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ECP 3-14

BASIC COMBAT INTELLIGENCE FOR

GROUND UNITS

DECEMBER 1968

Publiahed For Instructional PUrpo

""

UNITEO STATES MARINE CORPS EDUCATlON CENTER

MARINE CORPS OEVEL.OPMENT AND EDUCATION COMMAND QUANTICO, VIMGINIA 22134

From: To:

Director, Education Center Distribution List

N ItI:I>LY l1li1[1'1['" TO

45R/ad 27 November 1968

Subj: ECP 3-14, Basic Combat Intelligence for Ground Units 1. Purpose. To promulgate the publication ECP 3-14, Basic Combat Intelligence for Ground Units, for use in instruction conducted by the Marine Corps Development and Education Command.

2. Cancellation. MCS 3-14, Basic Combat Intelligence for Ground Units, dated November 1966.

3. Scope. This manual discusses tile production of combat intelligence with particular emphasis upon intelligence functions at the battalion level and below.

4. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

DISTRIBUTION: "E" plus C&SC (250) COS (10) ExtScol (5) TBS (6000) OCS (5) SupDept (250) NCOScol (5)

BASIC COMBAT INTELUGENCE FOR GROUND UNITS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

Paragraph ~ 101 Introduction 1 102 Strategic Intelligence 1 103 Combat Intelligence 2 104 Theory of Combat Intelligence 2 105 The Commander's Decision 3

SECTION 2. THE BATTALION S-2

201 General 5 202 Duties and Responsibilities 5 203 The Infantry Battalion S-2 Section 5 204 Staff Relations 6

SECTION 3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

301 General 9 302 Prisoners of War 9 303 Handling of Prisoners of War 10 304 Interrogation of Prisoners of War 12 305 Enemy Documents 14 306 Enemy Materiel 16 307 Enemy Communications 17 308 Escapees, Civilians, and Refugees 17 309 Aerial Imagery 18 310 Maps and Terrain Models 19 311 Enemy Activity 20 312 Summary 20

SECTION 4. COLLECTION MEANS AND AGENCIES

401 General 21 402 Observation Posts 21 403 listening Posts 25 404 Ground Surveillance Radar 28 405 Patrolling 28 406 Foot Patrols 30 407 Motorized (including :Vlechanized) Patrols 32 408 Helicopter Patrols 34 409 Aerial Reconnaissance 36 410 Visual Air Observation 36 411 Aerial Imagery 40 412 Reconnaissance Organizations 42 413 Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division 42

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Paragraph Page

414 Force Reconnaissance Company, Fleet Marine Force 43

415 Intelligence Specialist Teams 44 416 Adjacent and Higher Headquarters 44

SECTION 5. THE DIRECTION AND COLLECTION EFFORT

501 General 47 502 Essential Elements of information (E EI) 47 503 Determination of EEl 47 504 Form and Content of EEl 48 505 Indications 49 506 The Collection Plan 51 507 Supervision of the Collection Effort 53 508 Summary 53

SECTION 6. PROCESSING

601 General 55 602 Recording 55 603 The Journal File 55 604 S-2 Production Worksheet 56 605 The Situation Map 58 606 other Files 59 607 Evaluation 59 608 Interpretation 62 609 Summary 62

SECTION 7. DISSEMINATION

701 General 63 702 Radio 63 703 Telephone 63 704 Reports 64 705 Conferences 65 706 Messenger 65 707 Personal Contact 65 708 Combat Dissemination 65

SECTION 8. ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

801 General 67 802 Enemy Intentions 67 803 Enemy Capabilities 68 804 statement of Capability 70 805 Probability 71 806 The Estimate 71 807 Summary 72

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SECTION 9. COUl-:TERIl-:TE LUGENCE

Paragraph ~ 901 General 73 902 Responsibility 73 903 :vnssion 74 904 Counterintelligence Operations 74 905 Indoctrination of Personnel 76 906 Security Discipline 77 907 Camouflage 77 908 Concealment 78 909 Communication Security 78 910 Press and Radio Control 79 911 Mail Censorship 79 912 The Counterintelligence Plan 79 913 Employment of Counterintelligence Personnel 80

SECTION 10. lNTELUGENCE TRAINING

1001 The Individual Marine 83 1002 Intelligence Section Personnel 84

SECTION 11. INTELUGENCE AND THE SMALL UNIT LEADER

1101 General 85 1102 Reporting 85 1103 Patrolling 86 1104 Prisoners 87 1105 Documents and Souvenirs 88 1106 Counterintelligence 88 1107 Liaison 89 1108 Company Collection Plan 89 1109 Conclusion 91

GU)3SARY Discussion of Some Intelligence Terms 93

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SECTION 1. THE IMPORTANCE OF cm,mAT INTELUGENCE

101. INTRODUCTION

Since warfare began, sound application of military intelligence procedures has been a distinguishing mark of the successful commander. Modern warfare. with the premium it places on speed and flexibility, highlights the importance of good intelligence to the commander. Above all, the emphasiS in modern combat on small-unit action, and on initiative on the part of small-unit leaders, makes obvious the fact that the Marine company grade officer and noncommissioned officer must have a sound understanding of how essential intelligence concerning the enemy. terrain, hydrography. and weather is obtained. The purpose of this publication is to set forth in detail the basic procedures of combat intelligence activity at the platoon. company, and battalion level. As a basic publication. it is intended to provide the background in combat Intelligence which is essential to an understanding of combat intelligencertivity in amphibious operations.

a. Before the advent of large armies and the development of fire power, the commander served as his own intelligence officer. By posting himself on commanding terrain, he could usually observe what was going on and what the enemy was trying to do. He questioned prisoners himself and personally dispatched agents to the enemy camp. On receipt of information. he evaluated and interpreted It himself and made his decisions.

b. When armies began to expand in size and complexity. the commander found that he could not supervise single-handedly aU the details by himself. Instead, he selected a small group of experienced officers to assist him in the difficult task of command. These officers became known as a staff. Today the staff consists of officers who are expert in their speCific fields. The staff assistant assigned the task of planning, coordinating. and supervising the effort to obtain, interpret, evaluate. and disseminate all possible information about the enemy and the area of operations for the commander is the intelligence officer. If he serves on a battalion or regi-mental staff. he is called an S-2. If he serves on a brigade. division, aircraft wing, or higher staff, he is designated a G-2. But whatever his rank or deSignation, or whatever his echelon, the intelligence officer has the same duties and responsibilities. Below the battalion level. the commander must be his own intelligence officer and must carry out the basic intelligence tasks for which a staff assistant is provided at all higher levels.

102. STRATEGIC INTELUGENCE

strategic intelligence is Intelligence which is requlred for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. This type of intel-ligence is normally produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DlA), which is the consolidated intelligence effort of the armed services. and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although strategic intelligence is used to develop national objectives, it is similar to combat intelligence. in that it seeks data on foreign nations and possible areas of operations and uses the same intelligence collection and processing techniques.

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103. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

JCS Pub 1, Dictionary of United states l\1ilitary Terms for Joint Usage, defines combat intelligence as "that knowledge of the enemy, weather. and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of tactical operations." In expansion of this definition it can be said that combat intelligence is carefully interpreted information regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather which a tactical commander must have to make his decision and to conceal his own actions from the enemy. Combat intelligence answers the commander's questions about machineguns, enemy artillery batteries, reserve components, and probable future action. All such uncertainties regarding the enemy, terrain, and weather must be reduced to a minimum. It is. as its name implies. intelligence for. and by. combat units engaged with the enemy.

104. THEORY OF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

The military commander must know the environment in which he is going to operate; he must know where the enemy is, how strong he is, and what he can be expected to do. These are the commander's intelligence needs or requirements. The theory of combat intelligence is simply to notify these requirements through a logical. orderly plan of operation known as the intelligence process,

a. The combat intelligence process is initiated by the commander by determining his requirements; that is, what he needs to know in order to plan, make a sound de-cision. or avoid being surprised, This process consists of the following phases:

(1) Direction - Determination of intelligence requirements, collection plan-ning, issuance of orders to collection agencies and supervision of their efforts.

(2) Collection - Systematic procurement and selection of information pertinent to the command's mission and situation.

(3) Processing - Production of intelligence from aVailable and/or newly collected, raw information by evaluation, analysis, interrogation, and interpretation.

(4) Dissemination - Getting intelligence to those who need it in time to be of use.

b. The intelligence process is never-ending; it is a continning effort. New requirements are determined as the situation changes. information collected or intelligence produced one hour or one day will generate a need for additional or new collection efforts, causing the intelligence process to go on and on. For this reason it is helpful to think of the intelligence process in terms of a cycle, as depicted in Figure 1.

