trafficking of small arms and light weapons (salw) in west africa

TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND

LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN WEST AFRICA :

ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARM CACHES BETWEEN

GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIARt. Lt-Col. Seth Ohene-Asare | Félix Aklavon | Théonas Moussou | Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe

UNREC

Editors Simon Asoba Rodger Glokpor

Authors of Country Reports:Ghana, Rt. Lt-Col. Seth Ohene-AsareTogo, Félix AklavonBénin, Théonas MoussouNigeria, Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe

TRAFFICKING OF SMALL ARMS AND

LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) IN WEST AFRICA :

ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARM CACHES BETWEEN

GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA

First Edition Abuja December 2014

Design and Layout: Samson Nnah, [email protected]

© Copyright with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

Printed by Single Vision Limited, Abuja, [email protected]

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying or recording current known or later invented without prior approval of the holders of the copyrights. Short excerpts may be quoted, provided the source is fully acknowledged. The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and are in no way an official position of the institutions that commissioned the studies.

ISBN: 978 - 978 - 944 - 801 - 4

Editorial Team

Simon Asoba

Roger Glokpor

Colby Goodman

Karl Wagner

Christina Arabia

Nancy Mua Nsih

About the Authors

Preface

Introduction

Part One: Summary of Results and Recommendations

Origin of Illicit SALW

Internal and External illicit SALW Trade Routes

Illicit SALW concealment tactics

Status of Craft Production of SALW

Types of the most trafficked SALW

correlation between armed violence and illicit SALW trade

Demand Factors for SALW

The challenges faced by the government in controlling the illicit

trade of SALW

Part Two: Country studies on routes and illicit arms caches

between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria

A - Routes and Illegal Arms Caches in Ghana

Chapter 1: Background and Problem of SALW in Ghana

Chapter 2: Research Approach and Methodology

Chapter 3: Observations on the Study and Results

Chapter 4: Availability of Small arms and Light Weapons

Chapter 5: Local Craft Manufacture by Blacksmiths

Chapter 6: Ghana Legislation on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Chapter 7: Recommendations

B - Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Togo

Introduction

I - Background and Justification of Study

Table of Content

V

VII

VIIIX

1

1

1

1

2

2

3

3

5

6

6

13

21

29

35

39

43

47

51

51

VI

II- Methodological Framework

III-Presentation and Interpretation of Data

Conclusion and Recommendations

C - Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Benin

Introduction

I - Background

II- Methodology for the Study

III-Presentation and Interpretation of Results

IV-Way Forward and Recommendations

Conclusion

D. Routes and Illegal arms Caches in Nigeria

Executive summary

Introduction

I- Methodology

II- Proliferation and ownership structure

III- Sources of SALW

IV- Patterns and dynamics of salw trafficking

V- Regulatory frameworks

VI- Findings

VII- Recommendations

Conclusion

53

57

65

67

71

70

71

81

84

88

91

95

96

99

102

103

110

116

119120

122

About the Authors

Rt. Lt. Col. Seth Ohene-Asare is Chairman of the National Commission on Small Arms Ghana since August 2009. In this capacity, he oversaw a team of the commission that conducted this study. He was for several years an instructor in the Ghana Army, and has held numerous leadership positions including Director of Security Services.

Félix Kokou H. Aklavon is an independent consultant on small arms. He was a former Vice-Chairman of WANEP TOGO (West African Network for Peacebuilding), Chairman of the Action Network on Small Arms (RASALT), Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Civil Society Organisations Togo (CNSC) and is currently a member of the International Advisory Committee of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA).

Théonas Moussou, a graduate of Political Science, is an independent consultant on human rights and development issues. He has conducted several field studies including the study on improving techniques for the clearing of mines, decontamination, and destruction of SALW.

Prof. Augustine O. Ikelegbe teaches Public Comparative Politics at the University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. He has several publications to his credit on militia and self-defence groups and the scourge of siphoning oil in Nigeria.

VII

Preface

Dear reader, no doubt you are so used to reading several reports on the now common subject of small arms and light weapons that you are inclined to consider this document as yet another one!

We have pledged to overcome this indifference, and to renew your interest in the ¹current realities of this global problem of collective security which fosters terrorism and organised crime. The study in your hands tackles the problem from a new angle: a surgical operation into the heart of the network of circulation of SALW in West Africa. Rather than reading another negative account of the consequences of the proliferation and circulation of illicit small arms, you will embark on a trip along the routes of the traffickers and into the caches of the artisanal manufacturer who is becoming increasingly ingenious; you will see first-hand the strategies arms smugglers use to hide their weapons; you will experience what is known as “porous borders” and the poor border control services; finally, and without being exhaustive, you will experience some of the motivations driving illicit arms trafficking.

The circulation and manufacture of illicit SALW is as much a source of livelihood for ordinary citizens as it is the cause of much blood shedding and bereavement for several others. Somewhat regrettably, our resources do not allow us to extend the scope of our study beyond four neighbouring countries in West Africa - Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. The facts described below, however, may very well reflect the situation all over the sub-region.

VIII

1. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) and the United Nations Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC) jointly com-missioned the “Study on Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa: Illicit Routes and Caches between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria”.

Ÿ UNREC was created by the United Nations General Assembly (Resolution A/res/40/151/G) and estab-lished since 1986 in Lomé, Togo, with the mandate to “provide, upon request, substantive support for ini-tiatives and other efforts of Member States of the African region towards the realization of measures of peace, arms limitations and disarmament in the region” for more details. www.unrec.org

Ÿ FES, a German political foundation committed to social democratic values, was established in 1925 and has more than one hundred offices all over the world. The Abuja office, in charge of the “West Africa Security Policy Project” is working to strengthen the interface between democracy and security policy. Thus it facilitates policy dialogue platforms on threats to security and their responses Cf.

for more details.www.fes-westafrica.org

At the end of this expedition, you may very well arrive at the same observations and recommendations as the authors of the four country reports: the social tragedy of arms trafficking is no doubt complex and disturbing but far from being irremediable and desperate. With a measure of political will, internal organization and international cooperation, if member States take realistic measures within their sovereign powers and their international commitments in the area of arms control, they can overcome or at least reduce illegal arms smuggling significantly.

Dear reader, this report was compiled at the end of a long process, with the contributions and assistance of several actors, to whom we are deeply grateful. We hope you will derive as much pleasure as lessons to build your capacity, harmonize and coordinate your efforts with those of all those who are working to prevent, combat and eliminate the proliferation and circulation of illicit small arms and light weapons in West Africa.

Marco Kalbusch, Felix Henkel,Director, UNREC, Coordinator, FESLomé, Togo Regional Office, Abuja, Nigeria

IX

Introduction

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo has been considerable for some time . Although in recent times the ²security situation in the Sahel and the diversion of modern weapons from the Libyan State's stocks and its consequences to peace and security in the Sahel have dominated the discussions in West Africa, the proliferation of locally crafted weapons throughout the Gulf of Guinea States has featured just as prominently.

The illicit trade in weapons between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo is fuelled by more demand by the people for self-protection, as a result of the feeling of insecurity throughout the region . This regional demand is being met by forgers principally in ³Ghana but also in Togo, whose local revolvers, shot guns and rifle type weapons flood the arms markets of the sub-region.

Ghana has had a traditional weapons industry since pre-colonial days, when locally produced weapons were sold to slave traders and raiders. However the arms industry was criminalized under the successive Danish and then British colonial authorities who saw the local arms industry as a threat to colonial power. Production has since become more informal, with the national legislation of Ghana heavily regulating the industry and driving it further underground. Independence presented new opportunities for Ghanaian producers. As the political and economic situation improved, the market for more reliable or sophisticated weapons flourished. Ghanaian gunsmiths have been producing ever more reliable arms in response to market demands. This enhanced technical skill was sought after by Togolese gunsmiths during the political instability of 2005.

Following the death in 2005 of President Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, political instability ensued between Togo's security forces and the opposition, usually taking the form of armed violence. Consequently, the Togolese public's need for arms was more than Ghanaian forgers could meet. They therefore provided technical support

X

2. Florquin, Nicolas and Berman, Eric G.(eds) “Armed and Aimless: ARMED GROUPS, GUNS, AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ECOWAS REGION”Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005

3. Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi in Florquin, Nicolas and Berman, Eric G.(eds) “Armed and Aimless: ARMED GROUPS, GUNS, AND HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ECOWAS REGION”Small Arms Survey, Geneva, 2005, Pg 82

and exchanges to Togolese forgers to enable them to produce enough arms to meet local demand. However, the demand for SALW diminished with the restoration of stability. Togolese forgers then turned their attention to West Africa's largest market, Nigeria.

Prior to the onset of the current series of attacks by Boko Haram, the proliferation of arms in Nigeria was encouraged by the instability on account of social-political divisions, which in turn derived from continued ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflict. Violence also played a part in struggles to gain political power or access to resources. Despite the myriad political factors explaining the proliferation of arms in Nigeria, national legislation regulating arms ownership does not provide for civilians to possess arms under any circumstances. In 2007, the Small Arms Survey estimated that between one and two million small arms where in circulation throughout Nigeria. Due to the national legislation, most of these arms are procured and owned illegally. Regardless of national legal limitations, socio-political tensions throughout the country made ownership of illicit arms justifiable and worth the risk in the eyes of the civilians.

Despite its democratic transition in 1991, Benin is considered a transit country for arms coming from Ghana and Togo to Nigeria. There are concerns that some of these trafficked arms remain in Benin and are implicated in highway robbery, but experts insist that they are not sufficient to warrant serious attention.

This compilation of essays is written by arms control experts from Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. The authors share their insights and personal analysis of the prevailing arms trade situation within the sub- region, including the social factors that contribute to this trafficking. They also describe the public perception of the arms trade.

They give an overview of the physical and technical environment of these four countries. He argues for greater regional integration of legislation with sub-regional and international mechanisms as the best way to counter illicit arms flows and cross border trade.

The in-depth country studies provide insight into the conditions within the countries. Prof. Augustine Ikelegbe details the realities and social factors that make Nigeria the end destination for arms. He maintains that social conflicts, youth marginalization and high youth unemployment contribute to the demand for arms. He further argues

XI

that porous borders, weak law enforcement capacities and the current firearms legislation facilitate the accumulation of SALW, including locally produced weapons by non- State armed groups.

Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Seth Ohene-Asare reviews the production of craft weapons in Ghana with particular focus on the northern regions where inter clan conflict drives the demand for arms. In addition he mentions current trends fostering arms proliferation in Ghana such as the rising demand for self-protection by the citizenry, and the need for arms for traditional or customary use. Lastly he shows how porous borders aid the eastward movement of arms produced in Ghana.

Théonas Moussou, provides insight into the production of craft arms in Benin, which is slightly less than that of Ghana. He explains that even though a transit state, arms coming in from Ghana, Togo and Nigeria meet the national demand, particularly for criminal, hunting and traditional purposes.

Dr. Félix Aklavon comments on local production in Togo and how the secrecy surrounding the profession of gunsmith hampers the efforts of the national authorities to control the production and smuggling of arms eastwards to Benin and on to Nigeria.

The four authors identify the same needs: updating national surveys on arms ownership, instituting a national registration programme and maintaining a database. Lastly they highlight the need to update existing firearms legislation in each country and harmonize them with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms. This collection of opinion pieces should contribute to current and future efforts by all stakeholders to counter illicit arms trade between Benin, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo.

This publication aims to contribute to the on-going debate in West Africa on illicit cross border arms trade and also to alert the UN to the need for continued efforts by all relevant actors to eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects.

XII

Summary of results of the Study and recommendations

The analysis of the field reports from the four countries highlighted eight key elements: the origin of illicit SALW; internal and external illicit SALW trade routes; illicit SALW concealment techniques; status of craft production of SALW; types of SALW most trafficked; correlation between armed violence and illicit trade in SALW; SALW demand factors; and finally the challenges facing the government in the control of illicit trade in SALW. The analysis ends with some recommendations.

SUMMARY

1. The scope of the illicit trade in SALW The survey was not able to provide exact figures on the average number of small arms and light weapons in circulation between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria, but the four contributions are unanimous about the origin of arms found in illicit cross-border trade.

These weapons are either produced by local artisans or smuggled or imported from neighbouring countries. In addition, some tourist activities such as game hunting and movement of businessmen tend to facilitate access to SALW.

It was also observed that arms sold come either from public stocks, or were lost, misappropriated or stolen by defence and security officials. In Ghana and Nigeria, for example, it was found that soldiers returning from international peacekeeping operations sold the weapons given to them for their mission.

2. Internal and external illicit SALW trade routes The routes most used by smugglers of SALW between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria are the major border towns, forests, mountain areas, lakes, rivers, sea (ports), and airports.

3. Illicit SALW concealment tactics In investigating the mode of operation of SALW smugglers, the researchers were particularly interested in the most common concealment techniques. The reports showed that to go unnoticed, traffickers of illegal arms and ammunitions concealed the weapons in jute bags, passenger vehicles, containers and shipments chartered by national and international companies, diplomatic missions, government officials or private individuals.

Summary of Results and Recommendations / 1

For their part, local manufacturers hide their weapons in the ceilings of their houses, inside mattresses on their beds or in caches dug in the ground.

4. Status of craft production of SALW The reports show that small-scale production of arms is officially authorized in the four countries studied in this volume. Thus, several blacksmiths earn a living from their craft and are registered as such. In Benin, for example, they are more than 350 craft manufacturers, and subject to demand, the average production of a blacksmith is two weapons per week. In Ghana, artisan manufacturers are found in all the ten administrative regions; their expertise is sought in neighbouring countries.

The Ghana report reveals that 80% of the small arms used for criminal purposes are manufactured by local craftsmen.

5. Types of most trafficked SALWAccording to the reports, the illicit trade involves both craft and industrially manufactured SALW. While the former are more common in Ghana, Togo and Benin, industrially produced arms are in the majority in Nigeria.

The most trafficked local SALW are: Handcrafted pistols; Handcrafted hunting guns; Handcrafted baikal hunting guns; and Locally produced ammunition (cartridges, gunpowder, etc.).

The modern SALW most frequently seized from smugglers are: Assault rifles AK-47, AKM, AR-70, Mag-4 and G3; SMG rifles; Light machine guns; Shotguns; The double-barrelled shotguns; Revolvers; Automatic pistols; Grenade launchers RPG-7V1 Mukha 'Fly' type; and Explosives such as dynamite, plastic explosives and grenades.

6. Correlation between armed violence and illicit trade in SALW In their contributions, all four experts note that illicit trade in SALW fuels armed violence in the countries studied. With access to illegal guns, crimes such as armed robbery, physical assault and murder, as well as cases of minor delinquency are recorded frequently in both urban and rural areas.

2 / Summary of Results and Recommendations

The general observation is that armed violence is growing exponentially with the illicit trade in SALW.

7. Demand factors for SALW The reports show that in Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria illicit small arms and light weapons are needed mainly for hunting and farming, the need for self-protection given the prevailing insecurity, criminal activities, some cultural and traditional practices, and the activities of private militias and armed non-State groups.

8. The challenges faced by the government in controlling the illicit trade of SALW Having analysed the national responses to the trafficking of illicit SALW, the reports noted the institutional and operational weaknesses that limit the effectiveness of State action. Among these are:

§ the slow pace of legislative reforms and harmonization of national legislation to control SALW;

§ inadequate border controls in terms of appropriate strategy, proper equipment and qualified personnel;

§ poor data systems and inadequate tools for information gathering and sharing, record keeping, identification and tracking of SALW; and

§ lack of operational coordination between key players involved in the fight against the illicit trade.

RECOMMENDATIONSThe authors made recommendations aimed mainly at strengthening legal measures as well as operational and technical capacity for SALW control. They include:

§ Safety and security of State depots and stockpiles of small arms and ammunition by the national police, gendarmerie and defence services. This recommendation is in strict conformity with the provisions of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW (Article 16) and international standards, including the International Small Arms Control Standards ISACS (05.20) on the management of stockpiles;

§ Collection, seizure and destruction of illegal small arms on the initiative of the National Commissions on SALW, in collaboration with relevant national agencies (security and defence forces, judiciary, civil society) and international partners, particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the United Nations Regional

Summary of Results and Recommendations / 3

Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC). This recommendation is based on articles 17 and 23 of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW and international standards, including the International Small Arms Control Standards ISACS (05.50) on destruction of weapons;

§ Management of border security which should be modernized by the Governments of the subregion under the leadership of ECOWAS. This modernization will be based on a regional approach to border security, which will define the thresholds of tolerance as well as adequate functions to achieve set objectives. Several provisions of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW, including those dealing with marking and tracing (articles18 and 19), brokering (article 20), harmonization of legislation (art. 21) and the strengthening of border controls (article 22) provide the legal basis for government action in this direction.

In summary, the illicit trade in SALW as described by the authors is not limited to the four countries of Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria. It goes far beyond. A broader study could help to track illicit trade routes more comprehensively and further elucidate the networks of actors. Moreover, illegal trade continues to fuel the uncontrolled proliferation of illicit SALW, the misuse of which poses a serious threat to security and development in the countries studied and in the entire sub-region. All this underscores the need to eradicate the illicit trade in all its forms. The recommenda-tions proposed to this end emphasize the importance of implementing regional and international instruments and initiatives adopted to curb illegal arms transfers, such as:

§ The Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (2000);

§ Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its

§ Aspects (2001); § UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their

Parts and Components and Ammunition (2005);§ The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition

and Other Related Materials (2006); § African Union Strategy on the Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and

Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (2011); and § Arms Trade Treaty (2013).

4 / Summary of Results and Recommendations

PART TWO

Country studies on routes and illicit arms caches between Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria

ROUTES AND ILLEGAL ARMS CACHES BETWEEN GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA

THE SITUATION IN GHANA

Coordination:Lt. Col (Rtd) Seth Ohene-Asare with the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms, NACSA Team

ABBREVIATIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

2. 1 . Field Visits

2.1.1 Interviews

2.1.2 Focus discussion groups

2.2 The Selection of Sites and Respondents

2.2.1 Selection Criteria for Towns and Communities:

2.2.2 Selection Criteria for Organizations, Institutions, and Individuals:

2.3 Document review and data collection

2.4 Limitations of the study

2.4.1 Research Constraints

2.4.2 Challenges to Information Gathering

3. SOURCES OF SALW IN GHANA

3.1 Illicit SALW in Ghana

3.2 Illicit local manufacture by blacksmiths

3.2.1 The Situation of Illicit Production of Arms in Ghana

3.2.2 Policies to Limit the Number Illicit Local Producers

4. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW FLOWS

4.1 Trafficking Routes of illicit SALW

4.2 Mode of Trafficking

5. GUN CRIMES IN GHANA

5.1 Armed Robbery

5.2 Murder

Table of Content

Table of Content / / THE SITUATION IN GHANA 7

9

10

11

13

13

13

13

14

14

14

15

19

19

21

21

23

26

28

29

2932

35

35

37

20

6. SALW LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

6.1 Background

6.1.1 The Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972, NRCD 9

6.1.2 Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L.I.200

6.2 Enactments citing Arms and Ammunitions in Ghana

6.3 weaknesses in the current Ghanaian legislation

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. General

7.2 Mechanisms for Small Arms Control

7.3 Necessary Laws to address the legislative deficit

8. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

8 / Table of Content

39

39

39

40

41

41

43

4343

44

45

46

Abbreviations / 9

BNI Bureau of National Investigation

CEPS Customs Excise and Preventive Service

CSO Civil Society Organisation

ECOSAP ECOWAS Small arms Control Programme

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

FGD Focus group discussions

GAFS Ghana Armed Forces

GIS Ghana Immigration Service

GNPC Ghana National Petroleum Corporation

GPRTU Ghana Private Road Transport Union

GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda

NADMO National Disaster Management Organization

NASCA National Commission on Small Arms

NPoA National Programme of Action on Small Arms

RCC Regional Co-ordinating Council

SACP Small Arms Control Project

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

UNHCR United Nations High Commission on Refugees

WR Western Region

WRHC Western Regional House of Chiefs

Abbreviations

West Africa has witnessed prolonged armed conflict over the last two decades and as a result, the region has an estimated seven to ten million illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) in circulation in West Africa (Small Arms Survey 2007). SALW circulate within the sub-region through porous international borders and are used to facilitate criminal activi-ties such as robbery, money laundering, drug trafficking, and other violent acts. Even though Ghana is generally peaceful, there remain numerous chieftaincies, land and other resource related disputes across the country, which disturbs the country’s peace and se-curity. These conflicts thrive and are prolonged by the easy availability of illicit SALW.

In view of the above challenges and more, the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms, in collaboration with the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) conducted this research on arms trafficking in Ghana.

The research team conducted numerous field visits to towns and communities selected based on their relevance to illicit SALW issues. The field visits included on-site inspections, interviews, focus groups discussions, data collection, and follow-up surveys. Additionally, the team carried out an extensive desk review to supplement and verify the primary data.

The study reveals that illicit manufacture of artisanal weapons is a major factor that ac-counts for the illicit proliferation of small arms in Ghana in particular, and within the West African Sub-region in general. These weapons move out of Ghana to the neighbouring countries while industrial weapons move from countries in the region into Ghana. Wide and porous borders with numerous unauthorized routes make it extremely difficult for security agencies at border posts to effectively check arms trafficking. Many personnel of the security agencies lack the necessary capacities and equipment to effectively monitor and clamp down on the activities of arms traffickers. Additionally, corruption and bribery amongst security officials facilitates illicit SALW flows. This reason, coupled with inefficient legislation has led to many legal arms being diverted to illicit circulation.

Without effective legislation and security mechanisms the trafficking and production of illicit arms will continue unabated in Ghana further destabilizing conflicts within the coun-try and in the West African sub-region.

Executive Summary

10 / Executive Summary

Ghana is often described as a relatively peaceful country, though it is arguably bedevilled with pockets of conflicts, armed violence, and other social problems that give rise to the high demand for small arms. Similarly, the proliferation and easy availability of small arms in Ghana has facilitated armed violence and other forms of criminal activity. These developments coupled with the instability in the sub-region and the potential of resource conflicts with oil recently discovered in the Western Region are issues of concern because of their ultimate impact on peace, security, and development.

Many people in Ghana often acquire arms illegally for several reasons. In conflict prone areas, especially in the Northern and North-eastern parts of Ghana, some people acquire arms as a means to protect themselves in the event of attack. Others use arms to commit crimes such as robbery. Guns also feature prominently in the socio-cultural rights of Ghanaians. Arms are used to mark special occasions such as festivals, funerals of eminent personalities, and rituals such as the installation of a new chief.

Among some cultures like the Akan, Gonja, and Dagombas ethnic groups, owning a gun is a sign of attainment to manhood. Among the Gonja of Northern Ghana, a gun is fired when a male child is born. In almost all of the Ghanaian festive occasions guns are fired as part of the celebration. The death of prominent persons like chiefs is announced with the firing of guns. In some parts of the Northern and the Upper East and West Regions, guns are fired to announce the marking of long-standing funerals.

The true magnitude of small arms availability and the main sources of these weapons in Ghana are not accurately quantified and thus, many of the effects are difficult to measure. There is no dispute, however, that small arms have had a devastating effect on the development, governance, and the everyday lives of Ghanaians. In the absence of any empirical data on the actual flow of arms and the analysis on the conditions that facilitate this phenomenon, no concrete or decisive legislative action can be enacted to fight effectively against this scourge.

The porous nature of the country's international borders presents a significant challenge in the fight against the proliferation of small arms. Frontline security personnel such as personnel of the Ghana Immigration Service who man the

Introduction

Introduction / 11

country's borders are ill-resourced and have limited capacity to effectively check illicit trafficking of arms across borders in an era where illicit arms traffickers have become more sophisticated. Ghana is surrounded by countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, and Burkina Faso, which have in one way or the other experienced armed conflict or mutiny. Since people of the various countries are interrelated especially along border communities and are only separated by imaginary artificial borders, the spill over of arms into Ghana remains a difficult challenge.

