Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130437

US. Marine PFC Robert Harbula talkswith wounded Royal Marine Sgt JohnW Whiting, who awaits evacuationby planes of the 1st Marine AircraftWing from Yonpo Airfield, south ofHungnam.

weather. At Majon-Dong, the com-mandos mounted U.S. Armytrucks, which ferried them downto the assembly area prepared atHungnam. With elements of the5th Marines, the commandosboarded the transport USSGeneral George M. Randall (AP115) and set sail for the port ofPusan. From there the commandosmoved west to Masan, where theyspent Christmas with the 1stMarine Division.

The Chosin Reservoir campaignended the involvement of 41

Commando with the U.S. Marines,although it did not end their com-bat role in Korea. With the forcenow greatly reduced in strength,having suffered 93 casualties, theCommando returned to CampMcGill, Japan, where it refitted,took on new personnel, andresumed training as a raidingforce. Once again, operationalcontrol of 41 Commando fell toCommander, Naval Forces, FarEast.

Rested and re-equipped, 41Commando resumed its role as a

raiding force. After a practice raid atKure, Japan, a combined force ofCommando, U.S. Navy UDT, andother support personnel, partici-pated in a major raid aimed at theport city of Soiye-dong, 15 milessouth of Songjin, with the supportof two U.S. Navy destroyers, theheavy cruiser USS St. Paul (CA 73),and the aircraft carriers USS

Philippine Sea (CV 47) and USSBoxer (CV 21). On 7 April 1951,277 commandos, led by LieutenantColonel Drysdale, destroyed morethan 100 feet of railroad embank-ment by creating craters 16 feetdeep. Antipersonnel mines werethen left in the area. The Sorye-dong raid was accomplishedunder the cover of aircraft fromthe two carriers and naval gunfireprovided by the St. Paul. So com-plete was the surprise and soeffective the shield of naval gunfire,the Commando suffered no casu-alties during the raid, which lastedapproximately eight hours. Unfor-tunately, five villagers were killed

and 15 wounded by naval gunfire.Periods of inactivity followed,

during which future operationsand a possible return to the 1stMarine Division were discussed.Then in July, C Troop left Japan asthe advance party assigned toestablish a forward operating baseon the island of Yo-do in Wonsanharbor, more than 60 miles behindU.N. lines. The group also set up arear base near Sasebo, Japan.

Wonsan harbor is a large bayguarded by two peninsulas. Insideand across the entrance are a num-ber of islands, the largest beingYo-do. During the ongoingOperation War Dance, threedestroyers circled within the bayseeking targets of opportunity.When 41 Commando arrived,Korean Marines and a number ofintelligence gathering organiza-tions garrisoned the islands. Here,the Commando ventured out onreconnaissance missions, often-times in two-man kayaks.Throughout the summer and early

A Royal Marine searches a North Korean house for Communist soldiers duringa raid to destroy enemy installations and supply lines near Songjin, where themain north-south railroad runs close to the sea.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-428239

18

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fall of 1951, the Commando, with itsmain base on Yo-do Island, con-ducted raids up and down thenortheastern coast of the Koreanpeninsula, often landed from U.S.Navy high-speed transports.

In the process of carrying outthese raids, the Commando occu-pied several more islands as patrolbases. Royal Marines from BTroop, commanded by Captain E. T.G. Shuldham, occupied Mo-do on9 August, while commandos from DTroop, commanded by CaptainAnthony Stoddart, seized Tae-do,near a former leper colony. In aseparate but related action, DTroop commandos under the com-mand of Lieutenant John R. H.Walter took the island of

Hwangto-do back after Com-munist forces overran the KoreanMarine detachment there. OnHwangto-do, Royal Marines set upheavy 81mm mortars and a 75mmrecoilless rifle to harass enemypositions and interdict enemytroop movements on the main-land. Other Royal Marines madesix canoe landings on HodoPando. In one raid, on 30 August,enemy troops killed LieutenantJohn Harwood and SergeantCharles Barnes of B Troop in adaylong firefight. When the landingcraft transporting B Troop ashorebroke down off Mo-do on its wayto another raid a few days later,the enemy managed to capturefive commandos, including Troop

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Sergeant Major James Day. On 27September, Drysdale accompaniedB Troop on board the transportWantuck for yet another raid intothe Songjin area. There, one partysecured a road tunnel to attractenemy reaction while a secondmade a clandestine landing andambushed the enemy reinforce-ments. This was the last timeDrysdale led 41 Commando intocombat.

On 3 October, D Troop, rein-forced by assault engineers, UDTswimmers, and a rocket launcherteam from B Troop, set out onboard the transport Wantuck foroperations south of Chongjin.After a night rehearsal on the 4th,the Commando attempted tolaunch the main mission. As theforce approached the NorthKorean coastline, UDT swimmersdiscovered a much heavier enemypresence and the mission wasscrubbed. On 15 October,Lieutenant Colonel Ferris N. Grant,a veteran of World War II and agraduate of the U.S. Marine Corps'Command and Staff School atQuantico, Virginia, relievedDrysdale and assumed commandof 41 Commando.

While the primary purpose ofthe commando raids was to collectintelligence and harass enemysupply routes, the ever-presentthreat of a raid kept large bodies ofenemy troops committed as securityforces, thus denying their use else-where. In one major raid, on thenight of 4 December, British com-mandos landed from the transportBass and carried Out attacksagainst enemy communicationslines in Wonsan. Although theymet some opposition, the com-mandos managed to damage rail-way tunnels and inflict a number ofcasualties. The enemy slightlywound several commandos beforethe Marines were withdrawn.

Other Royal Marines, attached

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to the West Coast Support Group,continued to maintain a tightblockade of sea communications.Here, Commander, Naval Forces,Far East, employed the BritishCommando in deception opera-

tions on numerous occasions. Oneof these operations took place onthe west coast on 20 May 1951.The West Coast Commander,Admiral Alan K. Scott-Moncrieff,RN, commanded the operation

20

with naval gunfire support fromthe British ships HMS Ceylon andHMS Kenya. During the afternoonhours of that same day, RoyalNavy ships lowered into the watera dozen landing craft, three loaded

41 Commando Raiding TechniquesA part from the Soyre-Dong raid on 7 April 1951, all

raids carried out by the British Royal Marine's 41ndependent Commando were clandestine opera-

tions conducted at night and were of two-troop-strengthor less. Close approaches were made in rubber boats,later augmented by two-man kayaks, The U.S. Navy sup-plied the large rubber landing craft, which carried 10men (coxswain, bowman, and eight paddlers) and up to400 pounds of explosives packaged in 10-pound bricks.Parent ships, usually assault personnel destroyers(APDs), were ordered not to cross the 100-fathom linedue to the threat posed by North Korean and ChineseCommunist Forces use of a host of Soviet-suppliedmines. Although the APDs often came as close as 70fathoms, commandos still had to cover about eight milesto shore.

As the APDs closed on the coast to drop the corn-inandos, dim red lights would be switched on in thetroop spaces to aid night acclimatization. On "action sta-tions' being sounded, the commandos would fall in attheir boat stations. The four ramped landing craft wouldhe lowered and troops would inflate their rubber boats.pass them down into the landing craft, and thence out-board into the water. Each rifle section would embarkacross the landing craft and the explosives would behanded down and stowed. As each rubber craft wasloaded, it would be hooked to tow ropes and streamastern of its landing craft as the APD traveled at aboutone knot. When all was complete, with five or six rub-ber boats to each craft, the long tow in to the beachwould begin. The landing craft, moving at three or fourknots, would he vectored in by the APD, which wouldfollow their progress on radar and pass course correc-tions over the radio.

