AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS,  vs. Spouses HERMOSO and SOCORRO DE LEON

Facts:

Respondents alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land described as: No. 4786 of the Cadastral Survey of San Manuel situated in the Municipality of San Manuel, Bounded on the NW., by Lot No. 4785; and on the SE., by Lot Nos. 11094 & 11096; containing an area of Four Thousand Two Hundred Twelve (4,212) sq. m., more or less. Covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22134 of the Land Records of Pangasinan.’

which Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father Marcelino de Leon by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.  Sometime in the early 1960s, respondents engaged the services of the late Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of the properties of his parents.  Atty. Juan let them sign voluminous documents.  After the death of Atty. Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to Hermoso’s brothers and sisters, to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such conveyances were ever intended by them.  His signature in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was forged. They discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo de Leon to Aurora Alcantara. They demanded annulment of the document and reconveyance but defendants refused

Aurora Alcantara-Daus that she bought the land in question in good faith and for value. [She] has been in continuous, public, peaceful, open possession over the same and has been appropriating the produce thereof without objection from anyone.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale \ executed by Rodolfo de Leon over the land in question in favor of petitioner was perfected and binding upon the parties therein?

Ruling:

Petition has no merit.

Petitioner argues that, having been perfected, the Contract of Sale executed on December 6, 1975 was thus binding upon the parties thereto.

A contract of sale is consensual. It is perfected by mere consent,[10] upon a meeting of the minds[11] on the offer and the acceptance

thereof based on subject matter, price and terms of payment.[12] At this stage, the sellers ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale.

The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract.[13] It is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership of the thing sold.[14] In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged on the ground of the sellers non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract.[15]

Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold.[16]

Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo de Leon was not the owner of the land he delivered to petitioner. Thus, the consummation of the contract and the consequent transfer of ownership would depend on whether he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article 1434 of the Civil Code.[17] Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity and the due execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor.

2. Sampaguita Pictures vs Jalwindor Manufacturers

Facts:

Sampaguita is the owner of Sampaguita Pictures Building. The roof deck and all existing improvements were leased to Capitol 300. It was agreed that:

Said premises shal be used by said club for social purposes.

All imoprovements made by lessee shall belong to lessor without any reimbursement

Improvements shall be considered part of the monthly rental fee

Capitol purchased on credit from Jalwindor glass and wooden jalousies.

The parties submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreement wherein Capitol acknowledged its indebtedness to Jalwindor in the amount of P9,531.09, payable in monthly installments of at least P300.00 a month.

Capitol was not able to pay rentals to Sampaguita. Capitol was ejected from the building. Capitol failed to comply with the terms of the compromise agreement. Sheriff made levy on the glass and wooden jalousies. Sampaguita filed a third party claim alleging that it’s the owner of said materials and not capitol.

On the other hand, Capitol likewise failed to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement, and on July 31, 1965, the Sheriff of Quezon City made levy on the glass and wooden jalousies in question. Sampaguita filed a third party claim alleging that it is the owner of said materials and not Capitol, Jalwindor however, filed an indemnity bond in favor of the Sheriff and the items were sold public auction on August 30, 1965 with Jalwindor as the highest bidder for P6,000.00.

Issue: Who owns the glass and wooden jalousie windows?

Samapaguita.

When the glass and wooden jalousies in question were delivered and installed in the leased premises, Capitol became the owner thereof. Ownership is not transferred by perfection of the contract but by delivery, either actual or constructive. This is true even if the purchase has been made on credit, as in the case at bar. Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer of ownership as long as the property sold has been delivered. Ownership is acquired from the moment the thing sold was delivered to vendee, as when it is placed in his control and possession. (Arts. 1477, 1496 and 1497, Civil Code of the Phil.)

Capitol entered into a lease Contract with Sampaguita in 1964, and the latter became the owner of the items in question by virtue of the agreement in said contract "that all permanent improvements made by lessee shall belong to the lessor and that said improvements have been considered as part of the monthly rentals." When levy or said items was made on July 31, 1965, Capitol, the judgment debtor, was no longer the owner thereof.

The action taken by Sampaguita to protect its interest is sanctioned by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Section 17, Proceedings where property claimed by third person.

... The officer is not liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the property to any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent claimant from vindicating his claim to the property by any action.

