towards explaining anti-foreign violence in germany (wps 53, 1994) jens alber

8/4/2019 Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germany (WPS 53, 1994) Jens Alber.

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Towards Explaining Anti-Foreign Violence in Germanyby Jens Alber Universitat Konstanz Working Paper Series #53

AbstractGennany has recently witnessed a vast increase in anti-foreign violence. Assembling data from a wide variety ofrecent research, the paper addresses two basic questions: to what extent is the outburst of xenophobic attacks aGerman peculiarity? and what are the explanations for the mcreasing violence? An analysis o f criminal statisticsof various European countries an d of comparative opinion polls in the European Community shows that Germanyhas indeed witnessed a growth of anti-foreign sentiment, and a level of violence that is conspicuous from a comparative perspective. Four possible determinants of this peculiarity of recent German history are discussed: (1) thegrowing ethnic and cultural heterogeneity due to the vast increase in immigration from non-European countries;(2) the increasing costs of foreigners' claims on the German welfare state; (3) the economic context of immigration;an d (4) the transformation of national identity in the context of German unification. It is shown that neither therate of immigration nor the position of foreigners in the German welfare state yields satisfactory explanations forthe recent upsurge in violence, which only occurred af ter unification. The key for an explanation lies in a particula r macro-constellation that is characterized by the concurrence of a massive wave of immigration with aneconomic crisis, an d with the ethnicization of German national identity in the context of unification. Anti-foreignsentiments do not automatically follow increases in immigration, but grow in a specific political climate to whichthe political elites actively contribute.


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TOWARDS BXPLAINING ANTI-FOREIGN VIOLENCB IN GERMANYJens Alber, Universi tat KonstanzIntroductionGermany present ly presents a rather confusing and ambivalentpicture to the world. On the one hand, since the German uni f i cation hardly a day has passed without an outburst of ant i - foreign violence. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands ofGerman ci t izens ra l l ied in demonstrations against ant i - fore ignviolence, German newspapers were f i l led with ads expressingso l idar i ty with foreign residents, and, in almost every town,associat ions spring forth tha t seek to promote the in tegrat ionof foreigners .Attempts to explain the explosion of anti-foreign violence inrecent y e a ~ s are jus t as mult ifaceted as the presentat ion of thecountry in everyday l i f e . On the micro as well as on the macrolevel we find diametrical ly opposed hypotheses. One explanationprominent on the micro l eve l ' i s that the increasing readiness toresort to violence i s the resul t of the permissiveness of parents of the 68er generation who fa i led to draw l imi ts for t he i rchildren and to perform the socia l control functions required byadults in the social izat ion process. On the other side, thereare explanations in the t radi t ion of the "Authoritarian Personal i ty" , according to which the emotional deprivation suffered bychildren in too repressive families is a major cause of theupsurge in r ight wing violence.On the macro l eve l , there are similarly contradictory ideas. Onthe one hand, we have hypotheses which view ant i-foreign violence as a sor t of col lect ive self-defense against an excessiveimmigration of asylum seekers and an exploitat ion of the Germanwelfare s ta te by foreigners . On the other hand, there are hypotheses which highlight the problematic German national identi tyas the root of the problem. Thus, several pol i t ic ians and in te l lec tuals champion the idea tha t . the wave of ant i-foreign violence is the resu l t of a too heavy tabooing of nat ional pride.By overstressing cosmopolitan values, the pol i t i ca l es tabl i shment of the Federal Republic has l e f t i t exclusively to r ightwing radicals to sat isfy the neglected desire for nat ional prideand ident i ty. As rebell ious adolescents t ry to challenge theestabl ished adult world by t ransgressing taboos, and as Germannationalism has become more or less the only taboo l e f t in anotherwise permissive society, the adolescent rebel l ion againstthe establ ished insider cul ture ar t icula tes i t s e l f in a newradical nationalism. I f th i s may be called the vacuum hypothesis" of national ident i ty, there i s also a r iva l hypothesiswhich sees the recent violence as the resu l t of an excessivemobilization of national consciousness af te r German unif ica t ion,and of a fading of cosmopolitan, plura l is t pol i t ica l orienta t ions. From the l a t t e r perspect ive, not the neglect of, butrather the overemphasis .on national identity, is the root causeof the recent outbursts of r igh t wing violence.


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2In o p ~ n ~ o n i t is the task of socia l science to narrow themargin of possible interpretations by systematically confrontingsuch conjectures with empirical data. Hence I wil l t ry tosummarize and re-evaluate the available empirical evidence ihthe l ight of competing theoret ical explanations. As I am' asociologis t rather t h ~ n a psychologist, I will concentrate onexplanations on the macro level .The two r iva l hypotheses on national identi ty -, the vacuumhypothesis and the moblization thesis - have one aspect ,incommon. Both imply the idea that the upsurge of anti-foreignviolence i s a specif ical ly German problem which i s rooted in thepecul iar i t ies of German history. I wil l t es t th is idea by examining f i r s t whether Germany is more xenophobic than otherEuropean countries. This will serve to, specify the dependentvariable of the analysis . Then I wil l move to a discussion offour explanatory variables that figure more or less prominentlyin current public debates. Firs t I will t es t two popular hypotheses ~ h a t view the wave of anti-foreign violence as a sort ofcollect ive self-defense against (1) foreign exploitat ion of theGerman welfare s tate , or (2) against a wave of immigration whichhas moved beyond to lerable ' l imi ts . Then I wil l discuss twofur ther determinants, i . e . (3) the economic context of the recent immigration, and (4) th-e mobilization of a specif ic kind ofnational consciousness in the context of German unif icat ion .My hypothesis wil l be that nei ther the rate of immigration northe position of foreigners in the German welfare s ta te yieldsat isfactory explanations for the recent upsurge in anti-foreignviolence. The key for an explanation l ies rather in a part icularmacro constel lat ion that is characterized by the concurrence ofa wave of migration with an economic cr i s i s , and with the ethnizat ion of G e ~ a n national ident i ty in the context of unificat ion . As I see the prime task of socia l science less in developing speculat ions than in test ing hypotheses, I wil l add a f inalsection in which I discuss how th is idea and the r iva l vacuumof-national- idehti ty-hypothesis could be empirically tested .1. The dependent variable: Are Germans more xenophobic thanothers?There are two ways by which to approach an empirical answer tothe question whether the level of xenophobia is exceptional inGermany. Fi rs t we can-take a look a t the criminal s ta t i s t i cs ofvarious countries in order to measure the incidence of ant i - foreign violence. Secondly, we can turn to the comparative opinionpolls of the European Communities in order to see i f ant i - foreign sentiments prevai l in Germany to a stronger degree thanelsewhere in Europe.a} Anti-foreign violence in a comparative perspect iveAs there is no comparative source on anti-foreign violence, Ihave written to a number of European embassies in order toobtain the i r national data. Data were supplied by the govern-.