About 1,000 yards off the beach, the rubber boatswould slip their tows and stand off while the reconnais-sance boat, or canoe, closed the beach, sending swim-mers in if necessary to check the surf and beach clefens-es. The covering force would then land, clear the beacharea, and deploy to form a defensive perimeter aroundthe objective.

Next to land would he the demolition and humpingparties organized by the beachmaster. 'the assault engi-neers would lay the charges, which could take up to fourhours. Each 10-pound pack had to be carefully laid and

connected in a ringmain with Cordtex so all detonatedsimultaneously. There had to be at least two methods ofdetonation and customarily several time clocks wereused with a 20- to 40-minute setting.When the assault engineers were ready, fuses werepulled and orders given to withdraw. The force wouldthin out, return to the beach, and re-embark under thedirections of the beachmaster. Rubber boats would belaunched and paddled out through the surf to pick uptheir tows. The waiting landing craft, which could havebeached in an emergency to recover casualties or pris-oners, would then begin the long haul back to the wait-ing APDs. As they cleared the area, the charges woulddetonate, giving the commandos a feeling of intense sat-isfaction at a job well done. Alongside, the rubber boatswould be recovered, deflated, weapons inspected, andtroops would go below. Even though officially dry,"US. Navy personnel would generously break out themedicinal brandy to help celebrate a successful opera-tion.

with commandos, the othersempty. The craft then proceeded toshore opposite Cho-do. The com-mandos remained ashore and con-ducted a small raid before re-embarking on board the waitingcraft.

In their last raid of the war,dubbed Operation Swansong,British commandos, led byLieutenant Walter and TroopSergeant Major Roy R. Dodds of DTroop, raided enemy sampans inWonsan Harbor, destroying manybefore retiring to the waiting trans-port Bass. Shortly after returningto their base in Sasebo, Japan, theCommander, Naval Forces, Far

East, acting on orders fromWashington and London, replacedthe Commando with a force ofKorean Marines. Vice Admiral Joy,in a message to Lieutenant ColonelGrant and his men, emphasizedthe gratitude of the U.S. Navy andMarine Corps with their 16 monthsof dedicated service to the UnitedNation's efforts in Korea:

It is with the greatestpleasure that I commandthe officers and men of the41st Independent RoyalMarine Commando. Yoursuperb achievements havebeen a source of inspiration

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National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-438735

Royal Marine George Barnes poses onthe deck of the Horace A. Bass in mid-December 1951 as the ship and 41Commando team-up for the last time inan attempt to prevent any enemymovement by rail along the northeastcoast of Korea.

to freedom-loving peoplethe world over and will godown in history's brightestpage. You have contributedin no small measure towardarresting the forward mo-mentum of the Communistthreat to world peace.Since the inception of the41st in August 1950, yourcourageous combat recordagainst overwhelming oddsin the many months of hardfighting has reflected thehighest credit upon yourselfand your brothers in armsin other branches of theU.N. forces in the field. Onbehalf of the naval forces in

41 INDEPENDENT COMMANDOOPERATIONS IN KOREA

5 October 1950

'5 October 1951

380 — —17 September

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7Apr11 1951

6 October 1950

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3 December 1951

28 September 1951

2 October 1950

15 November— 16 December 1950

21 December 1951Occupied

July—23 December 1951

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12—13 September 1950

the Far East, I extend mostsincere appreciation for ajob well done.

Those Royal Marines who hadserved less than a year overseaswere transferred to 3 CommandoBrigade in Malaya, while theremainder returned to the UnitedKingdom. In a formal ceremony atStonehouse Barrack, Plymouth, on22 February 1952, 41 Commandowas disbanded. It was not untilmid-1953 that the 19 survivingRoyal Marine prisoners of warwere repatriated. (One Marinerefused repatriation and made pro-paganda broadcasts as aCommunist sympathizer. He wasofficially discharged from theCorps as a deserter in January1954. He returned to the UnitedKingdom in 1962. No action wastaken against him). On 3 April1957, in a private ceremony at theAmerican ambassador's residencein London, the Commandant of theMarine Corps, General RandolphMcCall Pate, presented to theCorps' Commandant General aPresidential Unit Citation, signedby President Dwight D.Eisenhower, officially recognizing41 Commando for its actions duringthe Chosin Reservoir campaign. Inaddition to the unit citation andbattle streamer, each surviving anddeceased commando, or their fam-ily, received a service ribbon thatdenoted their participation in thislegendary campaign.

The ties forged between the twoMarine forces during the 1900Boxer Rebellion in China grewstronger during their ordeal inKorea as they fought their way tothe port of Hungnam during thecold, dark days of December 1950.The highest praise for 41Commando came from GeneralSmith, who in a letter of commen-dation to Lieutenant ColonelDrysdale, wrote:

The performance of the 41Commando during their drivefrom Koto-ri to Hagaru-ri,during the defense ofHagaru-ri, and during theadvance from Hagaru-ri tothe south will, in the perspec-tive of history, take equalrank with the past exploits ofthe Royal Marines. I can giveyou no higher complimentthan to state your conductand that of the officers andmen under your commandwas worthy of the highest tra-ditions of Marines.

The value of the raids conduct-ed by the Royal Marines was ques-tioned at the time and since. Buteleven of the raids conducted by 41Commando were directed againstthe enemy's major supply routesand caused him to divert man-power needed elsewhere to guardits coastal railway and supplieslines. Furthermore, the effect theseraids had on the morale of boththe Royal Marines, and moreimportantly the U.S. Marines, wasconsiderable. As demonstratedduring the Chosin Reservoir cam-paign, the presence and battlefieldperformance of the Royal Marineslifted the spirit of the U.S. Marines,as many in the 1st Marine Divisionfelt they were the only "troopsfighting this goddamn war."

As for casualties of 41Commando, official reports statedthe unit lost a total of 116 menduring the course of its involve-ment in the war (August 1950-December 1951). The full impactof the losses is even more dra-matic considering the figure con-stituted one-third of the originalforce of 300 Marines sent toKorea in August 1950. This highrate of casualties, however, didnot diminish the fact that theRoyal Marines made an impor-tant and lasting contribution to

22

the United Nations victory inKorea.

On 15 April 1949, the ROKMarine Corps was activated at theChinhae naval base on the southcoast of the peninsula. The per-sonnel, approximately 10 officers,150 noncommissioned officers,and 300 privates, were drawn fromthe Korean navy—principally fromamong those ranks who had pre-vious experience in the Japanesearmy or Japanese-sponsoredManchurian army. Includedamong the officers was the Corps'first Commandant, Shin Hyen Jun,a captain in the Korean navy whowas made a colonel when heentered the new Marine Corps. Inhis first speech to his men,Colonel Shin outlined whatbecame the underlying philosophyguiding the Korean Marine Corps(KMC): "let us overcome any diffi-culty before us, let us unite and letus train ourselves to become thestrongest military unit to preparefor any national emergency."While he urged his officers andnoncommissioned officers to takecare and consideration when train-ing their men, he nonethelessstressed they make a dedicatedeffort to train their Marines as elitetroops so each Marine would"become a lion when we fightagainst our enemy."

