tower loans eeoc complaint

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Plaintiff, v. FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 2:15-cv-01161 SECTION: J MAG. SHUSHAN JURY DEMAND

Consolidated With FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, et al. Plaintiff, v. TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-02500-CJB-SS Section “J” (1)

EEOC’S COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND

NOW INTO COURT, through undersigned counsel, comes Plaintiff-Intervenor, the

United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”), and

files its Complaint and Jury Demand. The EEOC respectfully avers as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et

seq. (“Title VII”), to correct unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex, and to provide

appropriate relief to Mr. Tristan Broussard (“Mr. Broussard”), who was adversely affected by

such practices and to prevent further occurrence of such practices. As alleged with more

particularity below, Defendant, First Tower Loan, LLC (“Defendant” or “Tower”), terminated

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 71 Filed 09/16/15 of 13

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the employment of Mr. Broussard, who is transgender, because of sex, based on perceived

nonconformity with gender stereotypes and/or his gender identity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1.

Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 451, 1331, 1337, 1343 and

1345. This action is authorized and instituted pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1), (3), and 706(g), as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1), (3), and (g), and Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of

1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.

2.

Venue is proper in this district. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The unlawful acts of

employment discrimination described herein occurred within the State of Louisiana.

PARTIES

3.

The EEOC is the agency of the United States of America charged with the

administration, interpretation and enforcement of Title VII and is expressly authorized to

intervene in this action by Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-(5)(1) and

(3).

4.

At all relevant times, Defendant, First Tower Loan, LLC, has continuously been a

corporation doing business within the State of Louisiana, and has continuously had at least 15

employees. At all relevant times, Defendant has had more than 500 employees.


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5.

At all relevant times, Defendant has been an employer engaged in an industry affecting

commerce within the meaning of Sections 701(b), (g), and (h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e

(b), (g), and (h).

6.

More than 30 days before the institution of this suit, a charge of discrimination was filed

with the EEOC on behalf of Mr. Broussard alleging violations by Defendant of Title VII.

7.

The EEOC provided notice to Defendant of the charge of discrimination.

8.

The EEOC investigated the charge of discrimination.

9.

Based on evidence discovered during the investigation, the EEOC issued a Letter of

Determination (“Determination”) to Defendant, finding reasonable cause to believe that

Defendant had engaged in unlawful employment practices prohibited by Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964.

10.

The Commission’s Determination included an invitation that Defendant join the

Commission in informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion in an attempt to

eliminate and remedy the alleged unlawful employment practices.

11.

Defendant declined to participate in the conciliation process.


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12.

The Commission sent notice to Defendant that conciliation had been unsuccessful.

13.

All conditions precedent to the institution of this lawsuit, if there be any, have been

fulfilled.

STATEMENT OF CLAIMS

14.

At least since February 2013, Defendant required that Mr. Broussard conform to its

gender stereotypes to remain employed. This required conformity included, but was not

necessarily limited to, Mr. Broussard’s dressing, grooming, and conducting himself in a manner

which Defendant considered to conform with its gender stereotypes.

15.

On August 27, 2013, the National Center for Lesbian Rights (“NCLR”) filed with the

Commission the instant charge of discrimination on Mr. Broussard’s behalf, alleging violations

of Title VII by Defendant.

16.

Mr. Broussard’s gender identity is male and he presents as a male. Mr. Broussard has

been living his life as a man, consistent with his male gender identity, since September 2011.

17.

Mr. Broussard was designated as female at birth.


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18.

By definition, individuals who are transgender identify as and conform to a sex different

from the sex assigned to them at birth, which contradicts widespread, sex-based cultural

expectations, assumptions, norms, and stereotypes.

19.

By living and identifying as a man, after being designated female at birth, Mr. Broussard

did not conform to the sex-based stereotypes and norms expected of him by Defendant.

20.

In February 2013, Mr. Broussard applied for a Manager Trainee position at Defendant’s

Lake Charles, Louisiana, office.

21.

The duties of the Manager Trainee position do not require its incumbents to be of any

particular sex or gender identity. Sex is not a bona fide qualification for the job.

22.

Leah Sparks (“Ms. Sparks”), manager of Tower’s Lake Charles, Louisiana, branch

interviewed Mr. Broussard for the Manager Trainee position on or about February 25, 2013.

23.

Ms. Sparks and/or other officials of Defendant concluded that Mr. Broussard was

qualified for the Manager Trainee position.