The study, therefore, investigates the phenomenon of illicit arms proliferation in Ghana, with particular emphasis on the local craft production of arms and use of illicit SALW. The report begins with the main objectives of the study followed by the methodology section, which outlines the different means by which the research team obtained their data as well as challenges and constraints they were faced with. Thereafter, the report goes into depth on the observations and findings of the research team beginning with the sources of illicit SALW in Ghana and with a major focus on local weapon production and alternative livelihood schemes for current blacksmiths. The report also examines the routes and modes of SALW trafficking as well as the role of illicit SALW in armed violence in the country. The report discusses current legislation and mechanisms for SALW control as well as their weaknesses. Finally the report identifies factors in which the Government of Ghana could put in place to improve upon for prevention and the fight against the illegal trafficking of SALW in Ghana.

2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH

2.1 Field Visits During field visits the team conducted personal interviews with security personnel, heads of relevant institutions, chiefs, blacksmiths, arms dealers, convicts, opinion leaders, frontline agents, and civil society organizations (CSOs) at the Eastern Frontier border towns namely: Aflao, Akanu, Nyive, Leklebi, Nkwanta, Alavanyo, Nkonya, Ho, Kpando, Hohoe, Tamale, Bolgatanga, Yendi , Bawku, and Zabzugu-Tatale. The team also conducted personal interviews in the Greater Accra Region, Tema Harbour, and the Kotoka International Airport. In each town focus group discussions or interviews were conducted with selected groups of people and blacksmiths.

The team carried out on-site inspections and photo documentation of certain locations in the communities, including the areas of alleged active illegal manufacture of arms such as the Alavanyo and Nkonya area.

12 / Introduction

After gathering data the research team visited the agencies again to verify the information obtained or observed by the team. This was done to ensure that the data collected was of utmost integrity.

The team also gathered and consulted available statistics from relevant government agencies such as arms related crime and weapon seizure data from the Ghana Police Service, Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), Ghana Immigration Service, and the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms.

2.1.1 Interviews Interviews were conducted during field visits to organizations, institutions, towns, and communities as well as desk-based (telephone) interviews. The team consulted over 100 individuals, organizations, and institutions selected on the basis of their knowledge, participation, and experience in SALW issues, political and chieftaincy roles, and the general residents of the study area (See Table 1). The study focused on people's awareness and knowledge of the incidence of the use and trafficking of SALW.

2.1.2 Focus Group Discussions (FGD)The FGD method proved especially useful with local blacksmiths in the communities where they were willing to share their experiences and knowledge of SALW and the general socio-economic activities in the study area. The focus group sessions were facilitated by the study team with a set of key discussion points.

FGD with security personnel, heads of relevant Institutions, chiefs, blacksmiths, arms dealers, convicts, opinion leaders, frontline agents, CSOs, youth groups, farmers, community leaders, informants, and inhabitants in the towns along the Eastern and North Eastern border frontiers allowed the research team to delve into the relevant issues in considerable depth.

The FDGs, just like the individual interviews, allowed for issues to be explored in considerable depth from first-hand knowledge. In all, the team conducted 10 FGDs with 20 institutions and organizations including CSOs in particular.

Research Methodology and Approach / 13

[Figure 1: Focus group discussion with Officials at the Border]

To gather further information from those not interviewed by the team, a semi-structured questionnaire was distributed from the research consultants.

2.2 The Selection of Sites and RespondentsThe selection of towns, communities, organizations, and institutions in the study area was a critical step in the study; thus, a purposive sampling method was used to select the communities and organizations from which information was gathered. The criteria below were used for the purposive sampling:

2.2.1 Selection Criteria for Towns and Communities:• Presence of corporate and institutional offices• Border towns• Presence of arms dealers• Presence of Ghana Police Service Arms Clerks• Known activities of illegal arms manufacturing• Reported cases of SALW related incidences• Known cases of armed conflicts• Location of blacksmith

2.2.2 Selection Criteria for Organizations, Institutions, and Individuals:• Role of institution in relation to SALW• Chieftaincy institution• Political role or administration in the study area• Civil society organizations• Past and present dealings with the National Commission on Small Arms

14 / Research Methodology and Approach

2.3 Document Review and Data CollectionThe study team reviewed documentation received from the project consultants, experts on SALW in Ghana and the ECOWAS sub-region, as well as reports and articles obtained from newspapers and internet searches. The primary materials gathered during field visits were used to supplement this documentation. The research also utilized a large number of secondary sources including past documentation on SALW and mission reports and reviews from different organisations. In addition to the general document review, the study team undertook a separate desk review focused on the experience of borders areas in the east in terms of reported and documented incidences of violent crime involving SALW.

Table 1: Individuals, Places and Institutions Visited

Cities/Towns/Communities Institution/Organization/Individuals Contacted

Aflao

Arms Dealers Ghana Police ServiceAssembly Members for the areaBlacksmithsBureau of National InvestigationsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Armed Forces (Military Intelligence)Ghana Immigration ServiceInformantsInhabitants at the Border TownsLocal transport Services Operators National Security CouncilPolice Arms ClerksSuspects involved in arms related crimes

Nkwanta

Bureau of National Investigation, BNICustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration Service, GISGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at the Border Towns



Nyive

Blacksmiths Bureau of National Investigation, BNICustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration Service, GISGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at the Border TownsOpinion Leaders

Ho

Bureau of National Investigation, BNICustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration Service, GISGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at the Border Towns

Akanu

Arms DealersAssembly Members for the areaBlacksmithsBureau of National InvestigationsChiefs and Opinion Leaders Civil Society OrganizationsConvictsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Armed Forces (Military Intelligence)Ghana Immigration ServiceGhana Police ServiceInformantsInhabitants Local transport Services National Security CouncilOperators Police Arms ClerksSuspects involved in arms related crimesYouth groups


Shia

Lekelebi Dafour

BlacksmithsBureau of National InvestigationsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration ServiceGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at border towns Opinion Leaders

Honuta

BlacksmithsBureau of National InvestigationsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration ServiceGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at border towns Opinion Leaders

BlacksmithsBureau of National InvestigationsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Immigration ServiceGhana Police ServiceInhabitants at border townsOpinion Leaders

Blacksmiths Chief and EldersGhana Police Service Women assembly

Alavanyo

Arms ClerksArms DealersBlacksmiths FarmersGhana Police ServiceInformantsOpinion Leaders

Hohoe


Nkonya

Arms Dealers Bureau of National Investigations HeadquartersCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, CEPS ConvictsGhana Armed Forces HeadquartersGhana Immigration Service HeadquartersGhana National Commission on Small ArmsGhana Police Service HeadquartersGhana Police Service Regional HeadquartersHeadquartersInformantsMinistry of the Interior Arms and Ammunitions DeskNational Security Council SecretariatPolice Arms ClerksSuspects involved in arms related crimes

Accra

Blacksmiths FarmersGhana Police ServiceInformantsOpinion Leaders

Aviation SecurityBureau of National Investigations CEPS Clearing agentsCustoms Excise and Preventive Service, Ghana Armed Forces Ghana Immigration Service Ghana Police Service National Security Council

Kotoka International Airport

Bureau of National Investigations Clearing agents Customs Excise and Preventive Service, CEPSGhana Police Service Tema Regional HeadquartersGhana Armed Forces Ghana Immigration Service Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority SecurityInformantsNational Security Council

Tema Harbour


Tamale

Ghana Police ServiceInformantsYendi

Ghana Police Service Tamale Regional HeadquartersInformants

BawkuGhana Police Service, Bawku Divisional Command

Customs Excise and Preventive Service Ghana Immigration Service

Zabzugu-Tatale

Ghana Police Service, Regional HeadquartersBolga

Customs Excise and Preventive ServiceGhana Immigration ServiceInformants

Cenkasse (Polimakom Border Post)

2.4 Limitations of the Study

2.4.1 Research ConstraintsMost respondents required notification in advance prior to their scheduled interviews to enable them to prepare adequately. The semi-structured questionnaires were developed and sent ahead by the projects operational team to community focal points, however, in some towns they were not widely circulated and thus were not completed by all the relevant individuals. The translation of the questionnaire from English to local languages also proved problematic as some of the statements were difficult to understand and required further explanation to be completed effectively.

In some of the towns visited the availability of key personnel was a challenge and in others time constraints prevented visits; however, the number of communities visited and the individual institutions and organizations interviewed formed a representative sample for a meaningful conclusion to be drawn. Most people, especially authority figures, were reluctant to speak openly once we introduced the research team and the topic of research. This challenge was mitigated through assurances that the information was for research purposes only and would not be divulged without consent. Still most of the identified blacksmiths and arms dealers


were not willing to disclose critical information for fear of being identified. Consequently, it took the team a great deal of time to assure the respondents and get them to divulge the information required.

2.4.2 Challenges to Information Gathering It seems common knowledge that blacksmiths and metal fabricators are abundant in Alavanyo in the Volta Region and, as conversations with people in the community revealed, they are very skilful and experienced. As a community they were aware that it is known all over Ghana that there are skilful men in Alavanyo who can manufacture weapons, however, only a few individuals publicly admitted to being blacksmiths.

It was, therefore, extremely difficult to identify the blacksmiths and where they operated. Based on the team's research and observations this difficulty stems from the following:

• First, most of the workshops in which they operated were destroyed as a result of their role in a local conflict (the Alavanyo-Nkonya conflict). The security situation drove them underground making it difficult to trace any workshop in any part of the community.

• Second, due to the regular swoops by the military, blacksmiths have become very vigilant because they are often time arrested. The community members, therefore, regard anyone inquiring on the operations of blacksmiths as a spy or national security agent. As a result, they are not willing to implicate any of their relatives involved in the manufacture of SALW.

• Third, there is some level of political undercurrent as the Alavanyo people perceive the attempt to clamp down on illegal small arms a ploy to weaken them in favour of their the Nkonyas. This is based on allegations that some prominent Nkonya people are in the current government, which the Alavanyo people suspect were influencing their opponents against them. The Alavanyo have, thus, become very sceptical of anyone coming into the community.

Sources of SALW in Ghana / 21

3. SOURCES OF SALW IN GHANA The Ghana Baseline Assessment report on SALW points to the following as the main sources of small arms proliferation: local blacksmiths engaged in the illegal manufacture of small arms; gun trafficking and gun running which flourishes by means of Ghana's porous borders; and leakages of legal arms from the armouries of security agencies as a result of poor stockpile management and control.

The assessment also provides insight into the extent of Ghana's small arms problem. The evidence shows that there are at least 220,000 small arms in civilian hands in Ghana. Of these, at least 125,000 are illicit weapons, and 95,000 are currently registered (Ghana SALW Baseline Survey 2004).

This baseline assessment of illicit small arms in Ghana conducted in 2004 by the United Nations Development Programme and the Government of Ghana indicated that about 34% of the illicit guns in circulation as of 2004 were illegally manufactured locally. More recent statistics by the Ghana Police Service state that local blacksmiths produce nearly 80% of the illicit guns in circulation .4

3.1 Illicit SALW in GhanaThe research team's assessment of illicit small arms in Ghana provided alarming evidence regarding the leakages of arms into illegal hands. Many illegal weapons were originally legal in Ghana but have crossed over into illicit circulation for a number of reasons. Many civilians fail to reregister their weapons every year, contributing to thousands of guns moving from the legal sphere into the illicit market . Oftentimes those with registered guns do not feel compelled to apply for 5

prompt renewal upon the expiry of their license. However, the intent is not always malicious: some are not aware that a gun license must be renewed annually or that a change of ownership requires new registration in the new owner's name.

There is also the issue of weapons being legally imported into Ghana and their eventual end point. Legal annual shotgun imports in Ghana averages 20,000 units and are dominated by seven major arms importers; however, there is a shortfall between guns imported and those registered . With weapons being imported but 6

4. Ghana Police Service5. Ghana Police Service Firearms Bureau6. Interview with an Informant at The Ministry of the Interior

22 / Sources of SALW in Ghana

never registered, the question regarding the final destination of these weapons arises. Some licensed arms dealers often under-report stocks with impunity as a result of weak control by the government. For example, the police are supposed to observe the receipt of arms imports and accompany the arms; however, the performance of the critical oversight functions has become increasingly lax over the years. As a result, undetermined quantities of recorded stock sometimes disappear without a trace, indicating that undetermined quantities of arms are either smuggled out of Ghana or sold without police involvement as required by law .7

Another source of illicit weapons is leakages from state-owned stockpiles through theft and corruption. Corrupt members of the security forces illegally lease or sell their weapons and ammunition . Others conspire with licensed arms dealers to 8

under-report weapons stocks in return for various favours; this makes it difficult to trace arms that are sold illegally by arms dealers. Additionally, police arms clerks are susceptible to error and human failings due to an over reliance on manual intermediation in the process of registration and licensing transactions .9

Past military upheavals have also contributed to the leakage of large numbers of arms in the country. In the 1980s, after leading his second successful coup d'état, Jerry Rawlings' regime established and armed militias that were largely drawn from his grass-roots support base: the People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers Defence Committees (WDCs), later renamed Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. Allegedly equipment made available to these groups included hundreds of AK-47 assault rifles, the whereabouts of which are still unknown – although some speculate that many could still be stored in caches .10

There is growing evidence supporting allegations that many of the Ghanaian soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions buy guns, which they smuggle into the country by dismantling them. Having dismantled them, they keep the parts in separate locations. These guns are later reassembled when they arrive in Ghana and subsequently sold to citizens .11

7. Interview with an Informant at the Ghana Police Service Firearms Bureau 8. Interview with the Ghana Police Service Anti Armed Robbery Division. 9. Interview with a Senior Officers at the BNI10. Interview with a Senior Officer with the Ghana Police Service11. Interview with a Senior Military Officer


Another source of illicit weapons, are from Ghanaians living abroad smuggling weapons into the country by dismantling them and shipping them alongside other goods. The dismantled weapons are often hidden in different consignment of goods, and reassembled when the various consignments of goods arrive in the country.

3.2 Illicit local manufacture by blacksmithsIndigenous craft production is an age-old process in Ghana, dating back to the 15th century when the Europeans first arrived to the Gold Coast, as Ghana was known then. Still today, in some cultures such as the Alavanyo and Dagbon, gunsmiths are integral members of society. These local artisans or blacksmiths were engaged in iron-smithing and the production of a wide variety of tools for mining, farming, weaving, pottery, etc. These blacksmiths were also specialists in making weapons, arrowheads, guns, and bullets. These were produced mainly for the chiefs; however, blacksmiths also shared the art of making these guns and knives with professional hunters. Thus, over time, there was widespread growth of artisans in weapon manufacturing. It has also been reported that during the Biafran war, a group of Ghanaian blacksmiths went to train their counterparts in Nigeria (Small Arms Survey 2007).

The local production of guns was first banned in the colonial era for two main reasons: first, the colonialists' wanted to avoid the spread of guns; and second, the colonists felt that a gun in the hands of natives was a threat to their rule. Even after the end of colonialism, however, the use of illicit guns and gunsmiths remains widespread.

The manufacture and assembly of firearms is prohibited by the Arms and Ammunition Act of 1962 (Act 118) as amended by the Arms and Ammunition Decree 1972 (NRCD9) and the Arms and Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996. This law, however, legalized the repair of guns upon acquiring a license to do so. As a result this legislation has created more gunsmiths because over time the repairers acquired and perfected additional skills in manufacturing guns. These gunsmiths have then gone further to train others to manufacture guns. Today, blacksmiths in all of Ghana's ten regions possess the skills to produce small arms, although the cost and prices vary across the regions.


Hunting is an integral part of the rural economy of Ghana particularly in the three Savanna Northern Regions, which experience a dry season for most of the year. During the dry season in these regions farming activities are brought to a halt and hunting becomes the main economic activity. The demand for guns by hunters is high in this part of the country. Additionally, a large percentage of peasant farmers use guns to protect their farms from animals, which usually destroy their crops. These farmers purchase the locally manufactured guns from gunsmiths who are familiar with them and live in the same communities.

Craft weapons from Ghana serve customers from all over West Africa, especially Nigeria. The high demand within the sub-region by criminal networks for guns made in Ghana encourages the local artisans to carry on with their trade and adds to the illicit arms trade problem. These gun makers are located in places such as Lamashegu and Subaunjida-Machelene in Tamale in the Northern Region, Alavanyo in the Volta Region, Suame – Magazine (known as the technical hub of gun manufacturing) in Kumasi in the Ashanti Region, and Techiman in the Brong Ahafo Region (known as the regional trade center).

The study revealed that blacksmiths produce guns upon demand from a potential buyer. The purchase of such weapons is facilitated by “middlemen” who actually approach blacksmiths to produce the weapons for their clients. It was also revealed to the study team that large quantities of weapons, normally wrapped in sacks together with other goods, especially food stuffs, are transported at night to neighbouring countries through unapproved routes along the borders. In some cases these weapons together with other goods are left at locations along the border at night for agents waiting on the other side of the border to come and pick up at a later time.


[Figure 2: Map of Ghana showing major production areas of illicit weapons by Blacksmiths/ Source: Field Survey]


3.2.1 The Situation of Illicit Production of Arms in Ghana (Volta Region – Alavanyo and Nkonya)The Nkonya – Alavanyo land dispute and the resultant clashes started in 1923 and the two communities have seen renewed clashes over the years with the most heightened ones occurring in 1983, 1990, 2003 and 2004 resulting in loss of human lives and property.

The blacksmith and metal work trade is predominantly practiced in Alavanyo with a few located around Nkonya, Kpando, and other neighbouring villages. As previously mentioned, the industry dates over 150 years and has been in existence long before the emergence of the Nkonya – Alavanyo land dispute and the consequent wars.

The recurring clashes of the two communities over the past two and half decades have necessitated the tightening of security as well as regular swoops in the area in order to do away with small arms and other sophisticated weapons. These measures have led to the migration of the artisans out of the community while the remaining ones have resorted to covert manufacturing of illicit arms in fear of being arrested. Prior to these disturbances, there were over two hundred (200) blacksmiths operating in Alavanyo, as indicated by opinion leaders of the community.

In 2003 a major swoop by the security agencies destroyed the shops of the blacksmiths and their tools and equipment were seized in the process. As a result, many of these artisans have moved to other parts of the country such as Ashanti, Brong Ahafo and the three Northern Regions of Ghana to practice their trade. Others have resorted to farming and a few remain operating in hideouts around Alavanyo and Nkonya.

It was observed that generally blacksmiths obtained their skills in craft gun making from their fore bearers with an average working experience of about 30 years. These skills are not formally acquired and much of the craft is learned through apprenticeship. Of the participants interviewed, about 60% had basic education (that is, at the primary level), 20% had Middle School Living Certificates (MSLC) and 20% had Junior High School Certificates. Based on the sample interviewed, 15% were self-acquired and 45% acquired the skills through parent or family training. Almost all the participants were motivated to become blacksmiths as a relatively good source of income and a means of livelihood. About 50% of the participants


and blacksmiths interviewed owned blacksmith shops, 5% were apprentices and about 25% other family members.

The blacksmith workshops in Alavanyo and Nkonya are mostly located underneath buildings and caves of mountains. Currently, an average of four (4) employees can be found in the underground workshops and about eight (8) found in each cave. The products manufactured by these local artisans in various quantities are shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Types, quality and quantities of selected items produced by blacksmiths / Source: Field Study

Type of Item Quantities / Month/ Workshop

Perceived Quality

1. Hoes

2. Go to hell

3. Hand cuffs

4. Mattock/Pick Axe

5. Hand Bells

6. Riffles (including repairs)

7. Single Short Pistols

8. Revolver Pistols

9. Bullets and Cartridges

10. Incubators

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Very Good

Excellent

Very Good

Very Good

Very Good

Very Good

Very Good

20

10

5

18

5

3

2 - 3

2

-

6

3.2.2. Policies to Limit the Number Illicit Local ProducersA potential solution to the number of illicit local products is to redirect the efforts and skills of the blacksmiths and subsequently strengthen the relationship among the communities in which they live. Most of the participants indicated that farming and meal fabrication in industries are alternative skills they could resort to if the opportunity avails.

The identification of Alternative Livelihood Schemes (ALS) and related economic opportunities is a principal mechanism for redirecting artisanal weapon production skills. It was evident from the research that the blacksmiths are highly skilled and competent in the fabrication of tools and equipment such as keys, pruners, maize shredders, equipment for breaking firewood into pieces, handcuffs, corn mills, welding machines, car door locks, vises, carbide pot nozzles, motor crutch levers, spark sprockets and press button machines. A strong relationship with ALS and the broad acknowledgement of the economic benefits that may be derived is the best incentive for local artisans including blacksmiths.

Specific alternative livelihood schemes that were identified by the blacksmiths include: production of tools and equipment other than arms through revolving fund mechanisms; undertaking farming activities; sustainable income generation to enhance biodiversity conservation – plantation development programmes; and direct employment by Ghanaian security agencies.

However, the lack of a readily available market for the production tools and equipment, as well inadequate financial support makes harnessing their skills ineffective; conditions without which any attempt at providing alternative livelihood will be unsustainable.


Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows / 29

4. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW FLOWS

4.1 Trafficking Routes of illicit SALWThrough field research and interviews the research team identified various routes of trafficking in Ghana and the West African region. Table 3 shows some selected information of weapons seized by various security agencies in Ghana form 2001 till date.

From Table 3 it can be inferred that Ghana serves as a centre for production, a transit point, and a consumer for smuggled arms to and from the West African region. In one instance from February 2012, a large cache of arms and huge quantities of ammunition concealed in cola (soft drinks) Nigerian truck was seized in Ghana by the Ghana Police, which the suspect said was bound for Nigeria. The source of these weapons is still not known, however, it is clear that the weapons and ammunition were not made in Ghana but were imported from an unknown source .12

In May 2012, another quantity of AK-47 assault rifles with yet another unspecified quantity of ammunitions concealed in an articulated truck loaded with cola-nuts from Cote d'Ivoire was intercepted by the Ghanaian Security Agencies in Kumasi, the second largest city in Ghana . 13

This gives an indication that artisanal locally manufactured weapons move illicitly from Ghana into neighbouring countries and industrial manufactured weapons move into Ghana, especially in the conflict prone northern parts of Ghana.

Weapons are easily smuggled across Ghana's porous and poorly demarcated borders. Some parts of Ghana's border run through communities, households, and farms, creating artificial divisions of families and ethnic groups. Inhabitants from Togo cross the borders at various points to attend school, funerals, and other social gatherings and vice versa. To make SALW smuggling detection even more difficult the areas surrounding the borders usually consist of untamed bush, which is a haven for smugglers.