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Figure 1. - The Combat Intelligence Cycle.

c. Each of these steps is necessary to the overall process. A commander who is assigned a mission or confronted with a task initially applies all applicable. aVailable intelligence to the making of a sound decision. Invariably, certain infor-mation vital to the fulfillment of the decision will be lacking, particularly in relation to the detailed plans and later decisions. The commander directs the search for ~ this additional essential information through his intelligence officer. From the

commander's combat intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer makes plans, and issues Instructions and requests for the collection of the needed information. Intelligence agencies obtain the required information from a multitude of sources and forward it to the intelligence officer. The 8-2 then produces intelligence from the raw information; he records the information, evaluates it, and interprets it in relation to information and intelligence already on hand and the exisiting situation. He then presents the resulting additional intelligence to the commander and other users in usable form. This is the Intelligence cycle; it begins at any steP. and once started, continues indefinitely with the purpose of constantly providing the commander and the command with the knowledge necessary to plan, to decide, and to avoid being surprised.

d. It is particularly important to understand at the very beginning that "intelli-gence" and "information" are not the same thing. "Information" is simply a fact or facts about the enemy, weather. and terrain; It is only raw material of intelligence. For instance, a report that the enemy is entrenching on HILL A and laying mines on ROAD B is information only. After recording and determining that the information is reliable and accurate, it is intelligence data. A conclusion that the enemy will most probably defend rather than attack is Intelligence.

105. THE COMMANDER'S DECISION

a. Comhat intelligence activity is intimately related to the commander's plan. The primary roll of combat intelligence is to keep the commander up to date on the enemy situation and to assist him to make his deCision. Making this deCision is the principal role of the combat leader. He is faced with the problem of finding a wa) to accomplish his mission in spite of anything the enemy might do to interfere. To solve this problem, he must have knowledge of the follOwing four factors:

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(1) His mission.

(2) His own capabilities.

(3) Enemy capabilities.

(4) Terrain and weather.

b. Of these factors, mission and own capabilities are known, definite quantities. For example, the mission assigned to General Rupertus to carry out the Cape Gloucester operation in WW II was simply stated, "to seize and destroy the hostile garrison at CAPE GLOUCESTER and to defend it against further enemy action, being prepared for operations to the East as far as TALASEA." Although our own capa-bilities are variable, they may be readily determined by examination of personnel, ammunition, supply, and casualty reports.

c. Enemy capabilities and terrain and weather are unknown factors. Enemy capabilities, all possible courses of action open to the enemy, are an unknown because they are subject to a will that is free and independent. A course of action absolutely unreasonable to use may seem practical to the enemy. The first question, therefore, is not whether a course of action is reasonable or unreasonable, but whether it is possible. Terrain and weather, which may be understood to comprise all natural conditions affecting our own and enemy capabilities, are a second unknown, because the enemy domination of certain terrain hinders our access to it and weather is sub-ject to rapid change.

d. Only from a good knowledge of the total situation, the unknown factors as well as the known, can the commander arrive at a sound decision, determine if his scheme of maneuver is capable of overcoming hostile opposition, and raise his decision from the level of pure chance to the proper level of calculated risk. It is the intelligence officer's task to fill in the unknown (enemy capabilities, terrain and weather) to make possible a sound decision by the commander.

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SECTION 2. THE BATTALION S-2

201. GENERAL

Commanders of battalions and larger units are provided with officers to assist them with their command duties. (For purposes of this discussion the infantry bat-talion is used as typical.) These assistants are organized into a group called an executive staff at battalion and regiment. and a general staff at division and higher. These staffs are divided into four sections: personnel. intelligence. operations. and logistics. The intelligence. or S-2 section. is responsible for all intelligence matters. The officer-in-charge of the S-2 section is the intelligence officer. At the battalion level he is a captain; at regiment a major; and at division a colonel. The higher echelon intelligence sections will not be described in this introductory text. It suffices to say that. although larger and with more facilities. the higher echelon sections have the very same responsibilities and mission as are found in the bat-talion.

202. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The primary responsibility of the battalion S-2 is to provide his commander with timely. pertinent intelligence data and conclusions as to the effects of the weather. the terrain. and the enemy situation on the battalion mission. In connection with this primary responsibility. his duties include the following:

a. He is responsible for the never-ending intelligence process: planning for. and supervision of. the collection of information; the production of intelligence by recording. evaluation. and interpretation of information; and the dissemination of intelligence by a variety of means.

b. He is responsible for the organization. assignment of duties. training. welfare. and morale of the enlisted men of his section and the non-organic intelligence person-nel which may be attached.

c. He also has staff responsibility for the planning for. and supervision 0'. those counterintelligence measures applicable at the battalion level.

203. THE INFANTRY BATTALION S-2 SECTION

The battalion S-2 is assisted in his duties by 11 enlisted men. This section consists of one gunnery sergeant as intelligence chief; one staff sergeant as chief scout; one sergeant as intelligence assistant; six corporal/lance corporal/privates as scout/radar operators for the AK/PPS 6 (battlefield surveillance radar); and two privates as scout/drivers.

a. The intelligence section should be trained to take over all routine tasks. leaving the S-2 free to concern himself with only the vital aspects of the enemy situation and the ever-important evaluation and interpretation of information as it comes in. It should be the purpose of all members of the intelligence section to be proficient in carrying out the following list of tasks particularly appropriate to the efficient production of intelligence.

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(1) General knowledge of the contents of intelligence publications pertinent to the organization and functioning of the intelligence prodUction effort.

(2) General knowledge of the organization, weapons, equipment. tactics, and techniques of the enemy.

(3) Ability to prepare sketches. maps. overlays. photographic mosaics. and terrain models. This. of course. includes proficiency in map reading and a general knowledge of aerial imagery interpretation.

(4) Ability to plan and conduct reconnaissance patrols or, as Is more probable, to accompany patrols or raids as an intelligence observer.

(5) Ability to brief and debrief patrols, raids. and similar friendly activities. (6) Ability to organize and operate observation and listening posts. (7) Ability to plan and conduct the tactical employment of the ground sur-

veillance radar.

(8) Ability to handle captured enemy personnel, documents. and materiel: and. within the practical limits of language barriers. to participate in the examination of the same for Information of immediate tactical value to the unit.

(9) Ability to keep abreast of the enemy situation, terrain, and weather; and to prepare and disseminate intelligence reports concerning these to higher. lower, and adjacent units.

(10) Ability to maintain intelligence records. files. journals, and that which is of particular importance, the situation map.

(11) Ability to organize and supervise the counterintelligence effort of the unit with emphasis on the denial of information to the enemy.

(12) Ability to train personnel in the principles and techniques of combat intelligence.

b. Every campaign presents different problems under different Circumstances and this fact precludes a stereotype method of utilizing the personnel of the 8-2 section. The capahilities of individual members of the section may be limited by inadequacies in training and experience as would be likely in the case of the six corporal/lance corporal/privates serving as AN/PPS 6 scout/radar operators. Flexibility, however. keynotes the handling of the situation and the good intelligence officer Will constantly look for more efficient ways to use his section.

204. STAFF RELATIONS

The commander's executive staff consists of four sections. The S-2 section is only one aspect of staff assistance and its activity must be coordinated With the others. This is particularly true of the relationship between the S-3 and S-2. The S-3 is responsible for all tactical and operational planning and is concerned With the friendly

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situation. Thus, the S-3 and the S-2 supplement each other on the staff. The S-3, in order to work out the tactical plans assigned to him, must know all possible pertinent facts about the enemy. The way this usually works at battalion level is that the S-3 and S-2 sit down together and jointly work out the problem. For instance, if the S-3 is working on a raid plan, he asks the S-2 for the best targets and routes. The S-2, being the commander's expert on the enemy, is able to tell the operations officer where the enemy has, say, a small isolated outpost offering the best chance of success. The S-2 should be in a poSition to further advise the S-3 on the best routes of approach and withdrawal and be able to support his advice with facts. The close relationship between the 8-2 and S-3 is most important on a well functioning staff, and for this reason the two staff officers are usually billeted close to one another. The S-2. the 8-3 and the battalion executive officer must not have any secrets between them. Although there is very close working relationship between the 8-2 and S-3. the 8-2 must never lose sight of the fact that his primary responsi-bility is to plan for, and supervise the collection of information for the commander; control and supervise the proceSSing of information into intelligence; and disseminate intelligence to all who need to know.

