Project for the Study of the 21st Century (PS21) Event:

Defence of the Realm in the 21st Century

Monday 1st June, 2015. Canary Wharf, London

Moderator: Peter Apps Reuters global defence

correspondent, Executive Director of PS21

Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb former Director

Special Forces and Commander Field Army

Unchecked Transcript by Gabrielle Redelinghuys and

Claire Connellan

Apps: Well thank you very much for coming down this less than glorious summer evening to Canary

Wharf. Im Peter Apps, Im Executive Director of PS21, the Project for the Study of the 21st Century,

or possibly the Project for Study of the 21st Century. We never quite ironed that out but its not

hugely important. We are a young and feral think tank. We started operations in January, January

28th to be precise with an event on Cyber Security in this very room. Since then weve done 20 or so

events in London, in Washington DC and as of Friday for the first time in New York. Were also

building out with the hope of doing events in China and elsewhere in the world later in the year so

the aim is to be truly global. Tonight we are very lucky to have General Sir Graeme Lamb with us,

former Director of Special Forces, former field army. Probably the man with the most distinguished

military career over the last few decades, unlike me who did three and a half years in the training

corps and therefore is probably the least distinguished. I am for my sins global defence

correspondent at Thomson Reuters but they have given me a year off on full pay to do PS21 for this

year. I also having broken my neck in Sri Lanka in 2006 happened to be paralysed with all manner of

irritations but also reasonably large compensation pay out

Fantastic. So without more ado we shall crack on with our discussion in that case.

Graeme, I know you have a few words you want to say, but in general what do you think are the kind

of themes we should be looking at when it comes to strategic defence in the 21st Century?

Lamb: You know I think where the reflection point in many ways that we are very comfortable with

what existed. We got use to an army, navy air force, marine core. Weve been use to in fact the sort

of structures, the organisation, the order of things as we knew it which served this nation and others

well this last century and many before. My view would be that I think this century is different form

all the rest and therefore if we run right in that premise then my view would be that we then have to

go back and not undo everything, because in many ways that would be crazy, but recognise that

there are other parts of defence of this realm that need to be attended to with the same rigour,

passion, motion, discipline that has gone in looking after our single services and the defence

business.

Apps: How is this century different?

Lamb: Well I think the answer is number one is that everybody in here has got a mobile phone or

two. You know, that would imply that we are now informed. The internet of all things. There are

three hundred million users that go into the dark web. The dark web is a pretty fascinating space

which you dont want to go otherwise you get caught up. But the truth of the matter is that in that

space it is not about being informed, actually its just merely all we are today is connected.

Peter Apps: Thats as many people as many people as the entire population of the US right?

Lamb: And so youve got this massive energy out there of people who are connected. And now

within that space, if you look back to Germany could not have gone to war in the 1930s had they not

been prepared for that war in the 1920s. They were prepared for that war in the 1920s. Whether

good or not so good, got the gold. Propaganda was an essential tool. A force of great good is I think

what Peter Roosevelt talked about when he talked of journalism for a force of infinite mischief. If

you are merely connected your force for infinite mischief, the ability of something go viral and

change a whole series of perceptions because perception becomes reality very quickly, and people

react, reactions is number one. So you have that as a chain where a connected world increasingly

which allows people different spaces in social order now to observe things which they were unable

to see this last century. The second, is that it is possible with just a few souls to bring industrial

violence to bear which was only the opportunity it was afforded with events of previous centuries.

Armies, navies, air forces and marine cores. In this century, just a few souls could rip the heart out of

it. I went to Tokyo in 1992, four, 94 it was, when the Aum Sect put together in actual fact very

capable, very credible, actually pretty worthy weapons grade sarin. And they were you know

brewing around with at that time some biological capabilities. The poor thing was that they then

used it very badly, because they were under a degree of pressure. They merely sacked it, which

then pulled out, killed 18 people, hospitalised 5 000 . The part that isnt well known is that they had

absolutely in fact built a dispersion method of which you could have then completely reversed those

figures and then some. Thats 1994. And what were they? They were a bunch of lunatics who were

connected in a cult who believed they could see the future and they had 60 million dollars in

disposable income and some very, very smart people who were convinced about the reason,

unreasonable as it was, for their part in killing a shit load of people in Tokyo.

Apps: And you think thats been supercharged in this Century essentially?

Lamb: Yip. The answer is, you just go on the internet. You know, you go back to the old you know ,

the various books that use to sit in libraries that are all tagged, if you took them, the cookbook, that

sort of stuff, at the end of day you were tagged. Thats how it use to be because that was the only

way you could get to these sort of materials. Now you go online and you can dial up whenever you

fancy, wherever you want to go, whatever you want to use. And so if you just take those two single

factors, plus what I sense is a world in which our order as we knew it is being challenged in many

ways. The truth of the matter is that we have every reason to then review how we defend this realm

and all that order

Apps: And we also have a different geopolitical world right. So over the bunch of last fifteen years

youve had a unipolar world, and now weve got a bunch of other big countries doing stuff with big

countries were not doing.

Lamb: Yeah, Id agree entirely. You went from the chaos of Europe which then created in 16

whatever it was, 49, the Westphalian states, sovereign states, nation states, built upon therefore

some sort of order, which then Empires were then built, the two great superpowers coming out of

the Second World War. One lost, the other is losing interest. And the truth of the matter is that

youve now got back your 193 nations and then these transnational energies, the ISIL, a good

example of that, which the work across these boundaries just mega pumping, mega groupings

within that space, who are able to in fact look after their own selfish self-interest. And if you look at

something like the failing state index which looks at interestingly not at security, it just looks at

politics, economics and social. Its the three drivers. I think it reviewed 172 nations, if more than

that, what it may be, but of the 172 nations they have 126 on the wrong side of being stable. Actual

in fact fragile, failing and faltering. And if that is the that state that were in and then you throw in

these other dynamics, the connected, not informed world, then I sense the threats that can be both

born here and abroad which will threaten that which in fact the first responsibility of our

government our people, protection, our prosperity and our way of life and what we stand for. The

truth of the matter is those simple fundamentals define who we are. Define actually the

responsibility that governments have and my sense is that responsibility in this century remains

unchanged from any other century, but it needs to be attended to. If you look at the straightforward

costs, just take the numbers, and you might saw well actually, and its not about me saying we need

a belt load more for defence, I think we just need to recognise that I think in 1980 defence or war at

its height in many ways in the period coming out of Dtente into probably a period of tension at that

time, defence was on about 13.5 billion, I think Im right to say that education was on nine, the NHS

was 12 and welfare was 15, around those sorts of figures. Today defence is 36, education at 19, NHS

at 129 and welfare at 119. Now Im not saying that we should have matched up but the change in

space is notable. And that was at a period of time in 1980 where our future, as dangerous as it was,

you know I can even remember 1962 human crises as a young lad, but the truth of the matter is,

there was a certainty in that space, in a way that in fact that even the Cold War or even proxy wars,

Korea is a good example, of how it was contained and managed. Vietnam, another good example,

how it was contained and managed, ugly as it was, great number of deaths, China, and French and

the United States about 3.5 million lost, but the truth of the matter is there was a certainty in that

period. You know Ray Odierno when he was across here the other day and I would absolutely agree

with big Ray when he turned around and said that in my 40 years were now in a period of greater

uncertainty than Ive ever known. I would absolutely support that. My concern is that its not just the

uncertainty were in at the moment, actually my sense is we are going into a period that is unknown.

