traditional authorities in somaliland and the limits of hybrid political orders

7/28/2019 Traditional Authorities in Somaliland and the Limits of Hybrid Political Orders

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/traditional-authorities-in-somaliland-and-the-limits-of-hybrid-political-orders 1/33

DIIS WORKING PAPER 2011:18

1

No Easy Way Ot:

Tadtonal Athotes n Somalland

and the Lmts of Hybd Poltcal Odes

Markus Virgil Hoehne

DIIS Working Paper 2011:18

W O R K I N G P A P E R

DIIS WORKING PAPER




2

MArkuS VirgiL HOEHNEis post-doctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute or Social Anthropology in Halle/Saale, Germany.e-mail: [email protected]

DIIS Working Papers make available DIIS researchers’and DIIS project partners’ work in progress towardsproper publishing. Tey may include importantdocumentation which is not necessarily publishedelsewhere. DIIS Working Papers are published underthe responsibility o the author alone. DIIS Working Papers should not be quoted without the expresspermission o the author.


© Te author and DIIS, Copenhagen 2011Danish Institute or International Studies, DIISStrandgade 56, DK-1401 Copenhagen, Denmark

Ph: +45 32 69 87 87Fax: +45 32 69 87 00E-mail: [email protected]

Web: www.diis.dk Cover Design: Carsten SchiølerLayout: Ellen-Marie BentsenPrinted in Denmark by Vesterkopi ASISBN: 978-87-7605-463-2Price: DKK 25.00 (VA included)DIIS publications can be downloadedree o charge rom www.diis.dk




CONtENtS

Abstract 4

Introduction 5

Ideal-types o authority and the resurgence o traditional authorities in Arica 6

raditional authorities in Northern Somalia 8Case 1: raditional authorities within the state apparatus 10

Sheekh Ibraahim – a “pillar o reedom and peace” 10Boqor Buurmadow – rom being a national peace maker to being accusedo high treason 11

Case 2: raditional authorities at the margins 14wo leaders or one lineage 16Dierent types o traditional authorities 21

Conclusion 27

Reerences 30




AbStRACt

Somalia has been without eective state institutions since 1991. Over the past two decades, mod-

erately eective state-like institutions have been rebuilt in Somaliland and Puntland in northernSomalia, but they do not enjoy international recognition and are limited in power and scope. Tistext concentrates on the integration o non-state actors, particularly traditional authorities, during the process o state-ormation in Somaliland. Arguably, this integration has brought about a hybridpolitical system that unctioned quite well during the rst years o existence o Somaliland. Hybridpolitical systems are currently o great interest in various Arican settings, including the possibil-ity o integrating traditional authorities into (local) government in South Sudan. Tese systems,however, mix modes o legitimacy o dierent political actors in a way that, in the long run, eitherundermines the democratic capabilities o modern states or seriously damages the credibility and e-ectiveness o traditional authorities. Tus, hybrid political systems may be a way to stabilize politics

in a transitory phase (e.g., ater civil war or independence) but they are not the easy way out o thedilemma that state institutions in many Arican states are weak, have only a very limited outreachand in many regards lack popular legitimacy.




INtRODuCtION

Tis paper addresses the role o traditional

authorities as important non-state actors incontemporary northern Somalia, including in the conict between Puntland and Soma-liland.1 It explores a number o case studies toillustrate how relations o traditional authority have changed with the involvement o tradi-tional leaders in “modern” state politics in So-maliland. Te main argument presented here isthat despite much emphasis on hybrid politicalsystems in the Arican literature and beyond

(Boege et al. 2008; Logan 2009) it still makessense to distinguish dierent types o politi-cal actors in the Somali context with regardto their orm o authority and mode o legiti-macy.2 Mixing legitimacies does, in the long run, rather prevent modern states rom be-coming eectively democratic and/or damagesthe credibility and eectiveness o traditionalauthorities. My argument builds on the We-berian distinction o rational, traditional andcharismatic authority and their related modes

o legitimacy (Weber 1956).3 Te paper begins with a theoretical discus-

sion o the key concepts o authority and le-gitimacy and links this discussion to the recent

1 Details on the ormation o Somaliland and Puntland andtheir conict are provided urther below.

2 This paper is based on feld research that I conducted in

northern Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) between Julyand September 2002, and again, between September 200

and November 200. A frst drat o the paper was present-

ed at the 1- November, 2010 Conerence in Copenhagenwith the title: Access to Justice and Security. Non-State Actors

and Local Dynamics of Ordering . This conerence was organ-

ised by the Danish Institute or International Studies (DIIS)

with support rom the Ministry o Foreign Aairs o Den-

mark and the International Development Law Organisation

(IDLO). Revisions o the frst drat are based on reviewercomments by DIIS researcher Helene Maria Kyed.

I use a German version o this text that was compiled

posthumous.

resurgence o traditional authorities in Arica in general. It then provides an overview o how traditional authorities are conceptualised and

have developed over time in northern Somalia.In its third part, the paper presents two casestudies that illustrate the complex entanglemento traditional and state authorities in Hargeysa,the capital o Somaliland, and in Ceerigaabo, a town in the contested borderlands between So-maliland and Puntland. Te case studies show how the involvement o traditional authoritiesin state politics in the course o civil war, statecollapse and partial political reconstruction has

changed the modes o legitimacy upon whichtraditional authorities draw. State politics thatconcern access to state resources and positionso power in the government oered the pos-sibility or traditional leaders to mobilise new orms o power. At the same time state politicshave bound traditional authorities to military and political elites and distanced them romtheir ollowers. Tis has undermined theirpopular legitimacy, which originally was basedon closeness to ‘their’ people.

Te complicated relationship between tra-ditional and state authorities suggests that theormer are extremely inuential, but also con-ronted with great challenges in northern So-malia as well as other settings characterised by hybrid political orders (see e.g. Fanthorpe 2005or Liberia; Kyed 2008 or Mozambique; andOomen 2005b or South Arica). raditionalauthorities are to some degree able to success-ully perorm the unctions that weak and/or

emerging state institutions are not (yet) ableto perorm. But this comes with certain costs:First, traditional authorities will lose relevanceor ordinary people, whom they actually aresupposed to represent, the more they mingle

with the state; second, a state system integrat-ing traditional authorities will never be ully democratic. Tis counters the argument re-cently presented by Logan (2009), who claimsthat new hybrid political orders that combine




traditional and state modes o governance canpave the way or ‘real’ democratisation.

IDEAl-tyPES Of AuthORIty

AND thE RESuRGENCE Of

tRADItIONAl AuthORItIES

IN AfRICA

Weber (1956: 159) distinguishes between ra-tional, traditional and charismatic authority.Rational authority dominates in modern statestructures. Tese are based on bureaucracy that

unctions according to rules and laws that areconsidered rational and make the execution o authority calculable (ibid.: 160-66). radition-al authority is typical or medieval Europeanand contemporary so-called ‘tribal’ societies.4 It builds on the personal relationship betweenruler and ruled (ibid.: 167-78). Charismaticauthority characterises (war-)leaders, kings,religious leaders, prophets and others who, inthe eyes o their ollowers, have magic abilitiesat their disposal. Te rules and laws under such

conditions are made by the leader ad hoc , whorequently claims to ollow divine revelations.Charismatic authority can transorm into eve-ryday charismatic authority i it becomes tra-ditionalised and/or bureaucratised/legalised(ibid.: 179-88).5 Ideal types never exist in real-ity. Overlaps between the three orms o au-

Regarding the use o ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’ in this

paper, it must be recalled that both terms are derived rom

the Latin word tradere, which can be translated as “passsomething (over), hand something (over).” This under-

lines the active and process-oriented aspect o tradition,

in which the present is connected to the past in a dynamic

way. Weber (19: 17) ound that new creations or re-

orms in the context o traditional authority have to claim

historical precedence.

This is the case in certain religious communities, where,

or instance, upon the death o the charismatic leader his or

her designated heir or ‘rebirth’ is installed.

thority are the norm (ibid.: 157). Tis, how-ever, does not mean that two dierent kindso authority are merged one-to-one. It rather

means that within a political system, one typeo authority dominates, but traces o anothertype o authority can be ound as well.6

All three orms o authority are related totheir own ideal typical modes o legitimacy. Itis worth remembering that, in general, legiti-mate authority emanates rom the voluntary compliance o the subjects to the authority o the ruler(s) (Weber 1956: 157; Oomen 2005b:82). Legitimacy in modern states is usually

“based on elections and embedded in consti-tutional and legal procedures and rules” (Lutzand Linder 2004: 13). Te constituencies o state authorities consist o only loosely relatedpersons who orm an imagined community.Te limits within which authorities and ol-lowers establish legitimate relationships areultimately dened by law.7 Legislation aims atstandardizing relations o authority and proce-dures o rule and administration irrespective o the personal characteristics o the ofce holder

(Weber 1956: 166).8 Legitimacy in traditionalcontexts concerns closely knit groups such asvillagers or relatives, is rooted in reerences tolocal history and culture, and depends essen-

Patrimonialism, or instance, is an aspect o traditionalauthority that can be ound in many post-colonial and post-

soviet states around the globe.

7 This is related to a general characteristic o modernity,which is the “disembedding” o social relations rom local

contexts o interaction and the restructuring o these rela-

tions across indefnite spans o time and space (Giddens1990: 21). With Luhmann (1988), one can argue that the

unctioning o state authority is based on trust in abstract

systems, while the unctioning o traditional authority is

bound to the trust in the concrete person, i.e., in the abili-

ties o the individual traditional leader and the social rela-

tions he (rarely she) controls.

8 O course, persons whose behaviour is damaging to the

position they hold can be removed, based on legal provi-

sions.




7

tially on the skills and abilities o the personholding authority to satisy his or her ollow-ers. Weber (ibid.: 170) emphasizes that the will

o the ollowers to obey (das Gehorchenwollender Genossen) and the act that also the ruler isbound by tradition are central aspects o tra-ditional authority. Similarly, Kurtz (2001: 49)observed that particularly in societies with noor weakly institutionalized positions o author-ity, leaders “must continually earn the supporto their ollowers. I they ail, they are easily replaced”. With charismatic authority legiti-macy constantly has to be earned by produc-

ing ‘miracles’ or the ollowers o the leader.I miracles ail to materialise or misery strikesthe community the charismatic leader quickly looses his or her legitimacy (Weber ibid.: 179).In the everyday orm o this type o authority,legitimacy is enshrined in certain belies anddogmas (ibid.: 182-83).

Tis basic distinction between types o authority is useul or understanding recentdevelopments in Arica. While traditional au-thorities in the early post-colonial period were

considered anachronistic institutions by localelites and most external observers, they have re-gained recognition since the early 1990s. Tislargely owes to the ailure o the modern stateto take hold in Arica, namely a modern statebased on the Weberian denition o rational-bureaucratic legitimacy.9 Since the late 1990s,a considerable body o literature was producedon the resurgence o traditional authorities incountries such as Benin, Ghana, South Arica,

Mozambique, Somalia and Sudan. It turned

9 It is doubtul that such modern states were ever in place

in Arica. They hardly could have evolved out o the colo-

nial states that were ocused on the exploitation o natural

resources and human labour. The colonial system o rulewas usually based on orce and violence, and even where

indirect rule allowed more reedom or local orms o au-

thority it was ar rom rational-bureaucratic.

out that in some cases, chies, elders and othertraditional authorities had never ceased to beimportant. In other cases they came to the

ore again in the light o state-weakness, state-collapse and/or state-reconstruction ater cri-sis (see Lentz 1998; West and Kloeck-Jenson1999; van Dijk and van Rouveroy van Nieu-

waal 1999; Englebert 2002, 2005; Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Nyamnjoh 2003;Fanthorpe 2005; Oomen 2005a; Gundel2006; Kyed and Buur 2007; Leonardi 2007;Kyed 2008; Valsecchi 2008; Logan 2009).

