transparency and equitable remuneration for rights holders in the digital music industry

As music consumption continues to shift towards access instead of

ownership, how can the music industry adapt to increase transparency and

advocate for sustainable growth as well as equitable remuneration for all music

rights holders?

Student ID: U1338360 Module Code: HR6004

Transparency and equitable remuneration for rights holders in the digital music industry

BUSINESS SCHOOL – Assessment 3 Feedback Sheet

SECTION A:(to be completed by the student)

Please complete Section A Student Number: U1338360 U1338360Programme:(e.g. Business Management) BA (Hons) Music Industry Management

Module Title: (e.g. Studying for Business)The Business Professional – THEM Projects Seminar

GroupDave Wibberley

Module Code: HR6004 Word Count

4,453

I confirm that no part of this assignment, except where clearly quoted and referenced, has been copied from material belonging to any other person e.g. from a book, handout, another student. I am aware that it is a breach of UEL regulations to copy the work of another without clear acknowledgement and that attempting to do so renders me liable to disciplinary proceedings.

SECTION B: (to be completed by the tutor marking assignment)

Assessment Criteria: Weighting Criteria based Feedback Mark Achieved

Structure & Development of your Thesis - Please ensure that you identify the problem or issue that you are investigating, and discuss underpinning literature

40

Clear analysis of data leading to conclusions and recommendations 40

Evidence of Appropriate Research

10

Referencing Technique5

Presentation and Grammar

5

TOTAL MARKS 100%

Good practice demonstrated:

Aspect to consider for improvement:

Tutor's Name:

Date Received:PROVISIONAL MARK

Student ID: U1338360 2

Table of Contents

Literature Review 4

Abstract 4

Streaming Services Driving Growth in the Digital Music Industry 6

Performance Royalties 6

Synchronisation Licensing 7

Appendix 1. 8

Appendix 2. 8

Case Study – Kobalt: A Digital Music Success Story 9

Safe Harbour Laws 9

The YouTube Value Gap 10

Appendix 3. 10

Absence of Standard Royalty Reporting Format 11

Equity Shares in Streaming Services 11

Sample Usage 12

Global Rights Database 12

Black Boxes 13

Missing Neighbouring Rights Provision for the United States 13

Making Available Right 14

Recommendations & Conclusion 15

References 18

Literature Review Student ID: U1338360 3

The following report draws upon several key industry publications including Fair Music: Transparency and

Payment Flows in the Music Industry by Berklee ICE (2015) which was particularly helpful in order to gain a

broad understanding of the most significant issues that face creators, songwriters, publishers, performers

and record labels within the context of the digital music industry.

Dissecting the Digital Dollar, written by Chris Cooke (of the music business website, Complete Music

Update (CMU)) and published by the Music Managers’ Forum (2015) provided insightful, up to date and

detailed information, especially with regards to the issue of ‘neighbouring rights’ collections.

The insight paper regarding copyright legislation within the United Kingdom and specifically, the Making

Available Right (MA) entitled: It’s Just a Click Away: How Copyright Law is Failing Musicians which was

authored by Jon Webster and Fiona McGugan was especially valuable in understanding how different

methods of consumption determine the compensation due to those who performed on the sound

recording as well as owners of the copyright in the recording.

Additionally, several articles that written by Tim Ingham and to the Music Business Worldwide website and

included very recent figures that were obtained from IFPI were crucial in compiling this report.

Abstract

The consummate power of the Internet along with the development of digital technologies have

revolutionised the way in which most people consume music. Within today’s music economy, music

creators and rights holders rely upon many millions of micro-transactions occurring every day and each of

these micro-transactions are eventually divided into fractions to be distributed amongst millions of rights

holders around the world. The entire process has fallen under heavy criticism for being largely inefficient

and lacking necessary sophistication. It is estimated that between 20-50% of royalties are not paid to their

rightful owners. (Berklee ICE, 2015:26) It seems obvious that we have more than adequate technology at

our disposal which could be utilised to track, calculate and report on these millions of micro-transactions in

order to fairly and transparently distribute royalties. New licensing structures have emerged within the

last decade to deal with the rise of streaming services, however, much confusion remains within the music


industry about how streaming services are licensing copyrights, the amounts the services are paying labels

and in what ways these payments are shared amongst the various rights holders. (Chris Cooke, 2016)