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3ments of France, Great Britain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Inaddition some comparative newspaper accounts could be ut i l ized.According to these data" only Great Britain has witnessed anincrease in ant i - foreign violence that is comparable to Germany.Between 1988 and 1991, the number of instances of racia l assaul tand racia l harassment almost doubled in Bri ta in from 4,383 to7,882. In 1992 7,793 incidents with a rac is t motivation wereregistered (Horne Office Fax of 9/12/1993). In the f i r s t tenmonths of 1993 12 deaths were at t r ibuted to violence with arac is t background (International Herald Tribune November 3,1993: 4). In France, anti-foreign violence reached a climax ona much lower level during the mid-1980s, but has been decliningsince. Between 1980 and 1992, a, to ta l of 641 criminal ant i foreign act iv i t ies were registered in which 1,652 persons becamethe victims of rac is t threats . 25 fa ta l incidents occurred from1980 to 1992, non qf which happened in the two most recent years(Consulat General de France, l e t t e r of 28/10/1993). Germanyregis tered some twenty fa ta l incidents in the year of 1992alone .1Switzerland counted 34 anti- ,foreign violent acts in 1990 and 81in 1991, including one fatal ' incident (Schweizerischer Bundesrat1992: 33). sweden registered 25 acts of ant i - foreign arson orexplosive attacks in 1992, but no deaths. In the same year the,country hosted some 83,000 asylum seekers (Swedish Embassy Faxof 16/9/1993; see also Steinke 1993) .In Germany the number ofviolent acts committed by r ight wing extremists increased from270 in 1990 to 1,483 in 1991, and to 2,584 in 1992 (see table1). The German authori t ies also give data on the. number ofattacks with explosive devices or arson which are roughlycomparable to the Swedish data. In 1992, there were 722 suchattacks (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993: 70). I f th is i scompared to the 25 attacks in Sweden, i t becomes clear that witha population size 9.4 times larger than the Swedish one, theFederal Republic accepted 5.3 times as many asylum seekers asSweden, but experienced 29 times as many acts of anti-foreignarson.In sum, Germany is not the only European country to experienceincreasing ant i - foreign violence in recent years, but the numberand the in tensi ty of these acts seems to be higher than elsewhere in Europe. Data from comparative poll's also confirm that there is a remarkable degree of xenophobia in Germany.

1 In a very .detai led account of each individual act theperiodocal DIE WOCHE (No 24/1993) arr ives a t a to ta l number of26 deaths whereas the government's Verfassungsschutzbericht for1992 states the n u m b ~ r of deaths in a summary account as 17(Bundesministerium des Innern 1993: 70).


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b) Atti tudes on foreismers in comparative opinion polls 'The 1992 Burobarometer carr ied out by the Commission of theEuropean Communities contained several i tems measuring ant i foreign a t t i tudes . In none of these items does Germany rank asthe country with the highest degree of in tolerance. In contrastto other nations, however, she consistent ly appears among the 24 countries with the highest proportion of xenophobic s ta tements . Thus Germany has above average proportions of peoplesaying that there are too many foreigners in the i r country, ' t ha tthe presence of foreigners is disturbing, tha t the r ights offoreigners should be res t r ic ted ra ther than extended, or thatasylum seekers should no longer be accepted. I f a compound indexof xenophobia i s constructed from the various i tems, only theBelgians stood out as as equally hos t i le to foreigners in 1992as the Germans (Wiegand 1993: 4 i Kommission der EuropaischenGemeinschaften 1992) .By and large, we may conclude, then, tha t Germany is not uniquein experiencing increasing xenophobia in recent years , but tha tthe level of ant i - foreign at t i tudes and of ant i - foreign violencei s conspicuously high in a. comparative European perspect ive:This requires explanation.2. possible explanations2.1 The posi t ion of foreigners in the German welfare s ta teRight wing radicals see asylum seekers and other foreigners asmenacing competitors who not only take away jobs in the labormarket, but also exploi t the German wel.fare s ta te by an excessive claim of benef i ts . The authors o f a study on ant i - foreignviolence which was commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Womenand Youth summarized th i s posi t ion as follows: " I t i s not a se to f shared ideologies or po l i t i ca l convic t ions tha t serves as abond between the heterogeneous groups o f v io l en t actors butra ther a di f fuse sense o f general deprivat ion o f Germans v i s -a v is foreigners , espec ial ly asylum seekers . This percept ion i sabove a l l connected to problems o f housing and o f socia lt rans fe r payments fo r asylum seekers" (Willems/ Wurtz/ E c ~ e r t 1993: 132; t rans la t ion from the German original by th i s author) .Since the idea that foreigners are paras i tes who exploi t theGerman taxpayer serves as a legi t imizing bridge tha t helps toredefine anti-foreign violence as legi t imate sel f-defense, Iwil l examine brief ly to what extent foreigners indeed overburdenthe German welfare s ta te .As in a l l legends, there i s a grain of t ru th in the r igh t wingview. It' i s t rue that foreigners are increasingly overrepresented among the recipients of social ass is tance, which i s theGerman form of poor re l i e f . From 1980 to 1990 the proportion offoreigners among socia l a s s i s ~ a n c e recipients increased from 8to 22 (8eck 1992; 300). Only 6 t of all Germans, Dut 16 % ofthe foreign residents draw social ass is tance benef i t s . This may


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be seen as a basis for the growing resentment. However I thesocial assistance scheme is only a minor program, representingmerely 5 % of the Federal Republic's social expenditure. Thebulk of social outlays goes to the pension insurance system,where foreigners account for roughly 8 % of the income fromcontributions ,wh i l e .drawing only 2 % of the outlays forbenefits (Rehfeld 1991: 491).The aggregate impact that foreigners have on the German tax andt ransfer system was recently examined by one of the country'sleading economic research ins t i tu tes . I t came to the conclusionthat foreigners paid around 30 bi l l ion DM in taxes and socialinsurance contributioris in 1991, while receiving t ransfers worth16 bi l l ion DM. In other words, the presence of foreignersamounts to a f i scal gain of 14 bi l l ion DM per year (Barabas e tal 1992: 145). Hence foreigners actually unburden the Germanwelfare s ta te . Thus there is no empirical basis for interpreting"anti-foreign violence as an economically rat ional act of -selfdefense against an exploitation of the welfare s ta te . Let us nowexamine to what extent anti-foreign activi t ies can be seen as anact of self-defense against excessive immigration.2.2 The increasing pressures from immigrationFollowing the off ic ia l view frequently expressed by Germanpoli t icians, Germans have friendly feelings toward foreigners,but the i r basical ly posi t ive at t i tude became recently overstrained by an excessive wave of immigration, as Germanyaccepted more asylum seekers in 1992 than a l l other EC-countriestogether. From th is perspective, anti-foreign violence i s theinevitable consequence of an overflooding wave of immigration,which must be broken i f domestic peace is to be restored.I t is certainly correct that Germany is one of the most denselypopulated countries in Europe. I t is also correct that th isdensely populated country witnessed a"massive wave of immigrat ion in recent years with conspicuously high numbers of asylumseekers (see ' table 1). Since 1961 the proportion of foreignershas r isen from 1.2 to over 8 %. Moreover, the structure of theforeign resident population has changed signif icantly. Most ofthe immigrants now come from non-European countries so that theethnic and cul tura l heterogeneity of the population has rapidlyincreased. Within the European Community, Germany ranks thi rdaf ter Luxembourg and Belgium with respect to the proportion ofresident foreigners, but by fa r f i r s t with respect to the proportion of foreigners from non-EC countries (presently roughly6 % - see Fuchs/Gerhards/Roller 1993: 248),I f we analyze the Eurobarometer data on anti-foreign sentiments,i t becomes evident" tha t the frequency of xenophobic sentimentsi s highly correlated with the proportion of foreigners in thecountry " The more foreigners there are, the more f r ~ q u e n t areanti-foreign at t i tudes , This pattern shows up consistentlyregardless of whether we ask for evaluations of the presence offoreigners or for opinions concerning their rights as cit izens(see" graphs 1-5) .


