Listen! Pay Attention! Transnational Social Movements and the

Diffusion of International Norms

Josh Busby

Georgetown University

"Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

1Abstract

In the post-Cold War era, climate change, landmines, debt relief and a number of other issues emerged to re-shape the agenda of decision-makers in the advanced industrialized world. The primary advocates of these normative issues are motivated not by their own material self-interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What is the primary logic that contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? International relations scholars identify persuasion as the primary way in which states are convinced that a norm-based policy is worth accepting. How should we characterize this process of persuasion? Is this the right term to describe the actions of transnational protest movements? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, I offer an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. This paper emphasizes the rhetorical and framing strategies that are used to try to tip the political balance in support of normative agendas but ultimately ascribes these a different character than either coercion or Habermasian communicative action. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value traditions to build broader coalitions of political support.

2Listen! Pay Attention! Transnational Social Movements and the Diffusion of International Norms 1

In the post-Cold War era, a number of issues emerged on the policy landscape to re-shape the agenda of decision-makers in the advanced industrialized world. Many of them are related to the process of globalization and involve moral or normative concerns,2 if ultimately related to traditional security and economic issues. These issues include: debt relief, global warming, AIDS, the International Criminal Court, child labor, corruption, landmines, the international tobacco trade, fair trade, the death penalty, the diamond trade, racism and reparations, genocide, rights of women, small arms, sweatshops, core labor standards and other issues. Lest we make this a list of largely left-wing causes, we may also include anti-abortion campaigns as well as those for religious freedom in China and the Sudan.

What is distinctive about these cases is that the primary advocates of these normative issues are motivated not by their own material self-interests but broader notions of right and wrong. This paper attempts to focus on the following question: What is the primary logic that contributes to the domestic acceptance of these new international normative issues? Aside from clear instances of coercion, international relations scholars identify persuasion as the primary way in which states are convinced that a norm-based policy is worth accepting (Finnemore and Sikkink 274).

How should we characterize this process of persuasion? Is this the right term to describe the actions of transnational protest movements? The existing international relations literature has yet to offer an adequate theoretical treatment (Finnemore and Sikkink 274). Are actors who promote a normative issue primarily undertaking strategic action, based on purposive behavior? Are they involved more in appeals to shared values or norm-governed behavior? Alternatively, are they engaged in communicative action, based on the desire for shared understanding? Are the agents that accept (or the targets of activism) mainly driven by (1) instrumental logics of consequences, or (2) are they motivated by rule-governed logics of appropriateness?3 A third possibility is that (3) advocates and targets engage in back and forth dialogue en route to shared understanding through what Thomas Risse termed a discursive logic of arguing. While it is probably self-evident to suggest that the cleanliness of actor intentions and target response in the real world is one of mixed motives,4 we may be able to shed some light on which logics are the main determinants of behavior and outcomes. One of the main conclusions of this paper is that different logics may dominate under different circumstances. By drawing from the case of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing

1 This paper builds on previous conference papers at APSA and ISA. Busby 2001a. Busby 2001b. Busby 2003.

Thanks go to those who agreed to be interviewed. These include Jamie Drummond (Jubilee 2000s Global Strategist), Dan Driscoll-Shaw (National Coordinator of Jubilee 2000/USA), Thomas M. Hart, (Director of Government Relations, The Episcopal Church), David Bryden (Outreach Coordinator, Jubilee 2000/USA), Susan Thompson (Columban Justice and Peace Office), and Alan Gill (Alternative Director, Canadian Delegation, Inter-American Development Bank), as well as other government and finance officials who provided me with invaluable background on this issue. I have conducted more recent interviews with German officials and advocates which has yet to be systematically incorporated into this paper but largely supports the findings.2 In contrast to a utilitarian calculus of costs and benefits, normative concerns or values refer to idealized

judgments of right and wrong moral behavior such as rich countries have a moral obligation to reduce the debts of the worlds poorest countries. 3 The distinction between logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness, though perhaps problematic, is

generally accepted in the international relations literature. Olsen and March are credited with the conceptualization, though Elster provides a similar explication. March and Olsen 1998, 943-969. Elster 1989.4 Elster discusses mixed motives (1989, 202).

3country debt relief, this paper also demonstrates that the strategic effort to frame arguments is a potent mechanism by which advocates persuade decision-makers to pay attention to their cause even if deeper preference change fails to occur.

The Jubilee 2000 campaign provides an interesting area for case study. International finance is a rather arcane topic for grassroots advocacy. Debt negotiations are normally discussed in a rarefied world of central bankers and Treasury officials, multilateral bureaucrats, and private financiers, nearly all of whom are committed to minimizing moral hazard5 and are thus skeptical of writing off a countrys external debt. Thus, it was a surprise when the Jubilee 2000 campaign for third world debt relief became one of the most visible mass movements in the late 20th century. Two well-respected economists called the campaign by far the most successful industrial-country movement aimed at combating world poverty for many years, perhaps in all recorded history (Birdsall and Williamson 2002:1). It earned the endorsement of leaders of diverse ideological and professional orientationsfrom the Pope to pop star Bono to Harvards Jeffrey Sachs to conservative religious icon Pat Robertson.

Organized around the coming of the 21st century, Jubilee 2000 was an international campaign that aimed to relieve the worlds poorest countries of their unpayable external debts. The reference to Jubilee comes from the biblical notion in the Book of Leviticus of a time to relieve the debts of the poor. Martin Dent, a professor at Keele University in the UK, is credited for coming up with the idea for a Jubilee year in the early 1990s.6 Dents knowledge of the bible and his deep ethical commitment to the third world led him to formulate the plan for an end of the millennium campaign.7Dents advocacy began with a number of students but soon attracted Oxfam, Christian Aid and other UK charities who formally launched the campaign in April 1996. It would blossom, galvanizing millions of people around the world to participate in letter-writing campaigns and protests. By the end of 2000, the campaign had groups in more than 65 countries with more than 100 affiliated organizations in the UK alone (Jubilee 2000 campaign. Who We Are). Many of these groups come from Britains traditional religious-affiliated charities (like Christian Aid and Oxfam) that also run aid and development projects. They also include trades unions and environmental, peace, religious, and student groups. When the campaign formally ended in December 2000, 24 million people had signed campaign petitions, a world record (Bunting 2000).

This paper seeks to explain the relative success of the Jubilee 2000 campaign compared to previous efforts by advocates to politicize the issue. Section 1 differentiates the three logics above with respect to international relations theory and the work of Jrgen Habermas; Section 2 aims, with an emphasis on framing, to characterize the actions of transnational protest movements in the advanced industrial world; and finally, Section 3, using the debt relief case, tests the argument that strategic framing of issues for maximum persuasive appeal is an important mechanism by which states accept normative commitments.8

5 Moral hazard refers to policies that attempt to remedy a problem which actually increase the likelihood of the

problem occurring again, particularly when risky behavior is rewarded or unpunished. 6 Dent and co-founder Bill Peters recorded their history of the movement in a 1999 book.

7 Jubilee 2000 campaign. Milestones in the Campaign. For a 1999 interview with Dent, see Australian Broadcasting

Corporation 1999. 8 I thank Mark Warren and Rodger Payne for extensive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

4Section 1: The three logics and the work of Jrgen HabermasThe objectives of this section are to define terms and critically appraise the work of Jrgen

Habermas and IR scholars inspired by him. First, I explain what norms are and what would constitute domestic acceptance. In so doing, I differentiate between norms and norm-based policies. I then lay out the three logicsof consequences, appropriateness, and arguingand relate them to the familiar debate between rational choice/strategic action vs. constructivism.

By norms, we mean the set of social conventions or rules, procedures and principles that establish the standards of appropriate behavior members of a group should manifest in a given context.9 This notion of oughtness has been termed the logic of appropriatenes. In contrast to the utilitarian logic of consequences, logics of appropriateness are governed by notions of right and wrong, of good and bad ethical behavior.

What would constitute domestic acceptance of an international norm? It may be helpful to distinguish between norms and norms-based policies. While a norm is often an abstract idea, a norm-based policy is something more concrete. A norm-based policy reflects a situation where an issue with moral implications has been politicized by activists who see an injustice that needs to be corrected. For example, in the case of developing country debt relief, advocates believe that high levels of third world external debt constitute a wrong that creditor nations have a moral obligation to address. In response to their activism, a policy has been drafted. Thus, the norm (the unpayable debts of the poorest countries ought to be forgiven) becomes embodied in a particular policy (the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative). This particular policy may or may not be sufficiently far-reaching for an advocacy group to believe that the norm is being satisfied. Therefore, even if the norm-based policy is accepted, advocates may remain unsatisfied and charge that the norm itself is far from being fulfilled. New policies may be drafted that come closer to meeting advocates ideals.