Most o these authors, reerred to above,

argue that state and traditional authoritiesremain in a rather uneasy relationship. radi-tional authorities are somewhat ‘betwixed andbetween’ governments and local constituen-cies (see particularly West and Kloeck-Jenson1999). Some add that traditional authority usually eatures gerontocracy, patriarchy andundemocratic procedures (e.g. consensus in-stead o vote) and thereore intereres withthe development o modern democracy (Fan-thorpe 2005; Ntsebetza 2005). Recently, how-

ever, Logan (2009: 103) took issue with thesepositions and argued that traditional and stateauthorities are “two sides o the same coin”.She used survey data rom 15 Arican coun-tries (not including Somalia) to show that“Aricans who live under these dual systemso authority do not draw a sharp distinctionbetween hereditary chies and elected localgovernment ofcials as most analysts wouldexpect” (ibid.). She stressed that “Aricans are

thus creating or themselves, whether delib-erately or by deault, hybrid political systemsthat integrate the traditional systems with

which they are deeply amiliar and their newly minted electoral regimes” (ibid.: 123). She ur-ther argued that “hybridising political systemsin these ways may well represent a positive steptoward deepening democracy in Arica, ratherthan a step away rom ‘true’ democracy” (ibid.:123-24). Te material on politics and relations




8

o traditional authority in Somaliland doesnot conrm Logan’s rather general and opti-mistic ndings. People in Somaliland, where

I did extensive eld research between 2002and 2004 (and conducted shorter eld visitsuntil 2011), do dierentiate between variousorms o authority and their respective modeso legitimacy, and realize when the essence o,or instance, traditional authority is lost. Tey make such distinctions not in ideal-typicalterms, like Weber, but in vernacular terms.

tRADItIONAl AuthORItIESIN NORthERN SOmAlIA

Te Somali expressions corresponding to theEnglish ‘traditional authority’ are hoggaamiye dhaqameed (traditional leader/guide) or madax dhaqameed (traditional head).10 Te mostcommon traditional authorities are oday (pl.odayaal ), which simply means elder. Generally,every Somali male can become an elder withinhis close amily. Te heads o lineages or diya-

paying groups are usually called caaqil (pl.cuqaal ).11 Te highest-ranking traditional au-thorities in northern Somalia are called suldaan (pl. saladiin), garaad (pl. garaado), boqor (pl.boqoro) and ugaas (pl. ugaasyo). In the past,

garaad was most widespread among the Dhul-bahante and Warsangeli, suldaan among Isaaq,ugaas among Ciise and Ogadeen, and boqor among Majeerteen.12 Te prolieration o posi-

10 Names o Somali places, institutions, and persons in this

text generally ollow the Somali orthography. The Latin “c”

stands for a sound close to the Arabic “ ” (ayn); “x” de-

notes “ ” (ha), as in, e.g., Cali or in Faarax.

11 A diya-paying group consists o one or more lineages

whose members agree to pay and receive compensationtogether in case o homicide.

12 Common titles in central and southern Somalia are bee-

ldaje, malak and islam.

tions o traditional authority since 1991 (seebelow) loosened the use o these titles, whichin the early 21st century can be ound among

all clans inhabiting the region. Isim (pl. Isimo)is the generic term or the highest-ranking tra-ditional authorities in Puntland.13

Elsewhere (Hoehne 2007) I outlined in de-tail how the roles and positions o traditionalauthorities have changed over time as a resulto colonial and post-colonial politics, conictand recongurations o political orders inthe contemporary Somali context. It sufcesto stress that in pre-colonial time traditional

authorities held the position o primus inter pares . Northern Somali society was acephalous;permanent positions o power and state-likestructures were absent. People lived as pasto-ral nomads. Political and social relations wereregulated predominantly through solidarity

within patrilineal groups (tol ) and customary law ( xeer ). Alliances could also involve cross-clan or lineage alliances based on afnal ties,riendship, or simply common interests (Lewis1961). raditional authorities were involved in

‘pastoral politics’, which revolved around thenegotiation o access to pasture and water andconict settlement within and between rathersmall groups. Gradual changes were intro-duced by the colonial powers (the British inthe northwest and the Italians in the northeastand the south). Tey integrated traditionalauthorities in their system o indirect rule orundermined and replaced independent tradi-tional leaders with loyal colonial agents. Ater

the unication o the British and the Italianterritories to orm the Somali Republic on 1

July 1960, the post-colonial Somali elite waseager to marginalise traditional authorities who

1 The term may come originally rom the Arabic word isim,which means “name”. In the Somali context, it may have

taken on the meaning o nomenclatura reerring to the tra-

ditionally leading stratum o society.




9

were considered to be in the way o progress.Particularly the revolutionary socialist govern-ment under President Maxamed Siyaad Barre

(1969-91) ofcially disregarded anything tra-ditional. Nonetheless, traditional leaders con-tinued to play a role as mediators betweenclans and lineages in the peripheral areas, par-ticularly in the north. Tey gained new powerin the course o the Somali civil war that esca-lated in north-western Somalia in the 1980s.Te Somali National Movement (SNM) that

was mostly supported o members o the Isaaqclan amily began to ght the government in

Mogadishu in 1982. Te guerrillas had theirbasis in neighbouring Ethiopia.14 For money and manpower the guerrillas depended onthe support o ordinary members o the Isaaqclan amily (in Somalia, the Somali region o Ethiopia and the diaspora). Tis support wasusually channelled through the hands o tradi-tional authorities (Reno 2003: 24). Memberso other clans in the northwest, such as theDhulbahante and Warsangeli, who belongedto the Darood clan amily, sided with the So-

mali government against the SNM.In mid-1988, ater hundreds o thousands

o Isaaq had ed into Ethiopia rom the bom-bardment o their towns by the governmentin Mogadishu, around our dozen traditionalauthorities ormed a council called guurti toassist the SNM. Te victory o the SNM overthe Somali national army in the northwest in

January 1991 was ollowed by the declarationo independence o the Republic o Somaliland

in the borders o the ormer British protector-ate. Beore and ater the declaration o inde-pendence, traditional authorities engaged inlocal conict settlement and thereby built the

1 Ethiopia was the ‘arch-enemy’ o Somalia and happily pro-

vided Somali guerillas fghting the government in Mogadishu

with shelter.

basis or the social and political reconstructiono Somaliland. Te SNM guurti was institu-tionalised as “House o Elders”, one o the two

chambers o parliament. It took its seat in thecapital city Hargeysa (Renders 2007; Bradbury 2008: Chapter 4).15

Te northeast came under the control o another Somali guerrilla organisation calledSomali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).Te people in the northeast did not wish to se-cede rom Somalia. However, when it becameclear that rebuilding o the collapsed state

would take longer than expected, the SSDF

together with inuential traditional authori-ties in the region decided to establish Puntlandas an autonomous regional state that, nonethe-less, remains part o Somalia. Puntland was setup as administration o all Harti-territories innorthern Somalia. Harti is an ancestor withinthe larger Darood clan amily. It combines themembers o the Majeerteen, Dhulbahante,

Warsangeli and several smaller clans. Unlikein Somaliland, the position o traditional au-thorities in Puntland was not strongly institu-

tionalised. But ordinary elders and isimo con-tinued to act as conict mediators and settlersat the local and the national levels on an ad hoc basis.

Somaliland and Puntland promoted op-posed political visions. Somaliland wished tobe recognised as an independent state. Punt-land hoped to play a central role in a unitedbut ederal Somalia. Te conict between bothpolitical entities played out in the regions Sool,

Sanaag and ogdheer. According to the gov-ernment in Hargeysa, these regions were parto the ormer British Protectorate and there-ore belonged to Somaliland. Te government

1 Whenever the “House o Elders” o Somaliland will bementioned in the ollowing, I will write Guurti with capital

“G” to distinguish it rom the SNM guurti and other ad hoc

elders councils.




10

in Garowe argued that the inhabitants o theseregions were mostly Dhulbahante and Warsan-geli, who were part o the Harti clan conedera-

tion represented by Puntland (Hoehne 2009). While the conict since 2004 escalated severaltimes on a military level, political but non-vio-lent intererence in the daily lie o the border-landers by the two centres in northern Somalia is the norm. Tis also concerns the instalmento traditional authorities, who, in the marginalregions Sool, Sanaag and ogadheer, are stillhighly inuential actors (Hoehne 2010).

Te ollowing case studies rom Hargeysa,

the capital o Somaliland, and rom Ceeri-gaabo, the capital o the Sool region, exempliy how traditional authorities were increasingly drawn into ‘state politics’ which concern accessto state resources and positions o power withinormal state structures. Tis also requires tak-ing a stand in the conict between Somalilandand Puntland and thereore put traditional au-thorities at the oreront o political conict.

Case 1: tradiiona aoriies wiine sae apparas

Te role o traditional authorities in the Re-public o Somaliland became institutionalisedin the decade ater the secession in 1991. Ini-tially, traditional authorities chaired a numbero small-scale peace conerences (Somali sing.:shir ) to bring those clans in the north togetheragain that had stood on dierent sides during the civil war. raditional authorities were also

highly inuential at the national shir in Burcoin 1991, where the Republic o Somaliland wasounded. In the atermath, they continued tosettle conicts that escalated within the SNMas well as between dierent clans and politicalactions.

Te concrete role o the traditional authori-ties in the emerging state apparatus was in-scribed in the National Charter ( Axdiga Qara-meed ) adopted at the shir in Boorama in 1993

and in the Constitution o 2001. Te NationalCharter introduced the bi-cameral parliamentdivided in a House o Elders (Guurti ) and a

House o Representatives. Each house had 75members. Te main task o the Guurti -mem-bers was keeping the peace in Somaliland. Atthe shir in Hargeysa in 1997 the number o members o the House o Representatives ando the Guurti was raised to 82 each. Article61 o the Constitution o 2001 provides thatthe national elders in the Guurti enact lawsconcerning religion (diinta ), culture/tradition(dhaqanka ) and peace (nabadgelyada ) as well

as review laws already passed by the Houseo Representatives, with the exception o thebudget. Moreover they advise and assist thegovernment and enquire into the perormanceo its duties. Guurti -members receive a salary and allowances (Article 65) and enjoy immu-nity (Article 66). Besides these legal provisions,the weight an individual traditional leadercould gain in Somaliland politics very muchdepended on his personal skills and social capi-tal. Tis is illustrated by the contrasting ates o

two amous traditional leaders in Somaliland, who made their career in the capital city. One was or 20 years the chairman o the Guurti and had participated in all major decisionsconcerning Somaliland. Ater he had died, he

was celebrated as one o the big national he-roes. Te other was on the way to become a national hero but overestimated his power atone point, which led him to all into disgrace.

Sheekh Ibraahim – a “pillar of freedom and

peace”

Sheekh Ibraahim had been chairman o theSNM- guurti in the late 1980s in Ethiopia. Hehad participated in the declaration o inde-pendence o Somaliland and the peace coner-ences acilitating the new political beginning.From the establishment o the Guurti in 1993to his death in 2004, he had been the chairman




11

o the House o Elders. On the one hand, hisprestige derived rom his descent. He belongedto a amily o Su ‘saints’ within the Isaaq/

Habar Awal/Sacad Muuse sub-clan. Moreover,his grandather, Sheekh Madar, was consideredthe ounder o Hargeysa, where he had estab-lished a Qadriya congregation in the mid-19th century.16 On the other hand, Sheekh Ibraahim

was recognised as one o the most importantelders supporting the SNM in the 1980s andas a decisive gure in the state-building processin Somaliland. Immediately ater his death in a hospital in London on 23 July 2004, aged 83,

where he had been or several months o treat-ment, Hargeysa’s main newspapers covered thesheekh’s lie history in numerous articles. TeRepublican, the weekly English issue o Jam-huuriya, the most popular daily paper at thattime, had the ollowing heading on the rstpage: “Somaliland Lost Pillar o Freedom andPeace”. Te article summarised the importantroles played by the Sheekh Ibraahim. He hadbeen among those elders who mobilised thepeople against the atrocities o the dictatorial

regime in the 1980s. He had mastermindedthe reconciliation conerences leading to thedeclaration o the independence o Somalilandin early 1991, and he had persistently workedor peace and stability in the country ever since.Daahir Rayaale Kaahin, then president o So-maliland, announced a seven-day mourning (Te Republican, 24-30 July 2004). SheekhIbraahim’s body returned our days ater hisdeath in London by plane to Somaliland; it

was received by a huge crowd at Hargeysa In-ternational Airport. ogether with hundredso others I attended the state uneral that took

1 One o Sheekh Ibraahim’s cousins, Sheekh Yuusu Cali

Sheekh Madar, had been chairman o the SNM rom January

1982 to November 198.

place in the compound o the sheekh’s amily inHargeysa the same day.