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6In none of these analyses does Germany appear as an out l i e rwhich deviates from the general pat tern. On the contrary, thecountry i s to be found below the regression ' l ine which indicatesthe s ta t i s t i ca l ly normal relat ionship between the presence ofimmigrants and xenophobic sentiments. In other words, xenophobica t t i tudes are less marked in Germany than one would expect,given the s ta t i s t i cs on the proportion of foreign residents . Thedata thus seem to support the hypothesis of German pol i t ic iansthat Germans nourish friendly feelings toward foreigners andtha t the dramatic increase in the number of asylum seekers whichoccurred in the 1990s i s the root cause of current ant i - foreignac t iv i t ies .Al though th is interpretat ion may be' viewed as the consensusopinion shared by pol i t icians and most social scientis ts inGermany al ike , I think that it i s flawed in several respects .Firs t , opinion pol l data on at t i tudes ' must not be confoundedwith the frequency of anti-foreign violence. Secondly, an analys i s of tqe available empirical evidence from a comparative anda longitudinal perspective shows that such an in terpreta t ionwould not be in l ine with the facts./A comparison with Sweden shows that immigration alone cannot beinterpreted as a suff ic ient cause of anti-foreign violence. Witha population of 8.5 million, Sweden, accepted 83,200 asylum'seekers in 1992 (The Swedish Ins t i tu te 1993: 2; see also Suddeutsche Zeitung 40/1993: 7). In proportion to i t s populationsize , it thus accepted twice as many asylum seekers as the Federa l Republic. Yet, as was shown above, the level of violence inSweden remained much lower, and without any death to l l so far .A longitudinal analysis of the association petween the inf lux ofasylum seekers and anti-foreign violent acts 2 in Germany duringthe past decades is even more str iking. Generally speaking, i ti s t rue that the absolute number of violent acts increased asthe number of foreign immigrants rose. However, there is aphase-specif ic pat tern. Throughout the 1980s there has not beenany strong s ta t i s t i ca l association between the two developments.From 1983 to 1990 the number of asylum seekers increased tenfold, while the number of r ight wing violent acts only rosemoderately from 67 to 128 incidents per year (see table 1 andgraph 6). Only af te r the unification did a sudden explosion ofr ight wing violence occur. Within one year, the number of violent acts in the united Germany jumped from 270 in 1990' to L 483in 1991, while the number of asylum seekers merely increased by33 %.The argument that increasing immigration leads to growing ant i foreign ,violence may 'have two different meanings. Fi rs t , i t

2 The off ic ia l ' report on ant i -const i tu t ional ac t iv i t ies(Verfassungsschutzbericht) gives data on violence from r ightwing extremists without drawing a dis t inct ion between ant i foreign and right wing violence (see Bundesministerium desInnern 1993: 68-70).


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could mean that there i s a constant re la t ionship between thenumber of foreigners and the degree of ant i - foreign hos t i l i ty .This would imply that violence only increases in absolute terms,because there i s growing opportunity to express hos t i l i ty , asthe growing number of foreigners or asylum seekers increases thenumber of potent ia l targets . Secondly, the argument could mean,however, that the growing presence of foreigners actually leadsto an increasing in tensi ty of ant i - foreign aggression so thatthere are not only more violent acts in absolute terms but alsoin relat ive terms. I f we take the changing number of potent ia lvictims into account by calculat ing the ra t io of violent actsper 1,000 asylum seekers, the f i r s t version of the argumentwould imply a constant rat io of r ight wing violence over time,whilst the second'version would predict the ra t io to increase asthe number of asylum seekers grows.In actual fact , the ra t io of ant i - foreign violence increasedonly.br ief ly in the context of the government turnover from thesocial democrats to the chr is t ian union in 1982/83, but declinedin subsequent years during the 1980s despite a growing inf lux offoreigners (graph 7). Throughout the 1980s there was even a negative relationship between the inf lux of asylum seekers and thera t io of r ight wing violence (graph 8). After the unif icat ion,the rat io of right. wing violent acts then suddenly increasedfrom 1.4 to 5.8 per 1,000 potent ia l victims. As anti-foreignviolence grew vast ly out of proportion to changes in immigrationaf te r the unification, it follows that migration data alonecannot account for the sudden increase in r ight wing radicalismin tpe united Germany. Other explanatory factors also need to beconsidered.2.3 The economic context of immigrationThe mere number of foreign residents says only very l i t t l e aboutthe potent ia l of ant i - foreign violence. Only in the context ofcrises do foreigners and other minorities typical ly become thetarget of violent acts . This may be related to more and lessrat ional considerations or motives. Economic rationalism teachesus tha t , in the context of economic downturns, distr ibutionalconfl icts assume the character of zero sum games, in which onegroup can only get what another group loses. In such si tuat ions,social t ransfers for foreigners also have growing opportunitycosts for natives, so that the competition for shares in thebudget becomes f i e r c e ~ . There i s also a more i r ra t ional aspect related to cr ises , how ever . Crises usually give r i se to a search for scapegoats. Inhis his tory of the Jews, Abba Eban (1970) pointed out that ther ights of minori t ies have always been threatened when economicor national cr ises break forth. In his Studies on Germany (MStu dien Uber die Deutschen M -1990), Norbert Elias developed theargument that men s t r ive for the control of events , and that inthe presence of crises and the absence of ra t ional knowledgeacout theit" complex Cguses, they gre prone to turn to magicra ther than ra t ional mechanisms of control. Similarly, Max Weber.


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stated that charismatic leadership typical ly presupposes acharismatic si tuat ion in the sense of an extraordinary c r i s i sthat creates a demand for miraculous capacit ies which promise torelease people from the emergency (Weber 1980). In sum, only thechallenge of crises creates chances for pol i t i ca l seducers whooffer simple answers to complex problems .. Now it is important to real ize that the massive inf lux of foreigners combined in several respects with cr i s i s tendencies inGermany. F i r s t ~ i t coincided with an economic recession and aconcomitant cr i s i s of the welfare s tate . Secondly, i t combinedwith a c r i s i s of German identi ty in the context of the uni f i cation. .