Acceptance would appear to suggest that the actor who accepted did so out of agreement with the substantive content of the norm. However, with the question framed in terms of a norms-based policy, acceptance reflects the initial stage when a state agrees to adopt new policies and laws in accord with the norm in question.10 Acceptance would imply that a norm-based policy can survive a domestic approval process that requires local interest and support. When a state accepts a norm-based policy, it may do so for a variety of reasons that have little or nothing to do with its agreement with the norm(s).

Before a norm-based policy has survived the moment of authoritative choice, preliminary domestic acceptance may involve a normative issue becoming salient. Salience requires that an issue be temporally compelling to a fairly sizable attentive decision-making group. For a norm to survive an authoritative choice decision, it must achieve another degree of support11 and be the (or one of the) most important attributes by which decision-makers judge particular issues at that moment.12 This definition of salience makes coherent rapid transformations in policy. Here, policy

9 Hirshleifer 1998, 300. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 251. Hirshleifer 1998. This paper focuses on regulative rather

than constitutive norms.10

Finnemore and Sikkink 255, 262. Checkel makes a similar distinction between empowerment and compliance. Checkel 1997.11

Assessing the interplay between agenda-setting and the decision stage is the next phase of this research program.12

Decision-makers, as a cognitive heuristic, choose an option that is superior on the then more important attribute. Jones 1994, 61. For a similar perspective on salience from IR, see Vasquez 1985, 644.

5reversals reflect serial shifts in attentiveness (when different preferences are activated) based on events or deliberate efforts by policy entrepreneurs to re-cast the issue.13

Because the existing literature does not make the distinction between norms and norms-based policy, international relations theory has struggled to develop an adequate account of persuasion.

The Logic of Consequences and Strategic ActionAs indicated above, the logic of consequences, unlike the rule-governed role players

presupposed by the logic of appropriateness, reflects instrumental or teleological behavior by actors. Such goal -oriented action is governed by calculations of costs and benefits. Where actors pursuit of their goals is constrained or dependent upon the behavior of others, actors, if they are rational, must be strategic. Rationality here merely means that actors are goal-oriented and can rank order their preferences over outcomes. This does not mean that actors merely have self-interested preferences.14 Actors preferences may be altruistic or other-regarding.15

The Logic of Appropriateness and ConstructivismThe logic of consequences corresponds to utilitarian theories, including game theory as well

as realist and neo-liberal institutional theories of international relations.16 The logic of appropriateness most closely corresponds to constructivist theory in international relations. Constructivists recognize that actors are not merely utility-maximizers but are often immersed in rich normative commitments, as a result of familial or local ties, religious beliefs, ethnic loyalties, national patriotism, and broader ethical and moral sentiments. Such ideational factors constitute, in the language of Habermas, the lifeworld of shared understanding that actors bring to the table. In contrast to the utilitarian logic of consequences, logics of appropriateness are governed by notions of right and wrong, of good and bad ethical behavior. Actors, rather than calculate the costs and benefits of courses of action, think in terms of rules and roles, of what they should do in a given situation given who they are.

Constructivist theory sits, however, somewhat uneasily with the logic of appropriateness. As Habermas has noted, in the modern era, the traditional obedience to religion, of fealty to king and crown and other hierarchical values has fractured with the turn towards individual morality and the differentiation of attitudes and tastes in plural democracies (Habermas 1996, 448). As a result, even with the modern nation-state, it is difficult to appeal to shared values that are (nearly) universally valid and unchallenged (Young 41).

Nonetheless, new forms of shared meaning have emerged in the modern world to replace some of the antiquated values. Some of them have proven problematic; nationalism and ethnic identity have been potent value orientations. New social movements, for civil rights, environmental protection, womens rights, gay liberation and the anti-war movement have animated the left sincethe 1960s and 1970s. Competing conservative social movements in the 1980s, namely the Christian right, served as a focal point for the other side of the ideological spectrum.

13 These situational redefinitions are similar to Rikers heresthetics. Jones 1994, 83.

14 Levi makes this point (24). Levi 1997. Johnson (1991) critiques Habermas for making this error (189). Habermas

appears to make this error in Between Facts and Norms (1996, 337). 15

As Finnemore and Sikkink argued: Rational choice can specify a utility function that includes religious, ideological, or altruistic concerns (272). Johnson (1991) makes a similar point (189). Johnson 1991. 16

See John Ruggies characterization of both realism and neo-liberalism as neo-utilitarianism. Ruggie 1999.

6Given the differentiation of value orientations within countries, appeals to normative traditions may be less potent than they once were. Between countries, the normative chasm may be as great or greater than the domestic one, making shared understanding a chancy enterprise for furthering international norms. Even if we were to accept that said norms were or could become sufficiently shared to shape actors understandings of what they ought to do, the emphasis on the power of existing norms to constrain actors is far too structural and strays from constructivisms claim that actors and structures are mutually constitutive. Constructivists argue that actors preferences can be re-shaped by the normative structures around them. However, if actors themselves cannot remake those structures then the normative traditions become straitjackets for automatons. Agency becomes moot in such situations and thus dialogue is irrelevant in a world of norm-governed fixed preferences.

The Logic of Arguing and Communicative ActionIf norms are fully internalized and sedimented, then preference change through discussion

and debate becomes impossible. This aspect led Risse, inspired by Habermas theory of communicative action, to distinguish the logic of arguing from the logic of appropriateness.17 In the following paragraphs, I elaborate on Habermas/the logic of arguing and critique these views to give the subsequent section on transnational protest politics a deeper conceptual foundation.

The three logics can be re-framed in terms of types of action: strategic (the logic of consequences), norm-governed (the logic of appropriateness) and communicative action (the logic of arguing). Whereas the logic of appropriateness is based on prior normative consensus, the logic of arguing is based on consent. And, unlike strategic action, which is oriented to success, communicative action is oriented to shared understanding (Habermas 1989, 286). Strategic and communicative action, Habermas suggested, can be distinguished based on the motivations of the participants.

In strategic action, conflict is resolved through bargaining and arbitration, and outcomes are dependent upon prestige differentials and differential social power (1996: 141). Communicative action, however, presupposes that agreements are based on a shared understanding that comes out of discursive practice rather than bargaining or as a result of an existing normative consensus, as in the case of norm-governed behavior. Risse argues that argumentative and deliberative behavior is as goal oriented as strategic interaction, but the goal is not to attain ones fixed preferences, but to seek a reasoned consensus in which both sides are amenable to being persuaded by the better argument to change their views (7). Habermas argues the medium of language is inherently a process of one actor seeking to be understood by another: reaching understanding is the inherent telos of human speech (1989: 287).

To reach such an understanding, actors attempt to convince each other of the validity of their positions. The ideal conditions for speech (what Habermas originally referred to as the ideal speech situation) require that the social situation be cleaved of the effect of power, both material and normative.18 As Habermas acknowledged, moral discourses are typically not carried out under ideal conditions where the situation is free of external and internal violence that only permits better arguments to carry the day (183).

17 Johnson (1991) notes a similar distinction (187).

18 Warren provides an eloquent discussion of this (170-171).

7Does Habermas admission of real world complexities undercut his theoretical claims? Habermas sought to identify, based on the inherent characteristics of language itself, a context-transcendent (and yet simultaneously grounded), universal procedure for consensus that brings back in normative dimensions of rationality (Cooke 43). On this basis, Habermas aimed to rationally re-construct the democratic foundations of modern society. Recognizing that the pluralism of the post-modern world precludes a universal consensus on the good, his discourse ethics may allow us to identify a rational means by which shared understanding theoretically may be reached. Having said that, Habermas is not so nave to suppose a shared consensus actually characterizes the real world.

Habermas is acutely aware of the need to ground his theory in the pragmatic experiences of real situations where lifeworlds, albeit fragmented and less powerful than before, still shape the normative background actors face. Such resources may establish the foundations for communicative action: It is precisely the deliberatively filtered political communications that depend on lifeworld resourceson a liberal political culture and an enlightened political socialization (Habermas 1996:302).