Sheekh Ibraahim had without doubt been a

very important gure in the history o the Re-public o Somaliland. His death had let a gapin the political landscape and Saleebaan Gaal,the chairman o the Guurti who succeededthe sheekh, was not by ar as charismatic as hispredecessor. Yet, the unanimous appreciationexpressed ater Sheekh Ibraahim’s death in July certainly had to do with the act that one doesnot say anything bad about the dead. During his lietime, Sheekh Ibraahim, like every politi-

cian, had also made himsel enemies but hadmanaged to keep them in check.

Boqor Buurmadow – from being a national

peace maker to being accused of high treason

By contrast, the case o Boqor Cismaan Aw Maxamuud Buurmadow shows that celebratedtraditional authorities could also ‘burn theirhands’ by being involved in politics in Soma-liland. Te boqor belongs to the Isaaq/Habar

Jeclo/Muuse Aboqor sub-clan. Te clan-homeland (Somali sing.: degaan) o this groupextends rom the village o Ceelaweyn to theeast. It is located in the Sanaag region, closeto the Dhulbahante territories. He thereorebelongs to “Habar Jeclo bari ”, the “easternHabar Jeclo”.17 His mother was Dhulbahante.Cismaan Aw Maxamuud was inauguratedboqor in 2000, as a relatively young man, inhis late thirties. He did not come rom a amily

o traditional authorities. His ather had beena livestock trader. Cismaan nalised secondary school in 1979 and aterwards joined the anti-regime struggle rst o the SSDF, and then,

17 The “Habar Jeclo galbeed ”, the “western Habar Jeclo”

reside west o Burco; they consist o the branches o Max-

amed Aboqor and Cimraan, among others.




12

in 1984, o the SNM. He participated in theghting against the Somali national army in theSanaag region in the late 1980s. In the decade

beore his inauguration (Somali sing.: caleemosaar ) in 2000, Cismaan had been a business-man (Interview Boqor Cismaan Aw Maxamu-ud Buurmadow, Hargeysa, 24.07.2004).

Boqor Buurmadow, as he became known,earned ame throughout northern Somalia asa mediator between Cabdullahi Yuusu andCadde Muuse in the conict over the presi-dency in Puntland between 2002 and 2003.Cabdullahi Yuusu was the ounding president

o Puntland. He did not prepare elections andreused to step down ater his term o ofce hadofcially ended in mid-2001. A group o tra-ditional leaders thereore elected Jaamac Cali

Jaamac as new president in November 2001.In reaction, Cabdullahi Yuusu organised hissub-clan militia and chased the counter-presi-dent rst out o Garoowe, the capital, and a ew months later out o Puntland. However,General Cadde Muuse, a patrilineal relative o

Jaamac Cali Jaamac, took up the struggle and

continued to ght Cabdullahi Yuusu, partly backed by Somaliland. Peace negotiationstook place in late 2002 and early 2003. Tey

were led by Boqor Buurmadow and SuldaanSiciid o the Warsangeli clan. Boqor Buurma-dow knew both opponents rom his time inthe SSDF in the early 1980s. A peace agree-ment that guaranteed the stability o Puntlandor the coming years was nally signed in May 2003. Since then, the boqor was considered a

man with great inuence in ‘high politics’ and with good connections to the governments o both Somaliland and Puntland.

Te news that Boqor Buurmadow had beenarrested on the evening o 27 January 2004 ina hotel room in Hargeysa, where he was stay-ing with his wie, sent shock waves through So-maliland. Te media in Puntland also reacted.

Allpuntland.com, the main online news serv-ice covering Puntland and Somali issues rom

a Puntland perspective, reported the arrest andstressed that “Boqor Osman [was] one o many traditional elders rom north-west regions o

Somalia who had been voicing their disagree-ment with [the Somaliland] government’s pol-icy and handling o the issue concerning Sool,Sanag and Ayn” (Allpuntland.com, 27 January 2004).18 Te “issue” mentioned here was theacute conrontation between Somaliland andPuntland ater Puntland police orces had oc-cupied Laascaanood, the capital o Sool region,at the end o December 2003.

Boqor Buurmadow was charged with

crimes “against the state and the existence o Somaliland as a separate independent coun-try” (Te Republican, 31 January-6 February 2004). Additionally, he was wanted or “alseaccusations” against the President o Soma-liland” (ibid.). Te basis or these allegations

was two interviews that the boqor had given to Jamhuuriya. In the rst interview o 23 Janu-ary 2004, he had emphasised that the con-rontation between Somaliland and Puntlandover the control o Laascaanood and the Sool

region could be solved peaceully, and that he was in contact with Cabdullahi Yuusu, Presi-dent o Puntland, in this regard (Jamhuuriya,23 January 2004). Te tone o this interview had been riendly. However, in his statementsthe boqor clearly generated the impression thathe had a “master plan” that the governmentsdid not have, particularly not the governmentin Hargeysa. Te boqor gave a second interview on 26 January 2004, the day beore his arrest.

In this interview he changed his tone mark-

18 This news report ollows an anglicised version o Somali.

More importantly, the terminology is strictly “Puntlandish”:

“Somaliland” is not mentioned; instead the text reers to

the “north-west regions o Somalia”. Moreover, the district

o Buuhoodle is called “Ayn” (Cayn), which is the name thegovernment in Garoowe had introduced or the area in the

south o Togdheer region where mainly members o the

Dhulbahante clan reside.




1

edly and accused President Daahir RayaaleKaahin o Somaliland and his government ormismanaging the crisis in the Sool region and

or going against the interests o Somaliland.Concretely, he stated that the government inHargeysa tolerated the presence o Puntlandorces in Somaliland and ghting within thecountry’s borders. He also asserted that thegovernment wanted to cut the regions Sooland Sanaag rom the rest o Somaliland, andthat the president had entered into a secretagreement with the government o Djiboutiover the closure o the port o Berbera, so as to

benet the livestock export rom Somalilandvia the port o Djibouti (Jamhuuriya, 26 Janu-ary 2004).19

Te second interview triggered the arrest.Te boqor was kept in prison, despite someinterventions by elders rom his sub-clanand demonstrations by his ollowers. He wasbrought beore court at the end o February 2004. Tis was the rst time ever a traditionalauthority was brought beore court in the Re-public o Somaliland (Te Republican, 28 Feb-

ruary-5 March 2004). Te security situation inHargeysa and in Ceelaweyn, the town rom

where the boqor originated, was very tense. Inearly March, members o the traditional lead-ers’ lineage clashed with Somaliland orces inthe Sanaag region. Several people died in theconrontation (Allpuntland.com, 4 March2004). Te judgement was nally issued in

April 2004. Boqor Buurmadow was dischargedo crimes against the state, but ound guilty o

having damaged the honour o the president.

19 Daahir Rayaale Kaahin belongs to the Gadabuursi clan.

The Gadabuursi as well as the Ciise, who both are part

o the Dir clan amily, have a strong presence in Djibouti.

President Kaahin was repeatedly accused during his termo ofce (2002-2010) to have a secret and probably anti-

Somaliland agenda in cooperation with the government o

Djibouti.

He was sentenced to six months probation, with the condition that he would go to prisonor ve years i he committed “any crime dur-

ing the probation period” (Te Republican,10-16 April 2004: 1, 8). Critics argued thatthe court ruling was a political judgement tosilence an independent-minded and inuentialpersonality. Others, however, thought that the

whole aair was “a warning to other traditionalleaders [not to play] politics but strictly play their traditional role” (ibid.: 8).

In the atermath, Boqor Buurmadow kept a low public prole or some time. He had rent-

ed a house in Hargeysa and spent much timethere, receiving relatives, riends or other per-sons, such as the author. I conducted several in-terviews with Boqor Buurmadow between July and October 2004, during which he positionedhimsel “in-between” with regard to (northern)Somali politics. He strived or inuence andpower in Somaliland, but also mentioned thathe was a traditional leader or all who trustedin him, in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia (interview Boqor Cismaan Aw Maxamuud Bu-

urmadow, Hargeysa, 24.07.2004). In anotherinterview he openly said that he avoured a unitary Somalia in the long run (interview Boqor Cismaan Aw Maxamuud Buurmadow,Hargeysa, 27.10.2004).

Boqor Buurmadow’s case raises the ques-tion o what roles and powers traditional au-thorities can and should have in Somaliland.It also sheds light on the complicated relation-ship between the government in Hargeysa and

the local constituencies o traditional authori-ties who wish to be both: involved in nationalpolitics and representatives o their people. In2004 Boqor Buurmadow had the backing o his local ollowers, but no longer o the gov-ernment. For many members o the Guurti in Hargeysa the situation was the other way around. Tey had been selected by the pre-vious president o Somaliland, the late Max-amed Xaaji Ibraahim Cigaal, and by inuential




1

gures in their own clans. Tese ‘top-down’decisions did not always nd the approval o the local constituencies o the Guurti mem-

bers. Tis concerned particularly communi-ties in the eastern regions o Somaliland that

were geographically – but also politically – arrom Hargeysa. An intellectual in Ceerigaabo,the capital o the Sanaag region, mentioned:“We call the national Guurti the unny mem-bers o parliament” (interview Axmed Bando,Ceerigaabo, 05.08.2002). He recalled that in1993 messengers came to the region and askedor representatives rom the local groups to be

sent to the Boorama conerence. Yet, there wasno consensus among the locals in Ceerigaaboon the question o who should represent them.Some men just went to the shir in Boorama and became the elders o the region, but in theintellectual’s words, they were only “puppetrepresentatives” (ibid.).

Te two cases presented above illustrate thatrelations o traditional authority are subject toconstant redenition in their own specic con-texts. Tis underlines that traditions are not

static. Te next case study concerns the dou-ble-inauguration o two traditional authoritiesor one sub-group that led to serious tensionsin the local community. It shows how positionso traditional authorities are subject to politi-cal conict between Somaliland and Puntlandin the contested borderlands, comprising theregions Sool, (eastern) Sanaag and (southern)ogdheer/Cayn.

Case 2: tradiiona aoriies a e

argins

Ceerigaabo is the capital o Sanaag region, where various Isaaq (Habar Yoonis and Habar Jeclo) and Darood/Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli) clans reside together. Te town was ounded as seat o the British adminis-

tration in the 1930s, ater the Dervish war.20 In the 1980s, Ceerigaabo and Sanaag weredrawn into the escalating civil war. At rst, the

SNM in the region operated at a very low leveland clandestinely; open ghting escalated inearly 1989 (interview Keysi Ismaaciil Muuse

Wadaad, Ceerigaabo, 14.06.2004). Subse-quently, many Isaaq who were opposed to thegovernment o Maxamed Siyaad Barre letCeerigaabo and the surrounding areas to thenearby Daallo Mountains and the countryside.Tere, some o them joined the SNM. TeDarood/Harti clans, whose members predom-

inantly supported Barre, stayed in their homesand ought against the guerrillas, together withthe national army. When the SNM nally cap-tured Ceerigaabo in February 1991, the Dhul-bahante and Warsangeli ed to towns inhab-ited by patrilineal relatives, such as Bosaso andLaascaanood, or to the remote countryside.