The increasing immigration met with a very tense labor. marketsi tuat ion in Germany. For several years the German economy hashad di f f icul t ies in creat ing an adequate supply of jobs to meetthe growing demand. Departing from an already high level , theunemployment rate increased sizeably af ter the unif icat ion.Roughly one th i rd of those who are currently unemployed havebeen out of work for more than one year (Bundesministerium furArbeit and Sozialordnung 1991: 75)'.The adverse labour market conditions entai l massive processes ofdownward mobi l i ty . Empirically, these manifest themselves in thegrowing indebtedness of private households, and in the changingstructure of poverty. The proportion of private households inserious debt i s now estimated at 5 % (Korczak 1992: 112/113;Suddeutsche Zeiturig 110/1993: 48). Poverty increasingly threatens also economically active .categories. According to recentpoverty research, over one quarter of a l l private householdsf a l l at leas t temporarily under the poverty threshold during aperiod of five years (Habich/Headey/Krause 1991; .Krause 1992).Today it i s no longer the elderly, but younger cohorts who faceoverproportionate poverty r i sks . Amongst people aged 18-25 thera t io of registered poverty has increased sixfold since 1970.Whereas in 1970 only every hundredth younger person had toresor t to poor re l ie f , now every sixteenth l ives on publicassistance (Deininger 1983: 506; Stat ist isches Bundesamt 1992a:504). Various indicators suggest that the abandonment of democra t ic procedures and of c iv i l forms of behavior i s heavilyconcentrated in these increasingly impoverished younger cohorts .The degree to which pol i t i ca l al ienat ion is associated withsocia l downgrading processes is f i r s t revealed by electorals ta t i s t i c s . In federal elect ions voter turnout amongst thoseaged 18-25 decreased by some 20 percentage points between 1972and 1990 {Mayer 1991: 252}. In the most recent federal elect ion(1990), the r ight wing Republicans polled only 2.1% of the voteson aggregate, but 5.2 % among men below age 25 (Mayer 1991:..256). Younger age cohorts are heavily overrepresented amongstRepublican voters . This is especially true in the new easternt e r r i to r ies . Thus the Republicans scored the i r best elect ionresul t - 7 % - among male East German voters below age 25 (Mayer1991: 257).


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Opinion pol ls confirm the social concentration of r ight wingextremism among younger men and in the eastern te r r i tor ies (seee.g. Roth 1989). In January 1993. 5 % of West German adults,but 8 % of East Germans expressed an understanding for ant i - foreign violence (ipos 1993: 81) . The highest degree of approval 24 % - was found among young East Germans with l i t t l e schooling(ipos 1993: 82) .These findings f i t well with the sociology of s t ra t i f ica t ion andmobility which has always suggested that downward mobilityfavors extremist nationalism. According to th is ' sociologicalresearch, people in s t ra t i f ied socie t ies tend to develop concepts of the social order which allow them to uphold a posit ivese l f image (Zetterberg 1957: 184). Thus members of the lowerclas'ses tend to cult ivate concepts of social s t ra t i f ica t ion thatallow them to consider themselves as belonging to superior categories . Hence. they frequently adhere to ethnic or moral categorizations of the social order tha t make it possible to defineother groups as social ly in fer io r . Sociologists have called thistendency IIstatus COSDt.etiqs" (Mayer 1975: 92) . Following th issociological concept, I would argue tha t the downward mobilityexperienced by young Germans in recent years favors the m o b i l i ~ zation of ethnic class i f ica t ions which enhance the dist inct ionbetween Germans and foreigners while emphasizing the superiori tyof Germans. This allows the economically disadvantaged groups tobols ter a posi t ive self-image.The tendency.to mobilize an ethnic concept of national ident i tyis further strengthened by the massive migration movements fromEastern to Western Europe and from the South to the North. Thesehave led to increasing competition in the labour market wherethe underqualified lower classes now face growing numbers offoreign competitors. This f iercer competit ion for jobs alsofuels nat ional is t ic resentments. Thus. the most recent study ofGerman youth has shown that the re je9t ion of foreigners amongyoung East Germans increases with the degree to which they perceive the i r jobs to be threatened (Jugendwerk der DeutschenShell 1992: 58) .The German unification considerably in tensif ied the problems inthe economy and in the labor market. In addition, it alsospurred a cr is i s in German national , ident i ty .2 .4 'l'he transformation of German nat ional ident i ty in thecontext o f unif icat ionIn contrast to England or,France, Germany did not experience theformation of nation states within stable t e r r i t o r i a l borderspr ior to the social mobilization of the masses. This belatednation-building had manifold' consequences. While the ' FrenchRevolution conceptualized the nation as a pol i t i ca l bond amongstfree people subject to the same laws and represented by the samenational assembly, the Germans thought of the nation as a natural bond amongst people of the same ethnic extraction (Neumann1977: 135/137) . Thus the concept of the nation denoted not only
http:///reader/full/tendency.tohttp:///reader/full/tendency.to


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a pol i t ica l bond ( u Staatsnat ion a ) but also a cul tural bond(UKul tu rna t ion" ) . According to the sociologist Rainer Lepsiu5this fusion of various facets of national ' identi ty implied anethnizat ion of the concept of the nat ion-sta te and a pol i t i cizat ion of the concept of national culture (Lepsius/LudzlScholz 1974: 68). Lepsius also argues that pol i t i ca l e l i tes mayemphasize dif ferent dimensions of nat ional , ident i ty to varyingdegrees depending on what kind of pol i t ica l unity they considerdes,irable in a given histor ical si tuat ion ( Ibid. : 69). Pickingup this idea, I would argue that during the Cold War the FederalRepublic emphasized the concept of the nation as a pol i t ica luni t in order to st ress the difference to the GDR, while thecrumbling of the GDR led to the mobilization of ' the concept ofthe nation as an ethnic and cul tura l uni t . By stressing thefeatures tha t , the two parts of Germany had in common, the em phasis on the cul tural defini t ion of the nation allowed postunificat ion pol i t i ca l leaders to bridge the post-war differencesin eastern and western pol i t ica l t radi t ions . A s ide-effect ofth is ethnic concept of national identi ty was, however, that thedifference between Germans and foreigners became accentuated.The transformation of German'national identi ty was favored by asecond aspect, which has to do with the mechanism of statuscosmetics I have described as a means to cope with downwardmobili ty. As a consequence of , the unif icat ion, the ci t izens ofthe former GDR mutated from the r ich men of Eastern Europe tothe pauper of the united Germany. Given the marked East-Westdispar i t ies in the country, there was a strong incentive for theci t izens in the East to downplay the i r relat ive deprivation bymobilizing the concept of a ,common superiori ty of a l l Germansover foreigners . Since the old regime had barred them fromforeign t ravel and the concomitant contacts with foreigncultures, there has been l i t t l e room for developing cognitivedissonances which would impede the development of such concepts . 3The recent reports of the Ministry of the In ter ior on ant i - const i tu t ional act iv i t ies (Verfassungsschutzber ichte) providesome interest ing empirical findings which are perfect ly in l inewith the above interpretat ion. The most recent report issued in1993 pinpointed the fact that anti-foreign violence i s overproport ionately concentrated in the new eastern t e r r i to r ies . Although representing only one f i f th of the populat ion, theeastern t e r r i to r ies registered one th i rd of a l l violent actswith a r ight wing background (Bundesministerium des Innern 1993:70). The preceding 1992 report also revealed that r ight wingviolence e s c a l a t e s ~ a t special dates with 'a symbolic pol i t i ca lmeaning. While the number of violent acts increased mildly onHit le r ' s bir thday, it vir tual ly exploded on the day of Germanunif icat ion in October 1991 (Bundesministerium des Innern 1992:

3 A recent study showed that 15 % of East German adolescentsWho had t ravel experience to foreign countries, but 27 % ofthose without foreign t ravel rejected the i d ~ a of having f o r ~ i g n fr iends as a matter of principle (ipos 1993: 90).