As Risse acknowledges, communicative action in practice ultimately relies upon there being a common understanding--a lifeworld of sorts--that actors commit to resolving problems through dialogue. Despite the relative absence of agreement in society over ends, this minimal agreement on means is necessary to legitimate the outcomes that result from dialogue. In other words, a tradition of debate and dialogue has to be sufficiently entrenched already for actors to be able to appeal to better argument to be successful (14). Cooke makes a similar point. Strong idealizations are required for argumentation, namely the notion of universal moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity. These Cooke suggests are operative only in post-traditional societies where participants already are convinced by universalist moral thinking (31). Despite Risses protestations that the international sphere, with its increasingly dense networks of international regimes, has sufficient normative agreement to sustain dialogue, he admits that the world is a far cry from constituting an ideal speech situation. The question becomes, even in modern industrialized societies, what is the relative role played by communicative action relative to strategic and norm-governed action? Reality reflects situations where multiple logics are potentially operative. As Thomas McCarthy argued, even if social interaction is characterized by a complex of types of action, we may be able to discern the conditions under which certain aspects predominate.19

Section 2: What Are They Doing? Characterizing Transnational Advocacy Movements This discussion leads us to try to characterize the efforts of normative entrepreneurs in

bringing new issues to the attention of decision-makers. As noted before, persuasion is seen as the dominant means by which states are convinced to accept norm-based policies. This raises several difficult questions, (1) What is persuasion? (2) Is persuasion an appropriate term to describe this process? and (3) Whatever we call this process, what logics (consequences, appropriateness, or arguing) appear to dominate?

Some scholars of communicative action define persuasion in ways that preclude actors use of material or normative influence. These authors go further to suggest that the realm of studied

19 McCarthy 1978. Risse represents the three logics of action as a triangle, each corner the pure type. Movement

along the curve reflects the relative weight in two dimensions. The interior of the triangle would ostensibly represent relative weight in three dimensions. Risse uses this classification to discuss mixed motive situations such as cases of rhetoric (2000, 4-5). Similarly, Young makes the case that many situations exhibit both communicative and strategic dimensions (66).

8cases, for those interested in communicative action, ought to be circumscribed to situations free of such distortions. Such idealizations, I will argue, are misguided. On the other hand, existing accounts of persuasion need to separate out material incentives from appeals to existing norms.

In this section, I begin by discussing the strengths and limitations of the perspective of norms as strategic social construction elaborated by Finnemore and Sikkink. In so doing, I draw from the social movement literature that emphasizes the conscious efforts by advocates or norms entrepreneurs to frame their arguments for maximum rhetorical appeal. I try to assess how this sits with definitions of persuasion and accounts of communicative action. I follow that with the critique by Rodger Payne of framing and the need to examine cases uncontaminated by coercive influences. I conclude with a rejoinder to Payne, leading up to the empirical test of my argument.

Strategic Social Construction: The Norms Life Cycle and the Role of FramingFinnemore and Sikkink in their seminal article introduced the idea of a three-stage norm life

cycle. They described a process by which advocates strategically construct international support for a norm. Stage 1 or norm emergence occurs where norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms (255). This is followed by a second stage of a norm cascade and a third stage of norm internalization. Norm cascade refers to broad norm acceptance during which the rest of the population of states move to adopt a norm in response to the action of the norm leaders. Only later in the third stage does a norm become sufficiently internalized that it takes on a taken-for-granted quality.

Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that advocates of norms, typically non-governmental organizations, are not sufficiently powerful to coerce states to accept new norms. As proponents of non-dominant norms, they need to ally with key leaders and more mainstream actors20 to get on the agenda and to fashion a winning coalition. Finnemore and Sikkink regard persuasion as the principal means by which advocates are able to achieve their goals (260).21

However, where the first stage of norm emergence is characterized by states being persuaded by norms entrepreneurs, norm cascade reflects more a dynamic of imitation where states are socialized by other states to follow a norm. This may occur through a combination of pressure for conformity, a desire for international legitimation, and a leaders desire for self-esteem (255). While Finnemore and Sikkink refer to this as socialization, they then go on to define socialization as the mechanism through which norm leaders persuade others to adhere (262).

I find some problems with their account. Because they do not distinguish between a norm and a norm-based policy, it is difficult to judge empirically to what exactly states are accepting and adhering. Moreover, both norm emergence and cascade are ultimately cases of persuasion, first where states (norm leaders) are persuaded by advocates and second where another set of states (norm followers) are persuaded by the leaders. Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that actors who promote norms do so with both arguments and incentives. Arguments also typically rely upon appeals to shared values. Thus, there appear to be elements of all three logics operative, leaving a need for some assessment (if possible) of whether this action constitutes persuasion and what is the primary logic that animates norms advocates and moves target actors.

20 On the importance of appeals to mainstream ideas, see Adler 1997.

21 This view is echoed by Payne 2001, 38.

9Finnemore and Sikkink go on to define persuasion as efforts to change the utility function of other players when agent action becomes social structures, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the intersubjective (274). This change in actors underlying preferences over outcomes is typically difficult to handle with game theoretic methods.22 Aside from the standard empirical problem of evaluating preference change, there may be a number of problems with this definition and process of persuasion. One of the difficulties in categorizing these actions as persuasive is that they involve collective actors rather than individuals. What does it mean to say a state has been persuaded to accept a norm-based policy? We risk anthropomorphizing the state by ascribing it human characteristics. In some circumstances, the state is the embodiment of an individual voice or such a narrow elite that preference change does occur. Totalitarian regimes are such a case. In more plural societies, while a handful of minds may be changed, it is a much more difficult prospect to impute a collective mind to a state.

Before attempting, however, to unpack fully the concept of persuasion, it may be useful to evaluate the behavior of norms entrepreneurs as they seek to get their issues heard and their agendas taken up in policy. When assessing the efforts by norms entrepreneurs to push their favorite issues, Risse and other scholars interested in communicative action note that campaigners use rhetoric, symbols and appeals to existing norms to mobilize support.

Such symbolic politics is necessary given the relative weakness of proponents and because norms emerge in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest (Finnemore and Sikkink 257).23 This raises the question why some norms are more successful than others in gaining acceptance. Hall suggested success may be a function of an ideas congruence with existing traditions. That is, a certain idea may allow elites to "solve the puzzle of coalition formation" (Jacobson 294) as if an idea possessed an innate capacity to create a winning majority.

Decision-makers, however, rarely face a unitary environment in which there are unambiguous normative signals.24 A more apt characterization is a political one in which agents, through conscious manipulation (or potentially with less self-awareness), choose the language or rhetorical packaging of their ideas.25 The capacity of an idea to mobilize a strong coalition, to serve as a focal point for collective action, is largely a product of the process of its emergence. As a result of shrewd interpretation (Jacobson 1995: 295) or clever strategizing (Risse-Kappen 1995b: 26), norms entrepreneurs can alter the composition of other elements in the political sphere, like a catalyst or binding agent (Hall 1989: 366). Boosting a norms profile or salience requires that champions of new norms frame their arguments for successful alliance-building.26

The concept of framing is a recent import from the social movement literature in sociology pioneered by Sidney Tarrow, Mayer Zald, David Snow and others. Snow defines framing as the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of

22 Game theorists are not alone in having problems empirically documenting preference change.

23 Kowert and Legro make the point that because there is a plethora of norms, it is difficult to predict which norms

will be most influential. Kowert and Legro 1996, 486.24

As Gourevitch has argued, Policy requires politics, but if an idea is to prevail as the actual policy of a particular government, it must obtain support from those who have political power. Gourevitch 1986, 17.25

My theoretical account is closest to the work of Schimmelfennig on rhetorical action. Schimmelfennig, 2001, forthcoming. 26

Kaufmann and Pape 1999, 664. On framing, see Nelson 2000, 3-4. See also Keck and Sikkink 1998, 17.

10

themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.27 Zald defines frames in similar terms as the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action (Zald 262). Frames serve as a sort of mental short-cut by which policymakers can sort information and provide a number of concomitant functions; frames shape views about the causes of a problem, its consequences, who is threatened, who is to blame, and, finally, what solutions exist for the problem (Betsill 2000).

At the domestic level, there are knowledge structures or lifeworlds that shape the possible political choices. These traditions, habits and cultural norms establish the acceptable limits for new norms that seek domestic legitimacy.28 As Cooke argued, what counts as a good reason may be fixed by traditions of a society (13). These may both constrain the substance of claims that can be made as well as the form. Particularistic claims to self-interest in democracies typically do not succeed (Risse 17). In some countries, rowdy street protests may be considered a legitimate means to express grievances while other contexts may frown upon such public theater.