Apps: And what does that mean? I mean militaries are still the same structures as the way they were

in the 1980s, exactly the same structures as they were in the 1950s. Do they have the flexibility to

deal with that kind of role?

Lamb: Again, theres two interesting books Ive read by my mates. One is Emma Sky, who I wouldnt

ever class ever as mate but his book on unravelling is really good. And the other is Stanley

McChrystal which is [Team of Teams] which is a cracking read if you havent looked at it. But Stan

Nielsen I think he probably took all my best pieces, but he talks in that about. He takes Darwin its

not the strongest, the most intelligent species that survives, its the species that adapts. His

experience in Iraq, my experience in Iraq, my experience in Afghanistan, my experience and his

experience as of these terms as we change through the centuries from the last to this one is that

those who would wish us harm or would wish to the change the order as we know it and we take for

granted are adapting wickedly quickly.

Apps: And the idea of what you and he did in Iraq was to build a structure that was sufficiently

adaptive to keep up with that right?

Lamb: Yeah but again, my concern again is that when I talk about going from uncertainty to

unknown is that you know so you say alright, neat words, how does that look, I think let me give you

two examples. One would be that we came from a period where intrinsically it was state on state

enterprise, we then go into a period which is now a stateless enterprise which threatens our way of

life. Actually I can already see around there in fact a whole series of faceless threats. People who just

dont appear or are very difficult to track as to where they are or what their intentions, the viral

effects of that. We are now getting to a period where we left the last century where the United

States of America absolutely got to the finish line. Capability dominance. They nailed it. Oh what are

we seeing in those that can test this today or can test the order we in fact align to? Well actually

they now in fact capable of capability avoidance. What will be the next step? Actually the danger is

that if we do not change, and we should say hes a really good guy that came up with that great line,

if you dont like change, youll like irrelevance even less. Theres a danger well find ourselves as we

go forward if we do not adapt what weve got into becoming capability irrelevant, because the

simple equation: threat equals capability and intent remains in my view a reasonable case. Whats

happened is we were able to adapt the capabilities that existed before to deal with the threats as

they emerged. The threat now has gone into some new spaces to where actually the army, naval air

forces and able to deal with some of that but they cant deal with it all. And the all are the bits that

matter because we have to be able to have some response to those parts which will change our way

of life.

Apps: And its interesting because some of the countries that are now possibly west averse such as

China, Russia and so forth seem to be quite good at punching into that kind of space as well. Even

better than we are in a spot.

Lamb: Yes I think its interesting. You take hot and cold wars. The bit that makes it interesting is in a

hot war what really matters is, capability is credibility. You know, how damn good is your tank? As

you get into that cold wars or cooling wars, what matters is your intent. You start now playing in a

whole series of economic, proxy, propaganda fields, hybrid and all that, but I think were going

through and beyond that too. But thats the point, that were going into these new spaces in many

ways, where you turn around and say, hey listen, the capabilities that we have now dont match the

threats that were being presented with. Were trying to sort of muddle through and yet the dangers

I sense are very real. Let me just give you one example of this, you know on a dark side view. Are we

being is this

Apps: This is on the record. Well take off the record later.

Lamb: On the record. We might want to take this bit off the record, because it just gives somebody a

good idea

Apps: Were streaming it so its up to you. Any bit from here is going to be near impossible to take

off the record, so we might come back around

Lamb: Ok, we might pick this up at another point in time. I wouldnt want to give anyone a bad idea.

Apps: Lets talk about the Russian confrontation because that in some ways looks much more old

fashioned right. Youve got a line in the sand in the Baltic States which weve determined not to let

the Russians cross, but actually once you drill down into that its a very different kind of

confrontation.

Lamb: Yes, again you should not underestimate the Vlad. He is playing I think a bad hand extremely

well. If you turned around and look at the old, go back to the normal sort of what I call how we use

to do all the time in the Cold War, you know you turn around and say how many tanks has he got?

How many tanks have we got? How good are the tanks? How good is the training? How good are the

people? What is their commitment? A whole range of things you can turn around and say. You

know, that was NATO. Oh, by the way we didnt disband NATO in 91, they disbanded the Warsaw

Pact but thats what it was versed up against. The Warsaw Pact was four million men and women

under arms. You know, Russia today is what, 750 000 the way you look at it, its not that feasible, so

the numbers are very much reduced. If you start looking at just the gear, the United States of

America has 11, I think about 10 at sea, 10 you can fire out, carrier groups. Carrier groups. Russia

hasnt even have one.

Apps: But its power is focused much more narrowly on very small areas of terrain, right?

Lamb: Correct. Correct. So hes understanding, you know if you turn around and say, great, war is a

continuum of politics by other means. Actually I would reverse the words round now. Politics are a

continuum of war, of war but by other means. Politics in many ways are just being used now in a

way that we would understand as old fashioned sort of parts of war. And oh, by the way, should we

be surprised? If youre stuck in a corner and I sense if your economy is tanking, you have real

problems at home, actually you look at your investment and you want to increase that, then youre

going to use everything you can, propaganda and all the rest . All those parts yeah, youre going to

use all those parts, all these tools in many ways to present yourself as the aggrieved body. And if you

poke Iran, and you poke Russia and you poke China too hard, then they just coalesce in many ways.

Apps: How do you see things with China? I mean theres two parts to the question. Firstly, how do

you see the Chinese confrontation with the US, they have? And secondly, how does the UK fit into

that, because unlike Russia, were a long way away?

Lamb: I think, actually, both Russia. You go back to my original premise that world order is being

challenged by what I think are emerging and new threats, who has skin in the world order game?

Well, thatll be us, thatll be the United States, thatll be China, thatll be Russia. Chaos does not

serve well those nations. We need globalisation, we need the ability to move, get resources, move

logistics, to be able to in fact move money around. So theres a structure there which actually in

many ways you have a convergence of interests, not a divergence of interests as it is.