At the time of its activation, theKMC consisted of two rifle compa-nies and a headquarters companyand was equipped with weapons ofdoubtful quality—mostly "hand-me-down" Japanese rifles with afew machine guns and otherequipment. As Lieutenant GeneralKang Ki-Chun, who served asCommandant in the later half ofthe 1960s recalled: "it is beyondimagination to express the difficul-

Determined to Win: The Korean

Marine Corps

Lieutenant General Shin Hyen Jun

Lieutenant General Shin Hyen Jun had an impressivemilitary career that began with the Japanese army,which occupied Manchuria from October 1937 to

August 1944. There he served in a variety of militaryunits and as an instructor in various Japanese-adminis-tered military schools. From August 1944 to the end ofWorld War II in August 1945, Shin served as a companycommander with the Japanese Kwangtung Army inManchuria. From September 1945 to April 1946, the gen-eral served as a battalion commander with the KoreanLiberation Army in the Peiping-Teintsin area. Hereturned home to Korea in June 1946, where he joinedthe newly-organized Republic of Korea Coast Guard, sta-tioned at Chinhae. In August 1948, he was appointed acommander in the naval forces in the Republic of KoreaNavy and participated in the campaign to quell an armyrebellion at Yosoo in October 1948. Then Captain ShinHyen Jun was transferred from the navy to establish theRepublic of Korea Marine Corps on 15 April 1949, whichis now the official birthday of the founding of this eliteforce of Marines.

The most pressing problems confronting Colonel Shinduring those early days was obtaining equipment, locat-ing a suitable base for the Korean Marines, and recruit-ing personnel. Shin's instructions to his men were sim-ple: "act like sheep for our brethren, and become a lionwhen we fight against our enemy." Shin later recountedin his memoirs that "the outbreak of the Korean War inJune 1950 solved these and other immediate problems."

During the Korean War, he participated in the Inchonlanding on 15 September 1950, and in the subsequentallied drive to recapture Seoul. He likewise commandedall Korean Marine Corps elements from October 1950 toDecember 1950 in the Hamhung area during the massivecounterguerrilla operation against rogue North Koreanarmy elements. While Commandant, he visitedHeadquarters United States Marine Corps in December1952 as a guest of the Commandant of the U.S. MarineCorps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. In addition toattending the Japanese Military Academy located atMukden, Manchuria, Shin graduated from the KoreanMarine's Command and General Staff College, located atChinhae, and the U.S. Army's Command and General

Photo courtesy of the author

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. After steppingdown from the position as Commandant in October1953, he remained in the service and organized and ledthe 1st Republic of Korea Marine Corps Infantry Brigade.He also served on the staff of the republic's joint chiefsand defense department before retiring on 4 July 1961.In addition to his military education, General Shin holdsdegrees from the University of Nevada at Reno (1962),and Yeonsie University, Seoul (1974). He currently livesin retirement in Seoul, Republic of Korea.

ties of its early beginning," as theforce had to literally start fromscratch, and in a sense "beg andborrow" equipment and facilities tobegin training. The base selectedfor the KMC was a formerJapanese airfield at Duk-San,Chinhae; its abandoned, rusting

aviation sheds served as the unit'sfirst barracks.

Shortly after its formation, theKMC was reorganized as aninfantry battalion with three riflecompanies. With the addition ofthree more rifle companies com-prised of 440 officers and men,

23

recruited primarily from the ROKNavy Recruit Depot's 14th classand formed on 26 August 1949,the now two-battalion MarineCorps began an intensive five-month training program. Initially,no U.S. Marine or Army advisorswere assigned to the KMC. The

. •._

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Marines were trained primarily ininfantry tactics taken fromJapanese army infantry trainingmanuals, as many of the officershad served in the Japanese armyduring World War II.

In September, after the 1st, 2d,and 3d companies had been orga-nized and trained, two companieswere sent 40 miles west to Jinju toassist in counter-guerrilla opera-tions in the nearby ChideeMountain redoubt area. But therugged mountainous region ofsouthern Korea was not the onlytrouble area. In December, theKMC was transferred to the largeisland of Jeju-do off the southwestcoast of Korea where theCommunists were focusing effortsto take control. The KoreanMarines fought several engage-ments with Communist guerrillas,and in cooperation with the localpolice, quelled a number ofCommunist-inspired riots amongthe resident population. Althoughsome guerrillas were killed andothers captured, these counter-guerilla operations were not toosuccessful. One Korean officernoted "the guerrillas were veryadept at camouflage. They hid inholes in the ground, coveredthemselves with straw or othernatural camouflage, while theguerrilla hunters swept over thetop of them!" Despite the lack ofsuccess, the operations on Jeju-doendeared the KMC to the SouthKorean inhabitants. When warbroke out in June 1950, many of the3,000 South Koreans that rushed tojoin the Korean Marine Corps did sobecause of the publicity it receivedin its actions on Jeju-do.

As the KMC participated in theJeju-do counter-guerrilla opera-tions, and the subsequent internal

security operations, its ranks con-tinued to grow, adding a 37mmantitank platoon.

In the pre-dawn hours of 25June 1950, the NKPA invaded itssouthern neighbor and headeddirectly down the west coasttoward the capital city of Seoul.The KMC was one of the first unitsthrown into the fight to stem thesurge of enemy forces headedtoward Seoul, Suwon, andChunan. After NKPA forces seizedChunan, they pushed towardKunsan north of Changhang bydetouring along the western coast-line. To delay the enemy forces,ROK army leaders sent one Marineunit, the Kokilhun unit, comprisedof a solitary rifle battalion, to thearea in July. After digging in, the

unit successfully withstood repeat-ed enemy attacks, earning the rep-utation as "the marine unit whokills even ghosts." The KoreanMarines, now expanded to threebattalions and designated the 1stKMC Regiment, also took part inoperations at Mokpo, ChangHang, Chin-Jong-ri, Jinju, Nam-Won, Masan, and a landing opera-tion on the Tong-Yong Peninsula.

On Tong-Yong, southwest ofPusan, the KMC conducted thefirst of several independentamphibious landing operations ofthe war to relieve pressure onSouth Korean and U.S. Armyforces then engaged in the fightingaround the Pusan perimeter. Asone commentator later wrote, thelanding at Tong-Yong: "deserveshigh admiration as it was regardedas the only attack operation for thedefense of U.N. Forces in the

Prior to the landing at Inchon, SSgt Jack F Cams confers with South Korean Marineofficers Lt Suk Hoojing (left), Lt Kim Hong Bai, and Capt Boo Eunseowg, on prop-erfield procedures for military police.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A2160

24

The Ghost Killers

midst of a withdrawal operation."Due to the determined efforts ofboth the ROK army and KMC inthe early days of the NKPA offen-sive, as well as the stiff defenseput up by U.S. Army and Marineforces rushed to Korea in July andAugust, the enemy attack alongthe Pusan perimeter began toweaken. This determination wasevident in the landing at Tong-Yong where, between 23 Augustand 15 September, Korean Marinesunder the leadership of Colonel(later lieutenant general) Kim SungUn landed on Kueje Island anddestroyed a NKPA force in a seriesof bitter exchanges.

On 5 September, in preparationfor General Douglas MacArthur'sbold stroke at the port of Inchon,operational control of the 1st KMCRegiment passed to Major GeneralOliver P. Smith's 1st MarineDivision, and then to the 5thMarines. While waiting, LieutenantColonel Edward R. Hagenah, whohad been assigned as liaison officerbetween the 1st ProvisionalMarine Brigade and the KoreanMarines, made arrangements foradditional weapons training onKorean Military Advisory Groupranges near Pusan. Training com-pleted, the regiment, totalingapproximately 120 officers and2,600 enlisted, embarked on boardthe USS Pickaway (APA 222) atPusan and on the 12th sailed forInchon.