Knowledge structures strongly influence whether or not a frame finds a cultural match. There is a vast proliferation of like terms to describe this concept. 29 Whether a norm matches or fits, resonates, is legitimate, concordant or congruent with the political culture depends upon the way it is framed by norms entrepreneurs.30 The absence of cultural match suggests divergent preferences between actors or groups in society. Such ideological distance would reinforce policy stability of the status quo.

It should be emphasized that the process of framing is a synthetic activity rather than a purely evocative one. In other words, advocates create something new when they frame debates; they are not merely tapping into a static idea. While advocates may appeal to tradition, the new conditions to which they apply frames lead to innovation. The original meaning of the frame is not purely intact when applied to new circumstances. Sampling of music is an apt metaphor. Contemporary musicians often take snippets of old songs and re-mix them along with elements of other older songs combined with new vocals and instrumentation. The final product evokes the mood of the old songs but is, in the end, new. While actors may be self-conscious in their choices of frames, sociologists note that organizers of emerging movements often are less self-aware in their early choice of rhetoric. The language such nascent movements select is more for group cohesion and self-identification and is less explicitly geared for broader public consumption (McAdam et. al 16). Thus, a norms fit with existing traditions may be a stroke of luck.

Unpacking the Frame: The Three Logics and Persuasion

27 Quoted in McAdam 1996, 6.

28 The accepted substantive and procedural framework is similar to what Hall terms the structure of political

discourse (383). For a similar discussion, see Payne (2001): 38-39.29

Cortell and Davis lift from Checkel the term cultural match (Cortell and Davis 2000, 29). Checkel 1999, 86. Kingdon discusses the fit with dominant values (21) as does Betsill. Hall discusses the nature of the political discourse (1989, 363-365) and congruence of ideas with elite needs to solve the problem of coalition-formation (Jacobsen 1995, 294). Ikenberry describes this as resonance (Jacobsen 1995, 295) whereas Risse-Kappen calls it political culture (1997, 188). Jacobsen uses legitimacy. Legro terms this concordance or intersubjective agreement (1997, 35). Cortell and Davis identify salience with legitimacy. Habermas refers to this process as one of problematization and interpretation of norms to meet with the understandings of a shared lifeworld 1996: 358.30

See Krasner 1999 for the distinction between strong and weak states and his emphasis on how issues are defined (274), particularly in terms of distributional consequences.

11

Do protest politics, global civil society if you will, augur a new age of argumentation? While some observers of protest politics believe non-state actors will usher in a new era of dialogue and more idealized forms of political interaction,31 social movements are, as Warren notes, rather insulated, self-selected groups that resist internal critique. They are action-oriented and motivated to achieve their ends (189). Given their relative marginalization from the traditional levers of power, they are less accustomed to the give-and-take of pragmatic politics. Moreover, mission-oriented social actors believe they have truth and right on their side, both in terms of ends but also in terms of means. These qualities make social movements less flexible in engaging in sustained argumentation. They are prone to one-sided rhetorical appeals by which they seek to engage other actors.

Rhetoric, therefore, as Risse identifies, is indicative of actors with fixed preferences instrumentally using language to influence others (8). Successful rhetoric thus reflects what Habermas characterized as the cunning realization of perlocutionary effects, identified with strategic action (Habermas 1996: 166).32 While the one-sided inflexibility of normative entrepreneurs suggests a departure from the ideal dialogue of communicative action, rhetoric is parasitic on a successful tradition of argumentation. As Risse argues, the use of rhetoric implies that some actors believe others are amenable to argument (9). Warren states it more trenchantly, The effectivenessof lying or strategic manipulation depends on both speaker and audience assuming that individuals normally intend to be understood truthfully (180).

Given these qualities, Risse classifies rhetoric as an intermediate form of strategic and argumentative behavior. However, given that rhetoric appeals to shared values and is reliant on a tradition of dialogue (itself a shared value), the logic of appropriateness is also invoked. Risse states the dilemma clearly, The empirical question to be asked is not whether actors behave strategically or in an argumentative mode, but which mode captures more of the action in a given situation (18). Through a critique of framing, we may get closer to a more satisfactory answer.

Persuasion and Framing: A Critique and a RejoinderPayne raises important concerns about the use of framing in research. He notes that there are

multiple frames that can be invoked in a given context. Like the competition that exists between norms, frames compete and these frame contests may be won--not by better arguments-- but by those with material and/or social power. Power distorts speech, contaminating the research program in communicative action. Moreover, Payne argues that is almost impossible to predict which frames will succeed in a given instance. Despite similar circumstances, Payne argues that a frame may succeed in one instance and fail in another nearly identical case (44).

Because instances of framing are suffused with power and subject to manipulation, scholars of communicative action, Payne concludes, should cease to regard them as examples of true persuasion. He elaborates by writing that, constructivists should be relatively uninterested in outcomes determined by such distortions and instead should seek to explain norms grounded in bona fide persuasion and shared understandings (45).

31 Ann Florini has edited a volume that attempts a critical assessment of this kind of argument. Florini 2000.

32 Habermas, drawing from Austins speech action theory, distinguishes between locutionary, illocutionary and

perlocutionary acts. The latter two are of interest for us. Perlocutionary acts produce an effect upon the hearer whereas a speaker performs an action in saying something through illocutionary acts. In essence, he distinguishes betweens acts aimed at shared understanding (illocution) and teleological acts aimed at success (perlocution) (Habermas 1989, 289). As James Johnson argues, in his critique of Habermas, arguments derive force from their capacity to convince or persuade others. Johnson 1991, 193. This, he suggests is a perlocutionary act.

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What then is bona fide persuasion? Our earlier definition of persuasion from Finnemore and Sikkink identified persuasion as actors attempts to change the utility functions of others. Payne similarly suggests that persuasion by definition seeks to change actor preferences and create intersubjective meaning. However, does persuasion necessarily imply that both actors are amenable to argument? Moreover, can persuasion encompass changes in actors preferences over means, leaving preferences over outcomes unchanged? If we understand persuasion to mean that one actor attempts to convince another to do something through force of argument, then this need not imply that both or either actors preferences change. Even if the target is convinced of the rightness of the claims by the advocates and his/her preferences change, this is still one-sided communication rather than dialogue. We are left with the conundrum of how to treat advocates appeals to existing normative traditions. Are these good reasons or are they inherently coercive?

There may be problems with the way international relations scholars have appropriated Habermas views on what would constitute good reasons. While Risse suggests that the standards of validity claims force actors to resort to better argument, the concept of a universal, non-strategic standard may ultimately privilege certain normative commitments. A passage in Payne is indicative. Here, Payne discusses the way actors have used previous value traditions for repugnant ends:

A different kind of distortion transpires when frames resonate because they remind audiences of already agreed, but potentially harmful normative commitments. For example, advocates who employ frames for potentially xenophobic or event violent purposes can recall shared norms of nationalism (or even racism, in some communities) (46-47).

While one may personally agree with him that said values exhibit dubious legitimacy, I believe it to be dangerous to imagine that subjecting norms to the three validity claims will yield universally legitimate results. Rather, we should, as Cooke concluded, examine the extent to which certain contexts or processes are more or less cleaved of the influence of material and social power.

A related concern is the extent to which scholars interested in communicative action should only study situations that are relatively free of power distortions. This may ultimately limit the agenda of scholarship to a rather narrow set of concerns where interests are relatively harmonious and the political stakes are low.33 Indeed, some of the potentially coercive elements of speech that Payne is worried aboutnamely rhetoricmay be among the few resources that weak actors have.

Iris Young, while highly influenced by Habermas, is suspicious of efforts to denigrate rhetoric and civil disobedience as inappropriate and contrary to the civilized norms necessary for true persuasion. Indeed, the colorful use of speech, emotion, humor, playful protest and style are, for her, the principal weapons of the weak (Young 65). Habermas notes that moral arguments typically are not free of coercive forces: Moral discourses of justification are, as a rule, carried out in advocatory fashion (Habermas 1996: 183). He asserts that social movements are generally too weak to initiate learning processes or redirect decision making in the political system in the short run (Habermas 1996: 373) but that they may be able to dramatize contributions, presenting them so effectively that the mass media take up the matter (Habermas 1996: 383). Indeed, as Risse notes, communicative action presupposes that actors need to recognize each other as equals and have equal access to the discourse (11). Norms entrepreneurs typically are not so advantaged. Therefore, while it may be fine for scholars of communicative action to abandon the study of issues where there

33 Young makes a similar point in taking to task those scholars that assume there is common good towards which all

should be striving. Young 2000, 44.