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75). Moreover the 1993 report showed tha t 67 % of a l l suspectsof anti-foreign violence were under 21 years of age in 1992 andtha t they came predominantly from non-established soc ia lcategories . While pupils , apprentices and unemployed people wereheavily overrepresented among the suspects, more establishedgroups l ike employees, were heavily underrepresented. A studycommissioned by the Ministry of Women and Youth con.firmed tha tanti-foreign violence i s heavily concentrated in groups with loweducation: 78 % of a l l suspects had ei ther no or only the lowesteducational degree (Willems/Wurtz/Eckert 1993: 22).How can these findings be put into a broader theoret ical per spective? I think the work .o f the American sociologis ts ofdelinquent behavior, Sykes and Matza (1957), provides a usefulclue. Sykes and Matza argue tha t delinquent acts are not rootedin social ly closed and homogenous deviant subcultures, but tha tdelinquents are ra ther subject to ambivalent influen'ces of aconforming and a deviant nature. In order to jus t i fy deviantacts , the delinquents therefore need -techniques of neut ra l i zation" that allow them to re la te the i r deeds to norms whichthey perceive as more urgent or more valuable than the normsthat they violate . In other 'words, norm violat ions are fac i l i ta ted i f inhibi t ions or remorse are successful ly neutral ized bylegi t imizing bridges tha t provide jus t i f ica t ions for the deviantac ts . Following Sykes and Matza one crucial neutral izat iontechnique consists in conceiving of the victim as someone infer io r who deserves punishment. The chance to labe l a victim asin fe r io r or as deserving punishment i s a function of the socialdistance between him and the perpetrator . Therefore, especial lysocial ly dis tant groups become selected as ta rge ts of d e l i n ~ e n t acts (Sykes/Matza 1957).According to the empirical evidence tha t i s presently available,anti-foreign violence in Germany was so fa r only seldomly aproduct of planned, organized actions (Willems/ Wurtz/ Eckert1993: 138). Most acts developed spontaneously from contingentconstel lat ions in which the consumption of alcohol in gangscombined with pet ty pr ivate resentments, as well as more generalpol i t i ca l prejudice .. Thus the. ki l le rs of a Turkish g i r l inSolingen were apparently motivated by the fact tha t they hadbeen kicked out of a Turkish restaurant . Whether individualaggressions will be repressed as i l legi t imate or else be freelyexpressed, i s a function of the avai labi l i ty of legi t imizingbridge concepts, which provide a super ior jus t i f ica t ion forpet ty private motives. The mobil izat ion of an ethnicized conceptof national identi ty af te r the German unif icat ion, and the p e r ~ ceived increase in competition from foreigners in the.economicslump, provided bases for techniques of neutral izat ion thathelped to just i fy ant i - foreign violence as legi t imate self-defense.I f th i s interpretat ion i s correct , it follows that anti-foreignviolence is less a persis t ing t r a i t of German culture than atransitory phenomenon, which wil l vanish to the degree tha t theeconomic problems and the social disintegration processes fol lowing the German unification wil l be overcome. Fi rs t indica


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t ions of a gradual re turn to normalcy may be seen in the factthat the number of ant i - foreign violent acts declined again in1993 from 2,584 in the preceding year to '1,814 (see table 1).The. question then i s what prac t ica l policy consequences 'myanalys is i m p l i e s ~ 2.5 Summary and policY conclusionsI have in terpreted the upsurge of ant i -foreign violence as theproduct of a macro-cons tel la t ion in which growing pressure frommigration combined with an economic cr i s i s in the context ofGerman u n i f i c a t i o n ~ and with a concomitant mobil izat ion of anethnic concept of nat ional iden t i ty . Given these major explanatory variables, the question then i s which of these can besuccessfully control led by pol i t i ca l act ion. .The problem pressure created by in ternat ional migration andeconomic stagnation i s l ikely to pe rs i s t because of the widediscrepancies in the standard of l iv ing of the northern and thesouthern hemisphere as well as between western and eastern Europe. Despite of the heavy immigration in to the Federal Republicduring the pas t decades, the of f i c i a l German pol icy continues tobe bui l t on the premise tha t Germany i s not an immigrationcountry. I t now appears necessary to deny rea l i ty no longer andto channel the inf lux of immigrants by an immigration law, whichwould define annual quotas tha t help to define immigration assomething normal, ra ther than as a deviat ion from standard condi t ions .The tensions tha t a re associated with the increasing cul tura lheterogeneity of the population wil l only pe eased, however, i fsuff ic ien t openings in the labor market can be created whichlessen the competi t ion for jobs. Although it i s presently hardto imagine how unemployment may be successfully reduced, demographic changes wil l make for a rapidly shrinking labor forceaf te r the turn of the century. In th is new s i tuat ion, migrantworkers who contr ibute to a l lev ia te the pressure on the pensioninsurance scheme wil l probably be more welcome.As long as the problems in the labor market pers i s t , however, itwil l be'necessary to channel the mobil izat ion of nat ional consciousness in a way' tha t . ~ e e p s ant i -foreign violence withinl imi t s . This can be done on three l eve l s . The f i r s t 'concernssymbolic pol i t i c s . This i s where the behavior of pol i t i ca le l i t e s i s important. ,As the values cherished in the pol i t i ca lcenter of a socie ty disseminate to the periphery, those whooccupy the center become a cruc ia l reference group for c i t izensa t the margins (Shils 1965). The pol i t i ca l e l i t e s can mobilizeor inh ib i t ant i - foreign sentiments. As long as there was l i t t l epressure from foreign countr ies or from business c i rc les concerned about the export chances of German products in in te rnat iona l markets, the pol i t i ca l leaders of the Federal Republicdid l i t t l e to i nh ib i t the formation of anti-foreign a t t i tudes .Not only did they downplay the significance of anti-foreignviolence, but they also contr ibuted to mobilize ant i - foreign


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l

sentiments. Thus in september 1991, the former secretary generalof the CDU, Volker RUhe, wrote a c i rcu la r to a l l officeholdersof the party down to the di s t r i c t level , in which he demanded tomake the influx of asylum seekers an item on the pol i t ica lagenda. In the l e t t e r he gave concrete examples of how to mobi_lize public concern oyer the al leged overburdening of Germanloca l author i t ies (DIE ZEIT 23/1993: 1) . After the murder ofTurkish immigrants in Solingen, Chancellor Kohl deliberatelydecided not to t ravel to the s i te of the assaul t to express hissol idar i ty with the victims, but preferred to go to Berlin .inorder to celebrate the restorat ion of a monument of Germanhistory. This attempt to appeal to voters of th.e r ight wingfringes of the party system is in s t r ik ing contrast with theact ions taken by French President Mitterrand, who opted to marcha t the head of a demonstration against r igh t wing radicalisma f t e r an assault on the Jewish minority . In combination withdetermined police act ions against r igh t wing radicalism, ostenta t ious acts by pol i t ica l leaders of th is kind can serve to enhance the de-legit imation of access to violence.A second level of possible pol i t i ca l action refers to the defini t ion of ci t izenship . The' Federal Republic i s not the onlycountry in Europe which l inks ci t izenship to ethnic descent. TheNetherlands also do-that, for example. Moreover, other countriesl ike France present ly consider sh i f t ing from a t e r r i t o r i a l to anethnic defini t ion of cit izenship. Hence, it would be unreal is t icto advocate that the Federal Republic now change to a t e r r i to r i a l concept. As a compromise between the a l te rna t ive concepts,it would be possible, however" to introduce the possibi l i ty ofa dual cit izenship for second generation immigrants. This wouldcontribute to reducing the social distance between Germans andforeigners and would promote the socia l integrat ion of foreigners who are ~ o w prone to withdraw into the i r national subcultu res .A th i rd level of pol i t ica l action could consis t in extending ther ight to vote in local elections to foreign workers. The creat ion of universal suffrage for a l l res idents of a certainduration could contribute to overcome the segmenting effectstha t are associated with the ethnic defini t ion of cit izenship,and could help to narrow the social distance between Germans andforeigners. The experience made in Sweden and the Netherlandsshows that an extension of local voting r ights to foreignersdoes not necessari ly have any destabi l iz ing pol i t i ca l effects .Sweden granted foreigners who have been l iving in the countryfor at leas t three years the r ight to vote in local and regionalelections already in 1976. 'The Netherlands changed the i r electo