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SECTION 3. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

301. GENERAL

Before an apprentice workman can begin to learn the techniques of his trade, he must learn what tools are available to him and how they can be used. So it is with combat intelligence; before the technique of intelligence can be discussed, the tools of the trade must be presented. These tools of an intelligence officer are his available sources and agencies of information. Intelligence sources and agencies are the answer to the student's question of where Intelligence comes from. (See fig. 2.) In the language of Intelligence, sources and agencies are not the same, and this difference should be explained. A source is the actual person, activity, or thing from which the desired information is obtained. An agency is the means, unit, or personnel available to the intelligence officer for acquiring information. If an interrogator-translator team were questioning a POW, the POW would be the source, and the team the agency.

ORIGINAL

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

DERIVED

ENEMY ENEMY SIGNAL MATERIEL COMMUNICATIONS

Ij' ~ t# I~I -it

CIVILIANS, DETECTABLE REFUGEES. ENEMY ACTIVITY ESCAPEES

"),;,f W;::t...Jl+.

'V) WEATHER

FORECASTS

MAPS AND TERRAIN MODELS

SPECIAL STUDIES

Figure 2. - Sources of Information.

302. PRISONERS OF WAR

Shortly after a beachhead was established on Iwo Jima in WW II. a Japanese stepped out of a cave In sight of several Marines. He held his hands to his chest and began jumping up and down. A Marine sergeant. thinking that the Japanese held grenades in his hand. shot him in the leg. A corpsman treated the wound. and soon an interrogator was On hand. The enemy insisted that his rank was private first

class and consistently refused to answer any other questions. The interrogator, using the psychological approach, hinted that the enemy soldier might be exchanged for an American POW through Red Cross channels. The enemy immediately showed concern about this and muttered about his family. The interrogator mentioned that, if he were returned to Japan, he might indeed be regarded as a coward and his family might be perpetually shamed by his dishonor. On hearing this. the prisoner stated his true name and that he was a major of artillery. When convinced that any information he might give would speed up the end of the war and bring a new way of Ufe to his homeland, he revealed the enemy plans for the defense of one part of the island. This Information not only eased the seizure of the objective, but probably saved the lives of hundreds of Marines.

a. Prisoners of war are one of the most desired sources of Information. They have been where the commander wishes his S-2 had been. Who better knows the answers to questions about the enemy than the enemy himself? The systematic and methodical examination of POWs can yield a wealth of information about enemy dispositions, organization, morale, and plans. One prisoner, however, cannot be expected to know everything about all these subjects. Napoleon once said, "Infor-mation obtained from prisoners should be estimated at its true value; the soldier seldom sees beyond his company, and the officer can at most give an account of a position or the movement of the division to which his unit belongs." There are, however, many occasions when a single prisoner may supply a key piece of infor-mation. During the battle for Brest in 1944, American forces were held up by a strongly defended obstacle. the old city wall. The only way into the city was by infantry assault. Two divisions were to attack the west sector, while the 2nd Infantry Division was to attack the east sector. The maps showed only one approach into the city from the 2nd Division sector, and this was a road that was heavily defended. However. on the night before tbe attack, a German prisoner was taken. This POW stated that there was a little-used road, unmapped, that led into the heart of the city. and that this road was defended by only a single pillbox. Eventually the entire regiment entered the city by this newly discovered route. and within six hours and after sustaning only light casualties, the division had accomplished its mission. Later, the captured German commander opined that it was this Infiltration that broke the back of the defense.

b. :'vTany persons studying interrogation ask, "Why is it that a prisoner will give such information to his captor?" The explanation is not always simple: sometimes the soldier is a genuine malcontent or is politically opposed to his regime; sometimes he hopes to buy better treatment or survival, sometimes his government has so violently opposed surrender that it could not instruct its troops in what to say if they were captured; quite often it is simply expert interrogation teChnique that does the trick. The fact remains, though, that most POWs give information.

303. HA.'iDUNG OF PRISONERS OF \VAR

In order to handle prisoners as efficiently as possible, a system has been developed that should be known to all troops as well as by the S-2. This system can best be remembered by calling to mind the 5 S's: Search. Segregate. Silence. Speed (to the rear), and Safeguard. It is usually covered in the intelligence SOP and should embrace the follOWing points:

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a, When enemy soldiers first surrender it Is logical to immediately disarm them, They should be made to drop their weapons and to place their hands either over or behind their heads. POWs should then be moved to a place. sheltered at least from flat trajectory fire. and then searched. During this search the primary object is to find any concealed weapons. but any documents should be removed and held by the guard. Later. at company and battalion level. the prisoners will be searched again and again to be absolutely sure that nothing of interest has escaped detection. ""hen a guard removes a document or other object from a prisoner, he must be sure that he can later associate the object with the prisoner from whom it was removed. This Is quite important and can be very difficult when several hundred prisoners surrender at one time. Identification of objects with prisoners from whom taken is of the utmost importance. especially when the prisoner is being interrogated. For example. if the interrogator knows that the prisoner he is in-terrogating was captured with a radio. he can limit the scope of his interrogation to those things that a radio operator would know. thereby decreasing the amount of time required for interrogation and increasing the amount of usable information obtained from the prisoner.

b. After being searched. the prisoners should be segregated as soon as pos-sible into four groups: officers. NCOs. enlisted men. and deserters. If there Is another category present. like civilians. suspected guerrillas. women. or military from a force foreign to the enemy. another separate group should be formed. These groups should be separated from one another so that the officers or NCOs cannot communicate with one another or with the men. Sometimes it will be difficult to diS-tinguish officers. as in some armies combat leaders wear enlisted uniforms to become less of a target. During the summer and fall of 1952. Chinese Communists in Korea adopted this procedure. But. even so. officers were usually recognized by their command presence or by some distinguishing mark. like a white handkerchief wrapped around the head or arm.

c. Rigid silence must be enforced among all prisoners. These measures are essential to prevent plans of escape from being made or warnings being passed against giving information to our interrogators.

d. One of the most important single items to remember in the handling of prisoners is that they must not be spoiled. To explain the word spoiled here. it is necessary to say that when an enemy soldier is captured he puts his life into our hands, and thus is usually in a state of deep shOCk and fear. especially if his com-manders have told him that he will be cruelly tortured and killed if captured. This state of shock and fear is the greatest possible weapon in the hands of our inter-rogators. as they are in a position to gain the confidence of the prisoner by kind dignified treatment. However. if the capturing troops give the prisoner water. Cigarettes. or other comforts, he will realize that he is going to receive good treat-ment and regain confidence and composure, often frustrating the best of inter-rogators. For this reason, the POWs must be kept in doubt as long as possible about their fate. At the same time, prisoners should be allowed to give another first aid or be otherwise treated for wounds and should not be harshly or cruelly used. Friendly troops should not be allowed to vent any indignity on them.

e. After being searched and segregated as has been described. the prisoners should be evacuated to the rear as soon as possible. The POW evacuation route will

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usually follow the same route as our wounded, following natural lines of drift. Thus, slightly wounded Marines may often be used as guards, and prisoners may be used as litter carriers. Farther to the rear, the route is along the main supply route, MSR, so that supply trucks returning empty can be utilized for transportation. (See fig. 3.) At division. the military police company will assume control of POWs and control their movement farther to the rear. One more thing that should always be remembered is that prisoners should never be shown or brought within sight of any important friendly installation. This Is Important. as the prisoners may escape and successfully return to their own lines with locations of our artillery. dumps. or command posts.

Figure 3. - Evacuation Route of Prisoners of War.