It was late on D-Day, 15September, when the 1st KMCRegiment, assigned as divisionreserve, landed on Red Beach, andin place of the 17th ROKRegiment, began a mopping upcampaign in the port city designedto clear out all bypassed enemyforces. Despite the lack of service-able weapons and other types ofmilitary equipment, which werelater supplied by the U.S. EighthArmy, Marines of the 1st KMC

Marines for transportation to the front,regiment in taking Kimpo Airfield.

Regiment, under the command ofColonel Shin, successfully movedthrough Inchon in search ofenemy forces that had hiddenamong its inhabitants followingthe landing of United Nationsforces. To restore civil authority inthe Korean port city as soon aspossible, General Smith alsotasked the regiment with screen-ing the inhabitants to determinetheir loyalty to the republic. Oncecivil authority was restored,Admiral Sohn Won-Yil, the SouthKorean Chief of Naval Operations,and an honor guard of KMC andU.S. Marines participated in a briefceremony marking the destructionof the NKPA and restoration ofROK authority. After completingthe task at Inchon, the regiment, stillunder the operational control ofthe 5th Marines, participated in thedrive to Seoul.

On the evening of D+1, GeneralSmith issued Operations Order 5-50,which directed the 1st and 5thMarines to drive along the Inchon-Seoul Highway toward KimpoAirfield. Guarding the left flank of

25

where they would join the U.S. Marine

the 5th Marines was Major KimYun Kun's 3d KMC Battalion,which would attack north with theultimate goal of gaining the highground near Ascom City and westof the airfield. The 2d KMCBattalion, under Major Kim JongKi, would remain in Inchon onsecurity duty.

At 0700 on the morning of 17September, the regiment, less the 2dBattalion, passed through the linesof the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,and began to systematically clearthe western outskirts of AscomCity before turning north towardSeoul, its ultimate objective. Thisexpansive urban area proved to bea thorn in the side of LieutenantColonel Raymond L. Murray's 5thMarines for the next 24 hours as ele-ments of the 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, fought enemy troopsthrough the maze of small buildingsand thatched huts that had growninto almost two square miles ofbuildings, streets, and narrowalleys that characterized AscomCity. Originally built by the U.S.Army at the end of World War II,Ascom City proved to be an idealplace for the retreating NKPA tokeep a large portion of U.S. and

lstMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Nov 1950

At Inchon, South Korean Marines board amphibious trucks furnished by the 5th

I I''

South Korean Marines occupied innasty urban fighting.

It took Captain SamuelJaskilka's Company E, 2d Battal-ion, 5th Marines, an entire morningto methodically eliminate all of theNKPA troops in its sector of AscomCity. In scenes reminiscent of thefighting in Naha on the island ofOkinawa during World War II, theMarines had to enter every buildingto dislodge a determined enemywilling to fight to the death. WhileJaskilka's Marines fought it outwith the NKPA, the Marines ofCompany F, 2d Battalion, 5th

Marines, marched through theheart of Ascom City screening theremainder of the battalion'sadvance. Only one platoon leader,Second Lieutenant Titlon A.

Anderson, reported everythingquiet in his sector, although heasserted later that his men did nothave time to check all the sidestreets and blocks of buildings by-passed by other units.

While 2d Battalion, 5th Marines,battled the NKPA along AscomCity's eastern outskirts, LieutenantColonel Robert D. Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, assisted the

Korean Marines on the other side ofthe city. Already in regimentalreserve, Taplett's battalion hadbeen assigned to occupy a series ofassembly areas throughout the dayand move forward in boundsbehind the main assault elements.The morning's displacement intothe western edge of Ascom Cityhappened before the KMC attackhad cleared the suburb asplanned. Taplett committed hisbattalion against moderate resis-tance that had held up the SouthKorean Marines in their sweepthrough the town.

Swinging into action, CompanyG, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines,quickly knocked out a NKPAmachine gun emplacement in thecity as patrols from the same com-pany attacked a strong enemytroop concentration deployedamong the buildings. The NorthKoreans fled after a furious fire-fight, and in the process leftbehind 18 confirmed killed at acost of three Marines wounded.Meanwhile, Company I, 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, had spreadthroughout the maze of streets andcontinued to engage a well-entrenched enemy. As 3d Battal-ion, 5th Marines, fought the enemyforces, the Korean Marines con-ducted a passage of lines andattacked NKPA forces north of the

26

After the 1st Platoon, CompanyA, 1st Tank Battalion, movedthrough Ascom City, the M-26tanks, with Lieutenant Anderson's1st Platoon riding shotgun, contin-ued toward Kimpo Airfield, fivemiles away. Marines from 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, arrived atthe outer perimeter of the airfield at1600 that afternoon, and afterfighting off a weak enemy coun-terattack of snipers and a squad ofNKPA soldiers, Company Dreached the main runway around1800, where it was subsequently

Col Shin Hyen fun, commanding officer of the 1st Korean Marine CorpsRegiment, visits the U.S. Navy command ship Mount McKinley (AGC 7) accom-panied by his executive officer, interpreter, and senior U.S. Marine advisor,LtColEdwardR. Hagenah. An aide to Commandant of the Ma rifle Corps, MajorGeneral Thomas Holcomb, and a veteran of both theaters during World War IjLtCol Hagenah served as a Marine advisor until his death in December 1950.

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Gray Research Center

city.

joined by the remaining elements ofLieutenant Colonel Murray's regi-ment.

Even as the Marines prepared toseize the airfield, the NKPA's 1stAir Force Division, commanded byBrigadier General Wan Yong, pre-pared to launch a series of coun-terattacks against the Marines. Thedivision, comprised mostly of sup-port personnel, combat engineers,clerks, logisticians, and infantry-men, put up a stiff fight, and in thecounterattacks, one of them atnight, tried unsuccessfully touproot the 5th Marines. The sav-agery of the fighting was evident inthe fanaticism and casualties leftbehind by the NKPA when U.S.Marines decimated the motleymixture of poorly trained troops of10 7th NKPA Regiment, commandedby Colonel Han Choi Han, whofled the battle. In what became anindicator of the nature of the fight-ing the Marines would encounter inKorea, another NKPA regiment,the 8 77th Air Force Unit, led byMajor Kung Chan So, foughtalmost to the last man as Murray'sMarines killed 395 of that unit's400 soldiers. Also telling of thesavagery of the fighting wasanother engagement, fought 18September at 0300 when troopsfrom Genera! Wan's 1st Air ForceDivision probed the Marine's lines.In repulsing the enemy probes,Sergeant Richard L. Marstonjumped up in front of a squad ofsurprised enemy soldiers andshouted "United States Marines!"and opened fire with his Ml car-bine. Supporting automatic riflefire mowed down a dozen moreenemy soldiers before they beat ahasty retreat. The result ofSergeant Marston's squad's night-time firefight was evident the nextmorning as sunrise revealed a pileof dead enemy bodies scattered infront of their position.

Eventually, the combined

Marine infantry, mortar, machinegun, artillery, and tank fire suc-ceeded in breaking up repeatedenemy attacks as both Marines andenemy soldiers fought, bled, anddied in the savage fighting thatwas oftentimes hand-to-hand asMurray's 5th Marines clung toKimpo Airfield that night and intothe early morning hours. Whatbecame even more apparent to allin the battle for the airfield wasthat the fighting in Korea wouldbe savage, and oftentimes to thedeath. No matter what jobAmerican or South Korean Marinesperformed, they would be called onto serve as infantrymen, either asindividual riflemen or manningcrew-served weapons. Such wasthe case of Sergeant David R.DeArmond, normally a bulldozeroperator attached to the 1stEngineers, who died while operat-ing a machine gun in the Kimpoperimeter. "Every Marine, a rifle-men" now took on a new, andpermanent meaning.