It is, likewise, recignized in the case of Bayer Phil., Inc. vs. Agana, et al., 63 SCRA 358, wherein the Court declared, "that the rights of third party claimants over certain properties levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment, may not be taken up in the case where such claims are presented but in a separate and independent action instituted by claimants. ... and should a third-party appear to claim is denied, the remedy contemplated by the rules in the filing by said party of a reinvicatiry action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of the property after the sale is completed or that a complaint for damages to be charged against the bond filed by the creditor in favor of the sheriff. ... Thus, when a property levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of execution is claimed by a third person in a sworn statement of ownership thereof, as prescribed by the rules, an entirely different matter calling for a new adjudication arises."

The items in question were illegally levied upon since they do not belong to the judgemnt debtor. The power of the Court in execution of judgment extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor. The fact that Capitol failed to pay Jalwindor the purchase price of the items levied upon did not prevent the transfer of ownership to Capitol. The complaint of Sampaguita to nullify the Sheriff's sale well-founded, and should prosper. Execution sales affect the rights of judgment debtor only, and the purchaser in the auction sale acquires only the right as the debtor has at the time of sale. Since the items already belong to Sampaguita and not to Capitol, the judgment debtor, the levy and auction sale are, accordingly, null and void. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the sheriff is not authorized to attach property not belonging to the judgment debtor. (Arabay, Inc. vs. Salvador, et al., 3 PHILAJUR, 413 [1978], Herald Publishing vs. Ramos, 88 Phil. 94, 100).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and plaintiff-appellant Sampaguita is declared the lawful owner of the disputed glass and wooden jalousies. Defendant-appellee Jalwindor is permanently enjoined from detaching said items from the roofdeck of the Sampaguita Pictures Building, and is also ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P1,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, and costs.

PNB v. LoVillamor, J.

Parties: Philippine National Bank, plaintiff-appellee,Severo Eugenio Lo, et al. defendantsSeverio Eugenio Lo, Ng Khey Ling and Yep Seng, appellants

Facts: 1916 – Severo Eugenio Lo and Ng Khey

Ling together with J.A. Say Lian Ping, Ko Tiao Hun, On Yem Ke Lam and Co Sieng Peng formed a commercial partnership under the name of “Tai Sing Co.,” with a capital of P40,000 contributed by said partners.

Articles of Copartnership states that: o Partnership was to last for 5

years from after the date of its organization

o Purpose: to do business in the City of Iloilo or in any other part of the Philippines the partners might desire; purchase and sale of merchandise, goods, and native, as well as Chinese and Japanese products

o J.A. Say Lian Ping was appointed general manager

A. Say Lian Ping executed a power of attorney in favor of A. Y. Kelam, authorizing him to act in his stead as manager and administrator of “Tai Sing & Co.” and to obtain a loan of P8,000 in current account from PNB.

Kelam mortgaged certain personal property of the partnership.

The credit was renewed several times and Kelam, as attorney-in-fact of “Tai Sing & Co., executed a chattel mortgage in favor of PNB as security as security for a loan P20,000.

This mortgage was again renewed and Kelam as attorney-in-fact of “Tai Sing & Co.” executed another chattel mortgage for the said sum of P20,000.

1920 – Yap Seng, Severo Lo, Kelam and Ng Khey Ling, the latter represented by M. Pineda Tayenko,

executed a power of attorney in favor of Sy Tit.

By virtue of the power of attorney, Sy Tit representing “Tai Sing & Co.” obtained a credit of P20,000 from PNB in 1921 and executed a chattel mortgage on certain personal property belonging to the partnership.

Defendants had been using this commercial credit in a current account with the plaintiff bank from 1918 – 1922 and as of December 31, 1924 the debit balance of this account P 20, 239.

PNB claims in the complaint this amount and an interest of P16, 518.74.

Eugenio Lo’s defense: o “Tai Sing & Co.” was not a

general partnership.o Commercial credit in current

account which Tai Sing & Co. obtained from PNB had not been authorized by the board nor was the person who subscribed said contract authorized under the articles of copartnership

Trial Court: in favor of PNB

ISSUE: Whether or not “Tai Sing & Co.” is a general partnership in that the appellants can be held liable to pay PNBHELD: Yes. “Tai Sing & Co.” is a general partnershipRATIO: Appellants admit and it appears from the

articles of copartnership that “Tai Sing & Co.” is a general partnership and it was registered in the mercantile register of Iloilo.