Apps: and they do have an interest in tilting it

Lamb: Yes, but the question is, how do we see it as it is? We would see it in our terms, and what we

havent done, I sense in many ways, is embrace, you know its good to talk. If I take someone like,

you know, President Putin, pragmatic, practical, very Russian, in many ways recognises history. So

when he goes to the D-Day events, he recalls 20 million people. If we hadnt had the second front we

would never have gone into Normandy. Now, that doesnt mean that Im an apologist for Vlad. Im

not, but the truth of the matter is that there are some things we need to recognise, and not treat

this as a simple game of checkers. Dont forget the Russians play chess, the Chinese play Mahjong.

Its a very complex, complicated arrangement. I think it would be fascinating to have someone like

Henry Kissinger come along and just recall. I went to a thing the other day, an event the other day

where there were some good people who were dealing with looking at Russia. They were young,

very bright, PhD, dadidadida. Actually, what I really needed to have on the other side of the table

were people who had been working against Russia in the 1960s and the 1970s. Because the rules

havent really changed from a Russian perspective. Weve moved on. Actually, the truth is, weve

forgotten how the rules work. But that old fashioned, hard-nosed, very private diplomacy. Yeah,

weve sort of lost the art of that diplomacy, in many ways as we come out, we try and get a headline,

we get a sort of I said this, theyre going to do that, its about using the media for in fact what I call

popularity rather than actually just measuring out what its about, delivering what effect do you

want to have and my view is weve missed that part in understanding how to deal with some of

these, specially China, very long view, Russia very long back view.

Apps: And to bring it back into the kind of narrow world of what Britain does, what does this say

about the new hybrid world imply for the military. What kind of mind set, more importantly, do you

need?

Lamb: Well, I think number one would be, I did a piece of work for Andrew Muller, when he was

chairman, I was asked to go across by General Mattis, US marine corps to go across and look at some

scenarios, I said Im a Brit, he said no, no, no, you think like a lunatic, and so I went across and did

that, but during the course of that, a really bright fellow from MIT, spoke for about 40 minutes,

absolutely my brain was hurting, I couldnt quite understand most of what he said, but my

synthesis of the discussion was that he said that near term, thats three to five years is all about

innovation and integration, and when we were looking out at that point in time, it was 2007, we

were looking at 2025, he said 2025 is all about invention and discovery, of which your immediate

response is, well we dont know what were going to invent, we dont know what were going to

discover. Actually if you just reverse it long enough, you think actually what it means is that you

invest in your people. Your R&D, its actually about you making sure you have the right people. The

near term piece is about taking what youve got and being smarter with it. Its not about looking for

exquisite solutions. Invariably what I find in the new, robotic and automated, autonomous states

that we now rapidly seeing becoming commonplace, is the ability to separate complex weapons

from complex platforms. The platforms are very expensive. Your ability to relook at this actually,

doesnt mean you cancel everything youre doing at the moment, you know I grew up with all this

stuff, its really important but you do need to redesign because the truth of the matter is that our

forces have to be adaptable. The British army was able to come out of Iran in 1969 and go straight

onto the streets of Northern Ireland. They had 25 700 people. You know, Nelson won Trafalgar, not

by doing the normal thing, actually, in many ways he acted, he took an innovative approach and

actually, against the odds, absolutely trashed the French and Spanish fleets. The RAF in many ways

won the battle of Britain because they integrated with radar. So the idea of in fact what I called using

these new technologies that are emerging, investing in those technologies, is really important, but if

your money is only going into polishing the conventional, or the slightly unconventional, my view is

you will end up with a damn fine Ferrari, or Mercedes McLaren, with no wheels and no gear box. It

wont go anywhere. Itll look great but be actually not fit for purpose. We need to make sure that the

money thats available, its always tight, and by the way, people always cost more than inflation and

equipment costs more than inflation plus. So theres a problem there. So what have you got? You

always give up time. So by the time you get the gear, its already now becoming outdated. And yet

the speed of change in technology, and I try and sort of keep abreast of this, just blows my socks off.

Apps: I want to take a look at, lets get back to ISIS, which is the problem we have, that we have to

address with the tools that weve got. So given that, what is the ISIS war orders in the last year or so

that weve been trying to fight?

Lamb: Ok, go back to my mate Clausewitz, if war is a continuum of policy by other means, he didnt

finish the sentence. To politics it must return. What we see quite often is that if youve got a

hammer, you see every problem as a nail, that old maxim. The events have been with ISIL have been

tactical. The importance of the political, both specific to Baghdad, the regional dynamics, and the

international part, absolutely double up, and double up again. You know I see David Petraeus, old

friend, coming out with that yesterday, you know the answer is, me and David having been saying

this I would say for this last year. Saying its about getting the political scene right. If you set those

conditions, then you can say. Is ISIL doing well in Iraq? Actually its not doing that well. Weve taken

Ramadi, but about actually in fact propaganda, its about sending that message, back to where it is

very strong, in Syria and this international what I call censored.

Apps: They have to look like they winning basically. They have to look like they winning.

Lamb: They have to look like they winning. And by the way, what are they prepared to lose in Iraq?

Everything. Everyone. Without a heartbeat. If thats what it takes to give them a return. The reality

is, theyll absolutely do it. The weakness to where ISIL have now expanded to sits not in their

propaganda, we have to try and combat that with a compelling and appropriate narrative and thats

whole range of different people engaged in that narrative. Were really crap at that, theyre really

good at that. But the truth of the matter is their weakness sits in the need to own territory. They

have to have a caliphate. It is a physical space, that if you go and have a look at it, they have to have

the space. It is where they can then in fact conduct business as they would wish to see it for the

future and how they see it

Apps: Which is not how we operate?

Lamb: Which is not how we operate. That caliphate needs to be taken back. So somebodys boots

have to go on the ground. Its that simple

Apps: And whose should they be and can they be is the question?

Lamb: I think that Iraq is in an interesting space now partly because events that have taken to and

therefore I tend to work with Ive got and not rather what I wish to have. What Ive got is an Iraqi

army of which the basic moving parts are capable, like weve seen them in the past are fighting well.

They need great leadership, political leadership and military leadership. That was ruined, the military

leadership, under Malaki, and the political leadership is suspect. They need to have that leadership.

The problem they have, is they have a deep now involvement with the IRGC

Apps: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard

Lamb: The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, who are now in many ways seem to be those which are

fighting alongside and leading not only, elements of the Iraqi army, but most importantly, enabling

and backing Shia militias and these sort of guys.