Eventually, Murray's 5th Marinessecured Kimpo Airfield with the1st KMC Regiment providing secu-rity for its flanks. As Murray'sforces prepared to move out toseize Seoul, the 1st and 3d KMCBattalions moved out on the 5thMarine's left to flush out enemysoldiers that had retreated to theKimpo Peninsula. Eventually, theKorean Marines received assis-tance from the 17th ROK Reg-iment, which had landed at Inchonfor counter-guerrilla duties.

In the late afternoon of 18September, both X Corps and the1st Marine Division issued ordersfor the crossing of the Han River, amove that signaled the beginning ofthe drive into the South Koreancapital. In Division OperationsOrder 6-so, General Smith directed

27

Murray's 5th Marines to seizecrossing sites along the north bankof the Han and prepare to crossthe river while Colonel Puller's 1stMarines continued its attacktoward Yungdung-po. The planwas to have the Marines envelopthe enemy on the north bank ofthe river in the vicinity of Seouland then, in a concerted drive,seize and secure the city and thehigh ground to the north. Whilethe men of both the 5th and 1stMarines carried through with theircrossings, the 2d KMC Battalion,mopping up operations in Inchoncompleted, advanced and occu-pied the high ground south of theHan River and provided flanksecurity for the major crossinglater that day. With the exception ofthe 1st Battalion, which met someopposition as it positioned itself tocross the river, the 5th Marines hadno trouble on the 19th as it

advanced to its assigned positionson the banks of the Han. Murray'sMarines occupied all objectivesagainst little or no opposition asthe main body of the regimentprepared to cross the river.

General Smith directed the 5thMarines to "cross the Han in thevicinity of Haengju, seize Hill 125,and advance southeast along therailroad to the high ground domi-nating the Seoul highway." Theunits attached for the operationwere the 2d KMC Battalion; thedivision Reconnaissance Com-pany; Company A, 1st TankBattalion; and the U.S. Army'sCompany A, 56th AmphibianTractor Battalion. In addition,Smith's orders instructed the 11thMarines to give the 5th Marinespriority in artillery fires. In directsupport of the main crossingswere the 1st Engineer, 1st ShoreParty, and 1st Amphibian TractorBattalions.

As envisioned in the divisionoperations order, the Reconnais-

South Korean Marines on board amphibious trucks movetoward the Han River from Kimpo Airfield in support of the

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC348702

offensive against North Korean troops occupying Seoul,South Korea's capital city.

sance Company was to lead theadvance across the Han River bysending a swimming team acrossshortly after nightfall. If the swim-mers found the bank clear ofenemy activity, they would thensignal the rest of the men to followin tracked landing vehicles.Reconnaissance Marines wouldthen seize the bridgehead formedby Hills 95, 125, and 51. After theysecured these objectives, theywould act as a covering force forLieutenant Colonel Taplett's 3dBattalion, 5th Marines, at 0400 thatsame morning. While the 5thMarines passed through theReconnaissance Company, 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, would followin column at approximately 0600,with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines,

remaining in reserve until it alsocrossed with the 2d KMC Battalionprotecting its left flank.

The crossing of the Han beganon time, and while enemy fireproved difficult, LieutenantColonel Murray's Marines plowedacross the river in amphibioustractors and quickly secured theirassigned objectives. When it cametime for the 2d KMC Battalion tocross, the amphibious trucksbecame bogged down along thesouth bank of the river. LieutenantColonel John H. Partridge, com-manding officer of the 1stEngineers, and the KMC comman-der, Major Kim Jong Ki, decidedthe Korean Marines would crossthe Han in amphibious tractors tosave time and effort. They then

28

occupied the high ground to thenorth and northeast (Hill 95),guarding the crossing site. The restof the regiment, less the 3dBattalion, which remained onsecurity duty at Kimpo, followed.

By 20 September the Marineshad established control overKimpo Airfield. But persistentreports the NKPA planned toretake the airfield continued to cir-culate. At 0730 on the 21st, areport came to the commandingofficer of the 3d KMC Battalionthat warned of an attemptedNKPA crossing of the Han Riverabout seven miles north of the air-field. Major Kim Yum Kum called inair strikes, which dispersed theenemy force and broke up theattempt to launch a counterattack

• :1

. ..

4T:

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against United Nations' positionsat the airfield. At 1310, however, aU.S. Marine air liaison officerattached to the KMC battalion esti-mated that at least two NKPA bat-talions had positioned themselves infront of 3d KIvIC Battalion's posi-tions. This report placed all units inthe Kimpo area on full alert. Whilethe attack never came, there was lit-tle doubt the NKPA could, if it

desired, launch a counterstrikeagainst U.S. and Korean Marines.

At Kimpo, both the Americanand South Korean Marines had thesupport of the 16-inch guns of thebattleship USS Missouri (BB 63),and guns of the heavy cruisers USSToledo (CA 133) and USS

Rochester (CA 124) in defense oftheir perimeter. Naval gunfire wasat its best in the Kimpo area, withboth cruisers firing a total of 535eight-inch shells from 21 to 24September. In one action, Second

Lieutenant Joseph R. Wayerski, theshore fire control party officerattached to the 3d KMC Battalion,called in naval gunfire in support ofa patrol-sized action by the battal-ion. With the support of navalgunfire, the Korean Marines wipedout a company-sized pocket ofNKPA troops in the vicinity ofChongdong—about three milesnorthwest of the airfield on thesouth bank of the Han. In thisengagement, the North Koreanslost an estimated 40 men killedwith a further 150 taken prisoner.With the airfield fully secured, the1st Marine Division continued theadvance toward Seoul with ele-ments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d KMCBattalions in direct support.

At 0700 on 22 September, thebattle for northwest approaches toSeoul began in earnest. Fromnorth to south, the three assaultbattalions of the reinforced 5th

Marines were 3d Battalion, 5thMarines on the left, 1st KIvIC

Battalion, commandered by MajorKoh Ku Hun, in the center, and 1stBattalion, 5th Marines on the right.The 2d KMC Battalion remained inreserve. All three battalionsjumped off from the high groundabout three miles southeast ofHaengju along a line bounded byHill 216 to the north, Hill 104 in thecenter, and Hill 68 to the south.The Korean Marines had the unen-viable task of assaulting theseinterlocking heights, used by theNKPA to provide fields of fire tomove up in concealment andlaunch counterattacks along the1st Marine Division's perimeter.Almost as soon as the 1st KMCBattalion's attack from Hill 104began, it ran into stiff opposition asthe enemy poured small arms andmortar fire, as well as punishingartillery fire on the South Koreans.

Korean Marines conduct a search of a North Korean captive Marines moved along the right (north) bank on the Han Riverthat was flushed from his nearby hiding place during the in conjunction with the 5th Marines.allied drive toward Seoul. During that push, the Korean National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC349049

29

a

—

Even as the Korean Marinesattacked, NKPA detachments con-tinued to infiltrate into prepareddefensive positions. Enemy fireheld up both the 1st KMCBattalion and 2d Battalion, 5thMarines, until concentrated air andartillery strikes removed the stub-born defenders from the base ofHill 104. The fighting was sointense that even air strikes initial-ly failed to dislodge the enemy. Bynightfall on 22 September, theKorean Marines had been com-pelled to withdraw to Hill 104,their original starting point.Lieutenant Colonel Murray directeda rifle company from 1st Battalion,5th Marines, to provide supportingfire the next morning from theadjacent summit of Hill 105-Swhen Major Koh's battalionrenewed its attack in an effort toregain lost ground.