3M. INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

Since interrogation of prisoners of war is a job performed usually by highly trained specialists. details of Interrogation technique are not given in this text. Interrogation is both an art and a science by itself. and it has been developed to a very high degree of perfection in the First and Second World Wars. 'What every Marine must know is that. with exceptions of course, no real interrogation is done below regimental level; and POWs should be evacuated to the rear as soon as pos-sible. Are not companies and battalions interested in getting POW information? Does not Private Zhurnov speak the enemy language? The answer is yes. but com-panies and battalions must realize that interrogation by untrained interrogators will almost invariably result in half-baked and confused information. and in spoiled prisoners. In Italy. during World War II. Italian-speaking "GIS" in the infantry companies were the constant bogey of the interrogators and of the S-2s. Let the "pros" do the interrogation! It is no job for amateurs. This credo does not forbid a company commander. through his first generation automatic rifleman. asking a fresh POW the location of a mortar which has been bothering the company, or some

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other question of immediate tactical value. It is, however, of great importance to everyone that the prisoner get back to trained interrogators as soon as possible. One regiment in Korea. during the winter of 1952-53. was unable to send a prisoner from company level to the division interrogation team in less than six hours due to amateur interrogation. Not once was a useful report received from this low-level interrogation. Interrogation of VC POWs in South Vietnam is unique in several ways. Many of the larger engagements with the enemy occur during joint ARVN-U. S. Marine Corps operations and afford the opportunity for front line interrogation by South Vietnamese troops or liaison teams. Patrols are also accompanied by South Vietnamese Interpreters to assist In questioning captured personnel and sus-pected VC sympathizers. A battalion S-l should lend every effort to get POWs evacuated as soon as possible. Sometimes, in a special situation or separate mission, a battalion S-2 will have an Interrogation team available to him, in which case a more detailed interrogation can, of course, be performed at that level.

a. In general, interrogation is divided into two phases. During the first phase, information of Immediate tactical value Is developed, and if not accomplished by the capturing troops, the prisoners are tagged with special tags showing time, place, and circumstances of capture, as well as the capturing unit. This phase is usually done at the regimental collecting point, but when qualified Interrogators are not available to regiment, such work is done at MEB or LF level. All Information is relayed immediately to the S-2 to which the interrogation team Is assigned before evacuating the POWs further to the rear. The S-2 then forwards the information to the S-2s of lower units.

b. The second phase of POW interrogation is normally found In division or LF level. Besides details of immediate tactical value, information of more general interest is often produced. Usually division or LF is concerned with enemy or-ganization, identification of units, personalities, enemy equipment. and plans.

c. In larger operations of extended duration more strategic information may be sought at the LF or MEF level. Such subjects are explored as morale on the home front and other conditions there; the location of enemy war industry and its capa-bilities; and which elements of the enemy population are hostile to their regime. In counterinsurgency operations this information might well be sought in earlier inter-rogation.

d. The technique of interrogation is a complex subject, as has been stated. Briefly. it depends on the ability of the interrogator to analyze correctly the character of the prisoner and to adopt the correct psychological approach. To a great extent, this depends on the interrogator's knowledge of the enemy nation and its national characteristics and tendencies. The average German POW was found to give the best information when treated in a particularly military. firm manner. The Chinese communist prisoner was usually only too glad to talk out of relief of finding that his life might be spared. The Russian was discovered to respond best to friendly, frank treatment. The average Japanese was usually uninstructed in what to say if captured. and usually would not resist Interrogation. There are a hundred ex-ceptions to each rule In Interrogation and every man reacts differently to it. Quite frequently the prisoner is found to be friendly and opposed to his own government, in which case all the interpreter must do is lead the conversation. This will be found particularly true in nations where the people are ruthlessly controlled and

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suppressed by a party or government not wholly supported by the population. The interrogator, in any case, must know his enemy backward and forward. He should speak the enemy language without a trace of accent and know it so thoroughly that the words used by the POW and their slightest accent can sometimes tell the in-terrogator where the man probably came from, his degree of education, or even possible rank.

e. Even when standard interrogation fails, there are many tricks of the trade that can be used. Interrogators may be dressed in enemy uniform and introduced into the POW cage. In the Second World War, a German-born U. S. sergeant. who was an interrogator for an army division in Europe, was arrested by an alert "Gl" who heard the man's heavy accent in English. The sergeant was locked up in the POW cage as an enemy spy for four days before a release could be secured. On release, he was able to report information that had not even been dreamed of pre-viously, simply from the careless conversation of the POWs who believed him one of them. Also, dictaphones can be used to gather off-guard conversation. Such trickery is quite legal. However, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1929 and the Geneva Convention of 1949 to which the United States subscribes. no coercion may be used on prisoners or other personnel to obtain information relative to the state of their army or country. Prisoners or others who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind. The rules adopted at the Geneva Convention do not prohibit the examination of prisoners or others, and such interrogation, as long as it is not brutal, threatening, or degrading, is permissible.

305. ENEMY DOCUMENTS

In the fall of 1962, the military forces of the Republic of Vietnam conducted a number of successful attacks against scattered Viet Cong strongholds. A number of prisoners were taken and volumes of Communist propaganda was destroyed. However, one particular document didn't have the flavor of Communist propaganda and was Immediately forwarded to the intelligence officer for careful analyzation. As it turned out, this document, along with previous POW and agent reports revealed the time and place that units would be employed and what support would be required in a planned-to-happen large scale Viet Cong attack. The Viet Cong carried out this attack and the result was a decisive victory for the Republic of Vietnam forces. If this document had not been received and returned to the proper authorities, it could have been a decisive victory for the Viet Congo

a. Enemy documents are defUled as any reproduction by whatever meanJ3. that have at one time been in the hands of the enemy. Timely exploitation of such docu-ments has often turned the tide of battle. Documents may be found almost anywhere on the battlefiflld: on prisoners, on enemy dead, in recently won installatiOns. or strewn about the field. These documents must be diligently searched for and, when found, must be immediately put into the hands of competent intelligence interpreters. All S-2 personnel must be trained to recognize the common types of enemy documents, and every Marine must be trained to turn them in when they are found. All types of documents may be important: medical records often have the man's unit on them. diaries may disclose the state of enemy morale as well as his plans, torn and dirty shreds of paper may be an operation order or a supply status report, letters from home may be full of strategic information, even clothes may have the enemy unit

14

written on them in the lining. Of special value are enemy codes, ciphers, and other cryptographic mater!als. These will be found on the bodies of radio operators and signal personnel as well as in captured message centers and command posts.

b. Documents are forwarded to the rear through intelligence channels, each successive S-2 and G-2 extracting whatever tactical information applies to his unit. After the document is translated, which is often done at regiment, the translation will accompany It to the rear. If the information is immediately important, a digest can be transmitted to the appropriate commander. The document itself must always be carefully safeguarded and handled to avoid loss or damage. No marks of any kind should be made on the original.

c. The S-2 will find that in combat, no matter how much training has been given to the troops, he must still personally push his document campaign. Whenever a patrol or raid returns, he should check closely to see that no document has been withheld or overlooked. He should frequently tour through the front lines to see if any more documents can be found. Once, in Korea, a Marine regiment was trying to confirm the presence of a new enemy division to its front. After a successful raid on the enemy, some captured documents and material were forth coming, however there was still not enough information. Several days later, the S-2 heard through a friend that one Marine had found a sort of telescope while on the raid and was keeping it as a souvenir. This sort of telescope, after it was examined, proved to be a new enemy 57mm recoilless rifle sight of great interest to technical intelligence. But even more interesting, as far as the S-2's view, was that the box in which the instrument was packed, contained a hidden document under its silk lining. When this was translated, it was found to list the enemy soldier's unit, all the way from his squad to his army - finally confirming the presence of a new enemy division.

TO HELP US KNOW OUR NMY TURN IN ALI. DOCUMENTS

Figure 4. - Turn In All Documents.

15

r~iS JAPANESE MAP

OF THE MINE FIELDS ON PELELIU

WAS TURNEO IN BY A MEMBER OF THE ,., Bit 1'74 MARINES, ENABLING OUR ENGINEERS ro SAVE rHE LIVES OF MANY MARINES. TURN IN ALL DOCUMENTS

to .. _'n -:- '" ~,.. ... ~"t.,. _.'" t ......... ' I' u" .... U.U."Clt .~ ..... _,~& ~ ... _roO.hOle_ "t~HO". '11. U"_fU 'U~~L''' 'YO ,~~ .'''''''',

Figure 5. - The Japanese Map.

This is a good example of a valuable document that might have never been found if the 3-2 had not chased down every rumor.