In developing new licensing models to enable streaming services to exploit music copyrights, collective

management organisations, record labels and publishers have perfunctorily applied copyright legislation

that was not originally designed to be used in the digital distribution of recordings. (Webster and

McGugan, 2015) Within the context of the access model, it seems royalties will be derived from the

commercial release of songs and recordings through ‘sustained listening’ over prolonged periods of time,

instead of the traditional ‘short-term spike’ of revenue. (Cooke, 2015)

“Downloads and sales of any kind should be thought of as an advance payment on a future of

unlimited listens. Under the sales model, the same amount of revenue is generated whether a user

listens to the song once or 1,000 times. Conversely, streaming is based on a pay-as-you-listen

model, in which payments to rights holders directly correspond to the number of times the song is

listened to over time, such that a very different pool of revenue is generated if a song is listened to

only once compared to 1,000 times. Under this model, a particularly active user of a song could very

well end up generating more revenue for the rights holders than if he or she had simply purchased

the song for a one-time fee, but royalties earned from each performance of the song are far less

than the price of the purchased track” (Berklee ICE, 2015:8).

In 2014, Taylor Swift’s withdrew her entire back catalogue of albums from Spotify and openly criticised the

platform’s compensation model. (Ellis-Petersen, 2014) When Adele’s highly anticipated album was

scheduled for a release in time for Christmas 2015, it was announced that it would not be released on

Spotify or its competitor streaming service, Apple Music. (Smith, 2015) Although streaming services pay

exactly the same percentage of their revenue to individuals and corporations as iTunes (70%), per-stream

royalties are low when compared to royalties received from the sale of music in a physical format or a

digital download. (Berklee ICE, 2015) For those that are unable to match the selling power of megastars

like Taylor Swift or Adele, resisting streaming platforms is no longer a realistic option as audiences are

proving to be well on their way to transitioning from the ownership model to one of access. It seems there


are plenty of measures that could be taken in order to create an improved tracking and payment system

for creators and rights holders. However, attempts at solving some of the most significant issues have thus

far failed to produce viable solutions. (Cooke, 2014 and Berklee ICE, 2015)

Including live performances, the music industry reported to be worth USD $45 billion to the global

economy. (Berklee ICE, 2015: 2) This essay aims to account for the sectors of the industry that are currently

experiencing growth with a discussion of music’s influence on and significance to our culture and society.

There will also be an exploration of the most significant issues that face music rights holders in the digital

age and an analysis of different recommendations that have been put forward by a number of informed

organisations, in order to more effectively manage, modernise and regulate the new music economy and

progress towards a more sustainable, transparent and efficient global music industry.

Streaming Services Driving Growth in the Digital Music Industry

Evidence suggests that digital music streaming is providing music industry with its largest growth area and

as Appendix 1. illustrates, streaming comprised 19% of global recorded music income in 2015. Revenues

from streaming increased by almost a billion dollars since 2014 and were valued at USD $2.9 billion in

2015. (Ingham, 2016) Creating further competition for market-leader, Spotify; Apple Music and Tidal

entered the digital music streaming market in 2015. (Herstand, 2015)

“Music industry experts predict that streaming subscriptions will grow by 238% from 2013 levels to

reach $8bn in 2019, while download revenues will decline by 39%. They also forecast that streaming

and subscriptions will represent 70% of all digital revenues by 2019” (Gauberti, 2015).

Performance Royalties

In 2015, the United Kingdom’s Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) collected over GBP £197 million

for performer and recording copyright owner members, which represented a 5% increase on the revenues

it collected in the previous year. Improved licensing processes, raised awareness as well as better market

penetration have all been identified as the factors behind the raised figures, with the 10% year-on-year

increase to GBP £84.4 million in revenue generated through public performance of recorded music within

the United Kingdom. Although traditional television viewing audiences are levelling out, the continued


growth of online, catch-up television services and other new media are reportedly contributing to an

increase in licenses collected and distributed back to music rights holders. (ppluk.com, 2016) With respect

to performers, their right to equitable remuneration can not be assigned to another party by contract,

neither can it be waived in any way. Therefore, regardless of an artist’s financial position with a record

label, PPL and ER allow for performers to continue to receive income from the public performance of their

recordings, even if the advances or expenses they have incurred with their labels have not been recouped.