On the morning of 23September, Murray directed the 1stKMC Battalion to attack from Hill104 at 0700 in an attempt tostraighten the line. The 1st and 3dBattalions, 5th Marines, were toremain in position and assist theadvance by fire. The NKPA on Hill56 greeted the renewed KoreanMarine attack with heavy smallarms and mortar fire. Although theMarines made a valiant effort, thesmothering NKPA fire halted theirattack dead in its tracks. Sufferingheavy casualties (32 killed and 68wounded), the South KoreanMarine attack made little signifi-cant progress—the unit was spent.Lieutenant Colonel Harold S.

Roise, commanding officer of the 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, conferredwith Lieutenant Colonel Murray,who ordered his Marines to conducta passage of lines through theKMC battalion and renew theattack on Hill 56. The 2d KMCBattalion was relieved from guard-ing the crossing site and assigned toscreen the left [north] flank of the

5th Marines. Pulled back into divi-sion reserve, the 1st KMC Battalion

lines in support of Roise's 2dBattalion, 5th Marines, which setout in bloody fashion to renew theassault. After a furious, daylongbattle, Roise's Marines succeeded inbreaking through the enemy'smain line of resistance. As close airsupport strikes from LieutenantColonel Walter E. Lischeid'sMarine Fighter Squadron 214broke up an enemy counterattackon nearby Hill 105-S, the wearyMarines from both LieutenantColonel George R. Newton's 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, and Roise's2d Battalion, 5th Marines, foughttheir way up both hills.Meanwhile, artillery fire from the105mm and 155mm howitzers ofthe 11th Marines pounded enemytroop concentrations and kept theNKPA from attacking the dug-inMarines atop the two hills. Withthe enemy's position silenced, andthe remainder of his rifle battalionsacross the Han River, GeneralSmith ordered his Marines forwardinto the capital of Seoul.

As senior U.S. Marine advisor tothe Korean Marines, LieutenantColonel Charles W. Harrison, in

30

The Korean Marines werevery valuable in mopping up,screening, and reconnais-sance missions because oftheir familiarity with the terrainand the civilian population.Their limited training, almostcomplete lack of experience inthe use of supporting arms,and the absence of certaintools, e.g., flamethrowers,3.5-inch rocket launchers,etc., rendered them, however,incapable at that time of suc-cessfully assaulting a heavilydefended position. Their fail-ure here was a bitter pill to theKoreans, but it was only to beexpected.

At 0700 on 25 September, the1st Marine Division launched thefinal phase of its attack on Seoul. Asoutlined in the division OperationsOrder 11-50, the Korean Marines, inunison with their U.S. Marinecounterparts, were assigned themission of liberating the capitaland clearing it of enemy forces.Major Kim Jong Ki's 2d Battalion,

Approaching theEnemy MLRSeptember 1950NKPA MLR irrrrSEOuL—-—-—

0 1000 2000

Yards L_...._J I

reorganized and reentered the wrote:

bluntly assessing the South KoreanMarine assault from Hill 104, later

attached to Regimental CombatTeam 1 (1st Marines), was or-dered to seize the part of Seoulwithin zone of action and the highground beyond the northeasternoutskirts of the capital, about sixmiles from its original jump offpositions. As outlined in thatorder, the zone of action, whichranged from one to one-and-a-half miles wide, carried the attackthrough the heart of the city, withSouth Mountain on the right andDucksoo Palace on the left. Inaddition to acting as flank securi-ty, the battalion was assignedmopping up operations once thecapital was secured. At the con-clusion of the operation, the 2dBattalion was to revert to its ownregimental control.

Major Koh's 1st KMC Battalion,attached to Regimental CombatTeam 5 (5th Marines), and thedivision's reconnaissance com-pany, was to seize the part ofSeoul within its zone of action

and the high ground overlookingthe Seoul-Uijongbu road six milesfrom the line of departure. Aboutone-and-a-half miles wide, thiszone included the northwest sec-tion of the city and theGovernment Palace. Like the 2dBattalion, Koh's battalion wouldthen mop up any lingering resis-tance. The remaining units of theregiment (less 1st and 2dBattalions) were designated as thedivision reserve. The regimentwas to be prepared to reassumecontrol of its detached battalionsand then occupy Seoul.

As the 5th Marines moved out toattack the NKPA, elements ofLieutenant Colonel Newton's 1stBattalion, 5th Marines, along withthe division's reconnaissancecompany and 1st KMC Battalion,acted as a blocking forcedesigned to prevent the NKPAfrom reinforcing its tenuous posi-tions on Hills 338, 216, and 296.Most heavy fighting on the 25th

took place within the 1st Marineszone of action. As the morning of26 September dawned, the NKPAremained entrenched in Seoul,determined to fight to the death forevery inch of the city, eventhough X Corps had proclaimedthe capital taken. DivisionOperations Order 12-50, issued at1230, directed a continuation ofthe attack and committed ColonelHomer L. Litzenberg, Jr.'s 7thMarines. Litzenberg's regiment,augmented by the newly orga-nized 5th Separate KIVIC Battalion,was given the mission of "pinchingout" the 5th Marines beyond theGovernment Palace and attackingabreast of the 1st Marines towardthe northeast. (On 25 September,the 5th Battalion, in addition tothe 26th Company, landed atInchon and moved up by truck tothe regimental assembly area inthe southern part of Seoul.) In the7th Marines zone of advancenorth of the city lay the northernhalf of Hill 338, Hill 342, Hill 133,Hill 343, and Hill 171, some of thetoughest real estate yet encoun-tered by both the U.S. and KoreanMarines as they pushed forwardto liberate the capita!. ColonelLewis B. Puller's 1st Marines, withthe 2d KMC Battalion, was todrive northward from Hills 97 and82 in lower Seoul, clear the centerof enemy forces, then wheel tothe right to take Hill 133 in thenortheastern outskirts.

The 5th Marines, with the 1stKIvIC Battalion attached, wasassigned to support ColonelLitzenberg's attack until the twoforces converged to al!ow Mur-ray's regiment to reassemble indivision reserve and graduallyrelieve elements of the 7thMarines. The 1st KMC Regimentwas still under orders to resumecontrol of its detached battalionsfor the occupation of Seoul. WithX Corps now ashore and opera-

US. Navy Co'psman Wendal D. Lewark treats a wounded South Korean Marineas another looks on at an aid station in Seoul. During the battle for the capital,Korean Marine losses were more than 50 killed and 100 wounded.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-420501

31

tional, the 3d KMC Battalion was 3d Battalions) was directed todetached from the 1st MarineDivision and assigned to the U.S.Army's 187th Airborne RegimentalCombat Team for operations in theKimpo Peninsula. There, the 3dBattalion undertook counter-guer-rilla operations to clear out theremaining pockets of enemy strag-glers that posed a security threat.

Meanwhile, the 1st KMCBattalion moved into positionbetween the division's Reconnais-sance Company and 3d Battalion,5th Marines, which had estab-lished itself on Hill 296. In the finalbattle for Seoul, as the U.S.Marines fought their way throughthe rubble, Korean Marine andarmy elements continued to neu-tralize pockets of stubborn enemyresistance. By 1630 on 28September, the remaining ele-ments of the NKPA in Seoul hadeither been annihilated or hadabandoned the city and headednorth toward the 38th Parallel,returning along the same routethey used into the city only twomonths before.