306. ENEMY MATERIEL

a. Another excellent source of enemy information is his materiel. There are direct benefits from the study of enemy materiel. such as prompt developments of effective countermeasures. prompt exploitation of new ideas for our own benefit. deductions as to the state andlocatlonofenemy industry. speed in providing facilities for training our troops in defense against it, and our own use of this new enemy equipment. )l Is quite true that a good bit of this value may be considered in the realm of strategic intelligence, and so it is, but much of it is also of immediate tactical value. For Instance. when a new enemy weapon is captured. complete information can often be disseminated immediately on the capabilities of this new ordnance and bow best to defend against it. Through the study of captured enemy materiel such as weapons, vehicles, and aircraft, trained experts produce a great amount of technical intelligence. A good example of intelligence obtained from captured enemy equipment can be found in World War II. Late in December, 1943, the Germans introduced the pan.r.er-fauzt (German type bazooka) at a troop school in Italy. In the following January, the weapon was first used near Cassino. During

16

the operation, a U. S. infantry regiment captured a whole case of the new rockets. On the inside there was a sticker which gave complete information on the operation, safety precautions, tactical employment, and effectiveness of the weapon. This vital information was so widely and quickly disseminated that it was in the hands of our combat troops almost before the enemy was able to train his troops in the weapons' use. Countermeasures were developed quickly, and the weapon was later used against the Germans. A similar case involved the recoilless rifle. An experi-mental German model was captured in North Africa and analyzed in the United States. Here, its possibilities were realized, and the weapon was further developed and pro-duced. Our combat troops were equipped with this revolutionary weapon before the war was over while the Germans never did have its use. Besides these advantages of the examination of enemy equipment, there are other more obscure reasons. For instance, most pieces of manufactured equipment have factory plates on them. These plates usually have the name of the factory and sometimes its location. This information is of great importance to our strategic air intelligence authorities. Furthermore, the equipment itself can be analyzed to show what kind of metal is available to the enemy, his standards of workmanship and other facts about his industrial machine.

b. Enemy equipment is handled initially by intelligence personnel, but usually at regiment or higher echelons. It is then put into the channels of the technical service most applicable. That is, captured enemy artillery will be evaluated by artillery personnel, enemy explosives and engineer equipment by engineer units, and so on as specified by division SOP. This SOP will usually prescribe a system of tagging similar to that used with POWs. The unit which receives the captured equipment is usually required to send a report on it to the S-2 or G-2 of its parent organization, who disseminates the information throughout the entire force. In this manner, the combat troops get the benefit from early examination of enemy equipment as soon as possible. The equipment will then be evacuated to the rear for further exploitation.

307. ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

Enemy communications can be of great intelligence value. However, it must be remembered that the enemy also realizes this and will take every precaution to thwart our communication intelligence attempts. He will use codes, send dummy or false messages, and otherwise exercise good communication security. Tbe enemy will slip up at times, particularly during the heat of battle, and will give valuable information about his situation. While the interception of this information is the responsibility of higher echelon, the S-2 will do well to take it and use it to his advantage. If the situation permits, he will evaluate it thoroughly before disseminating it as intelligence. As the S-2 acquires knowledge of the enemy, this eValuation will become less difficult.

308. ESCAPEES, CIVIllANS, AND REFUGEES

Long before the invasion of Normandy in WW n there was a small but steady trickle of escaped and recovered personnel reaching Allied Headquarters in England. Tbe majority of these were aviators who had been shot down over Europe and had evaded capture or escaped after being captured. Because they had been traveling in enemy territory, they were of great intelligence value. Such escapees are

17

frequently found in combat, especially in a fast-moving situation, and can often divulge very accurate information about enemy installations, terrain, troop movements. and the general condition of enemy forces. Care must be taken. however, not to identify people or organizations who assisted in escape or evasion. or the enemy will take steps to eliminate them. Otherwise, these people and organizations will not be available to assist other escapees or evaders.

a. Friendly guerrilla forces provided our units with a great amount of intel-ligence during World War IL Almost anywhere in the world today. there are people and organizations friendly to this country. Such persons or groups could provide the latest and best information in case of operations in their country.

b. Other types of civilians that are of great value to intelligence are the refugees and displaced persons. Many of these people have worked on enemy fortifications and are acquainted with the most secret of the enemy works. These individuals often hate their former oppressors and will be eager to help the 8-2. In fact, they are often so eager to help that they tend to exaggerate or make faulty conclusions; their stories must he examined carefully. Of particular value to the battalion 8-2 are the latestlocations of enemy outposts. roadblocks. and checkpoints. The refugees. who have just traveled through the enemy territory, may have good information along this line.

c. In the Pacific, even such primitive people as the Melanesians often proved to be excellent sources of information. Once, after a 135 mile trip by outrigger canoe from a Japanese-held island, three Melanesian escapees reported that they had been impressed as laborers and used to build fortifications. These natives, far from being as stupid as their masters believed, had carefully noted the locations of all enemy positions and emplacements. and even reported scraps of overheard Japanese conversation. They were able to fill a large blank on the 8-2's Situation map. In Korea, thousands of civilian refugees constantly moved south to escape the communiSts In the early days of the Korean conflict. These people were often useless or even dangerous, but at the same time a tremendous amount of tactical information, often of great importance, was drawn from them.

do Warning. - Be careful of civilians on the battlefieldl The civilian Should always be approached as if he were an enemy agent. The enemy will attempt to infiltrate agents and guerrillas to our rear, disguised as civilian refugees. Some agents will deliberately try to "plant" false information in our Intelligence system. There is 00 all-embracing solution to the problem, but if care is exercised, security regulations enforced, and counterintelligence personnel assisted in every way. the 8-2 will have done his best. Counterintelligence will be discussed in Section 9,

309. AERIAL IMAGERY

One of the first recorded attempts of a commander to supplement his blgh ground advantage occurred In our own Civil War, when an observation balloon was launched to the dizzying belgbt of 800 feettospy on Yankee gunboats moving through the inland waterways and rivers of the Carolinas. After this breakthrough, it was a natural evolution from the employment of aerial observers to airborne cameras. The advent of the airplane provided aerial photography to both sides in WW L During WW 11 aerial pbotography was very highly developed and photos were literally taken

18

5

by the millions. Although equipment and techniques have been vastly improved since WW II, we still must have a basic platform capable of carrying cameras over the enemy, to bring back to the commander and his staff a graphic record of the situation.

a. Aerial imagery. as it is now called, has two main purposes: to supplement the existing maps of the area and to provide up-to-date information on the enemy. How much imagery a battalion S-2 will receive depends on how much is received by division; but he should have enough to work on himself. brief the staff, and send enough to his infantry companies so that patrol and platoon commanders can at least study them.

b. Interpretation of aerial imagery is broken down in phases. First phase interpretation looks for important tactical information only. like the location of enemy trenches, fortifications. and areas of activity. Second phase interpretation does more detalled work: the type and caliber of enemy weapons and their lanes of fire. barbed wire or minefields, and enemy command posts. Third phase interpreta-tion is even more detailed and can be used to compose exact terrain studies and advanced studies of towns orfortifiedpositions. Imagery interpretation will normally take place at the division/wing level, MEU/MEB level, by the immediate imagery interpretation center (lIIC). This center is a pool of all imagery interpreters. that until recently were scattered in the battalions and regiments. Pooling of inter-preters in the Imagery Interpretation Center at higher headquarters adjacent to processing facilities will assure them better utilization and permit better. faster. more complete interpretation of imagery.

310. MAPS AND TERRAIN MODElS

Maps constitute the basic source of information used by the intelligence officer in making terrain estimates. topographic studies. and hydrographic studies.

a. Accurate knowledge of terrain is a must for the S-2. He should know the ground, backward and forward, so that its influence on the enemy can be studied. Let us say that the enemy is showing signs of attacking a friendly position, and the artillery forward observer asks the S-2 what routes the enemy will probably use, so that concentrations can be prepared. If the S-2 knows that enemy tactics prescribe the use of flank attack. he can, by careful map study (if no time is available for personal reconnalssance), render the most likely routes of enemy approach. The S-2's knowledge of his terrain is very important, and it is good mapping that supplies a great percentage of his knowledge and that of the command. As he is responsible for map requirements; the S-2 must be familiar with the status of their supply within the battalion and antiCipate future needs.

b. Terrain models can be built with little effort in a sandbox. and a little imagina-tive effort can provide realistic details such as houses, trees. streams. and roads. Such hastily constructed models will be of great value in static situations and for the planning and briefing of special missions such as assault of fortified areas and other operations of special difficulty. If more time is available. a detailed terrain model can be built using plaster of Paris from medical stocks and painted to such accuracy that squad patrols can be planned from it. The Germans used such a model in their planning and briefing for the attack of the Belgium Liege Fort in 1940.

19

In conjunction with good intelligence, the model supplied so much information, and the Germans briefed their troops so thoroughly, that one of the strongest forts in Europe fell to their assault within hours. The battalion S-2 could do well to realize the benefits of good briefing and the aid to planning that a simple sandbox terrain model can afford.