24.

Later that same day, Ms. Sparks called Mr. Broussard to offer him the Manager Trainee

position, which Mr. Broussard accepted.


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25.

During the events described in Paragraphs 22 through 24 above, Ms. Sparks perceived

Mr. Broussard as male.

26.

Mr. Broussard began working for Tower on March 4, 2013.

27.

While Mr. Broussard was completing his employment paperwork for new employees on

March 4, 2013, Tower required him to provide a valid form of identification. Mr. Broussard

provided his driver’s license to Ms. Sparks.

28.

Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license lists his sex as “F,” which refers to the sex he was

assigned at birth (female). At all times relevant, Defendant had no information indicating that

Mr. Broussard was female, other than his driver’s license.

29.

When Ms. Sparks noticed that Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license listed his sex as “F,” she

asked Mr. Broussard about it. Mr. Broussard explained that he is a transgender man.

30.

After seeing the “F” on Mr. Broussard’s driver’s license, Ms. Sparks notified Tower Vice

President, David Morgan (“Mr. Morgan”), of it.

31.

During his first week of employment, Mr. Broussard performed his job duties

satisfactorily. Indeed, Ms. Sparks commented to him during this period that he was doing well.


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32.

Subsequently, on March 11, 2013, Mr. Morgan traveled to Tower’s Lake Charles,

Louisiana office to meet with Mr. Broussard.

33.

During the meeting, Mr. Morgan informed Mr. Broussard that Respondent did not want

Mr. Broussard to dress “like a man” and that going forward he must instead dress and act as

female in the workplace.

34.

Mr. Broussard told Mr. Morgan that he is transgender and lives and identifies as male.

35.

Mr. Morgan stated to Mr. Broussard that he could not dress as a man because it would be

confusing to customers.

36.

Defendant produced no evidence to the EEOC during its investigation that any customer

complained about Mr. Broussard because of his manner of dress or grooming, or otherwise

expressed any confusion or concern as a result of Mr. Broussard’s presenting as a man.

37.

Mr. Morgan stated to Mr. Broussard that Tower might consider employing him as a man

if he underwent surgery.

38.

Mr. Morgan then presented Mr. Broussard with a written statement which Defendant

required Mr. Broussard to sign as a condition of continued employment.


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39.

The written statement referred to in Paragraph 38 above provided:

I understand that my preference to act and dress as a male, despite having been born a female, is not something that will be in compliance with Tower Loan’s personnel policies. I have been advised as to the proper dress for females and also have been provided a copy of the female dress code. I also understand that when meetings occur that require out of town travel and an overnight room is required, I will be in [sic] assigned to a room with a female.

40.

Upon presenting the statement to Mr. Broussard, Mr. Morgan stated that Mr. Broussard’s

supervisor had said many positive things about him. Mr. Morgan did not state that there had

been any complaints about Mr. Broussard, either by customers or other Tower employees.

41.

Mr. Broussard refused to sign the agreement and explained that he could not agree to

dress or act as female because that is not who he is. Defendant’s conditioning Mr. Broussard’s

continued employment on his signing the statement effectuated his termination.

42.

The next day, Ms. Sparks called Mr. Broussard to apologize, stating that she did not

know Mr. Broussard was going to be fired for being transgender.

43.

The manner in which Mr. Broussard dressed and conducted himself while employed by

Defendant did not violate any of Defendant’s written policies concerning dress, grooming, or

conduct.


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44.

Defendant did not produce any written policies during the EEOC investigation that

employees are required to share a hotel room with employees of a certain sex or gender when

traveling on behalf of Defendant. If such a policy existed, Defendant did not explore at all with

Mr. Broussard whether other arrangements could be made, in lieu of discharge.

45.

Defendant terminated Mr. Broussard because of sex by firing him because Mr. Broussard

did not, in Defendant’s perception, conform to its gender stereotypes.

46.

Defendant fired Mr. Broussard because he identifies as a different sex than that assigned

to him at birth, because Mr. Broussard had a male gender presentation rather than a female one,

and/or because Mr. Broussard did not conform to the sex-based norms and stereotypes that

Defendant insisted that Mr. Broussard match.

47.

The employment practices alleged herein violate Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), by discriminating because of sex.

48.

The effect of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices was to deprive Mr. Broussard

of equal employment opportunities and otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,

because of sex.


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49.