Likewise, labels receive performance royalties as the owners of recordings. The function that PPL performs

has proven to be extremely valuable to both record companies and performers. (Webster and McGugan,

2015)

Synchronisation licensing

Income derived from music synchronisation licensing to use in television programmes, advertising, films

and video games increased by 8.4% and brought close to USD $33 million to the music industry in 2014.

(IFPI, 2015) Streaming, synchronisation and increased performance royalties are all driving forces in the

music industry’s continued growth and as Appendix 2. shows, the value of the digital music industry is

increasing year-on-year, with the most recent figures available to 2014 showing a 0.5% increase in global

digital music revenues since 2013. (IFPI, 2016 cited by Ingham, 2016)


Appendix 1. Music streaming represented 19% of global recorded music revenue in 2015:

39%

14%

20%

19%

8%

GLOBAL RECORDED MUSIC INCOME, 2015 (%)

Physical

Performance royalties

Downloads

Streaming

Other

(IFPI, 2016 cited by Ingham, 2016)

Appendix 2.

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 20140

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

4.44.7

5.3

66.4

6.9

GLOBAL DIGITAL REVENUES 2009-2014 (USD $ BILLION)



Case Study - Kobalt: A Digital Music Success Story

Kobalt serves as proof that a combination of excellent ethics and an innovative approach to business can

produce a leading independent music services company which is able to flourish in today’s digital

environment. Kobalt has harnessed the power of technology to provide complete transparency to its roster

of artists and publishers through the implementation of a unique, technologically advanced software portal

which Kobalt licenses to more than 500 independent publishers. (Kobaltmusic.com, 2016) It is likely that

Kobalt’s 40% year-on-year growth is the result of the company’s commitment to providing its clients, with

total transparency through advanced technological innovations, earning the leading independent music

business the trust of many of the biggest songwriters, publishers, artists and labels across the globe.

(Ingham, 2016 and Berklee ICE, 2015)

Kobalt’s three different service offerings include music publishing, label services and neighbouring rights

collection. (Kobaltmusic.com, 2016) Every radio broadcast, Spotify listen; all YouTube views are accounted

for and reported in real time through Kobalt’s online portal (Berklee ICE, 2015: 10) Kobalt’s tracking

software enables faster payment cycles as well as larger pay-outs than many of its competitors.

(Kobaltmusic.com, 2016) In just 15 years, through offering absolute transparency and real-time reporting

to its clients, Kobalt has become the second largest publisher by market share, representing 8,000

songwriters and artists who at any given time control approximately 40% of the Billboard Top 100 chart.

Kobalt does not own equity stakes in streaming services and has allegedly refused any such offers it has

received. Instead, Kobalt focuses on achieving higher streaming rates for clients. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

Safe Harbour Laws

Platforms such as YouTube and SoundCloud are protected by United States and European law, exempting

these services from any form of liability relating to third party copyright infringement. (Cooke, 2015)

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are afforded a defence through the Electronic Commerce Regulations of

2002. (Bainbridge and Bainbridge, 2008:111) When copyright is infringed upon on platforms such as

SoundCloud and YouTube, the onus falls upon the rights holders to use a ‘take-down-system’ in order to

remove content and this is likely taxing upon resources for most businesses. Some rights holders believe


that Safe Harbour laws should be revised and clarified so that services such as YouTube and SoundCloud

are held to more account for having knowledge of and continuing to allow their users to upload third party

copyright material. (Cooke, 2015)

The YouTube Value Gap

A significant ‘value gap’ exists between consumption of music through ad-funded platforms, compared

with premium subscription based services and the amount of money that is paid out to music rights

holders with respect to this method of consumption. (Ingham, 2016)

“These ad-funded services contributed $634m to the total pot last year – less than a third of the

revenues handed over by premium services. The $634m figure means that those 900m people, on

average, generated 70 US cents each for labels and artists across the whole of 2015.

Per person, that’s around $42 difference compared to premium services” (Ingham, 2015).