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are relatively unconstrained power disparities, I believe that it would be empirically a wrong turn for those interested in transnational protest politics to do so.

Are we any closer to understanding persuasion and specifying the conditions under which certain logics dominate in the process of acceptance of norm-based policies? Thus far, we have a number of different perspectives. From Habermas comes the suggestion that we can distinguish the operative logic based on the motivations of advocates. Finnemore and Sikkink describe a process of persuasion that encompasses both arguments and incentives, perhaps muddying the definition with coercive elements. Checkel suggests different regime types may be moved by different logics, something of an overgeneralization. Risse introduces another dimension based on timing. He notes that in general, instrumental interests and strategic rationality dominate the early phases of the controversy, whereas argumentative behavior becomes more relevant later on (29). Through synthesis of these perspectives on motivation, persuasion, regime type and timing, we can develop a more nuanced account of the logics that motivate actors and targets.

Do advocates of norms wish to change other actors preferences over outcomes? While this may be a long-term objective, activists in plural polities must realize that collective preference transformation is highly unlikely in the short run. At best, they may hope to change the preferences of a few influential actors. However, activists value policy change more than preference change. If advocates were faced with the choice of having decision-makers who shared their preferences yet could not act on them or decision-makers who disagreed with them but were forced for instrumental reasons to support their cause, they would by and large prefer the latter. If preference change is a distant prospect, advocates must settle for moving those that already more closely agree with them or those vulnerable to instrumental pressure. Having defined advocates motivations in terms of their policy goals, we can only conclude their primary motivation is strategic, even if they themselves are motivated by normative concerns. While agent motivations may be strategic, the means they choose to achieve their ends may influence targets through other logics.

One of the means they choose is clearly framing. How should we characterize framing efforts? Framing does not preclude preference change nor does it necessarily induce preference change. Rather, we should view framing exercises as defining situations and activating existing preferences. The frame might merely serve an information function and, in game theoretic language, allow decision-makers to coordinate in games of multiple equilibria. However, a frame might do something more.

Game theory takes preferences over outcomes to be relatively stable. Preference change is accommodated only by setting up a sequence of games like time-lapse photographs.34 There may be good reasons to assume stable preferences. Policymakers care about many things, not all of them equally. Circumstance may bring a new priority to the fore, much the way September 11th altered the perspectives of decision-makers. Not every shift in policy priorities, however, ought to be ascribed to a preference change. The fabric of rationality, which assumes that actors have preferences that they can rank order, would begin to unravel, making empirical analysis more difficult. If a group of decision-makers rejects a policy one year and then affirms it the next, this would suggest incoherent preferences. However, it may well be that their attention has shifted from one aspect of a particular problem to another. A politician, for example, may still care about both global warming and economic growth, yet, in the midst of a recession, the economic costs of mitigating global warming might become more important. These serial shifts in attentiveness, referred to in the earlier 34

Fierke and Nicholson make this analogy 14.

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discussion of salience, make sense of efforts to cue emotional/moral frames and boost the salience of one dimension of a problem over another.

Over longer periods of time, preferences can and do change. Jones notes that preferences in the Southern United States with respect to civil rights have changed since the 1960s (1994: 119). We can distinguish between what happens when preferences change (when minds change) and what happens when attention merely shifts (when the focus changes). When actors frame an issue successfully, they convince or persuade another actor that a particular problem ought to be evaluated by a different dimension. Given that frames depend on previous shared values, should we characterize a normative frame as coercive rather than persuasive? We have already acknowledged that rhetorical appeals rely on a tradition of argumentation but involve goal-oriented actors unwilling to change their preferences. Risse concludes from this that rhetorical actions are partially strategic (reflecting the goal-orientation of advocates) and partially argumentative (given the need for one side to be receptive to argument). However, as noted before, normative contexts shape what count as good reasons. Because empirical facts are primarily established by other dynamics, argumentation is largely limited to the realm of normative concerns. However, if we accept Risses definition of argumentation in which both sides must be amenable to preference change, then how are we to characterize situations in which one side has fixed preferences and appeals to shared values to achieve its ends? We must conclude that targets respond to logics of appropriateness that they consensually reaffirm.

Perhaps the only coercive frame would be one that denied individuals the equal opportunity to voice their opinion. This conception rejects the possibility for ideas to have coercive power and sits uneasily with traditions of the pre-modern era or even fundamentalist ideologies of the contemporary age. Moreover, it seems to counter the language used to describe knowledge structures as a set of constraints. However, identifying what constitutes a coercive concept is so fraught with ideological bias that we must limit coercion to the realm of instrumental logic. A frame becomes coercive only when combined with material power.

Weak actors try to convince decision-makers that other dimensions of a problem are important. Whether decision-makers, in turn, choose to heed those cues is often out of the hands of most campaigners. Only if strong actors appropriate those arguments will they typically matter materially. While civil disobedience raises the costs of non-action, the capacity of social movements to alter the cost-benefit calculus of decision-makers may be typically quite limited. Their more established allies (political parties, public officials, labor unions, lobby groups) have more resources and political wherewithal to make a difference. As non-governmental organizations become more established and financially endowed, they begin to exercise the kinds of instrumental power that political parties enjoy and business groups typically possess. Yet, for all the ink these groups receive from the press, they are generally much weaker than their more organized allies and adversaries.

This characterization of persuasion departs from other characterizations in three ways: (1) persuasion need not involve the possibility of preference change (over outcomes) by both actors or either actor, though it certainly does not exclude cases of preference change (2) persuasion does not necessitate preference change but may involve efforts to define a situation and convince decision-makers that a particular aspect of a problem is more important, and, finally (3) persuasion should be

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separated from material incentives which are necessarily instrumental/ coercive tools to induce behavior change.35

How can we know what logics were decisive in a particular case? Here, the sequence of events and the strength or weakness of various causal factors must be evaluated. Because of space limitations, only a partial portrait can be conveyed here. If weak actors frame a norm in a certain way and are unsuccessful in the absence of other bases of support, then we know the frame was not enough. If activists are able to enroll more powerful actors to support them who in turn exact costs on decision-makers through lobbying, then we must conclude that instrumental logics were most important. If, in the absence of strong mobilizational capacity, they find ready support for their efforts by powerful allies, then the logic of appropriateness is significant. In autocratic countries, the persuasive appeal of a normative frame may be more visible. In the absence of obvious instrumental pressure, a leader may appear to change his or her mind. If a dictator initially resists a normative appeal and then we observe pressure by more powerful states without manifest signs of someideational conversion, then we must conclude logics of consequences were operative. Real world cases may not fit quite so neatly, requiring some careful coding and possibilities of ambiguous cases.

In liberal polities, the system may be more open to social movement influence. This would allow room for communicative action, yet we have emphasized the degree to which advocates have fixed preferences, both over outcomes and, to a great extent, over means. At the outset, this limits the role of dialogue. If protest movements are later afforded more formal access to participate in the political process (either by electing one of their own or through appointments to government), then argumentation could become relevant. This would require, however, more flexibility by advocates, at least in terms of preferred policy solutions and perhaps also in terms of ends. While advocates rely upon a tradition of argumentation, they themselves are not amenable to argument. They appeal to shared norms to persuade potential allies to support them. Their aim is goal-oriented yet ultimately successful with targets if based on an existing normative basis or because of instrumental pressure.

From this discussion, we can conclude that logics of appropriateness and consequences are the significant processes at work in transnational movement politics. Though I have provided a partial specification under which instrumental and norm-based logics should dominate, it is still an open empirical question about the relative frequency each logic plays in successful advocacy. Abstract theory can take us only so far.

Section 3: The Rhetorical Narrative: Debt Relief Re-brandedHow did debt relief come about and to what can we attribute the success of the Jubilee

2000 campaign?36 As I argue below, the relative success of the campaign in Britain, Canada, Italy, and the United States was mainly due to the movements appeals to mainstream religious principles rather than a Marxist class analysis or ones based on charity and compassion. In other contextsnamely France and Japan, where opposition was stronger, transnational advocacy and the external pressure of powerful states were decisive. In the case of Germany, a leadership change was the primary factor responsible for the abrupt transformation in the governments policies.