311. ENEMY ACTIVITY

There are many times when the S-2 will find himself without any way of obtaining enemy information through his usual sources. Dueto a lull at the front and increased enemy security, there may be no prisoners. Due to poor weather, imagery may not be available and aerial observers may not fly. How can the intelligence officer form an estimate in this situation? The answer is that the S-2 will have to analyze shrewdly the enemy's detectable activity. Sometimes this can suffice by itself, even though it is a most incomplete and doubtful method. One of the best sources of such information is the enemy artillery activity. Is he firing a generally defensive fire, mostly against our weapons, and harassing fire deep in our sector? Or is he softening up our lines? All activity should be considered. Is there any tank activity seen? Has his patrolling become more aggressive? Each enemy action can tell the alert S-2 something, and the intelligence officer must examine every report about the enemy activity with a critical and analytical view. In an insurgency situation, such as in South Vietnam where there has been an insurrection against the constituted government, the intelligence officer must consider political, economic, psychological and civic action factors in addition to military and paramilitary activities. Some of the indications would be anti -government rallies and demonstrations, assassination of local officials, and destruction of schools. All of these would probably be ac-companied by a reluctance on the part of the populace to be cooperative with friendly forces. Indications of enemy courses of action will be discussed in more detail later, but the student should realize at this point that analysis of the enemy's de-tectable activity alone can often give him invaluable aid in working out the enemy picture.

312. SUMMARY

In this section, the student has been presented with a partial set of tools. By no means is the list complete, but the common sources, the ones most likely to be found in the field, have been listed. No one source can be said to be the best or the most accurate, as the combat situation wiUdictate which one may be more useful in a particular area at a particular time. If a group of experienced S-2s were asked which source supplied them with the most information, some would answer prisoners, some documents, some photographs, and some would say that it varied in different operations. The S-2 must know that the information that he needs is available to him through these sources; it is up to him to see that these sources are exploited.

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SECTION 4., COLLECTION MEANS AND AGENCIES

401. GENERAL

The sources information have been discussed in the preceding section. The student is now ready to learn how the enemy information reaches the S-2. It is obvious that the S-2 cannot be everywhere simultaneously. Interpreting aerial imagery, translating documents. observing enemy action. and presenting estimates to his commander. Thus. he must depend to a large extent on other means and agencies to collect the information that he needs. It is these means and agencies. along with the prinCiples governing their employment. which will be discussed in this section.

402. OBSERVATION POSTS

a. Capabilities and Limitations. - Observation posts are capable of providing visual coverage of a considerable area with a minimum of personnel. They are able to render detailed reports of events occurring within their sectors of observation. They are also capable of recounting a sequence of events and of recognizing the relationship existing between various occurrences. With appropriate communications they can rapidly report what they have observed and are responsive to requests for additional information. The present limitation is the reliance on human vision. which is subject to interference by darkness. fog. heavy rain or snowfall. smoke, vegetation, and terrain. However. night observation devices, such as the starlight scopes and infrared emitters, are proving effective in reducing this interference. A laCk of skill or alertness on the part of the observer may also be a limiting factor. Another llmitation is the passive nature of the observation post; its personnel do not actively seek out information but are restricted to observing activity which is visible from the single position.

b. Selection of Observation Post Positions. - (See fig. 6.) (1) Desirable Characteristics. - Observation posts should be located on

ground which affords the optimum visual coverage of the key area. If possible, good natural concealment should be available; otherwise. the position should be well camouflaged. Covered routes of approach from friendly positions are highly de-sirable in order that necessary traffic may move undetected.

(2) Location with Re~pect to Friendly Positions. - Complete visual coverage of a unit's area of responsibility is usually desired. although consideration must be given to the coordinate capabilities of other information gathering means. Within this general criterion. and based on the size of the area and the configuration of the terrain. observation posts may be located either within or at a distance from friendly positions. If locations within or just outside of friendly positions will satisfy require-ments, they are preferable, since they provide greater security for the observation post. are easier to maintain, and promote ease of reporting.

(3) Method of Selection. - During his personal reconnaissance the commander will note locations which afford good observation. He may also direct certain sub-ordinates, including the S-2. to make recommendations concerning observation post locations based on their reconnaissance. The terrain is then analyzed, and, based on the desired coverage, the number and general locations of observation posts are determined. The observer team assigned to a given observation post makes the

21

Figure 6. - Selection of Observation Post Positions and Sectors of Observation.

detailed selection of the position from which it can best observe its assigned area. The location is plotted as precisely as possible and is recorded for use as a reference point.

c. Selection of Observation Post Personnel. - 1\0 specific provision Is made in ;\larine infantry tables of organization for ground observer personnel except for the six privates who serve as scout/radar operators and two privates who serve as scout drivers in the intelligence section of the infantry battalion. In practice.

22

however, each infantry unit normally establishes a primary observation post utilizing personnel from the unit headquarters. In most cases, additional trained ground observer personnel are available in the forward observer and gunfire spotter teams organic to, or assigned to, the unit. "''hile these personnel are primarily interested in gathering information for use in providing fire support, they also will observe much that is of value to the Infantry unit; and their skill and experience should be utilized in the overall observation system. However, in order to provide the degree of visual coverage normally desired, additional observer personnel will be required. These :\larines, selected from organic troop personnel, should be well trained in map reading, use of the compass, and the method of systematically scanning a sector or area. They should also be thoroughly familiar with enemy organization and equipment. Sufficient personnel should be located at each observation post to assure continuous and efficient observation with due consideration of the tedious nature of the work. However, inordertoreduce the possibility of disclosure of the pOSition, only the minimum number of personnel required should be used. As few as three men may be sufficient.

d. Planning for Establishing Observation Posts. - Initial planning is concerned with determining the degree of coverage desired and the selection of observation post locations. Concurrent consideration is given to other information gathering means to be employed, since these may affect the number and locations of observation posts. Once observation post locations are selected, sectors of observation are determined. These often will be dictated by terrain configuration, but in open ter-rain lateral limits are established, based on the area an observer or observer team can effectively keep under observation. Requirements for special equipment, partic-ularly observation aids and communication equipment, are determined. Reporting times and procedures are established. In this respect, specific items of information which are required are determined and announced. This is important, since even the best trained observer can note only part of what occurs in his sector, and his efforts must be directed. Again, this must not cause neglect in reporting all ob-servations. The use of regular reporting times serves as a communication check and also serves to note the absence of observable events, which in itself may be Significant. Use of a standard report form which includes such items as time and duration of observation, azimuth, range reference points and description of the event observed, is also helpful in ensuring a complete report and providing a ready reference to previous reports. (See fig. 7.)

e. Operation of Observation Posts. - Each observer team makes the detailed selection and preparation of its position. If possible, this is completed prior to enemy contact or under cover of darkness. :'>laximum use is made of cover and con-cealment or camouflage, and strict light and noise diSCipline is maintained. T:!'affic to and from the position is held to a minimum. Observation posts are high priority targets and every effort nrust be made to prevent disclosure of their positions. Observation posts may be manned continuously. or only during daylight hours, with the personnel establishing listening posts at night. In addition to fixing the location of the observation post, reference points throughout the sector of observation are selected and plotted to promote ease of reporting observations. The observation post is equipped with a compass or aiming circle. map, aerial imagery binoculars or telescope. radiO and/or wire communications, and such other equipment as will facilitate observing and reporting. For security and reliability, primary reliance is placed on wire communications. Continuous observation is maintained over the

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GROUND OBSERVER'S REPORT

:

assigned sector and individual observers within the team are changed frequently for the greatest efficiency.

f. Historical Examples.

(1) Before the Russian attack in the Lemberg- Pizemysk sector in June of 1914, German observation posts were able to observe daily trains moving behind the Russian front. Those going north were loaded, partly with tanks; those going south were empty. Supplemented by the interrogation of Soviet POWs, tms ground observation established the fact that the Soviet 38th Army and the Soviet 4th Armored Army were being moved into the northern sector. This was particularly important because the movement had not been reported by German air reconnaissance.

(2) Another clever use of the observation post in the collection of information is illustrated by the following incident. In January, 19-15, an infantry regiment was to attack from Malmedy. Smoke screens were laid along the front at speCified locations in conjunction with small probing attacks. The observation posts were advised of this planned action and instructed to observe and record the location of the enemy prepared artillery and IT . 'rtar concentrations. This was accomplished and the reports were consolidated by the S-2. When the regiment attacked, enemy observed fire was neutralized by our artillery fire laid on the enemy OPS. As the enemy was forced to rely on his prepared concentrations, the infantry was able to avoid the enemy fire and take the objective without a casualty in one of the neatest regimental operations of the war.