The fact that the partners opt to use “Tai Sing & Co.” as the firm name does not affect the liability of the general partners to third parties under Article127 of the Code of Commerce. Jurisprudence states that:

o The object of article 126 of the Code of Commerce in requiring a general partnership to transact business under the name of all its members, of several of them, or of one only, is to protect the public from imposition and fraud

o It is for the protection of the creditors rather than of the partners themselves.

o The law must be unlawful and unenforceable only as between the partners and at the instance of the violating party, but not in the sense of depriving innocent parties of their rights who may have dealt with the offenders in ignorance of the latter having violated the law.

o Contracts entered into by commercial associations defectively organized are valid when voluntarily executed by the parties, and the only question is whether or not they complied with the agreement. Therefore, the defendants cannot invoke in their defense the anomaly in the firm name which they themselves adopted.

As to the alleged death of the manager, Say Lian Ping before Kelam executed the contracts of mortgage with PNB, this would not affect the liability of the partnership

o Kelam was a partner who contracted in the name of the partnership and the other partners did not object

o Lo, Khey Ling, and Yap Seng appointed Sy Tit as manager, and he obtained from PNB the credit in current account

Trial Court correctly held defendants to be jointly and severally liable to PNB

This is in accordance with Article 127 of the Code of Commerce “all the members of a general partnership, be they managing partners thereof or not, shall be personally and solidarily liable with all their property, for the results of the transactions made in the name and for the account of the partnership, under the signature of the latter, and by a person authorized to use it.”

Norkis Distributor vs. CA G.R. No. 91029, February 7,1991; 193

SCRA 694

FACTS: Petitioner Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in Negros Occidental. On September 20, 1979, private respondent Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis Bacolod branch a brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle Model YL2DX. The price of P7,500.00 was payable by means of a Letter of Guaranty from the DBP, which Norkis agreed to accept. Credit was extended to Nepales for the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan, Nepales would execute a chattel mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Petitioner issued a sales invoice which Nepales signed in conformity with the terms of the sale. In the meantime, however, the motorcycle remained in Norkis’ possession. On January 22, 1980, the motorcycle was delivered ¬to a certain Julian Nepales, allegedly the agent of

Alberto Nepales. The motorcycle met an accident on February 3, 1980 at Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. An investigation conducted by the DBP revealed that the unit was being driven by a certain Zacarias Payba at the time of the accident. The unit was a total wreck was returned.

On March 20, 1980, DBP released the proceeds of private respondent’s motorcycle loan to Norkis in the total sum of P7,500. As the price of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in March, 1980, Nepales paid the difference of P328 and demanded the delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis could not deliver, he filed an action for specific performance with damages against Norkis in the RTC of Negros Occidental. He alleged that Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle which he purchased, thereby causing him damages. Norkis answered that the motorcycle had already been delivered to private respondent before the accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of the unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a transfer of ownership of the motorcycle to Alberto Nepales.

HELD: No.The issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been considered not a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of delivery whether constructive or actual, be coupled with the intention of delivering the thing. The act, without the intention, is insufficient. When the motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of private respondent, Norkis did not intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to Nepales, but only to facilitate the execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the buyer’s motorcycle loan.

Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that “in the absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at seller’s risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer,” is applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor constructive delivery of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller, Norkis, which was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. This is in

accordance with the well¬ known doctrine of res perit domino.

Philippine Suburban Dev. Corp. vs The Auditor General

Facts

The President of the Philippines and the Cabinet had a meeting about the relocation of the squatters of Manila and suburbs. o They then eventually approved in

principle the acquisition by the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) of the unoaccupied portion of the Sapang Palay Estate in Sta. Maria Bulacan for relocating the squatters who desire to settle north of Manila, and of another area either in Las Pinas or Paranaque, Rizal, or Bacoor for those who desire to settle south of Manila

o The project was to be financed through the flotation of bonds under the charter of the PHHC in the amount of Php 4.5 million, the same to be absorbed by the GSIS

o PHHC was informed abut this approvalo PHHC Board of Directors then passed

a Resolution authorizing the purchase of the unoccupied portion of the Sapang Palay Estate at Php 0.45 per square meter subject to the following conditions precedent: President shall confirm the

purchase price Portion of the estate to be

acquired shall first be defined The President shall first provide

the PHHC with the necessary funds to effect the purchase and development of this property

That the contract of sale shall first be approved by the Auditor General

That the vendor shall agree to the dismissal with prejudice of a pending Civil Case

o The President subsequently authorized the floating of bonds to be absorbed by the GSIS, in order to finance the acquisition by the PHHC of the entire Sapang Palay Estate at a price not to exceed Php 0.45 per square meter.

