire mu ikorwa ry’ubushakashatsi mu ishuri rikuru ryigisha iby’ubumenyi’’Trinity college’’ ry’ I Dublin ryatanze uburenganzira bwo gukora ubu bushakashatsi. Guhererekanya ibyavuye mu bushakashatsi: Byanditse muri rapport ngufi, ibyavuye muri ubu bushakashatsi bizamurikirwa umuryango ushinzwe igenzura.Nubishaka nawe uzahabwa iyi raporo Kuwakenera ibindi bisobanuro: Ku bindi bisobanuro cyangwa ibibazo, ntutinye rwosse kwegera Travis Lyon [email protected]
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C.1 English Version of the Interview Informed Consent Form
Informed Consent Form School of Natural Sciences, Trinity College Dublin Lessons Learned from the DDR Process in Rwanda
Researcher: Travis Lyon Supervisors: Andy Storey
This research is hoping to find lessons learned from Rwanda’s experience with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. It is hoped that the knowledge gathered for this research can be used to inform the DDR processes in other post-‐conflict situations and contribute to existing academic literature in the field of DDR. Your confidentiality is very important to this study, if you wish no personal information will be accessed by anyone other than the lead researcher. Your participation will have no effect on your employment at your workplace. You have the right to refuse to continue participating at any time, as well as the right to refuse to answer questions within the interview. Interviews will be approximately 1 hour in length, discussing topics of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. With your permission, all interviews will be recorded on a voice recorder, and all information from these recordings will be kept in a locked and secure location. You are welcome to view your transcript of the interview afterwards at your convenience. Declaration: This study and this consent form have been explained to me. I believe I understand what will happen if I agree to be part of this study. I have read, or had read to me, this consent form. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I freely and voluntarily agree to be part of this research study, though without prejudice to my legal and ethical rights. I have received a copy of this agreement and I understand that, if there is a sponsoring company, a signed copy will be sent to that sponsor. Name of sponsor: PARTICIPANT’S NAME: PARTICIPANT’S SIGNATURE: Date:
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Date on which the participant was first furnished with this form: Participants with literacy difficulties: I have witnessed the accurate reading of the consent form to the potential participant, and the individual has had the opportunity to ask questions. I confirm that the individual has given consent freely and understands that they have the right to refuse or withdraw from the study at any time. Print name of witness: ___________________________________________________________________________ Signature of witness: _____________________________________________________________________________ Date (Day/month/year) __________________________________________________________________________ Thumbprint of participant (if applicable): Statement of investigator’s responsibility: I have explained the nature, purpose, procedures, benefits, risks of, or alternatives to, this research study. I have offered to answer any questions and fully answered such questions. I believe that the participant understands my explanation and has freely given informed consent. Researcher’s signature: Date: (Keep the original of this form in the project records, give one copy to the participant, and send one copy to the sponsor (if there is a sponsor).
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C.2 Kinyarwanda Version of the Interview Informed Consent Form
URUPAPURO RUMENYESHA UWEMEYE GUTANGA AMAKURU IBIGAMIJWE
Ishuri rikuru ryigisha iby’ubumenyi’’Trinity college’’ ry’ I Dublin Ibyakwigirwa kuri gahunda yo gusezerera no gusubiza abahoze ari
abasirikare mu buzima busanzwe mu Rwanda (DDR) Ukora ubushakashatsi: Travis Lyon