12. IGhana Police Service SITREP Ghana Police Service SITREP13.

30 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW flows

Table 3: Selected Weapons Seized by the Security Agencies Since 2001 till 2012 / Source: Ghanaian Security Agencies

Date Seized

weapons

Likely itinerary Origin of

traf�ickers

Transport

27/08/

2001

1 Artisanal

pistol

Kumasi-Techiman-

Tamale

Ghanaian SUV

30/01/

2002

4 hunting

ri�les

Mossberg

and 19,000

rounds of

ammunition

Accra-Ho-Lagos Ghanaian Bus

25/09/

2002

3 packs of

ammunition

N/A -Tema Port-

N/A

N/A Vessel

05/10/

2002

7 one shot

hunting ri�les

and some

ammunition

Kantamanto-Accra-

A�lao-Lome-

Cotonou

Nigerian Truck

04/04/

2003

6,000 rounds

of

ammunition

for hunting

ri�les

Accra-Nyive-Lome Ghanaian Truck

07/11/

2003

300

rounds

of

ammunition

Red

Star

for

hunting

ri�les

Accra-Menuso-

Tamale

Ghanaian Truck

13/01

2004

2,260

rounds

of

ammunition

Red

Star

for

hunting

ri�les

Accra-Ho-Lome N/A Truck


20/02

2004

2,000 rounds

of

ammunition

Red Star for

hunting ri�les

Accra-Nyive-Lome N/A Truck

18/04

2004

1 one-shot

artisanal

pistol

Accra-Menuso-

Tamale

N/A Truck

15/08

2004

1,584

explosif

pieces Goma

et Eco / 2

ignition

mechanisms

Control post

Kumasi-

Tamale/Yape -

Bolgatanga

Ghanaian Truck

13/04

2005

1 charger

with 15

rounds of

munitions of

7,62mm

Oseikojokrom-

Essem-Kumasi

Ghanaian Truck

13/05

2005

1 artisanal

pistol

N/A-Tamale-N/A Ghanaian Carried by a

person

20/05

2005

1 artisanal

pistol

Control post

Asawubsi-

Dadieso/Antokrom

-Cote d’Ivoire

Ghanaian Truck

10/01

2012

Considerable

(unspeci�ied)

caches of

weapons and

ammunition

Accra-Nigeria Ghanaian/Nigerian Truck

07/05

2012

18 artisanal

pistols

Bogoso-Sakondi Ghanaian N/A

06/06

2012

9 AK47 ri�les,

1 pistol and

its

ammunition

Cote D ‘Ivoire -

Kumasi

Ghanaian/Ivorian Truck


[Figure 3: Major Routes of Weapon Trafficking in Ghana/ Source: Field Survey]

4.2. Mode of TraffickingAs mentioned earlier, there seems to be growing evidence that supports the allegations that many of the Ghanaian soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions buy guns, smuggle them into the country by dismantling them, keeping the parts in separate locations and then later reassembling them for sale when they arrive in Ghana.

It was observed through focus group discussions with the security agencies that due to the volatility of areas in the Northern region, where much conflict has occurred, there is a general ban on the civilian ownership of guns. This notwithstanding, there have been incidents of sporadic shooting in some of the communities that result in


the temporal displacement of people. According to police officers, people often arm themselves for personal protection, especially against reprisal attacks.

An informant in Tamale hinted to the research team that arms are concealed in trucks used to transport goods from Burkina Faso and other neighbouring countries into Ghana. Some of these weapons are also transferred from the southern part of the country to the north, most of which are imported industrial guns and not the ones manufactured by local artisans in Ghana.

At the Zabzugu-Tatale border post, officials of Ghana Immigration acknowledged that because of the numerous unapproved routes that people use to and from the Republic of Togo the borders were very difficult to patrol. In fact, they informed the team that there is no record of arrest of people smuggling arms. In response to the patrol challenges a Close Circuit Television (CCTV) camera was being mounted to help monitor the movement of persons across the borders. According to the officials, the Zabzugu-Tatale area is not a conflict zone hence the rate of civilian ownership of weapons is on the low side.

An informant from the same area also shared information that a few people, including him, possessed arms purposely for hunting game and performing traditional ceremonies. According to him, they acquired the arms with the assistance of friends and relations from Accra or Kumasi. The informant also told the research team that there were no blacksmiths in the community.

The Ghana Immigration Officer at the same border post, however, informed the team that an arrest was made some 5 years ago involving the illicit trafficking of a pump-action gun from the Republic of Togo into Ghana.

The Bawku Divisional Command of the Ghana Police service also informed the team that illicit proliferation of arms in the area was primarily the result of conflict in the area. According to the officers, citizens feel insecure; hence, they acquire arms for self-protection. Some of the guns that are seized from residents include AK-47 assault rifles and pump-action guns. Asked whether such weapons are trafficked from Togo, the officers were sceptical as they were under the impression that the Togolese did not use such guns. Rather they suspected that the guns were acquired from Nigeria. According to police, there were no blacksmiths in the area that engage


in the manufacture of local artisanal guns, however, many people are skilled in customizing AK-47s into a portable weapon that can be hidden under clothes just like the pistol.

At the Pulimakom border post (Ghana-Togo border) around Cenkasse, Officers of the Ghana Immigration Service indicated that even though there were no arrests for illicit trafficking of weapons, they could not rule it out completely. According to the officers, it was difficult to identify small arms in concealed goods since they do not have scanners or metal detectors. The officers also point to the numerous unapproved routes littered in the vast savannah stretch of land between Ghana and Togo that make it difficult to monitor all border activity.

According to officers from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service, smuggling goods was very common, but there had been no arrests made involving arms trafficking in recent years. They informed the research team that a suspect was arrested in 2008 but freed due to lack of evidence.

Gun crimes in Ghana / 35

Although crime statistics are available to some extent, current methods of classification do not make it easy to determine what proportions of reported crimes were committed with firearms. This section, however, uses armed robbery and murder as representative indicators of the frequency of armed violence incidences in Ghana.

5.1 Armed RobberyAccording to the Ghana Police Service, the number of reported armed robbery cases has decreased from a high of about 1,949 in 2006 to a low of about 1,235 in 2011 (Figure 7). This implies that a total of about 7,444 and an average of about 1,489 armed robbery cases per year were reported nationwide between 2006 and 2011, which is nearly four armed robbery cases reported daily nationwide between 2006 and 2011.

5. GUN CRIMES IN GHANAGhana's experience in armed violence has been relatively mild. Information available from the Criminal Investigations Department Statistics and Information Technology Unit of the Ghana Police Service points to the fact that the number of reported armed violence cases have generally been decreasing since 2004. However, recent developments in some parts of the country point to the fact that there is the need to intensify the fight against the proliferation of small arms and armed violence.

[Figure 4: Types of weapons used in committing crimes in Ghana between 2005 and 2011 / Source: Ghana National Commission on Small Arms Media Incident Report Database]

The types of weapons most commonly used in armed violence, in non-conflict situations to commit crimes, are locally made guns. These are the most common in cases of armed robbery and murder.

[Figure 5: Total armed robbery cases reported nationwide between 2006 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]

36 / Gun crimes in Ghana

[Figure 6: Total Regional Distribution of Armed Robbery Cases between 2006 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]

Gun crimes in Ghana / 37

5.2 MurderThe research also revealed that armed related murder increases during election years. Below is a chart to illustrate the correlation.

[Figure 7: Total Number of arms related murder cases reported nationwide between 2004 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]

The above data indicates a significant increase in reported murder cases during election years as manifested in the period between 2004 and 2008. Even though post 2008 murder cases were equally high, they were still lower than 2004.

It is a widely held notion that guns are used to intimidate political opponents during election campaigns and on the election itself, which may account for the high number of murder cases during election years. The very high figure in 2004 is confirmed in a reported statement made by a former Member of Parliament for Bawku Central, the late Hawa Yakubu, that guns were used to intimidate a lot of voters during the 2004 elections.

In 2008, as evidenced by the chart above, there were several reported cases of armed violence, especially in the northern part of Ghana where houses were burnt and lives were lost. These incidents had a rippling effect in similar clashes in Accra between members of the two main political parties in the country, the New Patriotic

Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), which resulted in several injuries and the murder of about four people.

[Figure 8: Regional distribution of Arms related murder cases in Ghana between 2004 and 2011/ Source: Ghana Police Service]

38 / Gun crimes in Ghana

SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks / 39

6. SALW LEGISLATION AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

6.1 BackgroundThe main legislations on the subject are the Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972, NRCD 9 as amended by Act 519 of 1996 and Act 604 of 2001, and the Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L. I. 200 as amended by LI 277 and LI 315 of 1963.

The 1972 Arms and Ammunitions Legislation provides civilians with the possibility of acquiring single and double-barrelled shot guns, single and double-barrelled garden guns, pump-action shotguns, pistols, rifles, air pistols, and revolvers upon application to the Minister of the Interior, subject to certain qualifications. The Arms and Ammunitions Decree of 1972 was an expansion of the Arms and Ammunitions Act 1962. It elaborates further on the processes involved in the registration of firearms, including renewal methods and periods. It also prohibits the production of arms but makes provision for persons interested in the production of arms to apply to the government for a license to do so; however, no such license has ever been granted.

In spite of the above legal and regulatory regime, Ghana's gun-related laws are blatantly flouted due to ineffective monitoring mechanisms. The National Commission on Small Arms (NACSA) in collaboration with other agencies and its partners has undertaken several activities including the development of a national plan of action on small arms control. The plan has five key strategic thrusts namely: Public Education and Sensitization, Stockpile and Inventory Management, Border Control Management, Small Arms Control (policy, legislation, infrastructure and capacity) and Alternative Livelihoods.

On a more sub-regional level, article 17 (3) of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW calls on Member States to promote and/or carry out programmes for the voluntary handing in of weapons. In line with this, the Ghana Police Service embarked on a weapons amnesty programme between March and October 2005. The Weapons Amnesty Programme enabled the Police to regularize a total of 1,129 civil categorized weapons. 51 of these weapons were seized and are currently kept in the police exhibit store. Some of the seized weapons were surrendered voluntarily but did not fall within the category of civil weapons.

6.1.1 The Arms and Ammunition Decree, 1972, NRCD 9 The Arms and Ammunition Decree, NRCD 9, by its legislative scheme, seeks to monitor and control the possession and use of arms and ammunition through a

40 / SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks

registration process, and to further regulate their export/import, manufacture and ownership. The Decree therefore focuses on the following areas:

i. Mode of registration ii. Condition of change of ownershipiii. Expiry of permitiv. Manufacture of arms and ammunitionv. Control of public display of arms or ammunitionvi. Seizure and forfeiture vii. Control of export and importviii. Database through control Register ix. Offences and Regulations

Additionally, NRCD 9 repealed some enactments including:i. Explosives Ordinance (Cap. 254)ii. Explosives (Amendment) Ordinance, 1956 (No. 9)iii. Sections 1 to 5, 15 and 22 (2) of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1962 (Act

118)

Also, the Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Law, 1993, PNDCL 71 was repealed by section 4 of the Arms and Ammunition (Amendment) Act, 1996, Act 519. Further, section 12 of NRCD 9 saved the Explosives Regulations, 1970 (LI 666) as subsequently amended notwithstanding the repeal of the Explosives Ordinance (Cap. 254).

6.1.2 Arms and Ammunition Regulations, 1962, L.I.200 The Arms and Ammunition Regulations, L.I.200, on the other hand, contains details on the mode of implementation NRCD 9 and addresses the following:i. Ports of Entry and authorized personnelii. Modes of Export and Import and licensingiii. Public warehouses, landing, conveyance, packing and storageiv. Safety, Store ledger, confiscation of firearms, etc., not withdrawnv. Delivery and Withdrawal process from Public warehousesvi. Examination of Stock books and certificationvii. Private warehouses, classes, licensing, Stock and Sales Booksviii. Permits to purchase ammunition or gunpowder, or use ammunition ix. Inspection and Penaltyx. Licences to bear arms of precision, flint-lock or cap gun

xi. Qualification for issue of licences and, possessionxii. Surrender, transfer of licence and prohibitionxiii. Disposal upon forfeiture

6.2 Enactments citing Arms and Ammunitions in Ghana The following primary and secondary legislations contain provisions that cite arms and ammunitions (see details in Appendix).i. Africa Defence (Ghana) Act, 1965, Act 313 in Section 3(2)ii. Armed Forces Act, 1962, Act 105 in Section 98iii. Public Order Act, 1994, Act 491 in Section 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10iv. State Secrets Act, 1962, Act 101 in Section 15v. Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (Management) Law, 1993 (PNDCL

330) in Sections 274 and 340 vi. Criminal Code, 1960, Act 29 in Sections 192 and 209vii. Ghana Railway Corporation Decree, 1977, SMCD 95 in Section 27viii. Juvenile Justice Act, 2003, Act 653 in Section 60ix. Prisons Service Decree, 1972, NRCD 46 in Section 46x. Unclaimed Property Decree, 1969, NLCD 371 in Sections 1 and 2xi. Customs Regulations, 1976 (LI 1060) in Regulation 21xii. Police Service (Private Security Organisations) Regulations, 1992, LI 1571 in

Regulation 11xiii. Wildlife Conservation (Amendment) Regulations, 1983, LI 1284 in Regulation

7(3)xiv. Imports and Exports (Classification of Importers) Regulations, 1980 (L.I. 1247).

Second Schedule 571-400 xv. Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods) Rules, 1974, LI 971 in First Schedule

1(c)xvi. Trade Marks Regulations, 1970, LI 667 in First Schedule. 6.3 Weaknesses in the Current Ghanaian LegislationsThe nature and scope of the current legal regime is too restrictive, as it does not contemplate certain concepts that are inherently vital in dealing with SALW in contemporary times. The prevailing legal regime provides little avenue and encouragement for disclosure and the open interaction amongst interested persons or parties in possession of SALW.

Current legislation does not provide a rejected applicant the opportunity to appeal against a previous decision. Although this is not consistent with contemporary

SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks / 41

notions of human rights, it more importantly compels a rejected applicant to acquire weapons illegally without recourse to the law.

There are also many gaps in the current legislation. The law does not address or provide for the fate of the firearm or projectile being registered when the application to register is rejected. That is in cases where the individual has acquired the arm before going forward to regularise the acquisition. Also, when someone is being assessed and vetted as a person able to own a firearm the current law does not provide for the authorities to “question” the mode of acquisition of the firearm brought to be registered.

The laws in their current state do not indicate number of arms or the amount of ammunition an individual can acquire at any given period. There is no requirement under the law for a competency test or training of prospective owners of firearms prior to licensing of a firearm. Similarly, there is no legal regime for the provision of facilities for such testing or training nor is the private sector involved in such engagements.

The current law does not mandate the arms retailers to “retire “their allocations or provide records of sales information (whom they have sold the arms to, their contact addresses and their licenses enabling them to purchase, etc.) before they are given new allocations.

Legislation should take into consideration certain practices that are unavoidable such as providing for certain category of licenses like those for conducting a business as gunsmith. Given that about 80% of guns used in armed robberies are locally manufactured, it is important to consider licensing the gunsmith and his workshop subject to pre-requisites.

As it is, the laws on local manufacture of SALW do not indicate whether a request for a permit from the Minister of the Interior is to be granted to Artisanal manufacturers or local Industrial manufacturers, and even though none of the artisan manufacturers dotted all over the country have applied for a permit to manufacture, they are carrying on with their trade illegally.

Ghanaian law should also consider the possibility of granting accreditation for sports-shooting and hunting purposes.

42 / SALW legislation and regulatory frameworks

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 GeneralThere is the need for governments to implement policies that will help reduce the demand for small arms. When employment opportunities are created and citizens are employed, conflicts and criminal activities will reduce thereby reducing the demand for small arms.

Security agencies should be specially trained and adequately resourced and remunerated to check and monitor arms trafficking. Such agencies can be equally equipped with special purpose vehicles, communication equipment, metal detectors, and scanners to facilitate their work. Security agencies must also be given an adequate number of personnel, who will help to efficiently patrol the numerous unauthorized entry and exit points to and from Ghana.

Licensed arms dealers should be closely monitored for compliance with the law. Again, there should be a review of legislation to address current challenges in arms trafficking and proliferation.

There should be adequate public education to encourage the general public to volunteer information on arms traffickers.

There should equally be effective international cooperation between countries within the sub-region in terms of exchange of information as well as marking, tracing, and stockpile and inventory management.

It was clear from the interviews that blacksmiths have other skills that can be harnessed into alternative livelihood strategies. The production of tools and equipment can be implemented effectively through two (2) major approaches:

• Setting up regional Training Workshop Centers;• Individual Workshop Support (Financial and Technical) Schemes.

7.2 Mechanisms for Small Arms ControlPolitical commitments and action are equally essential to resolve the underlying causes of conflicts and disputes in various parts of the world. National programmes and laws to combat SALW need to be matched by strong legally binding international instruments. Financial and technical assistance from international partners should allow to put together actionable programmes, which will reduce

Recommendations / 43

the illicit proliferation of SALW. Developed countries should provide more financial resources to developing countries and foster partnerships for capacity-building. Sound planning and effective implementation strategies are also vital.

Agencies working on illicit arms trade, terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking should have innovative strategies to address the close interrelationship among these activities.

It is essential that a national computerized database to provide a network for licences and registered arms and facilitate monitoring is established. Another important mechanism is to introduce sanctions and appropriate minimum sentences for SALW crimes and the carrying of unlicensed SALW. In addition, registering and ensuring strict accountability and effective control of all SALW owned by private security companies is recommended.

7.3 Necessary Laws to address the legislative deficit Elements that need to be addressed in SALW legislation include:

i. Registration, mode of registration ii. Condition of change of ownershipiii. Expiry of permitiv. Manufacture of arms and ammunitionv. Control of public display of arms or ammunitionvi. Seizure and forfeiture vii. Control of export and importviii. Database through control Register ix. Offences and Regulationsx. Dialogue with Manufacturers and Suppliersxi. Brokeringxii. Strengthening of Border Controlsxiii. Public Education and Awareness Programmesxiv. Collection and Destruction of Small Arms and Light Weaponsxv. Transferringxvi. Tracking

44 / Recommendations

CONCLUSION

Considering the enormity of the challenge in the fight against the illicit proliferation of small arms and its concomitant devastating effects on the social, economic and political progress within the West African sub-region, it is critical to adopt a multifaceted approach in addressing these challenges. International, regional and sub-regional cooperation and concerted effort are required among States if the battle against cross-border illicit transfer of weapons is to be won.

This research has clearly shown, together with other pieces of evidence, that whereas weapons mainly local artisan manufactured ones move from Ghana into neighbouring countries through the numerous unapproved routes, industrially manufactured small arms illicitly flow from these countries into the Northern parts of Ghana.

Efficient law enforcement, modernized data and efficient record keeping using ICT, and effective marking will enhance tracing and stockpile management. Similarly, it was noted that if the energies and skills of the blacksmiths could be channelled into the production of other equally viable tools then they may not resort to the production of arms and thus, reduce the illicit SALW in circulation.

Effective public education, prompt and peaceful resolution of conflict, capacity building and resourcing security agencies to deal effectively with the menace, as well as legislation and policies on SALW are required to ensure the proper management of the SALW menace. Interventions should also be tailored towards addressing the remote causes of demand and supply of SALW. International cooperation is also critical in this regard.

If these interventions are effectively implemented, the illicit trafficking of arms and the local production of arms will reduce, thereby helping to promote peace, security, and sustainable development within the West African sub-region.


ReferencesUNDP and Government of Ghana (2004): Illicit Small Arms in Ghana - A Baseline Assessment

Small Arms Survey (2007): Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,

United States Institute for Peace (2010): Trends in Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition and other Related Materials (2006).

Ghana Police Service Reports (2004 - 2011).



THE SITUATION IN TOGO

Félix Kokou AKLAVON

INTRODUCTION

I. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

1. Organisation of the study

1.1 Identification of target groups

1.2 Distribution of target groups by socio-professional category

1.3 Field survey

1.4 Data collection method

1.5 Sampling and selection criteria

1.6 Literature review

II. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

1. State of trafficking in the country

2. Scope of the phenomenon in Togo

3. Distribution of arms manufacturers nationwide

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SEIZED AND THEIR

STATISTICS OVER THE PAST YEARS

1. Supply or manufacturing zones, routes, destinations and end-use

2. Causes of trafficking in SALW

3. Consequences of trafficking in SALW

IV. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK:

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

1. Actions of State

1.1 Institutional framework

1.2 Legal framework

2. Actions of Civil Society

3. Regional and international institutions

Table of Content

Table of Content / / THE SITUATION IN TOGO 49

51

53

53

53

53

53

54

54

55

57

57

58

59

60

60

61

62

62

62

62

62

63

63

V. WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Government

2. Civil society and national actors

3. International and bilateral partners

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

50 THE SITUATION IN TOGO / Table of Content /

63

63

64

64

65

66

Introduction / 51

Introduction

Togo is a small West African country. It has borders in the east with Benin, in the west with Ghana, in the north with Burkina Faso and in the south with the Atlantic Ocean. With a surface area of 56,785 km2 and five major economic regions, in 2011 its population was estimated at about 6 million inhabitants. Togo has about forty ethnic groups but the two major national languages are Kabyè and Ewé.

Togo had a very low crime level and virtually no record of organized crime or armed robbery prior to the 1990s. The end of the cold war, the advent of democracy and the emergence of armed conflicts in West Africa were accompanied by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) which has contributed to the growing insecurity in the country today.

A study conducted by Cambridge University reveals that close to half of the 875 million weapons circulating in the world are found in sub-Saharan Africa, with nearly 40% in West Africa.

This uncontrolled proliferation of SALW has become a cause for concern and is a daily preoccupation of the highest national and even sub-regional authorities.

Togo therefore joined the different regional and international processes aimed at combating this phenomenon, which constitutes a threat to national and regional security if nothing is done about it.

In 2001, Togo, in response to the ECOWAS Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), set up the National Commission to Combat the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL). Studies were also conducted at national level to have not only a global view of the situation but also to know the actual craft manufacturing capacity in the country.

Laws have been passed, agreements signed, and regional and international protocols and pacts ratified. Civil Society Organizations under the umbrella of RASALT (Togolese Action Network on Small Arms), are increasing capacity building actions for the communities and the population is being sensitized.

All of these actions did not succeed in eradicating crime. The people continued to experience armed robberies, holdups and inter-community attacks which the

population on a daily basis, although the phenomenon reduced in intensity. Togo is still searching for a way to restore national and sub-regional peace.

What is the impact of this phenomenon on the day-to-day life of the people? How does this phenomenon manifest? What is the actual local manufacturing capacity of weapons? What is the route of these weapons in our country? Who are the end users? What control strategies have been developed in the country? All of these questions are essential for an understanding of the phenomenon of SALW proliferation in Togo.

This study will provide detailed information on the illicit proliferation of small arms, which will contribute to the development of efficient and effective strategies to control the phenomenon and strengthen national and regional security.

The report will cover three essential items:Ÿ Methodological framework of the research Ÿ Presentation and interpretation of resultsŸ Guidelines and recommendations.

52 / Introduction

Blacksmiths 20

Farmers 22

District heads 12

Drivers 8

Nurses 5

Others 5

TOTAL

100

Methodological framework of the research / 53

I. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

1. Organisation of the study: Preliminary survey A preliminary survey was conducted to ascertain the level of understanding of the interview guide and to rephrase some questions to make sure they agree with the objectives of the study.

1.1 Identification of target groups As regards the identification of target groups, the traditional heads of shortlisted villages were contacted, and they did the preliminary work to facilitate our assignment. We also made use of some resource persons within the law enforcement forces to provided us with essential information on the phenomenon. Thereafter we were able to set the following targets:

1.2 Distribution of target groups by socio-professional categoryTable 1:

Targets Number

Forces of law and order 28

1.3 Field survey We spent four days in the northern region and three days in the Maritime, thereby covering all the shortlisted locations namely Boadé, Goukonssi, Sinkassé, Mango and Dapaong in the Savannah region; Bandjeli and Kara in the Kara region; Atakpamé and

Adeta in the Plateaux region; Lomé and Aného in the Maritime region. One-on-one and collective interviews were conducted to gather information from the targets.

1.4 Data collection method Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to collect data in the communities shortlisted for the study. In addition, we carried out a literature review of existing documentation on the phenomenon.

An additional tool, the interview guide, was developed and validated by the research team before the commencement of the study.