On the morning of 29September, while the battle stillraged in the suburbs, the legalgovernment of Korea was reinstat-ed in a ceremony held inChangdok Palace. Outside thepalace and along the route taken byGeneral Douglas MacArthur andKorean President Syngman Rheefrom Kimpo Airfield across theHan River to the capitol building, aKorean Marine or soldier withfixed bayonet stood guard everyfew paces. As an additional pre-caution, a second line of securitymanned by U.S. Marines wasestablished a block or two oneither side of the ceremonial routeand on the high ground outsidethe palace.

Instead of taking over securityresponsibility for the capital, the1st KMC Regiment (less the 1st and

advance about 18 miles east ofSeoul and establish blocking posi-tions near the junction of the Hanand North Han Rivers. An importantroad from the south crossed theNorth Han at this point, and it wasthought the enemy retreating fromthe south might use this route. TheKorean Marines met only scatteredresistance.

On 6 October, X Corps directedMajor Kim Yun Kun's 3d KMCBattalion to conduct a reconnais-sance in force on Kang Wha Islandto "ferret out any remainingCommies." Kang Wha lies a littleless than a mile off the northwesttip of Kimpo Peninsula, and it washere that Captain McLane Tiltonand his Asiatic Fleet Marinesstormed ashore in 1871 and cap-tured the Korean forts guardingthe Han River approaches to thecapital. However, the operationwas cancelled and the 3d Battalionwas directed to join the rest of theregiment in an assembly area nearInchon.

The Korean Marines' role in thefight from Inchon to Seoul wasinstrumental in the overall victoryachieved by United Nations forces.And that victory deserved a littlecelebration, as Lieutenant ColonelHarrison later recalled:

On 10 October a parade ofthe 1st KMC Reg[imen]t withall four battalions was held atan athletic field in Inchon.Generals Smith and [EdwardA.] Craig, together with thesenior officers of the Divisionstaff and regimental comman-ders, attended. General Smithtrooped the line and thentook the march past from ahastily constructed reviewingstand on the side of the field.The Korean Marines not onlyproduced a band hut also a setof U.S. Colors manufactured

32

Photo: 'A Marines Matches Thousands of Enemies"

TSgt Yang Byung Soo and Pvt ChoiKuk Bang hoist the Republic ofKorea's national colors at the capitolbuilding in Seoul.

by themselves. For an organi-zation which was so young,and which had just completeda rigorous campaign, theirperformance and appearancewas quite commendable.After the review the Koreanofficers and their Americanguests repaired to the largeschool building nearby wherethey were treated to beer andcocktails by the young ladiesof Inchon who had dug outtheir best silk finery for theoccasion. ... It was a pleasantdiversion from the gruelingtasks of the past fortnight.

The Inchon-Seoul campaignwas over, and the 1st KMCRegiment focused its efforts onpreparing for the next—the drivenorth across the 38th Parallel.

I

Zr4

I'

On 10 October, as U.S. Marine Gens Oliver P. Smith andEdward A. Craig stood by with senior officers of the divisionstaff and regimental commanders, Korean Marines held a

Photo: lstMarDiv Historical Diaiy Photo Supplement, Oct 1950

victoiy celebration and formal parade at Inchon followingthe Seoul campaign.

Still clad in summer utilities andlight rubber shoes, the KoreanMarines, with the assistance oftheir U.S. Marine liaison officersand advisors, attempted to securewinter clothing during the shortbreak in combat at Inchon.Winters, everyone knew, could get"mighty cold in North Korea." The3d Battalion, for example, man-aged to get sufficient gear from the1st Marine Division to give eachKorean a pair of woolen trousers,two blankets, a wool scarf, and acouple of pairs of socks, but nowool shirts, overcoats, or leathershoes.

On 18 October, three of theKMC battalions embarked on land-ing ships for the port of Wonsan.

Plans for the Wonsan operationgenerally followed the samescheme employed during theInchon-Seoul campaign—a Ko-rean battalion would be parceledout to the U.S. Marine infantry reg-iments. Having decided the regi-mental headquarters would haveno real role to play and would bea useless appendage, Colonel Shinand his staff did not accompanyhis battalions by ship, but arrivedlater by air.

After several days of steamingback and forth off the east coast ofKorea between Pusan andWonsan, mine sweepers finallycleared lanes for the landing shipsto drop anchor. But as one Marineadvisor remembered, "both theKorean army moving rapidly upthe east coast on Shank's mare and

33

the USO troupe with Bob Hopeand curvaceous Marilyn Maxwellhad beaten us to the objective."

Landing in late October, theKMC battalions, still under opera-tional control of the 1st MarineDivision, were assigned the on-callmission of securing and niaintainingthe main supply route in theMu c hon-Wons an- Koj o-Maj on-niarea. There was little to do untilearly November when the southernboundary of X Corps was movedfarther south and the U.S. Marineswere ordered north in the advancetoward the northern border ofKorea. On 2 November, the battal-ions, now detached from the 1stMarine Division, were givenresponsibility for the zone south ofthe 39th Parallel, which theywould assume over the next sever-

u—I

rrJ --•1 4

al days. The relief of 2d Battalion,5th Marines, for example, wascompleted by Korean Marines thatsame day at Anbyon, eight milessoutheast of Wonsan, freeing theU.S. Marine unit to rejoin its regi-ment that was moving north.

On 10 November, Major KimYun Kun's battalion was rushed toreinforce two squads of Marines ofSecond Lieutenant Ronald A.

Mason's 2d Platoon, Company H,3d Battalion, 1st Marines, atMajon-ni. Those Marines werethreatened with encirclement byremnants of the 45th NKPARegiment, 15th NKPA Division. Inthe fight that ensued during thenight and early morning of 11-12November, Lieutenant Mason'sMarines and Major Kun's battalionrepulsed several determined,although futile, attacks by theenemy force. By 0600, whatremained of the enemy regimentbeat a hasty retreat as it aban-

doned the attack on Majon-ni andshifted its focus to guerrilla war-fare in the Imjin Valley. The relief ofthe Marines and KMC battalion atMajon-ni began the next afternoonas elements of the U.S. Army's 1stBattalion, 15th Infantry, 3dInfantry Division, arrived to takeover the perimeter. With themovement of the 1st Marinesnorthward, X Corps attached the3d and 5th KMC Battalions to thearmy unit and directed the twobattalions to assume responsibilityfor a zone to the south and west ofKojo. (The Chinese character for"4th" is the same as for "death,"hence no 4th Battalion. Differentlogic was applied, however, innumbering companies, thus noobjection to a 4th company in the1st Battalion.) The 2d KMCBattalion, which had been detach-ed to conduct counter-guerrillaoperations in the Mokpo area ofsouthwest Korea, rejoined the

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A4436

A South Korean Marine, who foughtwith American Marines at Inchonand Seoul and accompanied theminto northeast Korea, interviews civil-ians at a checkpoint near Wonsan inan effort to restore order.

other two battalions in lateNovember.

As Chinese Communist forcescontinued to push south from theYalu River and the 1st MarineDivision fought its way from theChosin Reservoir to the coast inearly December, the KoreanMarines, still attached to the 3dInfantry Division, moved toWonsan where they assisted indefending the harbor and ensuringthe safe evacuation of allied troopsand Korean refugees. On 7 and 9December, after covering theremoval of Marine Aircraft Group12's equipment, the U.S. Navywithdrew the 1st and 3d KMCBattalions by landing ship andtransported them to Pusan. Evenas they withdrew, their perfor-mance in the defense of Wonsanwas "outstanding." Six days later,the U.S. Air Force's Combat CargoTransport Command moved the 2dand 5th KMC Battalions atHamhung. In mid-December, theregimental headquarters and allfour battalions were reunited at

BGen Shin Hyen Jun meets with MajGen Oliver P. Smith on board the MountMcKinley. As Shin had been just promoted, MajGen Smith "dug up a couple ofspare stars and pinned them on him." Here, Gen Shin isfiankedon his right byCapt MartinJ. Sexton, aide toMajGen Smith, and BGen Shin's interpreter, andon the left by his executive officer.