Umujyanama akaba n’umugenzuzi w’ubushakashatsi: Andy Storey Ubu bushakashatsi bwiteze kubona amasomo yakwigirwa ku Rwanda mu bijyanye na gahunda zo gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze ari abasirikare(DDR). Hari icyizere ko amakuru azava muri ubu bushakashatsi ashobora gukoreshwa mu kumenyesha DDR kuri gahunda zakoreshwa mu gucyemura amakimbirane ashobora kuvuka hagati aho kandi ayo makuru akanunganira ayari asanzwe arebana n’inyandiko zivuga kuri gahunda y’isezerera n’isubizwa mu buzima busanzwe ry’abahoze ari abasirikare. Kubikirwa ibanga mugihe ubu bushakashatsi bukorwa nin ingirakamaro, niba utifuza ko hagira umuntu umenya amakuru yawe bwite uretse ukora ubushakashatsi. Kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi ntacyo bizakora ku kazi kawe aho usanzwe ukorera. Ufite uburenganzira bwo kwanga gukomeza kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi igihe cyose wabishakira kimwe no kwanga gusubiza ibibazo mu gihe cy’ibazwa imbonankubone. Ibibazo ku buryo bw’imbonankubone(inerviw) bizajya bimara nibura igihe cy’isaha imwe, havugwa ku nsanganyamatsiko zijyanye no gutanga ibyangobwa by’ubucukuzi bw’amabuye y’agaciro, ibibazo bitera, ibigo bicukura amabuye y’agaciro, n’ishyirwa mu ngiro ry’itegeko ribigenga. Nubyemera ibibazo n’ibisubizo ku buryo bw’amajwi bizabikwa hifashishijwe utwuma mfatamajwi kandi ibizaba byavuyemo bizabikwa bifungiranye ahantu hari umutekano. Uhawe rero urubuga mu gihe waba ushatse kumva ibyo biganiro kandi ukazabyumvira ahagufasha nyuma y’uko ufashwe amajwi. Indahiro: Nasobanuriwe ibikubiye muri ubu bushakashatsi kimwe n’ibikubiye mu nyandiko igaragaza ibigamijwe. Ndizera ko nzi neza ibizaba mu nyuma niba nemeye kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi Nisomeye kandi nanasomerwa ibikubiye muri iyi nyandiko igamije gusobanurira uwemeye ibigamijwe. Nagize umwanya wo kubaza ibibazo kandi ibibazo byose nabajije byashubijwe uko nifuza. Ku bwende bwanjye,niyemeje kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi nubwo haba hari ibyabutambamira bijyanye n’amategeko cyangwa amabwiriza mbonezamyifatire y’iwacu. Nahawe fotokopi y’aya masezerano kandi nzi neza ko nihaba ikigo nterankunga, icyo kigo kizahabwa inyandiko yayo iriho umukono.
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Izina ry’umuterankunga: IZINA RY’UWITABIRA GURANGA AMAKURU: UMUKONO W’UTANGA AMAKURU: Itariki: Itariki uwitabira yahaweho iyi nyandiko bwa mbere Abitabira gutanga amakuru ariko bakaba bafite ikibazo cy’uko batize: Uwemeye kwitabira namusomeye ahibereye inyandiko y’ibigamijwe kandi nawe yagize umwanya wo kubaza ibibazo. Ndemeza ko ariwe ubwe wifatiye icyemezo cyo kugira uruhare mu bushakashatsi kandi azi neza ko afite uburenganzira bwo kuba yabivamo igihe cyose abishakiye. Izina ry’umuhamya ryanditswe na mudasobwa:__________________________________________ Umukono w’umutangabuhamya:_____________________________________________________________ Itariki(umunsi/ukwezi/umwaka):______________________________________________________ Igikumwe cy’uwemeye gutanga amakuru (ihitamo): Indahiro igaragaza inshingano z’umushakashatsi: Nasobanuye ubwoko, impamvu, uburyo, inyungu, ingorane cyangwa ibitekerezo bijyanye n’ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi. Niyemeje gusubiza ibibazo kandi mbisubiza ku buryo bwuzuye. Ndizera ko uwitabiriye akemera kumpa amakuru yumva neza uyu murimo kandi akaba yaratanze amakuru mu bwisanzure, nta gahato. Umukono w’ukora ubushakashatsi: Itariki: (Bika neza inyandiko ya mbere y’ iyi nyandiko aho ubika izindi nyandiko zijyanye n’uyu mushinga, ha uwemeye gufasha mu bushakashatsi fotokopi yayo hanyuma woherereze umuterankunga (niba hari uhari) inyandiko imwe ya fotocopi.
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D.1 English Version of the Survey Distributed
A Survey Regarding Public Awareness and Opinion of the Rwanda
Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
Survey Information and Instructions: This is a survey designed to gauge public awareness and perception of the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Program (RDRP) and the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC). The purpose of the program and the commission is to demobilize and reintegrate ex-‐combatants from the RDF, as well as ex-‐combatants from the FAR, FDLR, and other armed groups (AG) who have voluntarily disarmed themselves and returned to Rwanda into civilian life. The RDRP is a part of the government’s reconciliation and peace building policies and the RDRC offers financial and medical support to ex-‐combatants, as well as housing and extra support for disabled and mentally ill ex-‐combatants. They do not discriminate against ex-‐combatants due to their previous military affiliations. This survey is being administered with the permission of MINEDUC, and the National University of Rwanda. Please circle the answer you choose.