In the atermath o the civil war a numbero small-scale peace conerences took place allover Sanaag. Tey culminated in a regionalpeace conerence held in Ceerigaabo in early

1993. Tis paved the way or the members o the local Darood/Harti clans to come back andlive together with the Isaaq again. Ceerigaabo

was rebuilt, and in the late 1990s a Somalilandadministration was set up there, dominatedby Isaaq, but also integrating members o theother clans (erlinden 2008: 54-59).

Although peaceul coexistence betweenthe ormer oes characterized the situation inCeerigaabo and the region in the early 2000s,

politically the region remained split. Within

20 Between 1899 and 1920, a group o northern Somali,

mostly Dhulbahante, but also some Warsangeli, Isaaq and

Ogadeen, ought under the leadership o a religious man

and poet called Sayid Maxamed Cabdille Xasan against thecolonial powers in the region. Most Isaaq, however, sided

with the British against the Dervishes. The fghting caused

havoc throughout northern Somalia.




1

Ceerigaabo, the dierent clans did not livein seclusion. Members o Isaaq clans lived to-gether with Warsangeli and Dhulbahante. Still,

some neighbourhoods were predominantly in-habited by one group. Many Dhulbahante eltsomewhat distanced rom the local adminis-tration. Tey said that they were not strongly represented in the local police and military orces. Tis was conrmed also by non-Dhul-bahante (interview Maxamed Cabdille Cilmi,Ceerigaabo, 26.04.2004). Te relatively weak Somaliland administration or Sanaag regiondid also not enjoy their recognition, even i

the Vice-Governor and the Vice-Commandero the police in the region were Dhulbahante.“Tese are just nominal positions [withoutreal power]” and “Tey are just individuals”

was what local Dhulbahante leaders answered when I mentioned these acts (interviews Ga-raad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo08.06.2004; Garaad Cabdullahi MaxamuudGuuleed, Ceerigaabo, 10.06.2004). In the

Warsangeli and Dhulbahante territories toward the east or the south o Sanaag, people

rather sided with Puntland.Most inhabitants o Ceerigaabo avoided

speaking openly about politics and the conictbetween Somaliland and Puntland. Te reason

was that they had experienced the hardshipso war at a very intimate level. raditionally,the Isaaq and Darood/Harti o Ceerigaaboand Sanaag are related through marriage. Tedominant pattern is: Warsangeli and Dhulba-hante intermarry with Habar Yoonis in south-

ern Sanaag, and Dhulbahante intermarry withHabar Jeclo in eastern Sanaag.21 During thecivil war amilies broke apart along the ‘Da-rood/Harti-Isaaq-divide’, and in-laws andneighbours ought each other. It took a long

21 Some Habar Yoonis and Habar Jeclo also intermarry

with each other, as do some Dhulbahante and Warsangeli.

time to re-establish trust ater violence had rav-aged the closely-knit community built on mu-tual respect and cooperation.22 Arguably, these

traumatic experiences are inscribed in the col-lective memory o the people living in Ceeri-gaabo and Sanaag. Tis distinguishes themrom areas that are predominantly inhabitedby members o one descent-group and thathave not experienced internecine ghting dur-ing the late 1980s.23 Te result o these experi-ences was a “chosen amnesia” in everyday lie.

Tis concept was developed by Buckley-Zistel (2006: 134) to capture the act that peo-

ple in Rwanda ater the genocide rememberedthe violence o 1994, but “requently repliedthat they could not recollect what caused thegenocide”. In Buckley-Zistel’s view, chosenamnesia implies “that the memory [o vio-lence] is still stored in the mind, even thoughthe group does not (choose to) have access to itat present” (ibid.). What relates the Rwandanexperience to the situation o people in Ceeri-gaabo is that in both places groups that havebeen engaged in killing each other had been

closely related as neighbours and in-laws andhad to live together in close proximity againater the ghting. Amnesia is chosen in orderto acilitate co-existence. Tis was expressedby a young Warsangeli resident o Ceerigaabo:

22 One actor that strengthened the value o cooperation

was that Ceerigaabo is surrounded by arable land. Many

local amilies have gardens. Moreover, besides camels, sheepand goats also cows are herded near the town. This indi-

cates that the ‘sedentary ethos’ is more developed in Ceer-

igaabo and surroundings compared to most other placesin northern Somalia (apart rom the area around Gabiley

in western Somaliland and the port towns along the coast,

rom Berbera to Bosaso). I heard that horticulture in the

area o Ceerigaabo had been introduced by the British.

2 Belonging to one clan amily does o course not prevent

internecine fghting, as the example o Burco shows. Thetown is mostly inhabited by Habar Jeclo and Habar Yoonis

who both belong to the Iaaq clan-amily. Members o these

clans ought each other bitterly in 199.




1

“People here want to orget [the ghting be-tween 1988 and 1991]. Te past is like ‘dirty laundry’; nobody wants to touch it” (interview

with Axmed A-Kalahaye and Cabdi Cali,Ceerigaabo, 28.06.2004). In a similar vein, or-dinary people and government ofcials main-tained a cool and distant attitude toward poli-tics and avoided potentially divisive reerencesto civil war experiences.

Tis ‘coolness’, however, was seriously dis-rupted by external intererences during theprocess o establishing a new garaad or thelocal Dhulbahante/Naaleeye Axmed sub-clan

in early 2004. At rst glance, the creation o a new garaad was nothing unusual. Among allSomali clans (also in southern Somalia) posi-tions o traditional authority had been pro-lierating since the all o the Somali govern-ment. Te number o Dhulbahante garaado had increased rom our beore 1991 to morethan ten in 2004. Te new leaders brought new titles with them. In 2004, one ound boqor ,ugaas and even suldaan among Dhulbahante,in addition to the traditional title garaad (in-

terview with Siciid Xaaji Nuur, Laascaanood22.10.03). Upon closer examination, however,the events in Ceerigaabo in the rst hal o 2004 pointed to ongoing conicts in the re-gion that were highly signicant or the situ-ation o traditional authorities in Somaliland’seastern periphery.

Two leaders for one lineage

Upon my arrival in Ceerigaabo on 26 April2004, I heard that the process o establishing the new traditional leader was complicated.Te Naaleeye Axmed were not united. Someeven reused to establish any garaad and wishedto call or a big shir in Xudun, the Naaleeye

Axmed stronghold in the northern Sool re-gion, bordering Sanaag (interview MaxamedCabdille Cilmi, Ceerigaabo, 26.04.2004).One o the key gures in the process was

Maxamuud Saalax Nuur Fagadhe (Naaleeye Axmed/Cali Naaleeye), a ‘ull-blood’ politicianapproximately in his late 60s and a ormer For-

eign Minister o Somaliland whom I had metearlier in Hargeysa. Beore the collapse o theSomali government he had been part o a re-orm movement called “Maniesto Group” de-manding constitutional and political changesin Somalia in the late 1980s.

In Ceerigaabo, I met Fagadhe in a restau-rant with ‘his’ candidate, Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe. Saleebaan was introduced to me asa ormer BBC correspondent in London. He

had also worked or the Ministry o Inorma-tion under Maxamed Siyaad Barre and muchlater in Somaliland. Finally, he had been a member o the SSDF as well as the SNM. Hehad worked or the guerrilla radios, rst RadioKulmis and then Radio Halgan. Tis o course

was quite an interesting career, and now Fagad-he insisted that Saleebaan should become thenew garaad . Fagadhe argued that to be eligibleor garaad , a person has to have certain charac-teristics. “Waa nin rag yaqaan, Rabi yaqaan iyo

run yaqaan (He [a garaad ] is a man who knowsmen, God and truth).” Fagadhe continued:“He has to be a good speaker; he has to have a presence [charisma], a character; he has to be a man o substance; and he has to be loyal to So-maliland” (interview with Maxamuud Saalax Nuur Fagadhe and Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe,Ceerigaabo, 27.04.2004). Te last point aston-ished me. I asked why the new garaad had tobe loyal to Somaliland and mentioned that a

garaad is not a national politician. Fagadhe re-plied that the new garaad will be a politician.“Te conict between Somaliland and Punt-land results in political problems here in theregion, and thereore the garaad has to have a political position” (interview with MaxamuudSaalax Nuur Fagadhe and Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo, 27.04.2004). In Fagad-he’s view, the new leader should clearly be pro-Somaliland. When I asked i I could attend a




17

meeting at which members o the sub-clan dis-cussed the issue, Fagadhe reused. He stressedthat at this kind o meeting highly sensitive is-

sues were discussed that must not be heard by outsiders.

Te secrecy o the Naaleeye Axmed regard-ing the establishment o their new garaad

worked. At least, I did not manage to gainmore substantial inormation in the ollow-ing weeks. Finally, it was announced that on30 May 2004 Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe wasto be installed as garaad . I received an invita-tion. On the morning o the 30th I went to the

Hotel Sanaag, where the crowd was supposedto meet beore accompanying the uture tra-ditional leader to the ceremonial place on theedge o town. On my way someone handedme an invitation card. At rst I declined be-cause I already had an invitation. Te maninsisted and explained that this card was “orthe caleemo saar o the other garaad ”. I wastaken by surprise. Tis was the rst time Iheard about the installation o two garaado o Naaleeye Axmed on the very same day. One

was Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe; the other wascalled Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed. Bothbelonged to the Aadan Naaleeye lineage o theNaaleeye Axmed sub-clan and were thereoredistant relatives (I heard they were ina adeer shanaad : th [patrilineal] cousins). Te rst

was considered to be the “Somaliland garaad ”.He was supported by the local administrationin Ceerigaabo, particularly by the inuentialmayor, Ismaaciil Xaaji Nuur o Habar Yoonis/

Muuse Ismaaciil, and by the government inHargeysa represented in Ceerigaabo throughFagadhe. Te second was described by many Naaleeye Axmed in town as “the candidate o the people”. He allegedly was rather pro-Punt-land. Tose who did not like him stressed thathe was a wadaad , which in this context meantikhwaan or (ormer) “Al Itihad”, and in general

an Islamic undamentalist.24 In any case, the‘double installation’ o two garaado rom thesame sub-clan and even rom the same lineage

was something extremely unusual.Since I could not participate in both cer-

emonies at the same time, I decided to jointhe caleemo saar o Garaad Saleebaan. Later Ihad an opportunity to participate in a ollow-up ceremony called Allah bari (begging Allah)o Garaad Cabdullahi. In the ollowing para-graphs I outline the important political aspectsinvolved with both events.

On 30 May, around 8 a.m., people gathered

at the Hotel Sanaag, near the ‘government dis-trict’ o Ceerigaabo. Maxamuud Saalax NuurFagadhe was already there. A number o of-cials, such as the mayor, Ismaaciil Xaaji Nuur,and the vice-governor o Sanaag region, Cab-dicasis Xasan Siciid, came soon. Around 9 a.m.the local ‘big men’ held a meeting. I heard thatFagadhe was asking or soldiers to guard theevent. Aterwards I joined the men on theirtrip downtown to check the situation. By now I understood that they were worried about the

coronation o the counter- garaad that was un-derway in the countryside close to Ceerigaabo.Fagadhe and the others reerred to the other

garaad and his supporters as mucarad (oppo-sition). Te local police commander reportedthat only a ew people had gathered at the

2 Lewis (191: 27-28) distinguished wadaad (pl.: wadaado)

and waranle. Wadaad was typically an itinerant sheekh whotook care o the religious education and matters among

the nomads. Waranle meant “spear bearer” and described

the category o “warrior”. Traditionally, religious men did

not engage in fghting and depended on the protection o their armed relatives or hosts. Warriors, on the other hand,

needed wadaado or spiritual guidance. In the 1990s and

2000s, however, this terminology had changed. Wadaad was

requently used as “euphemism” or religious undamental-

ist, as ikhwaan (which literally means “brothers” and reersto those who hold views similar to the Muslim Brothers

in Egypt) or Al Itihad. Al Itihad was an armed movement. A

modern wadaad , thus, could also be a warrior.