35 This is most similar to Schimmelfennigs account of rhetorical action in part 4 of a forthcoming book.

Schimmelfennig relies much more upon shaming as a cognitive influence on actor behavior than I do. 36

Success must be italicized. Though the issue was politicized, prompting an unprecedented response by the major powers and the international financial institutions to try to reduce third world debts, the generosity of debt relief has not been sufficient. A number of countries with slow growth rates and high debt burdens are projected to fall into problems again in the coming years. Pettifor, Thomas and Telatin 2001. Beattie 2002.

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Issue BackgroundDebt was not a new issue for international advocacy. As Jamie Drummond, Jubilee 2000s

Global Strategist argued, debt relief campaigns had been around for years. Jubilee 2000, however, represented, a rebranding (Drummond Interview 2001). After the Mexican government defaulted on its foreign debt in 1982, the worlds policymakers and campaigners have been concerned about foreign debt. Prior to 1994, there had been efforts by campaigners to draw attention to the debt issue and the problems that developing countries were facing with IMF and World Bank-administered structural adjustment programs. However, neither effort achieved the level of publicity or grassroots participation that the Jubilee 2000 campaign did. Indeed, the issues complexity would seem to bode ill for mass participation.37 Moreover, debt issues were the stuff of finance ministries who had their own language and institutional habits of dealing with debts.38

Policymakers had been concerned with foreign debt dating back at least to the 1982 debt crisis.39 However, the countries most affected then were middle-income countries. Decision-makers in the Western industrialized countries were particularly engaged because the debts were sizable andlargely held by private banks like Citicorp and Bank of America with default potentially contributing to a meltdown in the international financial system.40 Even as middle-income countries were positioned for debt relief, the Paris Club41 slowly began to address the continued external debt problems of poor countries. However, where commercial banks had been the dominant creditors for middle-income countries, multilateral and bilateral debt characterized most of the poor countries debt.42 Beginning in 1988 with the Toronto terms, the major creditor countries began to offer poor countries some limited bilateral debt relief, not actual reductions in actual debt stock but reduced interest payments.43

In October 1996, after years of rolling over poorest countries debts and modest debt reduction (many of which were pioneered by the UK policymakers), developed countries and the World Bank and IMF decided upon a joint approach for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC).4437

Gormley 1986, 599-600 echoes this in his argument that public participation may be limited issues are complex. Donnelly discusses the impact of complexity on the salience of the issue (Donnelly Undated). 38

Nelson discusses how organizational roles can shape how issues are seen. Nelson 2000, 3-4.39

Third world debt was an issue in the 1970s as the Group of 77 developing countries sought to renegotiate the terms of debt commitments. Crane 1984. Debt has periodically been politicized in and after times of war and economic crisis. Hanlon 1998. 40

See Lipson 1981 for a breakdown of middle-income creditors. 41

The Paris Club is an informal group of creditor governments, established in 1956 with a permanent secretariat in the French Treasury to coordinate policies among bilateral creditors. Hanlon 1998. 42

According to 1997 data, the HIPC countries owed $201 billion, $174 billion in long-term debt and $27 billion in short- term debt. Of the long-term debt, $170 billion was public and publicly guaranteed. Within public and publicly guaranteed debt, $148 billion was owed to official creditors ($64 billion to the various multilaterals and $84 billion in bilateral aid) and $21 billion to private creditors. $4 billion of the total was of private nonguaranteed debt. World Bank 1999b. The Jubilee 2000 campaign reported in 1998 50% of HIPC debt was bilateral, 35% multilateral, and 15% private. See Jubilee 2000 campaign 2000b.43

The programs have evolved from Toronto terms of 33% reduction of eligible debt payments in 1988, to Naples terms of 50-67% reduction in 1994, to HIPC terms of up to 80% in 1997. Schuerch 1999.44

There are 41 countries the World Bank identified as HIPC countries eligible for debt relief: 34 countries in Africa, 4 in Latin America, 3 in Asia and 1 in the Middle East. World Bank HIPC Map. Eligibility is based on certain threshold indicators beyond which a countrys external debt is deemed unsustainable and a drag on its growth including: the net present value (NPV) of its debt to export ratio, the NPV debt-to revenue, and the export to GDP (outward orientation) and revenue/GDP (tax collection) ratios. Debt relief is also conditional upon good policymaking, both macroeconomic and poverty reduction. The original list of potential countries eligible for HIPC

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HIPC incrementally increased bilateral debt reduction and broke new ground with respect to multilateral debt held by the World Bank/IMF with debt reduction of about $22.5 billion (Oxfam 1999). HIPC also increased the level of bilateral debt reduction that was possible, equivalent to $30 billion in debt reduction. To fund the World Banks debt reduction, a Trust Fund was established. Countries that were deemed eligible for debt relief were said to have reached a decision point, and should they follow sound macroeconomic policies for several years while enjoying reduced debt payments, they would reach a completion point and be eligible for actual reduction of debt stock.

The Jubilee campaign launch anticipated the HIPC initiative by about six months and soon sought to broaden its terms, speed up implementation and extend the scope. Martin Dent traveled to the U.S. in fall 1996 to drum up support among development campaigners. On two occasions in 1996 and 1997, the campaign director, Anne Pettifor, would return to the US to press the case (Thompson Interview 2001). A primary focal point for the campaign was coordinated action around the G-8 Summit in Birmingham, England in May 1998 when 50,000 campaigners ringed the summit in a human chain. The campaigners later met in Rome in November 1998 where they designed a loosely affiliated coalition/network of autonomous national campaigns. In January 1999, the Pope announced his support for debt relief (Jubilee 2000. Quotes about Jubilee). Activists meanwhile conducted a number of high profile events with celebrities including mass concerts, rallies, soccer matches and other attention-getting actions.

By the spring, in advance of the summer 1999 G-8 Summit in Cologne, Germany, different governments were lining up to provide outlines of an enhanced HIPC initiative (HIPC II).45 In March 1999, President Clinton announced a plan that established the contours for what would come out of Cologne including front-loaded relief, increasing bilateral debt relief to 90%, and additional multi-lateral financing (Clinton 1999). The plan for the first time also linked debt relief to poverty reduction strategies so countries would guarantee that savings would be invested in education, health and other worthwhile expenditures. G7 countries in Cologne announced the expansion of the debt relief program for HIPC countries, promising $100 billion in total (nominal) debt relief which included about $45-50bn in new debt reduction.46 To fund HIPC II, the World Bank and IMF announced they would (1) accept additional contributions from members for a special Trust Fund47and (2) in the case of the IMF, sell $3.1 billion in gold reserves, 64% of which could be used for debt relief.48

Part of the Cologne Summit involved multilateral bargaining by creditors on who would top up the Trust Fund for multilateral debt relief as well as how much each would contribute to bilateral debt relief (Burgess 1999). The total amount to be contributed to the HIPC trust fund was to add up to $2 billion, though pledges have subsequently risen to $2.527 billion (World Bank 2002). The U.S.

included 41 countries, thirty-two countries of which had a 1993 GNP per capita of US$695 or less and a 1993 NPV debt to exports ratio higher than 220 per cent or a NPV debt to GNP ratio higher than 80 per cent. Nine others were included because they were eligible for concessional lending from Paris Club creditors. IMF 1998: 7. 45

For a more detailed account of the transition from HIPC I to HIPC II and a complementary argument, see Callaghy 2001. 46

In addition, HIPC II lowered the threshold of what were deemed sustainable debt targets including: NPV debt-to export ratio of 150% down from 200-250%, NPV debt-to-revenue ratio of 250% down from 280%, and a lowering of the export/GDP and revenue/GDP thresholds to 30% and 15%. World Bank 1999a. World Bank 2001a. Jubilee 2000 campaign 2000a. See also, US Treasury 1999. Kln Summit 1999.47

The cost of debt relief is less than the face value since governments discount the value of delinquent debts. 48

White House 1999. This later proved too controversial to implement and financing was provided through an accounting revaluation of gold. Fidler 1999.

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share (including bilateral relief) was $920 million spread out over three years (Dunne 2000). However, this was contingent upon the U.S. Congress both allocating the requested funds and authorizing the sale or revaluation of IMF gold. Of that $920 million, $320 million was to be used for bilateral debt relief and $600 million was to be dedicated to the HIPC trust fund (Hart Interview 2001) The $600m was roughly equivalent to the EUs pledged contribution and three times that of Japan.

After the Cologne meeting, the main remaining obstacle proved to be U.S. funding for the initiative which remained in doubt. However, in October 2000, a coalition of liberal Democrats and conservative Republicansnotably Spencer Bachus in the House and Jesse Helms in the Senatewas able to deliver for President Clinton the entire $435 million budget request the U.S. needed to fulfill its commitments for FY2000 and 2001 (Dunne 2000).