Gen Oliver P. Smith Collection, Gray Research center

34

the Chinhae naval base on thesouth coast of Korea.

At Chinhae, the 1st KMCRegiment underwent a period ofrest, rehabilitation, training, andreorganization. During this time,the first substantial number of U.S.Marine Corps liaison teams joinedthe Korean Marine Corps as advi-sors. The first such assignmentoccurred prior to the Inchon-Seouloperation. This team consisted ofLieutenant Colonel EdwardHagenah, who was the acting liai-son officer, three corporals, whowere radio operators, and one cor-poral who drove a jeep mountedwith a built-in radio. This arrange-ment lasted throughout theInchon-Seoul campaign. At theconclusion of the campaign andupon the recommendation of theliaison officer attached to the firstteam, its numbers were temporari-ly expanded to include a senioradvisor (a lieutenant colonel); bat-talion liaison officers (lieutenants);S-i (personnel) and S-4 (supply, amajor or captain); bulldozer oper-ators (corporals or privates firstclass); and jeep drivers (corporals orprivate first class). While the num-ber of liaison personnel stillproved to be inadequate to dealwith the multitude of organization-al and logistics problems associat-ed with the original compositionof the regiment, the liaison groupnonetheless remained intact untillate December when the KoreanMarines returned to Chinhae andthe group was disbanded.

In mid-January 1951, the 1stKMC Regiment was re-attached tothe 1st Marine Division andColonel Shin requested throughthe senior U.S. Marine advisor that,if and when a liaison teamreturned to the KMCs, it beenlarged to include an intelligence

officer, operations officer, four liai-son officers, communications offi-cer, medical officer, clerk typists,intelligence clerk, supply clerk,two navy corpsmen, ambulancedriver, and four drivers/mechanics(one for each battalion).Unfortunately, when U.S. Marineadvisors returned to the regiment,the team's composition remainedabout the same as before. Thisremained the case until the 1stMarine Division established a full-time U.S. Marine ProvisionalLiaison Team, which graduallyincreased as the Korean MarineCorps undertook more of thefighting from mid-1951 throughthe end of the war in July 1953.

While the majority of the workdone by the U.S. Marine advisoryteams took place behind the lines,it often involved being on thefrontlines and in the line of fire. Insome cases, enemy fire wounded orkilled an advisor. In one suchinstance around the "Punchbowl"on 31 August 1951, an enemymine severely wounded ColonelKim Tae Shik, 1st KMC Regiment'scommanding officer, and U.S.Marine advisor Second LieutenantJames F. McGoey, as both menreturned from an inspection tourof the frontline companies.

Despite the ever-present dan-gers of the battlefield, the advisorsworking with the Korean Marineswere enthusiastic and patient asthey instructed their South Koreancounterparts in the intricacies oflogistical support of a battalion inthe attack, fire support, andadministrative matters. ColonelKim made special note of oneMarine advisor, a Major Jennings,USMCR, who remained with theKorean Marines for almost a year.As Colonel Kim stated: "Jenningswas a real go-getter and was agreat help to him in his logisticalduties."

To work with the Korean

35

Marines, each U.S. Marine advisorneeded a working knowledge ofJapanese because of its commonusage, be mature, and above allelse, be patient, as well as beingtechnically and tactically knowl-edgeable in his particular militaryspecialty. Prior to their assign-ment, advisors were instructed to be"respectful and understanding," aswell as to avoid "talking down to"their South Korean counterparts.They were to "advise" or "recom-mend" and not "order" theirKorean allies to take a particularcourse of action. Lastly, Marineofficers and noncommissionedofficers assigned to advisory dutywere to be mindful of the culturalsetting in which they would beworking. They were not to expectthat "this was the way it was doneat Quantico or Parris Island," andthey were to avoid involvingthemselves in matters beyond theiradvisory mission. For the mostpart, the advisory effort workedvery well.

Rested and refitted, the 1st KMCRegiment once again entered theline on 24 January in the Andong-Tongduk area, northwest ofPohang. As General Kang laternoted: "the purpose of this movewas to engage and defeat the 10thNKPA Division, which had infiltrat-ed the main line of resistance bymoving along the TaibaekMountain Range." To stabilize therear area behind the lines of theU.S. Eighth Army and root Out thisenemy, the 1st KMC Regiment andthe 1st Marine Division conducteda massive counter-guerrilla cam-paign.

With Lieutenant ColonelHarrison and a group of divisionliaison and advisory officers alongas observers, the four battalions ofthe 1st KMC Regiment moved out

The Force Matures

from Chinhae by landing ship andtruck. On 26 January, OperationsOrder 4-51 assigned to the KoreanMarines Sector F astride theYongdok-Andong highway, whichhad been carved out of Sectors Cand D held by the 7th and 11thMarines respectively. They were toconduct daily patrols from posi-tions near Yongdok, Chaegok-tong, and Chinan-dong, prevent-ing the enemy from penetratingtheir sector.

The regiment opened its com-

mand post at Yongdok on 29January. The first operations orderissued divided Sector F into threeparts, assigning the western, central,and eastern sub-sectors to the 3d,1st, and 2d Battalions respectively.The 5th Battalion, meanwhile, wasassigned to the 1st Marines, whichwas patrolling in the Andong area.

The first days of February sawcontinuous action by the U.S. andSouth Korean Marines as bothforces sought to "snuff out" theremnants of the NKPA's 10th

36

Division. With reports that por-tions of the NKPA's 25th and 2/tbRegiments were fleeing toward thezone of the 5th Marines, Koreanand U.S. Marines prepared tolaunch a "knock out blow" againstthe retreating enemy, who antici-pated the attack and shifted theirretreat northward towardTopyong-dong. There, the 2d and3d Battalions, 1st Marines, planteda well-laid trap as they closed infrom one side while the 1st and 3dKMC Battalions blocked the roadsin the vicinity of Sarngo-ri andPaekcha-dong. Elements of thetwo enemy regiments were forcedto break into small groups andscatter to avoid utter destructionby the desultory fire of the U.S.and South Korean Marines.

The nearest the NKPA came tosuccess occurred on 5 February,after the 1st and 2d KMC Battal-ions had established zone blockingpositions at the request of the 7thMarines, which had been relent-lessly pursuing the shatteredenemy forces. In a sharp firefight,a platoon from Lieutenant ColonelRyen Bong Seng's 2d KMC Battal-ion stumbled into a well-preparedNKPA defensive position equip-ped with 81mm mortars andheavy and light machine guns afew miles southwest of Yongdok.In the exchange that followed, theNKPA forced the Korean Marines towithdraw with a loss of 1 killed, 8wounded, and 24 missing, inaddition to the loss of small armsand other equipment. However,by evening all of the missing hadbeen located. This would he theonly success the NKPA achievedduring the Pohang counter-guerrillacampaign.

In a follow-on assault, the bat-talion avenged the previous day'sactions as it succeeded in takingthe same position. In a sign of theever-increasing sophistication,Lieutenant Colonel Ryen skillfully