o PHHC then acquired possession of the property, with the consent of Phil. Suburban, to enable PHHC to proceed immediately with the construction of roads in the new settlement and to resettle the squatters and flood victims in Manila who were rendered homeless

by the floods or ejected from the lots which they were occupying.

o Philippine Suburban Development Corporation (owner of the unoccupied portion of Sapang Palay) and PHHC entered into a contract embodied in a public instrument entitled “Deed of Absolute Sale” whereby the former conveyed unto the latter the two parcels of land. The document was not registered

in the Office of the Register of Deeds until March 14, 1961, due to the fact, as petitioner claims, that the PHHC could not at once advance the money needed for registration expenses.

o On the other hand, the Auditor General expressed objections and requested a reexamination of the contract in view of the fact that the value of the hacienda greatly increased. This objection was communicated to the President.

o The President, however, still approved the Deed of Absolute Sale.

Provincial Treasurer of Bulacan requested PHHC to withhold a specific amount from the purchase price to be paid by it to the Philippine Suburban. Said amount represented the realty tax due on the property involved.o PHHC paid under protest. It then

requested the Secretary of Finance to order a refund of the amount on the argument that it ceased to be the owner of the land in question upon the execution of the Deed of Aboslute Sale and that the possession of the property was actually delivered to the vendee prior to the sale. Secretary of Finance denied the request.

Respondent argues, on the other hand, that:o Art. 1498 does not apply because of

the requirement in the contrct that the sale shall first be approved by the Auditor General

o that the petitioner should register the deed and secure a new title in the name of the vendee before the government can be compelled to pay the balance of the purchase price

o that according to the Land Registration Act, until the deed of sale has been actually registered, the vendor remains as the owner of the said property, and therefore, liable for the payment of real property tax

Issues:

1. WON the approval of the Auditor General is still needed – No

2. WON there was delivery of the property to the vendee – Yes

3. WON the payment of the real estate tax shall be paid by the purchaser - Yes

Ratio

1. The approval of the sale by the Auditor General is no longer needed in the case at bar since the contract has been entered into for a special purpose and that it was entered into to implement the Presidential directive.

The approval required by Administrative Order 290 only refers to contracts in general, ordinarily etered into by government offices and GOCCs

2. There is delivery of the property

General rule: there is symbolic delivery of the property subject of the sale by the execution of the public instrument, unless from the express terms of the instrument, or by clear inference therefrom, this was not the intention of the partieso Exmples when symbolic delivery is not

intended When a certain date is fixed for the

purchaser to take possession of the property subject of the conveyance

In case of sale by installments, it is stipulated that until the last installment is made, it is stipulated that until the last installment is made, the title to the property should remain with the vendor

When the vendor reserves the right to use and enjoy the property until the gathering of the pending crops, or where the vendor has no control over the thing sold at the moment of the sale

In the case at bar, the vendor had actually placed the vendee in possession and control over the thing sold, even before the date of the sale. The condition that petitioner should first register the deed of sale is not necessary for the validity of the sale.

3. After delivery of possession, purchaser shall be liale for the taxes

Since the delivery of possession, coupled with the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale had consummated the sale and transferred the title to the purchaser, the payment of the real estate tax after such transfer is the responsibility of the purchaser.

However, in the case at bar, the purchaser PHHC is a government entity not subject to real property ta

Addison vs. Felix

Facts:

By a public instrument dated June 11, 1914,

Addison sold to Marciana Felix four parcels of

land. Felix paid, at the time of the execution of

the deed, P3,000 and bound herself to pay the

remainder in installments. In January 1915,

plaintiff filed a suit to compel the defendant to

make payment of the final installment. The

defendant contends that the plaintiff had

absolutely failed to deliver to the former the

lands that were the subject matter of the sale,

notwithstanding the demands made upon him.

Also, the plaintiff was only able to designate

only 2 of the 4 parcels and more than 2/3 of

these two were found to be in possession of

one Juan Villafuerte. The trial court rendered

judgment holding the contract of sale to be

rescinded. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the lands were delivered.

Held:

No. The records show that the plaintiff did not

deliver the thing sold. It is true that the

execution of a public instrument is equivalent to

the delivery of the thing which is the object of

the contract, but, in order that this symbolic

delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is

necessary that the vendor shall have had such

control over the thing sold, that at the moment

of the sale, its material delivery could have

been made. It is not enough to confer upon the

purchaser the ownership and the right of

possession. The thing sold must be placed in

his control.