Appendix 3. illustrates the vast differences between the number of users of ad-funded services and

premium subscription services, compared with the amount of revenues these two groups of users

generate for the industry. (IFPI, 2016 cited by Ingham, 2016)

Appendix 3. the ad-funded vs premium subscription streaming ‘value gap’

Subscription-Revenues ($m)

Subscription-Users (m)

Ad-funded-Revenues ($m)

Ad-funded-Users (m)

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

2000

68

634

900

STREAMING RECORDED INCOME VS CONSUMPTION IN 2015



Absence of Standard Royalty Reporting Format

Royalty statements sent out to artists can be difficult to understand and the lack of transparency may work

in the favour of the business providing the report. (Berklee ICE, 2015) Within an increasingly fragmented

market, there is still no standardised format for royalty reporting. (Berklee ICE, 2015) Consequently,

dozens of different services report to rights holders in multiple formats which leads to an overwhelming

lack of efficiency throughout the industry. (Berklee ICE, 2015) Music businesses are processing

‘unprecedented amounts of data’ thanks to streaming platforms’ driving a general increased consumption

of music. (Cooke, 2015:12)

“Major labels and publishers benefit from the currently complex and inaccurate system, and streaming

services have no incentive to invest in transparent reporting and accounting systems, which are expensive”

(Berklee ICE, 2015: 10).

It seems we have access to adequate technology in order to track every stream in real-time, but difficulties

have arisen in finding a solution that will enable sharing of this information further ‘down the line’ (Berklee

ICE, 2015) It can most certainly be argued that the music industry has always historically relied upon the

creative input and cultural richness small, independent music businesses contribute, it seems the

digitisation of the music industry, along with the absence of a lack of standard reporting has made

processing data expensive and difficult for major corporations and collection societies and is therefore

likely to be a tremendous, taxing endeavour for smaller, independent music businesses. (Heath, 2015)

Major Labels’ Equity Shares in Streaming Service Providers

The ‘big three’ major labels own significant stakes in established digital streaming services and other music

start-ups including Spotify and SoundCloud. (O’Malley Greenburg, 2016) The manner in which the labels

first acquired their equity in many of these services has been reported to be through directly licensing their

respective catalogues of recordings at below market value. If and when the labels decide to make their

equity liquid, it is thought to be highly unlikely that labels will share any of these profits with the artists

whose work was commoditised as part of the initial deal. (Berklee ICE, 2015)


“Forbes estimates that the three labels have amassed positions in digital music startups valued at

almost $3 billion – or around 20% of the $15 billion or so the labels are collectively worth. The

percentage will shoot even higher if and when Spotify goes public” (O’Malley Greenburg, 2016).

Although it has widely been reported that Spotify has not made any profits as of yet, the company does

not need to be profitable in order to raise capital to become a publically traded and owned entity and if

this is Spotify’s next move, the “big three” stand to gain in excess of USD $1billion. (O’Malley Greenburg,

2016) Universal Music’s parent company, Vivendi received USD $404 million in 2014 when Beats was

acquired by Apple for USD $3 billion. It is very unlikely that any of these profits will make their way back to

the artists whose work made the initial deal possible. (Berklee ICE, 2015) Deals between Spotify and ‘the

majors’ have resulted in secrecy over per-stream payment rates that were agreed between labels and

Spotify because of non-disclosure agreements that were signed by the companies which apparently

prevents the corporations from revealing streaming rates to artists in royalty statements, adding to the

lack of transparency surrounding these kinds of deals. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

Sample Usage

In many instances, songwriters and publishers do not receive a detailed breakdown of performances of

their copyrights because many performance royalty organisations as well as radio stations base reporting

on sample usage, which seems to be an incredibly old-fashioned method that was developed when

technology was much less advanced. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

Global Rights Database

As the number of licensees has significantly enlarged in recent years, the need for a central database that

is capable of holding information about owners of lyrical and musical copyrights has become increasingly

urgent. (Cooke, 2014) Despite attempts to provide unique identifiers such as the International Standard