Apps: Filling the gap

Lamb: and all the rest. Of which those Shia militias will be running with two intents. One, which is to

in fact export their own interpretation, because as far as they are concerned for many, every

Sunnah, because they allowed ISIL to come in, are therefore guilty of a hideous crime against the

nation state of Iraq. And so therefore they are legitimate targets to be brutalised and killed. Women,

children, men, old, young, elderly

Apps: A very classic

Lamb: And so if Im sitting as a tribal leader or a tribal elder, a family or a clan out in western or

northern Iraq, I probably will accept ISIL because the alternative, if I go with it, is the Shia militia will

come through and probably ruin or destroy my life and my family. So the truth of the matter is that

the problem lies therefore in how we articulate the political space in order to try and change that

environment. Because the truth is, were already too late in stopping the influence that now exists

within the Iraq army and or the predominance of the Shia militias. And the result of both those

forces will create and generate refugees. Refugees will break the Middle East.

Apps: And as we currently stand, you need to change the game play so that it makes some sense to

the Sunni tribes that are left, whether it be a ruler or government, back into the crisis.

Lamb: So you need to come to some, not a case of breaking the country up into three parts, but in

actual fact, a level of devolution which sits where the Sunna and the Shia enjoy the same sort of

authorities and responsibilities that the Kurds have, have enjoyed at some typical time. Within that

space and then with the support of some of the regional players, in particular Saudi, Youve got the

ability to then turn the tribe, because the people who are best placed, and are well capable and have

skin in the game that can deal with ISIL are the tribes and the Sunni who live out in the west and

north of Iraq.

Apps: If we look more narrowly at what Britain can do in the world and what kind of force it wants

to have, you understand a little of the work of working in those tribal structures through the middle

of the last decade right? Do we have the capabilities we need to operate in that space, and what

would they look like?

Lamb: Its very interesting because you know what we have is we have and I understand it entirely

what I call a public and political dislike for intervention. The problem is we tend to intervene late.

Apps: And large.

Lamb: And large, because were going late. So it gets larger. The truth of the matter is what we

should be doing is to engage and early. There are cases where we will need to intervene and as

much as people might challenge all that, if I look at Burundi today, you know, I sat back as a young

officer. Well, maybe not quite so young, and felt as much as I ever feel a sort of pang of guilt, a bout

Rwanda. We sat back as the international community, watching from afar where over a period of 9

months 800 000 people were macheted to death. That is thoroughly unworthy. Unfitting. And as a

result of that and Kosovo, we then managed to hear the international community the right to

protect, which went through. We didnt do anything with it in Libya, and I sense you know, weve

taken a bit of a beating, but we do not need to somehow think we should not intervene because to

go back to my point about our way of life, what we stand for, our values, our standards, is about

doing the right thing on a bad day, and if that costs. You know, I remember as a young officer in

1973. In 1972, the British army lost over 100 men, probably odd woman, in 1972 in Northern Ireland

on internal security. But you have to have the tools to do that. Engagement and early. So when I look

at exquisite equipment, at what cost. Im look, Im more at having an adaptable force so if you turn

around and say if youre going to have an air force than consist of just Air 35s, actually we need

absolutely to have a balanced forced, but that that does mean we have to work with what weve got.

So I can look at things like the C130, and I can say hey be careful, keep it in place, move it out at a

point in time when the A400 am has proved itself, but dont in effect make that, otherwise well end

up with a capability to get out to give but we got rid of it, the carrier, but we got rid of the CVS. So in

this case we need to be careful how we structure ourselves because if you have a lot of

engagements early, and if we had had people doing a standard op tag task,

Apps: Operational Training Team

Lamb: Operational training team, so you know running company level or battalion level training,

which is what we did for Northern Ireland, what we did for all the operations, and then honed it for

Iraq and Afghanistan, if we had had that not a decade but two if not three decades ago, operating in

Nigeria, the Nigerian army today would not have a problem with Boko Haram.

Apps: And I dont get the impressions theres the same public opposition to sending in small training

teams to do stuff and get involved in this sphere as there is to suddenly going into Damascus.

Lamb: But you need to make sure, your structure, your equipment, your organisation, has a number

of these capabilities to be able to support, to be able to move, and to stay

Apps: But what does that really look like?

Lamb: I think it looks like in many ways, I think, because we have a homeland responsibility here,

because I sense that the social contract as I look around the world. I tend not to get fixated today by

security I get more focused on instability. Stability is what I look at, and thats economic, diplomatic,

political, oh and military. These things all come together in m any ways that if you turn around and

say, how do you maintain stability, well this is the point of engaging and early matters. So you need

to have sufficient force to do that, so therefore if I look at the British army and you might say well he

would say this wouldnt he, my view is whatever ceiling we were at 82 000, plus 30 000 in reserve,

11 000 on the civil service, strikes me for a size of a nation of 63.9 million people and the budget we

have, the ability to touch many parts of the world and are recognised from our history as being quite

good at this, my view would be in actual fact that that sounds about right for a regular force. But

someone turns around and says reduce that radically in which case youre just accepting that our

part in trying to stabilise a world which is unravelling. We will have no part in that and yet we

assume that we will be able to conduct global affairs, global finance, global logistics, global

resources, global reach, everything is going to go right without actually in fact putting our hands into

that equation

Apps: And a lot of that has come up but it needs to go beyond that, right? You cant just

.

Lamb: Correct. Correct, And Nick Carter, General Carter whos current GCS, hes done some good

work on looking at how you take one of the divisions and turn that into a more adaptive, regional

focused force, capable of sending small teams out, which are able to do that, engage and early. And

in the engage and early, its not just about in effect having people trained so they are capable of, you

know, down pressed just on a GPMG??? But actually what youre doing is, youre beginning to

impart your moral and your ethical, and your values and standards. Whats right and whats wrong.

Apps: road as well. Thats a long way away.

Lamb: Yeah, yeah, but my view again is that if we turn around and say that oh right you send an

army out, or you send a small force out and only if it is absolutely safe would you put them into

country x and up country in place, then my view is you might as well disband the bloody lot, just

write it off at the end of the day. You know as a young man my view is I expected to go into harms

way and I think that has not changed for anyone in uniform. You know you dont rush to get killed,

but the idea of being in the right place doing something which is a centre purpose which fits into a

broader programme of development, of change, of trying to improve something, which will bring

better stability, betterment, to that country, or its armed forces, or whatever the case may be, of

course youd do that. And if you lose some people on the way, thats what it takes.

Apps: And how much is that actually filtering into the SDSR process, which is traditionally about kit

and how the big the numbers are.