The supreme court of Spain, interpreting article 1462 of the Civil Code, held in its decision of November 10, 1903, (Civ. Rep., vol. 96, p. 560) that this article "merely declares that when the sale is made through the means of a public instrument, the execution of this latter is equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold: which does not and cannot mean that this fictitious tradition necessarily implies the real tradition of the thing sold, for it is incontrovertible that, while its ownership still pertains to the vendor (and with greater reason if it does not), a third person may be in possession of the same thing; wherefore, though, as a general rule, he who purchases by means of a public instrument should be deemed . . . to be the possessor in fact, yet this presumption gives way before proof to the contrary."

It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the mere execution of the instrument was not a fulfillment of the vendors' obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that from such non-fulfillment arises the purchaser's right to demand, as she has demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the price. (Civ. Code, arts. 1506 and 1124.)

Of course if the sale had been made under the express agreement of imposing upon the purchaser the obligation to take the necessary steps to obtain the material possession of the thing sold, and it were proven that she knew that the thing was in the possession of a third person claiming to have property rights therein, such agreement would be perfectly valid. But there is nothing in the instrument which would indicate, even implicitly, that such was the agreement. It is true, as the appellant argues, that the obligation was incumbent upon the defendant Marciana Felix to apply for and obtain the registration of the land in the new registry of property; but from this it cannot be concluded that she had to await the final decision of the Court of Land Registration, in order to be able to enjoy the property sold. On the contrary, it was expressly stipulated in the contract that the purchaser should deliver to the vendor one-fourth "of the products ... of the aforesaid four parcels from the moment when she takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be issued in her favor." This obviously shows that it was not forseen that the purchaser might be deprived of her possession during the course of the registration proceedings, but that the transaction rested on the assumption that she was to have, during said period, the material possession and enjoyment of the four parcels of land.

Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue of the provisions of law and not by contractual agreement, it is not the conventional but the legal interest that is demandable.

It is therefore held that the contract of purchase and sale entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant on June 11, 1914, is rescinded, and the plaintiff is ordered to make restitution of the sum of P3,000 received by him on account of the price of the sale, together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until payment, with the costs of both instances against the appellant. So ordered.

TEN FORTY REALTY V. CRUZ| PanganibanG.R. No. 151212 | September 10, 2003

FACTS:

• Petitioner filed an ejectment complaint against Marina Cruz(respondent) before the MTC. Petitioner alleges that the land indispute was purchased from Barbara Galino on December 1996, andthat said land was again sold to respondent on April 1998;

• On the other hand, respondent answer with counterclaim that never was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a portion of the premises. In addition, respondent alleges that said land was a public land (respondent filed a miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office) and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears that respondent had been in possession of the property prior to the petitioner;

• On October 2000, MTC ordered respondent to vacate the land and surrender to petitioner possession thereof. On appeal, the RTC reversed the decision. CA sustained the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not petitioner should be declared the rightful owner of the property.

HELD:

No. Respondent is the true owner of the land.1) The action filed by the petitioner, which was an action for “unlawful detainer”, is improper. As the bare allegation of petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation of the premises has

not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have been for forcible entry. However, the action had already prescribed because the complaint was filed on May 12, 1999 – a month after the last day forfiling;2) The subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence, it did not acquire possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers, therefore, respondent was first in actual possession of the property.

 As regards the question of whether there was good faith in the second buyer. Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of acquiring the property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. At the time, the property — which was public land –had not been registered in the name of Galino; thus, respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. As shown, the former’s name appeared on the tax declarations for the property until its sale to the latter in 1998. Galino was in fact occupying the realty when respondent took over possession. Thus, there was no circumstance that could have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate petitioner’s right of ownership.

DOCTRINE/S:

Execution of Deed of Sale; Not sufficient as delivery. Ownership is transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. Nowhere in the Civil Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is  a conclusive presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of real estate. The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not effected, because of a legal impediment. Such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. Disqualification from Ownership of Alienable Public Land.

Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain, as provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution. While corporations cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however acquire private land. However, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it purchased the property from Galino, the

property had ceased to be of the public domain and was already private land. The established rule is that alienable and disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a possessor — personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and exclusively for 30 years — is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere lapse of time.

RULING:

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.