4 Of course, cit izenship does not only convey r ights butalso obligat ions. One of the most fundamental obligat ions t iedto cit izenship i s mastering the language of the country one isl iv ing in . I t i s diff icul t to comprehend why the employment offoreign workers was not t ied to an obligation for workers andemployers alike to ansura partieipation in language courses ofan extended duration.


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ra l law in 1985 to extend voting r ights in local e lect ions toforeigners.who have been residing in the cQuntry for f ive years .In both countr ies , the concern that foreigners might vote fornew ethnic part ies of a radical type was not substantiated. Thevoting pat tern of foreigners actually followed class l inesra ther than ethnic aff i l ia t ion . Thus, the Turks residing inAmsterdam and Rotterdam c a s ~ 78 and 81 % of the i r votes for theDutch Workers' Party (Graziani 1992: 79/80). This Dutch exampleshows tha t the barr iers to an extension of voting r ights toforeigners l ie less in concerns over a possible disruption ofthe party system than in the electoral calculus of the establ ished par t ies , who fear that part ies of the l e f t might benefi tfrom such a change. I t i s noteworthy, however, that an extensionof voting r ights to foreigners would not be popular among Germanvoters . According to the EC-Eurobarometer, only the Danes aremore opposed to anextension of voting r ights to foreigners thanthe Germans (Wiegand 1993:3). Within Germany, followers of theGreens are the only population group where a majority supportthe extension of suffrage to foreigners (Noelle-Neumann/KOcher199'3: 529). Poli t icians advocating such a step would thereforehave to work hard to persuade the voters .3 . An al ternat ive hypothesis and possible strategies for t es t ing

who i s r ight

I had indicated in the introduction that there i s a seriouscounter-argument to the ideas ' I developed here. According toth is counter-argument, the explosion of r ight wing violence isnot so much an expression of xenophobia or chauvinism as anexpression of the resentment that adolescents nourish againstthe dominant cosmopolitan culture of the pol i t ica l e s t a b l i s h ~ ment. From th is perspective, anti-foreign violence i s not theresul t of a mobilization of ethnicized national sentiments, but,on the contrary, the consequence of a long-standing suppressionof national pride.This i s not merely an acadenUc debate but ra ther an argumentwhich has immediate pol i t i ca l repercussions. MY in terpreta t ionsuggests tearing down legitimizing bridges for the jus t i f ica t ionof anti-foreign violence by promoting the social integrat ion offoreigners, by expressing sol idar i ty with fore igners , and bytabooing chauvinism. The counter-argument implies tha t such apolicy would only fuel resentments against the taboos of theestablishment, and enhance the potent ia l for r ight wing violence. Hence it advocates consciously developing patr iot ism andnational pride in Order to occupy the space which would otherwise be l e f t free for extremist groups of the radical r ight .This counter-argument deserves serious considerat ion. Thequestion then i s how we can decide who i s r ight . Scholars whoare more impressed by Popper than by Feyerabend should think ofways to discriminate empirically between rival hypotheses. Thereare a t l eas t three ways that would help us to f ind out which of


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15the two arguments i s more compatible with the empirical facts .3.1 Pol i t ica l agenda se t t ing and monthly at t i tude changeA f i r s t way to t e s t the r iva l hypotheses could consist of at ime-series analysis that would re la te the monthly changes ina t t i tudes towards foreigners to preceding attempts of thepol i t i ca l e l i tes to put the problem of immigration on ' thepol i t i ca l agenda. German p o l i ~ makers have frequently voicedthe i r concern over the excessive influx of asylum seekers. Thel e t t e r mailed by CDU-secretary Volker Ruhe to the par ty ' s off iceholders i s only one of several examples. I f my hypothesis iscorrect , we should find an increase in anti-foreign sentimentsfollowing such act iv i t ies on the par t of pol i t icians. Thecounter hypothesis would predic t , in contrast , that radicalr ight wing views decline once the pol i t ica l e l i t e s prove thatthey are responsive to concerns over the excessive immigration.As there i s a monthly opinion pol l - called UPolitbarometer a andcarr ied out by the Forschungsgruppe' Wahlen - it should bepossible to administer this t e s t .

I

3.2 Regional dist r ibut ion of anti-foreign violenceA second way to t e s t the r iva l hypotheses could consist in ananalysis of the regional dis tr ibut ion of ant i - foreign violence.My hypothesis suggests that anti-foreign violence is concent rated in regions where there i s a favorable context for thedevelopment of neutral izat ion techniques tha t allow the perpetrators to deny any gui l t . Hence anti-foreign violence shouldpredominantly occur in regions with a high proportion of immigrants , with high unemployment, and with a local pol i t i ca lcenter that is occupied by conservative and pat r io t ic pol i t i ca le l i tes who do not ostentat iously de-legi t imate excessive nationalism. Holding the f i r s t two factors constant, anti-foreignviolence should be lower where the local center i s occupied byl ibera l forces of a cosmopolitan outlook who actively engage inpromoting sol idar i ty with ' foreigners. The counter hypothesiswould imply jus t the opposite dfs t r ibut ion, with violence concentrated in l ibera l areas. Data tha t allow to pursue thisstrategy of hypothesis tes t ing are avai lable from the studycommissioned by the Ministry of Women and Youth which has therecords of more than a thousand suspects who part icipated inant i - foreign violence.3.3 Target groups of anti-foreign violenceA th i rd strategy, f inal ly I could consist in e x a r r u n ~ n g whichgroups became the targets of ,right wing violence. The counterhypothesis would predic t tha t violent acts are not heavily concentrated on a specif ic group of foreigners, since taboos of thepol i t i ca l establishment can be violated regardless of whichgroup is made the target of aggression. My hypothesis, in contrast, would ~ r e d i c t that the violent acts are targeted on thosegroups of foreigners to which the greatest social distance i s


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16.

l/

I

fe l t . As we have data on the perception of foreigners by natio-,nal i ty , th is hypothesis can be subjected to a f i r s t preliminaryt e s t . .In his study Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen" (1991), Erwin K.Scheuch showed the Germans to feel most dis tant from Turks andnon-white asylum seekers ,and to direct ,most ant i-foreign resentment against these groups (Scheuch1991: 167). So far Turks andasylum seekers have also been the groups on which ant i-foreignviolence has been heavily concentrated (see e.g. the account offa ta l assaults in DIE WOCHE 24/1993). Thus there seems to be arather strong associat ion between the image of foreigners andthe targeting of violent acts . This suggests tha t ant i-foreignviolence i s not primari ly aimed a t violat ing taboos of thepol i t i ca l establishment, but indeed an expression of xenophobia'tha t focusses on those specif ic groups ofGermans feel the greates t socia l distance. immigrants to whichIn terms of policy making, th is analysis implies tha t Germanpol i t icians have so far seen ant i-foreign violence too exclusively from a perspective focussing on the wave of foreign immigra t ion :The data presented here suggest instead that the coreof the problem is less related to the mere quanti tat ive facts ofmigration, but rather of a pol i t i ca l nature. Anti-foreign sent i ments' do not automatically fllow immigration, but grow in aspecific pol i t ica l climate which the pol i t ica l e l i t es canactively influence.