(3) On the second morning of the battle of EI Guettar, in the North African Campaign, a forward observer from the 60th Field Artillery noticed some strange activity on a road to his front. The road ran across some low hills in enemy ter-ritory. A group of five or six men were seen moving along this road, every now and then stooping over to do something, then moving on. The range of observation was SO great that it was impossible to determine whether the men were German soldiers or Arabs. They did not appear to be carrying anything. and the observer presumed that they were Arabs looting the bodies that lay along the road. After this had been going on for about an hour, it was finally reported to higher headquarters. although the incident seemed too trivial to be of interest. Nevertheless, the report reached the S-2 and was carefully examined in the light of other information already on hand. What did the report mean? Was the enemy mining the road or was he removing mines? Probably neither as the report said that the men did not seem to be carrying anything. However. intelligence knew that the road was probably mined, as it fitted in with German tactical doctrine and the particular terrain. The most probable solution, then. was that the Germans were arming mines that had been previously laid. This action would indicate that the enemy no longer desired the use of the road and was preparing to withdraw. This estimate proved to be correct as the Germans did execute a general withdrawal shortly after the inCident, showing again the necessity of accurate and complete reporting and, at the same time. the value of an observation post.

403. LISTEXING POSTS

a. Capabilities and Limitations. - Listening posts are capable of gathering information by the identification of sounds and by limited visual observation. They

25

may be limited in their perceptiveness by weather or by battlefield conditions which produce a large volume of background noise. It is difficult to determine accurately the range and direction of distant noises, except by electronic means, such as seismic intrusion devices. Another limitation is the element of interpretation pro-duced at the reporting level. since the listener must decide the identity of noises heard.

b. Selection of Listening Post Positions. - Listening posts are established at night and during other periods of reduced visibility. Since they rely primarily on sound rather than vision to obtain information. they are not necessarily related to commanding ground as is the case Witb observation posts , but rather to likely avenues of approach and other logical routes of movement. otherwise, the criteria for selection of observation posts apply also to the selection of positions for listening posts. (See fig. 8.)

c. Selection of Listening Post Personnel. - The same general requirements for observation post personnel apply to the selection of personnel for listening posts. An additional requirement is the ability to identify and determine the significance of various noises such as those oftank engines and truck motors. Personnel assigned to observation posts during the daytime may also be used to occupy listening posts at night, prOViding due consideration Is given to the continuing requirements for a high degree of alertness in both activities.

d. Planning the Establishment of Listening Posts. - Since it is neither practi-cable nor desirable to cover a large area with a complex system of numerous listening posts, discrimination in planning is necessary. A thorough study of the terrain and enemy dispositions will indicate the locations at which listening posts may be employed profitably. EmploymentofUsteningpostsmustbecoordinated with the use of surveil-lance devices, which have their greatest application during the same periods in which listening posts are utilized. Information requirements are determined in order that guidance may be gIven to the listening posts as to the types of noises which will have the greatest Significance. Provision is made for the listening post personnel to become familiar with the terrain and the enemy situation prior to occupying their positions. As is the case With observation posts, provisions are made for special equipment and for establishing reporting times and procedures.

e. Operation of Listening Posts. - The method of operation for a listening post is similar to that for an observation post. The listening post personnel make the detailed selection and preparation of their position, emphasizing light and noise discipline. Because of the possibility of enemy patrols operating near the listening post, activity is kept to aminimum,anda means of communication is employed which is least likely to be detected by the enemy. Wire communications are preferable. Reports generally will be limited to the type of sound noted and the estimated range and bearing. Where possible and applicable, estimates should also be made of the quantities, types, and nature of activity of such objects as tanks and vehicles. In some cases visual observation may be possible due to proximity of the activity, natural or artificial illumination, or light emission by the source.

f. Use of Surveillance Devices. - Surveillance by the human eye is limited by the perceptibility of a given object, the distance between the viewer and the object, and tbe prevailing visibility conditions. Various types of equipment have been

26

\' ,

J // I, I, 'I (b) ! I il

'I

6

"'" "'\.. '.

Figure 8. - lDcation of Listening Posts,

27

developed to assist in overcoming these limitations. Electronic devices are avail-able in the Marine Corps to detect phenomena which cannot be seen by the human eye such as heat and radiation; to extend the range of surveillance; and to penetrate fog, haze, and darkness, which limit vision. Development is continuing in this field. Information concerning capabilities, limitations, and employment of surveillance devices currently available may be found in appropriate classified publications.

g. Historical Example. - During the Saipan operation. listening posts of the 6th Marines heard enemy tanks moving across their front. These listening posts turned in accurate reports. Listening posts of the 2d Marines also reported the route followed by enemy tanks to their front. Based upon an analysis of the terrain and the positions reported. the CO, 6th Marines, deployed his antitank weapons. permitted the enemy tanks to enter his position and took them under fire at the most opportune time. Due to alert listening posts. prompt reporting, and proper control of antitank weapons. the enemy tanks were destroyed.

404. GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADAR a. General. - The S-2 has primary staff supervision over the tactical em-

ployment of the ground surve1llance radar. The S-2 determines how the radar will be employed; that is. its general location. area of surveillance. type of surveillance to be conducted (scan. search, or monitor). how and when information is to be re-ported, and the frequency of coverage desired. He also coordinates closely with the S-3 and FSC in the overall integration of use of ground surveillance radar in the battalion's ground surveillance plan. which also includes patrols. observation posts. listening posts. and other sensory devices.

b. Capabilities and Limitations. - The Ground surveillance radar is capable of searching for and detecting moving targets in any direction. The set provides an all-weather, day-and-night combat condition surveillance capability. It is also useful during periods of limited visibility. such as haze, fog, smoke, dust. and clouds. It provides a more accurate range and azimuth reading than is possible by eye estimate. The principle limitation is extreme terrain. Terrain which will mask normal observation, will also mask the radar beam. The identification of targets is made by an audio response which is not highly descriptive and it depends to a great extent on the operator's training and experience. Radar equipment now in test stage will soon improve present capabilities.

405. PATROLUNG a. General. - While patrolling has long served as a primary method of ob-

taining information, increased emphasis is placed upon this means under conditiOns of modern ground combat which emphasize mobility and rapid movement over large areas. Military operations in a counterinsurgency role also put a premium on ex-tensive patrolling. In situations where wide separation between units exists, it will be necessary for patrols to operate at relatively great distances from friendly positions in order to adequately cover assigned areas of responsibility. In situations where the enemy is moving frequently and rapidly, patrols can assist in finding and fixing him. For our purposes, we will conSider only the capabilities and limitations of the various types of patrols. A complete discussion of all aspects of patrol opera-tions may be found in other appropriate texts, such as FMFM 6-4. Marine Rifle Company/Platoon and FMFM 6-5. Marine Rifle Squad.

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b. Classification.

(1) Patrols are classified according to their means of movement as follows: (a) Foot patrols.

(b) Helicopter patrols.

(c) Motorized (including mechanized patrols.)

(2) Patrols also may be classified according to the general type of mission for which they are employed.

(a) Reconnaissance Patrols are employed to gather information about the enemy, terrain, or resources, and to verify or confirm information previously received. They rely on stealth and fight only when necessary to accomplish the mis-sion or to protect themselves. There are two general types of reconnaissance.

1 Point Reconnaissance. - Your commander may require information about a specific location or small specific area, usually a known position or activity. Your patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the location or by maintaining surveillance over the location.

Area Reconnaissance. - Your commander may require information about an extended area, or may desire information of certain locations within an extended area. Your patrol secures this information by reconnoitering the area, maintaining surveillance over the area, or by making the point reconnaissance of a series of locations within the area.

(b) Combat Patrols are employed to destroy or capture personnel, instal-lations, equipment, or documents. Such action is ordinarily followed by a withdrawal as it is not intended that they remain permanently at the positions they seize or occupy. The ultimate purpose of a combat patrol may be the obtaining of information through capture of enemy personnel, equipment, or documents; but regardless of the type of mission, the patrol will report any information concerning the enemy, terrain, or resources acquired incidental to the accomplishment of that mission. Combat patrols are further categorized by the specific tasks assigned: raid, ambush, harassing, mop-up and security patrols.

c. Planning. - Thorough planning for patrol operations facilitates effective coverage with minimum expense in terms of personnel and effort. Patrols should be assigned specific missions. The assignment of vague and indefinite "see what you can see" missions is wasteful in time and manpower and does not produce effective results. An initial planning consideration involves comparison of patrol capabilities with other information-gathering means to ensure that patrolling is the most effective means for obtaining the desired information. Pertinent also is the decision as to the portion ofthe overall strength of the unit to be utilized in patrolling, ensuring that combat effectiveness is not seriously reduced. This consideration assumes great importance in view of the increased patrol requirements characteristic of dispersed warfare. Detailed analysis of each mission assists in keeping man-power requirements low. The exact items of information desired are determined,

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and previous knowledge of the enemy and terrain is employed to plan patrol routes which offer the greatest possibility of success. These means, coupled with the use of stealth by all patrols, hold the requirements for personnel for patrols to a min-imum. The ultimate success is the proper execution of the patrol planning steps.

d. Historical Examples.