1.5 Sampling and selection criteria The study covered two villages per region: Boadé and Goukonssi in the Savanes region, Bandjeli and Kara in the Kara region. These areas are villages bordering Ghana and Burkina Faso. We also met the Commissioners of Police and Gendarmerie Officials in Sinkassé, Dapaong, Atakpamé, Lomé, Aného, Kpalimé, Mango and Kara. The mission retained 100 persons considered to be involved directly or indirectly in small arms trafficking, as samples of persons to be interviewed.

Table 2: Distribution of the surveys nationwide

Region Locations

covered

Number of persons

interviewed

Savannah Dapaong 1

Sinkasse 5

Boade 13

Goukonssi 7

Mango 1

Kante 4

Kara Kara 5

Bandjeli 14

Plateaux Atakpame 7

Adeta 8

Maritime

Lome 25

Aneho 10

Total

100

54 / Methodological framework of the research


14. Amonaou Kataka (2005) , Study on the national production capacity of light weapons and small arms and ammunition Togo, Mission Report15. Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity in West Africa : Case of Togo.

Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity 16. in West Africa : Case of Togo.

Sylvio Combey , (2009 ) Article published on http // sylviocombey .wordpress.com / 2009 /08 /0817.

1.6 Literature ReviewMuch has been written on SALW in Africa in general and West Africa in particular. At national level, however, very few publications exist on the scourge. Since 2000 Togo has been part of the sub-regional initiatives aimed at adopting common positions on the proliferation of SALW. Some studies were carried out on it. In one of these studies on National arms production capacities in Togo, published in 2005, Amonaou KATAKA studied craft small arms manufacturers nationwide and the origin of 14 15

these arms in the country. He observed that a process should be put in place to have an ongoing, up to date inventory of firearms manufacturers. In the field, it is easy to see that there is a considerable flow of arms from abroad. These arms came mainly from Ghana, Burkina Faso, Nigeria via Benin, Mali, war zones or ceasefire zones following the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration processes.

In 2009 the National Commission on SALW conducted a general survey on SALW. This survey took stock of the overall situation of the proliferation of small arms in Togo with a view to developing national action plans to control it. SIMBIA Kpatcha , in a similar 16

study, indicated that statistics on local arms manufacturers and the flow of weapons of war recorded in the sub-region and in all gendarmerie and police units in Togo show that actions undertaken seem to be inadequate and ineffective. He then proposed that given the scope of the trafficking, there is a need for a global approach involving all States.

Furthermore, in the absence of empirical documentation on the illicit trade in arms and on account of the upsurge of crime in Togo, many media professionals took an interest in the phenomenon, and published articles on it. Sylvio COMBEY wrote that 17

the extremely serious nature of the situation in Togo led the government to set up the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLPAL) in 2001. It must be admitted, however, that the results have been below par, in spite of the sensitization drive. The authorities were no longer able to bring the situation under control due to the porosity of borders, absence of a regulation on conventional arms transfer and their manufacture, sophistication of locally manufactured arms, endemic poverty crowned by growing insecurity.

Difficulties and Limitations of the Study

The proliferation of illicit small arms is a very sensitive subject in Togo. It is shrouded in suspicion, which limits information gathering. Even though some law enforcement officers accepted to participate in the interview, not all the questions contained in the guide developed for the purpose were answered.

Most of the blacksmiths manufacturing arms were reticent, denying that they were arms manufacturers, even though they were found with weapon parts to be repaired.The farmers who accepted to answer our questionnaire clearly had no information on some critical points such as the identification of traffickers, the relationship between traffickers and the communities, the management of stockpiles as well as the institutions responsible for controlling the phenomenon.

The general ignorance of the population about small arms proliferation considerably limited the scope of our study.


II. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

1. State of trafficking in the country Insecurity has become a major challenge for the Togolese authorities. Recurrent incidents of burglary, highway robbery, local and trans-border crimes and armed robbery have traumatized the population in both rural and urban areas.

In Togo, the general belief is that only the army should possess arms, which explains why the phenomenon of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is not well-known. Data on SALW is the exclusive preserve of the State. As a result, the population does not have exhaustive data on the phenomenon. Few civil society organizations operate in the field. The following table was prepared with information drawn from the CNAPAL 2009 national report on the control of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and from the National Directorate of Judicial Police and Gendarmerie:

Table 3: Number of arms and ammunition seized between 2003 and 2009

Presentation and interpretation of results / 57

CATEGORIES OF

WEAPONS

2003-2004 2005-

2006

2007-

2008

2009 Total

Craft hunting guns 9335

Sophisticated

hunting guns

99

Weapons of warfare 475

TOTAL WEAPONS 9909

Hunting ammunition 697382

War ammunition 1846

TOTAL

AMMUNITION

699228

This table presents the overview of weapons seized from 2003 to 2009 in Togo in preventive police or judicial operations.

In 2009 alone, more than 400 weapons and 1000 ammunitions were seized. The traffickers ranged between 18 and 40 years of age according to CNLPAL . This shows 18

that the renewed spate of trafficking is being perpetrated by relatively young actors.

2. Scope of the phenomenon in TogoThe persons interviewed in Bandjeli, a town located at the Togo-Ghana border in the Kara region highlighted the extent and violent nature of armed attacks and gunfire exchange with the security forces at the border. There were several incidents at Kabou, Malfakassa and Bassar. These weapons were used in Inter-community conflicts; such was the case in 2009 with the Brakpabé and Bkatchebe (Bassar prefecture) communities on both sides of the Togo-Ghana border.

Farmers and blacksmiths interviewed in Boadé and Goukounssi admit that armed bandits create terror when they attack traders or rob vehicles. Border communities experience the phenomenon on a daily basis. Thirty-nine 39 out of the 50 persons interviewed confirm the existence of the worrisome phenomenon in Togo. Whilst putting the insecurity caused by the illicit proliferation of small arms in Togo in perspective, the security forces admit that the phenomenon is causing increasing concern . 19

Graph 1 : Perception of the scope of the phenomenon in Togo

0.78

0.2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Disturbing Not very

disturbing

18. 2009 Annual Report of CNLPAL Simbia Kpatcha ( 2009), " The uncontrolled circulation of small arms and small caliber , source of insecurity 19.

in West Africa : Case of Togo ."

Source: Field survey data, January 2012

58 / Presentation and interpretation of results

3. Distribution of arms manufacturers nationwide The sporadic crackdown by the security forces led to mistrust on the part of the blacksmiths who all claim that the majority of weapons come from neighbouring countries. Our documentary research however showed the existence of local manufacturers in all the regions of the country (General Report on SALW in Togo) . In 20

the Savanes regions, eleven (11) arms manufacturing blacksmiths were recorded, with 10 from the Sinkassé community alone. This community has borders with Burkina Faso and Ghana. Consequently, the vibrancy of this geographical location exposes it to all manner of trafficking and insecurity.

The analysis of the report and surveys conducted indicate that the most highly represented region is the Plateaux region with over thirty (30) manufacturers of which 26 are found in the Dayes prefecture alone. This community also has a border with Ghana.

Graph 2: Distribution of manufacturers per region

20. Rapport général sur les ALPC au Togo, CNPAL, 2009

0.17

0.08

0.16

0.48

0.11

0%

13%

25%

38%

50%

63%

Savanes Kara Centrale Plateaux Maritime


60 / Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF WEAPONS SEIZED AND THEIR STATISTICS OVER THE PAST 5 YEARS

According to information gathered from interviewees, arms seized include several hunting guns (Salaga, duplex, cabis), 8-mm and 12-mm calibre pistols as well as sophisticated weapons. The report of the general survey on SALW in Togo conducted by the National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) presented the statistics of arms and ammunition seizures carried out from 2003 to 2009 (See Table 3 above).

It is not easy to compare the information provided by interviewees with the one contained in the CNLPAL report. There are no statistics of arms seizures for the past 5 years. Civil society representatives reported the reluctance of the different target groups to provide information.

1. Supply or manufacturing zones, routes, destinations and end-use Most of the persons interviewed admitted the existence of arms in the country, but believe that Togo is just a transit zone for all categories of small arms bound for neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso, Benin and Nigeria. Thirty-nine percent (39%) of the interviewees are of the opinion that Togo is a transit country, whilst 31% believe that it is a destination country. However, 30% of the interviewees state that arms are manufactured in the country. Togo may therefore be cited among the countries that produce small arms locally.

Among these arms producing States, Ghana is the major supplier of arms bound for Togo. Northern Ghana is well known for its expertise in manufacturing craft SALW. As the manufacturers get better at their trade and increase their stock, they have to find outlets for them. Since Togo has not yet authorized local manufacture of arms, the blacksmiths work in secret and and have not yet reached the level of expertise of other countries. With the increased demand, it is easy to understand how the country has become a transit zone as well as a destination centre for locally manufactured arms from other countries.

The porosity of Togo's borders with neighbouring Ghana, Benin and Burkina Faso facilitates trafficking, particularly among the communities living on both sides of the border who share the same languages and cultures. Since the traffickers are relations of the transporters, or belong to the same ethnic groups with them, their movement does not raise any suspicion. They dismantle the arms into pieces before taking them across borders, often without the knowledge of the transporters. Among other

methods, they hide the dismantled parts inside grains or herbs used in traditional medicine. This was confirmed by a brigade chief who claimed to have once arrested a trafficker with arms hidden in herbs used in traditional medicine.

All this goes to show how difficult it can be to identify an arms dealer and raises the thorny problem of monitoring our borders, systematic identity control and training of law enforcement officials. According to one senior gendarmerie officer, it is not easy to catch a smuggler, although an intuitive, well-trained officer can recognize all forms of smuggling.

Togo, Burkina Faso and Benin are the major destinations for arms in transit. They are used in all sorts of activities, hunting, security protection, burglaries, armed robberies and inter-community conflicts. Hunters, farmers, robbers, cattle breeders and the masses use these weapons. It should be pointed out that Togo has not experienced the phenomenon of terrorism.

With regard to the routes used, according to a traditional leader, smugglers often pass through the Dayes community (Plateaux region). They leave Ikpa, a border village with Ghana with weapons hidden in grains. They move down towards Adéta in Kloto before going up towards Notsè in the Haho community to come out in Azové in Benin via Tohoun.

Kokoumbo and Gando are towns located in the Kara region and close to Ghana and Benin. These places are the departure areas with Benin as destination.

Goukonssi and Boadé, towns located at the Togo, Ghana and Burkina Faso borders are the other points of departure towards Burkina Faso.

2. Causes of Trafficking in SALWFive main causes can be adduced of the trade: • Poverty: most of the youths involved are either unemployed or low income

workers, and are therefore lured into this very profitable business by the need to survive.

• The absence of strong coercive laws creates a legal vacuum thus giving free rein to trafficking in Togo.

• The absence of an official market for the sale of modern arms paves the way for craft manufacture and illicit trade. The opening of a State controlled arms store would be a solution to illicit trafficking.

• Arms are also used for personal security and hunting. • The illicit circulation of SALW responds to market demand and supply.

Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years / 61

3. Consequences of trafficking in SALW The consequences of this phenomenon are many; • Insecurity of goods and persons; • Threat to civil peace ; • Slowdown of economic activities ;• Increased violence due to inter-community conflicts ;

IV. LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSESMany actions have been taken as part of an institutional framework to control the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. Governmental and non-governmental, national and international institutions are working to check the phenomenon nationwide.

1. Actions of State 1.1 Institutional framework The State established the National Commission to Control the Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons (CNLPAL) to effectively control the proliferation of SALW, sources of transnational crime, armed conflicts and/or terrorism. In 2006 the Commission prepared a draft bill on arms control in Togo, which recommends:

Ÿ the creation of the Committee on Defence and Security within the National Assembly;

Ÿ the systematic destruction of any arms and ammunition seized.

1.2 Legal framework Togo is signatory to several regional and international agreements. Thus it participated in the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) which was replaced by the ECOWAS Small Arms Programme (ECOSAP), now merged with the Small Arms Division of ECOWAS. It is also involved in the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms in All its Aspects, signed in 2001.

Togo is also party to the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in 2001, as well as the ECOWAS Convention. It has also signed the Arms Trade Treaty.

Even though Togo participates in many international treaties and mechanisms, its

62 / Characteristics of weapons seized and their statistics over the past 5 years

situation is far from enviable. The major obstacles to the control of the circulation of SALW are economic, social, cultural, legal and political.

Economically, the underdevelopment of the people who lack adequate means to meet their daily needs this prompts them to undertake illegal and illicit activities.

Socially, the population is generally uninformed, especially due to low level of awareness. The few sensitization activities do not have the desired impact.

Politically, the instability resulting from the endless political crises and the absence of a clear policy have created mistrust with respect to the control of SALW proliferation.

1. Actions of Civil SocietyThe network of civil society organizations working to control the phenomenon in Togo, RASALT, NGOs and Associations conduct sensitization, capacity building and advocacy activities on SALW. Yet, the phenomenon is far from being under control because all the actions turn out to be inadequate for a fast-growing phenomenon.

2. Regional and international institutionsUNREC and ECOWAS provide technical and/or financial support for capacity building and sensitization. They give considerable support to State institutions and to civil society organizations.

V - WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONS The following recommendations may contribute to reducing significantly the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Togo:

1. Government Discussions with the forces of law and order as well as the populations revealed inadequacies in the strategies to control the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. We therefore recommend:Ÿ Capacity building for all actors involved in controlling the circulation of SALW;Ÿ Building the operational capacity of the forces of law and order ;Ÿ Endowing the relevant agencies with appropriate and effective means for better

control of borders;Ÿ Adopting arms regulations;Ÿ Reviewing the provisions on the possession of SALW ;Ÿ Regulating and monitoring the importation of police and security equipment by

private security companies;Ÿ Cooperation between the Customs and both public and private security forces.

Real involvement of the border communities would be an asset.

Legal and institutional framework: Strengths and weaknesses / 63

2. Civil society and national actors Civil society organisations generally operate in the area of capacity building and sensitization of the populations. Field surveys revealed that the people know very little about the matter. It is therefore absolutely essential for civil society organisations to :

Ÿ be more involved in actions to control the circulation of SALW;Ÿ build their capacity on human security and the circulation of SALW; Ÿ raise the awareness of the populations on the tragic consequences and trauma of

SALW;Ÿ sensitize the populations on national laws and regional/international conventions

on SALW;Ÿ promote a culture of peace and non-violence;Ÿ involve the populations actively by having branches at community level;Ÿ involve health care providers whose intervention is often required during inter-

community conflicts;

3. International and bilateral partners The proliferation of small arms and their consequences should be controlled at international level. It is thus essential for international and bilateral partners to be more involved in the control of SALW proliferation by supporting the actions of Governments and especially Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) so as to scale up activities in the field. CSO actors should also enjoy more material and financial support.

The United Nations Organization and international partners have a major role to play in formulating strategies involving countries which fuel the illicit trade in small arms. They should also draw up instruments which shall be binding on all countries.

64 / Way forward and recommendations

CONCLUSION In recent years, the conflicts which rocked the African continent were the most deadly in its entire history. Today there exist many hotbeds of tension with the most barbaric atrocities committed, as is the case in Nigeria. Even if Togo has been spared armed conflict so far, it has experienced its own moments of tension, the considerable human consequences of which should not be forgotten. Rather, all actors involved in controlling the proliferation of SALW should constantly bear this in mind.

The study revealed that the extent of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country is a cause for concern. Most of the actors involved in data collection recognize the dangerous nature of the traffic in Togo.

All the actions of the forces of law and order to date have not succeeded in curbing the phenomenon.

Smugglers continue to carry out their trade easily either through the borders with the complicity of other actors, or through the forest or unmanned routes.

Small arms and light weapons continue to circulate and facilitate the perpetration of criminal acts, armed robbery, holdups, and highway robberies.

The phenomenon is deeply entrenched due to the vulnerability of the youths and smugglers who support the crime and all its consequences. The porous borders and the inadequate control equipment, the obsolete nature of legal instruments, the cunning of the smugglers and its geographical position make Togo a country of illicit production and transit of SALW.

Conclusion / 65

REFERENCES • Amonaou KATAKA, Etude sur la capacité nationale de production des armes

légères et de petit calibre et des munitions au Togo, Rapport de mission, 2005 [Study on the national craft production capacity of SALW and amunitions in Togo, Mission Report, 2005]

Ÿ SIMBIA Kpatcha (2009), « La circulation anarchique des armes légères et de petits calibres, source d'insécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest: Cas du Togo. [The anarchical circulation of small arms and light weapons, source of insecurity in West Africa: the case of Togo]

Ÿ Rapport national de l'année 2009 de la CNLPAL [CNLPAL National yearly Report 2009]

66 / References

ILLICIT ARMS ROUTES AND CACHES BETWEEN GHANA, TOGO, BENIN AND NIGERIA

THE SITUATION IN BENIN

Théonas MOUSSOU

Introduction

I. Background and justification

II- Methodological framework of the research

2.1. Preliminary survey, identification of target group and survey

2.2 Method of data collection : samples and selection criteria

2.3 Conduct of the Survey

2.4 Data Processing and Analysis

2.5 Difficulties and limitations of the study

III- Presentation and interpretation of results

3.1 State of trafficking of SALW in Benin

3.2 Characteristics of seized arms and their statistics over the last 5 years

3.3 Supply or production zones, circulation, caches, destinations and final use

3.4 Existing legal and institutional framework : Strengths and weaknesses

3.5 Actions of regional and international institutions

IV- Way forward and recommendations

4.1 To the State

4.2 To civil society and national non-state institutions

4.3 To international and bilateral partners

4.4 To the United Nations

Conclusion

Table of Content

Table of Content / / THE SITUATION IN BENIN 69

70

71

71

71

72

72

73

73

73

73

73

76

79

83

84

84

86

87

87

88

70 / Introduction

IntroductionSituated in West Africa and on the Gulf of Guinea, Benin is bordered in the north by the river Niger, in the north-west by Burkina Faso, in the west by Togo, in the east by Nigeria, and in the south by the Atlantic Ocean. It covers an area of 114,763 Km2. The population, estimated at 8,497,827 according to the 2009 figures of INSAE (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Analysis), has an annual growth rate estimated at 3.25%. The distribution of the population by age group shows that 46.7% are less than 15 years old, 47.9% are aged between 15 and 60 years old and 5.3% are over 60 years old. This shows that the Beninois population is predominantly youth.

Benin is made up of 12 departments, 77 communes, 546 arrondissements and 3,747 villages and city-quarters. It has more than 3,000Km of borders with four countries including Nigeria. The towns and villages along these borders are sparsely populated.Following its independence, Benin's development was slowed down by political instability caused by a succession of coups d'état. But as from 1990, it embraced a multi-party system and liberal economy. Thereafter, many institutions of the republic guaranteed and legalised freedom, social justice, social and economic welfare, press and religious freedom etc. These are the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, the High Audio-visual and Communication Council, Economic and Social Council, which are governed by the December 11, 1990 constitution. Thus, Benin adopted a presidential system and instituted democratic checks and balances, whilst respecting the principle of separation of powers. Since 1991 the country has been experiencing relative stability with successive democratic dispensations.

Security is a fundamental right and the responsibility of the State. Article 15 of the December 11, 1990 Constitution is clear on the issue of security, providing that each individual has the right to life, to freedom, to security and to personal integrity. But each day that passes, the Beninese are faced with increasing insecurity. Crime abounds in cities and highways. The Beninese have not forgotten the repeated armed robbery attacks at Dantokpa market.

Petty crimes and attacks are frequent both in the cities and on the roads. Cases of roadblocks followed by armed robbery also occur. The crime and insecurity have a fear relationship with the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, as shall be demonstrated by this survey.

This climate of insecurity and crime affects all West African States. Armed conflict has aggravated the insecurity and destabilized some ECOWAS States, bringing in its wake the proliferation of small arms.

Background and justification / 71

I – BACKGROUND AND JUSTIFICATIONThe Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria corridor is a transit zone for a huge quantity of arms in West Africa. This seems to be the origin of the proliferation of the illicit arms trade which provides weapons for Coup d'état, rebel movements, civil wars and other forms of organised crime and armed violence which ravage the sub-region. The frequent seizure of small arms and light weapons in some ports of the coastal countries and in some of their land borders tend to confirm the assumption.

Given that the extent of the phenomenon and its mechanisms are not yet fully understood, and in the absence of empirical data on the actual flow of arms (actors, types of arms, role of craft production) and of an analysis of its causes and enabling conditions, advocacy actions and indeed legislation on the menace have not achieved the desired results.

II- METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCHThe approach chosen is essentially qualitative and is based on individual or group interviews.

2.1 Organisation of the study: Pre-survey, identification of target groups, surveyBefore the field study, data collection tools were developed and a literature review was completed.

2.1.1 Development and validation of data collection tools Two sorts of tools were developed: a discussion guide and a data collection chart. With the aid of the interview guide, service officials, organised groups and resource persons were interviewed. A data collection chart was also developed and used to harness information from database sources.

2.1.2 Literature reviewWith the literature review, we were able to obtain available information on the SALW situation in Benin, from documentary resources and from the internet.To this end, we consulted the library of the National Commission for the Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms. This Commission has already conducted surveys, the results of which are available and were useful for this mission. They include the 2009 report of the national survey on the proliferation of small arms in Benin. We also consulted the papers presented at the conference on “Security and Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in ECOWAS: the situation in Benin” organised in Cotonou by the Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (IRIES) of the

Benin Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of Friedrich-Elbert-Stiftung (FES).Internet search engines also enabled us to appreciate the international dimension of the problem of SALW in Benin.

2.2 Data Collection Method The study concentrated on sensitive zones. These zones are considered to be crime prone on account of two major factors: proximity to Nigeria and the high level of local arms fabricating activities.

The study was done in with the involvement of the immigration, gendarmerie and customs at major border posts between Benin and Nigeria: Seme-Krake, Owode, Igolo, Kilibo, Chikandu, Neganzi.

Certain agencies, responsible for seizure, centralisation, destruction or securing of intercepted arms were also consulted, in order to obtain the approximate number of arms seized during a given period. They were:

Ÿ The Customs and Immigration Services at the Cotonou free port.Ÿ The Customs and Immigration Services at the Cotonou airport.Ÿ The Directorate of Public SecurityŸ The National Directorate of the GendarmerieŸ The Directorate-General of Forestry and Natural ResourcesŸ The Directorate-General of Customs

In addition, special attention was given to some important border posts such as those between Benin, Burkina Faso and Togo, particularly Ouake and Porga.

Lastly, some local gunsmiths were selected in Gogunu, Bembereke, Kouande, Copargo, Lokossa, Applahoue, Misserete, Ketou, Agbangnizoun and Abomey to fill the questionnaire. The survey took place from February 10 to March 20 2012.

2.3 Data Processing and Analysis The data collected were classified according to different sections of the research. Quantitative data were processed by zone and by centre of interest in order to generate a national trend.

Qualitative data served to back up the major conclusions which stemmed from the quantitative analysis and vice versa.


2.4 Difficulties and limitations of the studyThe major difficulty of this study is that the data on arms seizure was not easily accessible. It was not possible to determine the countries of origin of persons arrested for the possession and illegal use of SALW. That constituted a significant limitation to the study which was expected to determine the countries of origin of traffickers and the transit countries for SALW. Unfortunately such data was not available to enrich the observations and analysis.

III. PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

3.1. State of trafficking of SALW in BeninSecurity is assuming importance in public and private, individual and collective opinions, both in big cities where there is a growing perception of insecurity and on the highways.

Apart from cases not reported to the police and to the gendarmerie, between 2009 and 2011, Benin experienced a total of 335 armed attacks on 246 persons, with 20 motorcycles, 61 cars, close to 180 mobile telephones and more than FCFA 943, 270,335 stolen. More than 191 persons lost their lives as a result of those armed attacks.