Lamb: I think the problem with the SDSR will be at the moment, and in many ways youre already

seeing an article by Debra (Haines) in the Times, by the Telegraph, on sort of here are the numbers,

yeah, so in many ways, you go straight in what youve got, this zip, heres how much youre going to

have to save in the programmes. And I said if you turn around and say people come in at inflation

plus, and equipment comes in at inflation plus plus and then youve got make a saving, where does

the saving come from in real terms? Well it comes from activity. If Im a young pilot or I am in fact in

charge of a ships company, or a battalion of troops training, and I cant because theres no fuel and I

can do no activity, then Id rather come to the city and earn a shit load of money and do that. The

truth of the matter is activity is quite important, but thats what will suffer in a real term cut as it

comes in. The important thing is, we have to look at what parts of defence make sense in a world

that Ive badly described.

Apps: So what should suffer and what should we reinvest within that kind of world?

Lamb: Well I think what we should do is view what we have and see how we can run it on, how you

can manage it better and how can you can make more efficiencies. And the efficiency term, you

know people pander around, they give you a lot of right efficiency is dead. My view is I think that you

can look in certain spaces where we do things with these uniforms

Apps: Such as?

Lamb: or with non uniforms, who are inappropriately placed. We can relook at it, you know the

number of places we have, you know, and take that. You can look at the big programmes as is,

recognise them for what they are, see where we need those capabilities, but make sure that what

you dont do is take what little money you have and then force it into just those existing

programmes. The most important provider of new ideas, of delivering and being able to bring to

bear some of the short falls which I just sense, dont forget Im not in a privileged position now,

actually is not the head of the army, is not the head of the navy, is not the head of the royal air

force. The person that actually should have a large say in the, where the money is used, is he who

delivers the joint force capabilities, the joint force, so in this case General Barret. My view

would be to allow him to look at the spaces where the world is today and will be tomorrow, and

ensure that actually that were able, whether its reserves capable and in fact coming because they

wish to have a purpose in life but are so expensive, but they are so damn good in cyber spaces they

will come in for a period. I dont need them to go on a short course and try to compete with

somebody terrible, I just need or a boy or a girl to be able to deliver really clever algo rhythms and

look at these complicated spaces and then how they integrate and what we need to do with what

we have to safeguard what we intend to operate with. To look at capabilities, to be able to see the

emerging robotics, to look at these what I call new spaces which at the moment someone will say we

need new money. My view is to turn around and say weve got sufficient, so what do we do with

what weve got. Start with what you have and try and make that work better.

Apps: What would your must haves or must has be?

Lamb: I would probably be reluctant, very reluctant, to reduce on numbers in any one of the

services. Thats costly.

Apps: That doesnt give you a lot of money to play with

Lamb: It doesnt give you a lot of money and man power, and in the wider sense, ae expensive. But it

goes to my point about my friend from MIT, innovation, integration. I would absolutely turn round

and say that where we can look at capabilities, which previously matched a Warsaw Pact, need now

only match a coalition effort or what we could define Russia

Apps: We got something like that

Graeme Lamb Yeah, yeah. And the MPA is a problem, I sense that that is an issue that needs to be

addressed. How you deliver what the MPA does, doesnt necessarily require a new mode as we

know it or an Orion as the United States have it

Apps: But those are the numbers we have.

Lamb: But you could do something with other aircraft. It goes back to my point about you dont have

to have complex weapons or complex capabilities, stuck onto complex aircraft, complex platforms,

you can put some of that very clever stuff onto very clever platforms.

Apps: .special forces plus, that does lots of stuff all the time, and then the larger

force which is less active on a day to day basis, but its in reserve. How do you sort of prioritise that?

Is one too large? Is that balanced right at the moment?

Lamb: I think again if I looked at the armed forces that came out of it, Afghanistan and Iraq, if you

take that competence, you know I think it was Kreimeyers chief of staff who wrote, General Miles,

SS Commander in the Second World War, a Kurmite said, fortune favours the competent, is what he

wrote. Not the great. Anybody can be great and get killed and get away with it, but the truth is what

really matters is being competent and what really matters is therefore that competence sphere. If I

looked at therefore at the armed forces against the competences they had as we went into Iraq and

Afghanistan, they are just light years, light years away from.

Apps: What does that army not do?

Lamb: Well I think what you have to do is you have to in fact not underestimate, you know I say to

people that you know you dont have to pay me a bucket load of cash, and you can put me into just

about any diabolical situation that you can come up with, as long as I can sense the reason behind it.

But dont take me for granted, and dont have a laugh. Yeah, and so the truth of the matter is it is

trying to work out what that threshold is because the danger is if youre doing nothing. If youre a

young pilot and you can only get two hours a month flying, youre just not going to stay in the Royal

Air Force. Its that simple. Yeah, and you might say thats irrational, it doesnt make any sense. If you

cant give a young, the opportunity of a near term command of a ship, you know, straight out of

Master and Commander, you know, everyone wants to be Russell Crowe. Yeah, why not? Yeah, the

truth of the matter is, you know that is really important, because its the sense of belonging, the

sense of what those people bring to the fight, that in many ways differentiates the, what I call the

other runs from people who have a shot at the target.

Apps: Interesting I think thats one of the reasons I joined Reuters, was Reuters brought with it the

guarantee of early interesting stuff. I mean as it happened its suggested Id have been doing all

manner of interesting things over the last decade but it was that guarantee that was very

appealing for a young 22 year old

Lamb: Correct, and I think that remains the ideal. So we need to attend to that without becoming,

what I call lost into it. So try to find the balance between therefore conventional and

unconventional, the ability to deal with hybrid, the emerging threat, the relationship between

security service, SIS, GCHQ, immigration, the Met, counterterrorism and the armed forces here

might be something that we need to bring a lot closer. I find it extraordinary that National Security

Council doesnt have a serious economist. Because, as I look around the world, invariably when I go

into a country the first thing Im looking at, is Id say show me the underlying finances, tell me what

the dynamics here are on employment expectation and economic prosperity

Apps: Which is not traditional Sandhurst or staff college stuff, right?

Lamb: Which is not. But the truth of the matter is I think theres an awful lot of people that wear

uniform today, and people like me who did and are now old blokes that actually get the to politics it

must return, that actually the world we fight in has this range of different spaces which if we do not

address we will be undone by them. If you just think, the application of violence, and on occasion we

do need to absolutely bring the application of violence to bear, people have to be killed, or in fact

what I call shaped in that space. And you can shape them by a Blue 52, which is really impressive

when it goes off, or you can shape them by siting opposite them and having a conversation, which

turns around, as I did in Iraq, to how does this end?