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Abba Eban, 1970: Dies i s t mein Volk. Die Geschichte der Juden.Munchen/Zur:ich: Droeme.rsche Verlagsanstalt .Barabas, G./Gieseck, A./Heilemann, U./von Loeffelholz, A., 1992:Gesamtwirtschaftliche Effekte der Zuwanderung 1988 b is 1991.RWl-Mitteilungen. Zei tschr i f t fur Wirtschaftsforschung 43: 133154.Baratta, M. von (Hrsg.), 1992: Der Fischer Weltalmanach 1993.Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.Beck, M., 1992a: Sozialhilfeaufwand 1990. Wirtschaft und Sta t i s t ik 44: 30-34.Beck, M., 1992b: Sozialhilfeaufwand 1991. Wirtschaft und Sta t i s t ik 44: 891-826 .Beck, M., 1992c: Sozialhilfeempfanger 1990. Wirtschaft und Stat i s t ik 44: 299-310.Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1991: Arbeitsund Sozia ls ta t i s t ik . Hauptergebnisse 1991. Bonn.Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1992a: Sta t i stisches Taschenbuch 1992. Bonn.Bundesministerium fur Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 1992b: Arbeitsund Sozia ls ta t is t ik . Hauptergebnisse 1992. Bonn.Bundesministerium fur Arbeit undSozialordnung, 1993: AuslanderDaten. Bonn.Bundesinnenministerium des lnnern, 1993: Verfassungsschutzber icht 1992. ~ o n n . Bundesministerium des lnnern, 1992 etc . : Verfassungsschutzber icht 1991 (und fruhere Ausgaben 1980-1988). Bonn.Consulat General de France, 1993: Rapport 1992 sur la lu t tecontre Ie racisme en France et l 'ant isemit isme (zugestel l t mitSchreiben vom 28 ..10.1993) .

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Deutscher Bundestag, 1992: Jahresgutachten1992/93 des Sachverstandigenrates zur Begutachtung der g,esamtwirtschaftlichenEntwicklung. Drucksache 12/3774., Bonn.Elias, N., 1990: Studien Uber die Deutschen: Machtkampfe undHabitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert 4. Auflage.Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.Fuchs, D./Gerhards, J . /Roller , E., 1993: Wir und die Anderen.Ethnozentrismus in den zwOlf Landern der Europaischen Gemeinschaft . KOlner Zeitschrif t fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie45: 238-253.Graziani, R., 1992: Neue Konzeptionen der ln tegrat ionspoli t ikfur auslandische Arbei tskraf te . Universi tat Konstanz: Diplomar-'be i t .Habich, R./Headey, B./Krause, P" 1991: Armut im Reichtum - l s tdie Bundesrepublik eine Zwei-Drittel-Gesellschaft .? S. 488-509in : U. Rendte/G. Wagner (Hrsg.), Lebenslagen im Wandel: ZurEinkommensdynamik in Deutschland se i t 1984. Frankfurt/New York:Campus.Home Office, 1993: Fax vom 9.12.1993.ipos ( lns t i tu t fur praxisor ient ier te Sozialforschung), 1993:Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene in Deutschland. Mannheim.Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell (Hrsg.), 1992: Jugend '92. Dieneuen Lander: Ruckblick und Perspektiven. Opladen': Leske + Bud-r ich . ' .Kommission der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 1992: EurobarometerNr. 37. Brussel. .Korczak, D., 1992: Uberschuldungssituation und Schuldnerberatungin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland- Studie im Auf t rag des Bundesministeriums fur Familie und Senioren und des Bundesministeriums der Jus t iz . Band 3 der S c h ~ i f t e n r e i h e des Bundesministeriums fur Familie und Senioren. Stu t tgar t .Krause, P., 1992: Einkommensarmut in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.,Aus Poli t ik und Zeitgeschichte B49: 3-17.Lepsius, M. R./Ludz, P. C./Scholz, R., 1974: Nation. S. 1-154in : Bundesministerium fur innerdeutsche Beziehungen (Hrsg.),Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Deutsche demokratische Republik.Systemvergleich 3. Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation.Berl in . 'Mayer, H. -L., 1991: Wahlerverhalten bei der Bundestagswahl 1990nach Geschlecht und Alter . Ergebnis der reprasentativen Wahlstat i s t i k . Wirtschaft und Sta t is t ik 43: 248-260.Mayer, K.-U., 1975: Ungleichheit und'Mobili tat im sozialen BewuBtsein. U n t e r s u c h u n g e ~ zur Definit ion der Mobili ta tssi tuat ion.


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Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.Neumann, F., 1977: Behemoth: Struktur und'Praxis des Nationalsozialismus 1933-1944. KOln/Frankfurt a.M.: Europaische Verlagsansta l t .Noelle-Neumann, E./KOcher, R. (Hrsg), 1993: Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie 1984-1992. MUnchen u.a . : K.G. SauroRehfeld, U.: 1991: Auslandische Arbeitnehmer und Rentner in dergesetzlichen Rentenversicherung. Deutsche Rentenversicherung 7:468-492.Roth, Dieter, 1989: Sind die Republikaner die flinfte Partei? AusPol i t ik und Zeitgeschichte 41/42: 10-20.Scheuch, Erwin K., 1991: Wie deutsch sind die Deutschen? EineNation wandelt ih r Gesicht. Bergisch Gladbach: Gustav Lubbe.Schwedische Botschaft, 1993: Fax vom 16.9.1993.Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 1992: Extremismus in der Schweiz.Bericht des Bundesrates zum Extremismus in der Schweiz. Bern.Shils , E. A., 1965: Charisma, Order, and Status. AmericanSociological Review 30: 199-213.Sta t i s t i sches Bundesamt, 1991: Stat is t isches Jahrbuch fur dieB u n d ~ s r e p u b l i k Deutschland 1991. Wiesbaden: Metzler-Poeschel.Sta t i s t i sches Bundesamt, 1992a: Stat is t isches Jahrbuch fur dieBundesrepublik Deutschland 1992. Wiesbaden: Metzler-Poeschel.Stat is t isches ' Bundesamt, 19 92b: Datenreport 1992. Zahlen undFakten uber die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bonn.Steinke, Wolfgang, 1993: Rechtsxtremismus. Ein Blick auf dieLage in Europa und den USA. Kriminal is i t ik 8-9: 507-508.Svenska Ins t i tu te t , 1993: Immigrants in Sweden. Fact Sheets onSweden. Stockholm.'Sykes, G. M./Matza, D., 1957: Techniques of Neutralization: ATheory of Delinquency. American Sociological Review 22: 664-670.Weber, M., 1980: Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft , 5. Auflage.TUbingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).Wiegand, E., 1993: Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der Festung Europa.Eins te l lungzu Fremden im europaischen Vergleich, S. 1-4 in: lSIInformationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren, Nr. 9. Mannheim: Zentrumfur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA}e.V.Willems, H./Wurtz, S./Eckert , R., 1993: Fremdenfeindliche Gewalt: Eine Analyse von Taterstruktu.ren uno Eskalation:sproze:s:sen.Forschungsbericht im Auf t rag des Bundesministeriums fur Frauen