Most of the crimes mentioned above were committed with the use of small arms and light weapons. This shows a correlation between insecurity and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Benin.

3.2 Characteristics of seized arms and their statistics over the last 5 yearsA close look at seized arms shows that they are of two categories: locally made craft weapons and modern ones that come from outside the country.

3.2.1 Locally made craft arms in BeninCraft arms are made by both Beninese gunsmiths and artisans from other parts of West Africa.

In Benin, there are more than 350 local artisans who engage in arms production. The last count organised by National Commission for Fight Against Proliferation of Small Arms, CNLCPAL, dates back to 2006. In 2009, a study by the CNLCPAL on the proliferation of small arms and light weapons revealed that on the average, a Beninese artisan makes two arms per week. This


research confirms that trend, as 87 out of the 120 artisans interviewed said they were able to make no more than two arms per week; 14 claim to make two to three per week while the remaining 9 could not make more than one per week.

It should be noted, however, that arms are not necessarily produced on a weekly basis. Production varies according to demand.

The main clients for local makers of arms are hunters and all those who have expressed the desire to own arms. 92% of the 120 craft gunsmiths interviewed said that hunters were their major clients. 76% replied that people desiring to be armed for personal protection patronise them. Herein lays the complexity of local arms manufacturing. For the local gunsmiths, arms manufacturing is a means of providing for their families, but some observers consider this trade a threat to peace and security. According to these observers, the absence of a mechanism to control local arms manufacturing and the inability to trace their clients are elements that can only fuel crime and insecurity.

A close look at the types of arms made by local artisans reveals two types. There are shotguns and handguns which are generally automatic pistols. The seizures also revealed the existence of Baikal (from the former Soviet Union) among craft arms in Benin.

In response to the enquiry as to why local artisans were not satisfied with producing only shotguns, 85% of them justified their attitude by referring to the desire to “test their genius” and win prices at shows that exhibit indigenous know-how and technology.

3.2.2 Modern armsIllicit modern arms seized in Benin at border posts and other checkpoints in the big cities are post-cold War weapons. Indeed, the arms manufacturing technology and developed significantly since the end of the Second World War. Consequently countries of both the North and the South have been able to strengthen their military might by setting up arms manufacturing industries. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the breakdown of State structures in the torment East Bloc countries, the industries of the North were transferred easily to the countries of the South, particularly Africa.

With regard to the loss of arms, discussions with the high military command and police and gendarmerie officials show there are very few losses from the national


stock. They acknowledge, however, that this assertion should be qualified because of the occasional loss recorded among body guards. Some defence and security officers also lose their government issued weapons, while there are some cases of theft in some garrisons.

Although unable to give figures, they consider the losses insignificant, in light of the scope of the phenomenon.

3.2.3 Types and statistics of seized arms over the last 5 yearsThe table below provide an idea of the characteristics and statistics of seized arms and ammunitions. It should be noted however, that the picture is incomplete due to the absence of some data such as statistics from the customs services.

This table shows that there really exists illegal circulation of small arms in Benin. Notably, locally made arms are more in number and it is important to draw some lessons from that. The real issue is to know where the modern arms come from, their caches and the means of circulation employed by the traffickers.

Department Weapons Ammunitions

Homemadeweapons

Number Modernweapons

Number Types Number

ATACORADONGABORGOUALIBORA

Handguns 10Caliber 128mm cartridge 05

Shotguns 31

MONOCOUFFOZOUCOLLINE

Handguns 11

Shotguns 50

Baikal 01

ATLANTIQUELITTORALOUEMEPLATEAU

Handguns 67 AKM 13All calibers(12- 7,8-7,62- 9,ect.) 3678

Shotguns 09 SMG rifles 01

Pump rifles 05

Revolver 01

Automaticpistols

06

TOTAL

:

Confiscated arms andammunitions

179 26 3683



3.3 Supply or production zones, routes, caches, destinations and final usesApart from locally owned arms workshops, Benin has no official arms manufacturing factory. It is therefore clear that modern arms which are in circulation in Beninese territory come from other countries and cannot come in except through zones which are not monitored, hence the need to trace their routes.

3.3.1 Mode of penetration and routes of small arms in BeninGenerally, arms come into Benin by air. The seizures reveal that a significant number of sophisticated arms also come by sea through the Cotonou free port. Since 2005, the special arms monitoring unit established by the CNLCPAL has intercepted weapons carefully concealed in containers and used vehicles which arrive at the Cotonou port by ship.

Other modes of SALW penetration exist as well. The rivers Oueme, Mono and Niger, are the main channels of transit. Some land routes are also used. They include the areas along the borders with Togo (Hillacondji, Tohoun, Athiémé, Tchetti, Ouaké, Kprèkètè, Agouna) ; with Burkina-Faso (Porga, Concombi, Kérémou, Kabagou) ; with Niger (Malanville, Karimama) ; and with Nigeria( Sèmè-Kraké, Owodé, Ifangni, Igolo, Illara, Pobè, Kétou, Kaboua, Kilibo, Kabo, Sandilo, Chikandou, Néganzi).

These towns are the main points of penetration of small arms and light weapons into Benin. Illicit arms in circulation are also found in zones designated as crime-prone. They are towns with a tendency for crime, not only on account of the development of crime with the use of small arms, but also they have craft arms workshops. Such town include Natitingou, Bassila, Porga and Tanguiéta in Atacora and Donga departments; the towns of Ouidah, Abomey-Calavi, as well as Hwlacondji, Akpakpa dodomè , Zongo quarters in Cotonou in the Atlantique and Littoral departments; Ségbanan, Kandi, Malanville, Tchaourou, Parakou, N'dali, and Banikoara in Borgou and Alibori departments; the most notorious towns are Aplahoué, Klouékanmè, Comé, Dogbo and Lalo in Mono and Couffo departments; Sakété, Dangbo, Sèmè-Kpodji, Banigbé, Ifangni, Avrankou, Adjara, Akpro-Missérété, Pobè and Kétou in Ouémé and Plateau departments; and Djidja, Agbangnizoun, Kilibo, Zakpota, Sèto, Agonlin, Zangnanado, Zogbodomey, Massi, Dassa-Zoumè, Savalou, Bantè, Abomey, Ouèssè and Savè.in Zou and Collines departments.

The border posts have not been able to take any successful measures to trace the routes from the neighbouring countries into Benin. However, at all borders with Benin arms have been seized, either coming from or going into the neighbouring country. It


is evident, then, that Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, and indeed, Benin, are transit countries for illicit SALW.

Moreover, since 2009, piracy has been developing on the maritime coasts of Cotonou which could well favour the proliferation of small arms.

3.3.2 Arms caches The different types of organized arms caches were identified in the course of information gathering. First there are the caches discovered during searches at border posts or airports. Arms and ammunitions seized at border posts are often concealed in baggage inside 4 wheel or 2 wheel vehicles, or on motor cycles, or even by pedestrian porters. Sometimes coffins transporting corpses from one country to the other are used as caches for arms and ammunitions. Inside the vehicles, the arms are hidden under the seats.

In the case of arms and ammunitions seized at the Cotonou Port, it was observed that second hand vehicles and containers were used as caches.

Out of the 125 local arms manufacturers interviewed, 57% hide arms in the ceiling of their houses and 33% under the bed. 10% dug holes in the ground to conceal arms. The analysis reveals that the local artisans are well aware that trading in arms is prohibited, which is why they know that they cannot openly sell the arms they produce.

3.3.3 Final Destinations and end usersFinal destinations and end uses also vary. In Benin, small arms and light weapons end up in the hands of three categories of persons: hunters, those who want to ensure their own security and criminals.

Local gunsmiths were asked about the profile of their clients. 77% of the 125 persons interviewed said that their main clients were hunters, 21% believe that their usual clients are those who buy for their own security. No percentage was recorded for the variable “criminal use”. It follows that the end uses indicated in the present study are hunting and self-defence. To the extent that no measure has been put in place either for tracing buyers or for marking locally made arms, the reasons given for acquiring arms from local artisans are not always true. Obviously craft arms are used in criminal activities. Many of them are generally used for criminal purposes. Between 2009 and 2011, 211 armed attacks were officially recorded in the country.One can only imagine the number of cases not declared to the police or gendarmerie.

Apart from criminal purposes, the seizures by the national gendarmerie provide insight into other destinations and end users. They include conflicts resulting from transhumance, armed robbery assassinations, violence, poaching. Indeed, out of 34 reasons for seizing small arms, 7 are related to transhumance conflicts, 8 to armed robbery, 15 to murder, and 15 to other forms of violence (threat, deliberate assault and battery etc.)

3.3.4 Causes and consequences of trafficking in SALW and profile of traffickers

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has social, economic and environmental consequences, in addition to increasing the spate of insecurity.

Socially the people live in fear and insecurity, because certain places and times are known to be unsafe. The night is considered unsafe and places such as the beach, Dantokpa market, neighborhoods such as Akpakpa, Dodome, Wlakodji in Cotonou, as well as banks, commercial centers and classified forests in Ouidah, Zogbodomey and Setto etc.

It has been observed that people hesitate to buy luxury cars. Also there is an increasing tendency towards self-defence with the acquisition of weapons (tear gas, portable electric shock device, pen knife) and sometimes SALW.

The use of SALW is also an impediment to social cohesion. In Benin it has resulted in constant conflict between farmers and nomadic livestock breeders.

Economically, it has been observed that economic operators are reluctant to invest in an environment where one might attract the attention of miscreants. Similarly, the reluctance to buy cars, motor cycles or to invest in a bank or a commercial centre create an impediment to economic growth. Car snatching along the highways reduce the level of financial investment and therefore slow down the development of the country.

Environmentally, the proliferation of small arms has consequences for biodiversity. It is a threat to the survival and growth of fauna, and upsets the ecosystem.


3.4 Existing legal and institutional framework: strengths and weaknesses

3.4.1. Legal framework The State of Benin has responded to the circulation of illicit small arms and its consequences. But there is room for improvement. The responses relate to the legal and institutional framework put in place to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

3.4.1.1 Presentation of legal frameworkDecree no. 61/39/PR/MI/AM of February 7, 1961 sets forth the regime of arms and ammunitions and the provisions of the criminal code which constitute the legal framework for small arms in Benin. It covers all firearms, ammunitions and related materials for personal use, but excludes firearms and ammunitions for the use of troops, police or any other public law enforcement agency.

The decree provides for the acquisition, importation, surrender, manufacture, transfer, possession and carrying of arms by individuals. Strict prohibition is the principle that governs firearms in Benin. Under clearly defined conditions, however, individuals may be granted a waiver. The surrender, transfer, exchange, loan, loss, as well as importation, exportation, and possession of ammunitions and other related materials from one individual to another, or from one territory to another, are regulated. Article 14 of the decree of 1961 provides that nobody may surrender, free of charge or for a fee, any arms or ammunitions of whig he has legal possession without special authorization of the Minister of Interior.

The decree provides that an individual or an enterprise wishing to invest in the manufacture, export, marketing or warehousing of arms and ammunitions, shall apply first to the Minister of Interior and Public Security.

Trading in all categories of sophisticated arms is prohibited in Benin except for businesses that wish to serve as intermediary for orders made outside the country by persons who have received prior authorization to import and possess such arms.

Importation and transportation of ammunitions and related materials are also subject to prior authorization by the Minister of Interior under clearly defined conditions.


Ÿ With regard to warehousing, the decree distinguishes between warehousing in the government powder magazines - the conditions of operation of government powder magazines are kept secret for strategic and sensitive reasons;

Ÿ Warehousing in commercial warehouses.

3.4.1.2 Strengths of the Benin legal framework The decree has the following strengths:Ÿ The basic principle of the regulation is prohibition. It is the manifestation of a

strong desire to control, as contained in regional agreements:Ÿ The decree on quota restrictions seems to be an effective instrument of control;Ÿ A priori, the principle of control is a good intention in that surrender, exchange,

transfer, loss, loan and inheritance are often monitored and subject to prior authorization;

Ÿ Manufacture and marketing are delicate activities subject to control;Ÿ There is no succession in the matter of arms (article 9 of the decree of 1961)

3.4.1.3. Weaknesses of the Benin legal framework Decree no. 61/39/PR/MI/AM of February 7, 1961 regulating arms and ammunitions in the Republic of Benin does not conform to current realities.

It is observed that the sanctions prescribed - deprivation of liberty and fines - are no longer applicable. The provisions of the Decree are weak and do not match the gravity of the related criminal offences. Article 55 of the 1961 decree provides that violations of the Decree are punishable by either a fine of 1 to 1,200 Francs or 1 to 5 days in prison or both. Second offenders are always punished by a prison sentence. There is insufficient provision for arms tracing, marking, and transit, ammunitions and related materials, nor for brokerage.

3.4.2 Institutional frameworkThe institutional mechanism put in place to combat the proliferation of SALW is made up of a certain number of key actors; in particular this refers to the state through the CNLCPAL among others, which act as the national coordinating body, and the civil society among others.

The role of the State is perceived through the intervention of some ministries which network provides security structure. The latter is made up of four structures which ensure national territorial defence and integrity and three paramilitary bodies which ensure the missions administrative policing, maintenance of order and judiciary policing. But some weaknesses undermine the institutional framework.


3.4.2.1. Presentation of institutional frameworkThe following agencies are responsible for the defence and territorial integrity of the nation:Ÿ The Directorate-General of the National Gendarmerie (DGGN)Ÿ The Army Headquarters (EMAT)Ÿ The Naval Headquarters (EMFN)Ÿ The Air Force Headquarters (EMFA)

The paramilitary agencies are:Ÿ The Directorate-General of the National Police (DGPN)Ÿ The Directorate-General of Forestry and Natural Resources (DGFRN)Ÿ The Directorate-General of Customs and Excise (DGDDI)

All these agencies perform their statutory functions, which in this case relate to:Ÿ protection of the national arms stockŸ collection, seizure and destruction, where applicable, of surplus, obsolete or

illegally transported arms on Benin territoryŸ management and control of borders.

The country's stock of weapons as well as the zones in which they are stored, known as Sensitive Military Zones, are well protected today, thanks to the dynamism of the agencies mentioned above. Military officers responsible for the security of the weapons and their stores have also received specialised.

In addition, managing the national stock means keeping a general inventory made up of permanent documents such as registers, accounting vouchers and circulars (tax and payment advice) and supporting vouchers.

Finally, the administrative and technical supervision of weaponry takes the form of periodic reviews and visits. In accordance with the terms of these reviews, arms not in use or declared useless are disassembled and decommissioned.

Four agencies, the Police, the Gendarmerie, the Coast and Forest Guards and the Customs are responsible for the collection and seizure of illicit arms trafficked in Benin territory. Between 2009 and 2011, the Police and the Gendarmerie seized more than 215 arms of which 181 were manufactured locally. More than 1505 ammunitions were also seized by the Gendarmerie . As regards border 21


21 Confer statistics of arms and ammunitions seized during the 2009-2011 period by the Directorate-General of the National Gendarmerie and the Directorate-General of the National Police

administration and control, effective measures were taken to acquire modern equipment and train human resources.

Some tangible results have also been achieved in the fight against crime. In effect, progress has been made by the security and defence forces in pursuing and arresting armed robbers.

At regional level, Benin collaborates closely with other states in the area of border administration and security. To that end, constant exchanges of information and strategies take place between joint patrol units as well as INTERPOL services.

In addition to these efforts to control the proliferation of SALW, a National Commission for the Control of the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLCPAL) was established in 2003 and it has contributed to improving the results in the fight against the proliferation of SALW through:

Ÿ Capacity building for different categories of people (military and paramilitary, journalists, NGO's, local arms manufacturers, etc.) on different topics relating to the phenomenon, legislation, and techniques of detection, marking, tracing and destruction;

Ÿ Organisation of exchanges of experiences between the National Commissions of neighbouring countries;

Ÿ Participation in local intervention missions in arms and ammunitions seizure;Ÿ Establishment of an arms and ammunitions surveillance and seizure unit at the

Cotonou free port;Ÿ General census of local arms manufacturers;Ÿ Organisation of public information and awareness campaigns through radio

programs, road shows, etc.

Finally, more and more civil society groups are working in collaboration with CNLCPAL to reduce the proliferation of SALW. They include RASALEB, ALCRER, WANEP, and the Network of Journalists.

3.4.2.2. Some weaknesses of the institutional mechanismAn analysis of the problems hampering the success of the strategies revealed the following weaknesses:

Ÿ Seized arms are scattered throughout the various services (port, gendarme barracks, police stations, coast and forest guards departments, court registries, customs offices, etc.). They are not always stored in secure conditions.


Ÿ Today there is no up-to-date database on the number and types of arms seized because there are no statistics available for analysis and projections.

Ÿ Existing licenses are not managed efficiently and so cannot provide up-to-date, reliable statistics or information on the identity of holders.

Ÿ Local authorities (city councils) are not involved in policies to control the proliferation of light arms.

Ÿ The time spent studying applications is generally long (about two years); the result in attempted fraud, illegal possession and trafficking of arms.

Ÿ The low level of NGO involvement in the fight against SALW slows down sensitisation of the grass root population.

3.5 Actions of regional and international institutionsWest Africa's international priorities are based on the action of the United Nations and continental and regional organsations. A lot of initiatives to control the illicit proliferation of SALW have been taken since the early 1990s, either in implementation of international standards, United Nations recommendations or continental resolutions, or in the application of specific provisions of regional agreements.

The prevailing situation in Africa at the establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975, was dictated by the Cold War. There were persistent threats to the stability of States. Very quickly peace and security were seen as major challenges that ECOWAS had to tackle in order to promote the economic development of the sub-region.

The internal conflicts which have been on the increase in some ECOWAS countries in recent years as well as the illicit circulation and trafficking of light arms have given rise to several initiatives taken to establish a defence, peace and security policy. Among them are:

Ÿ The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters;Ÿ The 1998 moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small

aArms.Ÿ The 1999 Lome Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,

Management and Resolution;Ÿ The establishment in 2000, of National Commissions for the Control of the

Proliferation of Small Arms, at the instance of ECOWAS.

Moreover, the inauguration of the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program (ECOSAP) in Bamako was a follow-up to the Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security


and Development (PCASED). The objective of this program is to contribute to strengthening the capabilities of ECOWAS States to develop a global approach and response capacity to small arms and light weapons, in a context of conflict prevention, development and good governance in West Africa. In spite of the end of the ECOSAP programme, these initiatives show the strong motivation of the West African regional organisation to be part of the process, hitherto driven by local actors and some NGO's, for border cooperation for economic development, mobility, enhanced security and closer ties among peoples.

Finally in 2006, ECOWAS member states decided to transform the ECOWAS Moratorium into a “Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunitions and other Related Materials”. That convention was adopted on June 14, 2006 in Abuja by the Heads of State and Government of member States. It was a demonstration of the political will and determination of States to achieve the objectives of the Moratorium Declaration and in the Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Moratorium.

With the coming into force of the ECOWAS convention on SALW in 2009, a process was created within member States not only to harmonise their national legislation with this sub-regional instrument, but also to synergise national strategic action plans and ensure greater convergence at regional level, to better fight the illicit circulation and use of SALW in the ECOWAS region.

IV- WAY FORWARD AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe extent and consequences of illicit circulation of light arms call for certain recommendations, the urgent consideration of which could contribute to reducing the phenomenon significantly. Four (4) groups of recommendations can be proffered:Ÿ improving the legal framework;Ÿ providing greater security for armouries;Ÿ relaunching joint arms monitoring patrols along Benin's borders with its

neighbours;Ÿ increasing State commitment.

These lines of action are directed towards different actors involved in the fight against the phenomenon.

4.1 To the StateThe recommendations to the State include:


4.1.1 Improving the legal framework on arms in the Republic of BeninIt devolves on the State to improve the legal regime. In view of the numerous consequences of illicit arms trafficking on social and economic life, it is important that the government take steps to pass a law on the legal administration of arms in Benin to replace the 1961 Decree which has been obsolete for many decades. The process started recently at the National Assembly, but has stalled at the point of passing the law. Instructions should be given to the Minister of Interior, Public Security and Religious Affairs and his counterpart of Defence to resume work on the draft bill in collaboration with the CNLCPAL, and find appropriate ways and means of lobbying for the law to be passed without major hitches.

Among other things, the bill should increase the penalties and sanctions for offenders violating different legal provisions and contain special provisions to regulate the craft arms manufacturing sector.

4.1.2 Re-launching and maintaining joint arms monitoring patrols along Benin's borders with its neighbours It was observed that most illicit arms come into Benin by land and sea. This is as a result of the limitations of State land border surveillance policy. The State is unable to control the porosity of borders, and can only count on the efforts of the law enforcement officers at the border posts. It is hoped, however, that the Benin-Nigeria joint patrols meant to discourage arms traffic in sensitive zones along the border localities between Benin and Nigeria where the phenomenon is most visible, should be resumed and reinforced and even extended to other neighbouring countries such as Niger, Burkina Faso and Togo.

4.1.3 Providing greater security for armouries It has been observed that the administration and security of stocks in Benin are so well organised that loss of arms is considered insignificant, but at the same time the present condition of arms depots does not guarantee total security. Indeed, some of the existing armouries date back to the colonial era and are not totally secure. The arms warehouses also serve as living quarters for the personnel in charge, which is a threat to human safety. Besides, the arms warehouses are not equipped with facilities for the day to day needs of the guards who are forced to go off their duty posts for washing, feeding, communication, etc. This explains the occasional theft of arms which occurs once the guard is distracted by other human needs.

Way forward and recommendations / 85

It would be necessary to build modern arms depots able to provide greater security, and separating the arms depot from the living quarters of the guards.

4.1.4 The need to increase State commitment to the control of illicit circulation of SALWThe State has signed nearly all international instruments relating to the control of illicit circulation of SALW. It has established a national commission for the control of the proliferation of small arms to which it allocates an operational budget. All these actions no doubt reflect commitment and strong political will. However, given the extent of the phenomenon, more needs to be done to sensitize the masses, local arms makers, defence and security forces, hunters etc. on the dangers of illicit circulation of small arms and light weapons. It should also adopt a more efficient method of organizing and supervising local artisans. But it follows that government commitment should increase, not only in terms of decisions to be taken to facilitate the implementation of strategies to reduce the phenomenon, but also in terms of financing for such strategies. The present level of State commitment is insufficient to guarantee the smooth development of all these strategies. This is why it is desirable that advocacy be addressed to the State to raise its level of commitment.

4.2. To the Civil Society and non-State institutionsThe civil society is conspicuously absent from the fight against the proliferation of illicit SALW. This is understandable the danger of proliferation of small arms is still too low to fully mobilise civil society organizations and even technical and financial partners. The Benin civil society should be mindful of the danger of illicit circulation of small arms as it is of certain evils such as child trafficking, violence against women and children etc. The actions of the few NGOs working in the area of SALW go almost unnoticed. The work of these NGOs should be visible nationwide so that governments and technical and financial partners can pool efforts to ensure its elimination. RASALEB, which is already working in that direction, could reach out to other associations and enlarge its scope of action in such a way as to establish:

Ÿ a network of craft manufacturers of SALW;Ÿ a network of journalists against the proliferation of SALW;Ÿ a network of local representatives against the proliferation of SALW in their

respective constituencies

All these networks could mobilise their respective communities, especially during awareness campaigns, to surrender illicit arms for destruction and also conduct


advocacy towards local manufacturers, and towards the State and technical and financial partners in favour of greater attention to the problem of SALW in their intervention programmes.

