226 U.S. 184

33 S.Ct. 47

57 L.Ed. 180

TOYOTA, Plff. in Err.,v.

TERRITORY OF HAWAII.

No. 49.

Submitted November 13, 1912.Decided December 2, 1912.

Messrs. D. W. Burchard, A. L. C. Atkinson, and Ralph P. Quarles forplaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 185-188 intentionally omitted]

Messrs. Charles R. Hemenway, Alexander Lindsay, Jr., Attorney Generalof Hawaii, and E. W. Sutton, Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, fordefendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 188-190 intentionally omitted]

Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

1 The plaintiff in error was convicted in the district court of Honolulu, Hawaii, ofthe offense of selling goods at auction, in Honolulu, without an auctioneer'slicense, and was sentenced to pay a fine of $600 and costs. The supreme courtaffirmed the conviction and the case comes here on error.

2 In order to obtain a license for auction sales it was necessary to pay the feeprescribed by § 1343 of the Revised Laws of the territory of Hawaii, whichprovides:

3 'The annual fee for a license to sell goods, wares, and merchandise or otherproperty at auction shall be $600 for the district of Honolulu, and $15 for eachother taxation district.'

4 An agreed statement of facts showed that the plaintiff in error was the agent ofthe corporation known as the 'Hawaiian Fisheries, Limited,' which handled fishdaily for a large number of fishermen. The catch was brought to the market inHonolulu, where the plaintiff in error offered it in basket lots, each basketcontaining from 70 to 100 pounds, to the retail dealers of fish only, the onebidding the highest price becoming the purchaser.

5 The plaintiff in error contended in the territorial court that he did not sell atauction within the meaning of the statute, and further, that the statute, if it wasapplicable, denied to him the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the 14thAmendment of the Constitution of the United States, because of thediscrimination between the district of Honolulu and other districts in theamount of the license fees imposed.

6 The supreme court of Hawaii assumed, as the plaintiff in error argues, that theword 'auction' in § 1343 means public auction. This conclusion was reached inthe light of the requirement of § 1345, that the bond to be given by the personreceiving the license should contain a provision that he will not sell 'except atpublic auction;' and the court ruled that the sales conducted by the plaintiff inerror were sales at public auction within the contemplation of the statute,although bids were accepted only from the retail dealers or the personsconducting fish tables at the market. This ruling presents no Federal question,and hence is not reviewable, here, as only such questions are before us uponthis writ of error as could be raised upon a writ of error to a state court. Act ofApril 30, 1900, chap. 339, § 86, 31 Stat. at L. 141, 158; Equitable Life Assur.Soc. v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308, 309, 47 L. ed. 190, 191, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123;Notley v. Brown, 208 U. S. 429, 440, 52 L. ed. 559, 563, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385.In view of the amount involved, the case cannot in any view come within theamendment made by the act of March 3, 1905, chap. 1465, § 3, 33 Stat. at L.1035; Honolulu Rapid Transit & Land Co. v. Wilder, 211 U. S. 144, 53 L. ed.124, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46.

7 The remaining contention, urged in various forms by the assignments of error,comes to the single point that the statute created an arbitrary classification. Itcannot be said, however, that there was no reasonable basis for a distinctionbetween Honolulu and other districts. And it was the province of the legislatureto decide upon the amount of the fees which should be charged. It must beassumed that in so deciding it took into account varying conditions in therespective localities; as, for example, in the amount of business transacted andin the corresponding value of such licenses. Necessarily, as was said in Magounv. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 294, 42 L. ed. 1037, 1043, 18 Sup.

Ct. Rep. 594, the power of classification 'must have a wide range of discretion.'It is not reviewable 'unless palpably arbitrary.' Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 562, 43 L. ed. 552, 554, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Louisville & N. R. Co. v.Melton, 218 U. S. 36, 52-55, 54 L. ed. 921, 927-929, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 676;Engel v, O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 55 L. ed. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190;Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. 61, 78, 55 L. ed. 369, 377, 31Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 160; Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 235, 56 L. ed. 175, 179, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74. With its intimateknowledge of local conditions, the supreme court of the territory said upon thispoint: 'The great bulk of the business of the territory is done in Honolulu. It isnot for us to say whether we would make the difference in the amount oflicense fees in this case as large as the legislature has made it. It is sufficientthat we cannot say that the difference is unreasonable, or that the statute isunequal or arbitrary in its operation.' [19 Haw. 651.] We find no ground for adifferent conclusion.

8 Judgment affirmed.