18

place where Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed was to be installed. Ismaaciil, the mayor, waspleased. He said: “Ceerigaabo way degen tahay

(Ceerigaabo is calm).”25 When we returned tothe Hotel Sanaag, more than 50 people hadgathered there. Additionally, about ten carsstood ready to take the people along. Salee-baan Daahir Aqarshe sat in the hotel lobby dressed in a white khamis with a pink shawlaround his shoulders and a turban on his head.He was surrounded by several local traditionalauthorities. Tey were ‘posing’ or the photog-raphers. Te political ofcials and the police

commander also joined the picture. Around 11:30 a.m. most o the people jumped in the waiting cars and the parade took o rom the hotel. It passed near the city cen-tre, making maximum noise with horns honk-ing and people shouting. Te nal destination

was a place called ceel (Somali or “well”) nextto the once very important well o Ceerigaabothat now, however, was closed. Along the way I spotted a ew soldiers with Kalashnikovs onrootops and along the street. Te procession

walked the last 200 meters on oot, with theuture garaad taking the lead, surrounded by elders and people waving branches with greenleaves. It stopped under a huge tree, where a provisional ‘camp’ had been established withmats on the ground and a table and chairs setup under the tree. Speakers and a microphonehad also been arranged. An armed soldier satin the tree. He was soon joined by a dozenteenage boys sitting on the branches above the

uture garaad and the honoraries. Fagadhe, themayor, and a number o traditional authoritiesrom various clans (mostly rom Habar Yoonisand Habar Jeclo) delivered short speeches,

2 This phrase was requently used by people in Ceerigaabo

to describe their town’s situation. The opposite would be

… way kacaysan tahay (“… is in upheaval”).

praising the candidate and advocating peace inthe region. At least one-third o the crowd were

women. Some o them were chanting songs to

a monotonous drum beat, and a teenage girlsat on the ground and pretended to processmilk in a traditional vessel called haan. She was‘pretending’ because, as she told me, there wasin act no milk in the vessel. Te perormance

was just part o the ritual. Te event reachedits climax with dozens o people approaching and greeting the uture garaad . While shaking hands and expressing their good wishes, they ‘poured’ owers, leaves and popcorn over the

head o Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe. Tis wasthe essence o the rite called caleemo saar (ver-bally: putting on leaves).

During a caleemo saar a new leader is cov-ered with leaves and owers, and in the old days

was showered with camel milk as a symbol o ertility and prosperity (barwaaqo). Barwaaqo is an important concept in the pastoral-no-madic culture o northern Somalia. It is usedto describe a state o ultimate happiness, whenhumans and animals live in abundance, dur-

ing the months o the long rainy season (So-mali: gu). In this way, the caleemo saar is notonly an expression o joy, but also a reminderthat the traditional leader is responsible or the

well-being o his people. Ater he was ‘show-ered’, Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe took the microphone and addressed his people. Hethanked them and promised to work or peacein Ceerigaabo and Sanaag. Te ceremony wasover at around 1:30 p.m.; aterwards every-

body went home.Te event was a display o Somaliland poli-

tics in ‘traditional clothing’. On the one hand,the location under a tree near a well, the girlpretending to churn butter rom milk andthe leaves and owers poured over the newly elected garaad ’s head reerred to Somali pasto-ral-nomadic traditions and the concept o bar-waaqo. On the other, the strong presence o members o the local Somaliland administra-




19

tion, the important role o Fagadhe, a nationalgure, and the presence o Somaliland sol-diers along the way and at the ceremonial site

pointed to the political character o SaleebaanDaahir Aqarshe’s caleemo saar . Moreover, theact that the ceremony took place inside Ceeri-gaabo was another clear indicator o its strong backing by the local administration. Te coun-ter- garaad had to be crowned outside o town.However, the number o participants at Salee-baan Daahir Aqarshe’s caleemo saar was, withewer than 100 people, rather moderate. Tisshowed that the masses o the people had ei-

ther gone elsewhere, i.e. to the instalment cer-emony o the counter- garaad , or stayed away rom both ceremonies.

In the aternoon o that day, Ceerigaabo re-turned to ‘normal’. Most men sat with theirriends, relatives and/or acquaintances andchewed qaad . On that particular day, many qaad circles all over town received qaad asa present rom Garaad Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe. Beore chewing with some men, Ibriey went and visited the counter- garaad ,

Garaad Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed, inhis house. Te entrance was guarded by somemen (yet without visible guns). Inside thehouse a ew people were gathered. Ater having greeted the garaad I made an appointment ora later interview and let. A Naaleeye Axmedman who accompanied me along the way tothe garaad ’s house mentioned that most peoplehad joined the caleemo saar o Garaad Cabdul-lahi. Tis was conrmed by others, including

non-Dhulbahante. Tose who wanted to di-minish the act that more people had joinedthe counter- garaad ’s coronation stressed thatmostly “women and children” had gone toCabdullahi Maxamuud Guuled’s calemo saar .One Dhulbahante soldier serving in the localSomaliland orces commented ironically dur-ing a qaad session: “Geela iyo dumarkaba waa la hiddo raaca (Camels and women go withthe culture)” (interview with Axmed Aadan

Xuseen, Ceerigaabo, 23.06.04). Cismaan, a young Warsangeli wadaad and employee in a local telecommunications company, summa-

rised: “Te caleemo saar o Garaad Cabdullahi was a traditional ceremony, the one o GaraadSaleebaan Daahir Aqarshe was a political cer-emony” (interview with Cismaan, Ceerigaabo30.04.2004). Tis classication also becameapparent at a later religious ceremony, the Allahbari , held by Garaad Cabdullahi, but here po-litical elements were also apparent.

Te Allah bari ceremony o Garaad Cab-dullahi Maxamed Guuleed took place on 24

June 2004, roughly our weeks ater the twoparallel caleemo saar ceremonies. Te aim wasto “beg God” to bless the new garaad and hispeople. Tis event concluded the establishmento Garaad Cabdullahi.26 Despite its seemingly purely religious and traditional character theevent created tensions in Ceerigaabo. Te localgovernment had interdicted the ceremony, butGaraad Cabdullahi and his ollowers insisted onit. Te night beore the event rumours spreadin town that soldiers might be dispatched to

control the situation. In the morning I visitedGaraad Cabdullahi in his house. He conrmedthat the ceremony would be held. Tey hadnegotiated with the government and werenow allowed to gather in the countryside, at a place called Ceelqorey some 40 minutes walk-ing distance south o Ceerigaabo. It was thedegaan o Dhulbahante/NaaleeyeAxmed andHabar Yoonis. I went there by car with sev-eral religious men and elders. We reached the

place at around 10 a.m. About 30 people werealready there, preparing the ceremony and theood or the ollowing east. A place under a tree had been covered with mats and seats hadbeen arranged in a hal circle. Nearby, a ‘eld

2 I did not hear o an Allah bari ceremony or Garaad

Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe.




20

kitchen’ had been established. Four camels andabout 30 goats had been slaughtered at sunrise.Men and women were now busy preparing the

meal or all the expected guests. Some men,particularly elders o neighbouring clans andsub-clans, had been specially invited, but basi-cally everybody was allowed to come and getsome ood.

While observing the scene I had a conversa-tion with some o the men with whom I hadcome. alking about politics, one o the menstressed that he did not like the governmentin Hargeysa. Another man added, “I am Punt-

land; we are the same clan” (meaning: we areHarti). Later we talked about religion and, asusual, my pious Somali conversation partnerstried to convince me that Islam was the best o all religions and that only Muslims had a realaim in lie, namely, to reach paradise ( janna ).

Aterwards I strolled through the camp andlmed and photographed the preparations,particularly the cooking o huge amounts o meat in impressive pots over an open re. Icame across a guard sitting next to a pile o

already cooked meat. When he saw me lm-ing, he briey lited a blanket next to him andshowed me some Kalashnikovs hidden there.

Another man quickly stepped by and said tothe guard: “Don’t show this, it is peace and theguns do not t the picture o the Allah bari .”I ound this scene extremely inormative. Itclearly pointed to the tensions around theevent between the local government and ‘their’

garaad on the one side, and the counter- garaad

on the other.Te real event started shortly beore the

noon prayer. Te elders and other honourablepersons were seated on the chairs in a hal cir-cle. Garaad Cabdullahi, dressed in khamis, a cap on his head and with his long black beard,

sat in the centre.27 Around 300 people had ar-rived by oot or in cars and trucks rom Ceeri-gaabo and surroundings. Almost all o them

were men. Te ew women on the scene wereoccupied with kitchen work. Te ceremony

was opened by a young man, who reciteda long sura rom the Quran. Subsequently a ‘master o ceremonies’ introduced the speak-ers. raditional authorities rom dierent clansresiding in the Sanaag region spoke about thesituation o the local people and begged Allahto give his blessing to the new garaad , to theland and to the people. Te speakers as well

as the audience included people rom dier-ent clans. Habar Jeclo and Habar Yoonis satnext to Dhulbahante, Warsangeli and othersmaller groups. One speech by an elderly man

who had just returned rom the diaspora wasremarkably ‘out o place’. He spoke angrily and lamented the destruction o the environ-ment and moral decline o the Somali peopleover the past decades. Te new garaad had thelast word. He thanked the people and exten-sively (or ten minutes) begged the blessing

o Allah. Ten the people were called or thenoon prayer, which was led by the garaad .

Ater prayer lunch was served, and everybody received spaghetti and large amounts o meat.

At 2 p.m. people began to head back home.Te event was enlightening in several re-

gards. First, there were serious tensions sur-rounding it, yet the event itsel happened in a peaceul atmosphere. No armed guards or sol-diers were visible during the ceremony. Moreo-

ver, none o the speakers reerred to the conictover the establishment o the Naaleeye Axmed

garaado or the Somaliland-Puntland conict.

27 The beard was a clear sign o Garaad Cabdullahi’s reli-

gious orientation as modern wadaad or ikhwaan. Full beardswere rarely seen on Somali men until the early 1990s. A

common nickname or religious undamentalists in the early

2000s was garweyne (big-beard).




21

Second, a sizeable crowd attended the Allahbari o Garaad Cabdullahi, and they were not

just “women and children” as some o the sup-

porters o Garaad Saleebaan had claimed (seeabove). o the contrary, the majority were menrom dierent clans including Warsangeli andHabar Jeclo. Tird, Garaad Cabdullahi clearly displayed one o the characteristics o a tradi-tional authority, which is leadership in spiritualmatters. As Fagadhe had stressed, a garaad hasto “know men, God and truth”. Garaad Cab-dullahi certainly “knew God”. His “begging

Allah” beore the noon prayer was genuine and

emotionally touching.Tis Allah bari ceremony clearly accentu-ates the key dierence between the two par-allelly inaugurated leaders, which is: One is a religious man, the other a worldly politician.But or many people it was actually not justa question o deciding whether to support ei-ther Garaad Cabdullahi or Garaad Saleebaan

Aqarshe. In act, many Dhulbahante and oth-ers in Ceerigaabo stressed that the only “real”

garaad or Naaleeye Axmed remained Garaad

Saleebaan Garaad Maxamed, the leader o allUgaadhyahan (including all Naaleeye Axmed)in Laascaanood, the capital o the neighbouring Sool region. Tis was a much discussed issue.Earlier, Fagadhe had stressed that the estab-lishment o a separate Naaleeye Axmed garaad

would deal a severe blow to Garaad SaleebaanGaraad Maxamed, whom he considered to be“ignorant” and “nomadic” (meaning unedu-cated), and who clearly was very close to Cab-

dullahi Yuusu, the President o Puntland rom1998 to 2004. Others maintained that despitethe newly elected garaado in Ceerigaabo, Ga-raad Saleebaan Garaad Maxamed remained the“original” garaad or the Dhulbahante groupsrom Laascaanood up to Ceerigaabo in thenorth.