4.3 To international and bilateral partnersThe issue of SALW is a rallying point for all mankind today. Nobody can remain indifferent to the consequences of illicit circulation of SALW, considering that security has become a serious, cross cutting developmental issue. By way of example, water shortage in a community can cause uprisings during which arms are used. Another example is the increasingly frequent clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over grazing land. International and bilateral cannot afford to remain on the sidelines of this problem, knowing that the proliferation of SALW is a clear menace to their actions in the country. That is why it is recommended that they:

Ÿ accept to expand their scope of operations to include the control of the proliferation of illicit SALW;

Ÿ collaborate with the State and civil society organizations in organizing programmes to combat the proliferation of SALW.

4.4. To the United NationsThe international community seems to have lost its authority over fundamental issues including the trafficking in small arms and light weapons. In spite of the international legal instruments regulating the manufacture, transfer and circulation of arms, the number of arms in circulation rises daily. This shows that the directives of the international community are not always followed and more stringent measures will need to be taken to ensure that international standards are respected. Sanctions should be applicable to States that violate the standards.

Performance indicators on the reduction of illicit circulation of SALW should be developed and applied to every country, in much the same way that standards exist to measure the human development index, the level of governance or the freedom of the press in a country.

Way forward and recommendations / 87

CONCLUSIONTrafficking in SALW exists in West Africa. Being neither an arms producing country nor a country in crisis means there are virtually no arms caches beyond the traditional use for hunting or personal protection. The few caches that exist are in private homes. However, homes or workshops of local gunsmiths and criminals and robbers using these weapons can also be considered as caches.

Land routes are essentially the means through which arms come into Benin on account of the porous nature of the borders. The seaways also being used more and more.

Illicit arms circulating in Benin are used in social conflicts (farmers and herdsmen, self-defence and hunting).

In all cases, arms trafficked in Benin come mainly from local production and appropriate solutions need to be found to that. The consequences on the socio-economic life and human safety call for the State to commit fully to waging a relentless war against the phenomenon. Such a commitment should result in putting in place an appropriate legal framework and mobilizing necessary resources for the development of strategies for the eradication of the phenomenon. It is also important that the civil society and technical and financial partners play an active role alongside the government to implement the various strategies.

88 / Conclusion

REFERENCES

Ÿ Kisito Marie OWONA ALIMA; La prolifération et la circulation illicite des armes légères et de petit calibre en Afrique Centrale: Etude du phénomène et analyse critique des mécanismes de contrôle de ces armes, Université de Yaoundé 2 - Master en stratégie, défense, sécurité et gestion des conflits et catastrophes 2007 (The proliferation and circulation of Small Arms and Light weapon in Central Africa : study on the phenomenon and critical analysis of the control mechanism of arms, University of Yaounde 2, 2007)

Ÿ Statistics of arms and ammunition seizures during 2009-2011 by the Gendarmerie Nationale and Police Headquaters

Ÿ Chabi Dramane Bouko : La circulation des armes légères et de petit calibre en Afrique de l'ouest: contribution à une étude au programme de désarmement, 2004. (Small Arms and Light weapon proliferation in West Africa: contribution to the disarmament programme), 2004

References / 89


THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA

Augustine Ikelegbe Ph. D

With the Assistance of Joseph Ochongwu, Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, AbujaTowmwarriEgeran, University of Benin, Benin City.Surulola Eke, University of Benin, Benin City.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL ISSUES

2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

3. PROLIFERATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

3.1 THE ECONOMICS OF SALW: DEMAND, SUPPLY, AND PRICES

3.2 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE

3.3 TYPE AND DISTRIBUTION

4. SOURCES OF SALW

4.1 ARMS CACHES

4.2 ILLICIT CRAFT PRODUCTION

4.3 ARMS RE-CIRCULATION

4.4 ARMS AGENTS AND DEALERS

5. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW TRAFFICKING

5.1 SALW TRAFFICKING IN NIGERIA

5.2 REGIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER TRAFFICKING

5.2.1 Land Borders

5.2.2 Maritime Borders

6. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS

6.1 REGULATORY POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT

6.2 COLLECTION AND DESTRUCTION

6.3 RETRIEVAL AND INTERCEPTIONS OF ILLICIT SALW

6.4 DISARMAMENT

Table of Content

Table of Content / / THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA 93

95

96

97

99

99

99

102

102

102

103

103

104

105

107

108

110

110

112

112

113

116

116

117

118

118

7. FINDINGS

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 TO THE GOVERNMENTS

8.2 TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND CITIZENS

9. CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

APPENDIX

94 THE SITUATION IN NIGERIA / Table of Content /

119

120

120

121

122

124

129

Executive SummaryThis paper examines the phenomenon of the proliferation, use, and trafficking of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Nigeria as part of an overall study on SALW trafficking in West Africa. Particular emphasis was on the sources and methods of SALW flows, and the existing regulatory policies and frameworks for SALW control.

In the last two decades, Nigeria has been particularly plagued by violent conflicts including inter-communal and intra-communal and ethnic conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, inter-regional tensions, religious riots, and political conflicts. Nigeria has become a huge market for domestic, regional, and international arms dealers and syndicates; a major destination of SALW flows; and a centre of illicit trafficking. With the government unable to provide security for its citizens in certain regions, many have resulted to taking up arms and thus, driving the largest proliferation and use of SALW in Nigeria's peacetime history.

The research team conducted a number of interviews with relevant persons as well as conducted extensive desk research. The study utilized the country's six geo-political zones and the federal capital territory as units for the research, which were selected on the basis of centrality or relevance to SALW trafficking, production, and use. Based on its findings the research team estimates that the number of illicit SALW in Nigeria has at least doubled since the 2000-2003 estimates between one and three million to between three to six million. The research team estimates that about 1 in 50 Nigerians (mainly male, youth, middle and upper socio-economic classes) possess illicit arms.

The demand for SALW has risen in the last decade and with a consistent domestic market and constant inflow, arms are widely and easily available. With an increase in the arms-bearing groups and a rise in armed conflict and violent criminality major conflict points in the country have extended. Legal SALW for official use have been diverted to illegal use, mainly through leakages from unsecured official stockpiles of security agencies. Illicit craft production in Nigeria is growing in sophistication and provides more affordable arms. There is massive illicit SALW inflow through the maritime borders, from Sahelian Africa through very porous northern borders, and from West Africa through the South West borders.

Without effective controls or methods of deterrence, the already high levels of SALW proliferation in Nigeria will continue to increase as will insecurity amongst citizens. The existing laws need to be reviewed, as they are weak and inconsistent with the current security challenges. There should be strict enforcement and compliance with all firearms laws. A national arms control strategy must be adopted and accompanied with an aggressive arms mop-up operation in conflict zones. Safeguarding Nigeria's borders must also be a priority.

Executive Summary / 95

96 / Introduction

Introduction

With a population of over 167 million, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. The nation has vast human resources, enormous oil and gas reserves, expansive arable land, and huge export earnings. After a period of prolonged military rule, democratic presidential rule was instituted in 1999. The country faces the threat from terrorist armed groups, violent crime and huge inequalities. It is estimated that there are 20 million unemployed youth (ECOWAS Commission 2011), which has been associated with incidences of youth violence and participation in crime and conflict.

In the last two decades, the country has been particularly plagued by violent conflicts. There have been inter-communal and intra-communal and ethnic conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, inter-regional tensions, religious riots, and political conflicts. Different types of non- state actors (NSA) such as militias, religious groups, vigilantes and youth groups often initiated conflicts. Armed criminal groups have taken to bank robberies and kidnapping, and the federal government is facing challenges managing its national security environment with large areas of the country lacking adequate policing. As a result of these circumstances, insecurity has been a huge concern to citizens.

The abovementioned situation has created a fertile ground for small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation and Nigeria has become a significant market for domestic, regional, and international arms dealers and syndicates; a major destination of SALW flows; and a centre of illicit trade. This paper, therefore, investigates the phenomenon of illicit arms proliferation, possession, use, and trafficking in Nigeria, with particular emphasis on the sources and methods of SALW flows, trafficking, production, recirculation, and the existing regulatory policies and frameworks for SALW control.

First, a background about the political and contemporary context to understand arms proliferation in Nigeria will be provided, followed by the objectives of the study. The methodology section outlines the research method utilized, the limitations experienced, and a brief conceptual and analytical clarification. Thereafter, the study examines SALW proliferation and ownership structures, the sources of SALW, patterns and methods of SALW flows both domestically and regionally, and the regulatory frameworks for SALW control. Finally, the findings, policy recommendations and concluding comments are presented.

1.1 BackgroundImmediately following independence in 1960, Nigeria experienced political tensions and violence. Between 1962 and 1966 different ethnic and regional groups began acquiring illicit arms in anticipation of a national crisis. Arms proliferation, however, did not become a serious challenge until the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970). During the war, both the federal troops and rebels received weapons from the West, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, neighbouring countries, and arms dealers. In absence of an arms collection programme after the war these weapons became the first source of massive proliferation leading to the emergence of violent criminality.

Serving military regimes between 1985 and 1999, the country experienced a rise in criminality, youth gangs, and other non- state groups in a number of universities and towns. As a result, there was an increase in communal, ethnic, and regional tensions and conflicts; street protests and riots; militant movements; pervasive corruption; the militarization of society; and lawlessness. These conditions drove the demand for SALW and fuelled SALW proliferation throughout Nigeria. Arms became widely available with returning soldiers smuggling in weapons after peacekeeping operations, the production of local illicit weapons, and transnational trafficking by arms dealers and smugglers (Best and Von Kemedi, 2005).

Many Nigerians viewed the emergence of democratic rule in 1999 as a celebration of freedom including the opportunity to resist oppression and marginality. During this time numerous militant movements emerged and constructed a regime of violent engagements within and between ethnic groups, communities, and regions as well as against the State and transnational companies. Violent political and electoral struggles immediately before the 2003 general elections along with a massive rise in violent criminality and insecurity led to an increased demand for SALW. With such a large market, trafficking and trade in SALW reached unprecedented levels. In most of Nigeria's geo-political zones (North Central, South East, South South and South West) communal, ethnic, and ethno-religious conflicts have been fought with advanced arms and used by various militia groups. Between 1997 and 2009 in the South South (Niger Delta), various armed youth groups engaged with the federal government, law enforcement agencies, and transnational oil companies in a low intensity war over oil benefits and control. In the South West, between 1999 and 2005, a militia confronted the police and various non- state actors. In the South East, an armed vigilante group emerged across several states in resistance to violent criminality. In the South East, South West, and South South (Niger Delta), a regime of

Executive Summary / 97

rampant armed and violent criminality created an enormous sense of insecurity. Often times criminals numbering 30 or more and with very sophisticated arms have attacked banks, operated on the roads, and confronted law enforcement agents (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).

The South South, North East, and North Central regions have experienced incessant violent ethno-communal conflicts over struggles for ownership of land and water in which both sophisticated and locally made guns have been frequently used. The seeming inability of the government to manage these conflicts has left room for them to continue unabated. In parts of the South West, South East, and mainly the South South, an armed gang culture has emerged in which youth groups, gangs, and criminal syndicates use and flaunt SALW freely (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).

In the North East and North Central armed fundamentalist movements have emerged periodically since the 1980s and have taken a toll on civilians and law enforcement agencies. Currently, these regions continue to suffer the worst form of internal security challenges arising from sectarian violence, terrorism, and urban guerrilla-like warfare (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).

The recent emergence of atrocious violence conducted by Boko Harm and associated socio-political groups are fuelling new proliferation and the rapid build-up of arms stocks across the nation. Non-state groups (NSG) in the South South, South East, and South West as well as former militia members have begun to arm themselves and acquire more weapons in response to the Boko Haram insurgency (Interview, Lagos 29/2/12).

98 / Introduction

Methodology / 99

METHODOLOGYThe study is based on two principal sources of data: primary and secondary. Primary data was derived from direct interviews with a range of relevant persons identified. Interviews have been conducted with members of national governmental bodies in charge of law enforcement and security as well as with non- governmental organizations. The former include members of the police, state security services, military taskforces, customs, Immigration, the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corp (NSCDC)), the National Committee on SALW (NATCOM) and state governments. The remaining interviewees belonged to different types of non-state armed groups such as members of militias, vigilante and youth groups; religious groups; community and political leaders; blacksmiths and artisans; professional drivers and traders; and university students.

Secondary data was obtained through library and internet-based desk research and drawn from literature, reports, documents, newspapers, and magazines.

The sampling technique for the selection of communities and persons was purposive, based on relevance to the objectives of the research.

The study utilized the country's six geo-political zones and the federal capital territory as units for the research. Cities, towns, and communities within the zones were selected on the basis of centrality or relevance to SALW trafficking, production, and use. Thus, among others, interviews were carried out in Abuja, Port Harcourt, Awka, Owerri, Asaba, Warri, Lagos, Seme, Ibadan, Jos, Wukari, and Kamba (see Appendix 1). In the coastal communities of the Niger Delta interviews were held at Agge, Ekeremor, Amabolou, Buguma, Kula, Ijetu, Peremobiri, Olokpobiri, Oboro, Tuomo, Torugbene, Ojoba, Ogbe-Ijo, and Okerenkoko (see Appendix 2). In total, 133 respondents were interviewed. The exact spatial and organizational distribution of the respondents is presented in Appendix 1 and 2.

The primary data were analyzed qualitatively. Some of the information derived has been used to map the phenomenon, or as illustrating examples throughout the report. The secondary data are presented in tables and diagrams throughout the report.

2.1 Conceptual and Analytical IssuesSALW refer to the “cheap, simple, portable, durable and widely available arms; held and operated by individuals or two to three persons; and used in violent conflicts,

armed violence and criminality. Small arms are used by one person while light weapons are used by several persons working together” (Onuoha2011: 51). Academics, as well as other local and international actors are paying considerable attention to the relation between SALW and conflicts, including their occurrence, recurrence, duration and intensity and the link between SALW and criminality as well as (Duquet 2009). SALW pose a significant challenge to law and order and a high risk to personal security (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) (2001: 1) observes that:

The proliferation and misuse of small arms is endangering personal security, undermining good governance, contributing to violations of human rights, and undermining social justice, development and peace in all parts of the world.

A major characteristic of illicit SALW is their movement through trafficking and smuggling across national and regional borders. The end of the Cold War and the deregulation of former state arms industries in Eastern and Central Europe led to an aggressive search for new arms markets in the developing world. The illicit trafficking of SALW is a transnational and global activity that has been able to operate outside national and international regulatory institutions. In analysing how SALW enter into the black market, Stohl (2005: 63) provides a graphic explanation:

… weapons become one part of an illicit network that deals in drugs, guns, jewels, art, humans, and anything else worth trading through unofficial channels. While some dealers may specialize in weapons, most are plugged into the general international underground economy. These networks operate across borders with an international cast of characters, staying one step ahead of [the] law. However, the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is central to many of these networks, and in many cases, weapons are not only the desired commodity but also the method of payment.

There are certain conditions that facilitate illicit trafficking and smuggling into a country. Countries bordered by failed and conflict-ridden states face immense difficulties in controlling illicit SALW flows as fundamentalist cells, cartels, mafias, and syndicates infiltrate and supply them to sympathy groups. Conditions of insecurity, violence, criminality, poverty, and unemployment create a situation where the possession of SALW becomes a critical resource as well as a source of empowerment and employment. SALW proliferation and use also has implications on the nature of politics and governance. Both the politics of violence and the violence in politics in

100 / Methodology

Africa have led to proliferation of arms. Armed groups, governments, and political leaders are all implicated in the formation and arming of NSG's in pursuance of political interests (Ikelegbe, 2010).

2.2 Limitations of the StudyThe study has several limitations. None of the law enforcement agencies studied uses a system of centralized data collection, storage or analysis and a major share of the data are classified. As a result, the data used in this study, including information on SALW, are often disparate, inconsistent, and inaccurate. The available information on the registering, sale, purchase, possession, use, stockpiling, production, and seizure of arms is therefore insufficient and contains major gaps, resulting in an absence of baseline data.

In addition, most Nigerians find it unsafe to discuss the topic or volunteer to disclose information. Existing legislation and practice tend to directly link gun ownership with armed robbery, which has rendered it a very sensitive issue. The highly sensitive nature of the research subject has led to major problems regarding access and consent for interviews as interviewees expressed doubt about the intentions and motives of the research. This prompted the researchers to limit the range and substantive content of questions. Researchers faced significant security risks, often limiting research activities.

Methodology / 101

102 / Proliferation and ownership structure

3. PROLIFERATION AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTUREThere are no accurate records or documentation on the number of SALW in Nigeria; there are only estimates. In 2001, the Minister of Defence estimated there to be one million illicit SALW in circulation (Agbonton-Johnson, Ebo&Mazal, 2004), 2004). Other estimates state that about 70% of the eight to ten million SALW in West Africa are in Nigeria (Bello, 2010),the majority of which are possessed illegally (Hazen and Horner, 2007). In support of the evidence above, there are an estimated 1.5 firearms per 100 persons and about 0.71 illicit firearms per 100 people (Karp, 2007).

3.1 The Economics of SALW: Demand, Supply, and PricesGuns such as barrels, pistols, pump-action, and AK-47s are fairly easy to purchase since there are ready markets for them. Other weapons that are commonly traded include semi-automatic rifles, shotguns, machine-guns, and shoulder-fired rockets (bazookas). The prices have differed across time and place, although prices were generally higher about 10 years ago (Table 1). Weapons were readily available for purchase in Warri at prices that ranged from around US$570 for a shotgun, US$850 for a Kalashnikov rifle, to US$2,150 for a 'bazooka' (Onuoha, 2011).

TABLE 1: Reported Prices of AK-47 Assault Rifles in Nigeria, 2003-07

Date of Purchase Price (USD)

Late 2003 1, 700

December 2004 1, 000

May 2005 300

November 2006 1, 000 – 1, 500

December 2006 1, 500 – 2, 500

March 2007 400

Source: Von Kemedi (2006)

3.2 Ownership StructureThe information derived out of this research suggests that SALW are owned by a variety of actors, including various non- state groups (i.e. youth groups and vigilantes), criminals as well as certain businessmen, and politicians. It is estimated that, at the least one out of every five active politicians in Nigeria possess a gun. In the South East for example, data derived from interviews suggest that at least one in four businessmen and politicians possess SALW, particularly pump-action, AK-47s, imported rifles, and pistols (Interviews, Owerri, 10/2/12).

3.3 Type and Distribution of arms and ammunitionThe SALW that are commonly used include pump-action shotguns; locally made guns; assault rifles, such as the AK-47, Mag 4 rifles, SA Vz.58, G3, FN FNC, and FN FAL; and, light machine guns. (Interviews, Owerri 10/2/12).

Many wealthy Nigerians alledgedly use automatic rifles, imported pistols, and customized arms. The foreign made double-barrel gun is common among public servants and retirees. Most top public servants tend to have non-prohibited arms. It is alleged that some businessmen possess arms for protection, only some of which are licensed. It is alleged that some businessmen are often responsible for arming gangs that perpetrate violence and criminality. Politicians also tend to possess many arms, particularly AK-47s and customized pistols. (Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).

Campus groups and religious groups mainly use locally made pistols although they also obtain foreign made pistols purchased from police and security agencies. Town or street groups have more expensive arms such as locally made and imported riffles, because they tend to have more patrons and money. The more sophisticated armed groups and kidnappers often use rifles, AK-47s, MAG 4s, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), KPMGs, and rocket launchers while local criminals tend to possess barrels and locally made pistols.(Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).

In the South East, Lagos in the South West, and the Edo and Delta states in the South South, there are pockets of towns and cities with a strong presence of militias. Members of those militia groups carry double-barrel guns and have access to arms caches, which have reportedly been licensed and controlled by the police. However, they often choose to carry pump-action shotguns.

In the South West, illegally possessed SALW are rampant among members of the National Union of Road Transport Workers, who are often recruited and armed by political 'godfathers' to further their political objectives (Interviews, Ibadan, 23/3/12).

4. SOURCES OF SALW

4.1 Arms CachesInformation gathered from interviews (Coastal towns of Niger Delta, February 2012) shows that SALW caches exist among non- state groups, criminals, politicians and community leaders. Evidence shows that major stockpiles are abundant in the conflict-ridden regions of Nigeria. In the Niger Delta, the fact that the militia

Sources of SALW / 103

resurgence has an abundance of arms demonstrates that they clearly have access to major arms stockpiles.

Politicians and government officials allegedly acquire and stock arms prior to party primaries and electoral competitions. In the northern cities, traders and others have stocked arms in order to fight back against religious fundamentalists and rioters in Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, and other towns. Traders and markets in the South East often keep arms caches as a means to arm their vigilantes (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, 2012).

Many communities that have experienced or are currently experiencing conflict have access to arms caches that are kept by community leaders and youth leaders to protect against attacks from neighbouring communities and future communal and ethnic clashes. This is common in the North Central, parts of the South East, and the Niger Delta. The struggle to control community leadership and politics also drives the demand for SALW. Community leaders and factions from Ojobo, Okpokonou, Torugbene, Oboro, and Tuomor in Delta State and Agge, Ekeremor, and Amabolou in Bayelsa state have all maintained arms caches as part of their struggles to control community politics (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, February 2012). During the amnesty programme in the Niger Delta (2009), SALW were not thoroughly searched for nor were they recovered. Therefore, stockpiles of arms still exist in the creeks and in remote communities. The evidence of un-surrendered arms is seen in the discrepancy between the sophisticated arms in the militant armouries, such as the G3, FAL, GMP, and RPGs, and those that were surrendered. The militias surrendered mostly old arms and maintained newer ones. In the post-amnesty era many new arms have entered into circulation, such as the K2 (Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12). Some ex-militants still have arms caches and sell arms as indicated by interviews in Koloama, Olokpobiri, Peremabiri, Ijetu and Agge in Bayelsa State and Okerenkoko, OgbeIjo and Koko in Delta State. The dominant SALW stockpile are handguns, revolver pistols, pump-action, AK-47s, submachine guns, Beretta automatic rifles, assault rifles, Kalasil curves, GPMGs, FN rifles, RPGs, brandy guns, artillery guns, hand grenades, 81 mm mortars, and ammunition.

There are also several militant groups, leaders, and militants that either did not surrender at the initial stages of the amnesty or are aggrieved because of inequitable distribution of amnesty benefits. New and splinter ex-militant groups are emerging and being armed (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).

104 / Sources of SALW

4.2 Illicit Craft ProductionLocally produced small arms or craft weapons are widely available in Nigeria. They are inexpensive and robust copies of imported factory-made SALW such as revolvers, short guns, and rifles. Simple and crudely produced weapons in small quantities are rampant whereas more advanced ones are rare (Karp, 2007).

The industrial zones in the South East, such as Aba and Awka, serve as hotspots for more advanced production (Onuoha, 2011). The craft production of weapons is not entirely illegal in Nigeria. According to the 1959 Firearms Act, only the transfer of non-marked firearms is illegal. Craft production on the other hand is legal when the craftsman is licensed by the government, and thereby authorized to produce firearms. According to Hazen and Horner (2007), attempts to bring craft weapons under the legal framework in Nigeria have been partly successful by giving many of these weapons an ad hoc serial number and licensing their owners. However, field evidence suggests that a vast majority of locally produced small arms are still manufactured and purchased without licenses. Difficulty in tracing points of production coupled with frequent police harassment has kept the main local craft manufacturers underground. In Awka, in the Anambra State, local production of SALW takes place in hidden or underground shops under the cover of official business shops where they produce and deliver to customers on request (Interview, Awka, 2012).