1. Before this survey, were you aware of the Rwanda Demobilization and
Reintegration Program (RDRP) and/or Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC)?
a. Yes b. No
2. Before this survey, were you aware that the government gave financial and medical reintegration assistance to those who had served in RDF?
a. Yes b. No
3. How do feel about medical and reintegration assistance being given to those who have in the past served in the RDF?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
4. Before this survey, were you aware that the government gave financial and medical reintegration assistance to those who were in the FAR and voluntarily disarmed?
a. Yes b. No
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5. How do feel about financial and medical reintegration assistance being given to those who have in the past served in the FAR?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
6. Before this survey, were you aware that the government provided financial and medical reintegration assistance to ex-‐combatants who were in AGs / FDLR and voluntarily disarmed?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
7. How do feel about financial and medical and reintegration assistance being given to those who have in the past served in AGs / FDLR and other armed groups?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
8. Are you aware of any ex-‐combatants who living in your community?
a. Yes b. No
9. How do you or would you feel about ex-‐combatants from the RDF living in your community?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
10. How would you feel about ex-‐combatants from the FAR living in your community?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
11. How would you feel about ex-‐combatants from the AGs / FDLR living in your community?
a. Positively b. Neutral c. Negatively d. Don’t know
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D.2 Kinyarwanda Version of the Survey Distributed
Ikusanyamakuru k’ubumenyi abantu bafite kuri Komisiyo y’Igihugu yo
gusezerera abasirikare no kubasubiza mubuzima busanzwe
Amakuru n’ibigenga iri kusanyamakuru:
Iri n’ Ikusanyamakuru rigamije gupima ubumenyi n’uko abantu babona gahunda
y’Igihugu yo gusezerera abasirikare no kubasubiza mubuzima busanzwe(RDRP) na
Komisiyo y’Igihugu yo gusezerera abasirikare no kubasubiza mubuzima busanzwe
(RDRC).Intego ya gahunda na komisiyo n’ugusezerera no gusubiza m’ubuzima
busanzwe abahoze ari abasirikare ba RDF,ndetse n’abahoze ari abasirikare muri
FAR,FDLR,n’iyindi mitwe yitwaje intwaro (AG) bashyize intwaro hasi kubushake
bwabo bakagaruka mu Rwanda m’ubuzima busanzwe.RDRP ni imwe muri gahunda za
leta zijyanye n’ubwiyunge no kubaka amahoro naho RDRC itanga ubufasha mubijyanye
n’amafaranga ndetse n’ubuvuzi ku bahoze ari abasikare,ndetse n’aho kuba n’ubundi
bufasha ku bafite ubumuga n’abafite uburwayi bwo mu mutwe bahoze ari abasirikare.
Ntago bagira ivangura kubahoze ari abasirikare bitewe n’igisirikare bahozemo.
Iri n’ Ikusanyamakuru riri gukorwa k’uruhushya rwa MINEDUC, na Kaminuza
y’Urwanda.Ushyire akaziga ku gisubizo uhisemo.
1. Mbere y’iri kusanyamakuru,wari uzi gahunda y’Igihugu yo gusezerera abasirikare no kubasubiza mubuzima busanzwe(RDRP) na/cyangwa Komisiyo y’Igihugu yo gusezerera abasirikare no kubasubiza mubuzima busanzwe (RDRC)?
a.Yego b.Oya
2. Mbere y’iri kusanyamakuru,wari uzi ko leta itanga ubufasha bw’amafaranga n’ubuvuzi kubahoze mu ngabo za RDF?
a.Yego b.Oya
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3. Wumva ute ubufasha bw’ubuvuzi no gusubiza m’ubuzima busanzwe bihabwa abahoze mu ngabo za RDF?
a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi
4. Mbere y’iri kusanyamakuru,wari uzi ko leta itanga ubufasha bw’amafaranga n’ubuvuzi kubahoze mu ngabo za FAR kandi bashyize intwaro hasi k’ubushake?