Interestingly, I heard that the event at theend o May 2004 had not been the rst at-tempt o members o the Naaleeye Axmed

to split rom the line o Garaad Saleebaan inLaascaanood. In the 1950s Naaleeye Axmedhad gathered in Xudun to elect a new garaad .28

In those days, however, Garaad Maxamed, theather o Garaad Saleebaan, rode by horse to

Xudun to convince “his people” to stay underhis leadership. He succeeded. “People said: ‘I he [Garaad Maxamed] can solve our problems,

we will support him’” (interview with Axmed Aadan Xuseen, Ceerigaabo, 23.06.04). Tisunderlines that the power o any traditionalleader anong (northern) Somalis dependsupon his personality and his skills in satisying

the needs o his ollowers. At the same timethere are many dierent ways o articulating traditional authority in contemporary Soma-lia. A brie ‘comparison’ o the two garaado aspersonalities is instructive regarding the varia-tion o ‘types’ o traditional authorities.

Different types of traditional authorities

In early June 2004 I visited the two new ga-raado in Ceerigaabo or longer interviews in

their homes. With Garaad Cabdullahi I con-ducted one interview in his home on 10 June2004, starting at 9 a.m. Te garaad wore a

white khamis and a cap. He in act looked likea young wadaad or ikhwaan. His beard, hairand clothes were all perectly in accordance

with Islamist norms and he made a somewhatdistanced impression. Garaad Cabdullahi wasborn in Ceerigaabo in 1960. His mother wasrom the Dir clan amily (he did not speciy

rom which clan). Ater middle school he start-ed to work as a carpenter. In the late 1980s hebecame a businessman and spent some time inMogadishu and other places in the south. Forhim, people in northern and southern Soma-

28 I heard that in the 190s, it was Daahir Aqarshe, the

ather o Saleebaan, who had been chosen as candidate.




22

lia were the same, apart rom slight dialecticaldierences. He married a Dhulbahante/Naale-eye Axmed woman in 1989 and subsequently

spent some time abroad, in Arab countries. His wie and children stayed in Laascaanood, buthe now wanted them to settle in Ceerigaabo.

I asked why Naaleeye Axmed needed theirown garaad and could not stay under the au-thority o Garaad Saleebaan Garaad Maxamedin Laascaanood. Garaad Cabdullahi arguedthat too many problems existed inside Naale-eye Axmed alone to be solved by one garaad .He added that recently even smaller groups

within Dhulbahante/Ugaahyahan had createdtheir own traditional leaders, and that Naaleeye Axmed were much more numerous than theseother groups.29 Still, Garaad Cabdullahi em-phasized that he hoped to meet Garaad Salee-baan Garaad Maxamed in Laascaanood soon.“It is important that the dierent traditionalleaders work together.” When I mentionedthe ‘other’ garaad , Garaad Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe, Garaad Cabdullahi was slightly em-barrassed. He thought that the majority o the

Dhulbahante in the area were on his side. Inhis view, the other garaad was created by theSomaliland administration.

Garaad Cabdullahi stressed that, politi-cally, he was leading where the majority o hispeople would like to go. He argued that mostDhulbahante in Sanaag avoured the politicalorientation o Puntland with regard to the re-establishment o a united Somalia. As he putit, “Danta beesha waan ku khasban ahay (I am

orced by the interests o my constituency).”But he quickly added that the political situa-tion in the region was quite unstable. Peoplecan also ollow their interests and turn to di-

29 In act, the Naaleeye Axmed consisted o at least 11 line-ages, including Aadan Naaleeye, Cali Naaleeye, Reer Cilmi,

and Reer Jibril. Some i these again branched out into a

great number o smaller sub-groups.

erent sides. Still, particularly in the country-side, ‘clan’ and patrilineal descent guided peo-ple’s orientations. Regarding the situation in

Ceerigaabo the garaad maintained that Naale-eye Axmed were not so well integrated in thelocal administration. Not many Dhulbahanteserved as soldiers or policemen. Te garaad de-manded that the balance o power in town bechanged to the benet o his people (interview

with Garaad Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed,Ceerigabo, 10.06.2004).

I observed that during our talk almost no-body else was in the house o the garaad . Only

a ew young boys were there who most prob-ably belonged to the close amily o the garaad and helped around the house. I wondered i anybody ever came to sit with and consult Ga-raad Cabdullahi. As a wadaad he did not chew qaad , which most probably discouraged many men o his clan rom visiting him. Qaad is inact a central means o orging social and po-litical ties in northern Somalia (Hansen 2010).Inuential gures are expected to regularly hand out qaad to their relatives and ollowers.

Generosity, an important characteristic o any Somali leader, was traditionally expressed by slaughtering a goat or the guests. As the use o qaad has become endemic since the civil war innorthern Somalia and the experience o living in reugee camps in Ethiopia in the late 1980s,generosity is mostly shown by inviting peopleor qaad .

I also visited Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe. I had three longer interviews with

him in his house between 8 and 12 June 2004.30 During the visits the garaad and I sat on the

0 The imbalance in the number o interviews with the two

garaado derived rom my subjective impression that Ga-

raad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe had more to say. Ater thefrst interview we just continued to talk, whereas I elt that

talking with Garaad Cabdullahi Maxamed Guleed had been

‘exhaustive’ ater one interview session.




2

veranda or in one o his private rooms. Onthe rst occasion the Garaad Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe lit a cigarette and began to complain

that he had to work until midnight since hehad been elected garaad .31 He stressed that “hispeople” don’t even respect privacy, as “civilized”people do. I they see him sitting alone andreading or writing they think he has a problem;they think he needs people around him to behappy. Saleebaan mentioned that he had liveda long time abroad and has a kind o Westernliestyle; he enjoys privacy. Now several mencome every aternoon and want to talk with

him. “Tey don’t even talk about real impor-tant problems. Tey talk about the war in Iraq,the death o Ronald Reagan or something else,but they ignore the problems right out theirront doors” (interview with Garaad SaleebaanDaahir Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo, 08.06.2004).Te garaad added that these men, or example,do not understand that education and health-care are o enormous importance or their chil-dren. Morover, in case o conict “they don’task who started the ghting and who was right

or wrong; they just support ‘their boys’. Tisleads to an escalation o violence on a higherlevel and makes conict settlement more com-plicated” (ibid.).

Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe went onto say that other people just came to gossip or

wanted a bundle o qaad . Garaad Saleebaanmentioned that or the coronation ceremony (caleemo saar ) on 30 May 2004 he had to pay

1 During all our interviews, and also when I met Garaad

Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe on other occasions, he smoked

heavily. Once he mentioned that now, as garaad, he wassupposed to stop smoking since it was not considered ap-

propriate that a garaad smoked. Garaad Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe seemed to be unwilling to quit.

almost USD 3000 just or qaad .32 Tis contra-dicted past traditions:

In the old days, when they wanted to ap-point a new garaad , the clan used to col-lect livestock so that the new leader wouldbecome independent and un-corruptible.He then could be generous and pay minorcompensations or wrongs committedby anybody belonging to his own grouprom his own ‘pocket’; he also would in-vite guests and provide the meat. Now,in the urban context everything is dier-

ent. I somebody wants to become garaad today he has to have money or he has tohave alliances with the rich people o hisclan. Tis is why the position o garaad has become politicized. Also, the prob-lems he has to deal with are more politicalthan social/amily-related, as in the past.oday, in the absence o a strong govern-ment [in the periphery], a garaad has tokeep his people together in the midst o conict between Somaliland, Puntland

and southern Somalia, in the ace o mili-tary conrontations and against the back-ground o intererence by religious groupssuch as Al-Qaeda, imo Weyn and so

2 In act, much qaad had been distributed in Ceergaabo on

0 May in the name o Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe.The local price or a small bundle o qaad (mijin) was around

USD . On average, a Somali man chewed two to three

bundles at one sitting. USD 000 would buy qaad or ap-

proximately 00-00 men. The statement o the garaad was

quite credible, given the act that he certainly had to give

qaad to every male in the local and the regional administra-

tion as well as in the police and the armed orces in town

to thank them or their support o his election.




2

orth.33 Te latter mix religion with poli-tics and seek power in (northern) Somalia.

You have to manoeuvre very careully not

to alienate anybody. Te balance betweenthe various religious sects is especially di-cult. (interview with Salebaan Daahir

Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo, 10.04.2004)

Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe, whose ha-bitus was rather ‘secular’ and westernized, ob-viously was much occupied with the topic o sectarian splits within his sub-clan. He men-tioned that the religious undamentalists in

northern Somalia received orders rom outside(meaning: rom the Arab Peninsula). During the discussions prior to his caleemo saar someo the ikhwaan inside Naaleeye Axmed hadopenly stated that they had “clear orders thatone o them has to become garaad ” (ibid.).34

Ten Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshestarted to talk about the situation in Ceeri-gaabo. He mentioned that the interest o hispeople is the peaceul coexistence between thedierent clans. “My interest is in Ceerigaabo;

here we have to live together. Instead o think-ing about clan structures I think about theplace where I live. First comes peace in Sanaag,then we can think about Laascaanood, Ga-roowe, Hargeysa or Mogadishu” (ibid.). Hestressed that reconciliation in Ceerigaabo ater

Timo Weyn was an Islamic sect (within the larger Qadriya

group) that had its centre near Yagori in central Somaliland.It ollowed its leader, Sheekh Maxamed Rabiic (who died

in 200). The sect’s marker o distinction was a particular

haircut. The hair was relatively long and parted accuratelydown the middle o the head. In contrast, other Somali men

usually cut their hair very short. This was the sunna o the

Prophet, in the eyes o most Somalis. The members o the

Timo Weyn tariqa had a dierent opinion on this and several

other religious matters.

It was difcult or me to assess this statement. It mayalso just have been an indirect attack against the counter-

garaad, Garaad Cabdullahi, who was said to be ikhwaan and

Al Itihad.

the civil war o 1988-1991 was still not com-plete. Tereore, his rst priority as garaad wasto “heal the wounds o the previous civil war”

(ibid.). Regarding the situation o Dhulba-hante in town he said: “Politics in Ceerigaabois like a table with only three legs; the Dhulba-hante are still not ully integrated” (interview

with Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe, Ceer-igaabo, 08.06.2004).