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20und Jugend und der Deutschen ForschungsgemeinschaftZetterberg,' H. L. I 1957: Compliant Actions', Acta Sociologica 2:179-201 .

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Table 1: Asylum seekers and right wing deliuquenc:y in Germany

/

Year Asylumseekers Right wing violence Rightwingdelin quencyNo of violent acts Violent

actsper1000.asylumseekers

No ofdel inquentacts

GERMANY Total East Germany RatioN N N % N

1993 322842 1814 . . . 25 5.62 ...1992 438191 2584 865 33 5.90 71211991 256112 1483 4.93 33 5.79 38841990 193063 270 4 .. 1.40 1848OLD FEDERAL REPUBLIC1990 193063 128 0.66 13801989 121318 103 0.85 18531988 10307"6 73 0.71 16071987 57379 76 1.32 14471986 99"650 71 0.71. 12811985 73832 69 0.93 15691984 35278 83 2.35 17141983 19737 67 3.39 21691982 37423 53 1.42 24751981 49391 92 1.86 18241980 107818 113 1. 05 16431979 97 14831978 9921977 61 61976 3191975 2061974 136

~ BundemliDisterium des lDDerD: V ~ c h t e 1992" 1991. 1990, 1988. 1987. 1985. 1983. 1981. 1980; Der BundesIIliDislcr fiit Albeit UDd SOiiih:rdaUII,: AllsliDdcr-Dateu (1993 - fex asylum seekers 19!)O.1992); Siiddeutscbe Zeitlmg DO 1011994: 6 (forvio1eut a.c:ts 1993) aud DO 411994: 6 (for asylum seekm 1993); DER SPIEGEL 46Il992: 41 (fex asylum seekers 1980-1990).


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'." "

Graph 1: Attitudes towards non nationals of the EC 1992(presence, in one's country, of peoille coming from non-EC countrIes)I70T !

CUe {!. eo50 - 'LKRy

-,.".- .0

30 E '20

10 + IRL

B .. ' - oNL . --------------_._.OK _-----.-- F

L

r= 0,544O + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - - - - - - - - t io 1 2 3 4 5 8

% foreigners from non-EC countries

Source: OW,n calculations, based on raw data from: E u r o b ~ r o m e t e r 37 and FuchslGerhards/Roller (1993).


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--

. ' . ~ ""

Grap h 2: Attitudes towards rights of immigrants in the EC 1992(Extend or restrict)

';I!. B50.5 -en OKc 45u UK -! 40 -GR35 -Y30

-------/ F _ ! - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ / o-NLI

25

20 IRL L-p15 -10 I

:lr=0.622

- - - - - ---\0 1 2 3 4 5x % foreigners from non-EC colintrlesSource: Own calculations, based on raw data from: Eurobarometer 37 and Fuchs/Gemards/Rolier (1993).

6


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--

'", "".

Graph 3: Attitudes towards accepting foreign asylum seekers 1992 t!J 35IIrnE::si 30C\1I'0cti 25,IUarIt: UKGR ' 20 I ~ - - - / -

15 IRL -, . - - - - - - - - ~10 e

5

'o +- - - - - - - - - - - - -+ - - - - - - -

- - - / ~ - - - - - -B F ------------- .o ..- ' L .L

Kr= 0,804

----.f----- ..-.-----l. ~ ~ - - - ~ - - - - . ~ - -o 1 2 x 3 4 5 6% foreigners. from non-EC countries

Source: Own calculations, based on raw data from: Wiegand (1993) and FuchslGerhards/Rolier (1993).


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.t " '.

Graph 4: Attitudes towards foreigners' right to vote in local elections 1992r!.,70 1 DK601 B t .D

S I GR .FcDI 5 ~ ! " _ .UKy40 -.._----_.-.-. NLE 1301 pIRL20

10 r= 0,559

o + - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - + _ - - ~ - - - - - - --------Io 1 2 3 4 5 6x% foreigners from nonEC countries

Source: OWn calculations, based on raw data from: Wiegand (1993) and Fuchs/Gerhards/Rolier (1993).


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-.,,,,,-: ',. " "

Graph 5: Attitudes towards foreigners 1992(Compound index of rejection)= 160,...coti 140CD'!'.I; UK1:20 _GR.5 -100Y ,..".-,.,-,.,..., --80+6 0 + ~ ------0 -E20

o "

,.- ~ - - - - - -.., B

0- , -FOK..,.-------NL

",-""

r= 0.82

o 1 2 X 3 4 5% foreigners from non-EC countries

Source: Own calculations. based on raw data from: Wiegand (1993) and Fuchs/Gerhards/Roller (1993).

6


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"- ".,." , !

Graph 6: Asylum seekers and anti-foreign violence in Germany I!!!.2tI!.e;;c.;

~ 1 .2>~ oz

3 0 0 0 T , - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ -/ - - - - - - - - - -- t - - - - - - I I- - - - - t - - - - I I- - - t - - - - Ic - - -+- - I -+- - - - - - - - - t - - - - - 1 - -1-u+--t---1

2500 i--f--t---+-l1 - t - ' l - - - l ~ l _ _ - - - - - - - - _ _ I _ _ - - I _ _ _ _ _ - + - - - + - - l _ _ - - , - - 1 - - - + 1------ ___ f ___ .. . ~ - -

--------+1 ----\2000 + -I-- -- t --- - + - - - - - l - - - t - - - - + - - - + - - ~ + - = 1 - = J = f - = = = - - ...- - - - - ~ - t = - - - - ~ - 93.--t --j=t---L-J-_-L. I

----------------1500

-+----+---+---;

- - - - .JI I I I I .I. J-I I

1000 j I I I I II I I J t-r-I - - - - - 1 I - -+- - - l - - I i - - -

+--+--- t----1-__+_ --+-----1

500 r - - - - - - - - - + - - - - - - J

No of asylum seekers 1000000

Source: see table 1 (1990: united Germany),


29/30

"" ""

Graph 7: Right wing violence in Germany(,'Iolent acts per 1000 asylum seekers)

6,00!cu1::.!! 5,000'S:'S0

4,00rr.:

3,00

2,00

1,00

0,00 + -+1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993Years

Sources: seet table 1 (1990: united Germany),


30/30

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towards explaining anti-foreign violence in germany (wps 53, 1994) jens alber

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