Works Code (ISWC), the way in which these codes are being issued and used has presented problems with

one example including ISWC’s not being issued until all songwriters have registered, which results in the

code not being generated sometimes for months or years after the song’s release, making it incredibly

difficult for songwriters to claim royalties that are owed in a timely manner, which can often mean they


lose out on the revenue altogether. (Willens, 2015) The Global Repertoire Database (GRD) was the most

recent attempt by music publishers to develop a more efficient way of distributing royalties to rights

holders. (Cooke, 2014) The general consensus within the music industry is that an initiative such as the

GRD would solve many of the mistakes, inefficiencies and problems that plague the backend administrative

functions of the industry, however, due to questions over who exactly should be responsible for paying for

ongoing maintenance to what would be an enormous data management system, a number of large

organisations including BMI and ASCAP withdrew from the project and by the time the project was

completely abandoned in 2014, over USD $13 million had been spent on the initiative. (Willens, 2015)

Thanks to years of technological revolution, the world of music ought to be turning smoothly, with

artists, fans and labels everywhere finally able to create, share and sell music with minimum

friction, middlemen or waste. Instead, it remains congested and territorial, with interests around

the globe squabbling over data, royalties and transparency” (Willens, 2015).

Black Boxes

Large amounts of royalty revenue lands in appropriately named ‘black boxes’ and this revenue is rarely

allocated to rightful owners. The issue of the ‘black box’ is largely attributable to problems in identifying

the rights holders and may be due to the industry’s lack of a decentralised system to store music rights

holders’ information. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

Missing Neighbouring Rights Provision for Labels/Performers within the United States

Unfortunately for recording artists and labels within the United States, there is no provision for the

establishment of rights for the public performance of sound recordings. Countries that are signatory to the

Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting

Organisations of 1961 are required to enforce the payment of royalties to artists and sound recording

copyright owners if their sound recordings are publically performed. The Rome Convention established

what is commonly referred to as ‘neighbouring rights’. (Cooke, 2015) Within the United States, since the

passing of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (1998), the digital right in a sound recording is recognised

and recording artists and labels will receive performance royalties from public performances of their sound


recordings through digital mediums, such as an online radio station, Pandora; satellite broadcasters

Sirius/XFM and online streaming of terrestrial radio transmissions. (Gauberti, 2015) Despite the collection

of royalties being limited to digital services within the United States, the country is responsible for close to

30% of global neighbouring rights royalty collections. (Gauberti, 2015)

Performers and rights holders’ entitlements to royalties in countries where they aren’t nationals and do

not have direct agreements with collection societies are reliant upon the applications of provisions that are

found within the Rome Convention and the World IP Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms

Treaty (WPPT), which decide whether the performers/labels qualify for ‘full national treatment’ or ‘limited

reciprocity’ and the level of understanding a rights holder has of their entitlements can deeply influence

the extent of the neighbouring rights royalties they are able to collect. (Gauberti, 2015) Some rights

holders have navigated a way around this by ‘relocating’ sound recordings that originated in the U.S. in

order to claim licensing revenues from performances of their recordings in territories that do recognise

neighbouring rights, but it is fair to assume that an overwhelming number of labels and performers are not

paid for exploitation of their neighbouring rights and this revenue is being withheld and is often distributed

to local artists. (Berklee ICE, 2015: 16)

Making Available Right (MA)

As reproduction and distribution rights and concepts surrounding Communication to the Public have all

become less relevant, the Making Available Right (MA) was developed for the digital age is in need of

revisiting due to the interpretation of a particular piece of its wording:

“Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorising the making available to the public of their

performances fixed in phonograms, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that members of the

public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them” (Article 10 of the

WIPO Performer and Phonogram Treaty cited by Webster and McGugan, 2015: 8).

The significance lies in the MA mentioning: ‘from a place and at a time individually chosen by them’

(Webster and McGugan, 2015: 8) which is in reference to consumption that is considered to be on-

demand; consequently, the manner in which a consumer chooses to access a recording and whether their


engagement with the recording is classified as on-demand versus listening to a broadcast that is not

considered to be on-demand, have become crucial factors in determining whether or not featured artists

who performed on the recording are paid, as per their right to equitable remuneration. The method of

consumption also determines if the copyright owner of the recording (usually a record label) receives

either 50% for consumption that is not considered to be on-demand, with payments shared between

featured and non-featured artists and in the United Kingdom, administered and paid to artists by PPL.