I asked why Naaleeye Axmed needed a new garaad . Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe an-swered, “We have a new garaad now becauseo the tensions between Somaliland and Punt-

land. I anything happens, then the Isaaq andthe Dhulbahante [in Ceerigaabo and Sanaag] will again clash. Naaleeye Axmed would be onthe ront line since they inhabit the borderlandsbetween Isaaq and Dhulbahante” (interview

with Salebaan Daahir Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo,10.04.2004). In my interpretation, GaraadSaleebaan Daahir Aqarshe was suggesting thatGaraad Saleebaan Garaad Maxamed in Laas-caanood was leading his ollowers in supporto Puntland and against Somaliland. I even-

tually the conict between Hargeysa and Ga-roowe escalated violently, the Naaleeye Axmedin the Sanaag region would need an alternativeleader – Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshehimsel – who could prevent the Dhulba-hante in Ceerigaabo rom once again getting involved in internecine ghting with the localIsaaq neighbours and in-laws

Ater Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshehad elaborated extensively on his political po-

sitions and his “visions” as garaad , we talkedabout his personal background. He was bornin Ceerigaabo in 1942. His grandather hadbeen a Dervish leader called Sheekh Cabdi




2

Aqarshe.35 Sheekh Cabdi Aqarshe had been a member o the khusuusi , the leadership com-mittee o the Dervishes. He was killed when

the British bombarded a Dervish ortress intoday’s Sanaag region. Ater the Dervish warthe garaad ’s ather, Daahir, ed with his amily to Berbera, where he joined the police orceo the British Protectorate in 1935. Ater sec-ondary school, Saleebaan went to Moscow in1963, where he studied chemistry, physics andmathematics. When he came back to Soma-lia in 1967 he became a teacher at a second-ary school in Mogadishu. Soon he joined the

radio and became the head o the educationalbroadcasting service. Under Maxamed SiyaadBarre he was put in charge o the two Somaliradio stations in Hargeysa and Mogadishu. In1970 he was sent to East Berlin to edit the lmabout the “rst anniversary o the revolution”.But Saleebaan was already ed up with the new government. From East Berlin he escaped to

West Berlin where a BBC correspondent wait-ed or him. He was brought to London, wherehe stayed or several years and worked or the

BBC Somali Service. In late 1978 he joinedhe Somali Salvation Front (SSF) in Ethiopia,

which later, ater several other groups had joined in, became the SSDF. Saleebaan said heknew Cabdullahi Yuusu rom the time they spent together in Moscow. He also was close toMustae Xaaji Nuur (Isaaq/Habar Awal), therst SSF chairman and also a member o theBBC Somali Service in London. Tey estab-lished Radio Kulmis, the guerrilla radio net-

work, in Ethiopia. Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe mentioned that the Somali listeners were conused when the rst anti-regime radioprogramme was broadcast in February 1979.

The nickname Aqarshe (literally: Mouth-Hider) reers to

the clothing o the grandather ; he used to cover his mouth

as Tuareg do. This was his style as a Dervish.

Most Somalis knew Saleebaan’s and Mustae’svoices rom the BBC. Some listeners contactedthe BBC in London and asked i Radio Kulmis

was a new BBC network. Ater a while Saleebaan became “oreign

secretary” o the SSDF. A young Majeerteenman called Cabdulqadir Faarax Bootaan took over Radio Kulmis. Later Saleebaan joined theSNM and worked or Radio Halgan. In ret-rospect he complained that within both guer-rilla movements, clanism reigned. He arguedthat Maxamed Siyaad Barre had introduced a particular kind o narrow-minded clanism, an

“illness”, which Garaad Saleebaan called “ReerDiini”. Reer Diini was the lineage o MaxamedSiyaad Barre within the Marrexaan clan. GaraadSaleebaan Daahir Aqarshe urther explainedthat later other Somalis were inected with thisillness and within the SSDF, or instance, thosebelonging to Cabdullahi Yuusu ’s close amily,Reer Mahad, elt “more Diini” than the rest o the Majeerteen (interview with Garaad Salee-baan Daahir Aqarshe, Ceerigaabo, 12.06.04).Beore Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe became ga-

raad in Ceerigaabo, he had lived with his wieand children in Hargeysa. He was head o theender Commission there. Now he was think-ing about moving to Ceerigaabo to be with“his people” (ibid.).36

Te contrast between the two garaado wasalready visible on the surace. Te one, GaraadSaleebaan Daahir Aqarshe, was a worldly,chain-smoking, Moscow-educated and later

Western-oriented intellectual. He was more

than 60 years old and had experienced and

Garaad Saleebaan Daahi Aqarshe died on 1 June 2009.

A summary o his lie history was published online by Aadan

Cige Cali (2009). This account confrmed all key biographi-

cal details I had gathered in Ceerigaabo in 200. The only

signifcant dierence between the obituary and my inter-views is that the obituary mentions that Saleebaan Daahir

Aqarshe was born in Laascaanood, not in Ceerigaabo, as

he had told me.




2

partly participated in the political upheavalsin post-colonial Somalia. O course he chewedqaad occasionally, as long as his health per-

mitted, and most importantly, he was gener-ous and gave qaad to others. Te other, Ga-raad Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed, was anikhwaan, a strict Muslim ollowing a schoolo thought that was inuenced by the Mus-lim Brotherhood originally ounded in Egyptin the 1920s. Apart rom his strong religiousorientation, which prohibited him rom smok-ing and chewing qaad , he was rather a mem-ber o the ‘working class’ and relatively young.

His political awakening had happened aterthe all o the Somali government in early 1991, at least i the persistent rumours weretrue to some extent, which had it that Cabdul-lahi Maxamuud Guuleed had ought with AlItihad. His generosity was limited to inviting people or public easting, as happened at the

Allah bari ceremony. Yet there were also important similarities

between the two new Naaleeye Axmed garaado.Neither Garaad Saleebaan nor Garaad Cabdul-

lahi was well-versed in ‘pastoral politics’. Tey were urban gures and their positions and ori-entations were strongly inuenced by the con-ict between Somaliland and Puntland. None-theless, as ‘good’ traditional leaders, they bothemphasised that their main interest was withtheir people. Both mentioned that the posi-tion o the Dhulbahante in Ceerigaabo neededtheir attention, and that the members o theclan were not yet well integrated in the local

political structures in Ceerigaabo.Te conicts over the establishment o the

two Naaleeye Axmed garaado in Ceerigaabo inMay 2004 represented a local version o thelarger conict between Somaliland and Punt-land. It was essentially a conict over border-land constituencies. It concerned the Dhul-bahante in Sanaag region, who are claimed ascitizens by both Somaliland and Puntland. Inthe special setting o Ceerigaabo, where people

o dierent clans lived together, were closely re-lated, and had co-existed or generations – buthad ought each other or ‘clan reasons’ during

the civil war in northern Somalia – the conictover the election o a new Dhulbahante garaad

was particularly dangerous. Although every-body knew that the disunity within Naaleeye

Axmed over the installation o a new leader wasrelated to the conict between Somaliland andPuntland, rarely anybody ever mentioned that;all parties concerned tried to keep the tensionsunder control. Tis was, in my eyes, also thereason why the local Somaliland administra-

tion tolerated the installation o the counter- garaad , even though the administration wasvery unhappy about it. Any serious steps toprevent Garaad Cabdullahi’s caleemo saar or

Allah bari by, or example, arresting the can-didate or sending soldiers to prevent the cere-monies rom happening, would most probably have caused an escalation in the conict andcould have set local Dhulbahante against localIsaaq.

Te double installation urthermore illus-

trates more subtle conict lines between ‘mod-ern’ and ‘liberal’ interpretations o traditionalauthority on the one hand, and more conserv-ative and religiously-oriented interpretationson the other hand. Tese were entangled withthe conict between Somaliland and Puntlandin the particular setting, but also played a rolebeyond it. In Laascaanood, or instance, whereall traditional authorities I met were clearly against Somaliland’s secession, the conict

between worldly and ikhwaan traditional au-thorities existed as well. Tere, Garaad Cab-diqani, an intellectual, cigarette-smoking,politically very experienced leader with a long history in Somalia already beore the state col-lapse, represented the intellectual and worldly type. In contrast, two new garaado, GaraadCabdisalaan (Dhulbahante /Maxamuud Ga-raad/Cumar Wacays) and Garaad Maxamuud(Dhulbahante/ Ugaadhyahan/Wacays Cab-




27

dulle), who had been installed in the early 2000s, conormed exactly to the same typeas Garaad Cabdullahi Maxamuud Guuleed

in Ceerigaabo, including the rumours abouttheir ormer Al Itihad engagements.37 A newly elected Warsangeli traditional leader in LaasQoray was also said to be ikhwaan. Some peo-ple said that the recent coronations o ikhwaan as traditional authorities all over northern So-malia (but particularly among Warsangeli andDhulbahante) ollowed a long-term politicalplan o the Islamists to take over power, aterthe military campaigns o Al Itihad in north-

ern Somalia had ailed in the early 1990s. Telocal conicts over traditional authority shouldthereore be understood within a much broad-er context.

CONCluSION

Tis paper underlined that traditional au-thorities are highly relevant non-state actors innorthern Somalia, who inuence and are in-

uenced by the wider political developmentsin the region. From having been involved inpastoral politics in the pre-colonial past, they emerged as key actors in guerrilla and statepolitics in northern Somalia since the 1980s.Tey particularly shaped the social and politi-cal re-construction in the post-war and post-state collapse periods o rst Somaliland andthen Puntland. In this context, the Guurti in

7 There was also a third type o traditional leader, who

could be called ‘nomadic’. The prototype o this was, at leastamong the Dhulbahante in Laascaanood, Garaad Salee-

baan Garaad Maxamed. He was certainly not close to the

ikhwaan type, but also less sophisticated, at least in state

politics, than the intellectual type. He was a specialist in

pastoral politics and made the impression o a man closeto the ‘ordinary men’ o his clan. This did not save him rom

getting between the ront lines within his sub-clan and with

regard to the Somaliland-Puntland conict.

Hargeysa, which is the ‘upper house’ in thebicameral parliament o Somaliland, deservesspecial mentioning. Tis Guurti and its long-

term chairman until 2004, Sheekh Ibraahim, were the ‘backbone’ o the polity o Soma-liland, particularly in the 1990s. Besides theelders in the Guurti also many other tradition-al leaders, particularly at the level o saladiin and garaado, got involved in national politics.Trough this involvement individual lead-ers gained considerable inuence and power.Te case o Boqor Buurmadow, presented inthis paper, however, illustrates that one could

quickly all rom being a ‘national’ traditionalauthority to being a prisoner accused o hightreason. Clearly, the elevated political roles o many traditional authorities in the absence o eective state structures in northern Somalia came with certain costs. Te most obvious cost

was the erosion o popular legitimacy. Many ollowers did not benet rom their leaders get-ting involved in ‘national’ politics. Rather they longed or eective guidance and ‘governance’in everyday matters at the local level. Some au-

thorities ‘burned their hands’ in politics. Tisled to conicts over their person as well as ten-sions and splits among their constituencies.

In the contested borderlands between So-maliland and Puntland, traditional authoritiesas group representatives had other possibilities.Te traditional leaders there were in high de-mand since they were supposed to clariy theallegiance o their people to either Somalilandor Puntland. Te case study rom Ceerigaabo

presented in this paper showed how particu-larly Hargeysa tried to ‘enlist’ the local Dhul-bahante into its ‘camp’ by inuencing the se-lection process o a new traditional authority.Tis, however, led to more conusion and seri-ous political tensions at the local level, in anarea where most people were busy keeping theragile peace established ater intensive inter-necine ghting until 1991. Te burdening o local leaders with national politics, particularly




28

with regard to the stand-o between Soma-liland and Puntland, also eroded the popularlegitimacy o the traditional authorities among

the Dhulbahante, as the situation in Ceeri-gaabo showed.

Te insights presented in this paper con-tradict Logan’s (2009) claim that most Ari-cans do not draw a sharp distinction betweenhereditary traditional authorities on the onehand and elected local government ofcialsand state authorities on the other (ibid.: 103).Te Somali case also questions her argumentthat the hybridisation o both orms o author-

ity could pave the way or ‘real’ democratisa-tion (ibid. 123-24). In my view, the problemis that traditional authority is a very generalterm. It comprises quite dierent ‘kinds’ o traditional authorities. In Arica, the spectrumgoes rom traditional kings and paramountchies to elders and authorities who becomeonly active in special situations, or instance at

war time. Te rst are usually ound in hierar-chical and sedentary societies. Tey who enjoy considerable power are sometimes venerated as

“divine” beings. Te last are typical or ratheregalitarian, oten pastoral-nomadic societies.Teir status is one o primus inter pares andtheir power is rather limited. With this hugevariety o actors reerred to as traditional lead-ers, it could be argued that not all orms areeasily integrated into or compatible with statestructures. For instance traditional leaders intraditionally hierarchical and sedentary settingsmay more easily merge with equally hierarchi-

cal state structures. By contrast in the acepha-lous and still partly pastoral-nomadic context,such as in northern Somalia, the gap betweenthe authority o an elder and that o a state o-cial is much wider. Perhaps thereore, peoplealso seem to make a clear distinction betweenthese two dierent orms o authority.