Apps: That conversation is informed by the threat of force

Lamb: And the real threat of force. Because it gets back to this point about, you have not only the

capability and credibility so its credible in the form of what it can do and how its integrated, and

its all about joined up. But actually in fact its your will. Its not about warfare its about will-fare, so

actually your willpower, your willingness to bring this to bear. Political, public and the armed forces

to be prepared to put themselves in harms way and see whoever calls them out on whatever day in

whatever form of battle.

Apps: I want to open this up to the audience, were going to do a couple of rounds of questions on

the record then were going to take the whole discussion off the record.

Audience: Do we need a more explicit stance on market driven solutions? We see in the private

sector the huge role of maritime, for example. Should we be more actively acknowledging it and

engaging with it?

Lamb: UK has a real problem with the commercial sector. If I go to America I see the relationship

between commerce, the agency. I used to work with Palantir the result was fantastic. The truth of

the matter is, if I really want to know some skinny on a problem in my previous world, I would go

and get what the foreign office had, I would go and talk to SIS, I would look at all of this and then I

would go and find one or two people who I knew who were working in the commercial space in that

sector, in that nation, in that space, and have a private conversation. They would give me fantastic

insights. If I turned around and looked at them for leverageIf the foreign secretary wanted to go

down to lets say parts of Africa, whatever it may be it doesnt really matter, that would take three

months to organise, he would arrive in a commercial jet, pomp and ceremony, go and see the

President, go and see the embassy, do a tour of British councils and stuff and then fly out. His access

is 100%, his leverage probably around 10%. If the head CEO of Chevron wanted to go, the truth is

hed go there in three days, hed land, hed have a private meeting, hed fly back out again. His

access 100%, his leverage, I dont know, 30-40%. So the importance of the commercial filed,

somehow we see this as dirty in this country, you cant deal with people like me because Im a

consultant Im now a civilian so therefore Ive got interests

Apps: Is this changing?

Lamb: Its changing a little bit, but its taking forever. So the commercial world has fantastic

leverage. In many ways has more power and leverage out there than the best of government

Apps: And more flexibility?

Lamb: A lot more flexibility, they can move quickly, they can change an economic dynamic, they can

change investment dynamics, they can look at a whole range of things. You take for instance Cogen 2

which is coming up at the moment, what is interesting in that is not that we might go for the figures

that theyre talking about, but that if they do it will wipe 26 trillion dollars out of energy investment,

just like that. It will break the financial markets. So the position of commerce, the position of a

genuine partnership, not do as I say a bit like the bloke who stands beside Benny Hill and gets

battered on the head, is in this case I think really important. That means a mature, genuine

relationship. Of which there are rules to be part of that, and if you screw with them and break them

the answer is youre out of the club. The truth is if you see there is a common and converging

interest in maintaining this order in our society, my view is we should absolutely embrace the rule

there.

Audience: Taking your point about adaptive organisations, you talked about the military and all that,

and I really take your point about getting out of Afghanistan, there are clearly a lot of people in the

British military who had looked at that and understood the politics which made it difficult. My

question to you is the National Security Council, whatever mechanism that emerges throughout the

SDSR, do you think in the past its displayed the ability to adapt? And if it hasnt, how do we get

people, the FCO, treasury to react in a more intelligent, fact-filled and focused way?

Apps: And well take another question

Audience: Weve consistently salami-sliced defence since the 1990s... weve sacrificed entire

capabilities in maritime patrol aircraft in SDSR10, under the radar weve also reduced combat service

support to the point where we now cannot support the infantry battalions we have if we were to

deploy them. My question is, even if we do pay 2% GDP can we credibly purport to continue to

maintain full spectrum capabilities? And if not, what needs to be done?

Apps: Lets start with the National Security Council Question first

Lamb: I think the problem, its a bit like, in a crisis actually National Security Council should never

find itself in a meeting of extraordinary importance, not unless it was sort of what I would call end

of the world is nigh and the aliens have landed. Strategy is about setting those conditions and not

about dealing with tactical or political nuances

Apps: So its not a US National Security Council?

Lamb: So what we need to do is make sure that therefore it represents those that deal with the

issue. I go back to my point about stability, the National Security Council, or it should be National

Stability Council, it looks at national and our interests and the people who have a board for our

resource interests overseas or our values interests overseas, and therefore it should represent that

sort of voice.

Apps: Even then does it have enough economic or market capabilities to deal with it?

Lamb: So I think you have to relook at (personally. Im not the Prime Minister or Cabinet therefore in

fact my view is irrelevant in that respect ), but I think therefore in fact it would be interesting, weve

come from a period which had this security is the big issue, stability is now the new issue, I think it

has been for some time, its just not recognised as such. And in many ways we now need to reflect

that responsibility in that National Security/Stability Council, who makes it up and what it looks at.

You know the best articulation of strategy that Ive heard is the journey you imagine, the course

you steer, the voyage you actually take. Its these parts, both a vision out here, broad based, through

to actually a point deliverable, and you need to connect those two its not about a vision statement

which is worthless, its about connecting it through a series of activities which then take that vision

and give it meaning. Its about input, output and effect. And quite often that part is missed. So I

think there is work to be done in the National Security Council, I would suggest, but well see what

happens.

Apps: and now the salami slicing question

Lamb: Id say if you go back to the clear and present danger, what people saw as the Soviet Union in

the 1980s, we were cutting a significant amount of our GDP into that space and it was very pointed

designed to combat and challenge and match what was the Warsaw Pact on the other side of the

field. You know its just got broader, and yet we somehow dont seem to recognise what that clear

and present danger is. Now I would find, and I would challenge, and I was guilty of therefore, when I

was in uniform, of failing to be able, (because wars and its activities consumed my near space) but

the reality was that we were not good at constructing a compelling narrative which got to the

reasons why and therefore what we needed to therefore defend this realm with. Its not about

spinning; its about trying to articulate. I think it was Einstein once said; dont try to simplify a

problem, try to make it simple. Which requires a huge amount of effort to then turn around and say

this is what we should do, these is our responsibilities at home and these are out responsibilities

abroad, this is where we need to contribute and this is where we dont. We are no longer in the

business of being able to do the whole package on our lonesome. Actually its always been the case,

you know we drag on satellites for communication, we drag on satellites for overheads, for optics,

for intelligence coming from the NSA and a whole range of other spaces, which are not owned by us,

and its been like that for a long time. ITs about recognising who our close and near friends are, and

I would err, and its not because I have some relationship with America, with every reason they are

just foreigners, time and time again really hard work, disappointing, but actually theyve pulled my

arse out of too many fires and done the right thing on a bad day. In many ways our values and some

of the way we look at the world converge with America more than they converge with the sort of

amorphous group people talk about Europe. That doesnt mean we dont have close European

friends that we work with, but invariably with NATO its about coalitions of the willing, not about

NATO in its purest sense where they all turn up on the battle space. In this case I sense that how we

look to those relationships, how we therefore build the force and look at those organisations and

structures, which we are able to match and which we are likely to fight alongside because we have a

common purpose, we have a common view of what is right and what is wrong. Not an identical view,

because that would mean wed be like America and were not. But the truth of the matter is that

recognising that, and then building that in to the narrative is important.