Through 2000, campaigners continued to complain that the pace of debt relief was too slow and that few countries were being processed to reach the qualifying stage, let alone the completion point.49 Fourteen countries had qualified as of April 2000, at least preliminarily, for debt relief packages amounting to approximately $23 billion: 9 had formally qualified for more than $14 billion in debt relief and 5 qualified preliminarily for an additional $9 billion.50 Continued pressure by campaigners, perhaps most visible in the 30,000 protesters who attempted to shut down the IMF/World Bank annual meeting in April 2000, led to efforts to speed up the number of countries who reached the decision point. By December 2000, 22 countries had reached the decision point--becoming eligible for debt relief--and Uganda reached its completion point.51 Even though the Jubilee year ended, a successor campaign, Jubilee+, was established because campaigners remain wary the IFIs would slow down the pace and breadth of implementation. Tensions remained high, as finance ministers feared haste would compromise the quality of debt relief initiatives and that politicians would not be forgiving if the chance was misspent (Boorman 2000). Campaigners do not trust these agencies to administer debt relief and have called for an independent arbitrator to carry out the process.52

Coordination Problems as a Partial AnswerWhat accounts for the decision by the G-7 to deepen debt relief in 1999? A partial answer is

provided by what I later term neo-utilitarian theory. This perspective would ascribe the difficulties countries had in reaching agreement on debt relief to coordination problems and in-fighting over burden-sharing of the costs of the initiative (Krasner 1993). The argument goes something like this. If you want to give poor countries a fresh start, not only must multilateral debt be forgiven but also each bilateral member must be convinced to write off its debt. However, if the US, for example, writes off its bilateral debt, then the market value of the debt in secondary markets of other bilateral donors increases.53 Suppose one creditor drops its claims on the debtors, then the remaining creditors move up in the pecking order. In the absence of a coordinating mechanism or a hegemon willing to bear a disproportionate share of the costs of coordination, no one country will have an incentive to cooperate and forgive its debts unilaterally. While one might expect that institutions could play a role

49 Jubilee 2000. 2000a.

50 World Bank. 2001b. include: Bolivia (2 times), Mauritania, Mozambique (2 times), Tanzania, Uganda (2 times), Guyana, Burkina Faso, Cote dIvoire, Mali, Benin and Senegal. The additional five include Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, and Nicaragua. World Bank Undated.51

World Bank 2000b. Fidler 2000b. 52

Jubilee 2000a. See also Pettifor, Thomas and Telatin 2001.53

This idea of Paul Krugmans is explained in relation to commercial debt in Crook 1991. Busby 2001a discusses the coordination problem in more detail.

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in resolving these collective action problems, the IFIs have their own disincentives against cooperation. As noted before, the IFIs have a strong fear of moral hazard, and like bilateral governments, the loans from multilaterals are spread amongst the various IFIs the World Bank, IMF, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, etc. Being the first to forgive debt would yield a suckers payoff as the debts of those remaining would be more likely paid off as a result. Ultimately, the IFIs depend upon member governments for support so the institutions become fora for those distributional battles.

The complex bargains that were struck in Cologne reflect efforts to settle this problem collectively and equitably. Serieux makes the argument that the insignificance of poor debtors for international financial stability coupled with coordination problems led to the delay in creditor response and ultimately created the need for a grassroots movement to break the impasse (Serieux and Samy 2003: 4).

For the debtor nations, who have remained peripheral to this analysis, you have a different sort of collective action problem. Divided by culture, language, distance, poor communication infrastructure, the collective action costs of organizing for debt relief are extremely high. Moreover, there is an incentive for each country to defect and seek unilaterally the best deal with creditors before others secure better deals. If one country organizes to write-off debt for poor countries, there is no guarantee that they alone would experience debt write-off. For a poor country to succeed in campaigning for debt relief, it has to appeal to some broader philosophical or technical principlefairness, social justice, bankruptcy, debt overhang, etc. However, what is true for one may be true for a number of countries. Thus, if one country bore the costs of organizing the campaign for debt relief, it is likely the benefits would be provided to a number of countries. Countries would thus have an incentive to free ride on the organizing of others. As a result, less organizing than is optimalactually occurs. Combine this with creditor incentives to not unilaterally cooperate in debt relief, less debt relief than is socially optimal is provided.

Unfortunately, coordination problems better explain delay than the ultimate compromises that were reached. While delay may be a function of coordination problems, an agreement on debt was far from inevitable. Many international problems languish for the lack of an organized advocacy group. An analysis that failed to reflect the efforts by advocates would tell us little about how states and key leaders came to support expanded debt relief in HIPC II, the moral language they used and the timetable for trying to address the concerns of campaigners.

Testing the Narrative Versus Alternative ExplanationsWhat then was the role of the campaign? For a small moral interest group to have success,

what Kaufmann and Pape call a saintly logroll (663), they must appeal to principles backed by stronger interest groups or the main political factions. Moral movements, they argue, are likely to have success the more they are allied with those whose positions on other issues are in the middle of the spectrum (663-664). While certainly not the sole reason for their success, framing efforts I argue were central.

To evaluate whether or not debt campaigners framing efforts were responsible for their later success in deepening HIPC, we need to specify the observable implications of different alternative explanations. There are three possible explanationsstrategic framing, communicative action, and

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neo-utilitarian54-- for the relative success of campaigners between 1996 and 2000 compared to their prior efforts.

An argument rooted in strategic framing, like communicative action, sees persuasion as the primary causal mechanism. However, my account of persuasion differs from the existing literature in three significant ways: (1) persuasion need not involve preference change by both actors or either actor, (2) persuasion does not necessitate preference change but may involve attention shifts by policymakers in target states and, finally (3) persuasion should be separated from material incentives which are necessarily instrumental/coercive tools to induce behavior change.55 My argument, unlike the communicative action approach, focuses on the rhetorical efforts by advocates to frame their arguments to appeal to sympathetic actors in target states. An argument based on strategic framing would predict the following:

(SF1) FRAMING. Advocates and their allies should consciously manipulate symbols to appeal to mainstream cultural traditions and to build winning coalitions.

(SF2) FIXED PREFERENCES. Advocates should display few signs of willingness to engage in dialogue and risk changing their own preferences over ends or even means.

(SF3) ATTENTION SPIKE 1. Media coverage of the issue (and of the advocates) should spike after their frames fit existing cultural traditions.

(SF4) ATTENTION SPIKE 2. Appreciable increases in the level of mass public support for the issue ought to occur after successful framing as observed by protests, petitions, numbers of supporters/members in advocacy groups.

(SF5) RHETORICAL SHIFT. Decision-makers should incorporate the demands of campaigners into their own rhetoric and policy documents.

(SF6) ABSENCE OF COERCIVE INSTRUMENTS. If framing efforts are largely responsible for policy change, decision-makers should change policies in the absence of significant instrumental pressure.

(SF7) TIPPING POINT. When the campaign has gathered political momentum, potential veto actors either join the winning side for instrumental reasons or fail to oppose the advocacy efforts.

These are a number of observable implications of successful strategic framing. However, Paynes concern that successful frame attempts can only be known ex post facto remains. How might we a priori predict when frames should succeed? Here, there are four associated corollary claims. First, if the rhetoric by campaigners is wildly inconsistent with cultural traditions, then frame success is less likely. Some campaigners are bad strategists. Those, for example, that adopt anarchist, anti-capitalist rhetoric in the United States are, despite some flux in public opinion, less likely to succeed than those that wed their arguments to more mainstream political traditions. Second, if advocates claims are not supported by credible third party information that the problems of which they speak exist, then they should have more difficulty successfully framing their argument. Here, the role of epistemic communities, the media, and religious figures is critical. Furthermore, if there is both cultural match and credible information backing advocacy groups, their cause can be greatly assisted by a crisis or some other convenient focusing event that makes their problem more salient. Finally, frames that, through their attached policy choices, will produce high national costs or concentrated costs for particular sectors will be less likely to succeed.

54 Neo-utilitarianism is Ruggies term of art, encompassing realism and neo-liberalism. Strategic framing, unlike

neo-utilitarianism, allows for other-regarding preferences and logics of appropriateness to be operative.55

This account of persuasion is more akin to Rikers heresthetics and language as a strategic, manipulative tool. Riker 1986.