Figure 1


The predominance of craft weapon production in Awka is evidenced by the common reference to craft weapons as 'Awka-made'. Awka has an artisanal history with blacksmith and gunmaking skills being transferred through several generations. Awka was a center of production of guns, bombs (Ogbunigwe), gun-powder but also for repairs. It is also claimed to be the centerpoint of dissemination of these skills across the nation. As an Awka blacksmith claimed, any gun or metal can be reproduced as long as they are provided with a sample (Interview, Amawbia-Awka, 2012). There are associations that control the blacksmith business and there is a ban on gun production. However, others who are non-natives in the villages around Awka or that have been trained in Awka but live elsewhere still produce arms. Today these blacksmiths continue to produce barrel guns, pistols, revolvers, rifles, gun-powder, and local bombs (see Table 2). However, the industry is declining as it is no longer popular among the younger generation and is becoming more of a trade for the poor. The blacksmiths of Awka continue to transfer their skills to other parts of Nigeria through apprenticeship (Onuoha, 2011).

Apart from Awka, there are several other centres of SALW production. In the South East, Onitsha and Aba are key centres of production. In Rivers State, locally made pistols, short guns, and double-barrels are produced in Eleme. In Benue and Aqua Ibom States, some craftsmen are able to perfectly copy or replicate pistols and AK-47s. Police have also uncovered evidence of local arms fabrication in Barkin Ladi and Kuru within the jurisdiction of the Jos South local government in the area of Plateau State (Onuoha, 2011:54).

Table 2: Locally-produced SALW in Awka

Weapon Ammunition Cost

Pocket single-shot handgun Various calibres of shotgun

cartridge

NGN 4000/USD 32

Four-shot revolver 9 mm, 7.5mm, or 8.5mm NGN 8, 000/ USD 64

Eight-shot revolver Various calibre of shotgun

cartridge

NGN 10, 000 – 11, 000/ USD

80 – 88

Horizontal double-barrel

shotgun

Various calibre of shotgun

cartridge

NGN 25, 000 – 30, 000/ USD

200 – 240

Vertical double-barrel

shotgun

Various calibre of shotgun

cartridge

NGN 45, 000/ USD 360

Source: Karp, 2007


Local production is quite low in most states owing to the fact that the industry relies on traditional blacksmiths. Even in states with limited arms proliferation, local blacksmiths or craftsmen produce not only local guns for hunting purposes but also more advanced ones that are to be traded beyond state borders (Interview, Kamba 3/3/12). In addition, there have been some police seizures of moulds for fabricating arms, pipes, machine tools, and assorted instruments for manufacturing arms in the North West and South West (Nigeria 2004, 78-92; Appendix 3).

In conflict zones, local craft production prospers. In the Jos conflict, some remote villages were found hosting blacksmiths who specialize in manufacturing poisoned bows and arrows as well as short, single, and double-barrels guns (Interviews, Jos, 2012).

There are currently no records on the amount of locally produced arms. According to an ex-militant, there are about 30 blacksmiths in Awka, Aba, and Onitsha that supply the illegal market, each capable of making up to 150 guns per year (Interview, Southern Ijaw, 2012). It is known, however, that demand for locally made SALW was high until the 1980s, but when patronage began to decline, a decline of production followed. Locally manufactured or locally made pistols and barrels are mainly utilized by those who cannot afford imported ones. Patronage, therefore, has been present among various non- state groups, including hunters, cattle herders, vigilante groups, and local criminal gangs. A September 2005 survey in Bayelsa State revealed that locally produced SALW constituted 20% of the arms in possession by non-state actors (Isumonah, Tantua & James 2005).

4.3 Arms Re-CirculationThere has been a fairly high incidence of flows from legal SALW becoming illicit SALW. This includes seizures of state stock by militia and criminal group attacks on military and police posts, stations, and checkpoints as well as direct confrontations with law enforcement agencies. Arms from government stockpiles have been recovered in the Niger Delta during the militia-military confrontations and also in the North East during confrontations between Boko Haram and law enforcement agencies.

The major sources of arms deviation are the military and police armouries. In November 2008 six Nigerian Army soldiers were convicted of selling over 7,000 SALW to Niger Delta militants between January 2000 and December 2006 (Onuoha, 2011). According to some ex-militia sources, on one occasion an official was paid N100 million and distributed thousands of arms illegally removed from the Nigerian military


arms stocks including rifles, GPMGs, UMGs, and rocket launchers (Interview, Southern Ijaw,March 2012). Police and military officers, particularly those in armouries, often sell arms and escort customer purchased arms for fees. Short term hiring or renting out of authorized SALW to criminals for a fee is another widespread practice. (Interview, Abuja December 2011). The similarities between legal SALW stocks and the types of SALW in the supplies of NSG's and the illegal arms market, such as the G3, AK-47, and Beretta, provide further evidence of arms re-circulation from state armouries. Certain guns, such as the AK-47 and MAG 4, are mainly from the military stocks (Interview, Port Harcourt, 2012).

Leakages from state armouries into the illicit market are mainly the result of poor record-keeping and stockpile management. State armouries are not strictly documented, secured, monitored, controlled or managed. The discipline and technical capacity of armoury officials are severely lacking. The breakdown of state structures, lax controls over national depots and poor service conditions of security personnel also account for the leakages from official stocks (Interview, Owerri 2012).

Legal weapons also find their way into the illicit markets through ex-military and serving military personnel. Some rogue military and mobile police personnel are said to be involved in the racket of sales, movement, and flow of the illicit arms to Jos (Interview, Jos 2012). Some of these groups sell military type assault rifles such as the AK-47, MAG4, and ammunition obtained from the Kaduna Military Training Schools stocks (Interview, Jos, 2012). An incentive based SALW retrieval effort in Imo State, that occurred between 2007 and 2011, found that the arms recovered originated mainly from security agencies (Interview, Owerri 10/02/12).

Transnational criminal syndicates are also involved in the re-circulation of arms in the region. Robbers sometimes come into Nigeria from Benin with weapons previously trafficked into Nigeria and then returning them back to Benin after the robbery operations (Interviews, Lagos, March 2012). An ex-militia general from Bayelsa State allegedly used the Rio-Del route in Bakassi Peninsula to raid Cameroonian gendarmes and soldiers and transfer seized guns and ammunitions through Calabar and Ibino-Iket to Bayelsa (Interviews, Southern Ijaw March 2012).

4.4 Arms Agents and DealersIllicit arms trade is undoubtedly a lucrative business in Nigeria. There is a fairly high demand for arms and there are few sanctions because of weak law enforcement. Moreover, the restrictive national policies on possession of arms have accelerated


black market sales. The presence of foreign-made weapons in circulation, as evidenced by the nature of arms seized by security personnel, indicates that imported SALW are dominantly gaining entrance into the country (Alemika, 2011: 132-134; (see Appendix 3-5).

Nigeria has a system of registered arms dealers that legally supply arms, explosives, and tear gas to official sources and sell non-prohibited licensed firearms for gaming. However, there are allegedly some that operate without a license and some licensed dealers that are involved in illicit trade. In the 1990s a major arms procurement company in Lagos had most of its licenses revoked because its dealers moved beyond approved arms or dealt in both legal and illegal arms (Interview, Port Harcourt, 2012).

Some gun dealers are known to provide fake licenses for illegal guns; for instance, licensing a pump-action gun with 12 cartridges as a barrel gun. Most SALW dealers or traders in Nigeria operate on a small scale and in secrecy and many are located in the South East and South South. Local dealers transport few units for sale across the country at a time. The level of trading by the unlicensed arms dealers is indicated by the seizures usually along the highways. Upon arrest, an illegal dealer based in the Edo State was found to have sold about 68 pump-actions guns around Auchi, Benin, and Abuja (Interview, Abuja, 2011).

In the Niger Delta, arms dealers operate on a large scale and supply assault rifles such as the AK-47, G-3, FN-FAL, as well as machine guns, and RPGs to militias. In some circumstances, arms dealers are sought out and patronized by government officials in a highly clandestine matter. Information gathered from interviews revealed that past political executives in Rivers State have purchased arms from traders based in Russia and distributed them to party and political leaders as well as some militant leaders (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).

Herdsmen, who mostly migrate along largely un-governed West African cattle grazing routes, are known to carry arms for protection and trading. There have been allegations of herdsmen being involved in armed conflict and criminality in the North East and North Central zones including trafficking arms from Chad,; Niger, Sudan (Darfur), Central African Republic, and Chad (Interviews, Jos, 2012).

Criminal gangs are also engaged in trafficking and trading. In Jos, criminal gangs have taken advantage of the crises to trade arms for profit and steal from the individuals that patronize them (Interviews, Jos, 2012).


5. PATTERNS AND DYNAMICS OF SALW TRAFFICKING

5.1 SALW Trafficking in NigeriaConflict prone areas are the main destination points for arms in the country. Arms dealers from Onitsha and Nnewi in Anambra State, for example, bring in pump-action guns with cartridges AA and BB calibre to conflict ridden areas of the North Central and North East and in the Taraba and Plateau States. Traders from Saminaka and Pambegwa in Kaduna State also transport and sell arms and ammunition alongside other commodities in Jos. Guns are also brought in from Bauchi and the Abuja-Nasarawa axis. Some herdsmen have specialized in arms trafficking to remote villages in the North Central and North East, where security presence is scanty Interviews, Jos, 2012 &Wukari, 2012).

In terms of use, the traders possess SALW with which they arm militias to protect the markets. Criminal gangs are also known to move arms across states for criminal operations. On November 20th 2011, two general multipurpose guns, 653 live rounds of ammunition, and 416 live rounds in chains were intercepted by security forces as they were reportedly being ferried from a neighbouring state into Anambra State (ECOWAS, 2011).

The smuggling and trading in SALW in the South East is driven by business and linked to the import/export trade. Businessmen import goods, including SALW, in containers which are often not thoroughly checked by law enforcement agencies at the ports and borders. Often these security officials are compelled to let in contraband goods and even escort smugglers to their destinations. In fact, the South East is the haven of SALW smugglers and dealers. The multitude of interceptions and arrests tend to confirm this (Interviews, Awka 2012). In the South East, arms smugglers use underground warehouses as arms dealing points which are indicated by signs that only dealers can decipher. The city of Onitsha has become a main hub for importing and trading in SALW. Abala, in Abia State, is also home to gun dealers and is renowned for selling various types of arms.

The towns known for the high availability of weapons and presence of arms markets include Asaba, Benin, Warri, Aba, Onitsha, Enugu, Owerri, Awka, and Port Harcourt. Some of the weapons from these markets also move further north and towards other regions, where they supply markets across the country. Aba, for example, plays a central role in the supply of used weapons to the local Rivers State market.

110 / Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking

In the South South the level of arms users is high as a result of the presence of various non- state groups, criminals and political violence.

The South West has a low presence of SALW, but is rather a gateway and transit route. This region has an international airport, seaports, and busy borders, making Lagos and the South West a major gateway for arms trafficking. Lagos serves as a stopgap in the arms trade and smuggling chain for weapons in transit to the South East and other regions. The dominant weapons in the region include barrels and pump-action guns, which are used by vigilante groups (Interviews, Jos, 2012 & Wukari, 2012).

The western flank of the North West region has very low levels of arms proliferation. Until recently, the arms used in the eastern flank of the region, such as around Kaduna, tend to originate from outside the country, particularly the AK-47s from Niger and Chad. With the Boko Haram insurgency and counter actions by non-Muslim natives in parts of Kaduna, the eastern flank is now experiencing extensive SALW proliferation (Interviews, Jos, 2012 & Wukari, 2012).

SALW proliferation levels and usage also differ within the geo-political zones. For example, more guns are available in Anambra than in Imo, which indicates that arms flow from Anambra to Imo State (Interviews, Awka, 2012). In Kogi State, there is a higher concentration of SALW around Okenne. Arms proliferation and use is also higher in cities. This is most likely because of the high presence of politicians, businessmen, criminals, underground business crimes, and vigilantes in major cities. In the rural areas, SALW proliferation and use are rare except where criminality and ethno-religious conflicts exist. Similarly, the vastness of rural areas often provides a cover up for criminals and their arms stockpiles.

Patterns and dynamics of SALW trafficking / 111

TABLE 3: SALW Entry and Distribution Points in Nigeria

Primary Entry Points Idi-Iroko, Seme, Lagos, Warri, Calabar,

Maigatari, Nguru, and Mallam Falori

Primary Distribution Points Onitsha, Nnewi, Owerri, Aba, Abala, Port

Harcourt, IkotEpene, Ikom, Awka

Secondary Distribution Points Jos, Ilorin, Makurdi, Wukari, Takum

Craft Production Centres Awka, Calabar, Kaduna, Katsina.

Source: Karp, 2007.

5.2 Regional and Cross-Border TraffickingThe illicit arms trade is an extensive, planned, and secretly executed business. This is one reason why official seizures and interceptions have been low. In addition, the level of security alertness to effectively combat illicit trafficking has been poor. Nigeria's lengthy and porous borders, high number of airports (local and international), and numerous seaports along the southern coast have often been identified as facilitating SALW trafficking.

The arms trade is not comparatively lucrative among Nigeria's neighbours; thus, the outflow of arms from Nigeria is low. In regards to inflow, there are source and transit countries from which arms eventually enter into Nigeria. Apart from neighbouring countries, illicit SALW are sourced out of Nigeria from Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, South Africa, Turkey, and Ukraine as well as Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Serbia (Peel, 2005; Hazen& Horner, 2007). Ikelegbe (2010) also identifies Benin, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Gabon, and Guinea Bissau as SALW trafficking routes.

Leading up to the 2003 elections, there were two prominent areas known as easy entry points for illegal weapons. The first was the land borders through Idi-lroko in Ogun State and Seme in Lagos State and the border with Niger and Cameroon in the North East (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004). The second was the ports, coastal areas, and surrounding communities, particularly Warri in the South South.

5.2.1 Land BordersCross-border trafficking by organized international arms dealers is a major source of SALW inflow to Nigeria (Hazen and Horner 2007). Nigeria shares 1500km of land border with Niger and Chad in the north, 1000km border with Benin on the west, and 1700 km border with Cameroon in the east (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004). Border control at the borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are very weak despite the presence of law enforcement agencies. It is alleged that in the neighbouring countries, agencies tasked with maintaining border security focus more on illicit arms trafficking in the border posts (Interviews, Seme, 2012), but despite this it is clear that without a consistent, reliable, or strong border security Nigeria is left extremely vulnerable to the trafficking of illicit goods, including SALW.

The SALW acquired by Boko Haram, which include pump-action guns, rifles, AK-47s, RPGs, G3 rifles, double-barrel guns, and improvised explosive devices (IED), have been traced back to Libya, Chad, and Sudan (Darfur). These SALW entered Nigeria from the northern and north-eastern borders with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. This can be supported by an incident in June 2011 in which Nigerian security agents intercepted a consignment of rocket launchers, grenades, and other arms along the Nigeria-Chad border (Onuoha, 2011).


The South West, the border with Benin, and the maritime borders were closely monitored when the conflicts in the Niger Delta escalated. As a result, smugglers shifted operations to the northern borders, which are vast, porous, un-manned, and serve as a trading point for various goods between countries. Likewise, the North Central and North East SALW supply originates mainly from the northern borders (Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12).

At official posts, such as the Seme border post, there have been no major seizures since 2009. During a few isolated incidents only single items,such as few units of American and French manufactured pistols hidden in imported vehicles, have been intercepted (Interviews, Port Harcourt 25/2/12). With a heavy security presence at large border posts, traffickers tend to use smaller and less known crossing points. Small border posts on the border with Benin are important centers for cross- border illicit trafficking to the Nigerian states of Oyo, Ogun, Kwara, and Niger. Some of these points, such as Bokurun in Kwara State, are used for smuggling arms into Nigeria by hiding them in vehicles (Adejo, 2005). Arms have been moved from Cameroon into Benue, Cross River, and Aqua Ibom States through crossing points such as ManfeIkom and Obudu. Weapons from Chad and Niger entered through northern land borders at Maigatari, Nguru, and MallamFalori and mainly serve northern clients (Adejo 2005).

There are regional arms markets from which arms are trafficked into Nigeria. Allegedly, Burkina Faso is used as a transit country by illicit traders in West Africa where various non-state actors acquire SALW (Interview, Lagos, 2012). There is also evidence of illicit trade in SALW through the Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria axis, with source points in Ghana. The Tudu arms market in Ghana is reportedly an important source for arms which are being trafficked into Nigeria through Togo and Benin (Olori, 2007).

Trafficking between Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria is allegedly conducted by Nigerian businessmen and driven by Nigerian demand. A cartel operates the illegal arms market and assembles the arms in Ghana. It subsequently smuggles arms to illegal border posts and border villages by sea and road from where the Nigerian contacts take over. These arms eventually arrive in Lagos for outward distribution. (Interviews, Lagos, 2012).

5.2.2Maritime BordersNigeria has an Atlantic coastline of about 700km: without adequate or effective surveillance also Nigeria's maritime borders are porous. The Atlantic Ocean coastal flank is a black box, an area where ships and people from different countries berth.


Smuggling through major seaports has been difficult and rare. Recent measures such as scanning of containers by customs and consultants, physical examination of non-homogenous goods, the offloading and bagging of grains at the ports, and the physical examination of goods and containers by law enforcement agencies have helped to reduce illicit goods importation through the ports. Illicit arms movement through the ports has not been rampant; though occasionally port authorities intercepted illicit arms (Interviews, Lagos, 2012). An extreme case occurred in 2010 when 13 containers of heavy arms were intercepted and the arms comprised various mortar bombs, rockets, and hand grenades (Ohia, 2010).

The demand for small arms in the Niger Delta region of the country, coupled with its vast and mostly unguarded waters makes it a logical place for the reception of shipments. Weapons entering the south, especially the Niger Delta area, appear to be acquired through more direct means such as cash payments or the bartering of oil for arms between armed groups and offshore ships (Hazen and Horner, 2007). The Niger Delta ports function as an important hub for local arms dealers. Illicit arms are offloaded at the ports and then channelled through distribution networks, particularly in Akwalbom and Anambra States. The availability of private jets in the Niger Delta and other coastal areas has promoted smuggling and SALW trafficking. Some shipping companies as well as pirates operating in the coastal and maritime areas have allegedly been involved in transport of illicit SALW. The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency has recently rang the alarm bell about incessant pirate attacks and the influx of arms and ammunitions through the waterways (Oritse, 2012).

According to information obtained through interviews, international arms syndicates, mostly of Eastern European origin, are operating in the maritime waters, and exchange weapons for stolen crude oil. They mainly collaborate with militia groups and business syndicates who steal crude oil in barges and tankers from pipelines and pipeline intersections. The arms are transhipped from vessels standing off the Niger Delta coast by militias in speedboats. Some of the barges, which are thought to be filled with crude oil, are actually filled with arms. Trafficking of this kind has reportedly increased since 1999 and may be the source of large-scale in-flows of SALW into Nigeria (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, 2012).

After offloading, the arms are brought to Koloama and Ijetu, located at the mouth of River Dodo. The weapons are then transported through the Forcadoes River to Burutu, Warri and its environs, Agge at the mouth of River Raymos through to Ekeremor, and Kula at mouth of Saint Nicholas River, which is connected to River Nun. Numerous illegal crossing points to communities exist on these rivers, unknown to


customs and other security authorities (Interviews, Coastal towns of Niger Delta, 2012).

Nigeria's maritime neighbours, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau, are also sources of SALW smuggling. The major maritime smuggling hub is located in the Warri region, where smugglers from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, and Cameroon reportedly use speedboats to reach offshore ships and purchase guns. These weapons are then sold to communities in Warri, where they are further trafficked to other parts of the country (Best and Von Kemedi 2005).

It is also alleged that airline crews and shipmen are involved in illegal trafficking via airplane or vessel. Guns such as pistols and customized arms are smuggled through the ports (air and sea) by shipmen and aircrew via containers. These are sometimes sealed in black rubber and cello taped to prevent detection by scanners. Also Nigerians from the diaspora reportedly have entered the country with concealed arms, but usually in small quantities (Interview, Ozoro, 2012).

Figure 2


6. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKSDifferent laws, policies, and regulations constitute the regulatory framework for the control, retrieval, collection, and destruction of illicit SALW in Nigeria.

6.1 Regulatory Policy and EnforcementThe Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959, and its amendment of 1990, prohibit the illegal possession, transfer, manufacture, assembly, repair, shortening, and trading of personal firearms and prescribe a jail term of less than 5 years for infringement. The Act also prohibits the illegal possession, manufacture, importation, and exportation of non-personal firearms and prescribes a minimum of 10 years imprisonment for infringement.

The Nigerian police are the central agency charged with enforcing regulations concerning SALW. The police are responsible for issuing licenses for non- prohibited firearms (single and double-barrels), and the licensing of gun dealers. Government licensed dealers are allowed to sell non-prohibited firearms licensed for gaming such as single and double-barrel shotguns and sports guns.

Apart from the Nigerian police, which are responsible for enforcing the Act, also the Department of State Services and Nigeria Customs deal with SALW control. Other agencies such as Nigerian Immigration and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency are also involved as they report incidences to the appropriate agencies in the course of their duties. The National Civil Defence Corps registers and monitors private security groups (PSG), which sometimes have or use licensed firearms. In an attempt to curb SALW proliferation, regional, continental, and international instruments have been developed. Among those instruments are the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS)'s Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Ammunition and other related materials (2006); the Bamako Declaration on the Common African Position on Proliferation, Circulation and Illicit trade in SALWs (2000); and the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW (UNPoA). The ECOWAS Convention and ECOWAS Small Arms Control Programme requires member states to establish commissions which develop and implement national policies against SALW proliferation and illicit circulation. In Nigeria, the National Committee on the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NATCOM) was established as a specialized institution for SALW control. NATCOM, which is comprised of all security and intelligence agencies and domiciled in the Ministry of Defence, has largely been inactive. Even the national survey on SALW proliferation, embarked upon since 2010, is still at the national public dialogue stage. The National Task Force to Combat Illegal Importation and Smuggling

116 / Regulatory frameworks

of Goods, Small Arms and Light Weapons (NATFORCE) is another institution established to monitor, combat, and contain illegal cross-border flows.

Nigeria has yet to domesticate the conventions and agreements. NATCOM has yet to transmute into a commission. Only recently, the Ministry of Defence closed NATCOM's office and disbanded the committee (Interview, Nigerian Pilot, 13/08/2012). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently organized public dialogues on SALW controls in the different Nigerian geopolitical zones. The question of which institution is responsible for managing SALW proliferation and control however remains.

In 2004, the Government of Nigeria announced a ban on the all licensing of all firearms as part of an effort to reduce the arms in circulation. This means that as a result, the majority of arms and particularly those that have been trafficked, sold, and possessed since 2004 are illicit (Iroegbu 2012).

The massive proliferation of illicit arms in spite of national laws suggests that existing instruments for monitoring and enforcement are not effective. Current government regulatory policies are compromised by the lack of enforcement and rampant corruption. The internal mechanism of security agencies to combat illicit arms is also poor as many agencies face various limitations and challenges. Culprits are rarely prosecuted and are often freed after being caught with illicit arms. Efforts to control and enforce infringements of the laws on possession and trade in illicit SALW are often thwarted at the judiciary level where such offenders are released on bail. Since government officials and political leaders are often complicit in the arms trade the political will to control the proliferation and use of illicit arms can also be described as non-existent. As a result of compromised security agencies, weak legal systems, and the lack of political wil, larms dealers and smugglers are able to continue their opperations throughout the country (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).

6.2 Collection and DestructionThe aim of government regulations has been to quickly reduce the quantity of illicit SALW in circulation. During periods of intense inter-ethnic, communal, and group conflicts, the Federal Government enacts certain programmes, either as a solution or part of a peace process, for armed groups to surrender their firearms to the nearest police stations or designated collection centres. There have also been periodic task forces such as the Police Special Task Force on the Recovery of Arms, which was set up in 2004. During the Jos crisis, the Special Task Force named 'Operation Safe Haven' was responsible for calling on residents to surrender their guns. However, the efforts of these government programmes and task forces have not yielded the desired results as they were not sustained and the targeted groups hardly responded.