When consumption is on demand, it will be subject to the MA right and the record label will pass on

payment to the featured artist as per the artist’s recording agreement, but there will not be any further

payment made by the label to non-featured artists, beyond their original session fee, if there was one. It

seems apparent that this piece of legislation could be updated so that digital consumption is less

complicated and remuneration is more reasonable with regards to non-featured artists. (Webster and

McGugan, 2015)

Recommendations & Conclusion

In addition to advocating for a revision to the phrase within the MA which aids in the prevention of non-

featured performers from receiving any royalty from use of their work that is considered to be on-demand,

further recommendations have been put forward with the view to improve transparency for rights holders

operating within the digital music space. Perhaps one of the most interesting suggestions is to conduct a

thorough investigation into the potential utilisation of blockchain technology (and perhaps

cryptocurrencies) to more effectively track and pay creators, performers and copyright owners for use of

their work, online. (Berklee, 2015)

In addition to this suggestion of employing advanced technologies already in use in other areas, Cooke,

(2014) points out the importance of the development of a GRD which could benefit many stakeholders

within the music industry, but perhaps songwriters and publishers would be particularly well served by a

GRD, as not only would the implementation of an effective GRD aid in the distribution of performance

royalties, it would undoubtedly assist prospective licensees to identify owners of copyrights to the music


and/or lyrics in a piece of music, which could likely result in boosted synchronisation licensing revenue for

authors. (Cooke, 2014).

It also seems obvious that creators and rights owners could benefit enormously from the United States

adapting copyright legislation to recognise ‘neighbouring rights’ so that licenses could be collected and

distributed from not only digital plays, but also use of recordings by terrestrial radio stations. Public

performance income has proven to be an immeasurably valuable source of revenue for artists and record

labels within the United Kingdom and will undoubtedly benefit performers and labels within the United

States, but a full performance right must be instated for sound recordings in the United States and this will

involve lobbying to create new legislation. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

Aside from the enormous monetary contribution the music industry makes to the global economy, music is

also immeasurably influential upon our cultures and the societies in which we live. (Hesmondhalgh, 2013)

Humans likely experience senses, emotions and memories that are triggered by hearing a certain piece of

music. (Van Dijck, 2006 in Hesmondhalgh, 2013)

“Music, and its sibling cultural practice dance, more than any other kinds of communication, seem

linked to sociality and community” (Hesmondhalgh, 2013: 84).

Furthermore, it is apparent that music is able to provide a sense of community through the development

of subcultures that celebrate different styles of music, or music from a particular artist or band and

activities that these subcultures engage in have been associated with promoting feelings of strong human

connection and togetherness; whether it be through attending a concert or connecting with other fans on

social media or a forum, online. (Cavicchi, 1998 in Hesmondhalgh, 2013) As a form of communication with

an importance that permeates deeply within our cultures and our consciences, it should perhaps become a

priority for us to reinvent and innovate where necessary to develop an improved, more transparent, tightly

regulated and sustainable music industry. It seems that revisions to applicable copyright and safe harbour

laws should perhaps be the starting point, followed with the development of a global repertoire database,

which could be funded privately by the largest music companies that can reasonably expect to benefit


from its development the most, for example, the venture could be funded by the ‘big three’ music

companies, collectively. (Berklee ICE, 2015)

It also seems logical to expect that the United States should consider recognising the complete copyright

within a sound recording to enable performers and labels to collect performance royalties in exchange for

the exploitation of their ‘neighbouring rights’ within the United States, and outside of it. (Berklee ICE,

2015) Finally, it is important to note that although the consumption of music is shifting further and further

towards access rather than ownership, with millions of micro-transactions to account for, report on and

distribute; independent businesses like Kobalt are proving that it is entirely possible to run a successful

business in today’s digital music economy. It seems the key to Kobalt’s success has been ‘carving out a

niche’ by diligently collecting every available revenue stream while reporting in real-time, thus providing

absolute transparency to clients. (Berklee ICE, 2015 and Webster and McGugan, 2015) Hopefully through

improvements to legislation, adoption of modern technology and better organisation in general,

transparency and sustainability for all rights holders within the digital music industry will be just around

the corner.

Word count: 4,453


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