Apps: We should try to retain that cross-sectional capability rather than salami slicing well get rid of

this thing big thing to maintain these other three things

Lamb: My view is that wed be doing a disservice to the nation, on the basis that if I look at the level

of uncertainty out there, the number of bad actors out there who would wish to change our way of

life, that would absolutely challenge what we stand for and what we do. And what is our response?

We just roll over? Bugger that. The truth of the matter is that we do need to recognise how we

spend there. And these capabilities, through things like Engage Early, it does require what we see as

parts of the Royal Air Force, the Royal Navy and the Army. The idea of lets collapse one of the

services would be reckless. And actually in fact might be a ridiculous move. Its trying to work out to

have those services defend not what was, but to articulate what is and what will be. And to place it

into a narrative that makes sense to the common man and woman, and dont say that lightly,

because the common man and woman are, in my view, so much smarter than I am.

Apps: Ok well come to Patrick and take a few more

Audience: You were involved in the review of the reserves, I was just wondering if you could talk a

bit about the genesis of that, did it come from a treasury push? Was it a political push? And secondly

how you see it going, and does it actually matter?

Audience: To what extent do you see a blowback with Daish as a major risk and of the four

horsemen, CBRN, which do you see as the most serious?

Apps: So well let you take the reserves question first...

Lamb: The reserves to me I worked with the reserves, I had them under command, I pushed the

quite hard quite early on as soon as we brokered the first part of the Taliban in 2001. In the early

part of 2002 I immediately pulled in the reserves into Afghanistan because they were more than

capable

Apps: And in very large numbers

Lamb: Yeah, good numbers came in because in my view I needed to recoup on the force elements

that I had. So I worked with them then. Was I a harsh driven advocate? Not at all. But I was watching

what was happening and therefore the pressures on the budget for them to say we need to reduce

the reserves down to what, in my view, would have been probably a level at which it was incapable

of surviving. It would have been Dads army on Dads Army on something going back to Crimea. It

would have just fallen apart at one point in time. So I was watching that and then I got a call, literally

in my garden, from what was then and probably still is the Prime Ministers Chief of Staff, who said

Hey General, youre the only name thats come out of the hat who wed trust to play this straight.

But were going to put a commission up, General Horton is going to be the serving, Julian Bray is

going to be the MP, and Id like you to be in, and the Prime Minister is walking across to Parliament,

will you do it? And of course you think well alright that mean Ill get paid bugger all at the end of

the day, itll take up a shitload of my time. And of course like all these things, like Stanley McChrystal

turned around when I was retiring and said hey I need to come out to Afghanistan. I said Man Im

retiring of course I will. It didnt go down well with the wife. But in this case I said of course I

will. And my view was not about being a huge advocate for reserves, but I sensed, and I still sense

to this day, passion. Because I believe that we have not yet seen the outcomes, which slightly punch

into DIASH and all the rest here, of social disorder, of what could go wrong in this country, whether

its an attack of cyber, and attack on power, a failure of the system, and what that means. If you go

back and look at America, for instance, when we set up the guard, the guard was in fact a brigade to

a million people, that how we basically constructed it. And the reason was we had something that

could therefore bring order when chaos or disorder was effected. I still believe the reserve have an

important part to play in that

Apps: As important as the new plans suggest they should be? With a lot more heavy lifting

Lamb: Yeah but you can also look with the reserve, look at some of the conventional capabilities,

these are what I call skill sets which are quite mechanical, which are increasingly getting better with

automation and technology, and so therefore you say lining up the guns, will the guns do it

themselves? Actually in fact you manage that you say yeah these are skill sets which, if youre going

to go to a conventional exchange, the reserves are well up for this sort of stuff. And then in the very

specialist areas, 77th Brigade, cyber boys, you just cant afford these people. They cost a blood arm

and a leg. But its interesting, in retirement I have one simple rule, well rule number one: only work

with people I like. I have not broken that rule. Number two: ideally find a purpose. Find something

thats really really interesting, and the least important is pay. Actually a lot of people out there need

to have this sense of purpose. Actually in fact they feel better for it, because I think the sense of

society, the sense of the nation state. Big society, and I know it got a hard time, but in many ways,

look at Stan McChrystal and the work hes doing at Aspen on the idea of national service, Prince

Harry the other day talking about it. I dont discount that as being important. So actually, can you

find 30,000 people out there to come in? Of course you can, it really isnt a drama. It wasnt gripped

with enthusiasm in the early stages, there was lots of other things going on, coming out of Iraq,

Afghanistan and all the rest. But the truth is, my view is that General Carter absolutely gets it.

Apps: Im struck with what Tom Beazley told me a few years ago, the best indicator that everyone

knew war was coming in the 1930s is that everyone started joining the reserves. Clearly the world

has changed

Lamb: And so to go with my point about engage early about in fact what I call lots of Russell

Crowes, because I believe that its not just entertaining the navy, the army and the air force, actually

its genuinely about shaping events and activities and endeavours out there. The truth of the matter

is, there are some opportunities to pick up for the young men and women out there, which I would

leap to in a heartbeat if I could rerun this, but Ill be dead soon so I dont really give a shit.

Lamb (response to second question): Regarding ISIL, really important we actually look at that, I used

to work in North Africa, specifically to try to understand what the impacts of returning Daish will be,

foreign fighters coming home, about how they promote that twisted view of the sense of but dont

put them all down as lunatics or idiots, I think thats a fatal error. If you talk to some of these young

men, or you see them or hear their accounts, they absolutely, when Al Baghdadi, and I cant

remember the amount of times we killed Al Baghdadi in Iraq... but actually he keeps on coming back

up again, this kind of sense of person rather than the person. But the truth is when he declared the

Caliphate, just a shed load of people out there. A very good article was written when the jihadist just

turned around and said I was so empowered

Apps: Like the reserves in some sense

Lamb: Exactly because my sense is theres an awful lot of people out there where we have failed

them in the social contract. They have hopelessness. And in those circumstances, when I look at the

refugee camps and the disruption of the Middle East, if people have no hope, if their circumstances

were getting no education, failure of health, their families and their children dying, the answer to

what would you do? Well whatever will give you a sense of purpose, and I would be right there

alongside them. So we need to be really careful of dismissing them as just being bad actors, and

recognise that actually in many ways, the gap in the social contract if I looked at the Arab Spring

my view wasnt the race to democracy or a race to Islam, actually in many ways what I saw in the

Arab Spring was a failure of the social contract.