(1) "Send ye men up in the land beyond Jordan to spy out the ways thereof, the goings and comings of the people, the wines and honeys of the land." This quotation may well be the first recorded reconnaissance mission; it was issued by :\-loses 15()() years before Christ and shows that the value of good reconnaissance was no less then than now.

(2) The importance of detailed reporting by patrols is pointed out by the pre-D-day reconnaissance of Yellow beaches on Tinian. In this situation the only indication of prepared defenses was a Single row of antiboat mines. An amphibious reconnaissance party was landed at night for the purpose of ascertaining any ad-ditional defenSive preparations on the part of the defender. The detailed report prepared by the reconnaissance party indicated a strong, well-camouflaged line of pill boxes and prepared rifle positions within the embankment behind the beaches. As a result of this report the amphibious troop commander selected the alternate beaches, which were not properly defended, for the initial assault.

406. FOOT PATROLS

a. General. - With respect to means of locomotion, the most common type of patrol and that having the Widest applications is the foot patrol. Since the only major requirement is personnel, foot patrolling lies within the immediate capability of any size or type of organization. Figure 9 shows a foot patrol route with the control or cheCk points along the route which will assist in monitoring the location and pro-gress of the patrol.

b. Capabilities.

(1) Foot patrols can traverse almost any type of terrain under varying con-ditions of weather and visibility. They are not bound to existing roads or trails. Extremely rough terrain, waterways. or dense vegetation will impede, but will seldom preclude, the movement of a determined foot patrol. Snow, rain, fog. dark-ness, and other conditions of reduced visibility may aid a trained patrol by providing concealment.

(2) Since foot patrols actually traverse the terrain between friendly positions and the objective, they are able to make a detailed inspection and report on the terrain covered, to include cultural features and enemy positions to the extent that they can be observed. Equipment can be provided the patrol to permit the obtaining of in-formation in such detailed form as sketches. photographs, and measurements. Radio permits rapid reporting of collected information of immediate nature.

(3) Of the various types of patrols ,foot patrols are ordinarily least susceptible to enemy detection and counteraction. They are able to make use of minimal cover and concealment. are not restricted to easily negotiated routes, and involve no bulky

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~ OBJECTIVE .~.

.. -.: ... _.

FINISH

Figure 9. - Foot Patrol Route With Check Points to Control Movements.

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noise-producing equipment. They present a small and elusive target for various detection devices.

c. limitations.

(1) Foot patrols comprise the most time consuming means of patrolling under most circumstances since they are limited to the speed of a man on foot. This limita-tion is diminished to a certain extent by their ability to follow a direct route cross-country.

(2) In order to operate within enemy positions. foot patrols must pass through areas under enemy control and must evade his security. Every effort is made in planning to provide for the patrol to avoid enemy positions. but the patrol is left largely to its own devices once it departs friendly positions.

(3) Foot patrols are limited as to the types and amounts of equipment they can carry. In this respect consideration must be given not only to the carrying capability of the individual. but also to the restrictions on speed and freedom of movement imposed by bulky or heavy loads. This consideration is especially im-portant when it is desired that enemy equipment be captured and brought back by the patrol.

407. MOTORIZED (INCLUDING MECHANIZED) PATROLS

a. General. - Motorized patrols are effective in covering large areas as-sociated with dispersed warfare. They are a necessary component of the mech-anized or motorized force. whose means of reconnaissance must be at least as fast and mobile as the force itself. Most motorized patrols are for reconnaissance purposes which are categorized by type as route. zone. or area reconnaissance. (See fig. 10.) However. a mounted combat patrol may prove effective in mopping-up operations. Any type of vehicle can be used - jeeps. trucks. tanks. and landing vehicles. The jeep-tank combination is a flexibile arrangement. with larger trucks included when greater carrying capacity is required. Landing vehicles. traCked. may be employed when terrain considerations are clearly favorable. when the need for lightly armored personnel carriers is indicated. and when to do so will not interfere with the primary employment of the vehicle.

b. Capabilities.

(1) Motorized patrols have good speed on roads but limited cross-country mobility. Judicious selection of the type vehicle to be used will permit operations in the less rugged types of terrain. but usually with a corresponding loss of speed.

(2) A considerable amount of supplies and equipment can be carried. which contribules to the conduct of extended patrol operations. and facilitates return of captured personnel. information, and equipment.

(3) Time requirements for accomplishing a given mission are usually less than for foot patrols.

(4) A highly developed communication system allows rapid reporting of in-formation over relatively long ranges.

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ROUTE (ROUTE OF AIl'JANCE _ COOITRCUlNG TERRAIN FEAT\.I!ES AFfECTING IT ARE RECONNOITEREDl

I

/ /

- -

/ '--- -_/

AREA (PI!(J'()SO ASSEMBLY AREA) (PROPOSED ASSEMBLY AREA _ EXTERNAL TERRUI FEAlURES AFFECTING IT ARE I!!!iO!!NQ!TERED

Figure 10. - Types of Motorized Patrolling.

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(5) Speed. armor. and armament can assist in evading or overcoming enemy reaction. While motorized and mechanized patrols are more susceptible to hostile detection than foot patrols. the aforementioned advantages may compensate. in part. for this limitation.

(6) They can operate in contaminated areas too dangerous for dismounted patrols.

c. Umitations.

(1) Cross-country mobility is limited by the terrain and by certain types of vegetation. A careful terrain study should be made prior to deciding to employ motorized or mechanized patrols. Since vehicular operations are sensitive to the quality of the road net.

(2) Bad weather and limited visibility or darkness decrease speed and mobility. Unless good all-weather roads are available heavy precipitation may make vehicular movement impracticable.

(3) Continuous movement is dependent on logistic support. Extended operations distant from frtendly positions require provisions for maintenance and resupply of fuel.

(4) Vehicles are susceptible to detection due to noise. size. and dust created. They are readily detectable both visually and aurally and present a good target for detection devices. This reduces the possibilities of stealth and surprise. which are desired for most patrol activities.

(5) Obstacles. both natural and artificial. impede motorized movement. In some cases blown bridges. cratered roads. or minefields may prevent such patrols from moving over desired routes. Bridges. defiles. roadblocks. and other likely ambush sites must be reconnoitered by foot prior to passage of the vehicles. with a corresponding impediment to the movement of the patrol.

408. HEUCOPTER PATROlS

a. General. - The most pronusmg means of accomplishing the extensive patrolling over large areas which is required by dispersed warfare lies in the use of the helicopter. While helicopter patrolling offers many advantages. it does not replace. but rather supplements other types of patrolling.

b. Capabilities.

(1) Helicopter patrols are largely unrestricted by terrain since the helicopter is capable of flying over features which would be obstacles to foot or motor movement. Even where suitable landing points are non-existent the patrol can often be dis-charged from the hovering helicopter.

(2) The helicopter can usually deliver the patrol very near to its objective. (3) Since it is possible to fly over or around enemy positions. the dangers

involved in passing through such poSitions are greatly reduced.

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7

(4) Helicopters are capable of operating under most conditions of weather and visibility; navigational aids are steadily being developed to increase this capa-bility. When observation from the air is not a major consideration, weather and visibility will seldom limit use of the helicopter by patrols.

(5) The speed of the helicopter can be utilized to reduce the time required to accomplish a given mission or to increase the number of missions or the distance or area covered.

(6) A well developed, long-range communication system inherent to the helicopter permits rapid reporting over long distances.

(7) Patrols of various sizes and compositions may be matched by helicoptf't'S of varying capacities.

c. Limitations.

(1) Helicopters are vulnerable to ground and air attack. Their basic character offers little protection: but experience has shown that, except for a limited number of vital parts, the helicopter can withstand a number of hits. However, its lack of armor may result in occupants becoming casualties even though the aircraft itself is not shot down. Its vulnerability is largely offset by its speed and maneuverability with respect to ground attack, and by its maneuverability and ability to operate at low altitude With respect to air attack.

(2) Loss of a helicopter in some cases Will result in failure to accomplish the mission of the patrol. If the entire patrol is transported in a single helicopter, the loss of that helicopter may mean t