a.Yego b.Oya 5. Wumva ute ubufasha bw’ubuvuzi no gusubiza m’ubuzima busanzwe
bihabwa abahoze mu ngabo za FAR? a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi
6. Mbere y’iri kusanyamakuru,wari uzi ko leta itanga ubufasha bw’amafaranga n’ubuvuzi kubahoze mu ngabo za AGs / FDLR kandi bashyize intwaro hasi k’ubushake? a.Yego b.Oya
7. Wumva ute ubufasha bw’amafaranga,ubuvuzi no gusubiza m’ubuzima busanzwe bihabwa abahoze mu ngabo za AGs / FDLR n’indi mitwe yitwaje intwaro? a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi
8. Waba uzi abahoze mu ngabo batuye mu karere kawe? a.Yego b.Oya 9. Ubifata ute cyangwa wabyakira ute kuba hari abahoze mu ngabo za RDF
batuye mu karere kawe?
a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi 10. Wabyakira ute kuba hari abahoze mu ngabo za FAR batuye mu karere
kawe?
a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi 11. Wabyakira ute kuba hari abahoze mu ngabo za AGs / FDLR batuye mu
karere kawe?
a. Neza b. Ndifashe c. Nabi d. Simbizi
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E.1 English Version of the Informed Consent Form for Survey
Informed Consent Form School of Natural Sciences, Trinity College Dublin Lessons Learned from the DDR Process in Rwanda
Researcher: Travis Lyon Supervisor: Andy Storey
This research is hoping to find lessons learned from Rwanda’s experience with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs. It is hoped that the knowledge gathered for this research can be used to inform the DDR processes in other post-‐conflict situations and contribute to existing academic literature in the field of DDR. Your confidentiality is very important to this study, no personal information will be accessed by anyone other than the lead researcher. Your participation will have no effect on your employment at your workplace. You have the right to refuse to continue participating at any time, as well as the right to refuse to answer questions within the survey. Surveys should take no more than 10 to 15 minutes, on topics of ex-‐combatant reintegration. With your permission, this survey will be conducted, and all information from this survey in a locked and secure location. You are welcome to view your transcript of the interview afterwards at your convenience. Declaration: This study and this consent form have been explained to me. I believe I understand what will happen if I agree to be part of this study. I have read, or had read to me, this consent form. I have had the opportunity to ask questions and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I freely and voluntarily agree to be part of this research study, though without prejudice to my legal and ethical rights. I have received a copy of this agreement and I understand that, if there is a sponsoring company, a signed copy will be sent to that sponsor. Name of sponsor: Not applicable for this survey. PARTICIPANT’S NAME: PARTICIPANT’S SIGNATURE: Date: Date on which the participant was first furnished with this form:
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Participants with literacy difficulties: I have witnessed the accurate reading of the consent form to the potential participant, and the individual has had the opportunity to ask questions. I confirm that the individual has given consent freely and understands that they have the right to refuse or withdraw from the study at any time. Print name of witness: ___________________________________________________________________________ Signature of witness: _____________________________________________________________________________ Date (Day/month/year) __________________________________________________________________________ Thumbprint of participant (if applicable): Statement of investigator’s responsibility: I have explained the nature, purpose, procedures, benefits, risks of, or alternatives to, this research study. I have offered to answer any questions and fully answered such questions. I believe that the participant understands my explanation and has freely given informed consent. Researcher’s signature: Date: (Keep the original of this form in the project records, give one copy to the participant, and send one copy to the sponsor (if there is a sponsor).