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SF Corollary 1: CULTURAL MATCH. Frames that are wildly inconsistent with existing cultural traditions are likely to fail.SF Corollary 2: CREDIBLE INFORMATION. Credible third-party information will enhance the probability of frame success.SF Corollary 3: CRISIS/FOCUSING EVENT. A crisis or focusing event that supports advocates definition of a problem will boost the salience of their frame.SF Corollary 4: OPPONENTS. Frames that are link to policy choices that would create high concentrated costs or high national costs will have a lower likelihood of success.

By contrast, an argument based on truth-seeking communicative action should observe the following:

(CA1) PERSUADABLE. Advocates should display a willingness to be persuaded by others and may change their preferred policies after reasoned debate with others.

(CA2) PERSUASION. Advocates should be truthful and sincere with their primary motivation to persuade others and change their preferences.

(CA3) PERSUADED. Targets should demonstrate signs of changes in their preferences (as represented by words and behavior) and the relatively low incidence of coercive influences or rhetoric.

Whereas strategic framing and communicative action arguments differ over the ways in which advocates argue and affect change, neo-utilitarian explanations should discount the influence of advocates. Policy change is a product of two causal mechanisms: (1) of advocates having powerful benefactors capable of coercing others and/or (2) powerful actors learning to adjust failed policies with progressively superior ones. Neo-utilitarians would predict:

(NU1) COERCION. Advocates will only be successful when backed by the coercive influence of strong domestic interests or strong states.

(NU2) SELF-INTEREST. Support by strong domestic interests and/or states will primarily be a function of cost and instrumental self-interest. Only cheap or beneficial policies will be supported.

(NU3) OPPOSITION. States or sectors of society that bear the greatest costs of policy change will be the strongest opponents.

(NU4) LEARNING. Strong actors may change policy when they learn that an existing policy is not working to fulfill their self-interests.56

(NU5) COORDINATION. Where problems require collective action of multiple parties, delay in progress may be a product of coordination problems and conflict over burden-sharing of the costs of dealing with a problem.

The EvidenceTo test these three different possible explanations, I conducted a thorough process-tracing of

debt relief advocacy dating back to the early 1990s. I read relevant campaign documents and G-7/G-8 Summit pronouncements on debt relief from1993-2000. I interviewed a number of key participants in debt relief advocacy and government officials involved in debt relief policy. Finally, I coded for relevance all the articles between 1993 and 2000 that mention debt relief in the Washington Post,

56 For neo-utilitarians, other-regarding preferences would be irrational. Thus, if an actor learned that aid policies vis

a vis other actors were not working, realists would predict change in behavior only if the consequences of policy failure affected the donor adversely.

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FIGURE 1: SPIKE IN COVERAGE OF DEBT RELIEF

050

100150200

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Year#

ofAr

ticles

GuardianFTWPNY TIMES

The New York Times, The Guardian (London), and the Financial Times (London).57 In addition to tracking the number of relevant articles on debt relief, I tracked the number of explicit references to the Jubilee 2000 campaign as well as the number and content of editorials on debt relief by thosepapers.

The evidence from the coding of newspaper articles reveals some interesting dynamics. As might be expected, articles typically precede or accompany big eventsannual meetings of the G-8, the IMF/World Bank joint meetings, a vote in Congress or a crisis like Hurricane Mitch. As shown in Figure 1, there is clearly an attention spike in 1999 that coincided with the height of the campaigns influence and the 1999 G-8 Summit in Cologne, Germany where the second HIPC initiative was announced (SF3). In the Financial Times, there is something of an earlier spike in 1996 when the first HIPC package came about, of which more will be said. Furthermore, the two British newspapers, despite significantly smaller circulation sizes, covered debt relief more extensively than the three U.S. papers.58 This, as expected, reflects a higher salience of debt relief in the UK.59

A second indicator is the number of explicit references to the Jubilee 2000 campaign. As seen in Table 1, these begin in 1997 and subsequently spike, the American jump a year later reflecting its slower embrace of the issue than in the UK. Accompanying the increased absolute references to debt relief is a spike in the number of positive editorials on debt relief as observed in Figure 2.60 The Guardian, moreover, formally endorsed the campaign and suffused almost every article with a pro-debt relief spin.

57 These articles from Lexis Nexis mention debt relief anywhere in the article. Relevant articles include country-

specific articles on HIPC countries but exclude middle-income countries like Russia, Poland, Mexico as well as poorer countries that were ultimately not part of HIPC (namely Nigeria). I tried to code The Daily Telegraph, The Times of London and The Independent (UK), but these papers had archive availability problems. I am currently completing coding of The Wall Street Journal which shows a spike in media coverage.58

Current average daily circulation of the FT and the Guardian were 449,854 and 400,983 respectively for the period August 2002 to January 2003. The New York Times circulation was 1,100,479, and the Washington Postcirculation was 749,863. JobsPage 2001. 59

A t-test of the difference of means of the media coverage of the pre-Jubilee campaign period (roughly 1993-1996) compared to the Jubilee campaign period (1997-2000) supports the conclusion that the later period was significantly different from the earlier period. A one-tailed t-test provides a t-statistic of 2.82 is significant at the .025 level.60 The Financial Times had an ambivalent editorial in 1999 that, despite prior support, seemed to suggest that debt relief might be proceeding too quickly. The Washington Post had two editorials in 2000 that were less enthusiastic about faster debt relief, one based on the IMF protests in Prague and another based on the G-7 meetings in Okinawa.

Table 1: References to the Jubilee campaign

Guardian FT WpostNY TIMES

1997 1 2 0 01998 28 9 2 11999 40 16 8 22000 31 36 12 7

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FIGURE 2: SPIKE IN POSITIVE EDITORIALS

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000Year

#of

Edito

rials Guardian

FTWPNY TIMES

A possible objection to this report of a media spike is to point out that this number of articles in U.S. papers is still relatively low, compared to all the other international news subjects that are covered. Dennis Hoover makes this argument, suggesting the U.S. media was largely indifferent to the issue compared to the British media (Hoover 2001). However, a small media attention spike did occur, and as Hoover admits, the campaign, led by church activists, was hugely influential. It just did not get the coverage it deserved. While this may be true, the campaign did generate an unprecedented amount of coverage on debt relief, even in the United States.

These attention spikes in media coverage reflected and fomented wider public awareness and participation in mass debt relief-related events. Prior to the formation of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, there were few mass events of any size related to the issue. While there were a number of references to Oxfam publications as well as editorials by advocacy groups, there are no media accounts in the five papers in the period 1993-1996 of mass debt relief demonstrations. After the campaign became organized, large mass protests became common, most notably at G-8 meetings in Birmingham in 1998 and Cologne in 1999. The petition drive produced, as noted before, 24 million signatures after the coalition was formed (SF4).

Martin Dent picked a successful frame that resonated with the religious and moral principles in a number of countries. The religious argument proved successful, in part, because of the simplicity of the message and the timing. Wiping the slate clean of debt by the year 2000 was a powerful message for your average person, even if it elided a number of the difficulties of actual debt reduction (SF Corollary 3).

The religious symbolism, coupled with the timing of the new millennium, was such that the campaign was able to attract a very wide swath of support between North and South, between left and right. This was a unique achievement, a testament to the inoffensive and compelling religious frame and emphasis on poverty reduction (Birdsall and Williamson 2002: 51). Whereas there was a tendency for more radical elements to drift off into capitalism-bashing as in the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle and the Washington DC IMF/World Bank protests of 2000, the real strength of the campaign was its ability to bring on board heavy hitters of the entire ideological spectrum as well as ordinary mainstream citizens, what Drummond called establishment taxpayers (SF Corollary 1). With a vaguely Marxist or Luddite or anarchist frame, this campaign would have been stillborn. It is unlikely that Clinton, the Pope or Bono, let alone the chorus of U.S. Republicans who came to support the initiative--would have considered the campaign if the rhetoric had been framed as a matter of capitalist exploitation of poor people. The frame of the Jubilee year was a significant part of the campaigns success.

The debts were also rhetorically linked to cuts in education and health care and, in turn, the death, malnourishment and poverty of people in developing countries, particularly children. This relatively short chain had an impact in re-casting the issue from being about keeping corrupt

24

governments from being fiscally irresponsible to one of morality and justice. By the year 2000, moral hazard no longer held the dominant position as the guide for evaluation of debt relief as the Financial Times opined: the intellectual argument in favor of debt relief has largely been won few countries argue any more that relief will by itself create large moral hazard problems (Beattie 2000a).

The frame found success in part because of the wealth