Tower’s unlawful employment practices were intentional and were committed with

malice or reckless indifference to Mr. Broussard’s rights under Title VII and to the rights of any

persons in like or related circumstances.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, the EEOC respectfully requests that this Court:

A. Grant a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers, successor, assigns,

and all persons in active concert or participation with it, prohibiting unlawful sex

discrimination against employees or applicants from employment, including on

the basis of perceived nonconformity with gender stereotypes;

B. Order Defendant to institute and carry out policies, practices, and programs which

provide equal employment opportunities for all individuals regardless of sex and

which will eradicate the effects of its past and present unlawful employment

practices, including but not limited to: training of personnel; reporting to the

Commission concerning compliance with Title VII; and hiring and employing

persons without regard to their conformity with gender stereotypes;

C. Order Defendant to make Mr. Broussard whole by providing appropriate backpay

with prejudgment interest, in amounts to be determined at trial, and other

affirmative relief necessary to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment

practices;


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D. Order Defendant to make Mr. Broussard whole by ordering reinstatement or,

alternatively, by providing him with front pay, in amounts to be determined at

trial, to eradicate the effects of Defendant’s unlawful employment practices;

E. Order Defendant to make Mr. Broussard whole by providing compensation for

past and future nonpecuniary losses resulting from the unlawful practices

complained of above, including but not limited to emotional and mental anguish,

pain and suffering, humiliation, loss of enjoyment of life, and devastation in

amounts to be determined at trial, and by providing compensation for past and

future pecuniary losses resulting from Defendant’s unlawful practices;

F. Order Defendant to pay punitive damages to appropriate complaining parties

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a for its malicious and reckless conduct, as described

above, in amounts to be determined at trial;

G. Grant such further legal or equitable relief as the Court deems necessary and

proper in the public interest; and

H. Award the EEOC its costs of this action.

JURY TRIAL DEMAND

In accordance with Rules 38 and 39 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the EEOC

hereby requests a jury on all issues raised in the instant Complaint which may be tried by jury.


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Respectfully submitted,

P. DAVID LOPEZ General Counsel No Bar Roll Number Assigned JAMES L. LEE Deputy General Counsel No Bar Roll Number Assigned GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS Associate General Counsel No Bar Roll Number Assigned JIM SACHER Regional Attorney La. Bar Roll Number 14888 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Houston District Office 1919 Smith Street 7th Floor Houston, Texas 77002 Direct Line: (713) 651-4963 [email protected]

/s/ Gregory T. Juge GREGORY T. JUGE (T.A.) Supervisory Trial Attorney La. Bar Roll No. 20890 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION New Orleans Field Office Hale Boggs Federal Building 500 Poydras Street, Suite 809 New Orleans, LA 70130 Direct line: (504) 676-8239 Fax: (504) 595-2886 [email protected]


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/s/ Alexandra Navarre-Davis ALEXANDRA NAVARRE-DAVIS Trial Attorney La. Bar Roll No. 35000 U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION New Orleans Field Office Hale Boggs Federal Building 500 Poydras Street, Suite 809 New Orleans, LA 70130 Direct line: (504) 595-2914 Fax: (504) 595-2886 [email protected] COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing has been served on counsel of record for all

parties, via the Court’s ECF system, on this 8th day of September, 2015.

/s/ Alexandra Navarre-Davis ALEXANDRA NAVARRE-DAVIS


EXHIBIT “A”

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Plaintiff, v. FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO: 2:15-cv-01161 SECTION: J JUDGE BARBIER MAG. SHUSHAN JURY DEMAND

Consolidated With

FIRST TOWER LOAN, LLC, et al. Civil Action No. 2:15-cv-02500-CJB-SS Plaintiff, Section “J” (1) v. TRISTAN BROUSSARD, Defendant.

CERTIFICATION OF GENERAL PUBLIC IMPORTANCE PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(f)(1)

Upon review of the facts of this case, I have determined that it raises issues of general

public importance regarding allegations that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended, by terminating the employment of Mr.

Broussard, who is transgender, because of sex, based on perceived nonconformity with gender

stereotypes, and/or his gender identity.

DATED THIS 8th day of September, 2015.

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 71-1 Filed 09/16/15 Page 1 of 2

EXHIBIT “A”

/s/ P. David Lopez General Counsel UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 131 M Street NE Washington, DC 20507

Case 2:15-cv-01161-CJB-SS Document 71-1 Filed 09/16/15 Page 2 of 2

tower loans eeoc complaint

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