Te integration o some leading Isaaq el-ders into the SNM and their participation inthe emerging political order o Somaliland did

work out or some time. However, the successo this integration seems to be short-lived, asI have suggested in this paper. In the long run

traditional authorities in northern Somalia donot seem to qualiy or a seamless integrationinto state structures. Te hybrid system estab-lished in Somaliland in the early 1990s, bring-ing together traditional authorities and institu-tions o modern statehood did not succeed asintended. Rather it resulted in a change o thesources o legitimacy: raditional authorities,at least those sitting in the Guurti , became in-creasingly like politicians and lost their popu-

lar appeal. Tis should be understood againstthe background o how politicians (siyaasiin)are viewed in Somaliland. Tey are seen as sel-ish and as lacking responsibility or the widercommunity. Moreover, they are regarded as ig-niting conicts rather than working or peace,stability and social cohesion.

Still, in the countryside, away rom ‘statepolitics’, many traditional authorities con-tinue to work or the benet o their peopleand, e.g., engage in conict settlement among

pastoral nomads. But the situation is again di-erent in the contested borderlands betweenSomaliland and Puntland. Te accusation o being like a politician was in act used againstmany traditional authorities among Dhulbah-ante in Ceerigaabo. One inormant lamented:“oday the traditional authorities work or thegovernment, and the politicians lead the clan;previously, both [types o] authorities wereseparated. oday they are mixed” (interview

Sheekh Aboqor, Ceerigaabo, 12.05.2004).Returning to Weber’s ideal typical distinc-

tion, it is clear that rational authority, whichis the basis o every modern state, cannot bebound by tradition and personal relations, as isthe case with traditional authority. State insti-tutions are legitimate as long as they ollow thelaw that is in orce in a given context at a giventime, and as long as this law is considered legaland just by the concerned citizens. raditional




29

authorities, by contrast, have to take care o their people. Tey have to consider the needsand the will o the majority o the extended

amily o a traditional leader. While the law isan impersonal measure, the will and needs o people are exible and are expressed in closesocial relations. Bringing legal and traditionalauthority together either ‘corrupts’ the law, ormakes relations o traditional authority ‘sterile’and impersonal, which implies that such au-thority becomes ineective in the eyes o theollowers o a traditional leader. Against thisbackground, hybridization can thereore not

be seen as an easy way out o the dilemma thatin many Arican settings the state institutionsare weak, have only a very limited outreachand lack popular legitimacy. Hybridizationcan, however, be a short-term ‘remedy’ against(post-civil) war instability.




0

REfERENCES

books, Arices and book Capers

Aadan Cige Cali 2009. “arikh Nololedkii Garad Saleban Dahir Aqarshe oo Kooban (A ShortHistory o the Lie o Garaad Saleebaan Daahir Aqarshe). Online: http://www.somalireal.com/pageView.php?articleid=1169 (accessed 25.03.2011)”.

Bierschenk, Tomas and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan. 2003. “Powers in the Village: Rural Benin betweenDemocratisation and Decentralization”. Arica, vol. 73, no. 2: 145-173.

Boege, Volker, Anne Brown, Kevin Clements and Anna Nolan. 2008. On Hybrid Political Or-ders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context o „Fragility“ . Berlin: Bergho ConictResearch Centre. Online: http://www.bergho-handbook.net/documents/publications/boege_etal_handbook.pd (accessed 27.03.2011).

Bradbury, Mark. 2008. Becoming Somaliland . Oxord: James Currey.Buckley-Zistel, Susanne. 2006. “Remembering to Forget: Chosen Amnesia as a Strategy or LocalCooexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda”. Arica , vol. 76, no. 2: 131-150.

Englebert, Pierre. 2002. “Patterns and Teories o raditional Resurgence in ropical Arica”. Mon-des en Développement , vol. 30: 51-64.

Englebert, Pierre. 2005. «Back to the Future? Resurgent Indigenous Structures and the Recongu-ration o Power in Arica», in Oluemi Vaughan (ed.), radition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Arica . renton and Asmara: Arica World Press, 33-60.

Fanthorpe, Richard. 2005. “On the Limits o Liberal Peace: Chies and Democratic Decentraliza-tion in post-war Sierra Leone.” Arican Afairs , vol. 105, no. 418: 27-49.

Giddens, Anthony. 1990. Te Consequences o Modernity . Cambridge: Polity.

Gundel, Joakim. 2006: Te Predicament o the “Oday”: Te Role o raditional Structures in Security,Rights, Law and Development in Somalia . Danish Reugee Council and Oxam-Novib.

Hansen, Peter. 2010. ‘Te Ambiguity o Khat in Somaliland’. Journal o Ethnopharmacology , vol.132, no. 3: 590-599.

Hoehne, Markus Virgil. 2007. “From Pastoral to State Politics: raditional Authorities in NorthernSomalia”, in Lars Buur and Helene M. Kyed (eds), State Recognition and Democratisation inSub-Saharan Arica: A New Dawn or raditional Authorities? New York: Palgrave Macmillan,155-182.

Hoehne, Markus Virgil. 2009. „Mimesis and Mimicry in Dynamics o State and Identity Forma-tion in Northern Somalia“. Arica , vol. 79, no. 2: 252-281.

Hoehne, Markus Virgil. 2010. „People and Politics along and across the Somaliland-Puntland Bor-der“, in Dereje Feyissa and Markus V. Hoehne (eds), Borders and Borderlands as Resources in the Horn o Arica . London: James Currey, 97-121.

Kurtz, Donald V. 2001. Political Anthropology: Power and Paradigms . Boulder, Co. (a.o.): Westview Press.

Kyed, Helene Maria. 2008. “’raditional’ Leaders Formalization in post-war Mozambique: Explor-ing the Ambiguous Space between State and Non-state Domain”, in Alice Bellagamba and Georg Klute (eds), Beside the State: Emergent Powers in Contemporary Arica . Köln: Köppe, 163-181.

Kyed, Helene Maria and Lars Buur. 2007. “Introduction: raditional Authority and Democratiza-tion in Arica”, in Lars Buur and Helene Maria Kyed (eds), State Recognition and Democratiza-




1

tion in Sub-Saharan Arica: A New Dawn or raditional Authorities? New York: Palgrave Macmil-lan, 1-28.

Lentz, Carola. 1998. “Te Chie, the Mine Captain and the Politician: Legitimating Power in

Northern Ghana”. Arica , vol. 68, no. 1: 46-67.Leonardi, Cherry. 2007. “Violence, Sacrice and Chieship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan”.

Arica , vol. 77, no. 4: 535-558.Lewis, Ioan Myrddin. 1961. A Pastoral Democracy. A Study o Pastoralism and Politics among the

Northern Somali o the Horn o Arica . Oxord: Oxord University Press.Logan, Carolyn. 2009. “Selected Chies, Elected Councillors and Hybrid Democrats: Popular Per-

spectives on the Co-Existence o Democracy and raditional Authority”. Journal o Modern Arican Studies , vol. 47, no. 1: 101-128.

Luhmann, Niklas. 1988. “Familiarity, Condence, rust: Problems and Alternatives”, in DiegoGambetta (ed.), rust: Making and Breaking o Cooperative Relations . New York: Basil Blackwell,

94-107.Lutz, Georg and Wol Linder. 2004. raditional Structures in Local Governance or Local Develop-ment (unpublished report).

Ntsebetza, Lungisile. 2005. “Democratic Decentralisation and raditional Authority: Dilemmaso Land Administration in Rural South Arica”, in Jesse C. Ribot and Anne M. Larson (eds),Democratic Decentralisation through a Natural Resource Lens . London and New York: Routledge,71-89.

Nyamnjoh, Francis B. 2003. Our raditions are Modern, Our Modernities raditional. Chietaincy and Democracy in Contemporary Arica . Online: www.nyamnjoh.com/les/chietaincy_and_de-mocracy_in_contemporary_arica.pd (accessed 10.02.2006).

Oomen, Barbara. 2005a. Chies in South Arica: Law, Power and Culture in the Post-Apartheid Era.

Oxord: James Currey.Oomen, Barbara. 2005b. “Walking in the Middle o the Road: People’s Perspectives on the Le-

gitimacy o raditional Leadership in Sekhukhune, South Arica”, in Oluemi Vaughan (ed.),radition and Politics: Indigenous Political Structures in Arica. renton and Asmara: Arica WorldPress, 79-119.

Renders, Marleen. 2007. “Appropriate ‘Governance-echnology’? Somali Clan Elders and Institu-tions in the Making o the Republic o Somaliland”. Arica Spectrum, vol. 42, no. 3: 439-459.

Reno, William. 2003. Somalia and Survival in the Shadow o the Global Economy . Queen ElisabethHouse Working Paper No. 100. Oxord: University o Oxord.

erlinden, Ul. 2008. “Emerging Governance in Somaliland: A Perspective rom Below”, in Eva-

Maria Bruchhaus and Monika M. Sommer (eds), Hot Spot Horn o Arica Revisited . Hamburg:LI Verlag, 51-67.

Van Dijk, Rijk and E. Adriaan B. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal. 1999. ”Introduction: Te Domes-tication o Chietaincy in Arica: From the Imposed to the Imagined”, in E. Adriaan B. vanRouveroy van Nieuwaal and Rijk van Dijk (eds), Arican Chietaincy in a New Socio-Political Landscape . Hamburg: LI-Verlag, 1-20.

Valsecchi, Pierluigi. 2008. “’He who Sets the Boundary’: Chietaincy as a ‘Necessary’ Institution inModern Ghana”, in Alice Bellagamba and Georg Klute (eds), Beside the State. Emergent Powers in Contemporary Arica . Köln: Köppe, 139-161.

Weber, Max. 1956. Wirtschat und Gesellschat, Bd. II . Köln, Berlin: Kiepenheuer&Witsch.




2

West, Harry G. and Scott Kloeck-Jenson. 1999. „Betwixt and Between: ‚raditional Authority‘and Democratic Decentralization in post-war Mozambique‘. Arican Afairs , vol. 98, no. 393:455-484.

Newspaper Arices (prin and onine)

Allpuntland.com

27 January 2004. “Revered raditional Elder Arrested in Hargeisa”. Online: Homepage not avail-able any more (accessed 28.01.2004).

4 March 2004. “Casualties as Supporters o Jailed raditional Leader Revolt in Somaliland”. On-line: Homepage not available any more (accessed 05.04.2004).

Jamhuuriya

vol. 13, issue 2263, 23 January 2004. “Boqor Cismaan Buurmadow iyo xal u helidda xaaladda ka aloosan Sool iyo Sanaag Bari” (Boqor Cismaan Buurmadow and the Finding o a Solution orthe Situation Pending in Sool and eastern Sanaag), 1-2.

vol. 13, issue 2265, 26 January 2004. “Boqor Cismaan Buurmadow oo ka waeamay xidhiidhkiisaddey geesoodka aha ee Somaliland, Djibouti iyo Puntland” (Boqor Cismaan Buurmadow whoalked about the Relation between the Tree Sides Somaliland, Djibouti and Puntland), 1-2.

The Republican

vol. 8, issue 283, 31 January-6 February 2004. “A raditional Leader Accused o High reason”,1-2.

vol. 8, issue 287, 28 February-5 March 2004. “First raditional Leader, ‘the Black Mountain’, on

rial Amid ight Security”, 1-2.vol. 8, issue 292, 10-16 April 2004. “Deence Lawyer and Prosecutor Appeal against Sentence”, 1

and 8.vol. 8, issue 305, 24-30 July 2004. “Somaliland Lost Pillar o Freedom and Peace”, 1-2.

traditional authorities in somaliland and the limits of hybrid political orders

Documents