Apps: A race to respect in some ways

Lamb: And so how we bring that gap together, and if I look at the ills of the world we just keep

loading them up on the wrong side on the deficit scale, of the jewellers (scale). And you turn

around and say whats on the positive side? actually, research, development and technology.

Audience: Wondering about the role that mass surveillance might play, both as a potential strategic

weapons for us, and what the costs of that might be, but also as a potential offensive weapon for

non-state and state hostile actors

Lamb: I think that there is a debate that we should absolutely have, in many ways embrace and lead

upon, create the energy to. If you go back and look at the early period of the enlightenment,

Hobbes, Grotius, Montesquieu, Rousseau, just keep ticking the names off, there people put their

lives at risk, ex-communicated, etc. etc. as they fought to try and understand the relationship

between the individual and the state, or the individual and authority. And that went on for a great

period of time and in many ways brought about responsibilities, obligations, freedoms and rights.

We have not had that debate and yet the world is changing. In the many ways we are now

connected. The idea that it took armies, navies and air force to bring industrial violence to bear to

change or threaten our way of life, was something that went in previous eras. You could find an

army, you could find and air force, you could find a navy. Today just a few souls can challenge our

way of life and our safety and security. SO you have a problem which is this between what level of

surveillance, of intrusion into your civil liberties should we have? We need to have a debate on it, I

have no issue with that whatsoever and would welcome the lunatic right and the lunatic left and

everything in between to try and actually struggle with this sense of responsibility. Because the

ground rules have changed, and if the ground rules have changed such that you can turn around and

say only a few souls, of which these few are emergent, so they dont register on a network, they

dont come up. You go back and look at the Madrid bombing, 220 people dead, changed a

government, one email coming out of Iraq which said do something. And the Chinaman and the

Tunisian were complete muppets, they were really crap, but they were connected into a criminal

network Increasingly I now see criminal and radicalised networks out there of which they were

able to go and get the sufficiency to then go and kill a shitload of people. And when you looked at it,

you saw a whole series of flaws. So we have to address this. In many ways, when someone says to

me Graeme, dont you feel abused by the fact that the NSA have been looking at you emails and

telephone calls? I say Of course, theyve been looking at my bloody emails and telephone calls, Id

expect nothing less! Actually the Russians are doing the same, the Israelis are doing the same, the

Iranians, you just keep ticking the list off. Every Jack will be out there having a good look. I dont

write an email that I dont assume Im not going to see tomorrow in the newspaper. And by the way

when I get a text or an email I never assume its from the sender who sent it to me. Thats the nature

of it. People might say My goodness mate, youre paranoid. Im not, its just how the world is. And

by the way, if Im objecting to that level of intrusion, well shit, whose read all the bit where it says I

accept or I agree that goes with your Google or your Microsoft or your Mac or whatever. They

can absolutely register where you are, what youre doing. And theyll come back to you, suddenly

youll be walking down the street and itll say turn left, by the way theres a fantastic deal on those

shoes I know youve been wanting to buy. Thats the world as its going to be, until the truth of the

matter is, yknow I dont need an ID card, I am the ID card: retinal scan, DNA, voice scan, fingerprint,

physical. You know all these parts come into it. So we have to have a debate. Because my problem is

this; is I think that just a few people will really screw with our future. And therell be people that do

it because they can. I had a very interesting conversation a number of years ago with a young fella

who was a legendary carder, thatd done four years of a five year term for credit card fraud, he was

23 years old. What was interesting at the end of the conversation, now he lied twice, which was an

error because I wanted to have him in as a red team player, because he didnt think like the really

smart guys in the NSA or GCHQ, he thought like, in fact, somebody who just lived in the virtual world

and the dark net. What was really interesting at the end of the conversation, I came to the

conclusion, and Im a guy thats got pretty liberal boundaries, I came to the conclusion that he had

no moral, ethical or legal boundary. He would do it because he could. And the truth of the matter is

he would break the nations economy, he would destroy the logistic system, he would stop anything

moving, power stations not powering, you name it, just because he saw it as a virtual, technical

challenge. Those people are alive and well. And by the way when you get radicalised crime, criminal

networks and organised crime, when they are no longer fuelling that which they are there to provide

money for, then they will take these skill sets which are all in these spaces and they will apply

them upon our way of life. So how we look at these spaces, as disturbing as we might feel it is, but

VISA Europe and Google, they have a shit lad more on me than the NSA have.

Apps: One last thing from me and then I want to take this off the record. Scotland: 6 million seriously

pondering not having a future in the same country as the rest of us. Not something were used to

considering as part of our normal long-term view of the UK. How does that change the way you think

about defence?

Lamb: I think that, if you go back and look at, 45 against 55 is reasonably close, but not that close. If

you look at where the predominant regions for evolution or for independence sat, I think it was a bit

of Dundee and a lot of Glasgow, and that was about it, the rest Im not sure about. Its interesting in

the election that we just had, in many ways, there were a lot of people beforehand who turned

around and said there is not swing vote, theyve already figured out what theyre going to vote,

they just wont tell it. And what theyre going to vote for is economic stability. And the figures I had

well before the election was the sweep... I wish Id put down a shit load of money with the bookies

because I would have done rather well out of that. So the truth of the matter is, I think that 59 seats

in government are not unimportant, but theyre not a decision point. They will manoeuvre around

that space. I think Scotland is not generically inclined to leave the UK, I mean it wont. But in many

ways, from a Defence point of view, its principally about a nuclear deterrent, which is sitting up

there, and then obviously some people in bases and the like. My view is the nation would be weaker

with a loss of the Union, Ive always said that.

Apps: On the nuclear deterrent, should we be thinking seriously about where to put that because

Scotland might decamp?

Lamb: No, I think that again you go back to the numbers, the cost of it, we need to calculate what it

would be, that would be an additional cost upon what I call the cost of allowing devolution. So you

need to factor it in, you need to try and say this is what it would take to move those submarines and

the facilities and the storage, where in fact youve got all the bits and pieces that are sitting up in

Scotland. Lets say weve got to move them down, this is what it would look like in hard cash terms.

Its a bit like Fifth Fleet coming out of Bahrain, at the end of the day you turn around as say how

much is it going to cost to relay that amount of concrete somewhere else in the Middle East? Turn

around as say Wow, breath-taking! So people therefore think twice about the decision.