Regulatory frameworks / 117

When SALW are retrieved they are stockpiled for destruction. In July 2001, about 428 riffles, 494 imported pistols, 287 locally made pistols, and 48 Dane guns were destroyed by the Federal Government. Between January 2002 and June 2003, about 1,902 assorted firearms and 13,271 rounds of ammunitions were collected for destruction (Agbonton-Johnson et al., 2004).

Due to corruption the actual destruction of retrieved arms can however, not always be guaranteed. When arms are ordered for disposal, they risk falling into the hands of unscrupulous officers who may divert them for pecuniary individual, group, or communal interests. Furthermore, poor documentation and data management on disposals has created a loophole for the retrieved arms to be diverted and recycled for illicit uses.

6.3 DisarmamentIn most states where communal, ethnic, and ethno-religious conflicts have been pervasive, there have not been disarmament programmes. Combatants return to their communities with their arms and build individual and community caches. This has been the case in conflicts in Taraba, Nasarawa, Benue, and Plateau States. After the Plateau Peace Conference in 2004, efforts have been made to disarm combatants, but the programme yielded little result as most people and communities kept their guns.

In the Niger Delta, there have been several disarmament programmes. In 2004, the Rivers State Amnesty programme offered payments for arms that were nearly twice the prevailing cost of the surrendered arms. About 1,466 weapons were surrendered. Taking advantage of this programme, the militia members profited by surrendering old arms, and subsequently purchasing new arms with the money received through the disarmament programme. For example, militants that surrendered an AK-47, were paid about N150, 000. After receiving compensation they purchased a new one for nearly N87, 000 to N100, 000, making a profit of about N50, 000. The profit not only served as an incentive for militia members to continue buying more and advanced arms but also empowered them to do so. In the 2009 Amnesty programme, militants surrendered over 30,500 guns including some sophisticated ones. The success was said to be contingent on the benefits attached. Some of the militants, however, did not trust the amnesty but rather regarded it as bait and thus did not submit all the arms in their possession. Some militants are still hesitant to submit their arms, such as AK-47s, and others became involved in the arms trade (Interviews, Port Harcourt, 2012).

118 / Regulatory frameworks

7. FINDINGSThe research team notes that besides some unsubstantiated estimates, there were neither concrete baseline data nor a consistent record system upon which estimations and extrapolations could be based. Desk and field research have allowed generating data and patterns on SALW possession as well as on their seizure and surrender. However, those data are largely inaccurate and severe gaps remain, making a systematic and quantitative estimation of SALW difficult.

What is certain, however, is that the number of SALW in Nigeria has significantly risen since 2000-2003, when the number was estimated between one and three million. The evidence for this rests on the following:

i. The demand for SALW has risen astronomically in the last decade;ii. The declining prices of SALW are the result of increased supply rather than a

decreased demand;iii. The extension of conflict points beyond the Niger Delta, in particular in the

North Central and North East, have resulted in increased demand and supply; iv. The increase in arms bearing non-state groups including armed street groups;

militias in the Niger Delta; vigilante groups in the South East and parts of the South West; community and ethnic militias in the North Central; and a fundamentalist terror group in the North East, have led to an increased demand for SALW;

v. The rise in armed conflict and violent criminality has created rampant insecurity resulting in the emergence of armed vigilantes and community militias and thus, further driving the demand for arms;

vi. As a result of weak stockpile management, diversion from official stockpiles has become a major source of domestic supply of illicit SALW;

vii. The growing production of illicit SALW with types ranging from low-budget pistols to advanced weapons ,has been able to satisfy the SALW demand of the poor and communities in conflict but also professional militias and terror groups;

viii. The massive illicit SALW inflow through the high seas and maritime borders; through very porous northern borders from Sahelian Africa, and through the Southwest borders from West Africa has contributed to the increased arms proliferation.

Not only has there been an increase in proliferation but also a trend towards the use of more advanced arms. This is indicated by the arms possessed by militias, as revealed by disarmament programmes; the arms used by criminal in the South South, South East, and South West as well as the arms possessed by civilians, with the AK-47 becoming increasingly common, particularly among politicians.

Findings / 119

Given the peculiar circumstance of SALW flows, it is reasonable to estimate that the number of illicit arms has at least doubled and, therefore, currently ranges between three and six million. Evidence from interviews moreover indicate that the possession rate is particularly high among youth, businessmen, and the political class. The research team estimates that about 1 in 100 Nigerians (mostly male, youth, and the middle and upper socio-economic classes) possess illicit arms.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 To the GovernmentExisting laws such as the Firearm Act needs to be reviewed, as they are weak and therefore insufficiently address the current security challenges. There should be strict enforcement and compliance with all firearms laws.

The Federal Government should adopt a national arms control strategy, which Onuoha (2011) affirms, and further identify and eliminate the sources of inflow. It is essential that the Government designs and enforces strategies for effective and coordinated detection, tracking, and control of SALW flows.

Official stockpiles need to be properly managed, meaning that stockpile should be documented, controlled, and monitored. Moreover, to prevent diversion from official stockpiles, a centralized national register and database has to be established, based on data derived from weapons marking and identification.

The NATCOM should be encouraged and equipped to undertake its comprehensive national survey on SALW proliferation, which has remained in the national public dialogue stage since 2010. It is essential that a comprehensive SALW retrieval programme is enacted. A moratorium period for Nigerians to turn in arms could be declared and enforced (Interview, Shangisha-Lagos, 2012). This must be accompanied with an aggressive arms mop-up operation in conflict zones such as areas involved in violent communal conflicts.

Safeguarding the borders is another essential part of arms control. The technology, equipment, capacity, discipline, and incentives of law enforcement agencies at the borders, ports, coastal, and maritime therefore, need to be improved.

Nigeria should also collaborate with Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin on joint security arrangements to prevent the smuggling, trafficking, and flow of SALW.


Furthermore, addressing the underlying problems that lead people to take up arms is an important step in tackling SALW proliferation at the source. Good governance, human capital development, employment, and poverty reduction programmes would help to reduce criminality, youth vulnerability and involvement in armed violence. Effective and efficient management of elections as well as credible and fair election results would be disincentives to SALW inflow during elections. Underground economic, cross-border, and maritime crime must be contained as it is intertwined with SALW trafficking networks. A strong and reliable security environment that does not warrant arms usage must be created.

8.2 To the Civil Society and CitizensAs insecurity surrounding elections as well as political, communal, ethno-religious and fundamentalist conflicts are driving the proliferation and use of SALW and are a serious concern to all Nigerians, the involvement of civil society is essential to sustainably tackle the issue of illicit SALW. Awareness raising and capacity building efforts through sensitization, advocacy, training and research programmes on the regulation and control of SALW could contribute to this. Moreover, civil society groups and citizens should be encouraged to share information on illicit arms and their proliferation among their own communities.

For this reason, the West African Action Network against SALW (WAANSA) Nigeria, which was represented in NATCOM, needs to be strengthened.

Finally, youth, community leaders, members of armed groups, and citizens should be increasingly involved in state-wide and national efforts to identify and retrieve illicit SALW.


9. CONCLUSIONPrevalent communal, ethno-religious, and resource conflicts; the proliferation of non-state groups, rise in criminality -including pirating and smuggling-; political violence and continuous insecurity have driven recent proliferation of SALW in Nigeria. Nigeria is the end point of SALW flow and trafficking in West Africa as well as an area with a high demand. Given the circuitous nature of SALW, their wide availability is highly precarious. It is widely accepted that supply generates greater use, which drives more demand and then again more supply (Duquet, 2009). As such, the proliferation of SALW has directly contributed to a decline in human security across the country due to rising criminality, the emergence of a gun culture, frequent factional fighting, and other security threats.

Though there are local craft producers and gun manufacturers in Nigeria, the majority of both licit and illicit SALW in circulation are imported or smuggled into the country. However, criminals and militias to a great extent use locally produced arms of which some have been diverted from government stockpiles. This might indicate that imported and advanced arms are rather scarce because of limited availability or high cost.

Though local production is limited, it is important to look beyond existing production facilities and examine the knowledge, and technical capacity that exist to produce assault rifles when the need arises. Nigeria possesses the capacity for local production as it has technically equipped and experienced engineers, blacksmiths, and welders. Local production has moreover been encouraged by continuous conflicts throughout its territory.

The research team identified several actors involved in the illicit trafficking including law enforcement agencies; various non- state groups (i.e. militias, youth groups, fundamentalist Islamist movements and vigilantes); arms dealers, brokers and traders; criminal syndicates; importers; corporate organizations; and the diaspora. Sympathy groups outside Nigeria may also provide arms and ammunition to insurgent and militia groups. The domestic flow within Nigeria is facilitated through the complicity of retired and serving officers within various law enforcement agencies. Despite this rampant corruption there is no solid structure to control government stockpiles and as such curtail arms re-circulation. Additionally, Nigeria does not yet have a comprehensive national database and register of SALW. There is no single inventory system for official SALW nor are there regular audits of the existing stockpiles of the different agencies.

Even though the law is clear on what is illicit, the problem remains that there is no severe form of punishment for offenders. In other words, there is no effective

122 / Conclusion

mechanism in place to deter those who knowingly obtain illicit SALW. There is an interlocking relationship between drug smuggling, arms trafficking, and underground businesses and syndicates within Nigeria. In the context of such a militarized society with rampant insecurity, SALW possession is a critical resource and a form of empowerment.

Although Nigeria has a history of being an end point for trafficked SALW, the levels of proliferation in the last one-and-a-half decade have been considerably high due to the various conflicts within the country. Militias, rebels, Islamist militants, vigilantes, and criminal organizations have thrived because of the availability of SALW. For this reason, the inflow of arms into Nigeria has been extremely high and the outflow, if any, has been very low.

Within Nigeria there are regional disparities in SALW proliferation, caches, and use of SALW, just as there are disparities within demographic and socio-economic groups. For example, the North West, just like the South West, is a transit zone for movement of illicit goods and arms. However, the use and caching of SALW is concentrated in the South South, South East, North East and North Central.

Without effective controls or methods of deterrence, the already high levels of SALW in Nigeria have been increasing. Little attention has been paid to the source of arms flow and trade. Concerted efforts to control the arms trade and prevent its proliferation have been limited and in the instances they have been made, have not been effective. Though there was an amnesty programme in the Niger Delta, which included a disarmament programme, the availability of arms remains steady, which clearly indicates that the disarmament was incomplete. Furthermore, the fact that resurgent militia groups have not lacked arms indicates sustained availability and access to new supplies. SALW interceptions are mostly ad hoc and may be a result of non- compliance with corrupt practices of officials at the ports, borders, and highways. It is mainly in response to the current Boko Haram insurgency that there is an increased state of alert, which has resulted in border closures. The problem remains that those who abuse SALW processes rarely, if ever are prosecuted even though arrests are made.

The above mentioned findings indicate that high levels of SALW proliferation in the past decades, the thriving arms market in the country, and the spread of rampant insecurity, have resulted in parts of Nigerian society becoming deeply entrenched in a gun culture. In addition to fighting arms proliferation at the known sources of inflow, more attention needs to be focused on eliminating the causes of insecurity that are driving groups to take up arm in the first place. Major political will by the government,

Conclusion / 123

civil society, and the international community is necessary in order to curtail widespread corruption amongst political leaders and security agencies as well as to break the patterns that are sustaining such high levels of arms proliferation.

REFERENCESAdejo, P.Y. (2005). 'Crime and the Cross-border Movement of Weapons: the Case of Nigeria.' In AntoleAyissi and Ibrahim Sall, eds. Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa.UNIDIR/2005/7. Geneva: United Nation Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), pp. 93-100.

Agboton-Johnson, C., Ebo, A., &Mazal, L. (2004).Small Arms Control in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal (West Africa Series No. 2). International Alert - Security and Peace-building Programme and Monitoring and the Implementation of Small Arms Controls (MISAC).

Alemika, E. (2011) 'Privatization of Security, Arms Proliferation and Electoral Violence in Nigeria.' In Lai Olurode and AttahiruJega, eds. Security Challenges of Election Management in Nigeria. Abuja: Independent National Electoral Commission and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nigeria.

Alemika, E.E.O., Igbo E.U., and Nnorom, C.P. (2006) Criminal Victimization, Safety and Policing in Nigeria: 2005. Monograph Series, No 3. Lagos: CLEEN Foundation. October.

Bello, A. Y. (2010). '70% of Illegal Arms in West Africa are in Nigeria - NATFORCE Boss.' Daily Trust. Abuja. 9 November.

Best S.G. and Von Kemedi, D. (2005). 'Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria.' In Nicholas Florquin and Eric G. Berman, eds. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region. Geneva: Smalls Arms Survey.

Da Costa, K. (2012). 'Nigeria-Bound Weapons Intercepted in Accra.' Daily Trust. Abuja. 12 January. Daily Trust (2012) 'Nigeria: Investigate this Arms Shipment.' 8 February.Duquet, N. (2009). 'Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta.' International Studies Perspective, 10(2): 169-185.

Duru, Peter (2012) 'Benue Police Arrest Arms Manufacturers With Large Catchment of Lethal Weapons.' Vanguard (Makurdi). 14 February.

124 / References

ECOWAS Commission (2006). Convention on small arms and light weapon, Abuja, ECOWAS Secretariat

ECOWAS Commission.(2011). 'ECOWARN Daily Highlight Report.' Abuja: ECOWAS Commission Early Warning Department. 9 December.

Edegbulem, Simon. (2011). 'SSS, Edo Police Parade 48 Suspected Armed Robbers, Kidnappers.' Vanguard. 16 June.

Hazen, J.M. and Horner, J. (2007). Small Arms, Armed Violence and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective.Occasional Paper No. 20. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. December.

Ikelegbe, A.O. (2005)'The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.' Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14(2).

Ikelegbe, A.O. (2010) 'Crises of the State and Governance and Armed Non-State Entities in Africa.' In WafulaOkumu& Augustine Ikelegbe, eds. Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Insecurity and State Crises in Africa. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies.

Iroegbu, Senator. (2012). 'FG cedes Border Patrol to Nigeria Air Force.' Thisday. 22 August.

Isumonah, V. Adebumi, B.T. and James, N. (2006).'The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Bayelsa State.' In OkechukwuIbeanu& Fatima Kyani Mohammed, eds. Oiling Violence: The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta. Lagos: Frankad Publishers/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Karp, A. (2007). 'Completing the Count: Civilian Firearms.'Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City (pp. 39-71). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27 August.

Karp, A. (2009). 'Government Seizure and Destruction Information for 49 Countries.'Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War; Table 5.1, p. 162. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9 July.

Mensah, Kent. (2002). 'Ghana: Review Laws on Acquisition of Small Arms.' Accra Mail, 21 May.

Nigeria (1990) 'Firearms Act' Chapter 146, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990, Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1 January.

References / 125

Nigeria (1990), 'Firearms Regulations' Section 33, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990. Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1 January

Nigeria (1990), 'Enforcement of Act' Firearms Act Chapter 146, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990 Abuja: Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1 January

Nigeria (1990), 'Sale and Transfer: Firearms Regulations, Under Section 33, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1990, Abuja, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1 January

Nigeria (2004). Nigeria Police Annual Report.Ohia, Paul. (2010). 'Gambia Cuts Ties with Iran over Nigeria's Arms Seizure.' Thisday. 23 November.

Olukayode, Thomas and Kujenya, Joke (2012). 'Guns, guns everywhere…' The Nation. Lagos. 30 January.

Onuoha, Freedom (2011.). 'Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria.' Conflict Trends. Durban: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), pp. 50-56.

Peel, Michael (2005). 'Crisis in the Niger Delta: How Failures of Transparency and Accountability are Destroying the Region.' Africa Programme Briefing Paper 05/02. London: Chatham House. July.

Sunday Vanguard (2012) JTF Destroys Operational base cum Boko Haram's bomb Factory, August 12

Von Kemedi, Dimieari.. (2006). 'Fuelling the Violence: Non-State Armed Actors (Militia, Cults, and Gangs) in the Niger Delta.' Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 10. Berkeley: University of California.

Vanguard (2012) NIMASA raises alarm over influx of illegal arms. Friday, 3 August

126 / References

APPENDIX

APPENDIX 1TABLE 4: Fieldwork Interviews in the Six Geopolitical Regions (Excluding Coastal Towns of South South)

Appendix 1 / 129

S/N Geo-political Regions Towns No. of

Respondents

Date/Period of

Fieldwork

1 North West Kamba 15 March

2 North Central Jos, Abuja 17 December2011,

February 2012

3 North East Wukari, Ibi 19 February

4 South East Owerri, Orlu,

Awka

11 March

5 South West Lagos, Seme,

Ibadan

12 February-March

6 South South Asaba, Ozoro,

Benin, Port

Harcourt,

Excluding

9 February-March

Coastal towns

Total 83

Source: Fieldwork

130 / Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2TABLE 5: Distribution of Respondents in the Coastal Areas of the South South

S/n State Local Government Towns No. of respondents

Delta Warri South-West L. G area Okerenkoko 5

Ogbe-ijo 3

Warri 3

Burutu L.G area Ojobo 3

Torugbene 3

Tuomor 2

Oboro 2

Okpokonou 2

Bayelsa Southern-Ijaw L.G area Koloama 4

Olokpobiri, 5

Peremorbiri 4

Ijetu town 3

Ekeremor L.G Agge 2

Ekeremor 3

Amabulou 3

Rivers Asaritoru L.G Buguma 2

Degema Kula 1

Total 50

Source: Fieldwork

Appendix 3 / 131

APPENDIX 3TABLE 6: Selected Cases of Police Seizures of illicit SALW in 2004

Year Location Incidence Seizures

3 March Obosi,

Anambra

Police encounter

with armed

robbers

1 SGM rif�le, 2 locally made pistols, 24

rounds of cartridges, 3 rounds of 9mm

ammunition

9 March Okene-Lokoja

road, KogiState

Police encounter

with armed

robbers

4 AK-47 rif�les, 3 magazines, 3 rounds of

ammunition

14 March Anthony

Village, Lagos

Police encounter

with armed

robbers

5 AK-47 rif�les, 3magazines and 3 rounds of

ammunition

24 March Sokoto Police search on

premises

of

Engineer,Abubaka

r Musa

6 locally assembled pistols, 12 partly

assembled

pistols, 1 Berettapistol, 40

rounds

of

ammunitions, 25 rounds of 9.65

mm

ammunitions.

26 March Agbor-Asaba

road, Delta

Police

search

and

detection

of

PDP

chieftains

12

AK-47

rif�les, 2 magazines, 60 rounds of

ammunition

3 April Akobo-Ibadan,

Oyo

Police

encounter

with

armed

robbers

1

AK-47

rif�le, 1 Berettapistol, 1 brownie

pistol,

6

AK-47 magazines, 224 rounds of

ammunition

26 June KatsinaState Police

raid

on

criminal hideout

43

Dane

guns, 9 pistols, 1 revolver, 58

rounds of revolver ammunition, 6 pistol

magazines

10 July Odupkani

Junction, Cross

River

Police stop and

search operation

8 pistols, 62 rounds of .9mm ammunition

14 juillet Okrika, Rivers Police raid of

criminal hideout

37 assorted rif�les, 1 general purpose

machine gun, 4 AK-47 rif�les, 4 SMG rif�les,

2 sterling rif�les, 2 pump-action guns, 2 LAR

rif�les, 2 Berettapistols, 1 double-barrel

gun, 458 rounds of assorted ammunitions,

155 cartridges, 137 rounds of 7.6 mm

ammunitions, 24 rounds of 5.56mm

ammunitions, etc.

14 juillet Okrika, Rivers Police raid of

criminal hideout

37 assorted rif�les, 1 general purpose

machine gun, 4 AK-47 rif�les, 4 SMG rif�les,

2 sterling rif�les, 2 pump-action guns, 2 LAR

rif�les, 2 Berettapistols, 1 double-barrel

gun, 458 rounds of assorted ammunitions,

155 cartridges, 137 rounds of 7.6 mm

ammunitions, 24 rounds of 5.56mm

ammunitions, etc.

29

September

Bama and

Gwoza

communities,

Borno

Police operations

againstTaliban

religious

extremists

27 rif�les and 500 rounds of ammunitions

19

October

Kano-Bauchi

road, Bauchi

state

Police encounter

with armed

robbers

8 AK 47 rif�les, 14magazines, 705 rounds of

ammunition

Source: Tabulations from Nigerian Police Annual Report, 2004 (E.E.O. Alemika 2011: 132-134)

132 / Appendix 4

APPENDIX 4TABLE 7: Cases of Interception of SALW Smuggling 2010

S/N Cases Place Quantity/Type Date

1. Government

driver with

arms smuggled

from Cameroon

Maiduguri,

Borno State

25 AK-47s August 2010

2. Woman

smuggling arms

into Nigeria

from Cameroon

via boat

DabarMasara,

Borno State

10 AK-47s November 2010

3. Seizure of arms

and

ammunition

from a

suspected bank

robbery squad

Ibadan, Oyo

State

47 ri�les, 103

AK-47

magazines, 1

assault ri�le, 2

GMPGs

2010

4.

Lorry

load of

arms

and

ammunition

Onitsha,

Anambra State

18 October

2010

Appendix 5 / 133

APPENDIX 5TABLE 8: Seizures of illicit SALW by Nigerian Security Agencies, 2011-2012

Date Agency Location Quantity and Type

January

2011

Nigeria

Customs

Lagos Port 13 containers containing a variety of weapons

such as RPGs and mortars.

February

2012

State Security

Service

NenweArin

ri,Enugu

State.

56 single-barrel guns; 20 single-barrel long

range guns; 3 single-barrel short range guns; 2

locally-made double-barrel short range pistols;

1 double-barrel short Dane gun; 1 single-barrel

short range pistol; 5 long range engines; 19

engines with butt; 12 canons; 4 double-barrel

guns and 1 revolver barrel.

April 2011 Nigeria Police Lagos 3 locally madepistols; 1 double-barrel short

gun; 1 single-barrel short gun and 13 live

cartridges.

May 2011 Nigeria Police Lagos 3 locallymadepistols; 1 sub-machine gun and 51

live cartridges.

June 2011 State Security

Service and

the

Nigeria

Police Force

Uromi, Edo

State

10 AK-47 ri�les; live ammunition and 7 cut to

size single-barrel local guns.

June

2011

Nigeria Police Lagos 3 locally madepistols; 1 short gun; 2 live

cartridges and 30 rounds of 9mm calibre

ammunition.

November

2011

Nigeria

Aviation

Handling

Company

Lagos

Airport

6 double-barrels; 1 pump-action; 1 Uzi; 2

magazines, 1 Berettapistol; 20 pieces of 5.56mm

calibre, 19 cartridges; 12/12;500 pieces of black

armoury; a sealedbox of cartridges and a

Becheverriapistol.

January –

February

2012

Nigeria Police

Force

Makurdi,

Gboko and

Otukpo

2 AK-47 ri�les with 38 rounds of live

ammunition; 1 Smoke gunner with cartridges, 1

assault ri�le with 34 rounds of live ammunition;

and 7 rounds of G3 ammunition.

January –

February

2012

Nigeria Police TerhemeSe

var

1 complete AK-47 ri�le; 2 English AK-47

magazines; 1 locally-made AK-47 magazine; 1

locally-made Berettapistol; 1 Berettapistol

under construction; 2 AK-47s under

construction; 4 empty shells of Beretta

ammunition; 2 live AK-47 ammunition and

several tools for the construction of arms.

134 / Appendix 1

trafficking of small arms and light weapons (salw) in west africa

Documents