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E.2 Kinyarwanda Version of the Informed Consent Form for Survey
URUPAPURO RUMENYESHA UWEMEYE GUTANGA AMAKURU IBIGAMIJWE
Ishuri rikuru ryigisha iby’ubumenyi’’Trinity college’’ ry’ I Dublin Ibyakwigirwa kuri gahunda yo gusezerera no gusubiza abahoze ari
abasirikare mu buzima busanzwe mu Rwanda (DDR) Ukora ubushakashatsi: Travis Lyon
Umujyanama akaba n’umugenzuzi w’ubushakashatsi: Andy Storey Ubu bushakashatsi bwiteze kubona amasomo yakwigirwa ku Rwanda mu bijyanye na gahunda zo gusezerera no gusubiza mu buzima busanzwe abahoze ari abasirikare(DDR). Hari icyizere ko amakuru azava muri ubu bushakashatsi ashobora gukoreshwa mu kumenyesha DDR kuri gahunda zakoreshwa mu gucyemura amakimbirane ashobora kuvuka hagati aho kandi ayo makuru akanunganira ayari asanzwe arebana n’inyandiko zivuga kuri gahunda y’isezerera n’isubizwa mu buzima busanzwe ry’abahoze ari abasirikare. Kubikirwa ibanga n’ingirakamaro kuri ubu bushakashatsi, nta muntu uzamenya amakuru yawe bwite uretse uyobora ubu bushakashatsi. Kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi nta ngaruka bizagira ku kazi kawe aho usanzwe ukorera. Ufite uburenganzira bwo kwanga gukomeza kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi igihe cyose wabishakira kimwe no kwanga gusubiza ibibazo mu gihe cy’ikusanyamakuru. Ikusanyamakuru ntago rirerenza iminota 10 kugera kuri 15,kubijyanye no gusubizwa m’ubuzima busanzwe kw’abahoze mu ngabo.Ku ruhushya rwawe, iri ikusanyamakuru rirakorwa,kandi amakuru yose avuyemo azabikwa ahantu hizewe. Indahiro: Nasobanuriwe ibikubiye muri ubu bushakashatsi kimwe n’ibikubiye mu nyandiko igaragaza ibigamijwe. Ndizera ko nzi neza ibizaba mu nyuma niba nemeye kugira uruhare mu ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi Nisomeye kandi nanasomerwa ibikubiye muri iyi nyandiko igamije gusobanurira uwemeye ibigamijwe. Nagize umwanya wo kubaza ibibazo kandi ibibazo byose nabajije byashubijwe uko nifuza. Ku bwende bwanjye,niyemeje kugira uruhare muri ubu bushakashatsi nubwo haba hari ibyabutambamira bijyanye n’amategeko cyangwa amabwiriza mbonezamyifatire y’iwacu. Nahawe fotokopi y’aya masezerano kandi nzi neza ko nihaba ikigo nterankunga, icyo kigo kizahabwa inyandiko yayo iriho umukono. Izina ry’umuterankunga:Ntago ari ngombwa kuri iri ikusanyamakuru. IZINA RY’UWITABIRA GURANGA AMAKURU: UMUKONO W’UTANGA AMAKURU: Itariki: Itariki uwitabira yahaweho iyi nyandiko bwa mbere
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Abitabira gutanga amakuru ariko bakaba bafite ikibazo cy’uko batize: Uwemeye kwitabira namusomeye ahibereye inyandiko y’ibigamijwe kandi nawe yagize umwanya wo kubaza ibibazo. Ndemeza ko ariwe ubwe wifatiye icyemezo cyo kugira uruhare mu bushakashatsi kandi azi neza ko afite uburenganzira bwo kuba yabivamo igihe cyose abishakiye. Izina ry’umuhamya ryanditswe na mudasobwa:__________________________________________ Umukono w’umutangabuhamya:_____________________________________________________________ Itariki(umunsi/ukwezi/umwaka):__________________________________________________________ Igikumwe cy’uwemeye gutanga amakuru (ihitamo): Indahiro igaragaza inshingano z’umushakashatsi: Nasobanuye ubwoko, impamvu, uburyo, inyungu, ingorane cyangwa ibitekerezo bijyanye n’ikorwa ry’ubu bushakashatsi. Niyemeje gusubiza ibibazo kandi mbisubiza ku buryo bwuzuye. Ndizera ko uwitabiriye akemera kumpa amakuru yumva neza uyu murimo kandi akaba yaratanze amakuru mu bwisanzure, nta gahato. Umukono w’ukora ubushakashatsi: Itariki:
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F. Map of Rwanda
Source: http://intoreexpeditions.com/wp-‐content/uploads/2013/01/rwanda-‐map2.jpg
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G. Map of Kigali Districts and Sectors
Source: http://www.kigalicity.gov.rw/IMG/bmp/KCC-‐Cells.bmp
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H. Photos
Above: A Commissioner of the RDRC gives a sensitization and informational lecture to ex-‐
combatants awaiting disability categorization.
Below: The Mutobo demobilization center in Muzanze District.
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Above: Ex-‐combatants representing their home provinces compete with each other in the
2015 Peace Games, a playful form of ingando. Below: A RDRC truck used to ferry supplies
and staff.